Knights of Rizal v. DMCI (Preliminary
De La Cruz
Injunction)
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve
substantive rights and prevent further injury
until final adjudication on the merits of the case.
In the present case, since the legal rights of the
Knights of Riza are not well-defined, clear and
certain, the petition for Mandamus must be
dismissed and the TRO lifted.
Wack-Wack Gold and Country Club v. Won
(Interpleader)
It was only after adverse final judgment was
rendered against it that the remedy of
interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was
too late because to be entitled to this remedy,
the applicant must be able to show that he has
not been made independently liable to any of
the claimants. And since the Corporation is
already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the
present interpleader suit is clearly improper and
unavailing.
NOTE: Interpleader is a compulsory
counterclaim.
Eternal Gardens v. IAC (Interpleader)
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the essence of an interpleader, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation
on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the
property or funds in controversy with the court.
it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that
the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from
the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever
will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto."
Department of Finance v.
(Declaratory Relief)
The doctrine [of exhaustion of administrative
remedies], however, is not without exceptions.
Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (2) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4)
where the amount involved is relatively so small
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(5) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention
is urgent; (7) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (9) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies had been
rendered moot; (10) where there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where
strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo
warranto proceedings.
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-
2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently
illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case
clearly falls within the exceptions where
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
be resorted to by respondents.
Note: In the case at bar, the jurisdiction to try
and decide petition for declaratory relief is with
the RTC
Cudia v. Superintendent (Mandamus)
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be
enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act
is ministerial if the act should be performed
"[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of
[the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the
officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.
Villanueva v. JBC (Mandamus)
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of
by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper
because his right was violated when he was not
included in the list of candidates for the RTC
courts he applied for. He said that his non-
inclusion in the list of candidates for these
stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that the applicant should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. The petitioner
bears the burden to show that there is such a
clear legal right to the performance of the act,
and a corresponding compelling duty on the part
of the respondent to perform the act. The
remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ,
lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly,
the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
Lokin Jr. v COMELEC (Quo Warranto)
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to
questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The
objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the
petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest
where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.
Republic v. Sereno (Quo Warranto)
On the argument that Respondent is an
impeachable officer such that a quo warranto
petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the
origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and
quo warranto are materially different. While
both impeachment and quo warranto may result
in the ouster of the public official, the two
proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in
nature; while an action for quo warranto is
judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in
the courts.
Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as
alleged by the Respondent, because quo
warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously, as they
differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2)grounds, (3)
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing
and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The causes of
action in the two proceedings are unequivocally
different. In quo warranto, the cause of action
lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully
holding or exercising of a public office, while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an
impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in the two proceedings are different.
Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall
be ordered to cease holding a public office,
which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other
hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result
in the removal of the Respondent from the
public office that he/she is legally holding.

Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case
against the Respondent.
The proceedings in the House are merely in the
nature of a preliminary investigation whereby
probable cause is sought to be determined.
Sereno Case Salient Points:
Remedial principles attacked/ amended
a. Prescription does not lie against the state
The one-year limitation is not applicable when
the Petitioner is not a mere private individual
pursuing a private interest, but the government
itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing
for public interest. In the three instances
enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor
General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary quo warranto petition,
as seen in the use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili
v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be
stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right.” In
effect, when the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its
rights, there can be no defense on the ground of
laches or prescription.
b. Comparative with impeachment
On the argument that Respondent is an
impeachable officer such that a quo warranto
petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the
origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and
quo warranto are materially different. While
both impeachment and quo warranto may result
in the ouster of the public official, the two
proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in
nature; while an action for quo warranto is
judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in
the courts. Furthermore, there is no forum-
shopping, as alleged by the Respondent,
because quo warranto and impeachment can
proceed independently and simultaneously, as
they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2)grounds, (3)
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing
and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thecauses of
action in the two proceedings are unequivocally
different. In quo warranto, the cause of action
lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully
holding or exercising of a public office, while
inimpeachment, it is the commission of an
impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in the twoproceedings are different.
Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall
be ordered to cease holding a public office,
which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other
hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result
in the removal of the Respondent from the
public office that he/she is legally holding.
Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case
against the Respondent. The proceedings in the
House are merely in the nature of a preliminary
investigation whereby probable cause is sought
to be determined.
