H
Human Trafficking
Fabrizio Sarrica
Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs,
Policy Analysis and Research Branch; UN Office
on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Office at
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Synonyms
Trafficking in persons
Definition
The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
Children defines trafficking in persons as
The recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploita-
tion. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or ser-
vices, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servi-
tude or the removal of organs.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_1-1
Detailed Description
Introduction
Human trafficking is a crime affecting all the
countries around the world. Lives are stolen, vio-
lated, exploited, bought, and sold. In the year
2000, the United Nations presented to the inter-
national community the Protocol to Prevent, Sup-
press and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children (henceforth the
UN Trafficking Protocol). (The Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime.)
The UN Trafficking Protocol is certainly not
the first piece of international legislation tackling
human trafficking; however, it is the most com-
plete. It frames it under the UN Transnational
Organized Crime Convention, and by doing so
it provides the legal tools to national authorities
to combat it more effectively. In addition, the UN
Trafficking Protocol has the great merit to define
trafficking in persons internationally.
Defining Trafficking in Persons
The UN Trafficking Protocol supplementing the
United Nations Transnational Organized Crime
Convention was adopted by General Assembly
resolution 55/25. It entered into force on
25 December 2003. It is the first global legally
binding instrument with an agreed definition on
2 Human Trafficking

trafficking in persons. Article 3, paragraph (a) of The definition of trafficking in persons allows
the Protocol defines trafficking in persons as for the categorization of exploitation in three
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, ways: trafficking for sexual exploitation
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the (prostitution of the others and other forms of
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of sexual exploitation), trafficking for labor exploi-
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of tation (forced labor, slavery or practices similar
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to to slavery and servitude), and trafficking for
achieve the consent of a person having control organ removal. In addition, by introducing the
over another person, for the purpose of exploita- term “at a minimum” in the definition of the
tion. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the purposes of trafficking, the UN Trafficking Pro-
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or ser- tocol leaves open the option of including other
vices, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servi- forms of exploitation. In recent years, national
tude or the removal of organs. legislation and jurisdictions have expanded the
application of trafficking legislation. This has
On the basis of the definition given in the
resulted in the inclusion of trafficking for child
Trafficking in Persons Protocol, it is evident that
begging or the use of children to commit petty
trafficking in persons has three constituent
crimes or trafficking for forced marriages and
elements:
others. Cases of trafficking for the trading of
body parts for rituals and/or traditional healing
• The act: recruitment, transportation, transfer,
and medicine and trafficking for child soldiering
harboring or receipt of persons
have also been identified in some parts of the
• The means: threat or use of force, coercion,
world.
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
The combination of a universal definition that
vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits
is successful in addressing a variety of exploit-
to a person in control of the victim
ative patterns and the evolving national jurispru-
• The purpose: exploitation, which includes, at
dences makes this a complex dynamic
least, exploiting the prostitution of others, sex-
transnational problem. At the same time, this
ual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, or sim-
necessarily brings challenges in terms of mea-
ilar practices and the removal of organs
surement, analysis, and evaluation of this
phenomenon.
From a criminological point of view, the
exploitation is not only an element of the legal
definition of the crime but also the motivation
Research in the Field of Trafficking
that drives the criminal to commit the crime.
in Persons
Trafficking in persons happens mostly because
of money, as some human beings exploit others
One of the most persistent issues on the human
in order to gain profits. Exploitation normally
trafficking agenda has been the lack of knowl-
takes place as the victim is vulnerable and/or
edge about the phenomenon. Criminology and
discriminated. This is often the case for migrants,
related social sciences developed different
who are among the most frequently reported vic-
methods of research according to the type of
tims of human trafficking (75 % of the victims
crime under analysis. Victim surveys are largely
detected worldwide), or children because of their
used to estimate the severity of corruption, for
young age, or females in patriarchal societies.
instance.
The most frequently reported victims of traffick-
The methodological debate aiming at better
ing are those who suffer some sort of vulnerabil-
studying and measuring human trafficking is
ity vis-à-vis the more typical traffickers, adult
still at its early stages, especially when moving
men, and local nationals.
to an international ambit. As indicated above, the
first challenge lies in the definition and nature of
Human Trafficking
the phenomenon. Trafficking in persons, as
described in the protocol supplementing the
Transnational Organized Crime Convention, is a
criminal “process” rather than a criminal event.
Indeed, the process may take place in different
geographical areas and at each moment of the
trafficking process, different complex events are
occurring. These different events do not represent
trafficking per se, but all the events connected
produce the trafficking experience. The identifi-
cation of instruments capable of capturing the
severity of trafficking in persons would require
identifying a set of measurements representing
the prevalence of these different phenomena in
each of the geographical areas affected by the
process.
In addition, the trafficking process can take a
particular form (or forms) in the countries of
origin of those who will potentially become vic-
tims of trafficking in persons. It takes different
forms in transit countries and yet other forms in
countries of destination. One single country
could be affected at the same time by all of the
steps of the process in the case of domestic traf-
ficking, or because it is at same time a country of
origin of trafficking toward other regions and a
country of destination for victims of trafficking in
persons from other countries.
The trafficking process may also have differ-
ent characteristics according to the specific type
of exploitation. The phenomenon of child sol-
diers is very different, in form, from forced pros-
titution, which in turn is very different from
trafficking for organ removal or for begging.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to develop a
research method, an indicator, or a research tool
able to capture at once different forms of human
trafficking.
Moreover, trafficking in persons is
(fortunately) a relatively rare phenomenon. The
number of victims of trafficking is not as frequent
as the victims of corruption or of property crimes.
In comparison to these other crimes, fewer per-
sons get in contact with trafficking events, do
have direct trafficking experience, or define
their perceptions on the base of facts or episodes.
This makes human trafficking extremely difficult
to assess using normal survey instruments.
3
The challenges indicated above may help to
explain why it is so difficult to carry research in
the field of human trafficking.
The increased number of human trafficking
National Rapporteurs and similar mechanisms
whose function is to collect and report about
cases detected from the different national author-
ities opens the door to a new approach to research
trafficking in persons. A generally accepted, offi-
cial statistics on trafficking in persons represents
the tip of the iceberg, meaning that the large part
of the phenomenon remains hidden, the so-called
dark number of crime. As a consequence, by
using information concerning the cases officially
detected by the national authorities, it will not be
possible to draw conclusions on the dimension of
the phenomenon. Nevertheless, this data is
proven to be effective to understand what the
main patterns of the cases detected at national
level are.
The difficulties about grasping the size of the
human trafficking phenomenon cannot in any
way hinder investigating all the rest.
The Need for an International
Monitoring Tool
There is a clear need to enhance the knowledge
on trafficking in persons in its national and trans-
national manifestations. Such observation of traf-
ficking patterns and flows can be
comprehensively conducted only from an inter-
national, objective, and independent observatory.
While national-level studies and reports may
accurately present the human trafficking situation
in a particular country and provide valuable input
to international analyses, an international author-
ity is well placed to discern commonalities and
differences between countries or regions and
identify trafficking flows and patterns in different
parts of the world. This is the reason behind the
decision of the international community to assign
UNODC the mandate and the duty to produce a
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons to assess
trafficking flows and patterns at national,
regional, and international levels (General
Assembly Resolution 64/293, para. 60).
4 Human Trafficking
The first Global Report on Trafficking in Per-
sons was published in 2009 (available at www.
unodc.org/glotip). That Report was building
upon the experiences of many National Rappor-
teurs existing in the world, using mainly infor-
mation concerning the profile of the detected
victims and of the offenders to grasp patterns
and flows of human trafficking. It was a first
global effort to collate official national-level
information with the perspective of an interna-
tional overview of trafficking in persons. This
was done to assess the trafficking situation, par-
ticularly in terms of the criminal justice system
response, at the national and international levels.
Following that experience, a new Global
Report was published by UNODC in December
2012 (available at www.unodc.org/glotip). This
new edition of the Global Report continues the
work started earlier in terms of the methodolog-
ical approach, it pushes forward the explanatory
power of the data collected in order to discern, for
each region and subregion, the profile of the
victims, the profile of the offenders, and the
forms of exploitation detected.
Currently, forced labor is the most frequently
detected form of exploitation in Africa and in
Asia, while trafficking for sexual exploitation is
more prominent in Europe, and the two forms are
somewhat equally detected in the Americas.
Trafficking in children is affecting the African
continent most heavily, while in Europe victims
are more frequently adults, and child trafficking
ranges around 15–17 % of the victims detected.
The Report also registers trends globally and
regionally, such as that concerning the increase
in the detection of child trafficking, especially in
Europe and especially when the victims detected
are girls.
Other patterns are also apparent. For example,
there is a link between certain profile of the
offenders and certain profile of the victims, such
as women traffickers being involved in the traf-
ficking of girls. There is also a relation between
economic dynamics and trafficking. Certain
nationalities are more frequently trafficked
abroad when their own countries are undergoing
economic downturn or a rise in unemployment.
Conversely, there is a reduction of trafficking
flows for certain nationalities whose countries
enjoy economic improvements such as increased
GDP or higher employment rates.
UNODC has also been able to monitor traf-
ficking flows from the perspectives of the desti-
nation countries. The regional and international
relevance of the flow is then assessed, not on the
basis of one source of information but by the
number of destination countries in which a cer-
tain nationality among trafficking victims is
detected. For instance, if a specific nationality
among victims is detected in many countries
and every region of the world, this may indicate
that some trafficking flows occur globally as
compared to trafficking flows limited to specific
regions. On the basis of these assumptions, it is
possible to compare the East Asian trafficking
flows vis-à-vis the flows originating from Africa.
During the reporting period (2007–2010), Afri-
can victims were detected by national authorities
in Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe.
At the same time, East Asian victims were largely
detected by the authorities of many countries in
the Americas, in Europe, in Africa and the Mid-
dle East, and in Asia and the Pacific. It is clear
that East Asian trafficking has global promi-
nence, while African trafficking flows are limited
to certain areas of the world. The strength of the
results just described lies in the fact that they are
built on data analyses provided by a multitude of
national authorities.
This approach is also used to assess possible
increases or decreases in trafficking from certain
origins. While the reduction or increase of certain
nationalities detected in one destination country
may be due to local factors, the same trend reg-
istered in many other different countries of des-
tination can only mean that trafficking from those
origins is generally decreasing. This is the case of
trafficking in persons originating from Eastern
Europe, which has been decreasingly detected
over the last decade by most or all the institutions
reporting this trafficking flow affecting their own
country.
Human Trafficking
Conclusions
During the last two decades, the international
community has raised its head to combat and
prevent this human trafficking, and more coun-
tries are identifying it as one of their top priori-
ties. The UN Trafficking Protocol, open for
signature in the year 2000, entered into force in
a record time just 3 years later. As of August
2012, the vast majority of the countries in the
world do have a comprehensive legislation on
trafficking in persons. The number of prosecu-
tions and convictions is (too) slowly rising
around the world.
More countries are nowadays systematically
reporting and publishing about cases of traffick-
ing detected in their territory, with the result that
more is known about forms of exploitation, about
the potential victims, and about the profile of the
offenders and their modus operandi. The General
Assembly decision to produce a United Nations
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons is
unprecedented, as individual countries are nor-
mally reluctant to have an international organiza-
tion to look at their domestic crime situation. It is
now clear that studying human trafficking is not
5
about blaming and shaming one or another gov-
ernment, but it is about understanding who, why,
when, where, and how victims are exploited and
trafficked around the world. This is needed to
better combat it and prevent it, and this is what
global research on trafficking in persons is trying
to achieve.
Cross-References
▶ Global Trafficking in Persons
▶ Human Trafficking
▶ Human Trafficking Research
▶ UN Trafficking Protocol
▶ United Nations
▶ UNODC
References
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
UNODC (2013) Global report on trafficking in persons
L
Labor Trafficking
Melynda Barnhart
New York Law School, New York, NY, USA
Synonyms
Forced labor; Human trafficking; Modern-day
slavery
Definition
Labor trafficking is a subset of human trafficking,
involving the exploitation of a person’s labor by a
variety of means whereby the person does not
believe he or she is free to leave his or her work.
Trafficking usually begins with the transporta-
tion, harboring, recruiting, or procuring of a per-
son by means of force, deception or fraud,
coercion, confiscation of identity documents,
debt, or abuse of power or vulnerability, ending
with the person in a form of labor servitude.
Labor trafficking is more than the condition of
servitude, slavery, or exploitation, as it also
includes the process by which a person was
placed in that servitude. It is a form of modern-
day slavery.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_2-4
Detailed Description
Labor trafficking is a form of human trafficking
involving the exploitation of workers who are
forced, defrauded, or coerced into a condition of
servitude. Labor trafficking encompasses all
forms of labor or services except sexual exploi-
tation. Labor traffickers often target migrants,
finding their victims at various stages of the
migration process. Labor trafficking victims
may be migrating for a variety of reasons, but
most seek better employment or working
conditions than what is available at home.
While travel from home is not a necessary
component of trafficking, labor trafficking com-
monly occurs in internal and external migration.
The International Labor Organization reports
that almost half of forced labor victims migrate
within their country or across borders before
enduring forced labor (International Labor
Organization, Questions and answers on forced
labor, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/
newsroom/comment-analysis/WCMS_181922/
lang--en/index.htm. Last visited 18 Dec 2012),
also confirming the connection between move-
ment and labor trafficking. The cost of labor
trafficking exploitation is estimated to be $20
billion annually in the amount of wages, and
other benefits denied enslaved migrant workers
(United States Department of State).
The separation of human trafficking into two
forms, sex and labor, does not have a clear defin-
ing line. In general, any form of sexual
2 Labor Trafficking
exploitation, commercial or not, is considered to
be sex trafficking rather than labor trafficking.
Some forms of legal commercial sex work, such
as erotic dancing, may be included in labor traf-
ficking definitions rather than sex trafficking,
depending upon the relevant laws. For the most
part, labor trafficking is a catchall definition that
encompasses all nonsexual labor exploitation.
Legal definitions of what precisely encom-
passes the crime of labor trafficking vary at the
state and international levels, but most include all
forms of nonsexual labor or services, wherein the
person’s services are procured initially through
various methods and the person is kept in servi-
tude by a variety of means. Labor trafficking
shares many aspects of forced labor, but such
terms are usually not legally synonymous. At
the international level, forced labor focuses only
on the conditions of servitude at the site of labor,
while labor trafficking also encompasses the
methods of recruitment and the means of control-
ling the victims. The methods of trafficking com-
monly include transporting, obtaining, recruiting,
harboring, or selling a person for his or her ser-
vices. These methods commonly involve decep-
tion and fraud, as many trafficking victims are
willing migrants and trust their recruiters. The
common means of control once the person is at
the labor site involve restriction of movement and
harmful living and working conditions. These
means of labor trafficking encompass physical
force or restraint, psychological coercion, fraud
or deceit, abuse of power or vulnerability, confis-
cation of identity or travel documents, and threats
against the person or their loved ones.
Labor trafficking situations manifest in a vari-
ety of ways, but there are common patterns. The
stereotypical migrant labor trafficking case
involves traffickers who have established them-
selves in the foreign country or region and then
recruit others in their hometown with promises of
helping newer migrants to successfully migrate
just as the trafficker did. The trafficking usually
begins with recruitment for a “good job” else-
where, such as a job with better pay, benefits, or
working conditions than may be available to that
person at home. The recruiter establishes trust
with the victim, such that the victim usually
willingly undertakes migration. Recruiters may
be friends, relatives, or neighbors of the victim
and approach them individually, or recruiters
may set up storefronts advertising jobs in other
countries, just like legitimate labor recruiters.
Some recruiters are trafficked people themselves,
who are offered the opportunity to “purchase”
their freedom by recruiting others. Some traffick-
ing recruiters find victims after they have entered
or been smuggled into the destination country and
may be crew foremen or recruiters paid by legit-
imate employers to hire laborers. Due to the con-
stant market for workers in many parts of the
world, traffickers usually have no difficulty
recruiting their victims. Because this recruitment
mimics usual migration patterns and traffickers
often insert themselves into active migration
paths, most victims are not aware that they are
being trafficked until it is too late.
Once the worker arrives at the worksite, the
falsity of the “good job” is revealed. The prom-
ised job is instead labor exploitation, from which
there is no apparent escape. Typically the migrant
arrives at the foreign destination only to have his
or her identification and travel documents confis-
cated, to be threatened and physically or sexually
abused, and to be forced to perform work that is
either unpaid or severely underpaid. Debt bond-
age is quite common, in which a manufactured
fraudulent debt is required to be “repaid,” which
can be a highly effective form of coercion. This
debt is often in the form of a smuggling or
recruiting fee, set so high that the person can
never pay it. Labor trafficking cases may also
involve indentured servitude, wherein the person
is held in servitude for a certain period of time,
but this is less common than debts. Time periods
may be a harvest season or a term of years or
months. The trafficking ends when the person
frees himself or herself from the exploitative
situation.
The psychological trauma involved in labor
trafficking is a primary reason victims find it so
difficult to escape, even if the person is not being
literally restricted in his or her movement. Com-
mon emotional responses to trauma and victimi-
zation include emotional detachment and
feelings of self-blame, anxiety and fear, and
Labor Trafficking
difficulty in making decisions or concentrating.
Many experience a loss of memory related to the
traumatic event. Physical reactions, particularly
where the person was physically or sexually
abused, include weakened physical state,
untreated medical conditions, and often hunger
(2012 TIP report, p. 17). These traumas, com-
bined with threats from traffickers, can cause a
person to believe that he or she is not able to
leave. Trafficked people often do not know that
what they are experiencing is a crime, and many
are unwilling to trust law enforcement or govern-
ment officials in the country where they are.
Modern-day slavery thus involves psychological
chains more than physical ones.
Identified labor trafficking cases range in scale
from single victims, most commonly in house-
hold domestic service as nannies or maids, to
hundreds of victims, often occurring at sweat-
shops or factories. Labor trafficking has been
discovered in regulated and unregulated forms
of labor. Industries common to labor trafficking
include domestic service, restaurants, agriculture,
construction, manufacturing, and mining. World-
wide, very few industries have not included traf-
ficked workers. Even occupations requiring
extensive education have included trafficking
victims, such as teachers and nurses. Certain
industries may have higher incidence of labor
trafficking in particular geographic regions,
such as fisheries in Western Africa or
brickmaking in South Asia.
The International Labor Organization (ILO),
an international treaty organization, compiled the
most accurate global statistics on forced labor in
2012. While the ILO’s Global Estimate of Forced
Labor report focuses on more broadly defined
forced labor rather than human trafficking, all
human trafficking is encompassed within the def-
inition of forced labor (International Labor Orga-
nization). The ILO estimates the division of
forced labor as 90 % by the private sector and
10 % by governments, in the form of work
imposed by militaries or prisons in contravention
of ILO agreements (ILO Global Estimate of
Forced Labor, p. 13). Sixty-eight percent of vic-
tims are estimated to be in forced labor exploita-
tion, with the remaining 22 % in sexual
3
exploitation (Id.). Forty-four percent of the total
victims of forced labor had migrated either inter-
nally or internationally, although cross-border
movement was more strongly associated with
sexual exploitation than labor exploitation
(Id. at 17).
Women and children are often the focus of
anti-trafficking campaigns, but comprise about
half of all victims of labor trafficking. This
focus means that male trafficking victims are
often overlooked by governments and law
enforcement and are often not identified properly.
Women are the most likely victims of forced
labor through migration, but this is largely due
to their overrepresentation in sexual exploitation
cases. Women are 98 % of sexually exploited
forced labor victims, while comprising slightly
less than half of the labor exploitation victims
(Id. at 14). Women’s representation in labor traf-
ficking cases is roughly consistent with their rep-
resentation in migration overall (United Nations
Population Fund). Children are also trafficked for
labor; the type of labor and age of victims varies
greatly by geographic region. Approximately
26 % of forced labor victims are children (ILO
Global Estimate of Forced Labor at 14).
The current international definition of human
trafficking is from the “Palermo Protocol,” an
anti-trafficking protocol to the United Nations’
Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime (“Palermo Protocol”), Article 3(a),
25 December 2003, http://www.uncjin.org/Doc
uments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/con
vention_%20traff_eng.pdf). The convention also
included a separate protocol against the Smug-
gling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (United
Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children). Notably, the
definition does not distinguish between labor
and sex trafficking, focusing on the means and
methods of trafficking for “exploitation”
(Palermo Protocol, Article 3(a)). Exploitation
4 Labor Trafficking
is given an inclusive definition, enumerating
exploitation of “the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery or practices similar to slav-
ery, servitude or the removal of organs. . .” (Id.).
This protocol has been ratified by 154 countries
(United Nations Treaty Collection database,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&
lang=en. Last visited 18 Dec 2012). As well as
providing a common definition of human traf-
ficking, the Palermo Protocol mandates legal
and physical protection for victims of trafficking
in persons, including counseling, housing,
employment opportunities, and protections in
repatriation (Palermo Protocol, Articles 6–8).
The protocol also details the measures govern-
ments must undertake to prevent trafficking in
persons, detailing particular policies and pro-
grams and cooperation with other nations
(Palermo Protocol, Articles 9–13).
In the wake of extensive political pressure
from the United States, as well as to implement
the ratification of the Palermo Protocol, most
countries have adopted domestic criminal sanc-
tions against labor trafficking as well as sex traf-
ficking. Enforcement of these laws varies, but is
relatively nonexistent. When most countries
attempt to enforce anti-trafficking laws, the
focus is almost exclusively on sex trafficking
cases. Law enforcement officers are generally
unfamiliar with enforcing labor laws, while pros-
titution crimes are quite familiar. Considering the
estimates that most forced labor victims do not
leave their country of origin, although they may
move internally (ILO report at 16), the lack of
enforcement of labor trafficking statutes in par-
ticular means that labor trafficking victims are
unlikely to receive any assistance. Thus, imple-
mentation of domestic labor trafficking laws con-
tinues to be a widespread concern.
Labor trafficking falls within a continuum of
migrant labor exploitation. Migrants are often
vulnerable to exploitation, traveling to places
with which they are unfamiliar, with few support
networks, where they may have few legal pro-
tections as migrants. Thus, slavery, forced labor,
and labor trafficking are only one end of the
continuum of abuses. The spectrum also includes
difficult or dangerous working conditions, denial
of safety equipment, underpayment or lack of
payment, sexual harassment, overly long-
working hours, no breaks, lack of union protec-
tions, the absence of promotion or advancement
opportunities, etc. Just like with trafficking vic-
tims, exploited migrants may not seek the pro-
tections of labor or employment laws in the host
country where such exist for fear of being
deported, ignored, solicited for a bribe, or
harmed. In many ways, migrants are perfect tar-
gets for labor exploitation because these are a
group of willing workers who are less likely to
demand fair treatment and may not have legal
protections available to them. Until migration is
made safer, labor exploitation of migrants is
likely to continue.
References
International Labor Organization, ILO global estimate
of forced labor: results and methodology, 2012
report, pp 19–20. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---ed_norm/declaration/documents/publication/
wcms_182004.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially
women and children. http://www.unodc.org/docu
ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con
vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Female
migrants: bridging the gaps throughout the life cycle,
May 2006, p 3. http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/
global/shared/documents/publications/2006/bridging_
gap.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec 2012
United States Department of State, 2012 trafficking in
persons report, p 13. http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/192587.pdf. Accessed 18 Dec
2012
Further Reading
Brennan, Denise. Life Interrupted: Trafficking into Forced
Labor in the United States. Duke University Press,
2014
Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the
Global Economy. University of California Press,
Third Edition, 2012
European Commission Organized Crime and
Human Trafficking website. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-
and-human-trafficking/index_en.htm
Labor Trafficking 5

Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center, University of International Organization for Migration Counter-
California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in Trafficking website. http://www.iom.int/cms/
the United States, Sept 2004. http://www. countertrafficking
freetheslaves.net//Document.Doc?id=17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website. http://
International Labor Organization Elimination of Forced www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html
Labor website. http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/ ?ref=menuside
elimination-of-forced-labor/lang--en/index.htm US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons website. http://www.state.gov/j/
tip/index.htm
S
Sex Trafficking
Grace Chang
Department of Feminist Studies, UC Santa
Barbara, University of California, Santa Barbara,
CA, USA
Definition
The definition of sex trafficking has been
contested across international and US contexts
and among US government policy and legal and
advocacy frameworks as well. The US Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines “severe
forms of trafficking” as: (1) sex trafficking in
which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced
to perform such an act is under 18 or (2) the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for labor or services,
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for
the purpose of subjecting that person to involun-
tary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
The TVPA also defines “sex trafficking” as “the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a
commercial sex act” (Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act of 2000).
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_3-2
Detailed Description
The US TVPA definition differs from interna-
tional definitions of “human trafficking” in its
narrow focus and privileging of that deemed to
be “sex trafficking.” This both reflects and facili-
tates the priority within the US government
approach to focus on the prosecution of prostitu-
tion. In contrast to the TVPA, international agree-
ments such as the 2000 Palermo Protocol establish
a broader definition of trafficking, allowing for
greater attention to other forms of labor exploita-
tion and an emphasis on the means by which the
exploitation is achieved. The Palermo Protocol
states (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons):
(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruit-
ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a min-
imum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs
The Palermo Protocol put forth one of the first
international reformulations of the definition of
“trafficking in persons” since the 1949 UN Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Per-
sons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of
2 Sex Trafficking

Others, which had focused exclusively on prosti- trafficking cases, despite service providers’ obser-
tution and considered all prostitution, whether vations of more cases of labor trafficking:
voluntary or forced, to be trafficking. The Palermo Federal and state human trafficking data indicate
Protocol, in contrast, recognizes the existence and more investigations and prosecutions have taken
possibilities of both voluntary and forced prosti- place for sex trafficking than labor trafficking; how-
tution. The Palermo delegates had agreed that ever, victim service providers reported assisting
significantly higher numbers of foreign national
involuntary participation in prostitution consti- victims in cases of labor trafficking than in cases
tutes trafficking, but the majority of delegates of sex trafficking. . . (http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/
rejected the idea that voluntary participation by tiprpt/2012/)
adults in prostitution should be identified as traf-
Anti-trafficking advocates across the USA
ficking and thus left the definition of “prostitu-
consistently report that in the USA, domestic
tion” ambiguous to allow for different
work is the industry in which people are most
interpretations by nation-states. The language of
commonly trafficked, not sex work. One of the
the TVPA does not allow for such open interpre-
foremost anti-trafficking organizations in the
tation or the autonomy of other states in defining
country, CAST (the Coalition to Abolish Slavery
prostitution and trafficking. This poses a concern
and Trafficking), reported that among the traffick-
that the TVPA precludes the possibilities offered
ing survivors they have served in the Los Angeles
and originally intended by the delegates in creat-
region, 40 % were in domestic work, 17 % in
ing the terms of the Palermo Protocol and may
factory work, 17 % in sex work, 13 % in restaurant
lead to the assumption or bias in anti-trafficking
work, and 13 % in servile marriage (McMahon
policy or practice that all prostitution is traffick-
and Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking
ing, regardless of whether participation in this
2002). Despite these reports, US government anti-
labor is voluntary or not (Chang and Kim 2007).
trafficking efforts have continued to be focused on
Many scholars and advocates suggest that the
sex trafficking, which continues to be conflated
lack of a consistent definition of trafficking rein-
with prostitution.
forces the tendency within US government poli-
The US focus on sex trafficking has been
cies and practices to conflate human trafficking
imposed globally through restrictions that require
with prostitution and hinders the work of anti-
any foreign nongovernmental organizations
trafficking advocates in combating trafficking
(NGOs) receiving US federal funding to sign on
and protecting the rights of trafficking survivors.
to the “antiprostitution” pledge, attesting that they
Furthermore, many argue that this conflation has
do not support the practice or legalization of pros-
facilitated the use of these policies to criminalize
titution. Scholars and advocates argue that this
prostitution, rather than to combat human traffick-
reinforces the criminalization of prostitution and
ing. Finally, the US government approach to traf-
implies the criminalization of any activity in sup-
ficking has been dominated by a focus on
port of or serving sex workers. This hinders the
prosecution of participants in the sex industry, work of some anti-trafficking organizations as
within the “prevention, protection and prosecu-
well as sex worker rights organizations. It has
tion” framework (Chang and Kim 2007).
forced some international NGOs to forego US
The disproportionate focus on prosecution of funding in order to continue to provide essential
traffickers and search for potential victims of sex
services to sex workers or has led others to dis-
trafficking may leave many victims of trafficking
continue these services in favor of continued
in sectors other than the commercial sex industry funding (Chang and Kim 2007).
without due attention, recognition, or protections.
The US government has also pressured other
The 2012 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report,
countries to adopt the focus on “sex trafficking”
produced annually by the US State Department through international “prevention” measures that
to assess efforts to combat trafficking in the USA,
are mandated, monitored, and enforced by the US
notes the prevalent focus on prosecuting sex
State Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Sex Trafficking
Report (U.S. Dep’t of State). The TIP Report
ranks countries’ performance in preventing traf-
ficking based on their compliance with anti-
trafficking measures endorsed by the USA. The
US government sanctions countries with lower
tier rankings, while offering higher ranked coun-
tries funding to aid their anti-trafficking efforts.
Rankings are determined largely by each
country’s adoption of the major elements of the
US anti-trafficking approach: prostitution/traf-
ficking conflation, level of focus on prostitution,
and emphasis on prosecution.
The case of Korea provides a good illustration
of the consequences of the US government’s
antiprostitution and prosecutorial approach as
imposed internationally. Advocates report that
the Korean government has defined human traf-
ficking, in legal terms, only as prostitution. This
interpretation did not change subsequent to the
Palermo Protocol and was reinforced after intro-
duction of the TVPA. After Korea’s initial low
ranking as a Tier 3 country in 2001, the Korean
government responded by establishing an inter-
ministry task force to combat trafficking and sub-
sequently introduced a prostitution prevention
law. Despite protests by sex worker rights groups,
Korea instituted a sweeping antiprostitution law,
the first of its kind since 1961. The law included
prison sentences and fines for traffickers and for
women in the sex industry. Encouraged by its
subsequent higher ranking at Tier 1, the Korean
government set a goal ultimately to eliminate
prostitution. This illustrates the large-scale nega-
tive impact of the antiprostitution and
prosecution-oriented framework of the TVPA
and other US trafficking policy globally (Cheng
2005).
Other government practices focused on prose-
cution within the sex industry, such as the domi-
nant model of “raid and rescue” tactics in and
outside of the USA, negatively impact both survi-
vors of trafficking and migrant workers voluntar-
ily engaged in sex work. One “raid and rescue”
case in the USA, dubbed Operation Gilded Cage
and reported to be the largest “sex trafficking”
case in the history of the USA, illustrates this
pattern (U.S. Dep’t of Justice). In July of 2005,
law enforcement agents raided ten brothels in San
3
Francisco identified as suspected trafficking sites
and “rescued” over 120 women. Authorities
detained the women at a military base in Califor-
nia, while federal officials questioned them to
determine their status as possible victims of traf-
ficking, before calling in trained service providers
24 h later. By the time advocates arrived, federal
officials had already decided that the majority of
the women were not legal victims of trafficking
and placed them in immigration detention (Kim
K (2006) Interview. 7 October).
Advocates were able to convince officials to
interpret the law more broadly in screenings of the
remaining women, in direct conflict with the nar-
row federal framework. In this case and others,
advocates report that when clients identify them-
selves as voluntary or consenting participants in
their migration or employment at any point,
authorities deem them ineligible for benefits
under T-visas as legal victims of trafficking. If
clients do not fit traditional conceptions of invol-
untary or non-consenting victims, they may face
deportation, like many of the women in the Oper-
ation Gilded Cage case. Advocates also comment
that often they can only secure certifications from
law enforcement agents enabling their clients to
apply for T-visas if their clients cooperate exactly
as law enforcement demands during the investi-
gation and prosecution process. Authorities
deprived one woman “rescued” in Operation
Gilded Cage of trafficking victim status, citing
that she was “uncooperative,” after she decided
that she did not wish to cooperate with law
enforcement and instead, return to Korea. Author-
ities also denied her the ability to return to Korea
and held her in jail as a material witness for the
case (Leigh 2005).
Comprehensive research by Melissa Ditmore
of the Sex Workers Project (SWP) (Ditmore 2009)
of the Urban Justice Center in New York has
similarly documented the ineffectiveness and neg-
ative consequences of such raids through inter-
views with migrant sex workers and trafficked
persons, social service providers (including case-
workers and attorneys), and law enforcement per-
sonnel (including federal and immigration agents)
(Ditmore 2009). The interviewees identified the
criminal justice approach to trafficking as a major
4 Sex Trafficking
problem, as it focuses on finding people to prose-
cute, rather than on victims’ needs and rights.
Those who were targeted in raids experienced
them as chaotic and traumatic and often experi-
enced further trauma in subsequent detention. The
research found that police and the criminal justice
system have not been effective in either identify-
ing or helping victims of trafficking, noting that in
a number of cases, “trafficked sex workers have
been arrested multiple times without ever being
identified as victims of trafficking.”
The report concludes that many of those who
self-identified as being trafficked were able to help
themselves, that the service providers who
reported such cases did not learn of them as a
result of raids, and that people familiar with sex
work and those who have experienced trafficking
situations themselves are better able to identify
victims of trafficking. Thus, it recommends that
anti-trafficking efforts be focused on building
public awareness within sex worker and immi-
grant communities about resources available to
people in coercive situations, instead of the cur-
rent prevalent practice of raids.
These examples reflect the potential negative
impacts of US anti-trafficking policies and prac-
tices, both in the USA and globally, when traffick-
ing is conflated with prostitution. The US
government’s focus on trafficking for prostitution,
and the assumption that prostitution is involuntary
in all cases, has led to an inordinate emphasis on
the prosecution of prostitution. This emphasis
often results in human and labor rights abuses
against exploited workers who are consenting
adults in sex work and other industries yet may
still face exploitation through labor rights abuses,
poor working conditions, and debt bondage. Such
exploitation should be recognized and addressed
in the identification and treatment of all trafficking
victims. Moreover, all victims of trafficking need
protection, rights, and access to benefits, regard-
less of whether they choose to cooperate with
prosecution efforts or the form of trafficking they
have faced.
References
Chang G, Kim K (2007) Reconceptualizing approaches to
human trafficking: new directions and perspectives
from the field(s). Stanf J Civ Rights Civ Lib 3:318–344
Cheng S Anti-trafficking discourses and policies: a gen-
dered and human rights perspective. Paper presented at
Women’s Worlds 2005 conference, Ewha Women’s
University, Seoul, Korea, 21 June 2005; see also Lisa
Katayama, Sex Trafficking: Zero Tolerance, Mother
Jones Blog, 4 May 2005. http://www.motherjones.
com/news/dailymojo/2005/05/sex_trafficking.html
Cheng S (2010) On the Move for Love: Migrant Enter-
tainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea. Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Ditmore M (2009) The use of raids to fight trafficking in
persons: a study of law enforcement raids targeting
trafficking in persons. Sex Workers Project (SWP) of
the Urban Justice Center, New York. http://sexworker
sproject.org/publications/reports/raids-and-trafficking/
Leigh C, Op-Ed. Behind the moral panic, an opportunity to
work, S.F. Chron., 22 July 2005, at B9
McMahon K, Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking
(2002) Speaking out: three narratives of women traf-
ficked to the United States. Los Angeles
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 29 charged in con-
nection with alien harboring conspiracy (1 July 2005)
Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in
persons, especially women and children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (15 Nov 2000)
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, reauthorized and supplemented by the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–193 and the
TVPRA of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–164
U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in persons report, http://
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/ 2012/
M
Migration Industries, Legal Services,
and Human Smuggling
David Kyle
Davis Sociology, 1282 Social Sciences &
Humanities, University of California, Davis,
CA, USA
Synonyms
Migration business; Migration entrepreneurs;
Migration industries; Migration merchants
Definition
Migration industry: the business of migration or
migration merchants.
Detailed Description
There has been much attention recently in what
has been labeled alternatively the “migration
industry,” the business of migration, or migration
merchants. Much of the literature on international
migration emphasizes either the role of social
networks and social capital or highly stylized
economic explanations. There is growing dissat-
isfaction with conventional models of migration,
even when packaged together within a migration
systems framework, for explaining contemporary
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_5-3
migration patterns generally, and the rise of
migrant smuggling and trafficking specifically.
Apart from focusing on the institutional interme-
diaries, the migration industry concept allows for
an analysis of more asymmetric economic and
political power relationships shaping the migra-
tion process and subsequent patterns of transna-
tional mobility.
The “business of migration” is often used
casually to refer to the mostly legal set of formal
businesses profiting from migration and human
mobility more generally; at times, this is also
used interchangeably with the “migration indus-
try.” However, in both the academic and popular
literatures, migrants and others inhabit either an
entirely legal world facilitated by for-profit busi-
nesses and nonprofit organizations in which they
follow the regulations and laws or they use crim-
inal syndicates who smuggle them. In contrast,
the migration industry concept includes a broader
set of actors (variously labeled “migration mer-
chants” or migration entrepreneur), but also
potentially blurs the lines between legal and ille-
gal businesses, recognizing that migrations are
shaped by the complex interplay of economically
motivated individuals and organizations, the
legal frameworks established by states, and the
culturally embedded rationality of migrants
themselves.
There is widespread agreement about the core
definition of the migration industry. Kyle defines
a “migration merchant” as anyone (individual or
organization) profiting from the commodification
2 Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling
of the migration process, legally or illegally,
without specifying the many commercial activi-
ties connected to migration and transnational
social life in sending, transit, and destination
regions (Kyle 2000). Similarly, Castles and
Miller define the migration industry as “a broad
spectrum of people who earn their livelihood by
organizing migratory movements. . . . [including]
travel agents, labor recruiters, brokers, inter-
preters, housing agents, immigration lawyers,
human smugglers (like the “coyotes” who guide
Mexican workers across the Rio Grande, or the
Moroccan fishermen who ferry Africans to
Spain), and even counterfeiters who falsify offi-
cial identification documents and passports”
(Castles and Miller 2009).
Hernández-León’s definition of a “migration
entrepreneur” is similar to Kyle’s notion of a
migration merchant, including an emphasis on
embedded social relationships, though its rubric
is restricted to co-ethnic relationships and the
term is reserved for individuals. For Hernández-
León, a migration entrepreneur is “a distinct type
of ethnic entrepreneur who specializes in the
migration-driven mobility of people, remittances,
and goods across international borders and mov-
ing between formality and informality, legality
and illegality, depending on the activity, financial
resources, and other circumstances” (Hernández-
León 2008). A migration industry, then, is the
“ensemble of entrepreneurs who, motivated by
the pursuit of financial gain, provide a variety of
services facilitating human mobility across inter-
national borders” (Hernández-León 2008).
These migration industries consist of the spe-
cialized services that have arisen in response to
migration challenges and opportunities, becom-
ing significant players in the perpetuation of the
flow. Some of the common features of organiza-
tions that make them attractive and even neces-
sary to contemporary migration within this mix
are the higher levels of ongoing trust formalized
in ways that transcend the concept of “social
capital.” And, for the very same reasons that
organizations have proliferated in every area of
social life today, they also prevail in migration
industries. They can be tailored to the unique
demands of regional, economic, political, and
social dimensions growing or diminishing in
size, developing or eliminating new products or
services, and dynamically engaging with part-
ners, subcontractors, and other migration indus-
try actors in an ever-changing economic and
policy environment.
How the role of migration industries evolves
in relation to state immigration policies and
enforcement strategies is most striking in the
case of Mexico. Until the 1990s, most Mexican
migrants and others coming from further south
quite often crossed the border without a guide or
coyote; if they used a coyote, it was more out of
convenience. However, in the 1990s, it became
increasingly desirable as it would increase one’s
chances in successfully crossing the
border – today, it is rare not to use a smuggler
or intermediary organization. With higher and
higher smuggling fees, the direct costs of the
transportation of the journey is now only a
minor part of the total cost, especially when
interest on smuggling debts is included. Mexican
emigration, as striking as it may be, however,
may not provide the most appropriate model for
understanding the current and future role of
migration industries connecting sending and des-
tination regions without the long-standing ties or
long contiguous border of the USA and Mexico.
Specifically, the Mexico case may lead one to
view migration industries as mostly responsive
rather than as robust actors shaping many features
of the migratory circuit, including initiating it.
To the extent that a migration industry’s inde-
pendent impact in shaping many aspects of
migration patterns in ways that transcend either
supply–demand models, or more sociological
social network models, is debatable, we may
conceptualize a “weak” versus more “robust”
model of migration industries. In the weak ver-
sion, migration entrepreneurs are more or less
neutral middlepersons profiting from migration
services without fundamentally shaping migra-
tion systems in significant ways. For this reason,
this view would also not attribute to contempo-
rary migration industries much historical signifi-
cance in that similar migration entrepreneurs
have operated for centuries.
Migration Industries, Legal Services, and Human Smuggling
Under a more robust conceptualization, the
combination of punitive and restrictive immigra-
tion policies, while giving economic markets
more power to organize nearly all aspects of
social and political life, leads to novel forms of
migration industries that increasingly act as gate-
keepers and exert much sway over the evolution
of migration flows. Thus, Castles and Miller note
that “[Their] development. . .is an inevitable
aspect of the social networks and the transna-
tional linkages which are part of the migratory
process . . . . [and] in time, the migration industry
can become the primary motive force in a migra-
tory movement” (Castles and Miller 2009).
Today, in addition to crossing borders,
migrants must also navigate various legitimate
and illicit intermediary organizations – it is
nearly impossible to migrate without an organi-
zation, whether it is to help in navigating state
bureaucracies such as immigration and labor
agencies or crossing borders using legal transpor-
tation or illicit smuggling strategies. Like the rise
of bureaucracies everywhere, once the logic and
capacity of organizations to successfully compete
in transnational markets have taken hold, apart
from the initial conditions from which they arose
connecting supply with demand, they increas-
ingly begin to play more of a gatekeeping role
and assert strategic control over sectors, terri-
tories, and modes of transportation.
There is a growing parallel not simply histor-
ically with past migration services, but specifi-
cally a global revival of a new form of indentured
servitude in which most migrants and refugees
today are expected to have invested large amount
of resources in both their human capital but also
go into debt, often without the protection of the
state. Contemporary migration industries are
much better at profiting from the journey and
usurious financing than profiting from
resettlement or regularization. Even under condi-
tions of global recession, employers continue to
find ways to reach migrant labor they so desper-
ately feel they need (Kaye 2010). The truly novel
aspect of migration industries today is the
increasing power to transform migration into a
3
new indentured servitude with ever-higher smug-
gling fees financed with future earnings. While
the fact of for-profit intermediaries playing a
role – even a significant one – is not entirely
novel in the history of human mobility, these
contemporary examples underscore two signifi-
cant dimensions beyond the sheer numbers they
are able to facilitate: illicit journeys or border
crossings and the fact that they are indebted to
intermediaries or facilitators, not employers.
Profits can now be gained not only from labor at
the destination but extracting more of their
income through the debts, real or imagined,
incurred by the journey itself and by the ongoing
vulnerability of the immigrant population. The
global scale and diversity of this phenomenon is
new and expands the means by which individuals
may be trafficked.
Organizations with the financial, informa-
tional, and above all social resources to either
navigate or overcome state barriers have quietly
taken center stage in the migration process. The
future of migration in the context of climate
change and the resulting social and political com-
plexities will certainly require an appreciation of
the significant role of migration merchants and a
complex migration industry more generally.
Cross-References
▶ Human Smuggling
▶ Human Trafficking
References
Castles S, Miller MJ (2009) The age of migration: inter-
national population movements in the modern world,
4th edn. The Guilford Press, New York/London
Hernández-León R (2008) Metropolitan migrants: the
migration of urban Mexicans to the United States.
University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles
Kaye J (2010) Moving millions: how coyote capitalism
fuels global immigration. Wiley, New Jersey
Kyle D (2000) Transnational peasants: migrations, net-
works, and ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Johns Hop-
kins University Press, Baltimore
C
Child Trafficking
Wendi Adelson
College of Law, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, FL, USA
Synonyms
Child labor; Child trafficking
Definition
Child trafficking is the recruitment, transporta-
tion, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for
the purpose of labor or commercial sexual exploi-
tation. Unlike the trafficking of adults, child traf-
ficking can occur in the absence of threatened or
actual force, coercion, or fraud.
Detailed Description
Child trafficking is “the recruitment, transporta-
tion, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
the purpose of exploitation.” (United Nations
protocol). When children are the victims, child
trafficking has occurred whether or not “threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduc-
tion, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power or a
position of vulnerability or the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht (outside the USA) 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_6-1
of a person having control over another person,”
the means that define trafficking in adults (United
Nations protocol), were used (United Nations
protocol).
According to UNICEF estimates, approxi-
mately 1.2 million children are trafficked world-
wide ever year (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
gl=CA&hl=en&v=ayg8NriNEdU, UnicefUK
Campaign to End Child Exploitation, Last visited
May 25, 2012), accounting for almost 20–50 % of
the world total of human trafficking (However, in
some parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, children
are the majority (up to 100 % in parts of West
Africa). “A Global Report on Trafficking in Per-
sons,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-
trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.
html, Last visited, May 25, 2012; http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf,
page 7). Trafficking in children can occur within
national boundaries, or across international bor-
ders, and can take on many forms. (Antonio Maria
Costa, United Nations Office On Drugs and
Crime, Global Report on Trafficking on Persons,
February 2009, page 7, available at: http://www.
unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf.)
These permutations range from bonded labor,
domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation,
and prostitution to exploitative labor practices in the
restaurant industry and agricultural and industrial
sectors. (UN definition also includes removing
organs. The “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and
2 Child Trafficking
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime” Page 42 http://www.unodc.org/docu
ments/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Con
vention/TOCebook-e.pdf. See also Melynda
Barnhart, Labor Trafficking, Encyclopedia of
Migration (Springer 2013); Grace Chang, Sex Traf-
ficking, Encyclopedia of Migration (Springer
2013).) Each of these types of trafficking involves
the exploitation of a child’s vulnerability for the
purposes of securing their bodies or their labor
for use.
A child is generally defined as a person who has
not yet reached 18 years of age, unless their country
has recognized them as an adult at an earlier age.
(“The Convention defines a “child” as a person
below the age of 18, unless the relevant laws rec-
ognize an earlier age of majority. In some cases,
States are obliged to be consistent in defining
benchmark ages – such as the age for admission
into employment and completion of compulsory
education; but in other cases the Convention is
unequivocal in setting an upper limit – such as
prohibiting life imprisonment or capital punish-
ment for those under 18 years of age.” (UNICEF
2006); The FAQ page of the “Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime” uses the strict “under 18”
definition. http://www.unodc.org/documents/tre
aties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/
TOCebook-e.pdf.) According to UNICEF esti-
mates, 130 million children are born each year,
and in many countries, they represent more than
50 % of the population (UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child). Given global increase in the
population of people under 18 and deepening con-
nections and communication between countries,
children are far more likely now than at any time
in the past to leave their homes in search of better
economic opportunities. This migration can place
children in harm’s way. Recognizing the special
vulnerabilities of children, the law privileges
childhood and carves out special protections for
children. (See Franklin E. Zimring, Juvenile Jus-
tice Standards Project. By the Institute of Judicial
Administration and the American Bar Associa-
tion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (1978).)
Factors that increase children’s vulnerabilities
to being trafficked are similar to those that put
adults at risk. Poverty is an important risk factor,
though poverty alone is not enough (World Bank,
“Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
Additional risk factors include lack of rule of law,
marginalization based on gender, religion, race,
ethnicity, or disability, lack of work or educational
opportunities, political conflict or war, violence,
instability due to natural disasters or climate
change, and poor governance (World Bank,
“Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
The socioeconomic status of their families can put
children at risk. In many parts of the world attitudes
that do not value education for girls put girls at a
heightened risk for trafficking (World Bank,
“Human Trafficking, A Brief Overview,” Social
Development Notes, Conflict Crime and Violence,
No. 122, Dec. 2009, page 11, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/6
012763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
An organization working against child trafficking
in Southeastern Europe also identified violence or
abuse in the home, lack of family support or pro-
tection (e.g., children who were separated from
families or in institutional care), leaving school
early, and having been previously trafficked as
risk factors for children in the region (UNICEF
2005). Within the United States childhood sexual
abuse, exposure to domestic violence, homeless-
ness, and inadequate care or supervision within the
home have been identified as increasing the risks of
children and teens of being commercially sexually
exploited (Chicago Alliance Against Sexual
Exploitation, “Know the Facts: Commercial
Child Trafficking
Sexual Exploitation of Children,” page 2, available
at http://fdff.org/docs/case_facts.pdf).
Despite legal protection for trafficked chil-
dren, exploitation of children for their labor
and sexual services continues worldwide. Pre-
ventative efforts focus on enforcement of child
labor laws, decreasing demand for child sex and
punishing those who solicit sex from minors,
advocating for Fair Trade products, and educat-
ing children about avoiding “too good to be true”
schemes to make money (UNICEF Reference
guide). Patterns have emerged around the
world of scenarios involving trafficked children.
Common patterns involve children who have
been abused at home or are severely
impoverished (World Bank: Social Develop-
ment Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence,
No. 122, December, 2009, page 11 cites poverty
as a key factor, but emphasizes the “poverty
plus” approach, saying that poverty alone is not
enough. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/
244362-1239390842422/6012763-123990579322
9/Human_Trafficking.pdf) and either run away or
are given by their parents to a trusted person to
earn money through work in a restaurant or as a
domestic servant (World Bank: Social Develop-
ment Notes: Conflict, Crimes, and Violence,
No. 122, December, 2009, page 6 http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVE
LOPMENT/Resources/244362-1239390842422/60
12763-1239905793229/Human_Trafficking.pdf.
“There are several identified common patterns for
recruiting victims into sex trafficking,22 which
include but are not limited to 1) a promise of a
good job in another country; 2) a false marriage
proposal turned into a bondage situation; 3) being
sold into the sex industry by parents, husbands or
boyfriends, and 4) being kidnapped by traffickers.
Recruiters are often very familiar persons to the
victims, such as neighbor, friend, a friend of a
friend, boyfriend, acquaintance, and family
friend.23”). The actual scenario is different from
what was promised, and exploitative, either
because it involves the commercial sex industry
or because it involves labor without end, without
just compensation. In cases of bonded labor, very
poor families use the labor of their children, or of the
3
entire family, as collateral against a debt in order to
get a loan (United States Department of Labor).
The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) states that governments must
protect children from exploitation, abuse, and
trafficking in Articles 34 and 35 (UNICEF
2006). 192 countries have ratified the CRC
(UNICEF: Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Frequently Asked Questions, available
at http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.
html). The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child’s Optional Protocol on the
sale of children, child prostitution, and child
pornography became legally binding in January
2002 (UNICEF 2006). More than 100 nations
have signed and ratified the protocol (UNICEF
2006). This protocol expands upon Articles
34 and 35 of the CRC by mandating that gov-
ernments both punish those who buy and sell
children and provide support for trafficked chil-
dren by considering child victims’ best interests
in the criminal justice system and providing
legal, medical, psychological, and financial sup-
port to child victims of trafficking
(UNICEF2006).
Prosecutions involving children are different
than prosecutions involving adult victims of traf-
ficking. In the United States, a T visa is available to
foreign-born victims of human trafficking on a few
conditions (Questions and Answers: Victims
of Human Trafficking T Non-Immigrant Status,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9
bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
9a52923ee5dd3210VgnVCM100000082ca60aR
CRD&vgnextchannel=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnV
CM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited 6/8/12)).
The T visa enables a victim of trafficking without
immigration status to stay in the United States
while prosecutors assemble a case against the traf-
fickers. One of those conditions is that adult vic-
tims must cooperate with law enforcement by
testifying against their traffickers. However, a
child in the same situation is not required to coop-
erate with law enforcement because it is thought
potentially more harmful for a child to recount their
experience with trafficking and to face the traf-
ficker again.
4 Child Trafficking
In the United States, there is federal law on
human trafficking that addresses the role of chil-
dren in the commercial sex industry (Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 22 U.C.S. 7105 §
107 (2000) – need to cite to the reauthor-
izations?). In essence, a child induced to perform
a commercial sex act is considered a victim of
human trafficking. The standard is similar to that
present in cases of statutory rape: a child is unable
to consent to sexual abuse (whether commercial
or not) perpetrated against them. A child is there-
fore unable to consent to being prostituted, and
prostituted children are considered victims of
human trafficking according to US federal law.
These children are victims regardless of their
immigration status or country of origin. In con-
trast, most states in the United States define pros-
titution as a criminal act, meaning that regardless
of the age of the person engaged in prostitution,
they are considered criminals and not victims.
Currently, only a handful of states make any
distinction in culpability based on the age of the
prostituted person. That said, many states are
moving in the direction of having state laws on
human trafficking mirror the federal standard to
ensure that prostituted children receive the ther-
apeutic services and safe living spaces that they
require for recovery (Secure housing remains the
most acute need for trafficked children, as well as
intensive recovery and support services. Florida:
http://www.kristihouse.org/safeharbor.php New
York: Cynthia Godsoe, Finally, There’s a Safe
Harbor, The National Law Journal, November
10, 2008 (available at Lexis Nexis)).
Many different countries and regions of the
world have made efforts to combat child slavery.
These efforts have involved the enactment of
strong antitrafficking laws, increasing investiga-
tions and prosecutions of traffickers, rehabilita-
tion for the victims, and building public
awareness of this crime. For example, the Euro-
pean Union passed a new comprehensive
antitrafficking directive (21011/36/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
5 April 2011 on preventing and combating traf-
ficking in human beings and protecting its vic-
tims.) in 2011 that defines the crime of human
trafficking and sets standards for how EU mem-
ber states should respond to this crime (http://
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/192359.htm
(last accessed June 27, 2012)). This directive
requires that special measures be implemented
to provide child trafficking victims with care
and support based on their vulnerabilities as chil-
dren. In addition, the Organization of American
States has partnered with many other countries to
end human trafficking (http://www.state.gov/j/
tip/4p/partner/ (last accessed June 27, 2012)).
Mauritania has outlawed slavery entirely, and
Mauritius has provided care to children in bonded
labor and helped bring around 2,000 children
back to public school (http://www.state.gov/doc
uments/organization/192596.pdf (last accessed
June 27, 2012)). Many countries around the
world have made laudable efforts to combat
child slavery. However, one enslaved child is
still too many.
Cross-References
▶ Human Trafficking
▶ Labor Trafficking
▶ Sex Trafficking
References
UNICEF (2005) Action to prevent child trafficking in
Southeastern Europe, A preliminary assessment.
Available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Assess
ment_report_June_06.pdf. p. 36
UNICEF (2006) Convention on the rights of the child.
Web. 7 Jun 2012. Available at http://www.unicef.org/
crc/index_30229.html
UNICEF (2012) Convention on the rights of the child,
optional protocol on the sale of children, child prosti-
tution, and child pornography. Available at http://
www.unicef.org/crc/index_30204.html
UNICEF Reference guide on protecting the rights of child
victims of trafficking in Europe, talks generally about
all of these things except fair trade. Available at http://
www.unicef.org/ceecis/UNICEF_Child_Trafficking34-
43.pdf. p. 33
United Nations protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish
trafficking in persons, especially women and children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Organized Crime, general provisions, Article 3(c).
Child Trafficking 5

