PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DELFIN CALISO
G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011
FACTS:
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found
him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced
him to death. On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same
ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of
Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA
ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing
that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact
that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had
been submerged in the water.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a
crime by merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction.
HELD:
NO. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of
Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to
generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other
reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where,although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with
other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If
the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or
accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that
direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be
allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go
free and the community would be denied proper protection.
Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable
reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to
determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account

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of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that
set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA

G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014
FACTS:
Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant
testified that she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the
former was repeatedly rape for 8 days. However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she
testified that in between those 8 days, she was able to visit her grandmother. Furthermore, when
prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the
following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen
was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury;
and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell
whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed
lacerations.
On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who
testified that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and
discussed plans about marrying the accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with
CA, conviction of the accused was confirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony
of victim who positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant
inconsistencies therein.
HELD:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a
man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be
innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The
time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with
human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to
the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.
The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to
human experience: (1) the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s
house where 8 family members of the latter also resides; (2) that she was not able to ask for help
from any of the family member nor any of them was able to realize that accused was keeping her
against her will; (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend after her ordeal; (4)
admission that she was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged abduction
when she was supposed to be kept inside accused’s house against her will; and (5) lastly, that she
was repeated mauled by accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of
abduction but no physical injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the

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incident. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing
with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
against her will using threats, force or intimidation.

SUPREME COURT vs. EDDIE V. DELGADO et al.

A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011
FACTS:
On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T.
Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second
Division (OCC-SD). The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s
Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal
notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Owing
to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC- SD follows a very strict
procedure in handling them. Thus, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are
authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open;
only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy.
Herein Delgado were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said
agenda without being authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows:
Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30
May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70
from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja
and Florendo. During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and
took the said pages from the agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while
respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for
and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda, they vehemently denied
having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation
of the OAS.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants
prevails against the contrary testimony of their co- respondent implicating them in the alleged
deed.
HELD:
NO. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. It was
never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents
Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. HON.

FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender
of Accused and Convicted Persons.” Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with the
offense of “accepting an advantage as agent”. He also faces counts of the offense of conspiracy
to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong

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Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against Muñoz. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus
questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA declared the Order of Arrest void. The
DOJ filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari praying that the Decision of
the CA be reversed. The Supreme Court granted the petition of the DOJ and sustained the
validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for
the extradition of private respondent. For his part, Muñoz filed in the same case a petition for
bail, which was opposed by Hong Kong. The RTC denied the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight
risk.”
Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by respondent judge, allowing
Muñoz to post bail. Hong Kong filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied.
ISSUE: What is the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail in an extradition
proceeding?
HELD:
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard
of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the
standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO

G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012
FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m., Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste,
Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of
wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head
with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel
Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away.
Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced
dead on arrival.

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 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder
against
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk,
had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert,
had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking
up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face
down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was
no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had
“no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his
death” due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands.
ISSUE: What is the standard of proof required in order for self-defense to be appreciated?
HELD:
By invoking self-defense, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the
death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted
his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to
bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he
would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because
the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of
the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.
The plea of self-defense was belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location
and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to
prevent or repel an attack from Olais.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B.

BALMACEDA & ROLANDO RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011
FACTS:
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against
Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB
alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch
manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks.
PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one of
the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. The RTC granted this
motion. Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand,
Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos,
he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and
Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment
for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the
source of Balmaceda’s money.

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 RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint
against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with
Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations.
ISSUE: What is the quantum of evidence required in civil cases?
HELD:
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the
evidence offered in opposition.This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,defined
“preponderance of evidence” in the following manner:
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue
has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the
overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the
defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in
the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the
claim.
Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive
assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the
Bank.
Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even
necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even
if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a
judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain
his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to
achieve this result.

DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA vs. REBECCA BIONG

G.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013
FACTS:
At around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North
Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a
certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial
Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck
containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car
forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela
Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
The traffic investigation report identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that
Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.Joel later revealed that his employer was
respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of “Pongkay Trading” and
was engaged in a gravel and sand business. Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain
on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her

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injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move
her left arm. She consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to
examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury
caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her
to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition.
Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical
therapy. She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and
Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a
cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores operated on her spine
and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the
nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay. Thus, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. She alleged that she lost
the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed medical expenses (as of
the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00. She further prayed
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. The RTC ruled in favor of
Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be
Joel’s reckless driving.
ISSUE: Whether Dra. Dela Llana established her case by preponderance of evidence
HELD:
No. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-
delict.” Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person
for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s
employer. She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption — that Rebecca did
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel —
arise. Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can
then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, “an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against
the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.”
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has
the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance
of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any

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efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury
would not have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the
pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her
testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during
trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum
or the ultimate fact can be established.

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011
FACTS:
A team of auditors from the central office of the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted
an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for
Muslim Mindanao (ORG-ARMM) and the financial transactions and operations. It was found
that illegal withdrawals as stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) were made from the depository
accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of the (Disbursing
Officer II) petitioner Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement vouchers.
Criminal cases for malversation of public funds was filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against the (ORG-ARMM Regional
Governor) Zacaria A. Candao, (Disbursing Officer II) Israel B. Haron, (Executive Secretary)
Abas A. Candao and (Cashier) Pandical M. Santiago.
At their arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of malversation
of public funds. It was also explained that the procedure with respect to the processing of cash
advances as follows: that there were cash advances made in ARMM which cover travels,
salaries, etc. but particularly it is for "peace and order campaign," it starts with the ORG when
the Regional Governor issues an authority for cash advance, and then they process the voucher
(Finance and Budget Management Services).
Heidi L. Mendoza (COA State Auditor IV), prosecution’s lone witness testified that their
expanded audit disclosed illegal withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of
ORG-ARMM without the required disbursement vouchers and have no assigned voucher
numbers. Mendoza admitted the belated submission of original vouchers to the COA Central
Office but these are without supporting documents.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of
public funds committed in conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners claim
that the subject checks were covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly
submitted and received by the COA Central Office. The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioners
allegation of advances intended for “peace and order campaign” presented no proof that it were
spent for public purposes. In fact the alleged disbursement vouchers were not explained as to the
nature of expense such as purchase of equipment, services, meals, travels etc. and ultimately
there were no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase
Request and Inspection Report if the items said to be purchased. Disbursement vouchers were
not issued in accordance with the existing COA circulars due to it was all unnumbered and
undated. Liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the Sandiganbayan
held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron was able to consummate

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the illegal withdrawals without the required disbursement vouchers. Thus, by their collective
acts, said court concluded that petitioners conspired to effect the illegal withdrawals of public
funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the equipoise doctrine applies to this case
HELD:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence of
misappropriation arising from Haron’s failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal
withdrawals from the ARMM funds. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper
liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter.
Also there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the
equipoise rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is
doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction.
Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by
adequate evidence that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody
and control upon demand, specifically for the ₱21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said
funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct
evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary in malversation cases.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A.
Candao, that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to effect the illegal withdrawals and
misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be
effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In
other words, any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval, as in fact
checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had to be countersigned by them. Their
indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of
ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not
err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and
misappropriating such funds.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ANTONIO T. REYES

G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
FACTS:
Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit with the Office of the Provincial in Camigiun
against respondent Antonio Reyes (Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-
Charge) and Angelito Pealoza (Clerk III) of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office
in Mambajao, Camiguin but the same affidavit was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao. The latter office ordered that Reyes and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits
within the ten days from notice. In Pealoza Counter-Affidavit he denied the allegation of Acero
telling that if the latter was willing to pday additional costs, Reyes and him would reconsider his