Remedial principles upheld
a. Heirarchy of courts
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this
case is justified considering that the qualification
of a Member of the Court is in question, and the
issue is of public concern
b. Principle of transcendental importance

The petition for quo warranto is of
transcendental importance. The instant petition
is one of first impression and of paramount
importance to the public in the sense that the
qualification, eligibility and appointment of an
incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of
the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an
action for quo warranto.
c. Venue
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that the SC has original jurisdiction over
petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66
of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an
action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila,
CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor
General.
De La Cruz v. Hermano (Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer)
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires
that in actions for forcible entry, it must be
alleged that the complainant was deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and
that the action was filed anytime within one year
from the time the unlawful deprivation of
possession took place. This requirement implies
that in those cases, possession of the land by the
defendant has been unlawful from the
beginning, as the possession was obtained by
unlawful means. Further, the complainant must
allege and prove prior physical possession of the
property in litigation until he or she was
deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-
year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date
of actual entry into the land, except when entry
was made through stealth; if so, the one-year
period would be counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it.
It is not necessary, however, for the complaint
to utilize the language of the statute; i.e., to
state that the person has been deprived of
possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. A statement of facts showing
that dispossession took place under those
conditions is sufficient. Still, the complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Complaint adequately aver prior physical
possession by respondents and their
dispossession thereof by stealth, because the
intrusion by petitioner was without their
knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees
with the findings of the CA that contrary to those
of the RTC that the case was an action for
ejectment in the nature of accion
reivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible
entry and sufficient in form.
Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings
that the Complaint was timely filed. It is settled
that where forcible entry occurred
clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period
should be counted from the time the person
who was deprived of possession demanded that
the deforciant desist from dispossession when
the former learned about it. The owners or
possessors of the land cannot be expected to
enforce their right to its possession against the
illegal occupant and sue the latter before
learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to
deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the
summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder
managed to conceal the trespass for more than
a year, would be to reward clandestine
usurpations even if they are unlawful
Erorita v. Dumlao (Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer)
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the
complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the
defendant lawfully possessed the property,
either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b)
the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right
of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant
remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of
its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a
complaint within one year from the last demand
on defendant to vacate the property. A
complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of
possession of real property will not be
considered as an action for unlawful detainer if
any of these special jurisdictional facts is
omitted.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the
owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the
petitioners to continue operating the school on
the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter
dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao
told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the
property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate
the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed
the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year
from the last demand to vacate (February 12,
2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption
"recovery of possession," its allegations contain
the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer
case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful
detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed
value.
Sison v. Caoibes (Contempt)
The power to declare a person in contempt of
court and in dealing with him accordingly is an
inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be
used as a means to protect and preserve the
dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
proceedings therein, and the administration of
justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
personalities, and contumacious refusal to
comply with court orders.
At first blush, it would seem that the respondent
judge was justified in holding the complainant
for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to
comply with the judge’s Order of September 15,
1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that
the complainant was not a party to any of the
cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What
triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the
traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the
record shows that when the complainant filed
his reply to the charge as required by the
respondent judge, the same was refused by
some staff member in the latter’s sala.
• We agree with the Investigating Justice
when he opined that the respondent
judge should have refrained from
ordering the arrest and detention of the
complainant, since the incident involved
his own son, and the matter was very
personal to him. The fact that the
respondent judge insisted that the
complainant personally file his comment
in court gives rise to doubts as to the
motive behind it; as the Investigating
Justice puts it, the requirement of
personal filing was deliberately inserted
so that the respondent could confront
and harass the complainant.
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt
of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation,
as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of
Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates that "a judge should so behave at all
times to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
Balindong v. CA (Contempt)
Verily, the power of the courts to punish for
contempt is to be exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in
wielding contempt powers should be the rule
unless the act complained of is clearly
contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must
manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to cause injustice.
It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby
disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No.
159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there
was no indication in his Order that bad faith had
moved him to suspend the implementation of
the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al.,
or that he had thereby acted with a willful and
deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of
the parties. In the absence of the clear showing
of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could
only be an error of judgment, for which he could
not be held to account.