Available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/conven http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat2/

tion_20traff_eng.pdf bonded.htm#.UI3rW8Ue6So
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs. Forced and bonded child labor.
H
Human Trafficking Policy Responses
Kavitha Sreeharsha
Mountain View, CA, USA
Synonyms
Anti-trafficking legislation; Palermo Protocol;
The three Ps; Trafficking Victims Protection Act
Definition
Human trafficking, or modern slavery, is a pro-
cess in which a person is compelled into service,
psychologically or physically. Formal policy
responses to human trafficking began toward the
end of the twentieth century. Such responses
include multilateral protocols, state legislation,
bilateral agreements, local legislation, adminis-
trative oversight and implementation, and formal
private sector endeavors.
Detailed Description
While perceived as a separate human rights issue,
there is evidence in some countries that slavery
has bridged the span between the era of the trans-
atlantic slave trade and modern slavery. Never-
theless, the estimated numbers of people
currently enslaved, with estimates currently
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_7-1
ranging from 20.9 million to 29 million, require
a coordinated global policy response applied to a
modern context (Data on human trafficking is
methodologically limited and accurate numbers
are difficult to obtain. See Fabrizio Sarrica,
Human Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration
(Springer 2013) (discussing challenges in
research on human trafficking)).
On November 15, 2000, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the “Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children,” also known as
the Palermo Protocol. The Palermo Protocol
notably defined human trafficking as the “recruit-
ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments of benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purposes of exploitation” includ-
ing exploitation of prostitution, forced labor, and
organ removal. The definition in the Palermo
Protocol covers those under 18 years of age who
are exploited as noted without requiring the
means included in the definition.
In addition to establishing a definitional
framework that would be adopted in many coun-
tries, it also created a comprehensive framework
dubbed the three Ps (prevention, prosecution,
and protection) to address human trafficking,
encouraging state parties to enact and enforce
2 Human Trafficking Policy Responses
criminal offenses for human trafficking, develop
protections for trafficking victims including per-
mission to remain in a destination country, and
facilitation of repatriation. The Protocol also
required state parties to create prevention strate-
gies including protection against revictimization.
The adoption of this Protocol signaled the estab-
lishment of a comprehensive global effort to
encourage state parties to enact legislative
responses and coordinate multilateral efforts.
During the same time period, a bill proceeded
in the US Congress and was enacted as the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) on
October 28, 2000. Adopting a framework similar
to the Palermo Protocol, the TVPA included
definitions and a framework to address human
trafficking in the United States including preven-
tion of human trafficking, protection of victims,
and prosecution of human traffickers. The TVPA
established the T visa, which offered foreign-
born victims of a severe form of trafficking in
persons who are cooperative in the investigation
or prosecution of trafficking and meet other
requirements the opportunity to receive tempo-
rary permission to remain and work in the United
States and apply for permanent residence. The
law includes an authorization of funding to
implement these various efforts. Notably for
global efforts, the TVPA also established a
requirement that the US State Department issue
an annual report that evaluates each international
state government’s efforts to comply with “min-
imum standards for the elimination of traffick-
ing,” resulting in the State Department’s Annual
Trafficking in Persons Report.
Following the passage of the TVPA, many US
states began to pass additional state anti-
trafficking laws. While not necessarily compre-
hensive, nearly each US state has enacted legis-
lation to address human trafficking, primarily
focusing on criminal penalties available to state
prosecutors. State laws also include victim ser-
vice provisions and prevention efforts. US states
have adopted their own definitions of human traf-
ficking, which in some case exclude all forms of
trafficking included the US federal definition.
State parties have also begun to enact laws and
strategies to address human trafficking. The
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Traffick-
ing in Persons, especially women and girls, con-
ducts country visits and consults with
international governments (See The Global
Trafficking in Persons Report, UNODC
(2013) (tracking legislative responses to human
trafficking); see also Fabrizio Sarrica, Human
Trafficking, Encyclopedia of Migration
(Springer 2013)).
The US State Department Trafficking in Per-
sons Report, which now also evaluates US
efforts, continues to influence and motivate inter-
national states to enact legislation and improve
implementation. The report, issued annually by
the US State Department’s Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons, evaluates and
ranks the efforts of countries to engage in anti-
trafficking efforts. The report evaluates indicia of
a government’s effort to prosecute trafficking,
protect victims, educate the public, cooperate
bilaterally with prosecutions, monitor and
respond to migration patterns related to traffick-
ing, hold public officials accountable and coop-
erate with related US State Department efforts,
assess percentage of noncitizen trafficking as
insignificant, and monitor and assess these indi-
cia. The report also evaluates a country’s relative
annual progress in these efforts and efforts to
reduce demand for commercial sex. The report
ranks countries into three tiers. Tier 1 countries
are deemed to be in full compliance with the
TVPA’s anti-trafficking standards. Tier 2 coun-
tries are not in full compliance but are making
efforts to come into full compliance. Tier 3 coun-
tries are not in compliance and are not making
significant efforts toward compliance. Tier
3 countries are subject to US sanctions in the
form of the withdrawal of economic assistance,
which has been criticized by some commentators
as ultimately harming victims of trafficking
rather than encouraging governments to increase
anti-trafficking efforts (Janie Chuang, The United
States as Global Sheriff: Unilateral Sanctions
and Human Trafficking, 27 Mich. J. Intl. L. 437
(Winter 2006)).
Substantial gaps remain in human trafficking
policy. For example, some country’s laws do not
penalize all forms of trafficking or they fail to
Human Trafficking Policy Responses
enforce criminal penalties uniformly, leaving
particular sectors such as men and boys, foreign
labor trafficking, or child labor unaddressed.
Many countries fail to comprehensively protect
trafficking victims to the same extent that they
prosecute crimes related to human trafficking.
Furthermore, there is very little formal policy
development to institutionalize some of the best
practices including training in health and educa-
tion sectors, partnership with education and job
training initiatives that prevent human traffick-
ing, and resources to offer high-level services that
prevent re-exploitation.
Countries are beginning to advance formal
mechanisms to offer foreign trafficking victims
to remain and accept employment in their desti-
nation countries. Formal and informal partner-
ships between law enforcement and the NGO
sector are yielding fruitful results to protect the
rights of trafficking victims in concert with crim-
inal justice interventions. Yet, in some cases,
NGO and law enforcement partnerships may
reinforce a “raid and rescue” approach to victim
liberation that may result in harm to victims.
Finally, several countries have engaged in bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements to better address
trafficking spanning and affecting multiple coun-
tries. However, such bilateral agreements may
also result in repatriations of trafficking victims
against their preferred interests.
Policy initiatives involving the private sector
have also evolved. For example, in the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010
(SB 657), California’s state legislature enacted a
law with global reach, reflecting the global nature
of slavery and human trafficking. Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 1714.43. The law requires qualifying retailers
and manufacturers to disclose their efforts to
address slavery in their supply chains. Because
the law reaches companies merely doing business
in California, many companies incorporated or
based outside of California are still obligated to
comply. In September 2012, President Obama
signed Executive Order – Strengthening Protec-
tions Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal
Contracts, to reach and prevent human trafficking
by federal contractors. However, these measures
still lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms.
3
The business community itself is also at the
forefront of efforts to address trafficking involv-
ing their own corporations. In 2006, a coalition of
business leaders came together and established
the Athens Ethical Principles to Combat Human
Trafficking. Many companies have signed onto
these seven principles, which were aspirational in
nature. Building on these principles, in December
2010, the Luxor International Forum endorsed
the Luxor Protocol, which offered guidelines for
the private sector to adhere to the Athens Ethical
Principles. The Athens Ethical Principles and
the Luxor Protocol formed the foundation for
growing private sector interest and leadership in
addressing human trafficking. The goal was to
encourage the business community and govern-
ments to advance the seven ethical anti-
trafficking principles, yet there does not appear
to be a continuing method of evaluation or
enforcement of these principles.
As multilateral agencies, countries and local
governments, and the private sector continue to
develop policies to address human trafficking,
they will undoubtedly move beyond the frame-
work of the initial decade following the Palermo
Protocol and the TVPA to develop practical and
institutionalized solutions that extend beyond
formulaic criminal justice enforcement, protec-
tions, and prevention toward mechanisms that
address the root causes of human trafficking.
Cross-References
▶ Athens Ethical Principles
▶ Executive Order: Strengthening Protections
Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal
Contracts
▶ Luxor Guidelines
▶ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons
▶ The California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act of 2010
▶ Trafficking in Persons Report
4 Human Trafficking Policy Responses
Further Readings
Executive order – strengthening protections against traf-
ficking in persons in federal contracts (2012). Avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2012/09/25/executive-order-strengthening-protections-
against-trafficking-persons-fe
Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in
persons especially women and children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/53/383
(2000). Available at http://www.uncjin.org/Docu
ments/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/conven
tion_%20traff_eng.pdf
The athens ethical principles (adopted January 23, 2006).
Available at http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.
com/?page_id=77
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of
2010 (codified in sections of the California state code.)
The luxor protocol (2010). Available at http://www.
endhumantraffickingnow.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/08/The-Luxor-Protocol.pdf
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, P.L. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as
amended in various sections of the U.S.C.)
UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, 15 November 2000
L
Labor Migration
Mathias Sinning1 and Massimiliano Tani2
1
The Australian National University, Canberra,
ACT, Australia
2
The University of New South Wales (Canberra),
Canberra, Australia
Definition
International labor migration refers to the move-
ment of individuals from one country to another
for employment and other economic reasons that
often may be inseparable from reasons such as
family reunification, education, and seeking ref-
uge or asylum. Labor migration is regulated by
selective immigration policies of destination
countries and may affect economic and social
conditions in source and destination countries.
An increasing number of international labor
migrants are temporary workers who return to
the source country after a certain period of time.
Detailed Description
Labor migration affects most countries in the
world. People do not necessarily find employment
or employment adequate to support themselves
and their families where they normally live,
while other places face local shortages of workers
and offer attractive job opportunities. Labor
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_9-1
migration, as a notion, emerges as a spatial
reallocation to pursue better economic opportuni-
ties relative to those available at the place of
residence.
The International Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, adopted by the
United Nations (UN) General Assembly on
18 December 1990 and which came into force
on 1 July 2003, defines a “migrant worker” as “a
person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State
of which he or she is not a national” (Art. 2.1). As
most UN members, particularly those with the
largest number of immigrant workers, did not
ratify the Convention (United Nations 2013), the
definition of labor migrant still varies across coun-
tries, affecting the international comparability of
data on labor migration.
Additional sources of internationalçvariation
in the definition of labor migration include
(a) different usages of the concepts of “residence”
(the minimum length of time to record someone
leaving or arriving in a region may not match
between origin and destination) and “nationality”
(which can be based on where a person is born, jus
soli, or the nationality of the parents, jus
sanguinis), (b) whether employment information
is collected on the basis of where someone lives
(national concept) or works (domestic concept)
(examples of countries which adopted the domes-
tic concept are Germany, the Netherlands, and the
UK), and (c) minimum and maximum working
2 Labor Migration
ages which vary according to national practices in
relation to the end of compulsory schooling and
the retirement age. Movements of illegal and
undocumented migrants which the UN Conven-
tion includes in its definition of “migrant workers”
tend to be reported separately, if at all, from offi-
cial statistics on labor migration.
The estimated stock of international migrants
worldwide increased considerably during the
recent decades of globalization from nearly
156 million in 1990 to about 214 million in
2010. As a percentage of world population, it
grew only slightly from 2.9 % in 1990 to 3.1 %
in 2010 (United Nations 2011). The expansion in
international migrants lagged far behind those of
international trade and capital flows, with global
exports growing by more than 300 % and foreign
direct investment by more than 500 % over the
same period (IMF 2012; OECD 2012). In 2010,
about 60 % of international migrants resided in
economically more developed regions, where
they constitute 10.3 % of the population. Interna-
tional migrants make up only 1.5 % of the popu-
lation in economically less developed regions
(United Nations 2011).
People movements do not necessarily repre-
sent labor movements, and labor migration may
or may not include movements of workers that can
be accounted for as either a flow of a factor of
production or a service. If labor migration is
related to an employment contract (contract of
services), then it is accounted for as a movement
of labor, regulated by employment and immigra-
tion laws of the place of destination. If labor
migration is bundled with the provision of a ser-
vice (contract for services), the World Trade Orga-
nization in the General Agreement for the Trade of
Services (GATS) Mode 4 (Movements of Natural
Persons) argues that it should be treated as a
service, and hence be governed by trade legisla-
tion (e.g., Charnovitz 2003). As identical tasks
can be performed using alternative contractual
engagements with different normative obligations
and costs, labor migration statistics may omit
some movements of highly specialized workers
occurring because of globalization, outsourcing,
and technical change. (The GATS makes no pro-
visions for either self-employed temporary
migrants or foreign citizens temporarily employed
by a domestic company. Hence identical services
delivered by the same person under an employ-
ment contract with a local company or a services
contract with a foreign provider may be treated
differently (Charnovitz 2003).)
Labor migrants may enter their destination
country through various channels. In many coun-
tries most labor migrants enter under family
reunification schemes (Lucas 2008). In addition,
international students have become a rapidly
increasingly part of international migrants. The
estimated number of international students world-
wide grew from about 1.8 million in 2000 to 2.8
million in 2007 (Altbach et al. 2009). Regardless
of the program under which they arrive, interna-
tional migrants often work. International migrants
entering through reunification schemes typically
exhibit high labor force participation rates. Many
international students have jobs while studying
and they often stay in their destination countries
for employment after graduation. Refugees in
higher-income countries participate in the labor
force, although asylum seekers often do not have
the right to work.
Despite attempts to barricade international bor-
ders to limit international migration, irregular
migration of undocumented workers represents a
considerable part of international migration
around the world. Moreover, many international
labor migrants return to their home countries after
a certain period in the destination country. Return
migrants are not only temporary visa holders but
also “permanent” settlers who decide to return to
their country of origin. Over the last decades, the
number of temporary migrant workers around the
world has increased considerably (Lucas 2008). In
particular, the globalization process has increased
the dependence of employers on temporary
migrant workers and induced a growth in the
number of temporary migrant worker programs
in destination countries, mainly in low-skilled
sectors such as agriculture, construction, the
food industry, and services (Baruah and
Cholewinski 2006).
Labor migration is a flow concept, though both
flow and stock of labor migrants at different points
in time are studied. The two key interests of the
Labor Migration
literature on labor migration are documenting the
flows of workers and identifying their determi-
nants and impacts in both places of origin and
destination. Several studies are carried out by
institutional organizations such as the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, which promotes
“decent and productive work opportunities” for
migrants; the International Office for Migration,
which promotes good practices in “migration
management”; as well as the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development among others,
which have labor migration and labor market
units.
Two distinct theoretical approaches have char-
acterized studies of labor migration since the
1960s. The first is a neoclassical economic
approach, which models labor migration as an
optimization choice carried out by individual
agents (Lee 1966) or households (Stark and
Bloom 1985). Labor migration is determined by
the economic incentive of higher discounted earn-
ings available in the place of destination once
transport/lodging, psychological/social (e.g., no
friends and family), and uncertainty costs associ-
ated with the move are netted out (Hatton and
Williamson 1998; Borjas 1994; Chiswick 2005;
Freeman 2006). The second is a heterodox eco-
nomics/historical/structuralist approach (Castles
and Kosack 1973; Massey 1988) whereby institu-
tional forces associated with the development of a
capitalist production system cause an almost insa-
tiable demand for migrant labor, which therefore
emerges from institutional/systemic circum-
stances rather than rational individual choices.
Between these two competing interpretations,
some relevant work has addressed specific deter-
minants of labor migration, while others have
tried to combine elements of these two approaches
(e.g., summary in Abreu 2010). More recently, the
development of large and detailed datasets on
migrants and advancements in statistical analysis
have contributed to identifying key individual and
institutional determinants of labor migration, pro-
viding a better understanding of this phenomenon.
Within the neoclassical economic framework,
microeconomic studies have posited that labor
migration occurs when there is a difference in
3
expected earnings (average wage weighted by
the probability of being unemployed) between
places of origin and destination (Harris and
Todaro 1970). Interregional differences in income
distribution also matter when places of origin and
destination have similar average earnings because
income dispersion is viewed as a proxy of an
individual’s skills and abilities. As a result, given
a level of observable characteristics, workers in
the upper part of a compressed income distribu-
tion will have an incentive to migrate to places
with higher income inequality, while those on the
lower part of the compressed distribution will
have no incentive to migrate. In other words,
labor migrants self-select (Roy 1951; Borjas
1994) and take advantage of different earning
opportunities caused by an uneven spatial distri-
bution of jobs. Under this interpretative frame-
work, labor migration is akin to an investment in
the pursuit of optimal returns to one’s human
capital. Regions may hence experience contem-
poraneous in- and outflows of workers and wide
differences between their gross and net migration
rates (Sjaastad 1962).
Macroeconomic theoretical models have ana-
lyzed labor migration as a complement or substi-
tute of trade in other factors or commodities in
perfectly competitive markets (Mundell 1957;
Markusen 1983; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983).
In models of imperfect competition, workers
migrate in response to agglomeration externalities
exploited by firms locating near their market
(Krugman 1991).
International labor migration affects economic
conditions in sending and destination countries. In
destination countries with a flexible wage struc-
ture, such as the USA, there is some evidence that
immigration may lower the wage of competing
workers. Evidence on countries with a more rigid
wage structure and stronger influence of unions in
the wage-setting process, such as many European
countries, suggests that immigration may increase
unemployment. However, in both cases, labor
market effects of immigration are rather small.
From an economic perspective, migrant
workers do not only constitute factors of produc-
tion but are also consumers, and their arrival in the
destination country may increase demand for all
4 Labor Migration
factors of production, including migrant labor. By
paying taxes and receiving state support, they may
also have a sizeable impact on the fiscal balance of
the destination country. In addition, labor
migrants have the potential to foster technical
progress by the introduction of new ideas and
knowledge. On balance, empirical studies on the
impact of immigration on these outcomes have
generated mixed results (Bodvarsson and Van
den Berg 2009).
The economic impact of labor migration on
destination countries relies heavily on the rela-
tionship between individual skills of migrant
workers and labor market needs. Consequently,
several traditional immigration countries, includ-
ing Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have
introduced a point scheme to select immigrants
on the basis of their skills to improve the match
between foreign-born workers and skill require-
ments in the domestic labor market. Other coun-
tries, such as the USA, require prior job offers for
some visa categories to ensure a close match
between migrant workers and the demand of
employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed coun-
tries, which typically face a declining working-
age population, require skilled workers. As a con-
sequence, these countries have started to compete
for skilled workers in the international labor mar-
ket (OECD 2010).
The effects of international labor mobility on
the population in the sending countries also
depend on the skill profiles of international labor
migrants. On the one hand, the departure of skilled
emigrants, commonly referred to as “brain drain,”
is considered as a serious cost of immigration for
the sending countries. A number of policies have
been suggested to address the problems related to
the phenomenon but very few are actually in
place, partly because there is a lack of consensus
on the actual costs and benefits of the brain drain
for sending and destination countries (Bodvarsson
and Van den Berg 2009). On the other hand,
remittances have become an enormous source of
external funding for many developing countries,
exceeding three times the size of official develop-
ment assistance in 2010 (Ratha and Silwal 2012).
Highly skilled emigrants typically earn relatively
high wages that allow them to transfer large sums
to their country of origin, but less skilled emi-
grants are usually those who send remittances to
lower-income families (Lucas 2008).
Cross-References
▶ Brain Drain
▶ Circular Migration
▶ Economic Migration
▶ Illegal Migration
▶ International Migration
▶ Labour Mobility
▶ Migration
▶ Permanent Migration
▶ Skilled Labour Migration
▶ Temporary Migration
References
Abreu A (2010) The new economics of labor migration:
beware of neoclassicals bearing gifts. Springer
online http://www.academia.edu/349009/The_
New_Economics_of_Labor_Migration_Beware_of_
Neoclassicals_Bearing_Gifts
Altbach PG, Reisberg L, Rumbley LE (2009) Trends in
global higher education: tracking an academic revolu-
tion. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), Paris
Baruah N, Cholewinski R (2006) Handbook on
establishing effective labour migration policies in
countries of origin and destination. Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM), International
Labour Office (ILO), Vienna
Bhagwati J, Srinivasan TN (1983) On the choice between
capital and labour mobility. J Int Econ
14(3–4):209–221
Bodvarsson OB, Van den Berg H (2009) The economics of
immigration – theory and policy. Springer, Berlin/
Heidelberg
Borjas GJ (1994) The economics of immigration. J Econ
Lit 32(4):1667–1717
Castles S, Kosack G (1973) The function of labour immi-
gration in Western European Capitalism. New Left Rev
73(1):3–21
Charnovitz S (2003) Trade law norms on international
migration. In: Aleinikoff TA, Chetail V (eds) Migration
and international legal norms. T.M.C. Asser Press, The
Hague, pp 241–253
Chiswick, Barry R (2005) The Economics of Immigration.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing
Labor Migration
Freeman R (2006) People flows in globalization. J Econ
Perspect 20(2):145–170
Harris J, Todaro M (1970) Migration, unemployment and
development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev
60(1):126–142
Hatton TJ, Williamson JG (1998) The age of mass migra-
tion: causes and economic impact. Oxford University
Press, New York/Oxford
IMF (2012) IMF Data mapper: international financial statis-
tics, International Monetary Fund (IMF). http://www.imf.
org/external/datamapper/index.php. Accessed 4 Oct 2012
Krugman PR (1991) Geography and trade. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA/London
Lee E (1966) A theory of migration. Demography
3(1):47–57
Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a glob-
alizing economy. Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace. Working Paper No. 92
Markusen JR (1983) Factor movements and commodity
trade as complements. J Int Econ 14(3–4):341–356
Massey D (1988) Economic development and international
migration in comparative perspective. Popul Dev Rev
14(3):383–413
Mundell RA (1957) International trade and factor mobility.
In: Bhagwati J (ed) International trade. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA/London, pp 321–335
OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Paris
OECD (2012) Most recent FDI statistics for OECD and
G20 countries. Organization for Economic
5
Co-operation and Development (OECD). www.oecd.
org/investment/statistics. Accessed 4 Oct 2012
Ratha D, Silwal A (2012) Remittance flows in 2011 – an
update. migration and development brief
no. 18, migration and remittances unit. The World
Bank, Washington
Roy AD (1951) Some thoughts on the distribution of
earnings. Oxf Econ Pap 51(3):135–146
Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migra-
tion. J Polit Econ 70(5):80–93
Stark O, Bloom D (1985) The new economics of labour
migration. Am Econ Rev 75(2):173–178. Papers and
proceedings of the ninety-seventh annual meeting of
the American Economic Association
United Nations (2011) Trends in international migrant
stock: migrants by age and sex. United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Popula-
tion Division (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/
Stock/Rev.2011)
United Nations (2013) http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&
chapter=4&lang=en
Further Reading
Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward
sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the
labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374
World Bank (2012) World development indicators 2012.
The World Bank, Washington
Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we
know? Oxford University Press, Oxford
R
Reservation Wages and Immigrants
Mathias Sinning
The Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia
Definition
A reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at
which a worker is willing to accept a particular
type of job. Reservation wages are important in
the context of immigration because they may
affect the immigration process at various stages,
including the individual decision to migrate, the
economic integration of immigrants in their des-
tination country, the labor market success of the
native-born population, and the attitudes of the
native-born population toward immigration.
Detailed Description
Reservation wages may influence the individual
decision to migrate. Although migration deci-
sions depend on numerous factors, economists
typically view wage differentials between source
and destination countries as the most important
determinant of international labor migration. In
his seminal article on the costs and returns of
human migration, Sjaastad (1962) studies migra-
tion in a human capital framework, which implies
that workers decide to migrate if the wage in the
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_10-1
destination country exceeds the reservation wage
plus the costs of migration. Economic studies that
extend Sjaastad’s basic framework also recog-
nize the importance of reservation wages. In par-
ticular, Borjas (1987) discusses a framework that
accounts for self-selection of immigrants
resulting from the distribution of human capital
among workers in source and destination coun-
tries. According to this model, the decision to
migrate also depends on differences in income
distributions between source and destination
countries and the extent to which immigrants
may transfer their skills to the labor market of
the destination country.
Reservation wages of immigrants are typically
lower than those of native-born workers. Differ-
ences in reservation wages between native- and
foreign-born workers are not only the result of
sizeable wage disparities between poorer source
and richer destination countries, but may also be
attributed to differences in individual character-
istics. Recent labor migrants often do not possess
relevant country-specific human capital – such as
language skills – and have not received firm-
specific training in the destination country
(Chiswick 1978). Education and labor market
experience acquired in the source country are
typically less valued in the labor market of the
destination country (Friedberg 2000), and many
migrant workers do not even have a license to
apply the skills they acquired in the country of
origin (Chiswick 1978). As a result, a consider-
able nativity wage gap may be observed, which
2 Reservation Wages and Immigrants
typically declines over the settlement process
(Chiswick 1978).
If reservation wages of immigrants are lower
than those of native-born workers, they may have
adverse effects on labor market outcomes of
native-born workers. Economic theory suggests
that immigration may reduce wages or increase
unemployment (or both) if foreign-born workers
are substitutes to native-born workers. The eco-
nomic literature on the effects of immigration
mainly focuses on the empirical analysis of
unskilled immigrants, because they are more
likely to substitute native-born workers than
skilled immigrants. The size of the effects does
not only depend on the substitutability of skills
but also on the wage flexibility in the labor mar-
ket. If wages are highly flexible – such as in the
US labor market – then immigration is expected
to have relatively large wage effects. By contrast,
if wages are more rigid and unions play an impor-
tant role in the wage-setting process – such as in
many European labor markets – then immigration
is expected to increase unemployment. Empirical
studies typically find that immigration has rela-
tively small or no effects on wages and employ-
ment (Borjas 2003; Longhi et al. 2005;
Zimmermann 2005).
Low reservation wages of immigrants are usu-
ally a source of concern and a matter of intense
debate among policy-makers and the
public. Actual and perceived labor market effects
of immigration have important implications for
immigration policies designed to regulate immi-
gration flows and shape immigrant populations.
Since unskilled immigrants are more likely to be
a substitute for native-born workers than skilled
immigrants, many immigration countries, includ-
ing Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have
started to select immigrants on the basis of their
skills. The United States requires job offers for
some visa categories to ensure a close match
between migrant workers and the demand of
employers (Lucas 2008). Many developed coun-
tries, which typically face a declining working-
age population, have started to compete for
skilled workers in the international labor market
(OECD 2010).
References
Borjas GJ (1987) Self-selection and the earnings of immi-
grants. Am Econ Rev 77:531–553
Borjas GJ (2003) The labor demand curve is downward
sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the
labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–1374
Chiswick BR (1978) The effect of Americanization on the
earnings of foreign-born men. J Polit Econ 86:897–921
Longhi S, Nijkamp P, Poot J (2005) A meta-analytic
assessment of the effect of immigration on wages.
J Econ Surv 19:451–477
Lucas REB (2008) International labor migration in a glob-
alizing economy, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, working paper no 92
OECD (2010) International migration outlook. Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Paris
Sjaastad LA (1962) The costs and returns of human migra-
tion. J Polit Econ 70:80–93
Zimmermann KF (2005) European migration: what do we
know? Oxford University Press, Oxford
Further Reading
Borjas GJ (1991) Immigration and self-selection. In:
Abowd J, Freeman R (eds) Immigration, trade, and
the labor market. University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago, pp 29–76
Friedberg R (2000) You can’t take it with you? immigrant
assimilation and the portability of human capital.
J Labor Econ 18:221–251
Harris JR, Todaro MP (1970) Migration, unemployment
and development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev
60:126–142
H
High-Skilled Migration
Robyn Iredale
Australian Demographic and Social Research
Institute, ANU, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Definition
“Highly skilled workers are normally defined as
those having a university degree or extensive/
equivalent experience in a given field” (Iredale
2001, p. 8). According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD SOPEMI 1997, p. 21), it includes highly
skilled specialists, independent executives and
senior managers, specialized technicians or
tradespeople, investors, business people, “key
workers,” and subcontract workers. Individuals
in this category often seek to maximize the return
on their investment in education and/or training
by moving around in search of the highest paid or
most rewarding employment.
Introduction
Highly skilled migrants represent an increasingly
large component of global migration streams. The
phenomenon is not new, but the numbers and
trends have been rapidly changing. Historically
there was skilled mobility between countries
with similar cultures and training systems, such
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_12-1
as between the Commonwealth countries, or from
former colonies to the UK, the Netherlands, and
France. There was a major change in the period
leading up to World War II as Jewish refugees left
Eastern Europe for the USA, Canada, Australia,
and elsewhere. A significant proportion of these
European refugees were highly skilled, and the
arrival of non-British doctors, engineers, and
other professionals led associations/boards in
receiving countries to start developing procedures
to ensure that only “the fully qualified” were
admitted to the profession. “Fully qualified”
often did not extend to Eastern Europeans, and a
large proportion of these skilled refugees in the
1940s and 1950s were destined for unskilled
employment.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the main focus came to
be on “brain drain” and the “losses” that develop-
ing countries allegedly sustained when their
highly skilled workers emigrated permanently to
more industrialized countries. Though some of
these skills went under- or unutilized in receiving
countries, there was still a clear economic benefit
to these countries. In 1970 the monetary value to
the USA from admitting technical and profes-
sional immigrants was estimated at $3.7 billion
(Sassen 1990, p. 191). There were persistent calls
for taxes and levies to compensate sending coun-
tries that were not yet industrially developed for
their human capital losses, but such schemes
received very little favorable attention as they
were seen as unworkable and they were politically
unpopular in receiving countries.
2 High-Skilled Migration
Increasingly, by the 1980s, some countries
came to see skilled migration as a means of filling
skilled labor shortages so as to ensure that eco-
nomic growth was not held back. For others, it
was primarily to improve the “stock” of brains
generally. Papademetriou and Yale-Loehr (1995,
p. 2) argued that more than ever before human
resources constituted as much the wealth of a
company as of a nation and that immigration
should play its proper role in the broader strategy
of making the next century “America’s Century.”
Measuring Skilled Migration
The total number of highly skilled migrants at any
one time is unknown. One of the major problems
in estimating the numbers is that there are many
types of movement: permanent settlement to
immigrant-receiving countries; temporary inter-
national migration within and increasingly out-
side of multinational corporations; and highly
skilled refugee flows and skilled people who
move as part of family reunion policies. Very
few countries take highly skilled migrants on a
permanent basis, but an increasing number have
been seeking them on a temporary basis, suppos-
edly to meet skills shortages until they can train up
their own stock of skilled workers. This opening
of doors to “legally admitted, ostensibly tempo-
rary, high-skilled foreign workers” (Cornelius and
Espenshade 2001, p. 3) has become a global phe-
nomenon. In more recent years it has been
supplemented by the rise of trade in services
under the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and sim-
ilar arrangements. Such trade has largely been
confined to skilled contract service suppliers.
The increased level of mobility is also a man-
ifestation of the internationalization of profes-
sions and professional labor markets and the
desire of many people to move to widen their
skills base and gain more international experi-
ence. Skilled migrants often seek to maximize
the return on their investment in education and
training by moving around in search of the highest
paid and/or most rewarding employment.
Another issue in accurately measuring the
flows is how to define highly skilled migration.
According to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD 1997,
p. 21), highly skilled migrants include specialists,
independent executives and senior managers, spe-
cialized technicians or tradespeople, investors,
business people, “key workers,” and subcontract
workers. Others tend to want to limit “highly
skilled” to professionals with a university degree
or equivalent, but this is a narrow definition that
places too much stress on only the highest level of
formal education. The OECD definition is more
universally acceptable.
Other measurement problems that have been
enunciated by the OECD (2010, p. 31) include:
“movements that appear . . . as temporary are clas-
sified as permanent because the migrants in ques-
tion, for example, intracorporate transfers, are
granted a status that essentially places them on a
permanent migration track. Some movements, for
example, those involving cross border service
providers, may not be explicitly identified. In
still other cases, work assignments are short and
the movements may escape recording entirely.”
Given these difficulties, any attempt at measuring
skilled migration will be fraught with problems.
Until recently, there was no systematic empir-
ical assessment of skilled migration or especially
of the economic impact of the brain drain. The
main reason for this seems to have been the lack of
harmonized international data on migration by
country of origin and education level (Docquier
and Mafouk 2004). One exception was a paper by
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) in which they
estimated 1990 skilled emigration rates for
61 developing countries.
There are two major global approaches to mea-
surement. The first approach takes data that are
available in receiving countries to build up figures
on stocks of skilled immigrants generally or from
particular countries. For example, using OECD
data Stalker (2000, p. 107) estimated that there
were 1.5 million skilled expatriates from develop-
ing countries in Western Europe, the USA, Japan,
and Australia. Docquier and Mafouk (2004) used
a database covering 92.7 % of the OECD immi-
gration stock and showed that in absolute terms
the largest numbers of highly educated migrants
in 1990 and 2000 were from Europe, Southern
and Eastern Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Central
High-Skilled Migration
America. Such data were also used to estimate
emigration numbers or rates of skilled personnel
from particular countries, as a proportion of the
potential educated labor force. The highest brain
drain rates were observed in the Caribbean, Cen-
tral America, and Western and Eastern Africa.
Most data sets on international skilled migra-
tion define skilled migrants according to educa-
tion level, independently of whether education
was acquired in the home or in the host country.
According to Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport
(2006), this led to an overestimation of skilled
emigration/immigration. They introduced immi-
grants’ age of entry (as a proxy for where educa-
tion was acquired) into their statistical analyses.
Using this technique they estimated that six small
(less than four million population) countries in
Africa and the Caribbean suffered losses of over
50 % of their skilled labor force (i.e., they emi-
grated after age 22). For countries with more than
four million population, Haiti suffered the greatest
rate of loss (73.7 %) with Sierra Leone, Mozam-
bique, and Ghana experiencing loss rates in the
40–50 % range.
The second approach involves the national
measurement of skilled migration. This occurs in
some countries by means of tabulating permanent
and temporary visa-issuance figures or arrivals/
departure data, where such data are collected.
These data vary in quality and the categories
used, so they are not universally comparable.
Many countries are only just beginning to
improve their data collection systems so that
they can measure how many skilled migrants are
coming and/or going.
Changing Trends in High-Skilled
Migration
Escalation and Differentiation in High-Skilled
Migration
Whereas “brain drain” was seen by analysts as
being confined to a small set of countries that
were “losers” (e.g., India, Pakistan, the Carib-
bean, and parts of Africa) and to a similarly
small group of countries that were perceived as
“winners” (the UK, the USA, Canada, and
3
Australia), the scale and extent of skilled migra-
tion is now very widespread. Few parts of the
world remain excluded from the systems at
work, and the majority of countries embody both
inflows and outflows. Where the outflows
severely outweigh the inflows, the perception of
brain drain is still very evident, as will be
described later.
While the early skilled migrants were largely
doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, teachers,
and academics, the variety of skilled migrants is
now enormous. These early occupations have
escalated in the size and direction of their flows
and have been joined by a myriad of others. The
outstanding examples are in the information tech-
nology (IT) field where the growth of IT has
created worldwide opportunities and intense com-
petition for skilled workers in this field, leading
many countries to ease restrictions on the entry of
such workers. The German “green card” system is
a good example of this. It would be easier to list
the skilled occupations where there is relatively
little mobility than vice versa. For example, the
legal profession is one that stands out as being
characterized by low levels of mobility as trained
professionals find their skills as usually highly
specific to particular jurisdictions. However,
even this is changing with the growth of interna-
tional business, trade and the provision of services
across international borders.
The Rise of Temporary Migration
Early skilled migrations were generally seen as
permanent though some did return home or move
on elsewhere. One of the most dramatic changes
in recent decades has been the rise of “temporary”
skilled migration. For example, the “number of
temporary workers entering OECD countries was
approximately 2.3 million in 2008, significantly
higher than the number of permanent labor
migrants, which stood at roughly 1.5 million.
A significant proportion of this migration
occurred between OECD countries” (OECD
2010, p. 30). Australia’s skilled migration pro-
gram has undergone a revolution: temporary
skilled migrant arrivals rose from 48,610 people
(including dependants) in 2004–2005 to 110,570
4 High-Skilled Migration
in 2007–2008, compared with permanent arrivals
of 108,500 in 2007–2008 (Hawthorne 2011).
This change has been facilitated by a number
of factors. First, the development of new visa
entry categories, often based on points systems,
has enabled short-term migration of skilled (and
sometimes unskilled) workers. Many countries
now have complex arrangements to enable tem-
porary skilled migrants to enter for a specified
period. They are constantly evolving as new
shortages emerge or other pressures lead to
changes in critical shortages lists or methods of
selecting skilled employees.
Second, the rise of more varied methods of
selection has been used to expedite migration in
areas of high demand and where this does not
disadvantage local workers. In the USA, the
major avenue for large-scale temporary entry has
long been the H1-B visa scheme (no assessment
of qualifications but must hold university degree),
which admitted 462,000 in 2007 and 410,000 in
2008, along with many other visa types. “The US
Department of Labor certifies employer applica-
tions for both permanent and temporary foreign
workers. Certification procedures vary according
to the type of visa requested, but generally require
that the employer advertise the job or intent to
hire, and meet certain wage conditions to prevent
adverse effects on American workers. Certifica-
tion is required for application for a visa” (OECD
2010, p. 250).
Third, the increased mobility of intracompany
transferees has led to new categories of skills
mobility. “The structure of business, particularly
the process of internationalization by large
employers, is leading to increasing international
mobility among highly skilled employees of these
companies to meet client needs, provide input into
project teams, and aid in professional develop-
ment” (Khoo et al. 2007, p. 480). As companies
become more global and competition for their
location intensifies, OECD countries, for exam-
ple, have increasingly adopted policies to facili-
tate the ensuing secondment of staff: Belgium
amended its work permit conditions to allow
lower management the same benefits as executive
personnel; 2007 legislation in France relaxed the
conditions for granting a residence permit to
intracompany transferees by reducing the period
of secondment from 6 to 3 months; Germany no
longer requires a resident labor market test in the
case of intracompany transferees or their family
members who are posted to Germany, and Poland
introduced new work permits for highly skilled
workers, including intracompany transferees,
with stays of 3–5 years depending on seniority
(OECD 2010, pp. 59–60).
Few countries collect information on intracom-
pany transferees, but the data that are available
show that the annual numbers rose in most coun-
tries between 2000 and 2008: from 3,900 to
10,200 in Canada; from 1,300 to 5,700 in Ger-
many; from 3,900 to 7,300 in Japan; from 6,200 to
7,300 in Switzerland; and from 55,000 to 84,000
in the USA. Only France and Korea registered
falls (OECD 2010).
Fourth, increased transnational accreditation/
recognition with the creation of regional blocs,
such as the European Union (EU), the Australia-
New Zealand Mutual Recognition Agreement
(MRA), and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), has facilitated skills mobil-
ity. The EU introduced measures to achieve gen-
eral mutual recognition and harmonized training
that has enabled skilled workers to move rela-
tively freely within the bloc. The Trans-Tasman
MRA created a mini-common labor market with
mutual reciprocity arrangements in some occupa-
tions and a sharing of resources in others. NAFTA
has few mutual recognition provisions but permits
qualified Canadian and Mexican citizens to seek
temporary entry into the USA to engage in busi-
ness activities at a professional level, providing
the following provisions are met:
• The profession qualifies under the regulations.
• The position in the USA requires a NAFTA
professional.
• There is a prearranged full-time or part-time job
with a US employer (not self-employment).
• The person holds the qualifications of the
profession.
Fifth, increased trade in services, under the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
High-Skilled Migration
other agreements, has dramatically increased the
mobility of temporary service providers. The
GATS covers four modes (1, 2, 3, and 4) of oper-
ation, but modes 3 (commercial presence) and
4 (movement of natural persons) specifically
cater for the cross border mobility of service pro-
viders. At the global level this provides a mecha-
nism for skilled people to move temporarily (for a
defined length of time) to provide a service in
another WTO-member country. Few data are
available on highly skilled service provider
flows, partly because of the difficulty of isolating
these flows from highly skilled migration flows.
The Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has replicated the WTO agreement as a
means of speeding up service provider flows
between its ten member countries. Arrivals and
departures data are at present patchy for ASEAN,
but some data indicate that Singapore and Malay-
sia are currently the two major destinations within
ASEAN. They are both heavily involved in inter-
national business, and the consequent flow of
intracompany transferees is substantial, though
independent movement is also considerable. The
Philippines is the major source of independent
service suppliers – a proportion is highly skilled
and most are destined for non-ASEAN member
states. Emerging economies in ASEAN, such as
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and
Viet Nam, are beginning to benefit from flows of
skilled service suppliers associated with foreign
direct investment (Iredale et al. 2010).
The Role of Educational Services and the Link
to Migration
In recent years there has been a growing aware-
ness of the role played by the international migra-
tion of students in the global mobility system. In
the most popular destination countries, they are
seen by governments as a major source of finance
for educational institutions, thereby reducing the
need for state funding, as well as an important
source of foreign revenue and future skilled immi-
grants. Postgraduates especially are often viewed
as new knowledge creators who will contribute to
economic growth, either directly or indirectly. The
USA has consistently drawn a large number of
both permanent and temporary skilled workers
5
from the flow of international students, averaging
264,200 a year between 2000 and 2008, that it
continues to attract (OECD 2010, p. 251).
Many OECD countries have new measures to
encourage international students to stay and enter
their labor markets, in order to provide the domes-
tic labor market with highly skilled migrants who
have received education in the host country. The
issues of recognition of qualifications and lan-
guage knowledge, which are often obstacles to
high-skilled migration, are largely avoided when
students stay on after graduation. For example, the
Canadian Experience Class, implemented in Sep-
tember 2008, facilitates permanent residence for
international student graduates who have gained
professional and skilled work experience in Can-
ada. Encouragement for international students to
stay and work is also part of the new green card
regime in the Czech Republic. From 2009, those
who have completed secondary or higher educa-
tion in the country no longer need a work permit.
Similarly, those students awarded a masters
degree or a PhD in Italy may request the conver-
sion of their residence permit for study purposes
to a work or job-seeking permit, valid for a period
of 12 months. Germany and Poland have both
made it easier for international students and
those trained in other countries to gain access to
the labor market, through removing the need for a
resident labor market test. In the UK, post-study
students are part of Tier 1 of the new point-based
system. The category provides a bridge to highly
skilled or skilled work. International graduates
accepted under Tier 1 may stay in the UK and
look for work without needing a sponsor (OECD
2010, pp. 63–64).
Greater Involvement of Governments
Many of these changes have resulted in the
increasing involvement of governments in migra-
tion and tertiary education policy and manage-
ment. Increasingly, countries have sought to
identify workers/students in demand by their pol-
icy formulation. Point-based systems (based on
occupation, work experience, education, age, lan-
guage skills, job offer, finances available, and
intended location) were originally developed in
traditional settlement countries (Australia,
6 High-Skilled Migration
Canada, and New Zealand) in the 1980s to select
permanent migrants from a broad pool of appli-
cants for a limited number of visas available.
These countries continue to periodically review
their points system to adapt them to changing
demands and cater for expanded temporary
migration.
In the past five years, a number of European
countries – the UK, the Netherlands, and
Denmark – have introduced their own points sys-
tems. The recently introduced point-based sys-
tems in Europe are modeled on established
systems, but they introduced several new param-
eters: for example, the UK assesses earnings in the
home country; Denmark and the Netherlands, in
order to overcome the problem posed by assess-
ment of qualifications obtained abroad, use inter-
national survey rankings to classify educational
degrees, and Denmark gives points for experience
gained elsewhere in the European Economic Area
and Switzerland (OECD 2010, p. 59).
These policies are constantly under review, and
in recent years, Australia has moved from “points
tested” to “employer nominated” (similar to the
USA) as the dominant basis of entry so that by
“2009 . . . 70% of Australia’s labor migrants were
employer-sponsored, entering through the tempo-
rary and permanent skilled migration streams”
(Hawthorne 2011, p. 6). Further, recent decisions
in Australia to allow skilled US workers to get
work licenses on arrival instead of in the USA and
the introduction of Enterprise Migration Agree-
ments for large-scale resources projects will both
escalate this trend.
Another role of some governments has been
evident in enabling/encouraging the expansion of
training arrangements to provide skilled workers/
service providers for overseas countries. For
example, in the Philippines nurse production has
not only exceeded the country’s numerical
requirements but focused largely on preparing
practitioners for the health-care needs of devel-
oped nations rather than the public health needs of
the indigenous population (Brush 2010). Explicit
policies to send skilled workers abroad are
increasingly common.
Major Debates and Dilemmas
Brain Drain, Brain Circulation, and Brain Waste
Ongoing debate has prevailed since the 1960s
about the occurrence, scale, and consequences of
“brain drain.” In the 1990s to 2000s, it became
common for many to argue that even if brain drain
occurred it was of little policy concern for devel-
oping countries as the benefits provided by a
diaspora of skilled emigrants potentially
outweighed the loss of human capital resources
through emigration. That is, brain drain should not
be interpreted as a sheer loss to a source country
because in the longer term the country could ben-
efit from return migration if its former residents
brought back foreign knowledge and skills, and
extensive foreign diasporas could be instrumental
in building business/research and other relation-
ships between sending and the receiving coun-
tries. That is, converting “brain drain” into
“brain circulation” [could] play an important role
by facilitating the transfer of foreign technologies
or by helping the development of cultural and
economic ties with other countries (Soubbotina
2004, p. 93). Developing countries were advised
to develop mechanisms for encouraging the actual
or virtual return migration of their qualified
workers.
While some countries, most notably India, Tai-
wan, and China, have clearly benefited from their
diasporas of their skilled expatriate workers,
return of ICT, medical and research workers, net-
works established, and subsequent flows of busi-
ness investment, there is less evidence to support
this argument elsewhere. Sub-Saharan African
countries, Caribbean countries, much of South
America, and parts of Asia argue that they do
not benefit from their diasporas, and brain drain
has not turned into general brain circulation. This
is not to say that in specific fields of scientific
expertise, some countries may make gains from
their foreign nationals. For example, recent
research into scientific networks shows that
some expatriate scientists from less industrialized
countries participate in research related to their
source countries’ development problems, such as
High-Skilled Migration 7

Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Benin
Cape Verde
Congo
Cook Islands
Dominica
Fiji
Grenada
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Liberia
Mozambique
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
UR of Tanzania
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Emigration rate of doctors (%)

High-Skilled Migration, Fig. 1 Rate of emigration of doctors for the 23 most seriously affected countries, 2000
(Source: OECD 2007b)

eradicating malaria or improving crop production. working in unskilled jobs in 2005–2006.