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drivers license examination application. Also Pealoza submitted the affidavit of one Rey P.
Amper (driver examiner). In his affidavit he narrated that Reyes verbally instructed him that all
drivers who flunked the examination must be submitted to him and gave Amper a piece of paper
containing the rates to be charged to re-take the application with additional costs. Pealoza and
Amper allegedly reported the matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo but no
action from the latter was made only expressing his regrets for having recommended Reyes to
the position. Amper left the LTO because of the practice of illegal exactions of Reyes. In Reyes
Counter-Affidavit he claimed that Aceros complaint was mere blatant distortion and fabrication
of the truth. In fact it was Pealoza who processed the drivers examination application of the
complainant; the money paid by Acero was allegedly given to Pealoza; and Reyes had no
participation and was not present when Pealoza and Acero changed hands for the additional costs
of money. He allegedly reprimanded and ordered Pealoza to return the money of the
complainant. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero and it was
Pealoza who pocketed the P500.00.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ordered that in view of the non-appearance of
the respondents, they were considered to have waived their right to preliminary conference. The
case was then immediately submitted for a decision. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
rendered a Decision adjuging Reyes and Pealoza guilty of grave misconduct and guilty and
simple misconduct respectively. Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the
Case for Preliminary Conference and Pealoza filed a motion for Reconsideration. The Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order denying the aforesaid motions. Reyes then
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals granted
the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in the assailed
Resolution. Hence, Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition.
The Office of the Ombudsman avers that the findings of the fact are entitled to great
weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Petitioner arguesthat it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the
evidence submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of
the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
the substantial evidence.
HELD:
No. The Court finds merit in Reyes’ contention. Petitioner settled this issue in the
affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations without giving him
a similar opportunity to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and the
other witness to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision on the
basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A judgment in
an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on
substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well
as the affidavits of the witnesses. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said
documents before petitioner rendered its Decision. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due
process was violated. Department of Health v. Camposan restates the guidelines laid down in

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Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations that due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the
law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know
the reasons for it and the various issues involved.
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases
of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to
assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set
the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this
case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due
process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise
received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoz and the witnesses, whether before or after the
Decision was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.
G.R. No. 203186, December 4, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Xavier C. Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became
Vice-President for Dealer Network/Auto loans Division. A client named Trezita B. Acosta who
entered and obtain several auto and real estate loans which were approved and promptly paid.
However she did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan for the purchase of a
Toyota Prado vehicle rendering the transaction fraudulent. BPI Family conducted an
investigation and later on discovered that: (a) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and
succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch,
pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (b)
Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee;
and (c) Ramos was grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the bank’s
safety protocols, particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan applicant’s identity,
and that the promissory note was not even signed by the applicant in the presence of any of the
marketing officers.
Ramos shouldered the proportionate amount of P546,000.00 from BPI lost of
P2,294,080.00 and was deducted from petitioner benefits which accrued upon his retirement.

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Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits and non-payment of overtime
and holiday pay and premium pay before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming
that the deductions made were illegal. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint of the
petitioner on the basis that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was “legal and even
reasonable”.
The NLRC reversed the LA Decision. It found Ramos’s consequent signing of the
quitclaim to be without effect. It ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of
546,000.00, with additional payment of 10% thereof as attorney’s fees.
BPI Family moved for reconsideration which in turn was denied by the NLRC. BPI Family filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos. It also attributed negligence on
the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the
approval of the credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos,
the CA found it improper to deduct the entire ₱546,000.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits
and, instead, equitably reduced the same to the amount of ₱200,000.00
ISSUE: Whether or not the conclusions of NLRC are supported by substantial evidence whose
absence points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court
may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of
labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the
NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."
The Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper. BPI
Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-
settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue It is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the approval
of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family
itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent ion his duties. To this
end, it is well to note that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client
wholly comply with all the documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of
loan applications.48 As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions,"
yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is but reasonable that solely bears the
loss of its own shortcomings.

JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS

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 G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City to establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing). Lucas narrated that his mother Elsie Uy worked in a known nightspot and later on had
developed an intimate relationship and got impregnated by respondent Jesus S. Lucas; and to
whom she gave birth to petitioner. However, the name of respondent was not stated in the
certificate of live birth of Jesse U. Lucas. For a period of about two years respondent allegedly
extended financial support to the mother and petitioner but as soon as the relationship ended,
Elsie started to refuse the financial support and insisted that to raise petitioner on her own.
Respondent was not served a copy of the petition. Respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. Only his counsel went to the court and obtained a copy of the petition. Respondent then
filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature
and therefore summons should be served on him. The RTC also directed that the Order be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the
petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the
RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing to him as Jesse’s father. Respondent alleged that the petition was not in due form and
substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged
therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case and held that Jessie failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a parternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera vs. Alba, namely, a prima facie, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The RTC held in the new hearing
that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown has not yet taken place. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of the respondent, it noted that the petitioner failed to show
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order
HELD:
Yes. It was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case visavis
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.
The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before
he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or
scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the

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petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his
father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c)
although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated
as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
The CA view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative
proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that
there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions
for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the
question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explained although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing
of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE

G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012

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FACTS:
Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National
Bank (PNB), assigned at PNBs Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-
MWSS) located within the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
Compound, Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City. MWSS opened current account No. 244-
850099-6 at PNB-MWSS with initial deposit PhP 6,714,621.13. This became dormant by 16
April 2003.
Tria, one time requested for a list of dormant accounts and inquired about the irregularities
involving managers checks. On 22 April 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from
MWSS instructing to issue PhP 5,200,000 worth of managers check payable to Atty. Rodrigo
Reyes. This letter-request was evaluated and verified.
On 26 April 2004, despite sufficient available cash in PNB-MWSS, Tria accompanied
Atty Reyes to PNB Quezon City Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for the encashment of the managers
check. Tria proded the Sales and Service Office (SSO) of PNB-Circle, George Flandez to receive
the cash the same day and that Tria will just sign the check to prove that he identified Atty.
Reyes. In the same month, Tria revised the minutes of the meeting from 06 August 2004 after it
has been signed by all the attendees. He inserted the portion where he identified himself as
branch manager who “assists in accompanying valued client/clients to QC Circle Branch for
encashment of MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the MC whenever
we are short in cash.” Tria then retired by November 2004.
On 14 February 2005 MWSS wrote to the new branch manger of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia
Daway, expressing surprise at the withdrawal and demanding the refund or restoration of the
same amount. PNB conducted its own investigation and sought to hold Tria liable for qualified
theft.
Tria contends that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2) there was no intent to gain on
his part; (3) the personal property does not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank; (4)
there was no grave abuse of confidence on his part; and (5) his alleged identification of the payee
is not the operative act that triggered the payment of the managers check by the PNB-MWSS
Branch. Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who approved and paid the managers check even
beyond his authority. He added that it was the other bank employees who should be held liable
for the loss.
The Assistant City Prosecutor did not find probable cause to file information against Tria
citing that Tria’s identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of the Managers
Check. Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval
of the encashment. PNB elevated the matter to Department of Justice and Court of Appeals. Both
affirmed that no probable cause was established against Tria.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ erred in failing to consider the existence of probable cause?
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. There was more than
probable cause to proceed against Tria for qualified theft.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of

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probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the
crime of theft becomes qualified. The elements of which are:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
FACTS:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling
shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and
test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon
arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and
requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Thus, an information was
filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court
the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to
be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
ISSUE: Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the
shabu was found?
HELD:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that
the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to
show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said

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structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.
With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and
dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO et al.