Oropesa v. Oropesa (Guardianship)
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s
procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer
of evidence, his documentary proof were
comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his father’s and his
sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties, which do
not in any way relate to his father’s alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The
only medical document on record is the
aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological
Screening" which was attached to the petition
for guardianship but was never identified by any
witness nor offered as evidence. In any event,
the said report, as mentioned earlier, was
ambivalent at best, for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on
the part of respondent, it also contained findings
that supported the view that respondent on the
average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the
soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where
the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion
is not necessary [and that] the observations of
the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person’s state of mental sanity
will suffice."
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of
a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report which
states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were
tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and
(3) can provide solutions to problem situations.
The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except
for mildly impaired abilities in memory,
reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert
and able.
Nery v. Sampana (Adoption and Custody of
Minors)
Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis
position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the
alien adopter would be married to her close
relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Bartolome v. SSS (Adoption and Custody of
Minors)
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John,
then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s
parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail
the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death,
was that when the adoptive parent died less
than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s
death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of
the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child
if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and
legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition
[for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is
still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by
analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating
the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that
the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.
Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera (Habeas
Corpus)
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting
of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan
and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of
Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas,
Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is
indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a
family court in any of the cities enumerated is
proper as long as the writ is sought to be
enforced within the National Capital Judicial
Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition
before the family court of Caloocan City. Since
Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to
the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the
former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.
Datukan Malang Saliba v. The Warden (Habeas
Corpus)
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no
longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived
of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court. The restraint then has
become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic.
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of
any warrant charging him of an offense. He was
not restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself
of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Silverio v. Republic (Change of Name/
Correction of Entries)
When words are not defined in a statute they
are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female" or "the
distinction between male and female." Female is
"the sex that produces ova or bears young" and
male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary." Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Republic v. Cagandahan (Change of Name/
Correction of Entries)
In deciding this case, we consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has
been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for
those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’
nor truly ‘female’." The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its
course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with.
And accordingly, he has already ordered his life
to that of a male. Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication, to force his body into
the categorical mold of a female but he did not.
He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken
its due course in respondent’s development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court
will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the
male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the
Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold
of a female, as society commonly currently
knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent" and in the absence of evidence
to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed
out. In other words, we respect respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule
103, this Court has held that a change of name is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will follow. The trial
court’s grant of respondent’s change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s
change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
Almojuela v. Republic (Change of Name/
Correction of Entries)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the
procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry through an
appropriate adversary proceeding.
In this case, the CA correctly found that
petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil
Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he
claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged
and accepted him, the procedural rules
nonetheless mandate compliance with the
requirements in the interest of fair play and due
process and to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
Moreover, although it is true that in certain
instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent
publication of a notice of hearing to cure the
petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties, such as when: (a)
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or, (d) when a party is
inadvertently left out, these exceptions are,
unfortunately, unavailing in this case.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the
above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in
the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire
proceedings therein null and void.
Gan v. Republic (Change of Name/ Correction
of Entries)
In her amended petition for change of name, the
petitioner merely stated that she was born out
of wedlock; she did not state whether her
parents, at the time of her birth, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, which would make her a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at
the time of the petitioner's·birth, either of her
parents had an impediment to marry the other,
she may only bear the surname of her mother
pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, she may use the surname of her
father provided that she was acknowledged by
her father.
However, the petitioner failed to adduce any
evidence that would show that she indeed was
duly acknowledged by his father. The
petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth
certificate signed by her mother, school records,
employment records, marriage contract,
certificate of baptism, and other government
records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code,
she could still not insist on using her father's
surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part
of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to
change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to
"Emelita Basilio Gan."
Caram v. Segui (Prerogative Writs)
In this case, Christina alleged that the
respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their
action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
the respondent DSWD officers never concealed
Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian
was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when
she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides,
she even admitted in her petition for review on
certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the
hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.
There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance"
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the
third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of
forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority
over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who,
for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College (Prerogative
Writs)
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in
issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be
taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who
showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did
not resort to any unlawful means of gathering
the information as it was voluntarily given to
them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the
students who showed the images to Escudero.
Razon v. Tagitis (Prerogative Writs)
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended
Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a
victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be
read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim
is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity,
detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is
to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights
to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should
be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victim’s rights
to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise
be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the
required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and
the actual or threatened violations of the rights
to life, liberty or security – are present.
Roxas v. GMA (Prerogative Writs)
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the
reason why the petitioner was not able to
adduce substantial evidence proving her
allegations of government complicity in her
abduction and torture, may be attributed to the
incomplete and one-sided investigations
conducted by the government itself. This
"awkward" situation, wherein the very persons
alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the
same time, the very ones tasked by law to
investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic
of these proceedings and is the main source of
the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any
petitioner in any amparo case.