But in order for this to happen, it is necessary to
have sufficient local scientific capacity that is able
to access these dispersed science networks
(Turpin et al. 2008).
Moreover, many skilled emigrants continue to
experience “brain waste” in the destination,
potentially detracting from any possible benefits
of this emigration. For example, in the USA “[h]
ighly skilled European and Asian immigrants”
rates of underutilization approximated those of
natives; Latin Americans fared worse. About
44 % of recent immigrants and 35 % of long-
term immigrants from Latin America were
“African-born skilled immigrants also found
themselves at a disadvantage, having the highest
unemployment rates of all foreign-born groups”
(Batalova et al. 2008, p. 2).
The role of migration in promoting develop-
ment is the subject of ongoing debate about the
scale and usage of remittances, impacts on levels
of investment in human capital and enterprises,
impacts of returning and circulating migrants, and
the role of the diasporas. In relation to migration
of the highly skilled, it is clear that a positive
outcome is dependent on a number of key factors:
rates of return (actual or virtual); networks that
8 High-Skilled Migration
develop between groups of researchers/business
people; and the economic, social, and political
climate in the source country and employment
and social outcomes in the destination. “The
hope that change will be propelled by skilled and
business returnees or non-residents is overly opti-
mistic . . . and ignores the crucial importance that
negative factors play in influencing decisions to
both leave and return: such as the lack of individ-
ual autonomy and freedom, the high level of “red
tapism,” the lack of reward for excellence and
promotion on merit and the general poor level of
governance at the institutional, regional and
national level” (Iredale and Guo 2002, p. 22).
The return migration of skilled and business peo-
ple may play a major role in transforming an
economy and society, but it is in a
complementary way.
Local-National-Global Policies
The situation in some occupations is such that
outflows of skilled migrants are particularly dam-
aging for the source countries and special steps
need to be taken to ameliorate the impacts. By the
late 1990s, the OECD began collecting data from
destination countries that enabled it to estimate the
expatriate rate of doctors and nurses from various
source countries. Studies have found that the most
significant indicator of “loss” is the percentage of
trained doctors who have left a country, or the
emigration rate. Using WHO Global Health
Atlas data on the number of doctors at home and
the number working in OECD countries, the
OECD calculated emigration rates. The 23 most
seriously affected countries are shown in Fig. 1
where it is seen that all have rates above 40 %.
Those with above 50 % emigration rates have
more doctors working in OECD countries than
at home. They could, of course, have doctors
working elsewhere as well, but they do not show
up in the OECD data (For example, most Filipino
doctors and nurses and Sudanese doctors work
outside of OECD countries, in the Middle East
(OECD 2007a, p. 177)).
Figure 1 shows that some Caribbean and
Pacific Islands, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa,
are most affected by the loss of medical practi-
tioners to OECD countries. The most severely
affected, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and
Guyana, had 89.3 %, 72.7 %, and 72.2 %, respec-
tively, of their medical workforces in OECD
countries in 2000. Fiji (58 %) and the Cook
Islands (54 %) from the Pacific feature in the
graph. Five African countries, Mozambique,
Angola, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanza-
nia, (URT) and Liberia, had rates above 50 %.
Countries that have both high emigration rates
and low doctor density ratios (number of doctors
per 1,000 population) are particularly badly
affected: French-speaking African countries,
such as Senegal and Malawi, fall into this cate-
gory. On the other hand, some countries with high
emigration rates may be less impacted as they
have “not-too-low” density ratios: Cuba, Barba-
dos, Bahamas, and some other Caribbean coun-
tries fall into this category.
Other World Health Organization data (2006)
show that 57 “priority” countries are suffering
severe health worker shortages, often
compounded by the out-migration of their pre-
cious health workers. There is now widespread
agreement that the cooperation of all stakeholders
is needed to ensure that migration factors are
addressed coherently to have a positive impact
on the management of the movement of health-
care workers. Discussion of policy implications
has canvassed the major options available for
countries experiencing extreme shortages to
improve the quantity and quality of health
workers: improving national health sectors with
additional (obviously limited) finance; training to
meet local needs; creating new types of practi-
tioners to fill specific roles; bans, bonds, and
taxes; and more managed migration schemes. On
the other hand, recipient country policy options
include improving workplace conditions, increas-
ing training and reducing attrition rates, compen-
sating sending countries for the training costs
embedded in their health workers, encouraging
return migration to countries of shortage, and
making use of their own diasporas. Compensation
for scarce skills gained from overseas could be
addressed by more generous overseas aid to spe-
cific countries. International solutions, such as
codes of ethical recruitment, have limited chance
of producing much effect though the WHO Global
High-Skilled Migration
Code of Practice on the International Recruitment
of Health Personnel (2010) code is unique in its
broad focus and its emphasis on more overseas aid
to support struggling health systems and self-
sufficiency in developed countries.
Conclusion
High-skilled migration has become a very com-
plex and nuanced phenomenon in the twenty-first
century. In part, it has come to be seen in part as
competition between more industrialized coun-
tries for skills, with benefits for receiving coun-
tries being encapsulated in terms such as
“Advantage Canada,” “Benefiting Australia,”
and “America’s Century.” At the same time, they
may complain about the emigration of their own
skilled personnel. On the other hand, less indus-
trialized countries that are faced with the emigra-
tion of many of their skilled workers continue to
voice concern about their human capital losses.
These concerns are not necessarily assuaged by
promises of brain circulation or the benefits of
networks incorporating their skilled expatriates.
The rise of temporary migration has been the
most dramatic part of this process as countries
seek workers to meet short-term needs, not per-
manent migrants that will absorb government
resources or change the ethnic composition of
populations. While some of these temporary
migrants will remain permanently, others may
return home, which could be to the advantage of
less industrialized sending countries. The growth
of trade in services has introduced a new dimen-
sion with short-term flows of service providers
being seen as potentially beneficial for both send-
ing and receiving countries. These flows are less
unidirectional, that is, not only from poorer to
richer countries, and could potentially aid devel-
opment in less industrialized countries. Sending
government selection of countries for the move-
ment of natural persons could be based on which
country offers the best conditions and options for
benefiting the sending country (Mayer 2009).
The globalization of business, the internation-
alization of many occupations, the export of
skilled workers as explicit government policy,
9
and increased regionalism mean that the mobility
of skilled migrants has escalated. The role of
governments has become more complicated as
they seek to balance national and international
interests and responsibilities. And within this
broad framework, the opportunities for skilled
individuals to expand their horizons and more
freely choose their work destination/s mean that
the world is truly now their oyster.
Cross-References
▶ Australian Immigration
▶ Business Migration and Intra-Company
Transfers
▶ Employment-Based Immigration
▶ International Students
▶ Points System
▶ US Immigration Though the Diversity Visa
Program
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P
Pacific Island Countries
and Migration
Carmen Voigt-Graf
Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of
Public Policy, The Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT, Australia
Definition
Pacific Island countries (PICs) refer to the 14 polit-
ically independent island countries located in the
Pacific Ocean which are members of the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat (www.forumsec.org).
These are Cook Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall
Islands (RMI), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The PICs can be divided
into the three cultural regions of Melanesia, Poly-
nesia, and Micronesia.
Introduction
Numerous migration flows cross the Pacific
region and link rural areas with urban areas,
outer islands with main islands, different Pacific
Island countries (PICs) with each other, and with
the Pacific Rim.
PICs are divided into three cultural regions:
Melanesia (including Papua New Guinea, Fiji,
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_19-3
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Polynesia
(including Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga,
and Tuvalu), and Micronesia (including Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Nauru,
Palau, and Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI)).
Proportionate to their home population sizes,
migration has been significant, particularly in the
smaller island states of Micronesia and Polynesia,
and no other region in the world has in recent
decades experienced a larger outflow of their
populations than Polynesia.
In contrast to Polynesians and Micronesians,
there have been few migration opportunities for
Melanesians, with the exception of Fiji citizens.
Population growth rates in Melanesia remain
among the highest in the world. Melanesian coun-
tries have suffered considerable civil unrest, partly
caused by the absence of a migration outlet for
their unemployed youth (Duncan et al. 2006).
Melanesian countries currently experience a
large influx of internal migrants into urban centers
with the associated problems of a rise in squatter
settlements, growing unemployment, increasing
crime and violence, problems with waste disposal,
and breakdown of basic social services.
Current Migration Patterns and Trends
The largest contemporary international migration
flows in the Pacific are those from the islands to
the metropolitan countries of the Pacific Rim.
Migration is primarily a response to real and
2 Pacific Island Countries and Migration
perceived inequalities in incomes, education,
training, socioeconomic opportunities, and
health care.
In postcolonial times, several PICs have con-
tinued to maintain close relationships with devel-
oped Pacific Rim countries which often result in
special residency and work rights. The US grants
free access to citizens of the three Compact States,
FSM, RMI, and Palau. New Zealand has special
relationships with several PICs. Cook Islanders,
Niueans, and Tokelauans are New Zealand citi-
zens with full residential and work rights in New
Zealand.
Both the Cook Islands and Niue have experi-
enced substantial population losses, to the extent
that both actively encourage return migration and,
for Niue at least, there are concerns over future
viability. The population in Niue has declined to
just over 2,000 people while more than 22,000
Niueans live overseas, largely in New Zealand.
Similarly, the Cook Islands recorded a resident
population of 21,000 in 2006 compared to
58,000 Cook Islanders in New Zealand
(Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific
Island Affairs 2010). Due to high emigration
rates, the resident population of the Cook Islands
is projected to fall to less than 10,000 by 2029
(Duncan et al. 2006).
A different migration pattern is prevalent in
Tuvalu and Kiribati where the main overseas
employment opportunity is as seafarers on Ger-
man merchant ships and Asian fishing boats, lead-
ing to a specific form of temporary migration that
ensures the economic survival of these two atoll
states while also leading to less favorable social
implications.
Due to the huge emigration flows particularly
from Polynesia, the smaller island states have
been characterized as MIRAB states, where
development is based on migration generating
remittances and aid financing local bureaucracies
(Bertram and Watters 1985). The MIRAB model
suggests that external sources of financing that do
not leave a residue of debt are the key to economic
performance of small islands.
In many Polynesian countries remittances rep-
resent the main source of foreign income and
reach levels rarely found in other parts of the
world. In 2010, Tonga received 72 million US$
in remittances, equivalent to 19.7 % of the
country’s GDP, while the corresponding figures
for Samoa were 122 million US$ and 22.5 % (The
World Bank). These figures would be even higher
if unrecorded remittances were included.
In recent years, migration opportunities in met-
ropolitan states have increasingly targeted skilled
migrants. Thus migration flows from the Pacific
are increasingly likely to be of skilled migrants
from various sectors including health (Connell
2009) and education (Iredale et al. 2015). In con-
trast to the MIRAB argument that development
patterns in the Pacific, based on migration gener-
ating remittances and aid financing local bureau-
cracies, are durable and sustainable, the
emigration of workers, particularly skilled
workers, may have severe implications for small
countries that have to cope with limited human
resources. There has been a general shift in the
debate on the effects of migration from a previous
focus on the largely positive effect of remittances
to the potentially more negative effects of skill
loss or brain drain.
In line with global patterns, Pacific Islander
migration has become more diversified in recent
years with the emergence of nontraditional desti-
nations, new types of migration including tempo-
rary and seasonal migration, and new
occupational groups. Among the nontraditional
destination countries of Pacific Islander migrants
are the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries that have
attracted skilled migrants such as airline pilots
from Fiji and PNG.
An example of a new occupational group is
that of Fijians working overseas as private secu-
rity officers. Opportunities for employment in pri-
vate security companies have expanded
considerably in recent years, and Fijians, with
their long history of serving in the British Army
and as peacekeepers in various UN missions, have
been able to make use of these opportunities. By
mid-2005, there were over 1,000 Fijians working
in Iraq and Kuwait as soldiers, security guards,
drivers, and laborers. In addition there were more
than 2,000 Fijian soldiers in the British Army in
2006 (Wikipedia).
Pacific Island Countries and Migration
In response to high migration pressures, PIC
governments have been engaged in a campaign to
allow short-term migrants into Australia and New
Zealand. In April 2007, the New Zealand govern-
ment introduced the “Recognised Seasonal
Employer” scheme under which up to 8,000 sea-
sonal agricultural workers from Kiribati, Samoa,
Tuvalu, Tonga, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are
given visas for New Zealand (Immigration New
Zealand). A similar scheme was introduced in
2008 by Australia for three PICs, called the
“Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme;” in
2012 it was replaced by the Seasonal Worker
Program which expanded the program to eight
PICs (Department of Education, Employment
and Workplace Relations). The USA has also
included nine PICs into the list of countries eligi-
ble to participate in nonimmigrant visa programs,
known as H-2A (agricultural work) and H-2B
(nonagricultural work) (Hay 2011).
Despite the significance of migration in PICs,
research on the issue is lacking, partly due to the
paucity of data in many countries. While some
good qualitative studies have provided insights
into the causes and consequences of migration,
the absence of reliable statistical data on migration
by skill level, age, sex, etc., has hampered demo-
graphic analyses.
Cross-References
▶ African Island Migration
▶ Australian Immigration
3
▶ New Zealand Immigration
References
Bertram G, Watters RF (1985) The MIRAB economy in
South Pacific microstates. Pac Viewpoint
26(3):497–520
Connell J (2009) The global health care chain: from the
pacific to the world. Routledge, New York
Duncan R, Booth H, Zhang G, Rao M, Taomia F (2006)
The young and the restless: population pressures in the
pacific. In: World Bank (ed) At home and away:
expanding job opportunities for Pacific Islanders
through labour mobility. World Bank, Washington,
pp 28–45
Hay D (2011) New pacific seasonal workers scheme. Devel-
opment policy blog. http://devpolicy.org/new-pacific-sea
sonal-workers-scheme. Accessed 1 Sept 2012
Immigration New Zealand Recognised seasonal
employers. http://www.immigration.govt.nz/
employers/employ/temp/rse/. Accessed 2 Sept 2012
Iredale R, Voigt-Graf C, Khoo SE (2015) Trends in inter-
national and internal teacher mobility in three Pacific
Island countries, International Migration, 53
(1):97–114
Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island
Affairs (2010) Demographics of New Zealand’s
Pacific population. Statistics New Zealand and
Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Wellington.
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_
and_communities/pacific_peoples/pacific-progress-dem
ography.aspx. Accessed 27 Aug 2012
Wikipedia. Economy of fiji. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy_of_Fiji. Accessed 29 Aug 2012
World Bank. Migration and remittance data. http://econ.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTD
ECPROSPECTS/0, contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:6
4165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.
Accessed 3 Sept 2012
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Southern African Migration

Eugene K. Campbell*
Department of Population Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana

Introduction
Southern Africa is at the southernmost part of the African continent, and it is characterized by internal and
international labor migration whose history goes way back to the seventeenth century. Internal migration
is the movement of people within national borders of a country, while international migration occurs when
people move across international borders. This entry will state very briefly about internal migration; but its
focus is on contemporary international migration. Most recent studies of migration focus on international
migration because of the increasing awareness of its importance in national and international development
issues. Southern Africa experienced considerable forced migration from South Africa, Mozambique,
Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe between the 1950s and 1990s due to violent civil wars. The major
destinations in the region for refugees were Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. While several economic,
social and political, environmental, and demographic factors have influenced internal and international
migration in Southern Africa, these movements have in turn influenced national and international
development in these areas. Meanwhile, migration has had considerable effects on the incidence and
spread of communicable diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections
and noncommunicable diseases, such as hypertension and obesity (Levitt et al. 1993; Collinson
et al. 2006; Ansell and Van Blerk 2011).

Data Availability
So much has been written about the limited data on migration, especially international migration (Byerlee
1974; Black 2003) that it is needless getting into that here. Studies in genetic anthropology indicate that
the history of internal and international migrations in Southern Africa is ancient and may be traced back to
several centuries before the birth of Jesus Christ. However, social scientists have been more occupied with
investigating movements that occurred in modern history and contemporary times. There are indications
from studies in African genome that the modern human migration in Africa originated in Southern Africa,
especially Namibia and Angola, with pastoral occupation being the major motive for these movements
(Tishkoff et al. 2009). However, several unexplained factors, such as cattle herding and tsetse fly-induced
sleeping sickness in prehistoric times, have raised questions about the link between current and ancient
geographical locations of Khoikhoi people of South-West Africa and their northern “cousins” in
Botswana and Zambia (Boonzaier et al. 2000). Oral history and DNA were used in 1987 and 1988 by
Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), with a sample of 49 unrelated Lembas, to explain the existence of people with
non-African ancestry in the continent. These methods helped to identify the cultural origins and history of
the Lemba ethnic people who live in Zimbabwe and claim that their ancestral parents were Jews who
migrated from the Middle East to Southern Africa to trade in gold and other items. According to Spurdle
and Jenkins (1996), the ancestors of the Lemba settled in Yemen and traded initially with East Africans.
But a hostile invasion of their land, with devastating results, forced them to migrate to Africa with a part of
the ethnic group settling in East Africa, while another part proceeded to Southern Africa. It was observed

*Email: campbell@mopipi.ub.bw

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that the Lemba people practice circumcision in a manner similar to the Jews. They also observe dietary
laws similar to those of the Jews. The authors concluded that the Lemba was more likely a descendant of
Middle Eastern Jews than Arabs at about seventh century B.C.
Other data sources include censuses, random sample survey, and continuous recording systems
especially at international border posts and airports. Official statistics on remittances are generally
obtained from banks, post offices, and money transfer agencies. These sources have been widely used
to estimate volumes, rates and patterns of migration as well as explain their determinants (Kok et al. 2006;
Collinson et al. 2007; United Nations 2009a, b; World Bank 2011). Though little effort has been made to
improve the collection of international migration data in Africa, Southern Africa has been fortunate to
have over 12 years of continuous investigation of attitudes and behavior of internal and international
migrants and nonmigrant citizens by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). SAMP surveys are
mostly cross-sectional and cover several subjects including brain drain, brain circulation, remittance,
diaspora, xenophobia, and health (see SAMP website www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresource). Several
other researchers have done individual studies on the subject, and in 1978–1982, the government of
Botswana conducted a National Migration Survey which remains one of few such exercises in the region.
A notable finding from an individual researcher is the contribution of Ghanaian immigrants to economic
development in Southern Africa where the professionals worked in the educational, legal, and adminis-
trative sectors. As many of the men were accompanied by their wives, the women brought along skills
which they applied in commerce and service sectors and acquired considerable wealth (Van Dijk 2003).
These women also invested in the importation and sale of clothing obtained mainly from Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire. The variety of data sources has occasionally raised questions about the consistency of variable
definitions and measurements (Frayne and Pendleton 2001; Posel and Casale 2003; Campbell 2010).

Internal Migration
The most documented of internal migration in the region is the Great Trek, a mass movement of Dutch
settlers (or Boers) from the Cape Province in the western part of South Africa to areas which later became
the provinces of Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal. Calvinist Dutch began settling in South Africa
in the seventeenth century having moved from Europe to escape persecution at the hands of conservative
followers of John Calvin. The Great Trek was motivated by a mix of economic, political, and religious
factors. But central to these was a determination by the Dutch settlers to attain independence from British
rule as it was perceived to be oppressive (Templin 1968). The blacks in South Africa were restricted in
their ability to move to the cities. Movement from rural to urban areas was predominantly of the circular
type and families were not permitted to stay with male workers in the cities. The situation was similar in
Namibia and Zimbabwe. Black Namibians were confined in undeveloped communal farmlands with
controlled movement to the town, mines, and commercial farms (Frayne and Pendleton 2001). Before
independence in 1980, black people in Zimbabwe were restrained from undertaking rural to urban
migration because of economic and political factors. Rural–urban migration increased after 1980 resulting
in dramatic increase in urban population growth rates. For example, the growth rate of Harare rose from
3 % before 1980 to 6.2 % by 1990 largely due to internal migration (Potts 2010). Historically most labor
migrants in Southern Africa (internal and international) were men, though within short distances, women
dominated (Crush 2000; Crush et al. 2005; Posel and Casale 2003). Botswana is among the few
exceptions where females were dominant among internal migrants (Gwebu 1987).

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Immigration and Emigration

Southern African countries have a common economic goal (within the Southern African Customs Union)
which is to attain maximum economic development. This and other factors, including national security
and social development, contributed to the formation of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) which has recently been determined to facilitate international migration for development in the
region. However, the level of cooperation on international migration in the region has been fraught with
several challenges emanating from the markedly differential economic status of the countries. While
South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia have made significant economic progress, several others have not
done so well. This difference has been a major obstacle to the implementation of the protocol on free
movement of persons within the region, settling instead for the protocol on the facilitation of movement
persons in the region (United Nations 2011). The patterns of immigration and emigration in Southern
Africa center on South Africa, a country that has historically been the economic hub of the region. The
history of emigration in the region goes back to the nineteenth century when South Africa began recruiting
foreign labor to work in the gold mines. The recruiting agency of the South African Chamber of Mines is
The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA).
The intention of the South African government was not to recruit foreigners to work in the gold mines
permanently, but to restrict their stay and lifestyle by excluding families, keeping them in hostels and
ensuring that they were repatriated periodically. For instance, the contracts of miners from Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland were for 6–9 months, while Malawians were granted 2 years, partly due to the
travel risk associated with long distance from South Africa (Lucas 1987). Although most migrants to
South Africa were men who sought employment in the mines and farms, women also migrated to South
Africa primarily to work in the informal domestic sector. Most of the migrants were unskilled. The
motivation for cross-border migration was primarily economic with the aim of increasing household
incomes at home. Migrant remittances assisted much in this direction although there are conflicting views
on the level of assistance. Table 1 indicates that the peak of mine labor recruitment in South Africa varied
between countries of origin. The sudden stop in recruitment of Malawians was largely due to a conflict
between the South African and Malawian governments over HIV testing of applicants. Botswana received
tens of thousands of refugees from South Africa in 1976–1978 as they passed through to seek asylum in
Zambia and Tanzania. At the same time, Zimbabwean refugees increased in Botswana by over threefold to
25,300. Many resided in the country with thousands receiving Botswana citizenship (Campbell 2003).
The stock of immigrants in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average
annual increase of 7.3 % between 2005 and then. South Africa hosts the majority of these migrants (1.9
million) (see Fig. 1). The high sex ratios in Table 2 indicate the persistence of male dominance among
international migrants in the region. But with increasing education and personal liberation of women,
these ratios are falling due to the growing feminization of international migrants in the continent. Since
1990, migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and from the rest of
Africa to SADC has increased dramatically. The direction of movement is highly influenced by the
marked economic differentials in the region, with South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia being the
dominant destinations. The number of persons migrating from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia to
the commercial farms of Zimbabwe declined considerably since the land transfer program in Zimbabwe.
Immigration in Zimbabwe began in the nineteenth century with Europeans and South Africans entering in
the twentieth century (Mlambo 2010). Later in the century, an exodus of blacks and whites occurred in
response to the liberation struggle. But the greater exodus occurred in the twenty-first century following
the country’s economic recession which began in the late 1990s. The number of Zimbabweans migrating
to work or to look for work in Botswana and South Africa has increased dramatically. Opportunities for
Zimbabweans to work legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from
migrating (Crush et al. 2010).

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Table 1 Mine labor recruitment in South Africa, 1990–2000

Year Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Malawi
1920 2,112 10,439 77,921 3,449 354
1930 3,151 22,306 77,828 4,345 0
1940 14,427 52,044 74,883 7,152 8,037
1950 12,390 34,467 86,248 6,619 7,831
1960 21,404 48,842 101,733 6,623 21,934
1970 20,461 63,988 93,203 6,269 78,492
1980 17,753 96,308 39,636 5,050 13,569
1989 16,051 100,529 42,807 16,730 72
1990 14,609 99,707 44,590 17,757 –
1991 14,028 93,897 47,105 17,393 –
1992 12,781 93,519 50,651 16,273 –
1993 11,904 89,940 50,311 16,153 –
1994 11,099 89,237 56,197 15,892 –
1995 10,961 87,935 55,140 15,304 –
1996 10,477 81,357 55,741 14,371 –
1997 9,385 76,361 55,879 12,960 –
1998 7,752 60,450 51,913 10,336 –
1999 6,413 52,188 46,537 9,307 –
2000 6,494 58,224 57,034 9,360 –
Source: Crush et al. 2005

2009 (est.) 2005 2000

1,863
South Africa 1,249
1,022

139
Namibia 132
125

115
Botswana 80
56

40
Swaziland 39
37

6
Lesotho 6
6

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
Stock of migrants (in thousands)

Fig. 1 Stock of migrants in Southern Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (in thousands)

Skilled emigration on a large scale in Southern African is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is
associated with tertiary education and brain drain. The most attractive African country for skilled migrants
is South Africa. A distant second is Botswana, followed by Namibia. While it is quite difficult to estimate
skilled immigrants in Southern Africa, the proportion of skilled immigrants in South Africa seems to be
inversely related to social distance from the source countries. Most of the skilled migrants are from

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Table 2 Foreign-born population in Southern Africa (2007)a

Country Male Female Sex ratio**
Botswana 17,995 11,562 156
Namibia 63,056 56,162 112
South Africa 1,206,287 648,274 186
Swaziland 17,049 14,694 116
Zambia 72,623 68,791 106
Source: UN (2009) Demographic Yearbook 2007
a
Information is for countries with adequate immigration data. It excludes persons whose migration status was not known

Western Europe, followed by the rest of Africa and southern Africa (Mattes et al. 2000). About 33 % of
African labor migrants employed in South Africa are skilled (McDonald et al. 2000). Skilled Namibians
are more likely than the unskilled to migrate to South Africa. Greater skills among urban than rural
populations largely explain why urban Namibians are more likely to migrate to South Africa than the rural
folks. Among Zimbabweans, 20 % of male and 14 % of female visitors to South Africa had completed at
least high school education. The four principal sources of skilled immigrants in Botswana are South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the UK. Just as South Africa and Botswana have experienced brain gain,
it seems that there is the risk of brain drain from these countries. Brain drain occurs when the skills that a
government invested in emigrate to work and live elsewhere. Up to 1992, South Africa gained more
skilled immigrants than it lost (Mattes and Richmond 2000; Mattes et al. 2000). But since 1994, the
country has been experiencing a deficit in skilled human resource. Effectively, it has consistently lost than
gained skilled persons through international migration. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe.
From the wealth of research-based information on Zimbabwe’s brain drain, it may seem that the
country has lost the most skills in the region. But Table 3 indicates that Zambia is relatively the biggest
skill loser with 17 % of its professionals having emigrated. Still, it is evident that Zambia and Zimbabwe
have experienced the most brain drain in the region. Having previously been considered a curse, brain
drain is now acknowledged to be a national blessing because it has contributed directly to the positive
effects of international migration, namely, the diaspora, remittance, and brain circulation. From being a
net immigration country between 1921 and 1975, Zimbabwe has been characterized by emigration for
political reasons during the second half of the 1970s and for economic reasons since 2000 (Crush and
Tevera 2010). The health sector has been the most affected by skilled emigration in and from Southern
Africa. According to Table 3, every country has lost over 10 % of its native-born physicians and a fair
proportion of its nurses. From the health point of view, Zimbabwe has lost the most skilled workers with
the majority having obtained employment in the UK and South Africa.
In view of the extent to which professionals felt obliged to leave their ancestral home countries, it
appears that skilled emigration was underestimated. Between 1989 and 1997, about 233,000 South
Africans emigrated to the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But official statistics
revealed that 82,811 people actually left during this period. Throughout the 1990s, there has been a steady
decline in the number of immigrants. In 1993, there were 9800 immigrants and this declined to 4100 in
1997. Meanwhile, from 1994 to 1998, South Africa experienced net emigration of close to 4,000 annually.
Forty-eight percent of the 342,947 emigrants who lived in OECD countries were highly skilled (OECD
2006). Their exit left serious social, economic, and political consequences in its wake. Unfortunately the
loss of skills was not offset by a proactive, aggressive recruiting immigration policy. The implications of
these trends are very clear. There will continue to be a shortage of skilled workers as well as an oversupply
of unskilled labor. The negative implications will reverberate throughout the South African economy and
impact on the country’s global competitiveness given that skilled workers generally create jobs for
unskilled workers and that the level of skills in the labor force is an attraction for foreign investment.

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Table 3 Immigration and emigration statistics

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Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe Africa

Total population (2009) 2,000,000# 2,100,000 2,200,000 49,300,000 1,200,000 12,900,000 12,500,000
No. of emigrants (2010) 63,000 427,500 16,500 878,100 163,300 185,800 1,253,100
Emigrant as % of total popa 3.2 20.5 0.7 1.7 13.3 1.4 9.9
Skilled (tertiary) emigrant (%) 3.6 4.3 3.5 7.5 0.5 16.8 12.7
Emigration of physicians (%) 11.4 33.3 45.0 21.1 28.5 56.9 51.1
Emigration of nurses (%) 2.2 2.8 5.4 5.1 2.8 9.2 24.2
Immigrant stock (2010) 114,800 6,300 138,900 1,862,900 40,400 233,100 372,300
Immigrant as % of total pop 5.8 0.3 6.3 3.7 3.4 1.8 2.9
Remittance inflow (US$ mil)b 141 490 17 834 99 59 500+
Source: World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook
a
2000
b
2008 # 2011 National Census figure + over US$500 million

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A clear gender dimension emerges; men are more likely to leave permanently than women (Dodson and
Crush 2004).

Consequences of Immigration and Emigration

Until the 1990s, the informal sector was almost absent in South Africa’s economy. Its growth owes much
to the economic activities of contemporary immigrants especially from West and East Africa. The
informal economic sector which has historically been a common feature of West and East African lifestyle
hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia before 1990. Considering the high levels of
unemployment in the cities, the informal sector is crucial for providing those not employed in the formal
sector with a way out of poverty. Several migrants who fail to find work or are refused work permits in the
country become self-employed, at times illicitly setting up barber, food, clothing shops, etc. Zimbabweans
constitute the highest proportion of migrant street vendors. Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent,
Batswana, Basotho, and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa.
Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest
proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican, and
Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants 2002). Zimbabwean
males seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as it is for commerce. But almost three
quarters of migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Apart from
personal development within the new diaspora, a common feature of this group is the remitting of money
and goods to families in the ancestral home.

Diasporas in Southern Africa

Between ancient and modern times, two categories of diaspora have been identified. These are the
“classic” and “modern” diaspora. Classic diasporas are associated with the Jewish, African, Indian, and
other diasporas which were formed several centuries ago, while modern diasporas were formed fairly
recently from contemporary international migration (Cohen 1997). Examples of classic South African
diasporas in the region are the Tswana in Botswana and Shona in Zimbabwe. The modern diasporas in the
region were formed from contemporary migration from in and outside the region. The latter include
Nigerian, Ghanaian, Somali, and Kenyan diasporas. Though the African Union recognizes that both
groups should be encouraged to make significant contribution to economic and social development in the
continent, the focus in Southern Africa is harnessing the potential of the modern diaspora for immediate
and future socioeconomic development in the region. South Africa has taken the lead in this by organizing
meetings for dialogue and cooperation as well as reaching out to the diaspora with provision of incentives.
Diasporas in and out of Southern Africa have contributed much to the national economies at home
through financial and social remittances. Financial remittances are monies and goods sent home by
migrants, while social remittances include the ideas, identities, language, behavior, food, music, other
arts, and social capital that are transferred from destination to origin countries (Levitt 1998). The altruistic
relationship between African parents and their offspring explains much of the factors that influence
migrant remittances. The South Africa diaspora is the highest remitter in the region, and it is estimated that
Zimbabweans sent over US$500 million home in 2009 (IRIN 2012). Indeed, the nation of Zimbabwe
would have collapsed without migrant remittances (Crush and Tevera 2010). Lesotho also receives a
considerable amount of remittance, while Namibia is the lowest recipient (Table 3).
Migrant remittances contribute significantly to poverty reduction in the region. The bulk of all
remittances received in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland comes from South
Africa. Though the region receives the lowest amount of international remittances in Africa, they

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Table 4 Items remittance in Southern Africa is spent on, 2004 (in percentage)
Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe Total
% % % % % %
Food 87.5 89.3 69.9 83.4 75.7 81.9
School fees 42.9 56.0 49.1 54.9 54.6 52.3
Clothing 62.9 76.1 43.5 24.0 56.6 52.2
Transport fares 27.0 50.0 24.8 29.2 31.6 33.8
Seed 2.4 24.4 26.3 44.4 11.3 24.0
Fertilizer 1.1 18.5 1.3 34.2 9.4 15.2
Tractor 1.5 12.5 0.9 39.7 1.3 13.6
Savings 8.6 18.7 10.9 4.7 19.4 12.5
Cement 26.7 5.2 14.9 7.2 8.1 11.1
Funeral 18.9 16.3 5.5 5.0 9.1 10.8
Roofing 21.6 3.6 7.2 3.5 6.7 7.5
Bricks 20.3 4.5 5.0 2.7 6.7 6.9
Fuel 3.6 9.9 6.1 2.0 7.8 6.0
Labor 5.0 5.1 9.8 4.1 4.3 5.5
Cattle purchase 20.8 1.4 2.2 1.6 2.0 4.6
Repay loans 6.8 1.9 5.8 4.2 3.5 4.2
Other items excluded
Source: Pendleton et al. (2006) Migration, remittances. . .. . .. SAMP

contribute significantly to national development in several countries, especially Lesotho and Zimbabwe
where the remittance is 29 % and about 40 % of GDP, respectively (World Bank 2011; Bhebhe 2012).
Migration, remittances, and development have a long history in the region. Bilateral agreements between
South Africa and several Southern African countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and
Swaziland, ensured that foreign miners put significant proportions of their earnings into the national
economies (referred to as deferred payment). In 1984, 18,691 Batswana miners generated nearly R17
million ($2.6 million) in officially recorded remittances alone, which helped to grow Botswana’s rural
economies in particular. Remittances contribute substantially to several key areas within the Millennium
Development Goals, especially mitigating hunger and enhancing children’s education. Most of the
remittances to and in the region are used for personal and household consumption (Table 4). Food is
the primary item on which remittances are spent, followed by school fees, clothing, and transport fares.
Apparently, Batswana (citizens of Botswana) do not require remittances for children’s school fees as
much as other nationals do, and this is partly because of the existence of government-induced public
education system which is almost fee-free from primary to university levels (UNECA 2011). Meanwhile,
the dominance of Botswana’s expenditure on cattle purchase is due to the great value the nationals place in
cattle rearing (cattle is a major export product in the country). Most migrants remit through unofficial
channels, including taking money and goods home when they visit, using bus drivers and friends. High
frequency of visitation makes personal remitting the most popular. Others use banks, post office, and
money transfer agent such as Western Union.
Associated with diaspora and African development is ensuring that brain drain is moderated and
encouraging brain circulation. Former President Mbeki of South Africa once pledged about US$71
million to encourage highly skilled citizens to stay in (or return to) the country (Campbell 2007). In an
attempt to ease the effect of emigration of health workers in Lesotho, the Minister of Health and Social
Welfare met with Basotho health professionals in the UK to discuss the plans that the Lesotho government
had for those who returned. In order to attract skills back home, several governments are implementing

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economic policies that would guarantee employment, investment, and internationally competitive
income. The government of Malawi has introduced economic and investment policies since 2000.
These have helped improve economic performance and attracted the attention of potential professional
returnees. In collaboration with DFID, the government is offering incentives to discourage emigration of
health professionals. Sadly, brain circulation (generally defined as return home of skilled emigrants),
which has been successful in developed countries and in India and China, has not quite taken off in
Southern Africa because the social, economic, and emotional investment risks are high and minimize its
usefulness in the region and the rest of Africa (Wickramasekara 2002). It works best within developed
nations’ socioeconomic systems where the environment for setting up the networks required for profitable
professional, academic, and commercial ventures are quite advanced and favor performance and compe-
tition. But it is not so in Africa where populations are transitional.

Human Rights
Much of the policies on international migration either affects or is influenced by the rights of people to
move freely between countries. Though human trafficking has become increasingly important in human
rights issues, irregular migration takes precedence because of its general and more transparent nature.
Irregular migration is movement of people across cross-international borders without appropriate travel
documents (i.e., passport and entry visa). It also applies to migrants who entered another country legally
but stayed beyond the time permitted by their visitor of work permit. An alternative concept of irregular
migration is undocumented migration. The two terms are widely preferred to the apparently derogatory
one “illegal migration” because the concept “illegal” criminalizes the act of irregular border crossing. Due
to the absence of effective border controls in many African countries, irregular migration did not seem to
exist until the twentieth century. While irregular immigration occurred in Zambia and Zimbabwe during
the peak of mining, none is comparable to the attraction of South Africa. Irregular movement to South
Africa by men and women began in the 1920s. Women were more disadvantaged than men in getting jobs.
Apart from domestic work and street hawking, some women got into more demeaning activities such as
prostitution (Crush 2000, p. 17). A decline in recruitment of foreign mine workers occurred in the 1960s
partly due to the negative post-independence attitudes in several Southern African countries toward
apartheid South Africa. The governments of Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi did not favor labor migration
to South Africa; so Zambia and Tanzania withdrew its mine workers shortly after independence and
Malawi did so in 1972 (Crush et al. 2005). The policies which restricted migration to South African mines
fostered irregular migration to South Africa in pursuit of employment and higher living standards in South
Africa’s multi-sectoral economy.
Several countries which did not permit their citizens to visit or work in South Africa suspended this
policy when apartheid formally ended in 1994. The attraction to Zimbabwe, where almost a quarter of a
million African migrants were employed in 1961, and Zambia had dwindled remarkable as their
economies declined (Crush et al. 2005). Also, the lifting of apartheid occurred at a time of serious
economic and political turmoil in most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These factors boosted irregular
migration to South Africa. Initially, employment of irregular migrants was concentrated in the commercial
farm sector and mostly in farms close to the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Crush 1999). But
political changes in the 1990s enhanced opportunities for irregular employment in urban centers such as
Johannesburg and Durban, and the social and environmental effects of this drew the most attention to the
increasing inflow of irregular migrants to the country. Zimbabweans form the second largest group of
irregular migrants in South Africa. Between 1994 and 1999, they grew much faster than the Mozambicans
did (27.0 % annually), and from 2000 to 2004, they grew annually by 12 % (8.5 % points more than the

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corresponding growth rate of Mozambicans). In the absence of reliable statistics on irregular migrants, the
deportation figures give some idea of the trend of irregular migration. The total number of deportees from
South Africa between 1994 and 1995 increased from 90,692 to 183,861 (an increase of over 100 %). It is
acknowledged that this increase may be an effect of the governments’ restriction of movements into the
country and an intensified search for irregular migrants than increase in irregular immigration.
Zimbabwe’s economy has struggled immensely since 1990. The decision by ZANU PF, the ruling
party, in 2000 to redistribute highly productive white-owned farms to black nationals worsened the state
of the country’s economy (Bracking 2005; Moyo and Yeros 2005). Zimbabwe’s poor rose markedly after
the 2002 elections as a result of international discontent with the reelection of Robert Mugabe, the
inability of blacks to maintain the commercial value of the land, and the political excesses of Mugabe.
This forced scores of thousands of young Zimbabwean men and women to emigrate to South Africa and
Botswana. Botswana has historically been a transit station for refugees and travelers who moved
northward from South Africa to Zambia and Tanzania to escape violent conflict in their country. Between
1976 and 1978, about 10,000 refugees who escaped the apartheid regime of South Africa to seek asylum
in Zambia and Tanzania went through Botswana whose government was exceptionally sympathetic to
refugees. Botswana was also a popular destination of Zimbabwean refugees in the 1970s and remains so
to irregular migrants from Zimbabwe. Deportation figures indicate that about 95 % of all deportees from
Botswana are Zimbabweans. The average annual growth rate of irregular migrants in Botswana between
2000 and 2007 is 28.1 % (Campbell 2009). The surge in irregular migration to Botswana is largely due to
geographical distance and cultural relationship between the two countries. The northeastern part of
Botswana is dominated by the Bakalanga whose ancestry is in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Other
contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may
be too high for the poor, (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about where
and how to obtain international travel document, (3) mileage distance between the potential migrant’s
residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far, (4) corruption of customs and
immigration officers at border posts, and (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to the
destination country.
Among the difficulties experienced by irregular migrants in Southern Africa is the abuse of their right to
economic and social services. Much of this is due to negative opinion of nationals of the host country (i.e.,
the destination country) about irregular migration. Irregular migrants are usually stereotyped as criminals
as well as being the perpetrators of unemployment and spread of sexually transmitted diseases in host
countries. Irregular migration has therefore contributed to a rise in xenophobia in several countries in the
region, especially Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (SAMP 2001; Crush and Pendleton 2004).
Table 5 indicates that Namibians and Batswana are less tolerant of irregular migrants than South Africans.
Paradoxically, even nationals such as Mozambicans and Zambians who have been victimized by
xenophobic reactions to their presence in major destinations like South Africa and Botswana are
apparently also intolerant of irregular migrants (Crush 2000; Nyamnjoh 2002; Campbell 2003; Campbell
and Oucho 2003; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Over half of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans would
support a policy by their government if it denied legal protection to irregular migrants. Generally, there
was overwhelming support for a policy which ensured that irregular migrants were never granted freedom
of speech, voting right, and legal protection and giving policy the right to apprehend all irregular migrants
as well as military presence along the country’s borders. Some preferred the arrest of employers of
irregular migrants, while nearly a third approved the use of electric fencing of national borders.
Notwithstanding these negative attitudes toward irregular migrants, the policies of governments should
be guided by the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families. Though irregular migrants have limited coverage within this
Convention, it may be argued that, subject to correction of residence status, all migrants should be treated

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Table 5 Nationals support of government policies to minimize irregular migration, by country of enumeration (%)
South
Support policy Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland
Police right to detain suspected irregular 82.4 95.1 87.6 77.5 88.3 56.9
migrant
Foreigners to carry identification always 74.9 89.6 82.0 65.7 92.3 47.7
Increase tax to assist border patrol 20.6 49.9 37.7 14.6 35.7 11.4
Use army to patrol border 82.6 94.6 94.9 62.0 71.7 73.3
Allocate more money to border protection 61.1 80.7 68.5 39.8 61.0 51.4
Punish employers of irregular migrant 81.1 94.8 95.4 57.7 86.6 66.0
Turn on electric fence 60.4 79.8 62.7 47.5 22.9 33.7
No freedom of speech for irregular 85.5 90.9 94.8 82.9 84.5 87.3
migrant
No voting right for irregular migrant 88.7 98.8 98.4 90.4 96.1 95.8
No legal protection of irregular migrant 62.1 64.7 59.9 50.4 57.3 46.2
No social service to irregular migrant 65.4 49.9 77.3 46.5 33.9 40.7
Source: SAMP (2001) Raw data from 2001 NIPS survey

as equals with nationals and should therefore be granted freedom of expression of religious and cultural
beliefs and practices, social independence, medical care, education of children, and judicial rights in cases
of detention and deportation (United Nations 1990, Article 1.1; Bosniak 1991).
Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa
may be too high for the poor; (2) poor education limits potential migrants’ access to information about
where and how to obtain international travel document; (3) Mileage distance between the potential
migrants residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far; (4) corruption of
customs and immigration officers at border posts; (5) close proximity of potential migrant’s residence to
the destination country.
Irregular immigration contributes substantially to economic development of the nations throughout the
world. Contrary to “stealing” jobs from nationals, these migrants actually save the host citizens much
from the low wages they receive and their willingness to work in sectors which nationals do not favor.
Moreover, they do not necessarily benefit from health and unemployment insurance. Lack of data makes it
difficult to determine the financial benefit of irregular migration to African nations; but there is evidence
that in the USA, they save the private sector millions of dollars annually due to wage depression (Huddle
1995).
An increasing area of concern to governments in the SADC region is the trafficking of women and
children. Human trafficking involves deception of the victims and their parents about the eventual benefits
of the transporting to the destination. Unlike people smuggling, the association between victims and
traffickers does not end with the arrival at the destination. It continues and is often exploitive and violent
(Orhant 2009, p. 4). In Africa, this occurs mainly between West and East Africa (the source) and South
Africa where they are used mostly as prostitutes. Businesswomen in Malawi often work with long-
distance truck drivers to recruit young women with promises of marriage, education, and jobs in South
Africa. Trafficking of Asian women to South Africa involves trips through transit countries, such as
Lesotho and Mozambique, to Johannesburg and Cape Town where they are forced to become commercial
sex workers. Other sources of trafficked women include Eastern European countries from which women
are flown to South Africa with false offers of employment as waitresses and domestic workers
(Adepoju 2005).

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Table 6 Moving to another country

Consideration of moving abroad South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Swaziland Lesotho Average
A great deal 40.0 28.9 33.3 71.2 55.8 43.8 44.8
Some 41.4 40.4 33.7 20.8 29.4 34.4 34.4
None at all 15.7 26.6 27.4 6.0 11.1 17.9 17.2
Do not know 2.9 4.1 5.7 1.9 3.7 4.0 3.6
Source: Crush et al. (2005)

Future Emigration
Several studies by SAMP in the SADC region in 2002–2003 indicate strong intentions by young
professionals to emigrate. The studies were done in six countries and the respondents were final year
students in tertiary education institutions. The students were interviewed about their future emigration
intentions. The results indicated that 45 % of students who were about to enter the labor market had given
a great deal of consideration to emigrating (Table 6). The highest proportion of potential emigrants was in
Zimbabwe and the lowest was in Namibia. Only 17 % of them had never considered moving to another
country. The data also showed that 88 % of the students preferred to move to the USA, South Africa, and
Europe (in descending order), and about 7 % of them had already applied for work permits in the country
they were most likely to move to (Crush et al. 2005). With 62 % of the primary reasons for wanting to
emigrate, economic factors dominated the emigration consideration. They include income, job availabil-
ity, cost of living, professional advancement, etc. Thirty-two percent intended to stay in the destination for
a long time (over 5 years), while for 28 % the intended length of stay was 2–5 years. There was a general
desire to maintain socioeconomic links with families at home. The majority (37 %) wished to visit home
yearly, while 28 % intended such visits to be once every few months. Meanwhile, 52 % intended to remit
once a month, while 19 % wished to do so a few times a year. Relatively few students (17 %) expressed
satisfaction with their countries’ current economic condition, and just over a quarter anticipated future
improvements in the economy. Even economically prosperous countries (Botswana and South Africa)
were not perceived favorably. While some people may argue that intentions and behavior are mutually
independent, there is considerable reason to believe otherwise (see Campbell 2001 for a comprehensive
discussion of the interrelationship between attitude and behavior). Considering the effect of the ongoing
global financial crisis on the demand for luxury goods, it is more likely now than in 2002 that the
professionals (especially health providers) would increasingly look elsewhere for higher real income.

International Migration Policy

Until recently, migration (internal and international) was not considered a significant area in the devel-
opment of human populations and was therefore excluded from national policies. This position has
changed, and recognition of the positive economic effects of international migration has influenced
several governments to develop policies which address especially brain drain, brain circulation, diaspora,
and financial remittances. Several Southern African countries claim to have policies which address
international migration, especially issues related to irregular migration. Table 7 indicates that the
international migration in Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa operates on “policies” which determine
their goals on some immigration and emigration issues. For example, Botswana seeks to reduce overall
level of immigration while discouraging brain circulation (United Nations 2006). But the mechanism for
attaining these goals does not exist. Presently, the government is actively working toward developing a
comprehensive international migration policy. So far, it has addressed some immigration issues using the

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Table 7 Excerpts o f immigration and emigration policies of three countries

Country Immigration policy Emigration
Overall Highly integration Overall Encouraging
Level Skills of noncitizen level Return of citizens
Malawi Lower – Yes No interview Yes
Botswana Lower Lower Yes No interview No
South Africa Lower Maintain Yes Lower Yes
Source: United Nations (2006)

Immigration Act (Botswana 1987). South Africa is the only country in the region with a comprehensive
international migration policy (South Africa 2010). All other countries operate from the Constitution.
This is not adequate because, as much as possible, the international migration policy should address all
legal and development aspects of immigration and emigration. In order for Southern Africa to attain
maximum benefit from the positive effects of emigration, the governments should endeavor to produce
comprehensive international migration policies as soon as possible. South Africa’s experience shows that
it requires considerable time, money, and commitment to produce a fairly humane migration policy.

Conclusion
Southern Africa has been a center of considerable internal and international migration before the
seventeenth century, and their importance has grown since 1990 due to positive and negative economic
and political factors which have had significant effects on socioeconomic development in the region. Both
internal and international migrations have been largely influenced by the markedly different economies in
the region and particularly the dominant South African economy. Though government perceptions of
international migration vary, there has been a general shift from the pessimistic to the optimistic because
of the observed positive effects of the diasporas and migrant remittances. Hence, there has been increasing
positive response to the idea that cooperation between governments and the diaspora is crucial to the
enhancement of national economic development. The contributions of the Basotho, Batswana, Mozam-
bican, South African, Swazi, and Zimbabwean diasporas to economic and social development in the home
countries are highly commendable. Though it is not advisable to rely too much on migrant remittances, at
the expense of macroeconomic sources of national development, they have the potential to improve the
standards of living of families living in rural and urban areas. The contribution to children’s education
alone constitutes a viable investment in human development. For many poor families, this may not have
been possible without migration.

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African Island Migration

Iain Walker*
COMPAS, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Definition
African Island migration concerns the islands off the east coast of Africa in the western Indian Ocean:
Madagascar and the Comoros, the Mascarene Islands of Mauritius and Réunion, and Seychelles.

Detailed Description
Islands are particularly distinctive sites of migration. They are geographically separated from their
neighbors by water, which constrains movements of populations and grants island migrations a special
character. Moving into and out of an island generally requires more effort than crossing a land border, and
in the contemporary world, movements by sea and air are more easily controlled by the state. Island
populations are often more aware of their identities than groups on the mainland, partly because of the
difficulties faced in settling the island and partly because of the controlled character of contact with
neighbors. However, islands require contact with the outside world: all but the very largest of islands are
unlikely to be self-sufficient, and they rely on trading partners for foodstuffs, manufactured goods, labor,
and capital.

Historical Migrations
All the islands of the southwestern Indian Ocean have been settled by immigrants in a relatively recent
past. Madagascar was the last of the world’s great land masses to have been colonized by humans, during
one of the world’s great historical migrations. The Austronesian-speaking peoples of Southeast Asia
began moving out of their ancestral homeland in Taiwan more than 5,000 years ago, and their descendants
today are found across a wide swathe of the globe, from Easter Island in the southeast Pacific, through
Polynesia and Indonesia to, in the western Indian Ocean, Madagascar itself. These migrations finally
ended with the settlement of New Zealand in the fourteenth century. However, while there are indications
of a human presence in Madagascar as early as the late third millennium BC, there is no reliable evidence
of the existence of a settled human population prior to the fifth century AD, and linguistic and genetic
evidence suggests that Austronesian settlers arrived later still, almost certainly via the East African coast.
Regardless of the dates of their arrival, however, geneticists, linguists, and anthropologists all agree that
the contemporary Malagasy are descended from African and Austronesian immigrants (Adelaar 2012;
Cox et al. 2012).
The same migratory movements probably led to the settlement of the Comoro Islands, to the northwest
of Madagascar, but once again, evidence is lacking: the earliest reliably dated archaeological site in the
archipelago is late first millennium. However, the historical record and the physical evidence from the
nearby African coast confirms that Arab seafarers were navigating in the region some 2,000 years ago, and
by the time Islam reached the area toward the ninth century, it is clear that the Comoros were already
inhabited. Genetic analysis suggests that the bulk of the population has its roots in East Africa, but that
both Arab men and Austronesian women contributed to the Comorian melting pot. The populations of

*Email: iain.walker@compas.ox.ac.uk

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both Madagascar and the Comoros were subsequently augmented by substantial movements of slaves
from the East African mainland: the Comoro Islands were a notorious slave-trading center, while in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, large-scale slave raids on the African coast by
Betsimisaraka and Sakalava slavers from Madagascar saw the forced migration of large numbers of
East Africans to the latter island, whence many were sold onward to the Mascarenes.
Further east the smaller creole island states of Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles, uninhabited when
first visited by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were populated by large-scale
migrations during the colonial era. Plantation colonies were established on the islands, initially under
French control, later, following the Napoleonic Wars and (with the exception of Réunion, which was
returned to the French) under British control. In the early period large numbers of Africans were imported
as slaves to work on the plantations, and they rapidly came to constitute a majority of the population and
develop (much as in the Caribbean) a creole society. Although slaves were brought from all parts of the
African continent, it seems likely that the majority were from East Africa and a substantial number were
Malagasy. Malagasy immigrants were present in sufficient numbers in both Mauritius and Réunion to
maintain their own language and culture until well into the second half of the nineteenth century; they
were eventually assimilated to the general creole population, and while they lost their language in the
process, creole culture in both states owes much to Malagasy origins (Larson 2009).
Following abolition, initially of the slave trade, later of slavery itself, the colonists were forced to turn
elsewhere for their labor force. The French administration in Réunion was the first to recruit laborers
under the indenture system and began shipping contract laborers from their ports in India, particularly
Pondicherry, in 1826; however, it was the British government who recruited the greatest number of
indentured laborers, and it is estimated that nearly half a million indentured laborers arrived in Mauritius
from India between 1834 and 1913, with several thousand more arriving from Madagascar, China, and
parts of East Africa (Addison and Hazareesingh 1993; Carter 1995). Although indentured laborers were in
theory accorded a degree of legal protection and a free passage home at the end of their indenture, the
conditions under which they lived and worked differed little from slavery; nevertheless, few opted for a
return, and these mass migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have shaped contemporary
demographics in the creole islands: Mauritians of Indian origin today constitute some 67 % of the
population, while people of mixed African and European descent represent close to 30 %. Franco-
Mauritians and Sino-Mauritians make up the remainder. In Réunion the proportions are more equitable:
the three principal groups – of mixed African and European origin, of European origin, and of Indian
origin – probably each account for approximately a third of the population; Réunion similarly has a small
community of Chinese origin (Leguen 1979). In Seychelles – too small and remote for the development of
a successful plantation economy – there are few of Indian descent and the population is largely of mixed
European and African origin.

Internal Mobilities
From the high-income island of Réunion (a French department(s) and an EU Outermost Region) to the
resource-poor and overpopulated Comoros, contemporary migrations have left their mark on all the
islands although the political, economic, and demographic diversity of these islands provide for signif-
icant differences in the character and magnitude of migratory flows across the region. In the creole islands
internal migrations are of minor significance – employment prospects draw individuals to the urban areas,
while facility of movement allows those employed in towns to move out: in Mauritius, for example,
infrastructure improvements have prompted a slight net outward migration from urban areas to rural areas
over the past two decades. There are minor movements between the islands of Seychelles, generally for
profession reasons; there is also a small net out-migration from the Mauritian island of Rodrigues,

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although this has decreased significantly since the 1990s as the island’s economy and infrastructure
improves (Govt. of Mauritius 2000).
In Madagascar, internal migrations are more significant and are largely responsible for the growth in
urban populations, particularly outside the capital, Antananarivo: while the capital’s share of the popu-
lation has remained constant at about 9 % of the total population over the past 20 years, regional urban
centers have been growing proportionately more rapidly for several decades, currently at a rate 2 % in
excess of that of the national population growth rate. One in three Malagasy households now lives in an
urban area (Freeman et al. 2010; World Bank 2011). Despite this relative shift in growth, Antananarivo
continues to attract more than 100,000 internal migrants annually: urbanization in Madagascar is almost
entirely due to internal migratory flows, which are facilitated by the cultural and linguistic homogeneity of
the island and underpinned by the strong attachment that Malagasy feel toward their ancestral lands and
their ancestral tombs. This tends to discourage international migration; it also allows migrants to maintain
strong links with their homes. Although in many cases poverty is certainly a factor encouraging
rural–urban migration – migrants are drawn to urban areas by economic opportunities and better
infrastructure, particularly in health and education – internal migrations in Madagascar are also often
made possible by the wealth and support of a home that funds the movement to the city. Many rural
dwellers move to the cities in order to sell agricultural produce from their home regions, and many are
successful. It is not without significance that the majority of urban dwellers in Madagascar are land-
owners: all but the very poorest possess their house and a small garden where they grow rice – a culturally
significant foodstuff in Madagascar. Kin groups are particularly important in shaping migrant networks,
and the importance of the ancestors in Malagasy society means that an individual may belong to several
large and cohesive descent groups who can provide support, extending a welcome to new arrivals in the
city. In a similar vein, regional and ethnic associations also provide valuable support to migrants in urban
areas. The migratory process is therefore a dynamic relationship linking urban and rural economies:
produce from rural areas permits movement to the cities and provides both for regular physical return and
for remittances to the rural areas, thus in turn sustaining the rural economy and encouraging further
rural–urban migration (Nawrotzki et al. 2012).
Internal migrations are important on an interisland level in the Comoro Islands; the bulk of outward
migrations are from the island of Ndzuani where the economy is exiguous, land shortages are acute,
erosion is severe, and the population density (574/km2 at the 2003 census) is twice that of Ngazidja and
more than three times that of Mwali. Ndzuani is the poorest of the islands and, unlike Ngazidja, has no
significant diaspora on whom to rely for remittances.
For many years migrants from Ndzuani have therefore settled in Mwali, taking up agricultural land and
creating immigrant villages; they have also been drawn to Ngazidja, seat of the national government and
where many work either in the civil service or in private enterprise; and they continue to travel to Mayotte,
today (and despite Comorian claims over the island) a French département. All three of these movements
have caused problems in the past. The influx of large numbers of immigrants to Mwali has occasionally
caused tension, particularly over land, while in Ngazidja, migrants from Ndzuani are accused of being
disproportionately represented in the civil service. These conflicts are exacerbated by sporadic outbreaks
of secessionist sentiment on Ndzuani itself. In 1997, chronic political and economic instability at a
national level finally prompted local leaders on Ndzuani to declare independence and seek recolonization
by France; political reconciliation was achieved with the promulgation of the 2002 constitution, which
devolved significant powers to the islands, but there are still regular expressions of separatist sentiment
and, on a more social level, a general recognition and acceptance of strong and distinct island identities
within the Comorian nation that often characterizes interisland migrants as being socially and culturally
different.