G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011
FACTS:
Conrado Estrella and his wife employed AAA and Sulpacio Abad as maid and driver
respectively. Sometime on the afternoon of 07 May 2002, the group of Fernando Fernandez
(Lando), Alberto Anticamara (Al), Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim
(Marvin), and Fred Doe entered the house of AAA’s employer whilst she was sleeping. Thinking
that the intruders left the house already, she attempted to run but Dick was still there. After a
brief commotion, the group decided to tie AAA and was led outside the house. AAA saw Abad
tied and blindfolded inside a vehicle.
AAA was brought to the fishpond, there she saw Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita). The
group brought Abad outside the vehicle and was led away. AAA heard the group discussing to
make a decision since Abad apparently has been shot four times. Later on, Lando and Fred
boarded the vehicle taking AAA with them to San Miguel, Tarlac. She was kept in Lando’s house
until 09 May 2002. On 09 May 2002, Lando told AAA that Fred and Bert has intention to kill her
and he brought her to a hotel. Through threat, Lando sexually molested AAA. Later on Fred, Bert
and Lando transferred AAA to the house of Fred’s niece in Riles, Tarlac. Fred kept AAA as a
wife and repeatedly raped her at night, threatening to give her back to Lando whom she knew
killed Abad.
On 22 May 2002, Fred, together with his family, transferred AAA to Carnaga. AAA was
made to stay as a house helper in the house of Fred’s brother-in-law. On 04 June 2002, AAA
escaped the house and sought help from her friend who called AAA’s brother. Arriving Mandaue
City, AAA and her brother reported the incident to police authorities. The cadaver of Abad was
autopsied and cause of death was gunshot wounds on trunk.
Lando, Al and Cita pleaded not guilty during arraignment while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe
remained at-large. The Regional Trial Court convicted both Lando and Al for the crime of
Murder and Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention. Whereas Cita was found not guilty for both
crimes due to insufficiency of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Lando appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the court gravely erred in
considering the evidence presented by the accused-appellant which is more credible than that of
the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in finding circumstantial evidence against the accused-
appellant sufficient to convict them?
HELD:

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 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and
taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death
of Sulpacio. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred
utter “Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever
comes our way should be eliminated).” Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on
June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions
Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of
the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a
shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the
remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico
Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of
the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim’s death was the gunshot
wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets
and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left
wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the
house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was
repeatedly shot and buried.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EFREN DEOCAMPO et al.

G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012
FACTS:
Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco found the place
unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the house said that it
was Maritess and Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco dug up the
suspected spot. There they found the decomposing bodies of Melanio and Lucena. Based on the
post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire; Lucena was stabbed.
RTC found the four-accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and Edwin as principals and
Maritess and Elmer as accessories
ISSUE: Whether the accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based
on circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
Yes, the circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair
conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.

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Here, those circumstances abound.
Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved
his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that
house.
The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998. On May
28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night of May
27 or early morning of May 28. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute
saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house.
They even tried to conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered
that the fence wire had been cut. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a
woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig. At break of dawn, a witness saw
Efren in the Alolod kitchen.From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s
house, with Efren wearing the old man’s watch. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive
parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when
people started looking for them. They were of course buried in the garden. A witness heard Efren
instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house. The bodies of the
old couple were found underneath those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed
does not encourage belief. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27
near the couple’s house where they had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the
kitchen of that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was not
physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila,
South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.

EDUARDO CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209137, July 01, 2015
FACTS:
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navetas, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the
owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein
complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away
the following one gold bracelet 24K, 3 necklace 1 one 24K and 2 two 18K, 2 two digital cam
Sony player, 1 one DVD portable 1 one wrist watch Taugher, 1 one sun glass Guess,1 one
camera Canon, 1 one Gameboy advance, 1 one calculator, 1 one Discman Sony, 2 two pcs.
100.00 US dollar bill, 22 twenty-two pcs., 2 two necklace 18K worth, 2 two bracelets worth, 2
two gold ring, 1 one wedding ring worth 14K, 1 one wrist watch swiss military, 1 one cellphone
NOKIA 8250, 3 three pairs of earrings, 3 three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars, 60 sixty pcs. Of
Php50.00 bills, 100 one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills, 15 fifteen pcs. Of Php100.00 bills owned
and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of
the herein complainant, in the amount of Php223,000.00.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the petitioners guilt was proven based on circumstantial evidence?
2) Whether the search conducted was illegal, rendering the articles rediscovered inadmissible?
3) Whether the prosecution’s witness was ill-motivated in testifying?
HELD:

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 1) Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items
when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed
to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.
2) No illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the
stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-
up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the
stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that
the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing
either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry.
Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if
the items were the stolen ones, he confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left without
any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police
officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any
explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the
stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.
3) Contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also
tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill
motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.

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