Cognizant of this situation, however, the
Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—
requiring the "respondent who is a public official
or employee" to prove that no less than
"extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty." Thus,
unless and until any of the public respondents is
able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo
court that extraordinary diligence has been
observed in their investigations, they cannot
shed the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary
diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was
not fully observed in the conduct of the police
and military investigations in the case at bar.
Note: Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way,
by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive
to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers
to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.
Meralco v. Lim (Prerogative Writs)
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo,
habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent
is to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.
In another vein, there is no showing from the
facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right
to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter
as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere
jokes if they existed at all."
Lee v. Ilagan (Prerogative Writs)
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not
able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be
violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in
the suppression of this video – which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the internet for public consumption
– he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty
or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so
much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the
allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the
evidence presented. As the records show, all
that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition
was his self-serving testimony which hardly
meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is
because nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act
towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to
privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would
anything on record even lead a reasonable mind
to conclude that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends
– say for instance, to spread it to the public so as
to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee
even made it clear in her testimony that the only
reason why she reproduced the subject video
was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence
in the criminal and administrative cases that she
filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the
insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
glaring absence of substantial evidence, the
Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision
and dismiss the habeas data petition.
Arigo v. Swift (Prerogative Writs)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials)
in asserting that this petition has become moot
in the sense that the salvage operation sought to
be enjoined or restrained had already been
accomplished when petitioners sought recourse
from this Court. But insofar as the directives to
Philippine respondents to protect and
rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine
habitat adversely affected by the grounding
incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled
to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion
of the removal of the USS Guardian from the
coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact
that the US and Philippine governments both
expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss
the matter of compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy
has also declared it is closely coordinating with
local scientists and experts in assessing the
extent of the damage and appropriate methods
of rehabilitation.
Paje v. Casino (Prerogative Writs)
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is
principally predicated on an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the
writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and
prove such defects or irregularities, but must
also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under
the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be
dismissed outright and the action re-filed before
the proper forum with due regard to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve
the noble and laudable purposes of the writ
against those who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the
issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably
warrant the granting of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where
there are serious and substantial
misrepresentations or fraud in the application
for the ECC, which, if not immediately nullified,
would cause actual negative environmental
impacts of the magnitude contemplated under
the Rules, because the government agencies
and LGUs, with the final authority to implement
the project, may subsequently rely on such
substantially defective or fraudulent ECC in
approving the implementation of the project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to
merely allege such defects or irregularities, but
to show a causal link or reasonable connection
with the environmental damage of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the
case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable
connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of
allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived
defects or irregularities in the issuance of the
ECC. This would have been sufficient reason to
disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of
kalikasan case.
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes
(Prerogative Writs)
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no
interest in the case may file suits for others.
Uninterested persons will argue for the persons
they represent, and the court will decide based
on their evidence and arguments. Any decision
by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors
and the future generations. The court's decision
will be res judicata upon them and conclusive
upon the issues presented.
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to
justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate
environmental rights. Extending the application
of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine
Mammals, or animals in general, through a
judicial pronouncement will potentially result in
allowing petitions based on mere concern rather
than an actual enforcement of a right. It is
impossible for animals to tell humans what their
concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise
the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any.
Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal
redress before this court cannot be a product of
guesswork, and representatives have the
responsibility to ensure that they bring
"reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-
founded arguments" on behalf of those they
represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems
should be welcome. However, they should be
considered carefully so that no unintended or
unwarranted consequences should follow. I
concur with the approach of Madame Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant
ponencia as it carefully narrows down the
doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine
Mammals and the human petitioners have no
legal standing to file any kind of petition.
West Tower Condominium v. First Philippine
Industrial Corporation (Prerogative Writs)
The precautionary principle only applies when
the link between the cause, that is the human
activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect,
that is the damage to the environment, cannot
be established with full scientific certainty. Here,
however, such absence of a link is not an issue.
Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence
of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the
case at bar, is different from determining
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into
the surroundings will cause environmental
damage or will harm human health or that of
other organisms. As a matter of fact, the
petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to
the environment and to the residents of the
affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.