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Mayotte
Migrations to Mayotte are particularly problematic and are inscribed within a long-term circulation of
individuals and families in the archipelago. In a 1974 referendum Mayotte voted against Comorian
independence, and when the territory declared independence from France the following year, Mayotte
expressed a desire to remain French. French support for Mayotte’s self-determination, contrary to UN
resolutions on decolonization and Comorian claims over the island, culminated in the full incorporation of
the island into France as a département in 2011; and although the island is significantly less developed
than other French départements, it is significantly more prosperous than the other islands of the group. For
two decades following independence, there was a freedom of movement between the islands, but in 1995
France imposed visa requirements on Comorian passport holders wishing to travel to Mayotte. However,
Comorians from Ndzuani, in particular, continue to enter Mayotte in large numbers, traveling in small,
overloaded, and often unseaworthy boats: these boats frequently sink and the loss of life is high (Causes
Communes 2012).
Many of those who travel to Mayotte do so to visit family and friends but others are seeking work. In
Mayotte the undocumented are regularly exploited in the labor market; denied access to housing,
education, and health services; and frequently denounced to French immigration. Those apprehended
by immigration officials are held in overcrowded and insalubrious conditions in unfurnished cells in a
detention center in Pamandzi that has repeatedly attracted condemnation from human rights organizations
before being deported to Ndzuani: currently more than 20,000 individuals are deported annually from
Mayotte – in 2011 this represented almost 15 % of the population of the island. Amnesty International has
described the conditions in the detention center as “inhuman and degrading”; but the legal issues
surrounding movements from the other islands to Mayotte are particularly difficult to resolve since
from a Comorian point of view these are internal migrations. Furthermore, the nature of interisland
mobilities and attendant kin-links, particularly between Ndzuani and Mayotte, is such that it is often
difficult to determine with any precision who belongs where: many may have origins on the other islands
but have been residents of Mayotte for decades.

Regional Flows
Intraregional migrations tend to follow patterns established in the colonial period. Mauritius and Sey-
chelles are reasonably prosperous middle-income economies and migratory flows to the other islands are
limited, although there are some 3,300 Mauritian residents in Réunion; likewise a relatively small number
of migrants from Réunion to the other islands tend to be professionals. Intraregional migrations to
Mauritius and Seychelles are also limited. Seychelles is a small state, difficult to get to, and with limited
prospects for immigrants; and while French is widely spoken in both Mauritius and Seychelles, English is
the official language, thus also discouraging potential immigrants from the other islands. Both countries
are less attractive than Réunion which, as a French département, is a high-income economy member of the
EU; even if less prosperous than metropolitan France, the socioeconomic benefits of France, a shared
colonial history and a common language, and the facilitating role of Réunion for onward migration to
Europe are strong drawcards. More than three quarters of Réunion’s immigrant population come from
neighboring islands: nevertheless, at 1.8 % of the population, there are proportionally far fewer immi-
grants in Réunion than in metropolitan France, where the figure is more than 8 %. There are, according to
official figures, 6,400 Malagasy and 1,500 Comorians in Réunion. However, the latter are a particularly
visible minority since their numbers are increased by a significant number of French citizens of Comorian
origin, many of whom are from Mayotte: there may be as many as 30,000 Comorians in Réunion, almost
all of whom, as citizens, are legally resident (INSEE 2010; Marie and Rallu 2012). However, identifiable
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discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. They frequently find it difficult to obtain employment and
housing and many live in insalubrious conditions in the poorer urban areas of the island.
Comorians are also present in Madagascar. French colonial policy encouraged the emigration of
Comorians to Madagascar rather than East Africa to palliate labor shortages on the big island. However,
rather than seeking work as agricultural laborers, the majority settled in the urban areas. A sizeable
Comorian community was established in Mahajanga, on the northwest coast, and by 1960, Mahajanga
counted some 23,000 Comorian inhabitants, almost 40 % of the town’s population. Muslim Comorians
(the majority of Malagasy are Christian), often prosperous and, following independence, foreign, were not
always viewed favorably by their Malagasy neighbors and strained relationships reached breaking point
in December 1976 when, following a dispute between two families, intercommunal rioting broke out and
over a three-day period some 2000 Comorians were massacred. More than 17,000 individuals of
Comorian origin were subsequently repatriated to the Comoros, the largest forced migration in the region
in recent history. Although largely reintegrated, many of those repatriated had been born in Madagascar
and retain a distinct identity in the Comoros where they are known as Sabenas (from the airline whose
aircraft repatriated them) or Zanatany (Malagasy, “children of the land”) (Etudes Océan Indien 2007).
Forced migration was also responsible for the depopulation of the Chagos Islands, detached from
Mauritius in the late colonial period to constitute the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony was
leased to the United States for military purposes, on the understanding that there was no local population,
and between 1965 and 1973 some 2,000 Chagossians were forcibly removed, the majority to Mauritius
(Evers and Kooy 2011). Compensation was derisory and many lived in extreme poverty in the urban
fringes: unemployment was high, mental health problems were widespread, and there were several
suicides. Following many years of legal battles, the Chagossians obtained some compensation and British
passports, and they now have right of abode in the United Kingdom: a sizeable community now live in the
United Kingdom, particularly in Crawley, Sussex (Jeffery 2011). Others continue to live in Mauritius, and
there is also a small community in Seychelles. In 2000 the community won a judgment in the British High
Court that their eviction from the islands was illegal, paving the way for the Chagossians to return; but in
2004 this right was effectively blocked by a British Order in Council. After several further decisions the
community is now pursuing the case at the European Court of Human Rights.

International Migration
Inward immigration to the Comoros is negligible, with the exception of return migrations of Comorians
born elsewhere. The events of Majunga were a more brutal echo of the expulsion of a number of
Zanzibaris of Comorian origin following the Zanzibar revolution in 1964. Prior to the French annexation
of Madagascar (and the subsequent incorporation of the Comoros into the colony of Madagascar), the
Comoros, and particularly the island of Ngazidja, had maintained strong links with East Africa, where
Zanzibar was an economic and cultural center of some importance. A small Comorian community was
present in Zanzibar at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but emigration from Ngazidja to Zanzibar
increased rapidly following the French occupation of the former island in 1886. Enjoying the advantages
of French citizenship, the small but influential Comorian community of Zanzibar enjoyed the respect both
of the French government and of the British colonial administration and were generally employed in the
civil service or served as religious leaders. Although many took up Zanzibari nationality in the run up to
independence, they maintained their identity as a community and generally aligned themselves (with
varying degrees of success) with the Arab communities and the ruling classes. One month after
independence, the sultan of Zanzibar was deposed in a bloody coup that was followed by anti-Arab
pogroms that saw widespread killings (the number of deaths remains obscure today) and the mass
expulsion of Zanzibaris of Arab origin. Some Comorians, also perceived as foreigners due both to their
French citizenship and, for many, their Arab origins, were expelled or forced to flee, and although their

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number was small, the experience has marked the collective memory of the Comorian community in
Zanzibar.
Comorian emigrants are found elsewhere in East Africa – there are communities in mainland Tanzania,
Kenya, and Mozambique and individuals of Comorian origin in South Africa – and beyond. Ngazidja has
long been a supplier of migrants, partly due to the lack of economic development of the island and partly
due to the existence of an onerous customary marriage ritual, known as the ^ a da, which forces individuals
overseas to seek the capital with which to discharge their social obligations. For much of the late and
postcolonial period, the preferred destination was France and there are sizeable Comorian communities in
Paris, Dunkerque, and, above all, Marseille; and while the initial migrants are usually men, they are often
later joined by spouse and children. Many of these Comorians are sans-papiers, undocumented migrants,
and many more are French citizens and it is therefore hard to be precise about numbers – it is thought that
80 % of Comorians in France are French citizens, but that of the remainder 80 % are undocumented.
Official French government statistics give a figure of 18,700 Comorian citizens in France and 25,800
Comorian-born, categories that presumably largely overlap, but these figures grossly understate the size
of the population and it is thought that there are upwards of 100,000 Comorians in the country, of whom a
majority live in Marseille (Vivier 1996). The Comorian community is one of the largest and most visible
of immigrant communities and is frequently singled out for criticism, most notably in September 2011
when the French minister of the interior, Claude Guéant, claimed that the Comorian community was
responsible for much violence in the city. Certainly the community, and particularly the younger, French-
born, suffers from the discrimination and social disadvantage that touch many immigrant communities;
but they are also well organized: there are several dozen Comorian migrant associations in France and
social cohesion is strong.
Although much of the savings accumulated during a sojourn in France is destined for costs associated
with the ^a da and its rituals, the social cohesion that is both at the heart of these rituals and is reinforced by
them maintains immigrant links with the homeland. Most first-generation immigrants intend to retire to
the Comoros (hence participation in the ritual), and the social investments prompt economic investments
as the diaspora finance local development projects and send remittances to families at home. Remittances
are crucial to the Comorian economy, perhaps accounting for as much as 20 % of GDP (da Cruz et al.
2004; Thierry and Axus 2007). Once again, exact figures are difficult to obtain since up to 75 % of funds
are remitted in cash, but estimates range upward from €50 million annually. Criticism therefore that 75 %
of these funds are spent on consumption items (implicitly the ^ a da) should be tempered by the fact that
^
without the a da the remaining 25 % would undoubtedly be very much smaller. Recently, Comorian
migrants have moved beyond the traditional destination of France to the United Kingdom and Nordic
countries, North America, and even Australia. These latter destinations also attract Mauritians, partly for
linguistic reasons, and a small but significant group of Mauritians emigrated to Australia around the time
of Mauritian independence in 1968 – the largest population, some 9,000, live in the Melbourne area.
Although there are small communities of Indian and Chinese origin in Madagascar – both groups
generally run businesses, the former in the urban areas of the west coast, the latter on the east
coast – migratory flows to and from Madagascar and Réunion are also largely orientated toward France.
More than 100,000 Réunionnais live in metropolitan France; but the lure of the tropics is strong and there
are some 80,000 metropolitan French natives living in Réunion, where they are known as zorey. The
French also constitute the largest immigrant group in Madagascar, numbering perhaps 30,000, and the
Malagasy community in France is also sizeable, numbering perhaps 50,000. It is thus one of the larger
sub-Saharan African groups in France but is significantly less visible – at least in the French
imagination – than similar sized communities from West Africa. This is largely due to their profile.
Many Malagasy migrate to France for study rather than as laborers and they are also better integrated into
French society, partly no doubt, by virtue of the fact that Malagasy are Christian (albeit largely Protestant)

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and partly because many are phenotypically Asian rather than African and thus less likely to be subject to
the sorts of prejudices suffered by West Africans or Comorians.
Malagasy emigrate elsewhere – to other European destinations and North America – but one destina-
tion is egregious: some 7,000 Malagasy women work as domestic laborers in Lebanon. Maltreatment of
domestic migrants in Lebanon is chronic, and in 2009, in response to complaints and a rising number of
suspicious deaths and suicides, the Malagasy government imposed a partial ban on labor migration to
Lebanon, preventing new departures but allowing those in possession of Lebanese work permits to return.
In 2010, 17 Malagasy maids died in Lebanon, and at the end of the year, the ban was upgraded to prohibit
all labor migration to Lebanon; the following year, in response to more than 600 requests for help from
Malagasy in Lebanon, 86 domestic workers were repatriated (Human Rights Watch 2010). Nevertheless,
Malagasy continue to emigrate as domestic workers and there are small numbers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Jordan.

References
Addison J, Hazareesingh K (1993) A new history of Mauritius. Éditions de l’Océan Indien, Rose Hill
Adelaar A (2012) Malagasy phonological history and Bantu influence. Oceanic Linguistics
51(1):123–159
Carter M (1995) Servants, sirdars and settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874. Oxford University Press,
Delhi/Oxford
Causes Communes: Mayotte, la déchirure (2012) La Cimade, Paris
Cox M, Nelson MG, Meryanne T, Ricaut F-X, Herawati S (2012) A small cohort of Island Southeast
Asian women founded Madagascar. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 279(1739):2761–2768
da Cruz V, Fengler W, Schwartzman A (2004) Remittances to Comoros: volume, trends, impact and
implications. Africa Region working paper series No.75. World Bank, Washington, DC
Etudes Océan Indien No 38–39 (2007) Special issue: Les Comoriens à Majunga: Histoire, migrations,
émeutes
Evers S, Kooy M (2011) Eviction from the Chagos Islands: displacement and struggle for identity against
two world powers. Brill, Leiden
Freeman L, Rasolofohery S, Randriantovomanana EB (2010) Patterns, features and impacts of
rural–urban migration in Antananarivo, Madagascar. http://www.hayzara.org/index.php/eng/Knowl
edge-bank/Cross-Cutting-Themes/Patterns-Features-and-Impacts-of-rural-urban-Migration-in-Antanan
arivo-Madagascar
Government of Mauritius (2000) 2000 Housing And Population Census Analysis Report. Volume
IV. Population distribution and migration. Government of Mauritius, Port Louis. http://www.gov.mu/
portal/sites/ncb/cso/report/hpcen00/census4/index.htm
Human Rights Watch (2010) Without protection: how the Lebanese justice system fails migrant domestic
workers. Human Rights Watch, New York
INSEE (2010) Dossier Migrations: l’impact démographique et économique. Économie de La Réunion,
No 136. INSEE, Paris
Jeffery L (2011) Chagos islanders in Mauritius and the UK: forced displacement and onward migration.
Manchester University Press, Manchester
Larson P (2009) Ocean of letters: language and creolization in an Indian Ocean diaspora. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Leguen M (1979) Histoire de l’Ile de la Réunion. L’Harmattan, Paris

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Marie C-V, Rallu J-L (2012) Les tendances démographiques et migratoires dans les régions ultrapér-
iphériques: quel impact sur leur cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale? Institut national d’études
démographiques, Paris
Nawrotzki R, Hunter L, Dickinson T (2012) Rural livelihoods and access to natural capital: differences
between migrants and non-migrants in Madagascar. Demogr Res 26:661–699
Thierry B, Anne-Laure Axus (2007) Valoriser les potentialités économiques de la diaspora comorienne
pour le développement de l’archipel. Etude de cas Programme Pays Comores. Union des Comores/
FIDA, Moroni. www.fidacomores.net/IMG/doc/DOSSIER_transfert_diaspora_comores.doc
Vivier G (1996) Les migrations comoriennes en France: Histoire de migrations coutumières. Centre
français sur la Population et le Développement, Paris
World Bank (2011) L’urbanisation ou le nouveau defi Malgache. World Bank, Washington, DC

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Trans-Saharan Slave Trade

Michael Kehinde*
Department of Political Science, Lagos State University, Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria

Definition
Trans-Saharan slave trade was conducted within the ambits of the trans-Saharan trade, otherwise referred
to as the Arab trade. Trans-Saharan trade, conducted across the Sahara Desert, was a web of commercial
interactions between the Arab world (North Africa and the Persian Gulf) and sub-Saharan Africa. The
main objects of this trade were gold and salt; gold was in abundance in the western part of Africa, but
scarce in North Africa. On the other hand, while salt remains indispensable to human societies, it was not
producible in sub-Saharan Africa, but was abundant in North Africa. This created a rationale for trading
between these two regions, separated by a vast and hostile terrain. Subsequently, there developed an
intricate web of trade routes, powered by caravans of camels, between different sub-Saharan societies and
the Arab world. It was during the course of trading that human beings gradually became items of exchange
as the need for manpower grew on the north side of the Sahara.
Trans-Saharan slave trade was the trade in “human commodity,” sourced from different places in
sub-Saharan Africa, destined for locations north of the Sahara Desert, the Mediterranean shores, and the
Middle East. Unlike its later trans-Atlantic variant, trans-Saharan slave trade took place within the context
of a larger exchange relation between black Africa on the one hand and the Maghreb and the rest of the
Arab world on the other. It has been argued that perhaps one of the most significant effects of the trans-
Saharan trade was the establishment and proliferation of the trade in human beings (Brett 1969).
Sub-Saharan African slaves were bartered for bars of salt and other Mediterranean goods.

Origin
Trans-Saharan slave trade has its roots in classical times. Though it is difficult to specifically state the
origin of the trade, evidence suggests that as early as 1000 BC, slaves were one of the chief commodities
of the trade between Carthage (centered on present-day Tunisia) and regions located to the south of the
Sahara Desert (Boahen 1962). By the fifth century BC, trans-Saharan trade, of which slave trade was an
important component, had become very significant to the economy of Carthage. Trans-Saharan trade
blossomed following the introduction of camels as pack animals for the arduous journey across the Sahara
around 100 AD. While it is difficult to specifically date the origin of trans-Saharan slave trade, it is
possible to state that the trade reached its peak between the eighth and the late sixteenth century
AD. Indeed, by the tenth century AD, North Africa was “chiefly remarkable for black slaves” (Rose
2003). Trans-Saharan slave trade flourished following the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in North
Africa around the seventh and eighth century AD. The wars waged to spread Islam beyond North Africa
into other regions of the continent provided the initial impetus for trans-Saharan slave trade as prisoners of
war became enslaved and transported to the north side of the Sahara. The first set of slaves during this
period was transported to Islamized Egypt following the treaty of protection with Nubia (present-day
Sudan), as tributes in exchange for peaceful relations between the two states (Shinnie 1978).

*Email: mikehinde72@gmail.com

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Though the Koran does not discriminate among races, racial prejudices were later used by Arab slave
traders to justify slave trade and significantly influenced the enslavement of sub-Saharan Africans. Black
people were regarded as “dim” of intelligence and that “. . .the moral characteristics found in their
mentality are close to the instinctive characteristics found naturally in animals” (Reid and Lane 2004).
Hence, they were considered right for enslavement, and sub-Saharan Africa gradually became the greatest
reservoir of slaves to the Arab world. Slaves were sourced through raids and conquests and exchanged by
local rulers for a wide variety of Mediterranean products, especially salt and horses.
Slaves were transported in caravans of camels to North Africa through several routes across the Sahara.
As a rule, slave caravans usually departed North Africa between September and October, and the return
journey began just before the start of the rainy season in April or May. All things being equal, the duration
of the journey was usually 70–90 days depending on the size of the caravan (Boahen 1962). The journey
was hazardous and difficult. The major source of casualty being the harsh conditions of the desert and the
unpredictable sandstorms could bury alive an entire caravan or obliterate routes. Slaves were transported
naked, barefoot, and chained around the neck. They were also burdened with heavy loads of commodities
on their head. About 80 % of slaves transported across the Sahara perished in the course of the journey.

Rationale
Following the conquest and Islamization of the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh and
eighth centuries AD, the Islamic state supplanted the old order and inherited the trans-Saharan trade.
Slavery is taken for granted in Islam; the religion provides a humane treatment of slaves with their rights
protected under the Koran. It also states who can be enslaved – generally non-Muslims. As Islam was
expanding through wars and conquests, prisoners of war, who refused to accept Islam, were enslaved as
required by the Koran. As the growing need (economic, military, and prestige) for manpower in the courts
of rulers in North Africa and the Middle East continued to outstrip the supply by conquests, slaves were
sought from places far and wide. This was justified by the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave
black people as they were no better than animals. It was during this period that black Africa became the
largest depot of slaves to the Islamic world.
Slave labor was mainly used in the service sector – domestic chores as cooks, wet nurses for masters’
children, and waiters on ladies of the house and as concubines. It has been argued that the overwhelming
desire for female over male slaves in the trans-Saharan trade was driven by the need for concubines. It is
lawful under Islamic law for a man (Muslim) to have a number of slave women with whom (only) he
could have sexual relations. Concubinage however allowed some degree of integration into the society for
the slaves as they became excluded from resale and became free following the death of their masters
(if they had children for them). Their children were free, as the assumption was that it was impossible for
fathers to enslave their children.
Other roles served by slaves included military and security. Slaves were trained as distinct corps of
fighting men and bodyguards to rulers and merchants. Slave soldiers were a common phenomenon in the
Islamic world. Black troops were first introduced into Egypt between 868 and 884 AD (Hunwick 1992).
The Ifriqiya and the Fatimid also raised corps of black slave soldiers used in their many wars. Slaves were
also used as bodyguards and gatekeepers for members of the royalty and merchants. Black troops were
often used to counteract rebellious tendencies among local soldiers by the creation of a corps of alien
soldiers who had no local connections and whose allegiance can be taken for granted.
Slaves were also used as administrators and traders. They were used in the service of their lords as
record keepers, as deputies, and as couriers. They engaged in commercial activities on behalf of their

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masters; they accompanied them on commercial trips and served as bodyguards as well as took care of the
pack animals for the journey.
These different uses for slaves aided the perpetuation of the trans-Saharan slave trade as it engendered
growing demands for black slaves on the north side of the Sahara. Sub-Saharan Africa remained a vast
repository of slaves as political instability and Muslim expansionism provided the impetus for slave
raiding and slave trading. Trans-Saharan slave trade blossomed until the advent and growth of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century and the eventual abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.
Even after the abolition, slaves continued to change hands in sub-Saharan Africa between local rulers and
Muslim slave traders until European colonization.

Features
Over 28 million sub-Saharan African slaves were enslaved in North Africa and the Middle East during the
course of the trans-Saharan slave trade (see Austen 1992). However, the population of slaves taken from
sub-Saharan Africa was much more as only about 20 % of slaves successfully made the trip across the
Sahara to the slave markets on the Mediterranean coast. Trans-Saharan slave routes were littered with
countless human skeletons – fatal remains of those who perished in the desert.
Trans-Saharan slave trade was dominated by female slaves. The ratio of female to male slaves in North
Africa and the Middle East was 2:1. This has been explained in the desire for slaves not primarily as
laborers, but as concubines. Harem of rulers and merchants were reported to host hundreds of female
slaves. For example, the harem in the Fatimid palace in Cairo had over 6000 concubines (Khan 2009).
Most male slaves on the other hand were castrated and employed as soldiers, bodyguards, or
administrators.
For the greater part of the slave trade, slaves were exchanged for other good (salt, horses, and other
Mediterranean goods). However, records from Morocco in 1876 show that market prices for slaves ranged
between $48 and $140 (US Dollar of 1876) (Black Moor n/d). Other means of exchange included bars of
salt, cowry shells, and much later, the French francs. Prices varied according to the quality of the human
commodity, sex, and attractiveness. Female slaves commanded much higher price than male slaves, with
“attractive virgins” costing between $192 and $386 (Black Moor n/d).

Decline
Trans-Saharan trade generally began to decline with the entrance of European traders and adventurers into
Africa beginning from the sixteenth century. Trans-Saharan slave trade was the most affected by the
European with the emergence of trans-Atlantic slave trade, which diverted the direction of flow from the
desert to the ocean. Furthermore, following the European and American abolition of slavery, major slave
markets in North Africa and beyond began to decline, making the trade less attractive. Though these
factors greatly hampered the flow of slaves across the Sahara, it was not until European colonization
replaced local authorities that trans-Saharan trade in general experienced a fatal blow. Firstly, European
colonizers enforced the abolition of slavery in their new domains and promoted “legitimate” commerce in
place of slavery. In addition, as the European mode of organization of society and economy was imposed,
altering the traditional pattern of conducting business, the desert trade was fundamentally affected. The
stability and security engendered by the traditional power structure were shattered and could not be
reproduced under European political control. This resulted in the desert becoming unsafe for caravans as
they became easy targets for raiding desert bands. Finally, the transformation from the traditional to the

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modern mode of production and the growth of the railway shifted the direction of trade from the Maghreb
through the Sahara to Europe and the Americas across the ocean. While caravans were useful to cross the
desert, they were comparatively slow and ineffective compared to the railway and the ocean liners, which
were much faster and capable of conveying multiples of caravan cargoes.
Trans-Saharan slave trade resisted these forces well into the second decade of the twentieth century
when it was forced to an end. Though the trade is all but dead, slavery still existed in various forms in
regions that were sources of slaves during the trans-Saharan slave trade. In Mauritania and parts of Mali,
slavery remains an integral part of the society. However, slaves are no longer transported across the
Sahara. In other words, contemporary slavery in Mauritania and parts of Mali are domestic in nature, and
migration is limited to internal movement of slaves from poor regions to more affluent locations (within
the same country).

References
Austen R (1992) The Mediterranean Islamic trade out of Africa: a tentative census. Slav Abolit J Slav
Post-Slave Stud 13(1):214–248
Black Moor (n/d) Arab racism and imperialism in Sudan (Africa). http://blackmoro.blogspot.ca/p/
moslims-de-pioniers-van-de-afrikaanse.html. Retrieved from 5 Dec 2012
Boahen A (1962) The caravan trade in the nineteenth century. J Afr Hist 3(2), Third conference on African
history and archaeology: school of oriental and African studies, University of London, 3–7 July 1961,
pp 349–359
Brett M (1969) Ifriqiya as a market for Saharan trade from the tenth to the twelfth century A.D. J Afr Hist
X(3):347–364
Hunwick J (1992) Black Africans in the Mediterranean world: introduction to a neglected aspect of the
African Diaspora. In: Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave
trade. Frank Cass, London, pp 5–38
Khan M (2009) Islamic Jihad: a legacy of forced conversions, imperialism and slavery. iUniverse,
Bloomington
Reid A, Lane P (2004) African historical archaeologies. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York
Rose C (2003) Minerals, medals, faith and slaves: the trans-Saharan commodity trade. Paper presented at
the Hemispheres Summer Teachers’ Institute, Austin. http://www.utexas.edu/cola/orgs/hemispheres/_
files/pdf/presentations/Metals_Minerals_Faith_Slaves.pdf. Retrieved from 12 Nov 2012
Shinnie P (1978) Christian Nubia. In: Fage J (ed) The Cambridge history of Africa, vol.
2, c. 500BC – AD1050. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 556–588

Further Reading
Fage J (1969) Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African History. J Afr Hist 10(3):393–404
Law R (1967) The Garamantes and trans-Saharan enterprise in classical times. J Afr Hist
V111(2):181–200
McDougall E (1992) Salt, Saharans, and the trans-Saharan trade: nineteenth century developments. In:
Savage E (ed) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass,
London, pp 61–88
Savage E (ed) (1992) The human commodity: perspectives on the trans-Saharan slave trade. Frank Cass,
London

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Gentrification
Jan Brueckner*
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Definition
Gentrification is an intra-urban migration process under which households with high socioeconomic
status move into parts of a city formerly occupied by households of low socioeconomic status. According
to the Free Dictionary, gentrification’s route word (“gentry”) refers to “people of gentle birth, good
breeding, or high social position.” With gentrifying neighborhoods often located in central cities, where
the poor are usually concentrated in the United States and some European countries, the phenomenon is
commonly viewed as a path toward revitalization of ailing downtown areas. This view makes gentrifi-
cation a popular subject for newspaper articles, and the anecdotal evidence they provide has been
supplemented by data-driven scholarly research documenting and analyzing the phenomenon (for recent
examples, see Vigdor 2002; Ellen and O’Regan 2011; McKinnish et al. 2010).
Two main questions have been the focus of gentrification research by economists. The first question is
why gentrification occurs. What forces lead high-income households to relocate into neighborhoods
previously occupied solely by lower-income residents? The second question concerns the effect of
gentrification on the poor. Does gentrification harm the poor households living in the areas that experience
it either by displacement of these households or an escalation in their living costs?

Why Gentrification Occurs

To analyze the forces leading to gentrification, economists usually rely on the standard model of a
monocentric city, developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969). Under this model, all
employment is located in the city’s central business district (CBD), and workers commute to the CBD
from their residences, which are dispersed around the center. A stylized version of the model has two
income groups, rich and poor. The model can be used to predict the relative locations of the rich and poor
residential areas, along with possible changes in these locations over time. A pattern of gentrification
would be observed if the poor initially live in the central city, with the rich living in the suburbs, and if this
pattern is altered by the relocation of some rich households into central neighborhoods.
In the basic model, the location of the rich group relative to the poor reflects the interplay of two forces.
The first force is a household’s wish to economize on commuting costs, mainly time costs, a force that
pulls the household toward the CBD. The second force is a desire to consume housing where it is cheap on
a per-square-foot basis. This desire pulls the household toward the suburbs, where the model predicts that
cheap land and correspondingly cheap housing are found. For the rich to live in the suburbs, this housing
force must strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes, making the relative
advantage of the suburbs stronger for the rich. When this pattern holds, the rich will outbid the poor for
suburban housing, and the poor will outbid the rich for housing in the central city. Starting with this
location pattern, which has the rich in the suburbs, the model can generate gentrification if some change in
the economic environment causes the housing force to weaken, not strengthen, relative to the commuting-

*Email: jkbrueck@uci.edu

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cost force at higher incomes. Then, the rich will outbid the poor for central city housing, reversing the
locations of the two groups.
For example, suppose that traffic congestion in the city grows, a pattern that has become common
across the United States. With the rich having higher time costs, their commuting costs will increase
proportionally more than the commuting costs of the poor in response to the higher congestion. With the
commuting-cost force then stronger at higher incomes, the housing force, which is unchanged, will now
weaken relative to the commuting-cost force as income increases. With the relative advantage of the
center now stronger for the rich, the result will be gentrification, with the rich moving into the central city.
Simply put, the rich’s stronger desire to escape worsening traffic congestion will pull them toward the
CBD more strongly than the poor, leading to gentrification.
While changes that affect commuting costs might promote gentrification, the urban model identifies
other, more familiar forces that can lead to this outcome. These forces are (i) a change in consumer tastes,
which places more weight on the amenities available in central cities; (ii) a change in the level of these
amenities due to public investments in parks or other facilities or private investments in restaurants and
other retail outlets, with no change in tastes; and (iii) replacement of a worn-out central city housing stock,
which attracts high-income households in search of newer dwellings to downtown areas. The effects of
these forces again can be analyzed using the monocentric city model.
Central cities usually offer amenities such as museums and theaters, noteworthy architecture and public
spaces, and a wide variety of restaurants, which create a third locational force in addition to the housing
and commuting-cost forces. Like the commuting-cost force, the amenity force pulls consumers toward an
amenity-rich CBD. In addition, the force is likely to be stronger for higher-income households, who may
value the amenities offered by central cities more than the poor while having the purchasing power to
enjoy them. The amenity force, however, could initially be weak, with the housing and commuting-cost
forces determining the location pattern, and with the rich living in the suburbs. Rich households may then
experience a change in tastes, with their valuation of central city amenities strengthening. With the
amenity force now stronger for the rich and still inconsequential for the poor, it may then dominate the
housing and commuting-cost forces, leading the rich to outbid the poor for central city housing. The result
is taste-driven gentrification. Kern (1981) formalizes this argument using the monocentric city model.
This kind of change in the taste for central city amenities is frequently mentioned in popular
commentary as a cause of gentrification. The change is sometimes linked to the “empty-nester” phenom-
enon, where the departure of grown children from family households frees the parents to satisfy their
suppressed tastes for downtown amenities by moving to the city center. Other trends, such as the growing
culinary interests of consumers (which are more easily satisfied downtown), could also be a factor in such
a change.
Central city amenities can generate gentrification even in the absence of a change in tastes. If public
investment or other factors cause amenities to increase in the central city, then even if tastes remain the
same, the amenity force will strengthen, just as if tastes for amenities had become stronger. The amenity
force may then once again dominate the housing and commuting-cost forces for rich households, leading
them to outbid the poor for central city housing. Chicago, where substantial public investment in parks
and street-side amenities has occurred since 1990, appears to offer an example of this phenomenon. As the
central city has become a more appealing environment due to these public investments, anecdotal
evidence suggests that a number of central neighborhoods have undergone gentrification, experiencing
inflows of well-educated, high-income households.
These conclusions are connected to the analysis of Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (1999), who extend
the monocentric city model to capture the effect of amenity patterns on the location of the rich and poor.
However, rather than attempting to explain gentrification in a single city, their goal is to explain
differences in location patterns across cities. Arguing as above, they claim that in a city like Paris,

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which has strong central amenities, the rich will live in the center, whereas in a city like Detroit, where
central amenities are weak, the rich will be found in the suburbs (both patterns match reality). The
implication is that if Detroit could somehow generate Paris-style central amenities, the result would be
gentrification in that city.
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) attempt to explain gentrification by modifying the housing force to
include dwelling age as a factor. In a city that has expanded outward over time and has not yet experienced
any redevelopment, dwelling ages will decrease moving out from the CBD to the suburbs, where the
newest dwellings are found. In the model, both rich and poor prefer younger dwellings, so that the age
force (a modified housing force) then draws both groups to the suburbs, where dwellings are young. As
before, the commuting-cost force again draws both groups toward the center. But assuming that the rich
have a stronger preference and ability to pay for new dwellings than the poor, the age force is likely to
strengthen relative to the commuting-cost force at higher incomes. The relative advantage of the suburbs
will then be stronger for the rich, leading them to outbid the poor for young suburban dwellings, with the
poor then living in older housing in the central city.
Redevelopment of the central city, which occurs as its worn-out dwellings are replaced with new
housing, leads to gentrification in this model. The reason is that along with the commuting-cost force, the
age force will now also pull the rich toward the center, where new housing like that in the suburbs can be
found. With the center offering both new dwellings and a chance to economize on their high time costs,
the rich will outbid the poor for central housing, leading to gentrification. Some rich households, however,
will remain in the suburbs.

Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?

Although gentrification helps to revitalize central cities, many observers express concern about possible
negative effects on poor households. In the case where the poor are renters and the incoming higher-
income households are also renters rather than owner-occupiers, this concern has a logical basis. Then, the
higher bids of gentrifying households will drive up rents in the area, either making housing unaffordable
for the poor, who are then displaced, or crimping their budgets if they decide to stay. But the case where
gentrification occurs in an owner-occupied area may not entail negative effects. Escalating home prices
due to gentrification will confer capital gains on poor owner-occupiers, which can be cashed out if these
households decide to move or could be realized at a later date if they decide to stay. Although property tax
liabilities may rise with housing prices, poor owner-occupiers will generally gain from gentrification in
their neighborhoods.
Vigdor (2002), who studies Boston, casts some doubt on displacement as a consequence of gentrifi-
cation by showing that low-status households living in gentrifying areas were no more likely to relocate
than similar households outside such areas. McKinnish et al. (2010) present similar results for a broader
sample, showing that the share of black and Hispanic residents staying in gentrifying census tracts
matched their shares in the initial tract population 10 years earlier, showing no disproportionate displace-
ment of these racial groups. In addition, gentrification seldom led to lower incomes among stayer
households, regardless of race, indicating no displacement of the lowest-income households. Gentrifica-
tion also raised the incomes of black stayers with high school degrees, suggesting that gentrification may
spur better labor market outcomes for some existing households, reflecting a beneficial spillover from a
more affluent neighborhood environment.
Ellen and O’Regan (2011) find a similar “achievement” effect for stayer households in census tracts
experiencing strong gentrification. In addition, like McKinnish et al. (2010), they find that renter
households exiting census tracts with strong gentrification are similar to those exiting non-gentrifying

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tracts, with both exiters having incomes somewhat above those of original residents. Exiting owners in
gentrifying tracts, however, had notably lower incomes relative to original residents than did exiting
owners from non-gentrifying tracts. However, this pattern suggests that poorer owners were more inclined
to cash out capital gains from gentrification by moving, as seems natural. Overall, the up-to-date evidence
in these three studies mostly undercuts any concern that gentrification harms the poor.

References
Alonso W (1964) Location and land use. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Brueckner JK, Rosenthal SS (2009) Gentrification and neighborhood housing cycles: will America’s
future downtowns be rich? Rev Econ Stat 91:725–743
Brueckner JK, Thisse J-F, Zenou Y (1999) Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit poor? An
amenity-based theory. Eur Econ Rev 43:91–107
Ellen IG, O’Regan K (2011) How low income neighborhoods change: entry, exit, and enhancement. Reg
Sci Urban Econ 41:89–97
Kern CR (1981) Upper-income renaissance in the city: its sources and implications for the city’s future.
J Urban Econ 9:106–124
McKinnish T, Walsh R, White TK (2010) Who gentrifies low income neighborhoods? J Urban Econ
67:180–193
Mills ES (1967) An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area. Am Econ Rev Pap
Proc 57:197–210
Muth RF (1969) Cities and housing. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Vigdor JL (2002) Does gentrification harm the poor? In: Gale WG, Pack JR (eds) Brookings-Wharton
papers on urban affairs. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, pp 133–173

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Refugee Roulette
Jaya Ramji-Nogalesa*, Philip G. Schragb and Andrew I. Schoenholtzb
a
Temple University Beasley School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, USA
b
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, USA

Synonyms
Disparities in asylum adjudication

Definition
The term “refugee roulette” refers to disparities in asylum adjudication, also known as refugee status
determination. Asylum adjudication is the process by which a host state decides whether or not to grant
lawful immigration status to individuals who seek protection from persecution or torture in their home
countries. The adjudicator is generally a government official tasked with interviewing the applicant or
hearing testimony, reviewing background facts relevant to their claim, and applying the relevant legal
standards. In the developed world, this process may have several levels, entitling asylum applicants to two
or more opportunities to have their claim heard and reviewed.

Overview
Recent research on asylum systems in the United States and Canada has found high levels of disparity in
rates of granting asylum across adjudicators at all levels of the asylum process (USGAO 2008;
Rehaag 2008; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Some scholars suggest that the outcome of asylum determi-
nations in the United States is like a game of “refugee roulette,” depending in large part on the identity of
the particular adjudicator to whom an application is randomly assigned, rather than on the merits of
the asylum claim, and that this is cause for concern (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Other commentators state
that a good deal of disparity is inevitable and that refugees and their advocates must “learn to live” with
“unequal justice” (Legomsky 2007). A different set of researchers reported that the amount of disparity
diminished after 2008 (TRAC 2009).
The study that coined the term “refugee roulette” presents an empirical analysis of decision-making at
all four levels of the asylum process in the United States, namely, the asylum office of the Department of
Homeland Security, the immigration courts of the Department of Justice, the Board of Immigration
Appeals, and the United States Courts of Appeals, between 2000 and 2004 (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007).
The authors argue that their findings reveal an unacceptable level of disparities in grant rates, noting that
the asylum adjudicators who were studied heard large numbers of cases from the same country in the same
location over the same period of time.
For example, in one regional asylum office, 60 % of the officers decided in favor of Chinese applicants
at rates that deviated by more than 50 % from that region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants,
with some officers granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as
many as 68 % of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in
the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5 % chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges

*Email: jaya.ramji-nogales@temple.edu

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and an 88 % chance of prevailing before another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges
deviated by more than 50 % from the court’s mean grant rate for Colombian cases.
Relying on public biographies, the study also explores correlations between sociological characteristics
of individual immigration judges and their grant rates. The regression analyses determine that the chance
of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the random assignment of a case to a particular
immigration judge but also by the quality of an applicant’s legal representation, by the gender of the
immigration judge, and by the immigration judge’s work experience prior to appointment.
The study concludes with recommendations for reforming the immigration adjudication system,
including more comprehensive training, more effective and independent appellate review, mandated
representation for asylum seekers, and other reforms that would further professionalize the adjudication
system. A second book by the authors of Refugee Roulette explored in greater depth the disparities in
decision making by asylum offices of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Schoenholtz et. al
2014)
In a 2008 study of immigration court decision-making between 1994 and 2007, the United States
Government Accountability Office found that “the likelihood of being granted asylum varied consider-
ably across and within the [immigration courts studied]” (USGAO 2008).

Cross-References
▶ Asylum and Expert Evidence
▶ Asylum and Human Rights
▶ Asylum: Overview
▶ Gender and Asylum
▶ Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases
▶ On US Refugee Laws, particularly stressing the 1975 Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act and the
1980 Refugee Act
▶ Refugees Defined
▶ Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum

References
Legomsky S (2007) Learning to live with unequal justice: asylum and the limits to consistency. Stanford
Law Rev 60:413
Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2007) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication.
Stanford Law Rev 60:295
Ramji-Nogales J, Schoenholtz A, Schrag P (2009) Refugee roulette: disparities in asylum adjudication
and proposals for reform. NYU Press, New York
Rehaag S (2008) Troubling patterns in Canadian refugee adjudication. Ottawa Law Rev 39:335
Schoenholtz A, Schrag P, Ramji-Nogales J (2014) Lives in the Balance: Asylum Adjudication by the
Department of Homeland Security. NYU Press, New York
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) (2009) Latest data from immigration courts show
decline in disparity. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

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United StatesGovernment Accountability Office (USGAO) (2008) U.S. asylum system: significant
variation existed in asylum outcomes across immigration courts and judges. http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08940.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2013

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A
Asylum and Human Rights
Thomas Southerden
Department of Law, University of Sussex,
Brighton, UK
Definition
The legal process of allocating entitlement to
international protection for migrants.
Legal Processes, International
Protection, and Immigration Control
While asylum is by definition a migration-related
concept, the notion of human rights is applicable
to a variety of contexts. In relation to migrants
and migration, human rights issues can be raised
both in connection to the physical and legal act of
migration and also to the conditions in which
migrants find themselves once having arrived in
their host nation. In relation to this latter point, a
number of studies have shown that migrants find
themselves particularly vulnerable to human
rights infractions as a result of state policies and
their precarious position in host societies (see,
e.g., Dembour and Kelly 2011; Benhabib 2005;
Nash 2009). With regard to the former, the con-
cepts of asylum and human rights can be consid-
ered together as essentially legal frameworks
followed by states for formally recognizing and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_33-4
allocating legal status to certain classes of
migrant. As such, they tend not to relate to the
direct intentions of the migrants themselves, but
as post hoc concepts and processes States use to
respond to the arrival of migrants in their
territories.
Despite being distinct in a number of ways,
asylum and human rights, in this context, are
often perceived as being similarly related to the
concept of international protection. At the base of
this notion is a legal expectation that a host state
will refrain from returning migrants to a situation of
persecution or serious harm in their home country.
This expectation, known as the principle of non-
refoulement, is widely regarded as having achieved
the status of a universal norm within international
law. However, as mentioned above, asylum and
human rights derive from differing international
treaties and have differing political histories and
legal statuses.
Asylum as a legal process is based on the 1951
United Nations Convention on the Status of Ref-
ugees (which was principally designed to deal
with the ongoing problem of refugees in postwar
Europe) and its New York Protocol of 1967
(which universalized the original Convention’s
application by removing its temporal and geo-
graphical limits). Under the Convention and Pro-
tocol, an individual who believes they are at risk
of persecution for a specified set of reasons
(political or religious opinion, race or nationality,
or membership of a particular social group) and
who presents themselves to the authorities of a
2 Asylum and Human Rights
host state seeking their protection from such per-
secution is regarded as an asylum seeker during
the period when their claim for this protection is
being considered. If such a claim meets with
success, they are then formally and legally rec-
ognized as a refugee and are entitled to the forms
of support and assistance described in the later
sections of the Refugee Convention.
In contrast, human rights concepts in migra-
tion are far more diverse in their sources of both
legal legitimacy and procedures. Human rights’
relationship to international protection begins
with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
in which Article 14 declares the right “to seek and
enjoy asylum.” This formulation, however, was
expressly developed by the Declaration’s drafters
to avoid any duty being placed on States Parties
to actively grant such a status (Plender and Mole
1999, p. 81). In place of a single binding interna-
tional Convention relating to the issue, then, a
myriad of international instruments (including
the United Nations Convention Against Torture,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child) make up a general basis for entitle-
ments to international protection on human rights
grounds, augmented by regional and national
rights charters that have a greater or lesser utility
for migrants’ rights claims (see, e.g., Plender and
Mole 1999). However, these instruments cover a
broader range of issues than the sole focus on the
threat of persecution dealt with by the Refugee
Convention and have either served as comple-
mentary to the role played by the Convention or
as entirely separate bases for legal migration.
Important in this regard is the capacity, espe-
cially in states party to the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), for migrants to apply
for legal residence on grounds that are distinct
from issues related to international protection.
Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to respect for
private and family life, for example, has broad-
ened dramatically the impact of human rights
concepts on migration and has been applied to
such disparate issues as family reunion, student
migration, and regularization of long-term
undocumented migrants. In such cases, the issue
of non-refoulement does not normally arise, and
so the key issue is therefore where a reasonable
balance can be found between the legitimate
exercising of states’ authority to control immi-
gration and the individual claimant’s entitlement
to exercise their rights in their adopted country.
While such judgments frequently provoke con-
troversy, they have introduced a form of indepen-
dent assessment of the reasonableness of
governmental efforts to manage migration. They
thus provide a powerful counterpoint to the
impacts of politicized immigration policy.
Debate remains ongoing as to the relative
superiority of asylum or human rights claims
from the perspective of the protection and suc-
cessful integration of migrants (see, e.g., Chetail
2012). Arguments in favor of the human rights
model include its capacity to provide regulariza-
tion to migrants who would fail under the Refu-
gee Convention, for example, in cases where they
are excluded from benefiting from the Conven-
tion as a result of serious nonpolitical criminality.
Conversely, defenders of the Convention identify
as crucially important the duties it places on host
states to provide “treatment as favorable as pos-
sible and, in any event, not less favorable than
that accorded to aliens generally in the same
circumstances” across a range of social and eco-
nomic issues related to integration.
Whichever route is deemed most appropriate
to a given case, it should be understood that both
asylum and human rights as legal processes are
necessarily focused on the circumstances of indi-
vidual claimants, including their motivations for
migrating and their characteristics as migrants.
These processes are therefore highly personal-
ized and, as a result, are ill-equipped to respond
to the large-scale mass migrations following war
and natural disasters that are often associated
with the humanitarian concept of “refugees.”
These limitations have been demonstrated across
Western Europe during a period of unusually
high migrant intake over the last decade, where
national immigration authorities have failed to
keep up with growing demand, resulting in sys-
temic breakdowns and, in some cases, near aban-
donment of formal legal processes altogether
(see, e.g. Vine 2012; MSS v Greece & Belgium
2011).
Asylum and Human Rights
A rigid adherence to the formalized legal cat-
egories that asylum and human rights processes
are the results of can therefore provide extremely
important tangible benefits to certain types of
migrants but also risk excluding large numbers
of others in broadly similar circumstances.
References
Benhabib S (2005) The rights of others: aliens, residents
and citizens. CUP, Cambridge
Chetail V (2012) Are refugee rights human rights?: an
unorthodox questioning of the relations between refu-
gee law and human rights law. Social Science
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147763. Accessed 20 Dec
2012
Dembour M-B, Kelly T (2011) Are human rights for
migrants?: critical reflections on the status of irregular
3
migrants in Europe and the United States. Routledge,
London
MSS v Greece & Belgium. Grand Chamber Judgement
No. 30696/09. The European Court of Human Rights.
21 Jan 2011
Nash K (2009) The cultural politics of human rights:
comparing the US and UK. CUP, Cambridge
Plender R, Mole N (1999) Beyond the Geneva Conven-
tion: constructing a de facto right of asylum from
international human rights instruments. In:
Nicholson F, Twomey P (eds) Refugee rights and
realities: evolving international concepts and regimes.
CUP, Cambridge
Vine J (2012) An inspection of the UK Border Agency’s
handling of legacy asylum and migration cases. Statu-
tory Inspection Report. Independent Chief Inspector of
the UK Border Agency. Available at http://icinspector.
independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/UK-
Border-Agencys-handling-of-legacy-asylum-and-mig
ration-cases-22.11.2012.pdf. Accessed 20 Dec 2012
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Medical and Psychological Evidence of Trauma in Asylum Cases

S. Megan Berthold*
University of Connecticut School of Social Work, West Hartford, CT, USA

Definition
Individuals who flee their homelands due to persecution often apply for asylum, seeking a safe haven in
exile. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making difficult asylum determinations. Medical and
psychological evidence of the applicant’s trauma and its impact may be valuable in contributing to the
asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim of
persecution.

Detailed Description
The process of applying for asylum is often complicated, lengthy, and adversarial. Typically the applicant
has the opportunity to provide evidence of their persecution. This evidence often includes documenting
psychological evidence of the trauma and, if present, medical evidence. Some asylum claims put forward
by applicants are fabricated or embellished. Asylum adjudicators are frequently faced with making
difficult asylum determinations. Forensic medical and/or psychological assessments of an asylum seeker
may provide valuable evidence of the persecution and its impact on the person’s psychological state and
functioning in asylum proceedings and contribute to the asylum officer’s or immigration judge’s decision
related to the credibility of the applicant’s claim (Einhorn and Berthold 2015; Herlihy and Turner 2007;
Keast 2005; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005).
Chronic pain is one of the more common physical consequences of torture and other forms of physical
persecution frequently documented by physicians (Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Evidence of physical
abuse may be acute and/or temporary, observable upon medical examination soon after the trauma, such
as with certain lacerations, burns, bruises, hematomas, and fractures of teeth or bones (Quiroga and
Jaranson 2008). Quiroga and Jaranson (2008) indicate that more permanent lesions/scars have been
documented in 40–70 % of torture survivors. Common medical consequences found with particular types
of torture have been well documented. The use of a metallic or wooden baton to beat the soles of the
feet (known as Falanga) typically results in a burning sensation, chronic pain, and MRI evidence of
thickened plantar aponeurosis (Skylv 1995, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005). Skull fractures,
disrupted brain function, brain hemorrhage and edema, dementia, and seizure have been found in
survivors who have experienced severe traumatic brain injury, while those suspended by their arms
have developed peripheral neuropathies, and tight handcuffing has been found to be associated with
handcuff neuropathies (Moreno and Grodin 2002, as cited in Quiroga and Jaranson 2005).
Certainly there can be multiple possible causes of pain and other medical symptoms and conditions.
Often a physician may not be able to state with certainty that a given symptom or lesion is due to the
persecution but rather that it is consistent with the history of persecution that the individual reports and
that there is no evidence of alternative explanations (Physicians for Human Rights 2001).
Severe and persistent mental health consequences of torture and other traumatic persecution include,
most commonly, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression (often comorbid), other anxiety
disorders (generalized anxiety disorder or panic disorder), substance abuse, changes in worldview and
personality, and a host of other cognitive symptoms (impaired memory and concentration, disorientation/

*Email: megan.berthold@uconn.edu

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confusion), neurovegetative symptoms (insomnia, nightmares, lack of energy, sexual dysfunction), and
other psychological symptoms (withdrawal, irritability, emotional liability, dissociation) (Gerrity
et al. 2001; Quiroga and Jaranson 2005; Steel et al. 2009). A thorough mental health evaluation may
provide evidence associating the development or exacerbation of these symptoms/conditions with the
persecution.
The Istanbul Protocol is an official document of the United Nations (UN Resolution 55/89) and
provides international guidelines for legal, medical, and psychological professionals to investigate and
document the consequences of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment (experiences that qualify as persecution) (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
2001). The Istanbul Protocol recommends that an assessment cover, in part, a complete life history
(including history of torture, ill treatment, and other non-torture-related traumas), mental status exam,
medical and psychiatric history and current complaints, history of substance use/abuse, and an assessment
of psychosocial functioning over time.
A health and/or mental health professional’s assessment for malingering may provide information
relevant to the adjudicator’s determination regarding the applicant’s credibility. For both medical and
psychological reports, the inclusion of collateral information (if available), such as a medical report from
the time of the persecution, an independent report from others present at the incident of persecution,
and/or reports of family or friends noting changes in the person’s behavior or demeanor over time
associated with their history of persecution, may be valuable. Documenting the presence of notable and
visible scars not attributed to the persecution may lend strength to their claim.
In addition to providing evidence of the persecution itself, medical and psychological experts can help
the adjudicator understand that traumatized applicants might present with a variety of demeanors
consistent with their experience of persecution and mental state, including a blunt or flat affect, emotional
numbness, or a very emotional or labile affect. These demeanors are possible posttraumatic reactions and
also may be influenced by the impact of testifying in a stressful asylum proceeding. In the absence of
psychological explanation, an adjudicator may make an adverse credibility finding, erroneously conclud-
ing that the applicant was not sufficiently emotive or presented an overly emotional account based on their
own assumptions of how a person who is recounting traumatic experiences should present.
Culture and the impact of trauma can influence what is disclosed in an asylum application and/or
testimony. An applicant may not initially disclose their rape in their asylum application, for example, due
to the consequences and meaning of rape in their culture (e.g., being ostracized or disowned by family). If
the rape is revealed later in the asylum process, credibility concerns often arise. Reports or testimony from
a psychological expert may provide an explanation for this behavior (Einhorn and Berthold 2015).
Over time, the recollection of details tends to be compromised, even for nontraumatic events or in those
who have not experienced significant trauma. Medical and psychological experts may provide evidence
about the impact of head injury and other trauma on the applicant’s ability to provide a coherent,
consistent narrative of their experiences of persecution (Herlihy and Turner 2007; PHR 2001). Spatial
perception (Pynoos and Nader 1989), report of date and time sequence (Terr 1983), and ability to
concentrate may all be affected by trauma. As traumatic memories are usually triggered, the particular
trigger present during the trauma survivor’s asylum proceeding (including variations in how they are
asked about their experiences) may influence them to emphasize or recall different parts of their
experiences and lead to discrepancies in their testimony.
The strong desire to avoid revisiting their traumas and difficulty recalling aspects of one’s traumas (both
possible symptoms of PTSD) may further compromise a survivor’s testimony (Berthold and Gray 2011).
Trauma may be associated with memory blocks or dissociation in survivors such that their traumatic
experiences are not integrated effectively, with their memories stored as disconnected fragments, com-
prised of sensory perceptions and emotional states. If asked to testify in detail about their persecution,

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their account may appear incoherent, and they may not be able to recount aspects of their trauma that the
adjudicator believes is most salient to their case. Herlihy and Turner (2007) studied refugees with a history
of torture or other traumas and no reason to embellish or fabricate an account of trauma for secondary
gain. They found that inconsistencies in details of the traumas were common, particularly for those details
the survivor perceived as more peripheral to their experience, the longer the time between interviews, and
for those with PTSD. Inconsistencies are also more common when the individual is more anxious, under
great stress (such as during an asylum proceeding), and/or has experienced multiple traumas that share
some commonalities. Asylum adjudicators may perceive applicants who have experienced the most
severe trauma as the most incredible for the reasons discussed here.
Negative credibility determinations often result in an order of deportation for the asylum applicant.
Medical and psychological evidence can play an important role, where relevant, in providing alternative
explanations for the applicant’s demeanor, memory deficits, inconsistencies, and other aspects of their
functioning that may inform an asylum adjudicator’s determination of credibility.

References
Berthold SM, Gray G (2011) Post-traumatic stress reactions and secondary trauma effects at tribunals: the
ECCC example. In: Van Schaack B, Reicherter D, Chhang Y (eds) Cambodia’s hidden scars: trauma
psychology in the wake of the Khmer Rouge. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh,
pp 92–120
Einhorn BJ, Berthold SM (2015) Reconstructing Babel: Bridging cultural dissonance between asylum
seekers and asylum adjudicators. In Lawrance BN, Ruffer G (eds) Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum
Status: The Role of Witness, Expertise, and Testimony (pp. 27–53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press
Gerrity E, Keane TM, Tuma F (eds) (2001) The mental health consequences of torture. Kluwer/Plenum
Publishers, New York
Herlihy J, Turner S (2007) Asylum claims and memory of trauma: sharing our knowledge. Br J Psychiatry
191:3–4
Keast R (2005) Using experts for asylum cases in immigration court. Interpret Releases Rep Anal Immigr
Natl Law 82(30):1237–1243
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2001) Istanbul protocol: manual on the
effective investigation and documentation of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment. Professional training series, no. 8. United Nations, Geneva (HR/P/PT/8, ISBN 92-1-
154136-0, ISSN 1020–1688). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf.
Accessed 1 Jan 2013
Physicians for Human Rights (2001) Examining asylum seekers: a health professional’s guide to medical
and psychological evaluations of torture. Physicians for Human Rights, NYC/Boston/Washington, DC
Pynoos RS, Nader K (1989) Children’s memory and proximity to violence. J Am Acad Child Adolesc
Psychiatry 28(2):236–241
Quiroga J, Jaranson JM (2005) Politically-motivated torture and its survivors. A desk study review of the
literature. Torture 13(2–3):1–111
Quiroga J, Jaranson J (2008) Torture. In: Reyes G, Elhai JD, Ford JD (eds) The encyclopedia of
psychological trauma. Wiley, New York, pp 654–657
Steel Z, Chey T, Silove D, Marnane C, Bryant RA, van Ommeren M (2009) Association of torture and
other potentially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among populations exposed to mass
conflict and displacement: a systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA 302(5):537–549

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Terr L (1983) Time sense following psychic trauma: a clinical study of ten adults and twenty children. Am
J Orthopsychiatry 54:244–262

Further Reading
Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political asylum in the 21st century. Routledge,
London/New York
Bremner JD, Marmar CR (eds) (2002) Trauma, memory and dissociation. American Psychiatric Press,
Washington, DC
Gangsei D, Deutsch AC (2007) Psychological evaluation of asylum seekers as a therapeutic process.
Torture 17(2):79–87
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (2009) Psychological evaluation of torture
allegations: a practical guide to the Istanbul Protocol – for psychologists, 2nd edn. Copenhagen,
Denmark
Jacobs U (2000) Psycho-political challenges in the forensic documentation of torture: the role of
psychological evidence. Torture 10(3):68–71
Jacobs U, Lustig SL (2010) Psychological and psychiatric opinions in asylum applications: ten frequently
asked questions by fact finders. Bender’s Immigr Bull 15:1066–1069
Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001a) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of
torture – part I. Torture 11(3):85–89
Jacobs U, Evans FB, Patsalides B (2001b) Principles of documenting psychological evidence of
torture – part II. Torture 11(4):100–102
Moreno A, Grodin MA (2002) Torture and its neurological sequelae. Spinal Cord 40:213–223

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Relationship Between Asylum and Trafficking

Jean-Pierre Gauci*
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, The People for Change Foundation, Naxxar, Malta

Synonyms
Asylum – trafficking nexus; Human trafficking; Long-term protection for trafficked persons; Refugee law
and trafficking; Trafficking in persons

Human trafficking refers to the coerced or deceitful recruitment and/or holding of persons for the
purpose of exploitation. The crime of trafficking is composed of three related elements, each of which
must be fulfilled for the crime to subsist. These are the act (recruitment, transportation transfer, harboring,
receipt of persons), the means (deceit, coercion, abuse of a position of power or vulnerability), and the
exploitative purpose (UN General Assembly 2000a). Actual exploitation is not technically a requirement
and it is sufficient that there was an intention to exploit (UN 2000). Three broad types of exploitation are
usually identified: sexual exploitation, labor exploitation, and the removal of organs (this should be
distinguished from organ trafficking).
Trafficking is often described as modern-day slavery and entails a variety of human rights violations.
In particular circumstances, it may be a crime against humanity or a war crime (UN General Assembly
2000b). Trafficking must be distinguished from smuggling, another crime which involves the facilitation
of irregular movement across borders. Smuggling is often the only option available to asylum seekers in
their efforts to reach a safe country. In some circumstances, smuggling situations develop into exploitative
situations amounting to trafficking and as such the distinction between the two crimes is often difficult to
maintain.
An increasing number of trafficked persons have been turning to refugee law in search of protection.
This is partly because existing counter-trafficking law and policy does not prioritize the protection
of trafficked persons but instead is concerned primarily with the law enforcement dimension of the
crime (Gauci 2015). The international rules set out discretionary provisions on protection, and in some
cases one will only get support and protection if he/she is able and willing to help the law enforcement
agencies prosecute the traffickers.
International protection (asylum) offers a number of advantages over the protection provided by anti-
trafficking laws. It broadens the scope of protection. It protects not only individuals who have been
trafficked but may also, at least in theory, be used to protect persons facing real prospects of future
trafficking. It can also be used to protect family members and other known associates facing risks as a
result of their link to the trafficked person and individuals who are targeted due to their actions to combat
the crime. Moreover, it broadens the scope of where such protection may be sought to cover countries that
were not part of the trafficking route and experience. Another advantage is that protection is not made
dependent on helping law enforcement but only the needs of and risks faced by the individual applicant.
Moreover, asylum offers better protection in terms of the content and duration of the protection granted.
It is critical to note however that the recognition of trafficked persons as refugees is neither straight-
forward nor an easy process. Asylum processes have increasingly become skeptical of asylum seekers
meaning that recognition as a refugee is an increasingly complex and difficult endeavor. A culture of
disbelief is often quoted as underpinning many asylum decisions at least at the initial decision stages.

*Email: jean@pfcmalta.org

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UNHCR notes that not all trafficked persons or potential trafficked persons are refugees within the
meaning of the Convention definition. Courts have often found it difficult to determine that trafficked
persons form a particular social group.
A trafficked person must fulfill all of the refugee definition criteria in order to be recognized as a refugee
or a person who is otherwise in need of international protection. In 2006 the UNHCR issued guidelines
regarding the application of the refugee definition to trafficked persons and persons at risk of being
trafficked.
Some of the subjective factors that impact the well-founded fear of persecution in the context of
trafficking include the individual’s gender, age and past experiences, family background, as well as his/her
own state of mind. Persecution in trafficking-based asylum claims can include: re-trafficking, retribution
by traffickers, and ostracization by the family and/or the community. The agents of persecution in this
context are usually non-state actors including past traffickers and their associates, other traffickers, family
members, as well as society more broadly. This means that an asylum applicant must prove not only
persecution but that the State in his/her country of origin is unable or unwilling to protect him/her. Past
experiences of trafficking create a rebuttable presumption that such persecutory behavior will repeat itself
and is therefore relevant to the examination of a trafficking-based asylum claims. As highlighted above
the exploitation might have happened in the country of origin, in the country where asylum is being
sought, or in a third country. However the risk of persecution must be established with regard to the
country of origin. Many trafficking-based asylum claims have been filed under the Convention ground of
membership of a particular social group, and different jurisdictions have found it difficult to accept this.
Other grounds might also be relevant most notably race and religion. In Norway the Immigration Act
explicitly states that victims of human trafficking are members of a particular social group.

Cross-References
▶ Gender and Asylum
▶ Human Trafficking
▶ Human Trafficking Policy Responses
▶ Labor Trafficking
▶ Protection of Victims of Trafficking
▶ Refugee
▶ Sexual Offences
▶ Transnational Crime
▶ Victim Protection

References
Alfirev C, Bhabha J (2009) The identification and referral of trafficked persons to procedures for
determining international protection needs. In: Division of International Protection Services
(ed) Legal and protection policy research series. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Geneva
Bhabha J (2002) Internationalist gatekeepers: the tension between asylum advocacy and human rights.
Harv Hum Rights J 15:155
Gallagher AT (2009) Human rights and human trafficking: quagmire or firm ground? A response to James
Hathaway. Va J Int Law 49(4):789–848

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Gauci JP (2015) Why trafficked perosns need asylum. In: Gauci JP, Guiffre M, Tsourdi E (eds) Forced
migration(s). Current Challenges in Refugee Law, Brill
Hathaway JC (2008) The human rights quagmire of human trafficking. Va J Int Law 49:1
Juss S (2012) Human trafficking, asylum and the problem of protection, Chapter 13. In: Juss S (ed) The
Ashgate research companion to migration law, theory and policy. Ashgate, London, pp 281–319
Kneebone S (2010) The refugee–trafficking nexus: making good (the) connections. Refug Surv
Q 29(1):137–160
Piotrowicz R (2005) Victims of people trafficking and entitlement to international protection. Aust Year
B Int Law 24:159
UN General Assembly (2000a) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially
women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organized
crime, 15 Nov 2000
UN General Assembly (2000b) Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air,
supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 15 Nov 2000
UNHCR (2006) The application of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 convention and/or the 1967 protocol relating
to the status of refugees to victims of trafficking and persons at risk of being trafficked. In: United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ed) Guidelines on international protection. United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

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Asylum and Language Analysis

Peter L. Patrick*
Department of Language and Linguistics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Definition
Language Analysis for Determination of Origin (LADO) is a new branch of applied linguistics, used by
governments in processing asylum seekers who are applying for refugee status.

Overview
Undocumented asylum seekers present two types of evidence to refugee status determination (RSD)
processes:

• Their body, i.e., medical evidence relating to age, torture, injury, etc.
• Their speech, including both what they say about the reasons for their flight (the narrative content) and
the way in which they say it (the linguistic evidence)

Since the 1990s, when language expertise in Scandinavian government bureaux first became
outsourced to private language firms, governments have appealed to linguistic evidence as one means
of verifying asylum seekers’ claims of identity, ethnicity, origin or nationality, in the context of increasing
reliance on scientific evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, x-rays) from expert fields to assist in RSD.
Academic and forensic linguists refer to this as Linguistic Analysis for Determination of Origin (Eades
2009; Patrick 2012). Governments commissioning LADO – from language firms, individual experts, or
internal bureaux – include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
LADO practitioners before about 2002 were not scientifically trained academic linguists but had other
language qualifications (interpreting, translating) or were simply native speakers of the languages in
question, or related languages, without any formal linguistic training (Baltisberger and Hubbuch 2010).
Such persons, termed nonexpert native speakers (given their lack of credentials for the task of scientific
linguistic analysis that lies at the core of LADO and their consequent inability to qualify as linguistic
experts according to the legal requirements for forensic experts in many courts), still play a controversial
and central role in the practices of commercial and government LADO agencies today. Most agencies
have since raised their technical standards and hired linguists with varying levels of professional
qualifications, partly in response to pressures of competition, litigation, and the 2004 Guidelines
(see below).
LADO is a new and controversial application of linguistics, related to well-established areas such as
sociolinguistics, language assessment, speaker profiling and identification, first- and second-language
acquisition, language contact, and linguistic variation and change. Extensive academic research under-
lines linguistic findings crucial to the application of LADO:

1. “National origin, nationality and citizenship are all political or bureaucratic characteristics, which have
no necessary connection to language” (Language and National Origin Group 2004).

*Email: patrickp@essex.ac.uk

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2. Linguistic science can sometimes correlate an individual’s way of speaking with language socialization
into a particular speech community – a primary influence on native language acquisition – which may
help identify their country of origin; however, there are many circumstances where this cannot be done
with any certainty.
3. “Features of speech may vary in complex ways according to many. . . social and stylistic factors”
(Foulkes and French 2012). Variation occurs in the speech of individuals, often explicable by the
context in which they are speaking, while even greater cross-speaker variation is normal in stable, well-
studied speech communities, where it may be correlated with factors such as social class, age, gender,
ethnicity, etc.

LADO seeks to analyze a brief speech sample, specially collected in a formal, bureaucratic
setting – generally an interview of an asylum seeker concerning whose origins doubt has arisen – to
determine whether the person’s native language is as claimed. In forensic speaker comparison, typically
performed for criminal cases by phoneticians with expert credentials, such a sample is compared
explicitly, perhaps with statistical testing, to a dataset drawn from an adequately delimited reference
population (Foulkes and French 2012). In LADO, however, comparisons are often based only on an
analyst’s intuitions and beliefs as to what his native language (or some other language he knows) is
typically like, with little documentation, on the basis of few features implicitly analyzed, and conclusions
are expressed with great certainty (Patrick 2010).
Linguistic research has documented typical speech patterns (e.g., pronunciation or accent, grammar
including syntax and morphology, vocabulary, characteristic speech genres and discourse types, etc.) for
many languages and explored interspeaker variation in many speech communities. However, little research
specifically on LADO has been performed or published to date (fewer than 100 works). Relevant languages
for LADO are often under- or undocumented, while their home communities may be inaccessible to
research for the very reasons that produce refugees (civil unrest, armed conflict) and subject to dramatic
change over recent generations (e.g., age/sex imbalances due to flight and conflict, exodus to refugee
camps, change or interruption of education, abandonment of traditional ways of life and speaking).
In addition, language choice and contact between languages and dialects are the norm in much of the
world and may be extensive under normal circumstances for the communities in question, leading to
complexities in the notion of “native language” – complexities often underappreciated by governments who
commission and interpret LADO tests, as well as agencies who perform them and courts which review RSD
cases. Such intricacies may increase exponentially for individual refugees whose family life is interrupted,
who are raised or live for long in refugee camps, or whose flight carries them across regional, ethnic, or
national boundaries for periods of years, such that the notion of typical native language habits may become
wholly inapplicable (Blommaert 2009). For these reasons, most linguists familiar with LADO accept that its
application should be approached with considerable caution, and that the ability of linguistics to give
definitive answers to questions of origin and identity in the asylum context should not be overestimated.
Some common and important reasons for caution are spelled out in the “Guidelines for the Use of
Language Analysis in Relation to Questions of National Origin in Refugee Cases” (Language and
National Origin Group 2004; available via UNHCR’s RefWorld, www.essex.ac.uk/larg/resources/guide
lines.aspx). This document, intended to assist governments in assessing the validity of LADO, was
coauthored by 19 academic and forensic linguists in six countries and has been endorsed by a dozen
national and international linguistic organizations with membership numbering tens of thousands. Its
recommendations, largely uncontroversial among academic linguists, concern the complexity of language
use and the nature of linguistic expertise.
The 2004 Guidelines are routinely cited in asylum appeals in European countries. Their program for
improving the standard practice of LADO has been cited and responded to by various organizations,

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including De Taalstudio, Sprakab, and Verified language firms; the Swiss, Canadian, Norwegian, and
Dutch government bureaux; UNHCR; and many NGOs and legal organizations. Since 2010, a second
phase has been undertaken by the Language and Asylum Research Group (LARG), coordinated at the
University of Essex by the author and Dr. Diana Eades of the University of New England, Australia, with a
mission to stimulate research, contribute to the further development of guidelines, and promote best
practice for practitioners working in the field of LADO (www.essex.ac.uk/larg/).
An alternative resolution to the 2004 Guidelines, addressing the issue of the role of native-speaking
analysts vis-à-vis qualified linguists in the LADO process, was passed in 2009 by the International
Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics (IAFPA) and is cited by a number of agencies whose
practices resemble those recognized by the resolution (www.iafpa.net/langidres.htm).
Since academic linguists became aware of LADO in the early 2000s, monitoring and engagement with
government and commercial practices and legal cases has regularly featured in conferences, expert
meetings, and networks involving sociolinguists and applied and forensic linguists, alongside people
from many areas touching asylum and RSD: lawyers, doctors, immigration judges, policymakers,
members of government immigration and asylum bureaux, police officers, human rights practitioners,
forensic scientists, and academics from such fields as anthropology, genetics, interpreting, and
psychoanalysis.
Such efforts serve to introduce the complexity of language to actors in the RSD process and to engage
language experts and practitioners with a high-stakes application of their fields of knowledge. They may
ultimately function to minimize the misuse of language expertise in RSD, raise the standards at which it is
applied, or eliminate the practice of LADO entirely.

References
Baltisberger E, Hubbuch P (2010) LADO with specialized linguists: the development of Lingua’s
working method. In: Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and Origin. The role of language
in European asylum procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen,
pp 9–19
Blommaert J (2009) Language, asylum, and the national order. Curr Anthropol 50(4):415–441
Eades D (2009) Testing the claims of asylum seekers: the role of language analysis. Lang Assess
Q 6:30–40
Foulkes P, French P (2012) Forensic speaker comparison: a linguistic-acoustic perspective. In: Tiersma P,
Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 557–572
Language and National Origin Group (2004) Guidelines for the use of language analysis in relation to
questions of national origin in refugee cases. In: Eades D, Arends J (eds) Language analysis and
determination of nationality. Thematic issue of “Int J Speech Lang Law Forensic Linguist”
11(2):261–226
Patrick PL (2010) Language variation and LADO (language analysis for determination of origin). In:
Zwaan K, Muysken P, Verrips M (eds) Language and origin. The role of language in European asylum
procedures: a linguistic and legal survey. Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, pp 73–87
Patrick PL (2012) Language analysis for determination of origin: objective evidence for refugee status
determination. In: Tiersma P, Solan L (eds) The Oxford handbook of language and the law. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp 533–546

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Local Mobility
William A. V. Clark*
Department of Geography, University of California, California Center for Population Research, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Synonyms
Household moves; Residential mobility; Short-distance migration

Definition
Local mobility, or residential mobility, describes changes of residence that do not change the networks of
local interaction, including links to schools, health care, friends, and usually the place of work. Most local
moves occur within the same labor and housing markets and even in large metropolitan areas do not break
up the fabric of daily activities.

Overview
Most changes of residence involve very short-distance moves. In the last decade about 8.4 % of all moves
in the United States were within the same county, that is, basically within the same housing and labor
market. The proportion of changes of residence has been declining over the last three decades and is now
much lower than it was during the period of population expansion after World War II (see Fig. 1).
Traditionally, local mobility in Europe and Japan has been at lower rates than in the United States (Long
1992). Recent studies of OECD countries have documented their lower rates in general, but at the same
time New Zealand and Australia have some of the highest mobility rates worldwide (Caldera-Sanchez and
Andrews 2011).

Correlates of Mobility
Both short-distance and long-distance moves are usually linked to age as an explanatory variable for
household relocation, but in fact age is simply a proxy for the events that occur more frequently at younger
ages. The desire for, and move to, ownership also occurs at younger ages though affordability has become
an issue, especially in expensive housing markets, and often delays the transition to ownership. The move
to ownership itself is linked to socioeconomic status and the ability to purchase more space and higher-
status housing with increasing income. Overall, the likelihood of changing residence declines with age
and is lower overall for owners than for renters.

The Life Course and Residential Change

Overall residential mobility is the process by which households match their housing needs to the houses
available to them and is central to understanding how the housing market operates. As households change
their space needs with changes in the life course, they make decisions about what housing to choose and
where to move within the city. The choices are a function of their needs, external events, and the housing
stock available to them.

*Email: wclark@geog.ucla.edu

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Fig. 1 Sources: Percent of US population who change residence. US Census Bureau Current Population Survey (March
estimates) and Frey (2009) Brookings Institute

Early research on residential change by Rossi (1955) established how changes in residence were related
to the changing needs for housing space as families were established and grew with the addition of
children. That work was extended by Quigley and Weinberg (1977), who provided a theoretical expla-
nation for how residential change was linked to a disequilibrium between the space a family needed in
contrast with the space they were currently consuming. In response to this disequilibrium the household
engaged in a process of search and relocation (Brown and Moore 1970).
Recent research has elaborated the way in which housing demand affects choices to include specific
links to changes in the evolution of the life course. The concept of the life course recognizes that
movement from one residence to another is embedded in a sequence of events which occur with relative
regularity as individuals marry, have children, and experience interruptions to their life such as divorce
and widowhood. This approach to the way in which residential change occurs emphasizes the link
between specific events and the need to change locations (Mulder 1993; Clark and Dieleman 1996).

Mobility Across Neighborhoods

Because most moves involve short-distance relocations there is considerable interest in the link between
residential change and neighborhood choice. When the household makes a choice of an apartment or a
single-family home they are also making a choice of a particular location within the city. That neighbor-
hood choice brings with it a whole range of social and economic connections, including links to schools
and urban services more generally. Neighborhood choice also involves selections which express prefer-
ences for particular combinations of other neighbors, choices which often reflect ethnic and socioeco-
nomic preferences. These choices in turn lead to much of the residential patterning that we observed in
modern metropolitan areas (Clark and Morrison 2012). Studies of relocation behavior out of poorer
neighborhoods have shown that minority households have greater difficulty in leaving such neighbor-
hoods (South et al. 2005).

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Models of Mobility
Economists and demographers have suggested a number of ways of analyzing the probability of moving
and have used a series of logit and discrete choice models to provide an explanation for both the decision
to move and the choice of a house during the relocation process (Lee and Waddell 2010; Clark and
Dieleman 1996). Because residential change often involves moving from renting to owning there is a
substantial literature which links residential change and home ownership and how residential change is
linked to the housing market more generally (Smith et al. 2012).

Cross-Reference
▶ Family Migration
▶ Housing Change
▶ Life Course

References
Brown LA, Moore EG (1970) The intra-urban migration process: a perspective. Geogr Ann B 52:1–13
Caldera-Sanchez A, Andrews D (2011) Residential mobility and public policy in OECD countries. OECD
J Econ Stud 2011(1):185–206
Clark WAV, Dieleman F (1996) Households and housing: choice and outcomes in the housing market.
Rutgers, State University, Center for Urban Policy Research, New Brunswick
Clark WAV, Morrison P (2012) Socio- spatial mobility and residential sorting: evidene from a large scale
survey. Urban Stud 49:3253–3270
Frey W (2009) The Great American Migration Slowdown. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Lee BH, Waddell P (2010) Residential mobility and location choice: a nested logit model with sampling of
alternatives. Transportation 37:587–601
Long L (1992) Changing residence: comparative perspectives on its relationship to age, sex and marital
status. Population Studies 46:141–158
Mulder CH (1993) Migration dynamics a life course approach. Thesis Publishers- PDOD Publications,
Amsterdam
Quigley J, Weinberg D (1977) Intra-urban residential mobility: a review and synthesis. Int Reg Sci Rev
2:41–66
Rossi PH (1955) Why families move: a study in the social psychology of urban residential mobility. Free
Press, Glencoe
Smith S, Elsinga M, Eng O, O’Mahony L, Wachter S (2012) International encyclopedia of housing and
home, vol 7. Elsevier, Amsterdam
South SJ, Crowder K, Chavez E (2005) Exiting and entering high-poverty neighborhoods: Latinos,
Blacks and Anglos compared. Soc Forces 84(2):873–900

Further Reading
Clapham D, Clark WAV, Gibb K (2012) The sage handbook of housing. Sage, London
Flatau P, James I, Watson R, Wood G, Hendershot PH (2007) Leaving the parental home in Australia over
the generations: evidence from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
survey. J Popul Res 24:51–71

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Intrametropolitan Population Distribution

Lincoln Quillian*
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Definition
Intrametropolitan population distribution refers to the distribution of population within one or more
metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area is a city and its surrounding suburbs. Scholarly attention on
intrametropolitan population distribution has examined overall population distribution but has more often
focused on the relative distributions of population subgroups. Important subtopics of intrametropolitan
population distribution are studies of segregation between race, ethnic, and socioeconomic status groups.
Migration is a key mechanism of change of the intrametropolitan population distribution.

General Description
In general, intrametropolitan population densities decline with distance from the city center, with the
lowest densities at the metropolitan fringe. Population densities and the gradient of density with distance
have declined over the twentieth century. Improvement in transportation, in particular the spread of the
automobile, has been the key cause of declining densities, although increasing size of dwellings and
smaller household sizes have also played an important role. The growth of lower-density areas around
cities is explored in the literature on suburbanization and “urban sprawl” (Jackson 1985).
A basic fact of intrametropolitan population distribution is that persons with like social characteristics
tend to live near each other. Or as the early urban sociologist Robert Park put it, social distances tend to be
reflected in spatial distances.
Park’s dictum has been most thoroughly explored in studies of segregation. There is a large literature on
the measurement of segregation (James and Taeuber 1985), but the most-used measures of segregation
reflect the extent to which two or more population groups are unevenly distributed across neighborhoods
(or another spatial unit). Complete evenness implies that the same percentage of population of the groups
over which the measure is calculated live in each neighborhood, while complete unevenness implies that
there is no overlap between the neighborhoods lived in by different groups.
Segregation is most often applied to race and ethnicity (“segregation” without further qualifiers almost
inevitably refers to racial or ethnic segregation), but a literature exists on segregation on the basis of
income and socioeconomic status, and less commonly segregation measures are applied to other charac-
teristics. One reason for the emphasis on racial and ethnic segregation is that in American cities
segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity is higher than segregation measured on the basis of
socioeconomic status or other social characteristics (White 1987).
Segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity in American cities remains high. In the average
U.S. metropolitan area in 2010, 57 % of blacks or whites would need to move to other neighborhoods
to achieve an even spatial distribution between groups. Black segregation is consistently highest of major
race/ethnic groups but is gradually declining. By contrast, about 48 % of Hispanics and 41 % of Asians
would need to move to achieve an even distribution with whites in 2010; Hispanic and Asian segregation
has stayed at about the same level since 1970 (Logan and Stults 2011).

*Email: l-quillian@northwestern.edu

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Segregation on the basis of income in American cities has increased since 1970, with most of the
increase occurring from 1980 to 1990 and 2000 to 2010. Both poor and affluent households have become
more segregated from other households, although the most affluent households are consistently more
segregated from other households than poor households. These trends are partly accounted for by
increasing household income inequality (Reardon and Bischoff 2011).
A distinct literature on intrametropolitan population distribution examines the spatial geography of
population and land use. An early model of this sort is the concentric zone model of Burgess, which
described land use and populations as distributed across concentric circles around the central business
district. In Burgess’ model the affluence of residents increased with distance from the center. The sectoral
model of Hoyt, in contrast, described land use and population characteristics as segmented into distinct
sectors radiating from the central business district. Hoyt suggested the sectoral pattern resulted from land
use around transport corridors like rails and roads (Barry and Kasarda 1977).
Another research tradition in this area, factorial ecology, sought to define major dimensions of
population that differentiate urban neighborhoods. Factorial ecologists took demographic measures of
neighborhoods (like percentage in race/ethnic groups, percentage 25–35, etc.) and subjected them to
factor analyses. Using this method Shevky and Bell identified three major bases of neighborhood
population differentiation: socioeconomic status (income and education), life-cycle stage (age and
household type), and race/ethnicity. Subsequent studies support these as major dimensions of urban
spatial differentiation in many but not all metropolitan areas.
Changes in the intrametropolitan population distribution are the product of several population pro-
cesses, including births, deaths, household changes, changes in the housing stock, and migration. With
about 15 % of households migrating each year, migration is the most important of these.
Intrametropolitan population distribution has been studied in most detail in U.S. cities since 1940,
making possible a detailed history. From the 1940s to the 1960s, rapid expansion of manufacturing
employment in urban areas and the mechanization of Southern agriculture produced massive migration of
blacks from Southern rural areas into cities. This migration in the context of housing discrimination
outside of black neighborhoods produced highly segregated and dense black residential areas in Northern
cities. Black-white residential segregation peaked in 1970, when 79 % of black or white households
would need to relocate to achieve an even distribution over neighborhoods in the average metropolitan
area. These decades also saw increasing suburbanization and “white flight” by which white households in
racially transitioning neighborhoods moved to white middle-class or upper-class suburbs.
Increasing deindustrialization and worsened economic conditions of cities in the 1970s resulted in a
near halt to black migration into cities. Unemployment increased sharply, resulting in substantail increase
in the number of high-poverty urban neighborhoods from 1970 to 1990. While most agreed the decline of
urban manufacturing jobs was the most important factor contributing to growing high-poverty neighbor-
hoods, there was debate about other potential causes. W.J. Wilson (1987) proposed that many middle-
class blacks migrated from black to white neighborhoods with declines in the most overt forms of housing
discrimination. In Wilson’s account, this migration stripped black neighborhoods of their middle-class
residents and contributed to the formation of high-poverty black neighborhoods. Massey and colleagues
argued, by contrast, that middle-class blacks did not move to white neighborhoods in significant numbers
(see Massey and Denton 1993). Quillian (1999) found evidence that there was black migration to white
neighborhoods, but it was often a part of racial turnover in neighborhoods, and thus the share of middle-
class blacks in white neighborhoods did not significantly increase.
The populations of many central cities saw resurgence in the 1990s and (to a lesser extent) the 2000s,
with urban information and service economies prospering and more affluent households increasingly
choosing to live in central cities. Urban population growth also reflected increased international

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immigration into cities, resulting in growing Latino and Asian populations. These decades also saw
increasing racial diversity in suburbs and concentrations of poverty in some inner-ring suburbs.
Finally, intrametropolitan population distribution influences the character of urban and neighborhood
life and the quality of life, health, and life chances of residents. Living in close proximity to wealthier
persons is associated with better access to jobs, lower crime, better local schools, lower pollution, and
better access to urban amenities; close proximity to impoverished persons tends to be associated with the
opposite of these conditions. A major reason for concern with race/ethnic segregation is that it contributes
importantly to income segregation and increases the contact of blacks and Latinos with economically
disadvantaged contexts. These topics are the subject of the literatures on neighborhood effects, spatial
mismatch, and school effects (Sampson et al. 2002).

References
Barry BJ, Kasarda JD (1977) Contemporary urban ecology. Macmillan, New York
Jackson K (1985) The crabgrass frontier: the suburbanization of the United States. Oxford, New York
James DR, Taeuber K (1985) Measures of segregation. Sociol Methodol 14:1–32
Logan JR, Stults B (2011) The persistence of segregation in the metropolis: new findings from the 2010
Census. Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010
Massey DS, Denton NA (1993) American apartheid: segregation and the making of the underclass.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Quillian L (1999) Migration patterns and the growth of high-poverty neighborhoods 1970–1990. Am
J Sociol 105:1–37
Reardon SF, Bischoff K (2011) Growth in the residential segregation of families by income, 1970–2009.
Census brief prepared for project US2010. http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010
Sampson RJ, Morenoff JD, Gannon-Rowley T (2002) Assessing “neighborhood effects”: social processes
and new directions in research. Annu Rev Sociol 28:443–478
White MJ (1987) American neighborhoods and residential differentiation. Russell Sage, New York
Wilson WJ (1987) The truly disadvantaged: the inner city, the underclass, and public policy Chicago.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago

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P
Place Utility
David López-Carr and Daniel Phillips
Department of Geography, University of
California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara,
CA, USA
Definition
The concept of place utility was introduced in a
pair of articles published in the mid-1960s by
Princeton geographer Julian Wolpert. In the first
(1965), he coined the term “place utility” to
describe “the net composite of utilities which
are derived from the individual’s integration at
some position in space.” Based on past experi-
ences, both positive and negative, the individual
measures the utility of the place in which he/she
presently resides. According to Wolpert, place
utility is operationalized by migrants or potential
migrants who assess the outstanding attributes of
their current place of residence relative to those
same aggregate characteristics of a potential
place of migration destination. Traditionally,
most migrants have little or no personal experi-
ence in the potential destination. They make a
judgment based on information they hear or
read about, rather than from personal experience.
In sum, Wolpert theorized that people will base
their migration decisions on the varying values of
utility they associate with potential destinations
vis-à-vis their current place of residence.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
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DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_42-1
Place Utility Through Time
Wolpert (1966) advanced this theory in propos-
ing an ecological model based on his concept of
place utility. He theorized that people are
exposed to some amount of stress in a given
place throughout their lifespan, and their reac-
tions to stress (which he called “strains”) differ
depending on their stage of life. Certain “nox-
ious” elements such as traffic, pollution, noise,
and crowding produce stress that detracts from
the utility of the current place of residence, and
people are more vulnerable to these stressful ele-
ments during certain life cycle periods, particu-
larly infancy and old age. During such life
periods, the utility of the current place diminishes
and the relative attractiveness of another place
increases; people at these stages will be more
prone to migrate to that appealing place. Life
stage, therefore, exerts considerable influence
on the utility that people assign to places, and
thus on who migrates, where they migrate, and
when they migrate.
Since economic factors are typically more
substantial and thus more motivating than non-
economic ones, some writers have viewed place
utility in the lens of economic utility, meaning
those places with the most economic advantages
will have the most utility and attract the most
migrants, regardless of other factors. Economic
factors that often earn mention include availabil-
ity of employment, prospects for high income and
remittances, and the general standard of living in
2 Place Utility
the destination place (Kok 2006). According to
Datta (2003), people will migrate only if they
believe that the destination will offer more live-
lihood opportunities than the present place of
residence.
Macrolevel political-economic factors frame
migrant structural push and pull pressures, but
microlevel processes determine who migrates,
with the ultimate decision usually made at the
household level (De Jong and Gardner 1981).
The importance of the household scale is
highlighted by the fact that most people choose
to not migrate despite sometimes gaping spatial
income disparities (Goldscheider 1971).
Bilsborow and colleagues (1984), among several
others, have framed migration decisions within
perceptions of “place utility” given structural
inequalities (Wolpert 1965, 1966). Together,
these observations suggest that the way in which
an individual (or household) relates to surround-
ing space, an attribute of which could be connec-
tions to other spaces, shapes the likelihood of
migration.
Some scholars have questioned the usefulness
of place utility as a concept due to its perceived
subjectivity. Measured through surveys in which
individuals express their attitudes or preferences
about certain places, the concept is largely based
on opinions that vary from person to person and
may shift in time for a single individual (Janelle
1969). Perhaps as a consequence, scholars have
sought to find objective characteristics of places
by which to measure their utility. Baker (1982)
developed a utility function based on the interac-
tion of points in space. Fotheringham et al. (2000)
created what they called a relative intrinsic
attractivity (RIA) measure for a given place gen-
erated by its relative accessibility from adjacent
locales likely to attract migrants to that place.
Though using the distinct term of “locational
utility,” Janelle (1969) defined a formula for
aggregate transport cost and effort needed for a
place to meet its functional role in the regional
and world systems.
Recent scholarship has continued to provide
fresh insight on the role of place in migration.
While economic pushes and pulls constitute the
primary motivations for moving to a given place,
environmental factors are increasingly examined
in the context of migration pushes and pulls and
many of these are directly related to shaping
perceived place utility. For example, Adams and
Adger (2013) found that a pleasant climate, sim-
ple lifestyle, lack of pollution, and the aesthetics
of the landscape contribute greatly to a place’s
attractiveness. Similarly, in his Guatemalan
research, Carr (2008) observed that incentives
for out-migration varied depending on place of
origin. In addition to local sociocultural and
demographic factors, he found that environmen-
tal change, in the form of increasing or decreasing
frequency, timing, and magnitude of precipita-
tion events, ultimately changes perception of
place characteristics that relate to migration deci-
sions. Place-related characteristics arguably
remain the most important considerations in
migration decisions. Further development of the
concept of place utility promises greater under-
standing of age-old questions surrounding human
mobility.
References
Adams H, Neil Adger W (2013) The contribution of eco-
system services to place utility as a determinant of
migration decision-making. Environ Res Lett
8(1):015006
Baker RGV (1982) Place utility fields. Geogr Anal
14(1):10–28
Bilsborrow RE, Oberai AS et al (eds) (1984) Migration
surveys in low-income countries: guidelines and ques-
tionnaire design. Croom-Helm, London, 552 pp
Carr DL (2008) Migration to the Maya Biosphere Reserve,
Guatemala: why place matters. Hum Organ
67(1):37–48
Datta A (2003) Human migration: a social phenomenon.
Mittal Publications, New Delhi, pp 25, 26
De Jong GF, Gardner RW (eds) (1981) Migration decision
making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel
studies in developed and developing countries.
Pergamon Press, New York
Fotheringham AS, Champion T, Wymer C, Coombes
M (2000) Measuring destination attractivity: a migra-
tion example. Int J Popul Geogr 6(6):391–421
Goldscheider C (1971) Theoretical issues in migration
research. Population, modernization, and social struc-
ture. Little, Brown, Boston
Janelle DG (1969) Spatial reorganization: a model and
concept. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 59(2):348–364
Place Utility 3

Kok P (2006) Migration in south and southern Africa: Papers of the European population conference 2006.
dynamics and determinants. HSRC Press, Cape Liverpool, June 21–24 Session 32 “Population, devel-
Town, pp 275, 276 opment and environment in developing countries”
Wolpert J (1965) Behavioral aspects of the decision to http://epc2006.princeton.edu/papers/60302
migrate. Pap Reg Sci Assoc 15:159–169 Hugo G (1981) Village-community ties, the village
Wolpert J (1966) Migration as an adjustment to environ- norms, and ethnic and social networks: a review of
mental stress. J Soc Issues 22(4):92–102 evidence from the Third World. In: Jong GFD, Gard-
ner RW (eds) Migration decision making: multidis-
ciplinary approaches to micro-level studies in
Further Reading
developed and developing countries. Pergamon Press,
Arthur JA (2008) The African Diaspora in the United
New York
States and Europe: the Ghanaian experience. Ashgate,
Lee ES (1966) A theory of migration. Demography
Hampshire, pp 27, 28
3:47–57
Bible DS, Brown LA (1981) Place utility, attribute
López-Carr D (2012) Agro-ecological determinants of
tradeoff, and choice behavior in an intra-urban migra-
rural out-migration to the Maya biosphere reserve,
tion context. Socioecon Plann Sci 15(1):37–44
Guatemala. Environ Res Lett 7(4):045603. pp 7
Brown L, Horton F et al (1970) On place utility and the
Massey DS (1990) Social structure, household strategies,
normative allocation of intra-urban migrants. Demog-
and the cumulative causation of migration. Popul
raphy 7:175–183
Index 56(1):3–26
Findley AM, Li F (1999) Methodological issues in
Ravenstein EG (1889) The laws of migration. J R Stat Soc
researching migration. Prof Geogr 51(1):50–67
52:241–305
Golledge RG, Stimson RJ (1997) Spatial behavior: a geo-
Wood C (1982) Equilibrium and historical-structural per-
graphic perspective. Guilford Press, New York,
spectives on migration. Int Migr Rev 16(2):298–319
pp 414–418
Henry S, Bilsborrow R (2006) How migrants choose their
destination in Burkina Faso? A place-utility approach.
W
White Australia Policy
Gwenda Tavan
LaTrobe University, Melbourne, Australia
Synonyms
White Australia
Definition
A euphemism for both a national doctrine and a
government policy aimed at severely restricting
non-European immigration and maintaining
Australia’s racial, cultural, and legal integrity as
a white, British nation-state (Fig. 1). The Immi-
gration Restriction Act (IRA) of 1901 did not
expressly prohibit non-European immigration
but permitted Australian officials to enforce
migration restrictions through discretionary
application of a “dictation test.” The policy
helped keep Australia “white,” though exclusion
of non-Europeans was never absolute, and its
enduring record damaged Australia’s interna-
tional reputation. The final vestiges of the policy
and doctrine were abolished during the period
1973–1975.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_50-1
Detailed Description
The White Australia policy, in the form of the
IRA 1901, was one of the first pieces of legisla-
tion introduced by the newly created Common-
wealth Parliament of Australia. Another related
measure was the decision to abolish the use and
settlement of Pacific Island labor in northern
Australia (Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901).
Various other laws denied voting, naturalization,
and welfare rights to non-Europeans, including
the country’s indigenous peoples, in order to dis-
courage the growth of non-European populations
(Franchise Act 1902; Naturalization Act 1903).
The roots of “White Australia” lay in British-
Australian colonial experiences during the
mid-to-late nineteenth century and broader polit-
ical and intellectual currents across the white,
English-speaking world. Economic competition
on the Australian goldfields, and later in shipping
and manufacturing, saw the various colonies
introduce restrictions on Chinese migration
(Fig. 2). The use of Pacific Island labor on north-
ern Australian sugar plantations was also a source
of political concern (Fig. 3). Hostility towards the
Chinese and other non-Europeans, including the
country’s indigenous population, found affirma-
tion in Social Darwinist theories of the suprem-
acy of the white races and the incompatibility of
interracial mixing (Fig. 4). By the end of the
century, the growing nationalist consciousness
of colonists, and concern about Australia’s vul-
nerability as a white outpost on the edge of Asia
2 White Australia Policy

White Australia Policy, Fig. 1 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 severely prohibited the entry of non-European
settlers through the nefarious use of a ‘dictation test’. https://museumvictoria.com.au/pages/22912/1900s_3.jpg

reinforced the popular view that racial and cul-
tural homogeneity were fundamental to national
development and that all “Asiatic” migration
should be restricted (Fig. 5). Similar evolving
restrictions in other “white” countries, including
Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, no doubt
provided powerful legitimacy.
Political leaders could not completely ignore
the diplomatic sensitivities of immigration
restrictions. To mitigate the offence to Asian
White Australia Policy 3

White Australia Policy, Fig. 2 Economic competition
on the Australian goldfields deepened European hostility
towards Chinese diggers. This hostility spilled over into
outright violence on numerous occasions, including the
infamous Lambing Flat riots in New South Wales in 1861
which left approximately 250 Chinese miners severely
injured. http://www.nma.gov.au/collections/collection_
interactives/endurance_scroll/harvest_of_endurance_html_
version/explore_the_scroll/lambing_flat_riots

White Australia Policy,

Fig. 3 A group of South
Sea Islanders , Cairns, Qld,
1890 (Wikimedia
commons) www.google.
com.au/search?as_st=y&
tbm=isch&hl=en&as_q=
kanaka+labour+qld&as_
epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&
cr=&as_sitesearch=&safe=
images&tbs=sur:f#imgdii=
j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A
%3Bj1XOn9W_7PN5hM
%3A%3BDvib1mMTc
6SEmM%3A&imgrc=
j1XOn9W_7PN5hM%3A

countries, outright prohibitions were avoided and
restrictions relied upon Section 3(a) of the IRA,
which defined “prohibited” immigrants as “any
person who when asked to do so by an officer fails
to write out at dictation and sign in the presence
of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in
an European language directed by the officer”
(IRA 1901).
The policy proved remarkably successful. By
1933, Asian “races” represented less than 1 % of
the national population (Census 1933, p 902).
Political and public consensus underpinned
4 White Australia Policy
White Australia Policy, Fig. 4 Philip May’s cartoon
captured common fears about the ‘Chinese’ threat to
white Australians. These ‘threats’ took various forms
including disease, cheap labour, opium smoking and
White Australia Policy, Fig. 5 Cartoons such as Liv-
ingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities’ evoked deep anx-
ieties amongst early Federation white Australians about
inter-racial sexual relations and racial ‘miscegenation’
mixing. Livingstone Hopkins ‘Piebald Possibilities – a
“White Australia’s” status as a settled policy and
the foundation of national identity and sover-
eignty. Yet, commercial and diplomatic consid-
erations meant a considerable amount of
moral degeneracy. Phil MAY, Phil. The Mongolian Octo-
pus - His Grip on Australia, The Bulletin (Sydney),
August 21, 1886. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Mongolian_octopus.png
little Australian Christmas family party of the future’,
The Bulletin (Sydney) 13 December 1902. http://www.
aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/
Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/monographs/Within_
Chinas_Orbit/Chapterone
transnational movement between Asian countries
and Australia continued. Small but dynamic com-
munities remained, concentrated in major cities
like Sydney and Melbourne and parts of northern
White Australia Policy 5

White Australia Policy, Fig. 6 Controversial cases like immigration restrictions in the 1960s. Sun Herald,
that of little Nancy Prasad helped to build domestic and 8 August 1965
international pressure on Australian governments to end
6 White Australia Policy
White Australia Policy,
Fig. 7 Vietnamese boat
people arriving in Darwin
Harbour 1976 (image
courtesy of National
Museum of Australia).
http://www.nma.gov.au/
online_features/defining_
moments/featured/
vietnamese_refugees_
boat_arriv
Australia (Fitzgerald 2007). Neither did Austra-
lian political leaders ever completely hide their
racial preferences, at great cost to Australia’s
reputation. Prime Minister Billy Hughes was
instrumental in blocking Japan’s request for a
racial equality clause to be included in the Paris
Peace Settlement of 1919. Hughes later boasted
that his actions had saved “White Australia.”
Japanese authorities were deeply offended by
the public slight.
Pressure built on the policy after World War
II, despite repeated claims that the policy was
inviolable. State-sponsored racial discrimination
was increasingly unjustifiable after the horrors of
Nazism and as postcolonial movements across
the globe, including Australia’s own indigenous
people, demanded independence, racial equality,
and respect. Australia’s increasing strategic and
economic enmeshment with the Asia region
made it particularly vulnerable to criticism.
A mass immigration program, introduced in
1945 on defense, labor and nation-building
grounds and focused on British and European
migration, was profoundly changing Australian
society but tended to reinforce the racial biases at
the heart of immigration policy. The abandon-
ment of racial restrictions by other settler states,
including Canada and the USA, and the decline of
traditional British and European migration
sources by the late 1960s also prompted a rethink.
Policy change itself was gradual and slow,
beginning with citizenship rights to long-term
non-European settlers in 1956 and the replace-
ment of the IRA with the Migration Act 1958. In
1966, the Holt Liberal Government liberalized
non-European migration on the basis of people’s
capacity for “ready integration into the Austra-
lian community” and “ability to make a contribu-
tion to Australia’s economic, social and cultural
progress” (Cabinet sub. 31 1966) (Fig. 6). By
1970, almost 10,000 non-Europeans a year were
entering the country, though immigration policy
remained discriminatory (Cabinet sub.
713 1972).
The final “official” phase of the abolition
occurred with the election of the socially progres-
sive Whitlam Labor Government in 1972.
Whitlam introduced a universal visa system and
removed privileges for British migrants provid-
ing assisted passages, citizenship, and voting.
The introduction of the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 made it illegal to discriminate on the
grounds of race, color, descent, or national or
ethnic origins (RDA 1975).
White Australia Policy
The policy’s substantive end occurred in the
late 1970s with the arrival of thousands of Indo-
Chinese refugees and the expansion of family
reunion provisions (Fig. 7). By the late 1990s,
around 40 % of annual immigration intakes
were from the Asia region. Today, the majority
of Australia’s top ten source countries for migra-
tion are from there as well and the country
proudly proclaims itself as “multicultural”. Yet
successive immigration debates since the 1970s
indicate continuing disquiet amongst some Aus-
tralians about the rate and impact of migration
from Asia and, increasingly, from Africa and the
Middle East. This has prompted some commen-
tators to claim that the ghost of “White Australia”
still lingers (Tavan 2005).
References
Cabinet submission 31, ‘Entry and stay of
non-Europeans’, 2 March 1966, National Archives of
Australia, Canberra (NAA): A5908, submission 713
Cabinet submission 713, ‘Report on entry and stay of
non-Europeans and persons of partly non-European
descent’, 15 June 1972, NAA: A5908, submission 713
Commonwealth Franchise (Cth), no 8, (1902)
Commonwealth Naturalisation Act 1903 (Cth) no
11, (1903)
Commonwealth Naturalisation Act, Census of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, 30 June 1933, Part 1. Com-
monwealth Government Printer, Canberra
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013)
Factsheets. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/.
Accessed 20 Mar 2013
Fitzgerald J (2007) Big white lie: Chinese Australians in
white Australia. University of New South Wales Press,
Sydney
7
Immigration Restriction 1901 (Cth), no 17 of (1901)
Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 (Cth) no 16, (1901)
Racial Discrimination Act (1975) (Cth). http://www.
comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00013. Accessed
20 Mar 2013
Tavan G (2005) The long, slow death of white Australia.
Scribe, Melbourne
Further Reading
Bagnall K. A legacy of White Australia: records about
Chinese Australians in the national archives. http://
www.naa.gov.au/collection/publications/papers-and-
podcasts/immigration/white-australia.aspx. Accessed
4 Mar 2016
Bagnall K, Sherratt T (2010) Invisible Australians
[electronic resource]: living under the white
Australia policy. http://invisibleaustralians.org/http://
invisibleaustralians.org/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016
Brawley S (1995) The white peril: foreign relations and
Asian immigration to Australasia and North America
1919–1978. UNSW Press, Sydney
Jupp J (2007) From white Australia to Woomera: the story
of Australian immigration, 2nd edn. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Port Melbourne
Lake M, Reynolds H (2008) Drawing the global colour
line: white men’s countries and the question of racial
equality. Melbourne University Publishing, Carlton
Markus A (2001) Race: John Howard and the remaking of
Australia. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest
Palfreeman AC (1967) The administration of the white
Australia policy. Melbourne University Press, London
Richards E (2008) Destination Australia: migration to
Australia since 1901. UNSW Press, Sydney
Rivett K, Immigration Reform Group (Australia) (1975)
Australia and the non-white migrant. Melbourne Uni-
versity Press, Carlton
Walker D, Sobocinska A (eds) (2012) Australia’s Asia:
from Yellow Peril to Asian century. University of
Western Australia Publishing, Crawley
Willard M (1967) History of the White Australia policy
to1920, 2nd edn. Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne
G
Gold Rushes (Australia)
James Jupp
The Australian National University, Centre for
Immigration & Multicultural Studies, Building
70, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Definition
Between 1851 and 1861, the British colony of
Victoria in southern Australia increased its pop-
ulation from 77,345 to 538,628, constituting half
of the total population of the Australian conti-
nent. This massive increase was predominantly
due to uncontrolled immigration, mainly from
Britain and Ireland, and internal migration from
the adjacent colonies of Tasmania, South Austra-
lia, and New South Wales. The cause of these
migrations was the discovery of gold in 1851.
The second half of the nineteenth century saw
many other Australian “gold rushes,” but none
as large as that to Victoria (Hill 2010).
Detailed Description
The isolation of Australia, which took shipping
many weeks to reach it from the United King-
dom, previously limited immigration to schemes
organized by the British state. These included
convict transportation and assisted passages for
free immigrants, who began to replace convicts
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_51-1
from 1831. But the gold rush overcame that dis-
tance and also attracted immigrants from China
and the Californian gold rush of two years earlier.
By 1861 there were 24,732 Chinese residents in
Victoria, making up two-thirds of the continental
total but only two percent of the Australia-wide
population. The largest number of immigrants
came from England (170,000), Ireland (87,000),
Scotland (61,000), and Germany (10,000),
including those already in Victoria. Small but
influential numbers came from the United States
and were regarded unfavorably by the British
authorities, who feared their republican influence
and their use of arms.
The lasting impact of the Victorian gold rush
cannot be understood only in terms of immigrant
numbers, which made the arrival port of Mel-
bourne the largest city in Australia until the
depression of the 1890s (Serle 1963). The
suppressed miners’ revolt against licensing fees
at Eureka (Ballarat) in 1854 is credited with the
foundation of a democracy based on manhood
suffrage, before Britain or the United States
(Molony 1984). Hostility to the Chinese eventu-
ally gave rise to the White Australia policy,
which prohibited non-European immigration
until the late 1960s. The predominance of British
immigration consolidated the links with Britain,
which still survive. A heritage of magnificent
architecture in Melbourne, Ballarat, Bendigo,
and other towns was built on the wealth which
gold brought. The modern population of Mel-
bourne exceeds four million and of Ballarat and
2 Gold Rushes (Australia)
Bendigo 100,000 each. Most other gold-created
towns are much smaller or have faded away.
Shipping connections with Europe were greatly
improved, with clipper ships bringing out immi-
grants and returning with wool to Britain.
Other gold rushes were launched over most of
Australia (Blainey 1969). The only one with last-
ing influence was in Western Australia at
Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie in the 1890s. This
increased the population of Western Australia
fivefold between 1885 and 1901 from 36,000 to
184,000. By then gold mining had moved from
small-scale to major mechanized deep opera-
tions. Most migration to Kalgoorlie was from
other parts of Australia. Labor migration in the
west is now focused on the ore mines of the
Pilbara and further north, but no longer on gold.
Much of it is based on flying in miners from
elsewhere in Australia for set periods, rather
than on permanent communities. Foreign labor
is mainly based on limited term contracts.
References
Blainey G (1969) The rush that never ended. Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne
Hill D (2010) The gold rush. Heinemann, Sydney
Molony J (1984) Eureka. Viking, Ringwood
Serle G (1963) The golden age: a history of the colony of
Victoria 1851-1861. Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne
J
Jewish Diaspora
Suzanne Rutland
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Synonyms
Galut (Heb: exile); Tfusot (Heb: dispersions)
Definition
The word “Diaspora” is a Greek term referring to
“dispersion.” It refers to the dispersion of Jews to
countries outside of the Land of Israel, perceived
as the Jewish homeland. Over time the Jewish
people have, indeed, been dispersed across the
four corners of the world. Today, the term is used
to refer not only to Jews living outside Israel but
also to other groups of people who have been
dispersed from their homelands, such as the
Greeks, Italians, and Chinese.
Overview
The concept of the Jewish Diaspora began with
the biblical narrative, when according to tradition
Joseph, the second youngest son of the patriarch,
Jacob, was sold into slavery in Egypt and his
entire family ended up joining him there. Jewish
dispersion has been partly due to persecution and
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_52-1
expulsions and partly due to creation of Jewish
trade routes, which by the medieval period
stretched from France to China. Since the recog-
nition of Christianity as the official religion of the
Roman Empire in the fourth century, there have
been major four seismic shifts in the Jewish Dias-
pora, which have led to the formation of four
major Diaspora centers, each of which lasted for
centuries. These have been located in Babylon,
Spain, Eastern Europe, and currently America. In
the first three cases, a specific name has emerged
to describe the Jewish descendants from these
centers: Mizrachi (Oriental Jews) for the Jews
of the Arab, Muslim world; Sephardi (Spanish
Jews) for medieval Spain; and Ashkenazi (lit.
German Jews) for Eastern Europe. In each case,
Jewish practice was influenced by the majority
society, and issues of acculturation and integra-
tion came into play. These factors are relevant in
general for migration.
The Babylonian Diaspora
The Babylonian Diaspora began with the defeat
of the Jews of Judea and the destruction of the
First Temple in 586 BCE by the Babylonian king,
Nebuchadnezzar, who enslaved the Israelite lead-
ership and took them back to Babylon. The pain
of the loss of their homeland in Israel is expressed
in the words of Psalm 137:
By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea,
we wept, when we remembered Zion. . . If I forget
thee, O Jerusalem let my right hand forget her
cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue
2 Jewish Diaspora
cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not
Jerusalem above my chief joy.
However, this first exile did not last long, since
Cyrus, known as “the Great,” defeated Babylon
in 550 BCE and permitted the conquered Israel-
ites to return to their homeland. By 515 BCE the
Second Temple had been rebuilt, inaugurating
the period of the Second Jewish Commonwealth.
Jewish independence was to last another
600 years. Even after the defeat of the two
major Jewish rebellions against the Romans in
70 and 135 CE, the Jewish population remained
substantial in the land the Romans renamed
Palestina-Syria after 135, although the epicenter
of Jewish life moved to the Galilee in this period.
Little is known about Babylonian Jewry dur-
ing the Second Temple period, apart from the fact
that there were annual pilgrimages to the Temple
in Jerusalem for the Biblical festivals of Passover
and Tabernacles. In this period, a second Dias-
pora center emerged in Alexandria, Egypt, and
there were other substantial Jewish settlements in
Egypt. However, following the second major
Jewish Revolt of 132–135, the Bar Kokhba
Revolt, key Babylonian scholars began to emerge
so that we have more information about Jewish
life in Babylon. By the fourth century CE, this
community emerged as the center of Jewish
thought and life as a result of Byzantine Christian
persecution of Jews in Palestine.
The predominance of Babylonian Jewry by
the fifth century is seen in the emergence of key
Babylonian academies, which discussed rabbinic
laws and developed what has become known as
the Babylonian Talmud, which is considered to
be more authoritative than the Jerusalem Talmud
(also known as the “Palestinian Talmud”). The
leading academies were located in Sura and
Pumbedita. Twice a year before Passover and
the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashanah), scholars
across the Jewish world would gather around the
lake of Sura to discuss Jewish law and make legal
decisions for what was called the “Yarchei
Kallah” or month of learning.
While the rabbis were appointed on the basis
of their scholarship, Babylonian Jewry was led by
the exilarch, who was also known as Resh Galuta
(head of the exile/Diaspora). This position was
hereditary, claiming to date back to King David
and the leading Jewish scholar, Hillel, who had
originated from Babylon in the first century BC-
E. The exilarch enjoyed the status of a prince and
was extremely wealthy and powerful.
With the Muslim conquest of Babylon in the
seventh century, the position of the Jewish com-
munity continued largely unchanged. As the
People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), they were
granted dhimmi status (the tolerated ones), pro-
vided that they paid both a poll tax and a land tax
for their protection by the Muslim ruler. Theoret-
ically, according to the Pact of Umar, they had to
be inferior to the Muslim population, but the
restrictions placed upon them were not always
strictly enforced. Thus, the exilarch continued to
enjoy his elevated status. However, due to the
land tax and other external factors, the Jews of
Babylon gradually gravitated to the urban centers
and changed from being farmers to traders and
craftsmen.
In the post-Talmudic period, from the eighth
to the eleventh centuries, Jewish scholarship con-
tinued to thrive, under the leadership of the
Geonim (geniuses), who were the heads of the
Babylonian Talmudic academies. The most
famous of these was Saadia HaGaon, who was
born in Egypt, but moved to Babylon and became
head of the Sura Talmudic academy. Saadia
translated the bible into Arabic and was one of
the first Jewish scholars to synthesize Greco-
Arabic philosophy with Jewish thought. When
conflict developed between Saadia and the
exilarch, he was sent into exile, but his reputation
went with him. Eventually the exilarch recalled
him and reestablished him as head of the acad-
emy, indicating that while the hereditary position
was the most powerful in theory, in practice it
was scholarship that predominated. In this period,
the rabbinical responses to legal questions that
were sent to them from across the Jewish world
developed a body of literature known as
“responsa.”
By the eleventh century, the conditions for
Babylonian Jewry had begun to deteriorate.
Even though a Jewish community continued to
Jewish Diaspora
exist there, and throughout the Arab world, these
Oriental Jews, or Mizrachim, no longer enjoyed
the privilege of being the epicenter of the Jewish
Diaspora – that center had moved to Spain.
The Spanish Diaspora
There are records of Jews living in Spain from the
time of the Roman Empire. After the two major
revolts in the first and second centuries CE, many
Jewish slaves were brought to Rome, but the local
Jewish community quickly purchased and freed
them, since “redemption of the captives” is con-
sidered a very important commandment in Jewish
tradition. Some of these liberated Jews moved into
the Iberian Peninsula. The history of the Jews in
Spain is a complicated one, which can be divided
into three main periods: the Visigoth period, the
Muslim period, and the Christian Reconquista
(conquest). Each of these began well, but ended
up in religious persecution with the Jews being
faced with the alternatives of conversion or death.
The Visigoths conquered the Iberian Penin-
sula with the disintegration of the Roman Empire
in the fifth century. Originally pagan, they ini-
tially converted to a form of Christianity known
as Arianism, which rejected the concept of the
Trinity and papal power. During this period, the
Jews were permitted to continue to live in peace.
However, in 586 CE one of the Visigoth kings
converted to Roman Catholicism and insisted that
the Jews leave, accept Christianity, or die. In
response to this ultimatum, many decided to con-
vert to Christianity, while secretly continuing to
practice Judaism. This response provided a pre-
cedent for the ongoing decision of Sephardi Jews
to accept conversion rather than martyrdom when
faced by such choices.
In 711, the Muslims under the Umayyad
dynasty from Babylon conquered the Iberian
Peninsula. Initially reaching as far as France,
they were pushed back by the Christians, who
retained control of the northern provinces of
Leon and Navarre. Under the Umayyads, Cor-
dova became the center of power. Jews followed
the Muslim conquerors, and many of the secret
Jews again openly became practicing Jews, inau-
gurating a period of symbiosis between Jews and
Muslims, which has been described as “The
3
Golden Age of Spain.” Jewish life flourished, as
seen in the rich poetry, rabbinic literature, and
leading roles played by Jewish figures in this
period. This was particularly the case under
Abd-ar-Rahman III, who appointed Hasdai ibn
Shaprut as his adviser in the tenth century. Ibn
Shaprut was able to purchase the library of the
Academy of Sura, which was facing a period of
decline, and bring it to Cordova. The area where
this rich Jewish culture emerged was known as
Andalusia or al-Andalus and included centers in
Seville, Granada, Malaga, and Cádiz, in addition
to Cordova. For the next two centuries, under the
Umayyads, Jewish life continued to flourish, but
the situation began to deteriorate with the gradual
Christian reconquest, which led to first the
Almoravides and later a more radical Muslim
group, the Almohades, and Berbers from North
Africa, taking control in Southern Spain.
While Jewish scholarship flourished in Spain
during this period, much of the Spanish Jewish
poetry reflected a sense of pain at the fact that the
Jewish community was living in the Diaspora and
did not have their own homeland in Israel. One of
the best known of these poems was written by
Yehudah HaLevi (Judah the Levite):
My heart is in the East, and I am at the ends of the
West;
How can I taste what I eat and how could it be
pleasing to me?
How shall I render my vows and my bonds,
while yet
Zion lies beneath the fetter of Edom, and I am in
the chains of Arabia?
It would be easy for me to leave all the bounty
of Spain -
As it is precious for me to behold the dust of the
desolate sanctuary.
Zion is the name of a mountain in Jerusalem
and is a term which has come to represent not
only Jerusalem but also the Land of Israel, while
Edom refers to the Christian crusaders then ruling
Palestine and Arabia to the Muslim rulers of
Spain. HaLevi in the end followed his heart and
attempted to return to the Land of Israel. While
there are historical records that he spent time in
Egypt, it is unclear what happened to him after
that, even though legend claimed that he was
murdered when he reached Jerusalem.
4 Jewish Diaspora
The leading scholar of the Spanish period was
Moses Maimonides (also known as Rabbi Moses
ben Maimon – son of Maimon – or the acronym
RAMBAM). He was born shortly before the con-
quest of the Almohades, when his family was
forced to convert to Islam, before escaping to Fez
in Morocco, which was also under the Almohades.
The family then tried to settle in Palestine, but had
to leave because of the crusaders and in the end
settled in Fustat, the Jewish quarter near Cairo.
After his younger brother died in a shipwreck,
Maimonides became the physician to the caliph.
In addition to his medical works, he is known as
the leading Jewish scholar who attempted a major
codification of Jewish law, called the Mishneh
Torah, as well as taking a scientific and philosoph-
ical approach to assist Jews who were questioning
the traditions in his The Guide for the Perplexed.
His Thirteen Principles of Faith are included in the
Jewish prayer book and are considered founda-
tional to Jewish belief.
As a result of this Muslim persecution, the
Jews in Andalusia welcomed the Christian con-
querors, who initially needed the assistance of the
Jews, due to their knowledge of Arabic and their
willingness to resettle those areas from where the
Muslims had fled. Under Christian rule, Jewish
life again flourished with the symbiosis. The first
warning of deterioration came in 1263, with the
Barcelona Disputation, when a leading Jewish
scholar, Nachmanides, was forced to debate
Judaism with a Christian convert from Judaism.
The king ended the debate before a final conclu-
sion was reached and subsequently Nachmanides
was attacked and left Spain for Palestine.
However, the situation for the Jews of the
Iberian Peninsula seriously deteriorated from
the end of the fourteenth century, when riots
against Jews in 1391 forced many to convert to
Christianity. While some became committed
Christians, many sought to secretly practice Juda-
ism and became known by the derogatory term
Marranos or “pigs.” They are also called New
Christians, conversos in Spanish, or Anusim, the
forced ones in Hebrew. Many of the New Chris-
tians were extremely successful, creating a sense
of jealousy among the Old Christians, and in
Toledo in the 1450s, blood purity laws were
introduced, to limit the positions that the New
Christians were permitted to fill. In 1469, Isabella
and Ferdinand married, uniting Leon and Aragon,
the two most powerful kingdoms in Spain. Ini-
tially the Jews were promised protection, and two
leading Jewish figures, Isaac Abravanel and
Abraham Seneor, became advisers to the king
and played a key role in fundraising for his cam-
paign against Muslim Granada.
In 1480, the monarchs introduced the Inquisi-
tion, which was aimed at heretics, rather than the
open Jews. This placed the New Christians under
immediate threat, since any of them could be
accused of “Judaizing” and face the Inquisition
with torture, forced confessions, and the auto-
da-fé or burning at the stake. While the open
Jews were not the target of the Inquisition, they
were also at risk of being accused of converting
Christians or assisting conversos. Once the
Muslims in Granada were defeated in 1492,
Ferdinand and Isabella issued the Edict of Expul-
sion, giving the Jews just four months to leave
Spain or convert to Christianity.
Initially, 100,000 Jewish refugees – around
one third of Spain’s Jewish population – fled
across the border to Portugal where they formed
10 % of the Portuguese population. However, in
1496 King Manuel of Portugal negotiated for the
hand of Isabella and Ferdinand’s daughter, and
they insisted that he expel his Jewish population
before they would consent to the marriage.
Manuel issued an Edict of Expulsion but he was
reluctant to lose his Jews, whose financial exper-
tise he valued. Thus, when they arrived in Lisbon,
there were no boats waiting for them, and instead
they were all forcibly converted to Christianity.
However, the Portuguese Inquisition itself was
only introduced in 1536, after Manuel’s death,
and the first auto-da-fe in Portugal was held in
1540. Despite the risk of exposure, many New
Christians continued to practice Judaism secretly,
while creating trading networks in Amsterdam
and Antwerp. The situation developed after
1600 when the Netherlands became Calvinist,
where Jews could again become openly practic-
ing Jews. A number of Sephardim managed to
escape the Iberian Peninsula and create the Jew-
ish communities of Amsterdam and later London.
Jewish Diaspora
East European Jewry
The third major Diaspora center emerged in East-
ern Europe from the thirteen century onwards,
when the Polish kings invited the Jews of the
German Rhineland area, as well as non-Jewish
Germans, to settle in their kingdom. A rich Jew-
ish life had emerged in France from the eighth
century under Charlemagne the Great and from
the tenth century along the Rhineland, in towns
such as Cologne, Speer, Mainz, and Bonn. They
became known as Ashkenazim, literally German,
and they developed a rich Jewish learning tradi-
tion exemplified by Rabbenu Gershom and Rabbi
Solomon Isaac, known by the acronym
“RASHI,” who till the present day is considered
one of the greatest biblical commentators.
These communities suffered severe attacks
during the First and Second Crusades in the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries, and even though their
numbers were reinforced with the expulsion of
the Jews from English in 1290 and from France in
1306, they felt under threat. The invitations from
the Polish kings offered them a possibility of
escape to a more welcoming environment. This
movement of Jews from Western Europe to East-
ern Europe was reinforced in 1348–1349, during
the terrible plague, known as the Black Death.
Jews were accused of causing the plague and
suffered terrible attacks across the Germanic-
speaking kingdoms and duchies.
The most important of the Polish kings was
Casimir, who offered the Jews special protection
and the right to organize themselves, provided
they paid him a communal tax under the charter
system. Many Jews were invited in by the Polish
nobility to run their estates and collect the taxes
from the serfs. They settled in shtetls (private
towns), with each shtetl being ruled by the council
(kehilla), consisting of 12 representatives of the
leading citizens. In 1580, a united Jewish Council,
known as the Council of Four Lands, was formed,
and it continued to operate until 1764, so that
Polish Jewry became a state within a state. The
kehilla was responsible for every aspect of com-
munal life, including running the synagogue and
mikvah (ritual bath) and providing assistance to
the sick, the poor, the widows, and the orphans
through an extensive system of charity.
5
Jewish scholarship in Poland flourished during
this period. In a period when most people were
illiterate, Jewish literacy was valued. All boys
studied Hebrew, the Torah, and Talmud from
the age of three in what became known as
heder, literally room, as they learned in a room
in the teacher’s home. The more talented stu-
dents, regardless of their economic status, were
then selected to continue their studies after their
Bar Mitzvah, the coming of age at 13, in a Tal-
mudic academy, or yeshiva, located in the bigger
Jewish centers. The system known as “tag”
developed, where the yeshiva boys would sleep
in the synagogue, and each day a different family
in the shtetl would host them for their meals.
Sometimes they would earn some money by
matchmaking.
One of the key centers of Jewish scholarship to
emerge in this period was in Krakow, with Rabbi
Moshe Isserles emerging as the most significant
scholar in the mid-sixteenth century. He
responded to the codification of Jewish law by
the Sephardi scholar, Joseph Caro, who was born
in Spain just before the expulsion, lived in Italy,
and then moved to Safed in the Galilee, where he
produced his codification called Shulchan Aruch
(Prepared Table). Isserles produced a critique of
Caro’s work, which aimed to undermine it, but
instead his comments were incorporated into the
work, so that a unified code of Jewish law rele-
vant for both the Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jewish
traditions emerged. This is used as the basis of
Jewish law to the present day.
The positive Jewish life in Poland was
disrupted in the mid-seventeenth century, when
the Cossacks attempted to conquer the country.
They were supported by the serfs, who attacked
the nobility, and the Jews were caught between the
two opposing groups, suffering enormous losses in
1648–1649. With this tragedy, the center of Jewish
life moved north to Lithuania. By the beginning of
the eighteenth century, the Jews of Poland and the
Ukraine were suffering from great poverty and a
spiritual crisis. The system of Talmudic scholar-
ship excluded the lower classes, who felt alienated
from their Jewish traditions. In response, the Has-
sidic movement was created by the Baal Shem
Tov (Master of the Good Name or Besht), a
6 Jewish Diaspora
pseudonym referring to his healing powers as a
naturalist. The Besht focused on the joy of Juda-
ism, stressing that love of God, expressed through
song and dance, and the allegiance to a rebbe or
tzaddik were what was required to be a good Jew.
After his death, his movement splintered into dif-
ferent Chassidic sects, each led by a dynasty of
rebbes.
In Lithuania, there was a movement called the
Mitnagdim, which opposed the Chassidic
approach, fearing the undermining of the Jewish
intellectual tradition. Elijah ben Shlomo Zalman
Kremer, known as the Gaon (genius) of Vilna, led
this oppositional movement. He sought to intro-
duce more secular knowledge, including trans-
lations into Hebrew of key mathematical and
scientific works by his students. While he
attacked the Chassidim, they admired his Talmu-
dic scholarship.
The period of the Enlightenment resulted in
radical changes in Western Europe, with the
gradual breaking down of the ghetto walls, par-
ticularly after the French Revolution. However,
while classical Christian anti-Judaism waned in
Western Europe, a new form of prejudice, called
anti-Semitism, based on racial characteristics
emerged in Western Europe by the end of the
nineteenth century.
Dominated by tsarist Russia, the situation for
Jews in Eastern Europe deteriorated in the nine-
teenth century. In 1772, Catherine the Great con-
quered Eastern Poland and the country was
carved up between Russia, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, and Prussia. Catherine disliked Jews and
did not wish them to enter Russia proper, a policy
continued by her successors. The Jewish Pale of
Settlement was established from the Baltic to the
Black Sea, with Jews only being permitted to live
within these boundaries. During the rule of
Nicholas I, the position of the Jews was particu-
larly difficult, as he sought to introduce Russifi-
cation and forcibly conscripted Jewish boys into
the Russian army, from the age of 12. Under
Alexander II, who emancipated the serfs in
1860, the position of the Jews was slightly liber-
alized, but after his assassination in 1881 by a
group of radical students, one of whom was Jew-
ish, their situation again deteriorated. Jews faced
pogroms and government-sponsored attacks, and
in May 1882 new laws were introduced forcing
many to move from their small shtetls into the
larger towns. The unofficial tsarist policy was
that one third of the Jews should emigrate, one
third should die of starvation, and one third
should convert. While the latter two goals were
not achieved, Jewish there was mass Jewish
migration from Eastern Europe, as will be
discussed in the next section.
The perilous existence of Jews in Eastern
Europe continued after World War I, and Polish
Jewry experienced almost total devastation with
the Nazi Holocaust. Of the six million Jews mur-
dered in Europe, three million were from Poland,
leaving a tiny residue of less than a quarter of
million. Most died in the six death camps, all
located in Poland. The gas chambers were fully
operational by 1942. The numbers 1942 can be
transposed to 1492 – marking the destruction of
the two major Jewish Diaspora centers in Spain
and Poland.
American Jewry
The most recent Diaspora center is located in the
United States. The first Jews to settle in the North
America were Dutch Sephardi Jews, fleeing per-
secution in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies
of South America. However, by the early nine-
teenth century, these communities, reinforced by
some British Jews, were still very small with
about only 10,000 Jews living in North America
in the early nineteenth century. However,
between 1830 and 1880, around 300,000 German
Jewish refugees fled to the United States, follow-
ing the defeat of Napoleon and the failure of the
1830 and 1848 revolutions in Western Europe.
Then, from 1880 to 1924, over two million Rus-
sian Jews arrived on American shores, in what
they called the Goldene Medina (the Golden
Country). While the German Jews became
hawkers and traders and tended to spread out
across the country, including the Californian
gold fields after 1848, the East European Jews
clustered in the East Coast in the major urban
centers of New York, Chicago, and Boston.
In 1924 America closed her doors to refugee
migration in response to the anti-migrant Populist
Jewish Diaspora
movement, which saw the introduction of a quota
system. The American Jews rapidly acculturated
and moved up the socioeconomic ladder, from
working in the industrial sweatshops, largely of
the textile industry, to becoming professionals
and businessmen, within a generation. After the
war, one third of New York’s population was
Jewish – the other two thirds of the nation’s
economic center being black and Irish/Italian.
The Jewish population had increased to five mil-
lion by the 1950s, and with the destruction of
European Jewry and the forced expulsions of
the Mizrachi Jews from the Arab Muslim lands,
America had emerged as the new Jewish Dias-
pora center.
Hybrid Languages
One of the key features of all the different Jewish
Diaspora centers has been the development of
hybrid languages. The first hybrid language to
emerge in the Jewish world was Aramaic, the
spoken language across the Greek and Roman
worlds. With the emergence of Islam and the
Muslim conquests, Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-
Persian developed. Thus, Maimonides wrote his
The Guide for the Perplexed in Judeo-Arabic.
Ladino, a mixture of medieval Spanish, Hebrew,
and Arabic, developed first in the Iberian Penin-
sula and later in the Balkans, while Yiddish, a
mixture of medieval German, Slavic languages,
and Hebrew developed in Eastern Europe. The
cementing element of these different hybrid lan-
guages, representing the cultures of the Mizrachi,
Sephardi, and Ashkenazi Jews, was that they
were always written in the Hebrew alphabet,
since Hebrew remained the language of prayer
and scholarship. Hebrew was the glue that kept
the Jewish Diaspora together, throughout all the
period of the Diaspora.
It can be argued that no other ethnic or reli-
gious group has experienced such radical demo-
graphic changes over the history of its Diaspora
or dispersion. This phenomenon has been partic-
ularly dramatic from the mid-nineteenth century.
In the early nineteenth century, the bulk of the
Jewish world lived in Europe and the Arab lands,
with only a tiny minority in America and Pales-
tine/the Land of Israel. Today, 40 % of the Jewish
7
world lives in North America and over 40 % in
Israel. There are only around 4000 Jews
remaining in the Arab world, and Europe’s pop-
ulation is less than one and a half million and
declining.
Further Reading
Antony P (2012) The Jews in Poland and Russia
(volume 3: 1914–2008). Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, Portland
Baron SW (1983) A social and religious history of the
Jews, vol 3. Columbia University Press, New York
Bauer Y (1982) History of the Holocaust. F Watts, New
York
Bauer Y (2010) The death of the Shtetl. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, London/New Haven
Ben-Sasson HH (ed) (1976) A history of the Jewish peo-
ple. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Biale D (1986) Power & powerlessness in Jewish history.
Schocken Books, New York
Cohn-Sherbok D (1994) Atlas of Jewish history.
Routledge, London/New York
Cohn-Sherbok D (2003) Judaism: history, belief, and
practice. Routledge, London/New York
Dawidowicz L (1996) The golden tradition: Jewish life
and thought in Eastern Europe. Syracuse University
Press, Syracuse
Deshen S, Zenner WP (eds) (1996) Jews among Muslims:
communities in the pre-colonial Middle East. Macmil-
lan Press, London
Eisen A (1986) Galut: modern Jewish reflection on home-
lessness and homecoming. Indiana University Press,
Bloomington
Elazar DJ (1991) Land, State and Diaspora in the history
of the Jewish polity. Jewish Polit Stud Rev 3:1–2,
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), http://
www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?
PublicationID=3641
Eliach Y (1998) There once was a World: A 900-year
chronicle of the Shtetl of Eishyshok. Little Brown,
Boston
Flannery EH (1985) The Anguish of the Jews: twenty-
three centuries of Antisemitism. rev. edn. Paulist
Press, New York
Gerber J (1992) The Jews of Spain: a history of the
Sephardic experience. The Free Press, New York
Goitein SD (1974) Jews and Arabs: their contacts through
the ages. Schocken Books, New York
Goodman M (ed) (2002) The Oxford handbook of Jewish
studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York
Hertzberg A (1999) Jews; the essence and character of a
people. Harper, San Francisco
Holtz BW (1992) Back to the sources: reading the classic
Jewish texts. Simon & Schuster, New York
8 Jewish Diaspora
Johnson P (1988) A history of the Jews. Harper Perennial,
New York
Neusner J (1965) A history of the Jews in Babylonia,
vol 1 & 2. Brill, Leiden
Parkes J (1965) The conflict of the Church and the Syna-
gogue. Meridian, New York
Poliakov L (1974) The history of anti-semitism.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Polonsky A (1914) The Jews in Poland and Russia
(volume 2: 1881–1914). Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, Portland
Polonsky A (2010) The Jews in Poland and Russia
(volume 1: 1350–1881). Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, Portland
Raphael C (1985) The road from Babylon: the story of
Sephardi and Oriental Jews. Weidenfeld and Nichol-
son, London
Sachar H (2005) A history of the Jews in the modern
world. Knopf, New York
Sarna JD (2004) American Judaism: a history. Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven
Scheindlin R (1998) A short history of the Jewish people:
from legendary times to modern statehood. Oxford
University Press, Oxford
Seltzer RM (1982) Jewish people, Jewish thought: the
Jewish experience in history. Macmillan, New York
Stillman NA (1979) The Jews of Arab Lands. JPS,
Philadelphia
Telushkin J (1991) Jewish literacy: the most important
things to know about the Jewish religion, its people
and its history. William Morrow, New York
Wistrich R (1991) Antisemitism: the longest hatred.
Schoken Books, New York
Zohar Z (ed) (2005) Sephardic & Mizrahi Jewry: from the
golden age of Spain to modern times. New York Uni-
versity Press, New York/London
C
Cultural Diversity: The Australian
Social Cohesion Surveys
Andrew Markus
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Definition
The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion surveys,
first conducted in 2007 and repeated on seven
occasions, provide a rich body of surveying data
on Australian attitudes to immigration, cultural
diversity, and social cohesion. The survey find-
ings indicate that Australia ranks alongside Can-
ada as the most receptive to immigration among
Western nations. There is, however, a substantial
minority in Australia, close to 40 %, who do not
support immigration. The Scanlon Foundation
surveys – and other polling over the last
30 years – have consistently found that the vast
majority of Australians have a high level of iden-
tification with their country, the fundamental pre-
requisite for any cohesive society. Consideration
of attitudes of recent arrivals provides evidence of
rapid integration. Of those who arrived since
2000, 86 % of English-speaking background and
88 % of non-English-speaking background indi-
cate a sense of belonging to a “great” or “moderate
extent.” There is strong endorsement of the view
that “Australia is a land of economic opportunity
where in the long run, hard work brings a better
life.” These views are consistent with
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_56-1
international indicators, which rank Australia at
or near the top of developed countries in terms of
standard of living, education, health services, and
quality of life. There is, however, also a consistent
finding of lower levels of social cohesion in
regions of high immigrant concentration, indi-
cated by survey findings on trust, experience of
discrimination, political participation, and
involvement in voluntary work.
Detailed Description
Over the last 10 years, Australia’s population has
increased by over three million, or 15%, to an
estimated 22,485,000 (2011). There has been a
steady increase in the proportion overseas born,
from 23 % in 2001 to 24 % in 2006 and 26 % in
2011; this represents an increase from 4.1 million
overseas-born persons in 2001 to 5.3 million in
2011. The proportion overseas born ranks Austra-
lia first within the OECD, among nations with
populations over ten million. The Australian pro-
portion compares with 20 % overseas born in
Canada, 13 % in Germany, 13 % in the United
States, 11 % in the United Kingdom, and 12 % in
France. The average for the OECD is 12 %.
In 2011, of the overseas-born population of
Australia, the leading countries of birth were the
United Kingdom (20.8 %) and New Zealand
(9.1 %). Over the last 30 years, an increasing
proportion of immigrants have been drawn from
the Asian region. Thus, between 2007 and 2011,
2 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys
the leading country of birth for immigrants was
India (13 %). Among settler arrivals in
2010–2011, immigrants from New Zealand and
the United Kingdom ranked first and third; of the
remaining seven top countries of origin, five were
Asian and one was African.
A high proportion of the overseas born in Aus-
tralia live in capital cities, with concentrations
above 50 % in some local government areas.
The full extent of cultural diversity is indicated
by census findings on the proportion of Austra-
lians who speak a language other than English in
the home. In 2011, suburbs with a large proportion
indicating that they speak a language other than
English in the home include Cabramatta (88 %),
Canley Vale (84 %), and Lakemba (84 %) in
Sydney and Campbellfield (81 %), Springvale
(79 %), and Dallas (73 %) in Melbourne.
Given the significance of immigration for Aus-
tralia, there has been surprisingly little investment
in systematic public opinion research. In England,
the Citizenship Surveys were conducted bienni-
ally and then every 3 months between 2001 and
2010. The first three Citizenship Surveys were
each administered to some 15,000 respondents
(including a minority ethnic boost of 5000) in
face-to-face interviews, taking approximately
60 min to complete. The Canadian Department
of Citizenship and Immigration for more than
20 years undertook annual surveys to track atti-
tudes to immigration (EKOS 2010). Statistics
Canada, in conjunction with other government
departments, conducted an Ethnic Diversity Sur-
vey in 2002 which interviewed 42,500 respon-
dents. Within the EU, major surveys include the
annual Eurobarometer, established in 1973, with a
minimum of 1,000 respondents in each member
state, and the biennial European Social Survey,
which reaches over 30,000 respondents.
In Australia, knowledge of public attitudes to
immigration and cultural diversity has in large
measure been dependent on commercial polling
for the print media. The problem with such polling
is that it is reliant on a handful of questions, often
just two or three, administered to small samples
and without consistent wording to track change
over time. A few government and academic sur-
veys have provided richer insights. (For a detailed
discussion of Australian surveying, see Goot
1999; Goot and Watson 2011.)
The Scanlon Foundation social cohesion sur-
veys, for the first time in Australian social
research, provide a rich body of surveying data
on public attitudes to immigration, cultural diver-
sity, and social cohesion. Eight Scanlon Founda-
tion national surveys have been conducted to date
(2007, 2009–2015), with an average sample of
1,750 respondents, utilizing a uniform methodol-
ogy and a survey instrument of some 70 questions;
in addition, three parallel surveys (2007, 2009,
2012) have been conducted in Sydney and Mel-
bourne in areas of high immigrant concentration
(Markus 2007–2015).
The Scanlon Foundation surveys are distinc-
tive not only for the scale, consistency, and fre-
quency of surveying but for exploring attitudes in
multiple dimensions: at the national level, within
selected localities, within subgroups, and with
comparative reference across these dimensions.
The large sample makes possible reliable analysis
of subgroups of the population, for example, by
age group, educational attainment, and political
alignment.
What Does the Corpus of Australian Surveying
Establish?
The evidence indicates that Australia, together
with Canada, ranks as the most receptive to immi-
gration among Western nations (Markus 2012;
Reitz 2011). In Australia and Canada, a majority
of the population supports the level of immigra-
tion, in contrast with a number of European coun-
tries. For example, in 2003, an international
survey found that 32 % of Canadian and 39 % of
Australian respondents favored a reduction of
immigration, compared with 58 % in Sweden,
66 % in France, 70 % in Germany, and 78 % in
England. The 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey
found that 27 % of Canadian respondents agreed
with the proposition that “immigration is more of
a problem than an opportunity,” compared to 52 %
of respondents in the United States and 65 % in
the United Kingdom (Markus 2012, pp 117, 119).
There is, however, a substantial minority in
Australia, close to 40 %, who do not support
immigration. This includes a core element,
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys
To a great extent To a moderate extent
2012 74%
2011 73%
2010 72%
2009 72%
2007 77%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 1 To what extent do you have a sense of belonging
in Australia? 2007–2012
comprising an estimated 10 % of the population
(or 1.5 million adults), who consistently indicate a
strong level of opposition to immigration and
cultural diversity.
The Scanlon Foundation surveys – and other
polling over the last 30 years – have consistently
found that the vast majority of Australians have a
high level of identification with their country, the
fundamental prerequisite for any cohesive society.
Almost unanimously, Australians express a sense
of belonging (95 % in 2012), indicate pride in the
Australian way of life (90 %), and believe that its
maintenance is important (91 %). Less than 5 % of
respondents to the 2012 Scanlon Foundation sur-
vey indicated that they had slight or no sense of
belonging (Fig. 1).
Consideration of attitudes of recent arrivals
provides evidence of rapid integration. Of those
who arrived since 2000, 86 % of English-speaking
background and 88 % of non-English-speaking
background indicate a sense of belonging to a
“great” or “moderate extent.”
There is strong endorsement of the view that
“Australia is a land of economic opportunity
where in the long run, hard work brings a better
life.” In 2007, 81 % of respondents “strongly
agreed” or “agreed,” 82 % in 2010, and 81 % in
2012. These views are consistent with interna-
tional indicators, which rank Australia at or near
the top of developed countries in terms of standard
of living, education, health services, and quality
of life (Fig. 2).
3
Only slightly Not at all
21% 4%
21% 6%
23% 3%
23% 4%
19% 2%
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
A prime objective of the Scanlon Foundation
surveys has been to further understanding of the
social impact of Australia’s increasingly diverse
immigration program. A central focus is on the
emerging challenges of cultural diversity. To fur-
ther this specific objective, the Scanlon-Monash
Index (SMI) of Social Cohesion was developed,
using the findings of the 2007 national survey to
provide baseline data.
As a concept, social cohesion has a long tradi-
tion in academic enquiry, of fundamental impor-
tance in discussion of the role of consensus and
conflict in society. From the mid-1990s, interest in
the dynamics of social cohesion grew amid con-
cerns prompted by the impact of globalization,
economic change, and fears fuelled by the “war
on terror.” There is, however, no agreed definition
of social cohesion. Most current definitions dwell
on intangibles, such as sense of national belong-
ing and attachment, willingness to participate in
community life, mutual respect, and common
aspirations or identity. The Scanlon Foundation
surveys adopted an eclectic, wide-ranging
approach, influenced by the work of social scien-
tists Jane Jenson and Paul Bernard, to incorporate
five domains related to:
sense of belonging, valuation of the Australian way
of life;
worth: satisfaction with financial status and level of
happiness;
social justice and equity: views on economic
opportunity, income distribution, government
4 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys

Strongle agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree

2012 39% 42% 5% 10% 5%

2011 40% 42% 4% 10% 4%

2010 34% 48% 4% 10% 3%

2009 39% 43% 3% 10% 4%

2007 34% 47% 2% 12% 3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Fig. 2 Australia is a land of economic opportunity
where in the long run, hard work brings a better life, 2007–2012

Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 1 The Scanlon-Monash Index (SMI) of Social
Cohesion, 2007–2012
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012
SMI – average result 100 101.2 92.6 93.8 94.4

policies to assist people on low incomes, confi-
dence in government;
participation: in the political process of the nation,
indicated by voting in an election, contact with a
member of parliament, participation in a boycott
or protest
sense of acceptance/ rejection: experience of dis-
crimination, view of cultural diversity and gov-
ernment assistance to migrant communities,
expectations for the future. (Markus and
Kirpitchenko 2007)
The key finding of the SMI is the stability of
Australian society. Despite the continuing large
immigration intake and global economic uncer-
tainties, the variance in the Index over five sur-
veys has been within 10 points, from a high of
101.2 to a low of 92.6. The major shift in the Index
occurred between 2009 and 2010, associated with
the growing unpopularity of the federal labor gov-
ernment, with trust in the government declining
from 48 % to 31 %. The two surveys after 2010
registered marginal upward movement in the
Index (Table 1).
A major point of interest in the Scanlon Foun-
dation surveys has been the findings of three local
surveys, conducted in suburbs defined by their
high concentration of immigrants – and relatively
high economic disadvantage.
The local surveys, parallel with the national
surveys, have found consistent evidence of strong
identification with the Australian way of life
among both native born and immigrant. Immi-
grants, presumably reflecting on their previous
conditions of life, provide strong endorsement of
Australia as a land of economic opportunity and
social justice.
There is, however, also a consistent finding of
lower levels of social cohesion in regions of high
immigrant concentration, indicated by survey
findings on trust, sense of safety, experience of
discrimination, political participation, and
involvement in voluntary work. At 82.9 in 2012,
the SMI for areas of high immigrant concentration
is markedly lower that the national Index (94.4).
A relatively high proportion of respondents of
non-English-speaking background (NESB) in
areas of high immigrant concentration indicate a
positive response when considering the level of
immigration, the contribution of immigrants, the
impact of immigration in the local area, and the
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys
Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys, Table 2 Which, if any, of the following have you done
over the last 3 years or so?
National Australia
Response born
Voted in an election 91.8 %
Signed a petition 58.6 %
Written or spoken to a federal or state member of 28.2 %
parliament
Joined a boycott of a product or company 14.7 %
Attended a protest, march, or demonstration 13.5 %
ability of people of different backgrounds to get
on with each other. Thus, among NESB respon-
dents to the 2012 local survey, 77 % agreed that
“my local area is a place where people from dif-
ferent national or ethnic backgrounds get on well
together,” and 66 % agreed that “people in my
local area are willing to help their neighbors.” Just
36 % considered that the immigration intake was
“too high,” and 63 % agreed that “accepting
immigrants from many different countries makes
Australia stronger.”
But the local survey found markedly higher
reported experience of discrimination on the
basis of “skin color, ethnic origin, or religion.”
The reported level in 2012 was 12 % for
Australian-born and 11 % for NESB respondents
in the national survey, 23 % for both groups in the
local survey.
The survey in areas of high immigrant concen-
tration also found markedly lower levels of
political participation and trust (Table 2).
In response to the question, “generally speak-
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted
or you can’t be too careful in dealing with peo-
ple,” 52 % of respondents in the national survey
indicated that “most people can be trusted.” In
marked contrast, in the local survey, just 34 % of
Australian-born and 30 % of NESB respondents
agreed that “most people can be trusted,” while
close to 65 % disagreed.
A further finding of significance is the rela-
tively high proportion of third-generation Austra-
lian respondents who indicate dissatisfaction with
their neighborhoods in the local survey, an
increase of close to 20 percentage points when
compared to the national survey.
5
Local Australia National Local
born NESB NESB
83.5 % 81.8 % 81.9 %
38.4 % 42.3 % 26.9 %
17.7 % 28.5 % 9.6 %
12.8 % 12.0 % 5.7 %
11.4 % 16.8 % 8.3 %
The fact that these areas are also classified at
the most economically disadvantaged raises the
question of whether the lower levels of social
cohesion are more a consequence of poverty
than cultural diversity.
Robert Putnam, in an influential 2007 article,
argued that ethnic diversity has a negative impact
on social cohesion. Putnam’s argument was based
on a US survey of 30,000 participants, which was
analyzed using a range of bivariate and multivar-
iate processes. He concluded that in areas of eth-
nic diversity, there were, among other outcomes,
lower confidence in ability to influence local deci-
sions, less expectation that people will work
together on community projects, lower likelihood
of giving to charity or volunteering, lower indica-
tion of life satisfaction, and lower perception of
quality of life. Putnam concluded that “inhabitants
of diverse communities tend to withdraw from
collective life,” but the evidence did not establish
that ethnic diversity led to “bad race relations” or
to “ethnically defined group hostility” (Putnam
2007).
The 2009 and 2012 Scanlon Foundation local
surveys found evidence consistent with Putnam’s
findings. Using the 2012 survey, economically
disadvantaged areas of low ethnic diversity (less
than 20 % overseas born) were compared with
economically disadvantaged areas of high diver-
sity (over 50 % overseas born). Economically
disadvantaged areas were identified using the
Australian Bureau of Statistics Socio-Economic
Indexes for Areas (SEIFA), which provides a
ranking of postcode areas in deciles, from rank
1 for the most disadvantaged to rank 10 for the
least disadvantaged. Analysis of seven general
6 Cultural Diversity: The Australian Social Cohesion Surveys
questions related to neighborhood and level of life
satisfaction across the most disadvantaged SEIFA
deciles found lower participation and higher
levels of negativity in the areas of high ethnic
diversity. Thus, 65 % of respondents in high-
diversity areas indicated low levels of trust (“you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people”),
compared with 44 % in the low-diversity areas;
28% of respondents in high-diversity areas
disagreed with the proposition that “people are
willing to help their neighbors,” compared to
16 % in low-diversity areas.
In conclusion, the Scanlon Foundation surveys
in conducted between 2007 and 2012 indicate that
Australia is a socially cohesive and welcoming
country, but areas of high immigrant concentra-
tion present a complex and far from uniform pic-
ture: they are characterized by many positive
findings but also lower levels of trust and sense
of safety, lower levels of political participation
and involvement in voluntary work, and height-
ened experience of discrimination.
There is also clear evidence of disaffection and
negative valuation of the impact of immigration
among a minority of third-generation Australians
in high-diversity areas. The survey identifies a
constituency potentially receptive to advocacy of
discriminatory immigration policies, which if
translated into action would present a threat to
social cohesion.
References
Ekos (2010) Ekos Research Associates, annual tracking
survey – winter 2010. Submitted to Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Apr 2010
European Commission Public Opinion, Eurobarometer
Surveys, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin
ion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en
Goot M (1999) Migrant numbers, Asian immigration and
multiculturalism: trends in the polls, 1943–1998,
National Multicultural Advisory Council, Australian
Multiculturalism for a New Century Commonwear of
Australia, Canberra Statistical Appendix part 2
Goot M, Watson I (2011) Population, immigration and
asylum seekers: patterns in Australian public opinion,
Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library,
Commonwear of Australia, Canberra, May
Markus A (2012) Immigration and public opinion. In:
Pincus J, Graeme H (eds) A greater Australia: popula-
tion, policies and governance, CEDA Pollara 2003,
A Pollara report on Canadian’s attitudes regarding
immigration. Prepared for Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, Dec 2003
Markus A, Kirpitchenko L (2007) Conceptualising social
cohesion. In: Nieuwenhuysen J, James J (eds) Social
cohesion in Australia, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Markus A, Mapping Social Cohesion, The Scanlon Foun-
dation Surveys (2007–2015) available at Mapping
Australia’s Population internet site. http://www.arts.
monash.edu.au/mapping-population/
Putnam R (2007) E pluribus Unum: diversity and commu-
nity in the twenty-first century. Scand Polit Stud
30(2):137–174
Reitz J (2011) Pro-immigration Canada. Social and eco-
nomic roots of popular views, IRPP Study, No 20, Oct
P
Points-Based Immigration
Madeleine Sumption
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC,
USA
Keywords
Points system; Points; Human capital; Highly
skilled immigration; Merits-based immigration;
Employer-based immigration; Hybrid systems;
Government-led immigrant selection, Canada;
Australia; The United Kingdom
Definition
A points system is a mechanism for determining
eligibility for employment-based immigration. In
a points-based immigration system, governments
devise a list of attributes or characteristics that
they deem important for prospective foreign
workers or their employers to possess to receive
a temporary, provisional, or permanent visa. Dif-
ferent attributes are assigned a certain number of
points, and applicants who earn sufficient points
are eligible to apply for a visa. The points system
was first introduced in Canada in 1969 and has
since been adopted and adapted by several other
countries, including Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, Denmark, Austria, and Singapore.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_65-2
Points systems can take many different forms,
some of which have little in common with each
other. In the purest version of the points-based
immigration model, prospective immigrants
apply directly to the relevant government agency
and can qualify to migrate on the basis of their
personal and human capital characteristics alone.
As a result, points systems are often referred to as
“government-led” selection mechanisms,
because governments determine the selection
criteria. They are also known as “supply-driven”
selection systems because applications depend on
prospective immigrants’ decisions rather than on
employers’ demand for specific foreign workers.
Points systems are usually defined in contrast
with the more widespread “employer-led” sys-
tems, under which migrants qualify to receive
work visas only when they are sponsored by
prospective employers. In practice, points-based
and employer-led selection approaches are not
mutually exclusive, and several governments
have experimented with hybrid selection models
that combine elements of both systems
(Papademetriou et al. 2008). In particular, while
the term “points system” is often used to refer to a
system that admits immigrant workers without a
job offer, several recently introduced versions of
points systems either require or prioritize a job
offer in the application process.
Points systems were traditionally used to
admit immigrants on a permanent basis, although
more recent adopters such as Austria and Den-
mark have used them to admit workers on an
2 Points-Based Immigration
initially temporary basis, adjudicating permanent
residence applications a few years later. Austria
also uses a points system to determine eligibility
for job-search visas that allow prospective immi-
grants to come to the country to find work. More
unusually, some Chinese provinces and cities
have used points systems to award urban hukou
registration (a status which confers various social
benefits and rights) to internal, mostly rural,
migrants.
Commonly Used Criteria in Points
Systems
The most basic points system comprises a pass
mark and a list of points for various individual,
occupational, or employer characteristics. Points
are typically awarded for criteria that imply that
applicants have high levels of human capital or
that their skills are in high demand. The most
common attributes for which points are awarded
are language ability, education, age (i.e., youth),
and work experience, especially in occupations
considered to be in high demand. Less common
criteria include the intention to settle outside of
the major destination regions or cities, the pres-
ence of close relatives in the country, and the
education and work experience of an applicant’s
partner (these criteria are also less valued, earn-
ing considerably fewer points).
Points systems generally allocate points to
factors that are associated with (a) a positive
economic contribution (such as high levels of
human capital or specific occupational skills)
and (b) the ability to integrate successfully into
the receiving country’s labor market.
Most points systems award points for age,
with younger applicants generally receiving
higher scores. Age is valued for several reasons.
First, people who migrate at a younger age, on
average, integrate more seamlessly into the labor
market, are more likely to be able to learn the
local language, and have a longer time horizon in
which to invest in local human capital (such as
qualifications or in-work training). Second, youn-
ger migrants contribute more to resolving demo-
graphic imbalances, because they have a longer
working life ahead of them. Third, awarding
points for age may help to offset the disadvantage
that younger applicants otherwise face because
they have had less time to accumulate work
experience.
Education and relevant work experience
appear in almost all points systems. Applicants
can often earn additional points if their education
and experience were gained in the host country,
on the basis that local education and experience
are among the factors that best demonstrate
migrants’ ability to integrate. Local education is
valued because it is easily recognized by local
employers, reducing the barriers to employment
than foreign-trained professionals often face.
Local work experience is a signal that host-
country employers have “endorsed” an individ-
ual’s qualifications by choosing to employ them.
Language skills appear in all of the major
points systems and are considered one of the
most important predictors of an immigrant’s abil-
ity to find employment at their skill level. All
systems award points for proficiency in the
national language or languages, while some
non-English-speaking countries reward English
or other widely used second languages. Austria
rewards English language skills as well as as its
native German, for example, and applicants in
Denmark can earn points for Danish, Swedish,
Norwegian, German, or English.
Some points systems award points for specific
occupational skills considered to be in high
demand. New Zealand, for example, gives extra
points for applicants with qualifications, a job
offer, or work experience in one of a list of
occupations perceived to face a shortage of qual-
ified workers. In 2002, Canada stopped awarding
points for specific occupations because of con-
cerns that immigrants selected on this basis did
not fare well in the labor market; the revised
points test instead emphasized education and lan-
guage more strongly, and the data from the pro-
gram suggest that immigrants selected under the
new system have fared better in the labor market
(even if poor labor market outcomes from points-
tested migrants is still a major concern in Canada)
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). In
2011, Australia also stopped awarding points for
Points-Based Immigration
specific occupations; the new system required all
migrants coming under the national-level points
test to work in one of a narrower list of occupa-
tions, while pushing applicants in other occupa-
tions toward employer-sponsored visas.
Other points systems have used more unusual
criteria. In 2012, Australia introduced a new
“innovation points test” for migrants applying
under its business innovation and investment pro-
gram designed to attract investors and entrepre-
neurs. This test include several criteria that do not
usually appear in points systems. In addition to
age, language, and educational qualifications, it
gave points for years of business and investment
experience, financial assets that the individual
may be able to invest, the turnover of businesses
they own, and certain indicators of innovation
such as having registered patents or being
involved in joint ventures or export trade.
In China, some subnational jurisdictions use
points systems to award hukou registration to
residents from other areas within China; these
systems have rewarded criteria such as property
ownership, charitable giving, and blood donation
(Zhang 2012).
The Mechanics of Points Systems
Points systems can come in many forms, adapted
to a country’s policy objectives and circum-
stances. They generally provide significant flexi-
bility for determining eligibility – for example,
applicants might qualify if they have either very
high levels of education or substantial work expe-
rience in the host country and they might be able
to compensate for deficiencies in one area (such
as language ability) with higher achievement in
another (such as education). As a result, the
points system is essentially a way of organizing
information about the different ways in which
applicants can qualify for visas.
The criteria in points systems are not weighted
equally. Some characteristics earn their holders
more than others, and the emphasis that the var-
ious attributes receive varies widely by country.
In late 2012, for example, Denmark’s points test
valued academic credentials above all else, and
3
some prospective immigrants could earn suffi-
cient points for entry on the basis of their educa-
tion alone. Canada, by contrast, gives most
weight to having a job offer or sponsorship by a
Canadian province.
By way of example, Table 1 shows the points
allocations in Australia for prospective migrants
applying without an employer or regional-
government sponsor. Applicants can reach the
required 60 points in numerous ways. For exam-
ple, an individual between the ages of 25 and
32 who speaks excellent English will reach the
pass mark with relative ease by earning just
10 points in other areas (e.g., having a diploma
or trade qualification or higher). An older appli-
cant would need higher qualifications; for exam-
ple, a 42-year-old applicant (15 points) might
reach the pass mark with 10 years of work expe-
rience (20 points), a bachelor’s degree (15 points),
and proficiency in English (10 points).
Several points systems have compulsory
requirements in addition to optional ones. For
example, Australia and New Zealand require a
minimum threshold of English language ability,
while Denmark requires applicants to have at
least a bachelor’s degree. Australia also requires
applicants to have their credentials and skills
assessed and validated by the relevant assessing
agency in Australia before prospective candi-
dates apply for a visa.
Traditionally, points systems have made
applicants eligible for a visa if their points equal
or exceed the specified pass mark. However,
recently the ‘expression of interest’ model has
become more popular. Under this system, created
in New Zealand and later adopted in Australia
and Canada, applicants with more than a certain
number of points are instead admitted to a “pool,”
from which candidates are then invited by the
government (or, potentially, by employers or
regional governments); this system is designed
to give the government greater control over the
number of applicants that are eligible in a given
period and to select people from the pool who are
considered most skilled or most closely matched
to current labor market needs. The UK policy,
meanwhile, specifies that a points test should be
used to prioritize applications for employer-
4 Points-Based Immigration
Points-Based Immigration, Table 1 Points table for Australian skilled independent visa (subclass 189)
Category
Age
English language ability
Work experience in Australia
Work experience overseas
Education qualifications
From Australian institution or overseas qualification of
recognized standard
Other qualifications, including:
Study within Australia
Professional year in Australia
Skilled partner
Speaks community language
Studied in regional Australia
Pass mark
Source: Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012)
sponsored visas only in the event that the numer-
ical limit on these visas is oversubscribed this
happened for the first time in June 2015.
Since points systems are, at their core, a way
of presenting information about eligibility
criteria, almost any country’s immigration could
be organized into a points system without any
change to the underlying eligibility criteria.
A typical employer-led immigration system
could be presented as a points system in which
immigrants earn 100 % of the required points by
having an employer sponsor. The United King-
dom, for example, uses a points system to orga-
nize information about eligibility requirements in
what is – in all but name – a relatively traditional
employer-driven immigration system. Table 2
shows the points table for workers applying as
an employer-sponsored skilled worker (known in
the United Kingdom as “Tier 2 of the points-
based system”). Applicants must earn at least
70 points to qualify; the only way of earning
70 points is to meet all of the listed criteria.
This is not a points system as the term is typically
understood. It does not allow immigrants to apply
without an employer sponsor, applicants do not
earn points on the basis of their human-capital
characteristics such as age or education, and there
is no flexibility in how applicants can meet the
Maximum points Attribute for which maximum
awarded points are awarded
30 25–32 years old
20 Superior English
20 8–10 years
15 8–10 years
20 Doctorate degree
5 for each attribute
60
criteria. The United Kingdom previously oper-
ated a traditional points system that allocated
points for human-capital characteristics and
admitted immigrants without a job offer, but
this route was closed to new entrants in 2010.
Policy Rationale and Critiques of Points
Systems
Governments that rely on points systems have
done so for a number of reasons. First, the points
system allows governments to choose the charac-
teristics of selected immigrants. Points systems
that admit immigrants without a job offer have
largely been used as a mechanism to accumulate
human capital, bringing in workers with high
levels of qualifications who are thus expected to
contribute economically in the long run (even if
their integration is not always immediate). Points
systems may also have a demographic objective,
prioritizing applications from younger immi-
grants who have a full working (and tax-paying)
life ahead of them. Meanwhile, points systems
that require a job offer or employer sponsor are
often designed to ensure that the immigrants that
employers select have a minimum threshold of
human capital and thus (a) have the potential to
Points-Based Immigration
Points-Based Immigration, Table 2 Points awarded in the United Kingdom for employer-sponsored skilled workers
Attribute
Employer sponsorship
Job will pay appropriate salary
English language
Individual has GBP 945 to support self
Pass mark
Source: United Kingdom Borders Agency (2012)
“Appropriate salary” is defined in regulation according to the applicant’s occupation and experience level
integrate in the long run, even when no longer
working for their initial employer, and (b) are less
likely to compete for jobs with low-wage local
workers.
Second, points systems are transparent, since
the selection criteria can be easily published and
explained; this allows governments to demon-
strate to their publics that immigrants are selected
on merit and are bringing valuable human capital.
The major critique of the points-based selec-
tion model is that it has often been used to admit
immigrants without a job offer; there is thus no
guarantee that these individuals will find work at
their skill level. Employers routinely dedicate
very substantial resources to vetting prospective
hires through interviews and tailored assess-
ments, but points systems are by their nature
based on a relatively narrow set of criteria. Points
systems can only assess quantifiable skills and
credentials, and it is difficult for them to distin-
guish between qualifications of different quality
or value to local employers. Some countries have
attempted to address this problem by maintaining
lists of academic institutions from which points
for education can be claimed or awarding extra
points for degrees from top-ranked institutions.
Denmark, for example, awards bonus points if the
applicant’s university is among the top 400 world
universities, as ranked by the higher-education
consultant Quacquarelli Symonds.
Points systems are also ill equipped to identify
“soft” attributes that are rewarded in the labor
market, such as interpersonal skills or informal
on-the-job training. A research from Canada, in
particular, points to substantial un- and underem-
ployment among points-selected foreign
5
Points
30
20
10
10
70
workers – giving credence to the concern that
points systems often lead to “brain waste” and
do not identify workers with skills that local
employers value. A further criticism of points
systems is that they are slower than employer-
led systems to react to changing labor market
conditions (including business cycles) and that
they do not satisfy employers’ demand for spe-
cific workers to fill specific vacancies in real time.
In recent years, several countries have sought
to address these problems by relying less on
“pure” points systems that admit immigrants with-
out a job offer. Canada and Australia have scaled
back the share of immigrants admitted without a
job offer and encouraged greater use of employer-
sponsored visas. Hybrid selection systems that use
a points test but also require or prioritize a job
offer have also become increasingly popular.
Some systems, such as Canada’s and New
Zealand’s, offer high numbers of points for a job
offer, making it harder for people to qualify if they
do not already have employment lined up. The
points system in Austria is also a hybrid of
points-based and employer-led selection. Under
the Austrian system, most applicants must have a
job offer and pass a points test; applicants who
pass a slightly more stringent points test but do not
have a job offer can receive a 6-month job-search
visa which can be converted into a work permit if
they find skilled employment. Finally, some coun-
tries, including Australia and New Zealand, allow
workers initially selected by an employer to qual-
ify for permanent residence or a status indepen-
dent of their employer, by applying through the
points system; points tests that reward local work
experience naturally facilitate this transition.
6 Points-Based Immigration
References
Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship
(2012) Skilled independent (subclass 189) visa. Online
document. http://www.immi.gov.au/skills/skillselect/
index/visas/subclass-189/#australian-study-requirements.
Accessed 3 June 2016
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Evaluation of the
federal skilled worker program. http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/pdf/research-stats/FSW2010.pdf. Accessed
3 Dec 2012
Papademetriou D, Somerville W, Tanaka T (2008) Hybrid
immigrant-selection systems: the next generation of
economic migration schemes. Migration Policy Insti-
tute, Washington, DC, http://www.migrationpolicy.
org/transatlantic/HybridSystems.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec
2012
UK Visas and Immigration (2016) Tier 2 of the Points Based
System – Policy Guidance. https://www.gov.uk/gov
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/514054/Tier_2_Policy_Guidance_04_2016. Accessed
3 June 2016
Zhang (2012) Economic migration and urban citizenship
in China: the role of points systems. Popul Dev Rev
38(3):503–533
S
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity,
and Asylum
Rachel Lewis
Women and Gender Studies Program, George
Mason University, Fairfax, USA
Keywords
Sexuality; Gender; Asylum; Refugee law;
Human rights
Definition
The process of seeking asylum for persecution on
the basis of one’s sexual orientation or gender
identity; the challenges to political asylum claims
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Overview
Since the United Nations Refugee Agency
published its official guidelines on claims relating
to sexual orientation and gender identity in 2008,
there has been a growing interest in the treatment
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and inter-
sex refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2008).
While the European Union recently recognized
sexual orientation as a cause of persecution in
Article 10 of the EU Asylum Qualification
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_68-2
Directive, in December 2011, the United States
issued specific guidelines for the evaluation of
asylum claims based on sexual orientation and
gender identity (USCIS 2011). Despite recent
developments in political asylum policy, it is
still difficult for LGBT refugees to translate
their experiences of persecution into the kinds
of narratives that are recognizable to the state.
Like all asylum applicants, LGBT refugees
must prove both that they have a “well-founded
fear of persecution” and that they are members of
a particular social group (in this case, gay men,
lesbians, transgendered individuals, and so on).
The primary challenge to LGBT asylum claims
lies in the fact that the 1951 Refugee Convention
was designed to protect individuals from racial,
religious, or political persecution, and the cate-
gory “social group” included neither women nor
individuals persecuted for their sexual orienta-
tion. Although sexual orientation and gender
identity have been included in the category
“membership of a particular social group” since
the mid- to late 1990s, it is still the case that the
closer one’s application conforms to the tradi-
tional model of the male political activist fleeing
an oppressive regime, the more likely one is able
to obtain asylum (Bohmer and Shuman 2008).
While a number of countries – including the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech
Republic, and Australia – have recently rejected
the “discretion” argument (i.e., the notion that
LGBT asylum applicants can return to their coun-
try of origin and be “discreet” about their sexual
2 Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum
orientation or gender identity), a growing number
of LGBT asylum claims are now being refused on
the grounds that the applicant’s claimed sexual
orientation is disbelieved (Jansen and
Spijkerboer 2011; UKLGIG 2010). In assessing
the credibility of a political asylum applicant’s
claim, the immigration officials often rely on
stereotypical assumptions and expectations (i.e.,
that all lesbians and gay men engage in practices
of cross-gender identification, that they all form
part of a common social group with shared cul-
tural tastes and social spaces, and that they will
all “come out” as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or trans-
gendered immediately upon arrival in the receiv-
ing country). Unlike other refugee claimants,
who are not compelled to “perform” a visible
identity as part of political asylum hearings,
LGBT asylum applicants are frequently expected
to conform to Western models of sexual citizen-
ship grounded in visibility, consumption, and an
identity in the public sphere in order to be con-
sidered worthy candidates for asylum.
These sexual citizenship narratives, which are
based primarily on racialized sexual stereotypes
and behavioral white gay norms, pose particular
challenges to lesbian asylum applicants. In the
context of lesbian asylum cases, courts still
equate lack of documented evidence of human
rights abuses against lesbians in country of origin
reports with an absence of such persecution
(Minter 2000; NCLR 2006; UKLGIG 2010).
Moreover, courts will often disregard the interre-
lation of gender and sexual identity in narratives
of lesbian persecution. The privileging of credi-
bility assessment in women’s and LGBT’s asy-
lum claims means that lesbian asylum cases are
frequently evaluated on the basis of
heteronormative assumptions about lesbian sex-
uality. For example, lesbian asylum applicants
are regularly asked by judges to “explain the
nature of a sexual relationship between two
women” (Human Rights Watch 2010). As a
recent report examining asylum claims based on
sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe
has shown, bisexual and transgender identities
tend to be similarly misunderstood by asylum
adjudicators; while transgender and intersex indi-
viduals are commonly labeled as “medical
problems” by immigration officials, bisexuals
are deemed unworthy of protection because of
the notion that it is possible for them to return to
their country of origin and assume a heterosexual
orientation (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011). All of
these stereotypes reinforce the idea that sexual
orientation and gender identity can be strictly
ordered according to a set of categories within
which heterosexuality remains the norm.
In the future, there is a need for greater self-
awareness on the part of immigration officials
about the challenges to establishing credibility
in the context of asylum claims based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has
suggested that asylum adjudicators need to be
sensitive to the difficulties of proving sexual ori-
entation and focus instead on narratives that help
individuals to articulate their sexual histories
(UNHCR 2008). By showing asylum adjudica-
tors how to better understand the complexities of
refugee narratives, LGBT asylum cases could
represent an important site of reform for political
asylum policy in the twenty-first century.
Because claims based on sexual orientation and
gender identity are so far removed from the initial
refugee convention, they serve as an instructive
example for how the political asylum system
might better account for the experiences of
those subjects – namely, women, children, and
sexual minorities – to whom international human
rights discourses have traditionally been slow to
attend.
References
Bohmer C, Shuman A (2008) Rejecting refugees: political
asylum in the twenty-first century. Routledge, New
York
Human Rights Watch (2010) Fast-tracked unfairness:
detention and denial of women asylum seekers in the
UK. Resource document. http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf. Accessed
30 July 2012
Jansen S, Spijkerboer T (2011) Fleeing homophobia: asy-
lum claims related to sexual orientation and gender
identity in Europe. Resource document. http://www.
rechten.vu.nl/nl/Images/Fleeing%20Homophobia%
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Asylum 3

20report%20EN_tcm22-232205.pdf. Accessed United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

30 July 2012 (2011) Guidance for adjudicating lesbian, bisexual,
Minter S (2000) Lesbians and asylum: overcoming bar- gay, transgender, and intersex asylum claims.
riers to access. Resource document. http://www. Resource document. http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/Lesbian%20Issu Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/
esPacket.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2012 Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20and%20Static
National Center for Lesbian Rights (2006) The %20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf. Accessed
challenges to successful lesbian asylum claims. 30 July 2012
Resource document. http://www.nclrights.org/site/
DocServer/challenges_lesbian_asylum_cases.pdf?
Further Reading
docID=1142. Accessed 30 July 2012
Berg L, Millbank J (2009) Constructing the personal nar-
The UN Refugee Agency (2008) UNHCR guidance note
ratives of lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claimants.
on refugee claims relating to sexual orientation and
J Refug Stud 22(2):195–223
gender identity. Resource document. http://www.
Morgan D (2006) Not gay enough for the government:
unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf. Accessed
racial and sexual stereotypes in sexual orientation asy-
30 July 2012
lum cases. Law Sex Rev 15:135–161
UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (2010)
Randazzo T (2005) Social and legal barriers: sexual ori-
Failing the grade: home office initial decisions on
entation and asylum in the United States. In:
lesbian and gay claims for asylum. Resource docu-
Luibhéid E, Cantú L (eds) Queer migrations: sexuality,
ment. http://uklgig.org.uk/docs/publications/Failing%
U.S. citizenship, and border crossings. University of
20the%20Grade%20UKLGIG%20April%202010.pdf.
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 30–60
Accessed 27 Jan 2013
F
Fertility of Immigrants
Sylvie Dubuc
Department of Social Policy and Intervention,
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Definition
Fertility and immigration is a subject area of
demography and population studies, investigat-
ing how the fertility behavior of immigrants and
their descendents is influenced by the migration
process and the sending and resettlement
environments.
Detailed Description
Immigration affects the size and composition of
the population directly and indirectly, through
childbearing. Understanding the ways in which
resettlement and adaptation to the socioeconomic
and cultural context of the receiving country may
influence the fertility of immigrants and that of
their descendants is of interest to minority group
integration processes and of practical value for
ethnic population projections. Because fertility is
a major characteristic of immigrant
groups – reflecting on socioeconomic and cul-
tural norms – changes in childbearing behavior
can serve as indicators of assimilation and inte-
gration processes of immigrants and ethnic
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_69-1
minority groups. The fertility and immigration
subject area complements the field of sociology
concerned with social and cultural assimilation/
integration processes of minority groups. Today,
the field is mainly concerned with the adaptation
of fertility to the country of resettlement follow-
ing international migration, although some of the
concepts are derived from earlier work studying
fertility of internal migrants, notably rural–urban
migrants. Most of the work on fertility and immi-
gration has been conducted in developed Western
countries, where the fertility of immigrants and
that of their descendants increasingly shape
national ethnic compositions.
Many of the early studies on the fertility of
immigrants were conducted in Western countries
with long immigration histories, particularly the
USA, Australia, and Canada. Strong immigration
flows into Western European countries com-
menced during the economic recovery after
World War II and were often fuelled by migrants
from former colonies. The rather heterogenic ter-
minology used to describe the incorporation pro-
cess of new comers to the receiving society
probably reflects the absence of theoretical con-
sensus on the matter. While the general concept
of integration is widely but not exclusively used
in Europe, the somewhat differing notion of
assimilation prevails in the USA, mainly pivoting
on the assimilation theory (see Schneider and
Crul 2010 and references therein). Although crit-
icized, assimilation theory remains prevalent to
analyze the incorporation of immigrants (Barkan
2 Fertility of Immigrants

Fertility of Immigrants, Table 1 Theoretical framework to analyze fertility of immigrants

Disruption hypothesis
Interrelation with family
formation
Selectivity effects
Socialization hypothesis
Adaptation hypothesis
Socialization hypothesis
Assimilation and
intergenerational adaptation
Characteristics hypothesis
Subculture hypothesis
Segmented assimilation
hypothesis
Minority status hypothesis
Stress associated with migration resulting in temporary fertility disruption,
lowering fertility
Migration linked with union/family formation, fertility often especially high
following migration
Characteristics of migrants are different to that prevalent in their country of origin.
Family/childbearing aspirations are closer to the receiving country than the norms
in the sending country
Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices
Immigrant’s adaptation with duration of settlement to the fertility norms in the
receiving country
Influence of the context of socialization in influencing fertility choices
Intergenerational fertility adaptation toward the mainstream, pace of fertility
convergence depending on duration of settlement and socialization
Differences in fertility between immigrants and natives are due to unequal
socioeconomic characteristics
Prevalence of the norms and values in the sending country on fertility choices of
immigrants and their descendants
Impact of ethno-cultural dimension in the process of incorporation, groups may
assimilate to various socioeconomic strata of the society
In response to minority status penalty, individuals/families have fewer children in
order to facilitate upward social mobility

2007; Alba and Nee 2003) and is applied to
understand fertility of immigrants’ children in
the USA (e.g., Bean et al. 2000; Parrado and
Morgan 2008), although assimilation is increas-
ingly understood in a broader sense, compared to
its initial conceptualization.
The more recent emergence of conflicting and
complementary hypotheses to explain fertility of
immigrant groups in Western countries (Table 1)
probably reflects on their heterogeneity and our
increasingly detailed understanding of the under-
lying factors influencing fertility of immigrants.
Early Work
Although the link between fertility and interna-
tional migration has received much attention,
earlier work on rural–urban migration has
nourished our understanding on how newcomers
adapt to the environment of resettlement. Park’s
first conceptualization of assimilation of new-
comers was based on the socioeconomic adapta-
tion of internal migrants to urban Chicago. The
socialization hypothesis applied to fertility
behavior – whereby the values and norms at the
childhood place of residence largely influence
later reproductive behavior – was supported by
the fertility behavior of first-generation migrants
in industrialized countries (e.g., Duncan 1965).
The socialization hypothesis and Gordon’s sem-
inal work (1964) on the influence of the cultural
and socioeconomic environment at destination
underpinned the linear assimilation theory.
Applied to fertility, the linear assimilation theory
assumes that immigrants are influenced by repro-
ductive norms and values in their place of origin
and childhood environment (Goldstein and Gold-
stein 1983) and the fertility of immigrants at
destination would be weighted by the duration
of stay in each place, resulting in ethnic fertility
differentials. The fertility adaptation to the desti-
nation country would occur over time and partic-
ularly from generation to generation (Goldstein
and Goldstein 1983; Stephen and Bean 1992).
Immigrants’ children are therefore expected to
show a fertility pattern closer to the local norm
(i.e., traditionally white mainstream levels) than
the one of their immigrant parents and that of the
new comers from the same region of origin,
Fertility of Immigrants
Fertility of Immigrants,
Fig. 1 Prior and
postmigration ASFRs of
immigrant women in the
Births per 1,000 women
UK (Source: Dubuc (2012))
assuming a constant selectivity effect of migra-
tion over time. According to Gordon (1964),
immigrants’ social and economic adjustment to
the receiving country would follow their cultural
assimilation. Therefore, socioeconomic assimila-
tion to the general profile of the society of settle-
ment would result in full fertility convergence
(Bean and Marcum 1978).
Influence of the Migration Process
on Fertility
Major sources of criticism of the traditional linear
assimilation theory include the association
between structural (social and socioeconomic)
assimilation and acculturation and the view of
assimilation as a linear process. Deviation from
the expectation of the linear assimilation theory
with respect to fertility has led many contempo-
rary analysts of immigrants’ fertility to mobilize
a number of concurrent and/or complementary
hypotheses (e.g., Milewski 2010). These include
hypotheses related to the migration process
per se.
The disruption hypothesis postulates that
prolonged partner separation and stress associ-
ated with the migration process would disrupt
childbearing postmigration. The depressed fertil-
ity of some immigrant groups shortly after immi-
gration to Canada (Ram and George 1990), the
USA (Stephen and Bean 1992), and Australia
(Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000) support
3
250
200
Prior women's
150 migration
Post migration
100
Total immigrant
women
50
0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
5 years age group of women
the disruption hypothesis, although lower fertility
after migration may be temporary. A “catch up”
effect a few years after resettlement was observed
in some studies.
Many studies, notably in Europe, found a
higher parity progression of immigrants com-
pared to that of nonmigrants shortly after arrival.
For instance, in France, a peak of fertility within
3 years following migration was observed
(Toulemon 2004). The interrelation of migration
and union/family building is likely to increase
fertility following migration. The high
postmigration fertility is often thought to fully
compensate for especially low premigration
levels, presumably due to earlier childbearing
postponement in the country of origin.
Low premigration fertility and high
postmigration levels were evidenced for immi-
grants in France (Toulemon 2004), the USA
(Parrado 2011), and the UK (Dubuc 2012,
Fig. 1). For instance, Emilio Parrado (2011)
found that the apparent high fertility of Hispanic
immigrants in the USA recorded in previous stud-
ies was the result of postmigration fertility mea-
surements, whereas the total fertility was
significantly lower when premigration fertility
history of immigrant women was taken into
account. These differences called into question
the use of standard period total fertility rates
(period TFRs) that are based solely on birth reg-
istration data in the receiving country to approx-
imate the average number of children of
immigrants. For instance, in France, the period
4 Fertility of Immigrants
TFR of immigrants based on vital statistics was
0.86 higher than the TFR of the French native
(1.86) over the period 1991–1998. Over half of
this difference was shown to be attributable to
period TFR calculations compared with calcula-
tions including the premigration fertility history
(Toulemon 2004).
The selectivity or selection hypothesis postu-
lates that migrants are a select group with specific
sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., age, fam-
ily/marital status, education, employment, and
inspirational model) influencing family forma-
tion and reproductive choices. Therefore, fertility
of immigrants may be closer to those at destina-
tion than the fertility norms in their place of
origin (e.g., Sobotka 2008). Although the selec-
tivity hypothesis is often considered in studies of
fertility and immigration, its validity has rarely
been tested. Immigrants from high-fertility coun-
tries tend to exhibit fertility levels lower than
those in their country of origin (e.g., Abbassi
Chavazi and Mc Donald 2000). Potentially, this
may be an effect of selectivity, as it has been
suggested of Indian immigrants in Australia and
the UK. However, other factors may apply,
including the disruption effect and/or the influ-
ence of the host country.
Settlement of Immigrants in the Host
Society
Other hypotheses relate to the influence of the
context in which immigrants are living. The influ-
ence of the immigrant background and that of the
receiving country’s environment in determining
fertility remain a matter of debate.
Immigrants tend to exhibit fertility levels
between those in the sending country and those
at destination. The difference between immi-
grants’ and natives’ fertility may fluctuate over
time linked to fertility dynamics either in the
sending or receiving country. For instance, fertil-
ity of immigrants from Hispanic countries to the
USA was stable during the baby boom years
when US natives’ fertility was rising, resulting
in a narrowing of the fertility gap (Parrado and
Morgan 2008). In contrast, in the 1970s and
1980s, fertility decreased more rapidly among
non-Hispanic White natives than among His-
panic immigrants, contributing to widen the gap
(Bean and Tienda 1987; Kahn 1994). The
decrease in fertility of Hispanic immigrants in
recent years is consistent with and is reflective
of the fertility transition in their sending country
(Parrado 2011).
The socialization hypothesis emphasizes the
role of the main place/environment of socializa-
tion in shaping norms and consequently repro-
ductive choices. According to the socialization
hypothesis, the main place of childhood largely
shapes the fertility of women. Evidence in sup-
port has been provided by studies showing that
the women’s age at immigration largely influ-
ences fertility behavior (e.g., Andersson 2004;
Toulemon 2004).
The adaptation hypothesis focuses on the role
of the duration of settlement of new comers in
converging fertility across immigrant groups
toward the local norm – generally estimated by
the average fertility at destination, potentially as
a result of an adjustment to the new institutional,
economic, cultural, and political context (e.g.,
Hervitz 1985). The adaptation hypothesis is
supported by a number of studies, showing a
convergence of immigrants’ fertility to the local
norms or childbearing behaviour depending on
the duration of residence in the receiving country
(e.g., Ford 1990; Kahn 1994; Sobotka 2008).
In accordance with the socialization hypothe-
sis, immigrants who arrived in their early child-
hood (the so-called 1.5 generation) show stronger
signs of adaptation to the receiving country’s
childbearing prosil. For example, Lebanese who
migrated to Australia in their childhood show
considerably lower fertility than other migrants
from Lebanon and similar to that of the second
generation (Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald
2000).
Intergenerational Adaptation Processes
The descendents of immigrants are mostly
nationals of their resident country. These are
commonly referred to as second, third, and
Fertility of Immigrants
successive generations the and may further be
distinguished by ethnic or racial categories
when these differ from the majority white popu-
lation of Western countries. Recalling and
extending the socialization hypothesis, the fertil-
ity of the second and successive generations has
been generally assumed to converge toward that
of the majority ethnic group. This assumption
was supported by the rapid converging fertility
of the descendants of earlier European immigrant
waves to the USA (Morgan et al. 1994). In
Europe, the converging fertility trends of descen-
dants of immigrants from high-fertility countries
further support ongoing intergenerational inte-
gration. Nonetheless, persisting fertility differen-
tials over generations of some ethnic minority
groups may suggest some ethnic-specific fertility
distinctiveness.
Early critique of the linear assimilation theory
was based on the intergenerational fall in fertility
of the Jews and some segments (middle and upper
class) of Black and Japanese Americans in the
USA, below the level of White Americans of
similar socioeconomic position. In response to
the divergence from the expected
intergenerational fertility convergence,
Goldscheider and Uhlenberg (1969) proposed
the minority status hypothesis. Due to perceived
minority status penalty, and in the absence of
pro-natal norms, individuals/families would
have fewer children in order to facilitate upward
social mobility, potentially until full assimilation
is completed. Further evidence of this effect was
found among relatively high-fertility minority
groups in the USA like Black Americans
(Ritchey 1975) and the Chicanos (Lopez and
Sabagh 1978). The effect of the minority status
on childbearing choices may apply independently
of cultural and structural factors influencing
fertility.
Intergenerational adaptive fertility behavior
should accompany sociodemographic change
(like age composition, marital status, age at mar-
riage, education, and social class) of the second
generation, assuming no strong inherited cultural
distinctiveness. Adaptation of fertility behavior
would involve changes in family norms and
values, for instance, from traditional
5
(presumably with large family) to more modern
(small nuclear family) attitudes to fertility. Per-
sistence of differences in fertility between ethnic
groups would reflect differences in
sociodemographic and/or economic characteris-
tics of their members over generations, according
to the characteristic hypothesis. The role of
female education in shaping fertility patterns
and differences between immigrant groups and
natives appears particularly significant and
inversely related (e.g., Bean and Tienda 1987).
Some authors tend to distinguish the social char-
acteristic hypothesis from the economic hypoth-
esis, derived from the economics of the family and
particularly the “opportunity-cost” of rearing
children.
In contrast, the subculture hypothesis assumes
the dominance of parental and ethnic community
values in the socialization process of the second
generation and the maintenance of community or
ethnic-specific cultural and family norms
(independently of socioeconomic factors),
influencing fertility behavior across generations,
shaping ethnic minorities. For instance,
pronatalist values promoted by traditional fami-
lism in Hispanic countries have been proposed to
explain some of the maintenance of high fertility
among Hispanic immigrants and their children in
the USA, which are not fully explained by their
social characteristics (Bean and Tienda 1987).
The causal link formulated at the origin of the
linear assimilation theory between cultural and
structural integration/assimilation processes and
later the co-occurrence between these dimensions
have been repeatedly contested. The more recent
segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou
1993) proposes alternative combinations
between these two dimensions of assimilation
and an attempt to integrate some of the multicul-
turalist and structuralist views. The segmented
assimilation theory, whereby various groups
may assimilate to various socioeconomic strata
of the society (i.e., mainstream, upward, and
downward paths), includes an ethno-cultural
dimension to the process of incorporation of
immigrants and their children into the society of
settlement. The segmented assimilation proposi-
tion has hitherto mainly focused on social
6 Fertility of Immigrants

Fertility of Immigrants, Table 2 Children ever born (CEB) to women of Mexican origin: immigrant and two
successive generations in the USA
CEB Birth cohort Period of completed fertility
In Mexico 6.5 1910–1914 1950–1954
Immigrant generation 4.3 1910–1914 1950–1954
Second generation 3.5 1935–1939 1975–1979
Third generation 2.4 1960–1964 2000–2004
Non-Hispanic White 2.0 1960–1964 2000–2004
Sources: Drawn from Parrado and Morgan (2008), Tables 2 and 3

mobility, education, and socioeconomic achieve- the national levels has been evidenced for immi-
ment but is increasingly considered in immi- grants from high-fertility countries in the UK
grants’ fertility studies. Emerging research (Dubuc 2012), in the Netherlands (Garssen and
analyzing fertility behavior of immigrants’ chil- Nicolaas 2008), and Germany (Milewski 2010).
dren converging toward the national average in In Australia, Abbasi-Shavazi and Mc Donald
the USA remains inconclusive. A number of stud- (2000) found that adaptation of immigrants to
ies comparing fertility of Hispanic Americans by the local fertility pattern was the norm, although
immigration status (i.e., immigrant, second, and with some signs of cultural persistence over the
third and successive generations) found a rela- second generation of Italian and Greek ancestry.
tively high total fertility of third and successive
generations often above levels recorded for the
second generation (e.g., Carter 2000; Bean
The Contribution of Immigrants
et al. 2000). The apparent persistence of high-
to Fertility Replacement in Receiving
fertility levels of Hispanic Americans across gen-
Countries
erations is inconsistent with the expectation of
the linear assimilation theory and has been
Immigrants from high-fertility countries tend to
interpreted as indicative of downward social
dominate international migration movements
mobility and racial stratification (Frank and
contributing to a rise in overall fertility in receiv-
Heuveline 2005). However, more recent findings
ing countries with below-replacement fertility. In
on fertility of successive cohorts of immigrants
Europe, the contribution of higher fertility of
and subsequent generations of Hispanic Ameri-
migrants to the total fertility of receiving coun-
cans may suggest otherwise (Parrado and Morgan
tries remains relatively small (Sobotka 2008).
2008). Comparing completed number of children
Immigration and fertility of both Hispanic and
over the parent immigrant generation in the early
non-Hispanic immigrants, particularly Asians,
twentieth century and successive second and
have fuelled the recent population growth of the
third generations of Hispanic background, Emilio
USA. However, their expected contribution to
Parrado and Philip Morgan found evidence for a
radical changes in the demographic and ethno-
continued intergenerational decrease in fertility
racial composition of the USA may well be
and convergence toward the native childbearing
overestimated according to a recent study of
behaviour (Table 2). Changes in fertility of His-
cohort fertility of Hispanic immigrants (Parrado
panic American generations also follow the same
2011). The global fertility transition over the past
general trends as the US mainstream, providing
decades, showing rapidly decreasing fertility in
arguments for the impact of the US context in
many developing countries, is likely to influence
influencing fertility of immigrants’ descendants.
the fertility differential between sending and
Similarly, an ongoing process of
receiving countries in the future.
intergenerational fertility convergence toward
Fertility of Immigrants
Glossary
Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) Refers to
the number of live births to females in a par-
ticular age category in a particular year com-
pared to the number of females in that age
category. Most commonly 1 and 5 years age
categories are used.
Children ever born (CEB) CEB to women in a
particular age group is the mean number of
children born alive to women in that age
group. The number of children ever born to a
particular woman is a measure of her lifetime
fertility experience up to the moment at which
the data are collected.
Cohort fertility A cohort is a group of women
born in the same year. Cohort completed fer-
tility rates (CFR) may be used to compare
fertility of successive generations of women
who have completed their fertility life.
Total period fertility rate (TFR) Is the aver-
age number of children that women would
have if they experienced the ASFRs for a
particular year throughout their childbearing
lives (typically between 15 and 44/49 years
old).
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D
Dual/Multiple Citizenship
Sara Wallace Goodman
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Definition
Dual/multiple citizenship enables a person to
hold full membership – conveying rights, access,
and obligations – in two or more countries.
A person may have a claim to dual citizenship
by any number of circumstances: they may inher-
ent citizenship from one or more parents, they
may obtain citizenship through jus soli (birth in a
territory, e.g., the United States recognizes all
persons born in the country as citizens regardless
of parental status), they may gain eligibility
through ancestral claims (Israel, e.g., allows any
Jewish immigrant to claim citizenship without
renouncing other nationalities), they may gain a
new citizenship through the process of naturali-
zation, or they may acquire it through other
means (e.g., through marriage).
Detailed Description
Dual citizenship is often at the center of vigorous
political debate, both internally among political
parties and across borders between the conferring
and sending states. On the one hand, allowing
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_76-2
citizens to hold multiple passports provides
increased mobility and enables expatriates to
maintain connections with their country of birth
or heritage. Dual citizenship can also facilitate
integration by encouraging immigrants to natu-
ralize and participate politically in their new
country without compromising other connec-
tions. According to this view, compulsory renun-
ciation of prior citizenship(s) may not only
stymie migrants’ personal integration but also
generate a disincentive to citizenship acquisition
altogether. On the other hand, critics of dual
citizenship claim that it undercuts immigrant
integration and that, in maintaining a second cit-
izenship or identity, immigrants are never fully
moored to their country of residence. Dual citi-
zenship raises not only the specter of dual – and
potentially divided – loyalty but it is also believed
to create conflicts between states regarding an
imbalanced distribution of the benefits and bur-
dens of citizenship, as dual citizens could enjoy
multiple rights and benefits (such as social bene-
fits) or face multiple duties (such as military
service) compared to mono-nationals. States
also may take different positions on whether to
allow dual citizenship for an immigrant natural-
izing into the host society (as is the focus of this
entry) compared to whether they allow expatriate
citizens to maintain citizenship if they naturalize
elsewhere. Politics are even further amplified
when considering the implications not merely of
dual nationality but multiple citizenships.
2 Dual/Multiple Citizenship

Dual citizenship is widely accepted across Estonia Greece

many advanced democracies. Indeed, there has Germanya Hungary
been a recent wave of change in the past couple of Latvia Ireland
decades whereby more and more European states Lithuania Italy (1992)
have begun to adopt dual citizenship laws for Netherlandsb Luxembourg (2008)
immigrants (Faist 2007; Sejersen 2008). Italy Polandc Malta
abolished a requirement that immigrants natural- Sloveniad Portugal
izing as Italians renounce a previous citizenship Spaine Romania
in 1992, and other countries that have recently Slovakia
removed renunciation requirements include Sweden (2001)
Sweden (2001), Finland (2003), and, most United Kingdom
recently, Luxembourg (2008). These states join Non-EU
other Western European countries as well as the Croatia Iceland
postcolonial traditional countries of immigration Moldova (2002) Switzerland
Norway Turkey
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
States (While the United States maintains allow- a
Not for citizens of other EU member states (since 2007)
ance for multiple citizenship de facto, naturaliz- b
Not between 1992 and 1997. After 1997, exemption for
ing citizens formally swear to “absolutely and persons born in the Netherlands and for spouses of Dutch
entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and citizens
c
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or In practice, renunciation is requested discretionarily and
performed in low numbers
sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore d
Not for citizens of other EU member states where there is
been a subject or citizen” during the Naturaliza- reciprocity
e
tion Oath of Allegiance.)), which all tolerate dual In practice, no evidence of renunciation is required
citizenship. The following table identifies these
states in the right-hand column as states that do This table also illustrates two additional pat-
not require renunciation as a condition for natu- terns of interest. First, there remain a number of
ralization. (For a full discussion and where this significant holdouts to the liberalizing trend of
table originally appears, see Goodman 2010.) tolerating multiple citizenships. Austria and Den-
This table pertains to the rules of dual citizenship mark, as well as a majority of recent European
for naturalizing immigrants; policies for native- Union accession countries, have firm require-
born citizens who naturalize abroad may differ. ments for renunciation. In the Netherlands, after
a period of allowing dual citizenship
(1992–1997), dual citizenship can now only be
Renunciation of Prior Citizenship
claimed by those applicants born in the Nether-
as a Requirement for Naturalization
lands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens.
Renunciation requirement The second trend this table indicates is that
Yes No while a number of states maintain a renunciation
Postcolonial requirement de jure, practices produce a de facto
Australia toleration of multiple citizenships. The many
Canada asterisks that appear next to country names in
New Zealand the left-hand column indicate some of these
United States exceptions to the rule. Effective enforcement of
European union renunciation exists in countries like Austria, the
Austria Belgium Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany
Bulgaria Cyprus (with the exception of citizens of other EU mem-
Czech Republic Finland (2003) ber states), and the Netherlands (except for per-
Denmark France
sons born in the Netherlands and spouses of
(continued)
Dutch citizens). In Spain, however, while persons
Dual/Multiple Citizenship
granted citizenship need to declare renunciation
of a prior citizenship, they do not need to deliver
any proof that they have actually lost another
citizenship, and no request for information or
for evidence is sent to the country of the presump-
tively renounced citizenship. In Poland, persons
granted citizenship are formally required to
renounce a previous citizenship, but this is
applied in a discretionary manner and, as a result,
a high percentage of persons become dual citi-
zens through naturalization. There are also
exceptions practiced when renunciation is
deemed unreasonable. The extent to which
exceptions are granted in countries like Austria,
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, for
example, is based on the fee that candidates
need to pay in their country of origin to be
released from their previous citizenship, which
varies from country to country. As a rule, renun-
ciation is normally not required when this is not
possible (as is the case, e.g., for citizens from
most Arab countries). Also, for reasons of prac-
tical impossibility or unreasonable burdens, a
number of countries make explicit exceptions to
the renunciation requirement for refugees.
Why do some states allow for dual citizenship
while others do not? In some cases, countries
have different historical interpretations of citi-
zenship, which have led to particular bureaucratic
practices and political debates in a path-
dependent way (Faist et al. 2004; Howard
2009). Greece, Italy, and Hungary are often
seen as more restrictive countries of immigration,
but they have relatively liberal dual citizenship
practices because they are historic nations of
emigration. Sometimes the politics of dual citi-
zenship hinges on the composition and political
strength of immigrant populations within the
country or co-ethnic communities living abroad.
Thus, in the cases of Hungary, Greece, and Italy,
dual citizenship is a strategy for keeping expatri-
ates and co-ethnics living abroad connected to
homeland identity. Spain is an exception to this
rule, but allows for an easier, facilitated natural-
ization among co-ethnics from Spanish-speaking
countries. Other countries that tolerate dual
3
citizenship do so as an instrument for promoting
immigrant integration within traditionally inclu-
sive conceptions of citizenship, such as in Bel-
gium, France, and the United Kingdom.
Beyond the question of whether or not states
allow for immigrants to obtain dual citizenship, a
second question is whether immigrants decide to
take up multiple citizenships. Laws might make
or allow people to hold multiple citizenships due
to birth, heritage, marriage, or naturalization, but
not everyone knows that they have the legal abil-
ity to hold dual citizenship or identify unique
incentives for seeking out multiple passports.
A study of naturalized immigrants in Canada in
the 1990s Bloemraad (2004) showed that while
reports of dual citizenship had tripled from 1981
to 1996, only 17 % reported multiple nationality
(Bloemraad 2004). Immigrants born in countries
that allowed multiple citizenship and who were
naturalized Canadian citizens were, in the eyes of
the law, dual citizens, but in every case but Swit-
zerland, less than half of immigrants acknowl-
edged their dual citizenship status.
This brief overview of dual citizenship poli-
cies reveals patterns of both convergence toward
toleration and continued divergence with regard
to requiring renunciation of prior citizenship by a
certain group or by all outsiders. Though many
states that require renunciation by law do not
adhere to this stricture, a number of European
states continue to limit dual citizenship. The
salience of the politics of dual citizenship only
reaffirms the continued relevance of political
belonging and national membership through cit-
izenship in an age of migration, mobility, and
diversity.
References
Bloemraad I (2004) Who claims dual citizenship?
The limits of postnationalism, the possibilities of
transnationalism, and the persistence of traditional
citizenship. Int Migr Rev: IMR 38(2):389
Faist T (2007) Dual citizenship in Europe: from nation-
hood to societal integration. Ashgate, Burlington
Faist T, Gerdes J, Rieple B (2004) Dual citizenship as a
path-dependent process. Int Migr Rev 38(3):913–944
4 Dual/Multiple Citizenship

Goodman SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe:
exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion. In:
EUDO citizenship comparative reports. Florence:
EUDO Citizenship, Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies, EUI
Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Sejersen TB (2008) “I Vow to Thee My Countries” – the
expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century. Int
Migr Rev 42(3):523–549
I
Indirect Methods for Estimating
Internal Migration
Richelle Winkler1 and Katherine J. Curtis2
1
Department of Social Sciences, Michigan
Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA
2
University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Synonyms
Cohort forward survival methods; Residual
methods
Definition
Indirect methods are a set of techniques used to
estimate net migration and net migration rates
based on population counts and other character-
istics (i.e., vital statistics, life tables) at two suc-
cessive time periods. The methods do not require
administrative data collection of individuals’
moves or specific survey or census questions
about migration. They are applied to geographic
units (e.g., counties, states) and can be calculated
for subpopulations (e.g., age, sex, race,
ethnicity).
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_83-1
Detailed Description
Indirect methods estimate net migration based on
the principles of the demographic balancing
equation, which explains that a population in a
given geography changes through births, deaths,
and migration. Population change between two
time periods for any geographic area is the com-
bined result of natural increase (births minus
deaths) and net migration (in-migration minus
out-migration). The demographic balancing
equation can be rearranged to calculate net
migration, shown below, whereby P0 is the pop-
ulation in a geography at time zero, P1 is the
population at a future time, B is the number of
births in that geography between the two time
points, and D is the number of deaths:
Net MigrationðNMÞ ¼ ðP1  P0 Þ  ðB  DÞ
Because population counts are generally known
from censuses and natural increase is generally
known from vital statistics (or can be estimated
using survival ratios), net migration is indirectly
estimated as the residual of this equation. For this
reason, indirect methods are sometimes referred
to as residual methods. Residual methods can be
applied to generate migration estimates by
unchanging demographic characteristics includ-
ing age, sex, race, and/or ethnicity.
The basic strategy is to start with a beginning
population at a particular age (i) at time zero,
advance the population forward in time t years
2 Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration
so age is i + t at time t, and adjust the population
for natural increase that occurs over the time
period (t) to generate an “expected” population
at time t had there been no net migration. The
estimate of the number of net migrants is the
observed population at time t (based on the suc-
cessive census) minus the expected population.
This estimate is divided by the expected popula-
tion to construct a net migration rate.
Net migration captures the balance of
in-migration and out-migration in a geographic
area over the intercensal time period. It cannot
measure inflows, outflows, gross migration (total
sum of migrants), or migration streams from one
location to another. Thus, indirect methods cap-
ture migration’s contribution to population redis-
tribution, not individual migration experiences.
Residual methods can be based on vital statis-
tics or survival ratios. Vital statistics methods
directly incorporate data on births and deaths to
inform the demographic balancing equation. This
approach provides “theoretically exact” esti-
mates of net migration (Siegel and Hamilton
1952) since each of the data points is a count of
the population or demographic events. Typically,
it combines internal and international migration
unless specific assumptions are introduced to
subtract international migration. While concep-
tually simple, vital statistics approaches require
more data points than other indirect methods and
the amount of data that must be collected and
organized can be overwhelming, particularly
when generating estimates of demographic char-
acteristics (e.g., age) for multiple small geogra-
phies. This approach is only feasible for
geographies with reasonably complete vital reg-
istration systems and censuses. The greatest con-
cerns associated with vital statistics methods
center on errors in census or vital statistics data,
including misallocations, undercounts/over-
counts, and missing data. Moderate errors in cen-
sus counts produce large errors in net migration
estimates, although errors may be offsetting.
Survival ratio methods estimate the natural
increase portion of the demographic balancing
equation using either life tables or census survival
ratios. These methods provide reasonable esti-
mates of net migration, not exact measures. Life
table methods use established life tables to esti-
mate natural increase for component geogra-
phies. This practice becomes problematic when
appropriate life tables are not available for all
geographies of interest. For instance, national
life tables may not accurately represent mortality
in each component geography of a country. Cen-
tral challenges with this approach are the poten-
tial misrepresentation of mortality for constituent
geographies, the inability to account separately
for international migration without introducing
specific measures, and the effects of census cov-
erage and reporting errors.
Census survival ratio methods estimate popu-
lation “survival” by comparing the ratio of the
number of people in the same national cohort at
successive censuses. An example is to compare
the number of people in the USA who are aged
20–24 in Census 2000 to the number of people in
the USA who are aged 30–34 in Census 2010.
This ratio captures mortality and the relative dif-
ference between census coverage and reporting
errors in the two censuses. National data must be
used since the goal is to create a survival ratio
reflecting mortality, not migration. The census
survival ratio approach is preferred for its few
data requirements and generally works well in
circumstances with incomplete data (McInnis
1974). However, the assumption that survival
ratios, census coverage errors, and international
migration for component geographies are the
same as the nation can be problematic, particu-
larly in circumstances with high mortality and
geographic variability.
Important limitations to all indirect
approaches are that only net migration is avail-
able, with no counts for gross flows or streams;
time periods must be defined for intercensal
periods to generate highly accurate estimates;
and it is not possible to estimate migration for
characteristics that change in unpredictable ways
over time (i.e., educational levels, marital status,
or income). Potential complications common to
each of the residual approaches include census
misallocations and undercounts/overcounts,
changes in census geographies, errors in vital
statistics or life table data, inability to separately
account for international migration, and a lack of
Indirect Methods for Estimating Internal Migration
options for countries or geographies without
quality mortality data.
Application
Indirect methods have been used by government
statistical agencies and researchers to estimate
net migration at least since the early 1900s and
continue to be popular methods around the world
because of the limited data collection required,
high level of accuracy, applicability for small
geographic areas, and low cost. Especially in
the context of wide availability and highly accu-
rate digital census and vital statistics data, vital
statistics approaches provide cost-effective and
robust estimates of net migration. In the USA,
for instance, a set of county-level net migration
estimates by age, sex, and race has been produced
each decade from 1950 to 2010 by university- and
agency-based demographers with support from
federal agencies. They are publically available
through the Inter-university Consortium for
Social and Political Research (ICPSR) and online
at www.netmigration.wisc.edu.
The data are used by applied demographers in
generating small area population estimates and
projections, by planners for understanding com-
munity change, and by academics for ecological
analyses of age- and race-specific migration pat-
terns. The authors rely on the US county-level net
migration estimates by age, race, and ethnicity in
1950–2010 in their own research. Winkler
employs the data to understand the growing pull
of environmental amenities for attracting
migrants to specific places at different points in
the life course. Curtis uses these data to investi-
gate racial patterns of return migration to the US
South, and she is currently relying on them to
understand how natural disasters and climate
change interact with age- and race-specific
migration patterns to shift population composi-
tion in affected areas.
3
Cross-References
▶ Demographic Balancing Equation
▶ Inflows
▶ Migration Streams
▶ Net Migration
▶ Outflows
References
McInnis RM (1974) Census survival ratio estimates of net
migration for Canadian regions. Can Stud Popul
1:93–116
Siegel JS, Hamilton CH (1952) Some considerations in the
use of the residual method of estimating net migration.
J Am Stat Assoc 47(259):475–500
Further Reading
Hamilton CH (1967) The vital statistics method of esti-
mating net migration by age cohorts. Demography
4(21):464–478
Morrison PA, Bryan TM, Swanson DA (2004) Chapter 19:
Internal migration and short-distance mobility.
In: Swanson DA, Siegel JS (eds) The methods and
materials of demography, 2nd ed. Elsevier Academic
Publishing out of San Diego, CA, pp 503–508 on
“Residual Estimates”
Smith SK, Swanson DA (1998) In defense of the net
migrant. J Econ Soc Meas 24(3–4):249–264
Thomas DS, Arias J, Bachi R, Eldridge HT, Elizaga JC,
Kono S, Macura M, Shryock HS, van den Brink T,
Zachariah KC (1970) United Nations. Chapter 2: Indi-
rect measures of net internal migration. In: United
Nations manual VI, methods of measuring internal
migration. United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.
70.XIII.3
Voss PR, McNiven S, Hammer RB, Johnson KM, Fuguitt
GV (2004) County-specific net migration by five-year
age groups, Hispanic origin, race and sex 1990–2000,
CDE Working Paper no 2004–24. Center for Demog-
raphy and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison
Winkler RL, Johnson KM, Cheng C, Beaudoin JM, Voss
PR, and KJ Curtis (2013) Age-specific net migration
estimates for US counties, 1950–2010. Applied Popu-
lation Laboratory, University of Wisconsin- Madison.
Web. Accessed 9/29/2015. www.netmigration.wisc.
edu
D
Dual-System Estimation
Patrick J. Cantwell
U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA
Definition
Dual-system estimation is a statistical method,
based on the capture-recapture technique, applied
to estimate the size of a population of people,
animals, farms, etc. One enumerates the units of
interest independently in two separate frames and
observes how many are found in each frame and
in both frames. Under appropriate conditions, an
estimate of the number missed – and thus an
estimate of the size of the total population – can
be calculated.
Concept and Use
Dual-system estimation (DSE) is a statistical pro-
cedure used to estimate the size of a population. It
is based on an approach, often referred to as
“capture-recapture” or “mark and recapture,”
long used to measure the number of wildlife in a
region or setting (Petersen 1896; Lincoln 1930;
Sekar and Deming 1949). In recent decades, DSE
has been one of several methods applied to eval-
uate the quality of a national census by estimating
the actual number of people in a country
(demographic analysis is another; see Devine
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_84-1
et al. 2012). The name refers to the two frames
or populations from which all or a sample of units
(people, wildlife, farms) are selected for
enumeration.
Under specified conditions and assumptions,
by comparing the enumerations between frames
and noting whether the units were captured in
both enumerations, one can estimate the size of
the total population. The net coverage error of the
census can then be defined as the difference
between the estimated population size and the
census count. If the census count is smaller than
the estimated size, the difference is labeled as the
estimated net undercount in the census. With a
net overcount, the census count is larger than the
estimated size.
As noted, one can apply DSE to estimate the
size of the total population. However, one of its
strengths is that it can also be used to estimate the
size of demographic subgroups or geographic
subdomains. Since 1990, the US Census Bureau
has conducted a survey following its census of
population and housing and applied DSE to
assess the quality of the census. The Census
Bureau then released estimates of net undercount
or overcount for the nation as a whole, the
50 states and the District of Columbia, and for
demographic groups defined by race, gender, and
age categories.
To estimate the size of a subpopulation
through DSE, the distinguishing characteristic
or identifier should be collected or available in
both enumerations. If the characteristic is not
2 Dual-System Estimation
Dual-System Estimation, Table 1 Estimated undercount of Hispanics in the US census, 1990–2010
Census year Estimated undercount (%)
1990 4.99
2000 0.71
2010 1.54
Source: US post-enumeration surveys (Mule 2012)
available in either enumeration, DSE cannot be
used without additional assumptions or modifica-
tions to estimate the size of that subpopulation.
For example, the US census attempts to count
everyone living in the country as of census day,
but it does not collect information on place of
birth, citizenship, or legal status in the country.
Thus, a dual-system estimate or net undercount is
not produced for immigrants or noncitizens.
On the other hand, the US census and its post-
enumeration survey collect information on His-
panic origin, allowing an estimate of the net cov-
erage of Hispanics in the USA. Post-enumeration
survey estimates of coverage among Hispanics
have been used to set upper bounds on coverage
among Hispanic subgroups, such as the Mexican
or Hispanic foreign born (Van Hook et al. 2014),
or among groups containing larger portions of
Hispanics, such as the unauthorized foreign
born (e.g., Passel and Cohn 2009) (Table 1).
How It Works
To understand how DSE works, one can consider
capture-recapture methodology. To estimate the
number of fish in a pond using this approach, one
captures a set of fish, tags them for later identifi-
cation, and throws them back into the pond. After
the fish have had time to disperse sufficiently, a
second set of fish is caught, representing the
“recapture.” One then counts the second set of
fish and how many of them are tagged. All fish in
the pond can be placed into one of four categories
as depicted in the following Table 2:
Note that the numbers in the Table 2, N11, N1+,
and N+1, can all be observed by counting the fish.
The entry N22, and thus the true size of the
population N, is unknown. If we can assume
Standard error (%)
0.82
0.44
0.33
(a) that the capture and recapture are conducted
independently, (b) that each fish has an equal
chance of being captured initially, and (c) that
each fish has an equal chance of being recaptured,
then the ratios N11/N+1 and N1+/N should be
approximately equal. Hence, an estimator for
the unknown total, N, is
N 1þ  N þ1
N^ ¼ (1)
N 11
or
N^ ¼
no: counted in first enumeration  no: counted in second enumeration
:
no: counted in both enumerations
(2)
Turning from fish to people, the census itself is
the initial capture, while a second
enumeration – often a post-enumeration sample
survey – represents the recapture. In Eq. 1, N11 is
the number of people enumerated in the census
and then later in the second enumeration. They
can be matched across the data files created from
the two enumerations.
Erroneous Enumerations and Other
Complications
In extending the analogy of capture-recapture
from fish to people, much has been simplified to
focus on the basics. For example, the first row of
the table portrays numbers of census enumera-
tions. Before inserting N11 and N1+ into Eq. 1 or 2,
“erroneous enumerations” must be removed from
each. In the pond analogy, one can think of an
erroneous enumeration as a captured “frog”; a
frog does not contribute to the size of the fish
Dual-System Estimation
Dual-System Estimation, Table 2 Number of fish or people captured in the two enumerations
Found in first enumeration (captured)? Yes
No
Total
population in the pond. In a census, erroneous
enumerations include people who should not
have been counted for any of several reasons:
they had already been counted at a different
(correct) location, they died before census day
or were born after census day, they were only
visiting from another country, etc.
The US census count also includes people for
whom so little valid information was collected
that all the characteristics had to be imputed
(statistically inserted). For these people, it
would be difficult to determine whether their
census records match to someone in the second
enumeration. DSE addresses this problem by
removing these records from the census count.
The idea is that these people will generally be
found in the second enumeration but not match to
the census because of the missing census infor-
mation. Algebraically, if the frequency of these
records is relatively small, the effects on the
terms N11 and N1+ in Eq. 1 essentially offset
each other.
The dual-system estimate removes erroneous
and certain other census enumerations and then
adjusts upward for units missed in the census.
Breaking the census count and the estimate into
these “components of census coverage,” as in the
following table, can provide additional valuable
information for assessing a census and preparing
for the next one (Mulry and Cantwell 2010)
(Table 3):
In practice, two samples are often used in DS-
E. Although records from the entire census are
usually available, determining whether a census
enumeration is correct or erroneous is generally
done for only a sample to save money and time.
For similar reasons, the second enumeration to
measure coverage of the census is usually
conducted on only a sample of geographic
3
Found in second enumeration (recaptured)?
Yes No Total
N11 N12 N1+
N21 N22 N2+
N+1 N+2 N
areas. Sampling weights and other adjustments
can be applied to produce estimates for the entire
population or a subdomain of interest.
A basic assumption on which DSE
relies – whether estimating fish or people – is
that the two enumerations are conducted indepen-
dently. To satisfy this requirement, the second
enumeration cannot use the same list frame or
any results obtained from the first enumeration.
An independent area sample or another approach
is often used. In the 1980 US Post-Enumeration
Program, the second enumeration was based on a
sample from the US labor force survey (Wolter
1986). When collecting data for the two enumer-
ations, care must be taken so that neither will
contaminate the results of the other.
In a census, the people enumerated are not
actually “tagged” as the fish in a pond. To deter-
mine which ones are counted in both enumera-
tions, sophisticated computer or clerical
matching operations are conducted (Hogan
1993). Although matching errors can occur due
to missing data or because addresses or people’s
names may differ slightly between the two enu-
merations, procedures are implemented to mini-
mize the errors. Follow-up interviews may be
conducted to resolve a small portion of cases in
which more information is needed.
When catching fish on consecutive occasions,
one might assume that the pond and the fish
population have not had much opportunity to
change before the recapture. A related issue
when conducting a post-enumeration survey is
the delay between census day and the occurrence
of the survey enumeration. Such a delay may be
warranted to maintain independence between the
two operations. However, a longer delay carries
with it several risks. First, as the time between
enumerations grows, it is possible that the
4 Dual-System Estimation

Dual-System Estimation, Table 3 Components of census coverage for the US household population, 2010
(in thousands)
Component of census coverage Estimate Standard error Percent Standard error
Census count 300,703 0 100.0 0
Correct enumerations 284,668 199 94.7 0.07
Enumerated in the correct state 283,720 206 94.4 0.07
Enumerated in a different state 948 31 0.3 0.01
Erroneous enumerations 10,042 199 3.3 0.07
Due to duplication 8,521 194 2.8 0.06
For other reasons 1,520 45 0.5 0.01
Minimal information 5,993 0 2.0 0
Dual-system estimate from post-enumeration survey 300,667 429 100.0 0
Correct enumerations 284,668 199 94.7 0.07
Omissions 15,999 440 5.3 0.07
Net overcount 36 429 0.01 0.14
Source: US census coverage measurement survey of 2010 (Mule 2012)
Does not include people living in dormitories, prisons, military barracks, etc., or remote Alaska

respondents forget where they or their household
members lived on census day or other details
relevant to the estimation. Perhaps more impor-
tant, as this time grows, more people will have
moved to another residence, making it more dif-
ficult to determine exactly who lived at which
address on census day.
One may recall, among the assumptions lead-
ing to Eq. 1, that each fish has an equal chance of
being captured and that each fish has an equal
chance for recapture. In fact, the accuracy of DSE
generally increases if the underlying probabilities
are equal for units (fish or people) in each enu-
meration separately. In reality, these probabilities
are generally not equal among different units. As
they become more and more heterogeneous, an
error labeled “correlation bias” can increase
(Konicki 2012).
This problem can be addressed by defining a
number of mutually exclusive groups, sometimes
called post-strata, such that the probability of
being captured in the pond or the census is more
homogeneous among those units within the same
post-stratum (US Census Bureau 2004). To esti-
mate the population total, one then computes the
estimated total within each post-stratum and adds
the estimates across the post-strata. One can
define the post-strata using available variables
that are correlated with the chance of being
enumerated. In a census, these variables might
include demographic characteristics such as age,
gender, and owner/renter status, as well as oper-
ational variables such as whether census forms
are mailed in the area or the level of the mail
return rate.
It can be shown that applying DSE within
post-strata is simply a special case of a more
general modeling approach that uses logistic
regression to estimate the probability of being
included in both enumerations (Mule 2012).
Working with the more general model allows
one to select a more efficient model – compared
to forming post-strata – and thus reduces the
correlation bias.
Other innovations can be applied to the con-
cept of DSE. With multiple-systems estimation,
one extends the number of overlapping frames to
three or more. A third frame might consist of a
database of administrative records that covers all
or part of the universe of interest (Zaslavsky and
Wolfgang 1993). Matching records between any
two frames, along with its difficulties and poten-
tial for error, become more important and
complex.
Dual-System Estimation
Cross-References
▶ Capture-Recapture
▶ Erroneous Enumerations
▶ Net Undercount
▶ Omissions
▶ Post-Enumeration Survey
References
Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG,
Scopilliti M, West KK (2012) The development and
sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis
estimates. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC http://
www.census.gov/people/files/popworkingpapers/
Development%20and%20Sensitivity%20Analysis
%202010%20DA.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015
Hogan H (1993) The 1990 post-enumeration survey: oper-
ations and results. J Am Stat Assoc 88:1047–1060
Konicki S (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement
estimation report: adjustment for correlation bias.
DSSD 2010 Census Coverage Measurement Memo-
randum Series #2010-G-11, https://www.census.gov/
coverage_measurement/pdfs/g11.pdf. Accessed 14
October 2015
Lincoln FC (1930) Calculating waterfowl abundance on
the basis of banding returns. US Department of Agri-
culture, Circular No 118: 1–4
Mule T (2012) 2010 Census coverage measurement esti-
mation report: summary of estimates of coverage for
persons in the United States. DSSD 2010 Census Cov-
erage Measurement Memorandum Series #2010-G-01.
5
http://www.census.gov/coverage_measurement/pdfs/
g01.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015
Mulry MH, Cantwell PJ (2010) Overview of the 2010
census coverage measurement program and its evalu-
ations. Chance 23(3):46–51
Passel JS, Cohn D (2009) A portrait of unauthorized
immigrants in the United States. Pew Hispanic Center,
Washington, DC, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/
107.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2015
Petersen CGJ (1896) The yearly immigration of young
plaice into the Limfjord from the German Sea. Rep
Dan Biol Station 6:5–84
Sekar CC, Deming WE (1949) On a method of estimating
birth and death rates and the extent of registration.
J Am Stat Assoc 44:101–115
US Census Bureau (2004) Accuracy and coverage evalu-
ation of census 2000: design and methodology. DSSD/
03-DM. Issued September 2004. US Census Bureau,
Washington, DC. Chapter 7. http://www.census.gov/
prod/2004pubs/dssd03-dm.pdf. Accessed 14 October
2015
Van Hook J, Bean FD, Bachmeier JD, Tucker C (2014)
Recent trends in coverage of the Mexican-born
population of the United States: results from applying
multiple methods across time. Demography
51(2):699–726
Wolter KM (1986) Some coverage error models for census
data. J Am Stat Assoc 81:338–346
Zaslavsky AM, Wolfgang GS (1993) Triple-system
modeling of census, post-enumeration survey, and
administrative-list data. J Bus Econ Stat 11:279–288
Further Reading
Anderson M, Fienberg SE (2001) Who counts? The poli-
tics of census-taking in contemporary America. Rus-
sell Sage Foundation, New York
M
Methods for Estimating
International Migration
Melissa Scopilliti, Kirsten West and Jason
Devine
U.S. Census Bureau, Suitland, MD, USA
Keywords
International migration; Immigration; Emigra-
tion; Population estimates; Demographic
analysis
Definition
International migration is the movement of peo-
ple across a national border. This includes both
immigration (migration to a country) and emigra-
tion (migration from a country) or the combina-
tion of the two (net international migration). The
US Census Bureau produces estimates of inter-
national migration annually as part of the Popu-
lation Estimates Program and decadally as part of
the Demographic Analysis Program.
Overview
International migration is a component of popu-
lation change (i.e., births, deaths, migration) that
is difficult to measure directly using
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht (outside the USA) 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_85-1
administrative data sources. The Census Bureau
annually produces estimates of international
migration as part of its Population Estimates Pro-
gram. The population estimates use the most
recent decennial census as a base and measure
population change from the census forward. They
include one series of international migration esti-
mates, using the most robust methods for estimat-
ing international migration. In addition, the
Census Bureau produces international migration
estimates every decade as part of the Demo-
graphic Analysis (DA) Program. The DA esti-
mates are used to assess coverage of the most
recent decennial census. Unlike the population
estimates, the Demographic Analysis estimates
do not use the decennial census as a base. They
are developed using historical data on births,
deaths, and international migration and are inde-
pendent of the census being evaluated. The DA
estimates for 2010 included a range of interna-
tional migration estimates that reflected different
assumptions and methods for estimating interna-
tional migration. This entry will focus primarily
on methods for estimating international migra-
tion in the 2012 Population Estimates Program
although some alternative methods will be
presented.
The United States collects administrative data
on some types of immigrants, but does not main-
tain administrative records on most persons leav-
ing the country (emigrants). For example, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) col-
lects and publishes information on immigrants
2 Methods for Estimating International Migration
who became naturalized US citizens, obtained
legal permanent resident status, were admitted
as refugees or granted asylum, or who entered
the United States as nonimmigrants (foreign
nationals who are granted temporary entrance),
while the Department of State collects and pub-
lishes information on immigrant and
nonimmigrant visa issuances and refugee admis-
sions (Grieco and Rytina 2011). Although these
administrative data sources are useful for mea-
suring particular migration streams, they cannot
be used to measure total immigration flows unless
assumptions are made for immigrant groups not
represented (e.g., persons entering the United
States illegally and citizens relocating to the
United States after residence abroad) or people
obtaining multiple visas within the time period of
interest (may be counted in the statistics more
than once). In addition, little information is avail-
able on people leaving the United States.
In the past, the Census Bureau used adminis-
trative data sources to estimate international
migration as part of the Population Estimates
Program and pre-2000 Demographic Analysis
estimates. However, during the last decade, data
sources and methods were altered to incorporate
information from the newly implemented Amer-
ican Community Survey (ACS) (Dick and
Bhaskar 2012). While administrative data are
still used in research and evaluation, the Census
Bureau’s current methods rely primarily on infor-
mation from the decennial census, ACS, and data
collected by other countries. The next several
sections will describe methods the Census
Bureau used to produce annual estimates of inter-
national migration as part of the 2012 Population
Estimates Program. Alternative methods will be
presented, and in some cases, alternatives
described were used in the development of the
2010 Demographic Analysis estimates. For infor-
mation on methods used in 2010 Demographic
Analysis, see Bhaskar et al. (2013) and Devine
et al. (2012).
Producing National-Level Estimates
of Net International Migration
Net international migration (NIM) is estimated at
the national level using the following
subcomponents:
(a) Foreign-born immigration (FBIM)
(b) Foreign-born emigration (FBEM)
(c) Net migration of the native-born population
(NNM)
(d) Immigration of the native- and foreign-born
population from Puerto Rico (PRIM)
(e) Emigration of the native- and foreign-born
population to Puerto Rico (PREM)
(f) Net movement of the Armed Forces popula-
tion (AFM)
where
NIM ¼ FBIM  FBEM þ NNM þ PRIM
 PREM þ AFM:
Foreign-Born Immigration
The term “foreign born” refers to people who
were not US citizens at birth and includes both
noncitizens and naturalized US citizens. Foreign-
born immigration is estimated using information
on residence 1 year ago (ROYA) from the ACS.
The ROYA question is asked in two parts. The
first asks “Did this person live in this house or
apartment 1 year ago?” If not, the next part of the
question asks “Where did this person live 1 year
ago?” An annual estimate of foreign-born immi-
gration is produced by tabulating the foreign-
born population who lived outside of the United
States, Puerto Rico, and outlying areas 1 year
prior. Because of the large migration flows
between Mexico and the United States, immigra-
tion estimates are produced separately for the
population migrating from Mexico and the pop-
ulation migrating from “other countries”
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The ACS is an
annual survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2009); there-
fore, a time series of estimates can be produced
using several years of ACS data.
Methods for Estimating International Migration
Although not used in the national-level esti-
mates production process, foreign-born immigra-
tion flows can also be estimated using ACS data
from a question on year of entry that asks, “When
did this person come to live in the United States?”
An annual estimate of immigration could be pro-
duced by tabulating the population who came to
live in the United States in the year prior to the
ACS survey year. Year-of-entry-based estimates
were included in the range of 2010 Demographic
Analysis estimates and tend to be higher than
residence 1-year-ago-based estimates. There are
also differences in the characteristics of immi-
grants estimated using the two survey questions
(Borsella and Jensen 2013).
The Census Bureau uses information from the
ACS rather than administrative data sources pri-
marily because the ACS includes the foreign born
regardless of legal status. In addition, the survey
measures migration of people, rather than migra-
tion events (i.e., multiple visas issued to a person
for trips within the same year), so records do not
have to be unduplicated. The ACS sample size is
also relatively large for a survey, sampling
roughly three million household addresses a
year in the United States and 36,000 household
addresses in Puerto Rico (U.S. Census Bureau
2009).
However, there are several limitations of using
survey data to estimate migration. Surveys have
both sampling and non-sampling error that can
impact estimates. Population controls are applied
to surveys to help account for sampling and
non-sampling errors. However, population con-
trols are applied to the ACS by age, sex, race, and
Hispanic origin but not by nativity (i.e., native
born or foreign born) or migration status
(U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Therefore, if immi-
grants are underrepresented relative to nonimmi-
grants within a control cell, the resulting estimate
of immigration may be too low.
While both the residence 1 year ago and year
of entry approaches can be used to produce an
annual estimate of foreign-born immigration,
time lapses between the date an immigrant enters
the United States and the time of the survey. The
ACS’s residency rule excludes people who plan
to stay at their current address for less than
3
2 months unless they do not have another place
to stay. Therefore, immigrants with short dura-
tions of stay in the United States or who stay at
multiple addresses for short periods of time may
be underestimated in ACS-based estimates.
In addition, ACS estimates are centered on
July 1 of the survey year. If the aim is to produce
immigration estimates for the calendar year,
assumptions about the sub-annual distribution of
estimates are needed.
Foreign-Born Emigration
Emigration of the foreign born is harder to esti-
mate because censuses and surveys do not usually
ask about people who reside outside of the United
States. In addition, little information on migrants
leaving the United States is collected by nation-
wide surveys or through administrative records.
Therefore, a residual method is used to estimate
emigration (Ahmed and Robinson 1994;
U.S. Census Bureau 2012), where
Emigrationtime 1 to time 2 ¼ ðPopulationtime 1
Deathstime 1 to time 2 Þ
 Populationtime 2 :
For example, to estimate foreign-born emigration
from 2000 to 2008, the Census Bureau starts with
the foreign-born population estimated by the
2000 Census (Population time 1) that arrived
before 2000 (using year of entry); the population
is then survived to 2008 (time 2) by subtracting
deaths from 2000 to 2008 (calculated using life
tables). This provides an “expected” foreign-born
population in 2008 of the cohort arriving before
2000 if there were no emigration. An estimate of
the “actual” foreign-born population in the
United States in 2008 that arrived before 2000
(from the 2008 ACS) is subtracted from the
“expected” population. The difference (residual)
provides an estimate of emigration from 2000 to
2008 of the foreign-born population who resided
in the United States in 2000.
In the Population Estimates Program, resid-
uals are annualized and divided by the estimated
mid-period population to create annualized emi-
gration rates that are applied to the population “at
4 Methods for Estimating International Migration
risk of emigrating” each year to obtain annual
estimates of emigration (U.S. Census Bureau
2012). The “population at risk of emigrating” is
obtained by tabulating the foreign-born stock in
annual ACS files. For example, if the foreign-
born population in the 2008 ACS is assumed to
be “at risk of emigrating,” the emigration rate can
be applied to this population to generate an esti-
mate of emigration from 2008 to 2009. Since
recent immigrants have a higher propensity to
emigrate, emigration rates and estimates for two
periods of entry groups are calculated, those that
entered the United States in the past 10 years and
those that entered more than 10 years prior. Rates
are also calculated separately for people born in
Mexico and those born in other countries.
There are several limitations to this approach.
The ACS is subject to sampling and
non-sampling error that may impact the residual
calculation. In the Population Estimates Program,
several emigration rates are averaged before
being applied to the population at risk of emigrat-
ing. Additionally, emigration rates are lagged
because the residual calculation is limited to the
population residing in the United States at time
1. This can be problematic if there are period-
specific changes in emigration rates. Information
on year of entry is needed at both time 1 and time
2 to match entrance cohorts across time (and
exclude immigrants who entered between time
1 and time 2). If this information is not available,
the Warren and Peck (1980) model could be used
to estimate emigration. Warren and Peck (1980)
used information on the foreign-born population
at time 1 and time 2 (regardless of year of entry)
and subtracted a measure of immigration from
time 1 to time 2 from the emigration residual.
Since the immigration component is subtracted
from the residual, the emigration residual is
highly sensitive to the accuracy of the immigra-
tion component.
While Ahmed and Robinson’s (1994) residual
method is used in the population estimates pro-
gram, there are several other methods for estimat-
ing emigration. These include panel attrition
methods, indirect estimation and multiplicity
sampling methods, using migration surveys or
population registers, and statistical modeling
(Suitland Working Group 2012, Suitland Work-
ing Group forthcoming).
Native-Born Migration
There is little direct information on the native-
born US population residing abroad. The US
Department of State maintains information on
US citizens traveling or residing abroad, but reg-
istration is voluntary. Many overseas trips are for
vacation and are short in duration and even
longer-term migrants may not register with the
Department of State when they move abroad.
Due to the dearth of information, native migra-
tion is estimated as a net number using informa-
tion on people born in the United States or US
citizens (if place of birth information is not avail-
able) collected by censuses and population regis-
ters in other countries (Gibbs et al. 2003;
Schachter 2008).
Comparable data for two time points are
needed to produce the native migration estimate.
The US-born or US citizen population at time 1 is
survived forward (subtracting deaths) and com-
pared to the population at time 2. The difference
in the time 1 and time 2 population provides an
estimate of net native migration over the time
period. For example, information on the
US-born population was obtained from the 2001
to 2006 Census of Canada. The population in
2001 was survived to 2006 by age group and
sex then compared to the population in 2006.
The difference represents net migration between
the United States and Canada from 2001 to 2006
of the US-born population. Schachter (2008)
annualized the residuals and combined net native
migration estimates from 84 countries to produce
an overall estimate of native migration.
There are several limitations to the method.
Similar to the foreign-born emigration estimate,
the native migration estimate assumes that cur-
rent migration is similar to migration in prior
periods. Additionally, not all countries collect
information at the same point in time; therefore,
the composite measure of migration is a sum of
country-specific migration estimates across a
variety of time periods. The quality of data also
varies across countries, and coverage of the
native-born US population may not be complete.
Methods for Estimating International Migration
The method for estimating the native-born popu-
lation also has some imprecision, particularly
when citizenship is used to classify the native
born (person may be a US citizen by naturaliza-
tion and therefore not “native born” or may have
dual citizenship and not report their US citizen-
ship). The measure is sensitive to errors in esti-
mating mortality when surviving the population
from time 1 to time 2 and is also time intensive to
update regularly.
Rather than using information from other
countries, a method of estimating native-born
immigration and emigration separately could be
used. Information on residence 1 year ago can be
used to measure the native-born population
migrating back to the United States (note that
year of entry is not asked of the US-born popula-
tion). However, estimating emigration is more
difficult. Flows of the native-born population
are small relative to the size of the native-born
population in the United States. Residuals (using
the native-born population residing in the United
States at time 1 and time 2) are sensitive to errors
in estimation because the time 1 and time 2 pop-
ulation is large compared to the residual between
the two time periods. Differential error in esti-
mating the population at time 1 and time 2 results
in a volatile residual estimate.
Migration Between the United States
and Puerto Rico
Migration between the United States and Puerto
Rico is estimated separately from foreign-born
and native-born migration because data sources
are available to measure both immigration and
emigration flows. The ACS is fielded in Puerto
Rico (Puerto Rico Community Survey or PRCS).
Migration is estimated using information on res-
idence 1 year ago (similar to the method for
estimating foreign-born immigration). People
who indicated on the ACS that they lived in
Puerto Rico 1 year ago are considered immigrants
to the United States. Those who indicated on the
PRCS that they lived in the United States 1 year
ago are considered emigrants.
5
Movement of the Armed Forces Population
International movement of the Armed Forces
population is estimated using restricted-use data
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Cen-
ter (DMDC). DMDC provides monthly tabula-
tions of military personnel stationed or deployed
outside the United States by demographic char-
acteristics. Net movement of the Armed Forces
population is estimated by comparing the popu-
lation overseas during consecutive time points.
Producing Subnational Estimates
of International Migration
Producing subnational (e.g., state, county) inter-
national migration estimates poses additional
challenges. Foreign-born immigration can be
estimated at the subnational level using informa-
tion on current place of residence, residence
1 year ago, and/or year of entry. Since the ACS
is based on a sample, the margin of error around
the immigration estimate may be relatively large,
particularly for smaller levels of geography or
areas with few international migrants. Estimating
foreign-born emigration and native migration at
the subnational level is more difficult. If the
residual method is used to estimate these compo-
nents, it is not possible to distinguish between
international migration and domestic migration
unless an independent estimate of domestic
migration is produced and included in the model.
In the Population Estimates Program, state and
county estimates (by age, sex, race, and Hispanic
origin) are produced using a distributive method
whereby national-level estimates are allocated to
states and counties. This is done through the
creation of “proxy universes,” or groups of peo-
ple who are assumed to have similar characteris-
tics to recent immigrants or emigrants. For
example, to distribute the national-level estimate
of foreign-born immigrants to states and counties
by demographic characteristics, the distribution
of the foreign-born population who entered the
United States within 5 years of the ACS year is
applied to the national total (age is adjusted to
represent age at arrival instead of age at survey
date). The foreign-born immigration totals are
6 Methods for Estimating International Migration
distributed separately for people born in Mexico
and people born in other countries. There are two
main reasons for using proxy universes. First,
some of the estimation methods cannot distin-
guish between domestic and international movers
when applied at the subnational level. Second,
estimates must be produced for all states and
counties by demographic characteristics, and
sampling error around the ACS-based estimates
of recent migrants by demographic characteris-
tics is substantial for some cells. For information
on the proxy universes for other components, see
US Census Bureau (2012).
The Population Estimates Program releases
estimates of net international migration, but the
subcomponents of net international migration are
not publicly released. However, the 2010 Demo-
graphic Analysis subcomponent estimates for
2000 through 2010 are publicly available.
Tables on residence 1 year ago, year of entry
and place of birth are available on the Census
Bureau website or through tabulations from the
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Addi-
tionally, ACS-based state-to-state and county-
to-county migration files are publicly released
on the Census Bureau’s website that includes a
category for “movers from abroad.”
References
Ahmed B, Robinson JG (1994) Estimates of emigration of
the foreign-born population: 1980–1990, Population
division working paper 9. U.S. Census Bureau, Wash-
ington, DC
Bhaskar R, Cortés R, Scopilliti M, Jensen E, Dick C,
Armstrong D, Arenas-Germosén B (2013) Estimating
net international migration for 2010 demographic
analysis: an overview of methods and results, Popula-
tion division working paper 97. U.S. Census Bureau,
Washington, DC
Borsella CP, Jensen EB (2013) Evaluating methods for
estimating foreign-born immigration using the Amer-
ican community survey. Paper presented at the popu-
lation association of America annual meeting, New
Orleans. 13 Apr
Devine J, Bhaskar R, DeSalvo B, Robinson JG,
Scopilliti M, West K (2012) The development and
sensitivity analysis of the 2010 demographic analysis
estimates, Population division working paper 93.
U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC
Dick C, Bhaskar R (2012) Improvements to the net inter-
national migration component in the U.S. Census
Bureau’s population estimates: 2000 to 2011. Presen-
tation at the southern demographic association annual
meeting, Williamsburg. 10–12 Oct
Gibbs JC, Harper GS, Rubin MJ, Shin HB (2003) Evaluat-
ing components of international migration: native-
born emigrants, Population division working paper
63. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC
Grieco EM, Rytina N (2011) U.S. data sources on the
foreign born and immigration. Int Migr Rev
45(4):1001–1016
Schachter J (2008) Estimating native emigration from the
United States. Memorandum dated December
24, delivered to the U.S. Census Bureau
Suitland Working Group (2012) Update on the Suitland
Working Group project on reviewing methods for esti-
mating emigration. Presentation at the joint economic
commission for Europe and conference of European
statisticians work session on migration statistics.
Geneva. 17–19 Oct. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/
DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.10/2012/WP_8_US.
pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013
Suitland Working Group (forthcoming) A review of
methods for estimating emigration
U.S. Census Bureau (2009) Design and methodology:
American community survey. U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, DC
U.S. Census Bureau (2012) Methodology for the United
States resident population estimates by age, sex, race,
and hispanic origin and the state and county total resi-
dent population estimates (Vintage 2012): April 1, 2010
to July 1, 2012. Methodology statement. http://www.
census.gov/popest/methodology/2012-nat-st-co-meth.
pdf. Accessed 13 May 2013
Warren R, Peck JM (1980) Foreign-born emigration from
the United States: 1960 to 1970. Demography
17:71–84
A
Age, Period, and Cohort Effects
Claire E. Altman
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri,
USA
Definition
Age effects refer to variation in life course expe-
riences due to chronological age (e.g., an immi-
grant’s age upon arrival). Period effects are
experienced by all groups in the population
regardless of age (e.g., national immigration pol-
icies). Cohort effects include social and historical
changes affecting a specific group with a shared
event (e.g., immigration).
Detailed Description
In 1965, Norman Ryder wrote about the cohort as
a critical demographic element of social change
and began to lay out the process for untangling
the differences between cohort, age effects, and
period effects. In doing so, he established an
important approach for distinguishing changes
experienced by a population or those experienced
by a specific group. These approaches are still
employed today by demographers and sociolo-
gists studying a range of events including immi-
gration. We begin by discussing period, cohort,
and age effects generally and then discuss how
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_88-1
they complicate our understanding of immigrant
integration by providing empirical examples
from published research.
Period effects are defined as changes occur-
ring over time experienced by all groups in the
population regardless of age (Ryder 1965; Yang
and Land 2008). Broad historical, social, cultural,
or environmental changes such as wars and tech-
nological advances that affect all members of a
society at a particular moment are considered
period effects. Cohorts, in contrast, are defined
by a common initial experience or event such as
birth, marriage, migration, etc. Cohort effects
include social and historical changes affecting a
specific group with a shared initial event (Reither
et al. 2009; Ryder 1965; Yang and Land 2008).
Cohorts share a social history during the same
historical time period (Alwin et al. 2006). Age
effects denote “the variation associated with dif-
ferent age groups brought about by psychological
changes, accumulation of social experience,
and/or role or status changes” (Yang and Land
2008, p. 298). In other words age effects refer to a
birth cohort moving through the life course
because the biographical time of an individual
or cohort is embedded in historical time.
In thinking about immigrant incorporation,
period, cohort, and age effects play important
roles. For instance, migration to the USA has
varied drastically during the last century. During
the early twentieth century, the majority of
migrants originated from Southern and Eastern
Europe. The passage of the Immigration and
2 Age, Period, and Cohort Effects
Nationality Act of 1965, which served to elimi-
nate national-origin quotas, resulted in larger
flows of migrants from Latin America and Asia.
Currently, the largest migration stream is from
Mexico to the USA which has grown substan-
tially since the 1970s (Durand et al. 2001). Period
changes in geographic origin of immigrants have
altered the size and composition of the US popu-
lation and context of reception, as millions of
nonwhite immigrants moving to the United States
may now have difficulty integrating (Portes and
Zhou 1993; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Furthermore,
period changes in the US economic structure
have served to bifurcate the economy which
may limit the economic mobility and integration
of immigrants (Foner 2000; Park and Myers
2010).
Cohort effects on immigrant integration often
refer to the arrival of a group of immigrants,
regardless of the time period or their age at
arrival. For instance, a cohort may include immi-
grants of any age arriving to the USA between
1987 and 1997. Recent research suggests that
recent cohorts of immigrants are more racially
and ethnically diverse than previous cohorts
(Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003;
Park and Myers 2010; Portes and Rumbaut
2006). They are also more diverse in terms of
education, earnings potential, occupation, lan-
guage ability, and legal status. These factors
may serve to propel or impede their integration.
In terms of education differences, more recent
cohorts of immigrants have slightly higher attain-
ment than earlier cohorts, but compared to
natives, recent cohorts have become less well
educated (Betts and Lofstrom 2000). However,
there is substantial variation by country of birth
and period of immigration on years of schooling
attained (Chiswick 1986). As a related point,
recent cohorts of immigrants earn a smaller per-
centage of the median earnings of native males.
For instance, the 1965–1969 immigrant entry
cohort earned 65 % of the median earnings, the
1975–1979 immigrant entry cohort earned 50 %,
and the 1985–1989 immigrant entry cohort
earned only 41 % (Duleep and Regets 1999).
Immigrant cohorts also vary in their occupational
distributions. Among immigrants with children, a
larger percentage of earlier cohorts of immigrants
occupied professional or technical occupations
compared to more recent entry cohorts (e.g.,
32 % of immigrants arriving before 1965 were
in professional occupations compared to 21.6 %
of immigrants arriving between 1985 and 1990).
Furthermore, more recent cohorts of immigrants
work in service, farm, craft, or laborer occupa-
tions (Jensen and Chitose 1994). The increasing
diversity of immigrants has increased the likeli-
hood that recent cohorts of immigrants speak
languages other than English. Carliner found an
important cohort effect in language ability among
immigrants: immigrants arriving since 1950 are
less likely to be English language proficient
(2000). Moreover, evidence from the 1990 Cen-
sus found that recent cohorts of immigrants were
less likely to speak English exclusively and more
likely to speak Spanish or an Asian language
(Jensen and Chitose 1994). Finally, two other
cohort effects play a role in immigrant integra-
tion: legal status and selectivity. Larger shares of
recent immigrant cohorts have unauthorized legal
status compared to earlier cohorts (Durand
et al. 2001). As migration has spread through
community networks, recent cohorts are less pos-
itively selected (Durand et al. 2001; Feliciano
2005).
An immigrant’s age at migration, also thought
of as age effects, may have implications for their
integration. Age at arrival denotes which life
cycle stage an immigrant was in upon arrival
(Myers et al. 2009; Piore 2011). In the immigra-
tion literature, these age effects are often used to
distinguish among the foreign born or those in the
first generation. Age at arrival is used to further
distinguish the 1.5 generation (who arrived
before age 12 or 15) from adult, first-generation
immigrants (Rumbaut 1991). Immigrants arriv-
ing at younger ages spend a larger portion of their
childhood and adolescence being socialized in
the USA and may have outcomes similar to
native-born children. Thus, age effects may
have bearing on an immigrant’s language ability
or acquisition, schooling, and other socioeco-
nomic indicators of integration. Immigrants that
arrive at older ages are less likely to speak
English well than younger arrivals (Carliner
Age, Period, and Cohort Effects
2000; Stevens 2004). Mexican immigrants who
arrive as children are more likely to be English
proficient in adulthood than teenage/late adoles-
cent arrivals (Myers et al. 2009). Further, those
who migrate as teenagers have fewer completed
years of schooling compared to those who
migrated before or after teenage years
(Chiswick and DebBurman 2004; Myers
et al. 2009). Finally, child migrants earn higher
wages as adults than migrants who moved at
older ages (Bleakley and Chin 2004). Higher
educational attainment and English proficiency
mediate this earnings gap. Overall, the findings
suggest that earlier age at arrival may lead to
increased integration (Myers et al. 2009).
In sum, period, cohort, and age effects play
important roles in the immigrant integration pro-
cess. However, distinguishing between cohort,
aging, and period effects remains an empirical
challenge since they are intertwined. The bound-
ary of each effect blurs into the next effect; “The
cohort record is not merely a summation of a set
of individual histories. Each cohort has a distinc-
tive composition and character reflecting the cir-
cumstances of its unique organization and
history” (Ryder 1965, p. 845). In practical
terms, one cannot include age, period, and cohort
effects in a multivariate model because they are
completely collinear. For example, for
nonimmigrant populations, age is a function of
birth cohort and time period. For immigrants, the
situation is more complicated because more time
scales are involved: the time since birth
(indicating age) and the time since migration
(indicating duration of residence). Thus the col-
linearity problem is magnified; for example,
duration of residence for a particular immigrant
entry cohort in a given year is a function of
current age and age at migration. Some
researchers have attempted to follow immigrant
cohorts as they concurrently increase in age and
duration of residence in the USA with the “gen-
erational cohort method” (Myers and Lee 1998;
Park and Myers 2010). This method involves
(1) pooling multiple cross-sectional surveys and
(2) estimating the effects of multiple interaction
terms among time period, age or birth cohort, and
period of entry. Another approach involves
3
specifying one of the three effects (age, period,
or cohort) as a random effect while treating the
other two as fixed effects in a multilevel model
(Yang et al. 2004). This approach has been used
to simultaneously estimate age, period, and
cohort effects for general populations, but to my
knowledge has not yet been applied to immigrant
integration. To date, the debate on how to best
estimate age, period, and cohort effects is ongo-
ing as evidenced by a scholarly exchange on the
challenges of identifying age, period, and cohort
effects in a 2013 issue of Demography (Tolnay
2013).
References
Alba R, Nee V (2003) Remaking the American main-
stream: assimilation and contemporary immigration.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Alwin DF, McCammon RJ, Hofer SM (2006) Studying
baby boom cohorts within a demographic and devel-
opmental context: conceptual and methodological
issues. In: Whitbourne SKE, Willis SL (eds) The
baby boomers grow up: contemporary perspectives
on midlife. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers,
Mahwah
Bean F, Stevens G (2003) America’s newcomers and the
dynamics of diversity. Russell Sage, New York
Betts JR, Lofstrom M (2000) The educational attainment
of immigrants: trends and implications. In: Borjas GJ
(ed) Issues in the economics of immigration. Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 51–116
Bleakley H, Chin A (2004) Language skills and earnings:
evidence from childhood immigrants*. Rev Econ Stat
86:481–496
Carliner G (2000) The language ability of U.-
S. immigrants: assimilation and cohort effects. Int
Migr Rev 34:158–182
Chiswick BR (1986) Is the new immigration less skilled
than the old? J Labor Econ 4:168–192
Chiswick BR, DebBurman N (2004) Educational attain-
ment: analysis by immigrant generation. Econ Educ
Rev 23:361–379
Duleep HO, Regets MC (1999) Immigrants and human
capital investment. Am Econ Rev 89:186–191
Durand J, Massey DS, Zenteno RM (2001) Mexican
immigration to the United States: continuities and
changes. Lat Am Res Rev 36:107–127
Feliciano C (2005) Does selective migration matter?
Explaining ethnic disparities in educational attainment
among immigrants’ children. Int Migr Rev
39:841–871
Foner N (2000) From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s two
great waves of immigration. Russell Sage, New York
4 Age, Period, and Cohort Effects
Jensen L, Yoshimi C (1994) Today’s second generation:
evidence from the 1990 US census. Int Migr Rev
28:714–735
Myers D, Seong Woo L (1998) Immigrant trajectories into
homeownership: a temporal analysis of residential
assimilation. Int Migr Rev 32:593–625
Myers D, Gao X, Emeka A (2009) The gradient of immi-
grant age-at-arrival effects on socioeconomic out-
comes in the US. Int Migr Rev 43:205–229
Park J, Myers D (2010) Intergenerational mobility in the
post-1965 immigration era: estimates by an immigrant
generation cohort method. Demography 47:369–392
Piore MJ (2011) Birds of passage. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Portes A, Rumbaut RG (2006) Immigrant America: a
portrait. University of California Press, Berkeley
Portes A, Zhou M (1993) The new second generation:
segmented assimilation and its variants. Ann Am
Acad Pol Soc Sci 530:74–96
Reither EN, Hauser RM, Yang Y (2009) Do birth cohorts
matter? Age-period-cohort analyses of the obesity epi-
demic in the United States. Soc Sci Med 69:1439–1448
Rumbaut RG (1991) The agony of exile: a study of the
migration and adaptation of Indochinese refugee
adults and children. In: Ahearn FL, Athey JL (eds)
Refugee children: theory, research, and services.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 53–91
Ryder NB (1965) The cohort as a concept in the study of
social change. Am Sociol Rev 30:843–861
Stevens G (2004) Using census data to test the critical-
period hypothesis for second-language acquisition.
Psychol Sci 15:215–216
Telles EE, Ortiz V (2008) Generations of exclusion. Rus-
sell Sage, New York
Tolnay S (2013) Editor’s note. Demography
50:1943–1944
Yang Y, Land KC (2008) Age–period–cohort analysis of
repeated cross-section surveys: fixed or random
effects? Sociol Methods Res 36:297–326
Yang Y, Fu WJ, Land KC (2004) A methodological com-
parison of age-period-cohort models: the intrinsic esti-
mator and conventional generalized linear models.
Sociol Methodol 34:75–110
D
Duration of Residence Measurement time spent in the receiving country, either as an
1 2
Ilana Redstone Akresh and Douglas S. Massey
1
University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, USA
2
Office of Population Research, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Definition
Duration of residence refers to the variable used
in empirical research that captures the time a
foreign-born individual has been in the USA. This
time could be accumulated in one continuous
stretch (e.g., an individual who left his or her
home country, came to the USA, and remained
in the USA), or it could be accumulated across
multiple trips to the USA. While this variable is
relevant in both qualitative and quantitative
research on the foreign born, it is relied upon
heavily in quantitative studies as a proxy for an
individual’s exposure to the USA.
Concept and Background
A fundamental attribute of all immigrants is the
amount of time they have spent in the host coun-
try. Whatever theory of immigrant absorption
one favors – whether classical assimilation the-
ory, ethnic pluralism, human capital theory, seg-
mented assimilation, or ethnic stratification – an
adequate empirical test requires measuring the
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_90-1
independent variable or, at least, as a control.
Hence, most national censuses and surveys con-
tain questions to ascertain the place of birth and
year of arrival of foreign-born persons; and most
analyses based on such data include a variable
labeled “time since arrival” in statistical models
involving immigrants.
Challenges to Measurement
Despite its centrality to the process of immigrant
adaptation, measuring the amount of host-
country experience an immigrant has accumu-
lated is far from straightforward. A question on
the year of arrival works well in a world in which
all immigrants arrive once and only once to settle
permanently in the host society. Under these cir-
cumstances, subtracting the year of arrival from
the year of the census or survey exactly yields the
years of host-country experience, and there is no
ambiguity. In addition, cross-sectional compari-
sons of immigrants by duration of residence may
lead to biased estimates of the effects of US
exposure due to cohort differences (for more
detail on this point, see Park’s entry in this vol-
ume on following immigrant cohorts overtime).
If migrants move back and forth in multiple
trips, however, this methodology breaks down
because it begs two crucial questions: on which
of the several US trips did a respondent “arrive”
and when did he or she decide to remain
2 Duration of Residence Measurement
permanently? For instance, in the 2004 study
referenced in the section below using data from
the New Immigrant Survey – Pilot, 22 % of
respondents stated they had made two trips to
the USA before being granted legal permanent
residency, and 17 % reported three or more trips
prior to the same event. Perhaps more important
is that no matter how one defines “settlement,”
either objectively or subjectively, subtracting the
year of arrival from the year of the census or
survey will not equal the total amount of time
the migrant has accumulated in the host society.
Inevitably, picking 1 year to define “arrival” out
of a series of entries and exits will either over- or
understate the total amount of host-country expe-
rience the migrant has accumulated.
Known Biases
The following are three of the biases found in a
2004 study (using the New Immigrant
Survey – Pilot data) when comparing the census
question on year of arrival with a more inclusive,
cumulative measure of US duration (Redstone
and Massey 2004):
1. One study of legal permanent residents found
that roughly 45 % of all legal immigrants to
the USA report a year they came to stay that is
not the year of their first US trip; and among
those with multiple trips, 54 % report a year
they came to stay that is not the year of their
last trip.
2. Estimates of the total amount of US experi-
ence that are based on answers to the census
question on the year of arrival produce num-
bers that are quite different from those that are
produced by asking about US experience
directly. Only 59 % of immigrants had their
total US experience accurately estimated by
the usual census-based procedure. In contrast,
31 % of immigrants had their experience
understated and 10 % had it overstated, with
an average difference of about 4 years.
3. Whether total US experience is under- or
overestimated depends on the year of the first
trip and the number of trips taken between the
first trip and the survey date. Immigrants
whose prior trips were in undocumented status
tend to have their experience underestimated
by the census procedure, whereas those whose
trips are in documented status tend to have
their experience overestimated. The size of
the error is likewise determined by the year
of the first trip and the number of trips taken.
References
Redstone I, Massey DS (2004) Coming to stay: an analysis
of the U.S. census question on year of arrival. Demog-
raphy 41(4):721–738
E
Ethnographic Analysis
David FitzGerald
University of California, San Diego, CA, USA
Keywords
Participant observation; Qualitative
interviewing; Fieldwork
Definition
Ethnographic analysis is a set of methods involv-
ing direct, long-term engagement between the
ethnographer and the individuals whose lives
are the object of study.
Overview
Ethnographic analysis is the principal method
used in anthropological approaches to studying
migration as well as an important technique in
sociology. The most classical form of ethnogra-
phy involves many months – even years – of
“participant observation” in which the ethnogra-
pher becomes immersed in a field site. All eth-
nographers participate in the life of the
community, though they vary in the degree to
which they attempt to become social insiders
and the degree to which they are successful in
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_91-1
that endeavor. Participant observation involves
watching and analyzing social life as well, usu-
ally with great attention to details of social life
that could not be captured in a standardized
survey.
Participant observation is often complemented
by qualitative interviews, which differ from sur-
veys in that they are unstructured or semi-
structured in a way that allows the researcher to
probe for nuance, emotion, and explanations of
actions. Qualitative interviews by a researcher
engage the other individual less as a passive
object, and more as an interlocutor, who together
with the researcher creates the substance and
meaning of the interview (Emerson 2001). Qual-
itative interviewing techniques are also easily
adapted to focus groups. The line between infor-
mal conversations and formal interviews may be
blurred in practice.
What distinguishes ethnographies from jour-
nalism or travelogues is the systematic way in
which evidence is collected (typically in the
form of field notes, transcriptions of conversa-
tions, photographs, and audiovisual recordings),
the extended time period of the study, and the
engagement between findings in a particular site
and broader theories of social life. The presenta-
tion of ethnographies, most often in the form of a
monograph, usually emphasizes what Clifford
Geertz described as a “thick description” of a
setting that sheds light on social worlds with
which the reader is unfamiliar. Carefully
designed ethnographies also move beyond
2 Ethnographic Analysis
descriptions of processes to address broader the-
oretical questions.
Ethnographies of Migration
Fieldwork among international migrants poses a
host of challenges. Classical ethnographies
involved a lone researcher working in a single
site. Yet international migration is defined by
movement that often takes place across multiple
sites. Migration inherently means both emigra-
tion from some place and immigration to another,
implying that research should include both send-
ing and receiving areas as ethnographers “follow
the people” on the move (Marcus 1995; Glick
Schiller 2003; Sayad 2004).
Among studies adopting a two-site strategy,
Smith (2005) examined migration between a
town in the Mexican state of Puebla and New
York City, demonstrating migrants’ integration
into New York at the same time as many remain
deeply engaged in the political, economic, and
cultural life of Puebla. A second strategy is to
compare multiple destinations for migrants of a
common origin, as Tilly and his associates (1998)
began to do for Italians from the village of
Roccasecca dispersed in Lyon, Sao Paolo,
Buenos Aires, New York, and Toronto. Such a
comparison sets up a natural quasi-experiment
controlling for origins that explains how local
and national receiving contexts pattern migrants’
economic mobility. The multi-sited framing of
the field need not be exclusively
geographic. Migrants and expatriates around the
world have established Internet sites containing
membership directories, chat rooms, political
commentaries, advertisements for goods and ser-
vices, and news about life in different nodes of
the members’ network – all of which are grist for
the virtual ethnographer’s mill. Internet sites
linking dispersed virtual communities based on
a common town of origin are important vehicles
for maintaining cross-border ties and can be used
to locate members in other nodes.
Several cautions and objections about multi-
sited fieldwork have been advanced. First, multi-
sited work tests the limits of a method usually
thought to rely on deep, local knowledge of
everyday interactions as a means to understand
members’ experience. The requisite intensity of
fieldwork and linguistic competence may be dif-
ficult to achieve in multiple sites, with conse-
quent variation in the quality of the fieldwork
and the ability to make systematic comparisons
between sites (Marcus 1995; Hannerz 2003). It is
precisely because of the dangers of stretching
time and resources too thin that successful
multi-sited fieldwork is even more dependent on
a clear theoretical orientation and strategic site
selection than work in a single site.
A second objection to multi-sited fieldwork is
that scientific comparative ethnography is no lon-
ger possible. Colonialism and globalization have
eroded the idea that discrete cultural units exist.
In a world of rapid mobility of people, ideas, and
goods, the cases themselves may be influencing
each other. Without discrete units, causal pro-
cesses are not independent of each other, and
the logic of the Millian methods of agreement
and difference breaks down (Ragin 1987; de
Munck 2002). That is, similar outcomes across
cases cannot necessarily be ascribed to similar
conditions in each case (as in the method of
agreement), and different outcomes among
cases with different conditions cannot necessarily
be ascribed to those different conditions (as in the
method of difference). Seen from a different
view, the linkages between sites are not the end
of comparative ethnography, but rather an oppor-
tunity for its rejuvenation. Different source and
destination localities can be selected precisely
because they are linked by migrant networks
while still shaping migrants’ experiences
differently.
Another objection to comparative ethnogra-
phy is the ceteris paribus problem that bedevils
comparative study regardless of method. In
nonexperimental studies of social life, it is impos-
sible to definitively isolate the effects of just one
factor’s addition or removal. For instance, one
should not assume a given difference between
two migration destinations causes variation
found between migration streams sharing the
same source. That connection can only be made
by carefully specifying process and exploring
Ethnographic Analysis
alternative accounts. It is because the methods of
agreement and difference should never be applied
mechanistically by simply creating a matrix of
independent and dependent variables (Lieberson
1992) that multi-sited ethnographies are best
positioned to tease out the influences of different
ecologies on migration processes by explaining
causal mechanisms through an evidence-rich
encounter with theory.
The practical difficulties involved in multi-
sited research, particularly when they involve
multiple languages, can be resolved in part by
abandoning the “lone ranger” model of fieldwork
and adopting a bi- or multinational collaborative
model. Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish
Peasant in Europe and America (1927) is an
early template. The collaborative dimension
combined the advantages of insiders’ intimate
acquaintance with the social milieu and easier
access with the advantages of outsiders’ fresh
perspectives and autonomy (Merton 1972). The
binational dimension enabled the researchers to
examine the full range of migrants’ experiences,
migration’s impacts on both countries, and the
causes of migration from Polish push factors to
US pull factors. There are inherent limits to rig-
orous multi-sited fieldwork, but collaborations
are a way to approach those limits.
What Do Case Studies Represent?
Ethnography’s capacity to show process in fine-
grained detail and to open “black boxes” to show
mechanisms causally linking independent and
dependent variables is a recognized strength of
the method. Ethnography is also particularly well
suited to describe and explain the articulation of
macrostructures with members’ lived experience,
micro-interactions, and a deep appreciation of
members’ meanings. That same strength inher-
ently limits the ability of the ethnographer to
study a wide range of cases intensively.
A commonly held view is that ethnographies
can only explain a particular case (Blumer 1939,
1969). How can ethnographers hope to make
general arguments about anything other than
their field site?
3
The extended case method offers a more ambi-
tious alternative to the descriptive case study by
showing how a single case can yield theoretical
leverage (Gluckman 1961; Burawoy 1991). In
any scientific research program, there is a set of
“core” postulates. Surrounding the core is an
“outer belt” of secondary postulates that explain
outcomes the core postulates do not predict. If
multiple ad hoc qualifications are necessary to
explain anomalies, the research program is
degenerative. If the secondary postulates can be
revised to explain anomalous outcomes and pre-
dict new facts, the research program progresses
(Lakatos 1978). A single case study that success-
fully explains an anomaly by developing a sec-
ondary postulate protects the core of the research
program from negation and provides an ethnog-
rapher with justifiable claims to generalize based
on the program’s enhanced explanatory
capability.
The dominant research program in the sociol-
ogy of immigration analyzes “assimilation” or
“integration.” Ethnographies have pushed the
assimilation program forward by showing that
the different domains of assimilation (e.g., cul-
tural, marital, and economic) are not always
mutually reinforcing and, in fact, can be at odds
with each other. Specifically, economic assimila-
tion, in the sense of upward mobility, can actually
be increased through ethnic retention.
For example, Zhou and Bankston (1998) mix
ethnographic and quantitative school testing data
to argue that Vietnamese students in a poor
neighborhood of New Orleans performed well
in school despite their impoverished material cir-
cumstances and low human capital when they
became deeply involved in family and Vietnam-
ese Catholic institutions that discouraged the
adoption of the putatively “oppositional culture”
of urban youth in the neighborhood. Zhou and
Bankston help refine the assimilation program,
even though their study only analyzes a tiny pro-
portion of contemporary US immigrants, by
adopting the logic of the crucial case. It is com-
monly held that Asians tend to do well on educa-
tional measures in the United States relative to
other immigrant groups because of their gener-
ally higher levels of human capital. The case of
4 Ethnographic Analysis
Vietnamese in New Orleans was a good test of
this proposition, because this population was gen-
erally low in human capital even as children
tended to do well in school.
The question still remains how ethnographers
know if what they find are just “outliers.” If the
case is just a product of rare conjuncture, the
research program is not threatened. There are at
least three complementary strategies for
assessing representativeness (see Hammersley
1992). The first is collaboration via contempora-
neous or serial ethnographies that capture a
greater range of variation than is possible in one
researcher’s project. For example, Levitt (2003)
conducted research on the role of religion in
contemporary “transnational life” by working
with colleagues in India, Ireland, Brazil, and the
Dominican Republic. The second strategy is
using existing statistics to assess the degree of
representativeness of a case, as ethnographers
often do using census data (e.g., Guarnizo
et al. 1999). The third is combining ethnographic
and survey evidence gathered either on one’s own
or in collaboration. The ongoing Mexican Migra-
tion Project “ethnosurveys” (Massey 1987) of
more than 100 migrant sending communities,
co-directed by demographer Douglas Massey
and anthropologist Jorge Durand, are a premier
example of this sort of collaboration. Armed with
quantitative data on how representative a case is
of a larger category, it is possible to convincingly
adopt another strategy for developing a crucial
case (Eckstein 1975). Knowing that a case is
highly atypical can be grounds for generalizing
if the case is an extreme crystallization of some
theoretically significant phenomenon. If a theo-
retical prediction does not apply to the extreme
case, it is unlikely to apply anywhere.
The utility of using a single case or small set of
cases to advance a research program is positively
related to the degree of the theory’s determinism
and inversely related to the scope of the theory.
According to a Popperian (1968) logic of deter-
ministic laws, a single case of negation is not a
fatal blow to the research program if a secondary
postulate consistent with the core explains the
anomaly. But Popperian formulations are delib-
erately made to be easier to falsify with a few
negative cases than probabilistic theories. If
“laws” are conceived in probabilistic terms
(Berk 1988), as they generally are even in the
grander versions of social scientific theory, par-
ticular negative cases can still be useful for
advancing general theoretical claims under two
conditions. Negative cases are most useful when
the gap is large between the theoretical prediction
and the outcome, and an examination of the case
is the basis of expanding a theory’s range of
explanation (Emigh 1997). Research programs
are not negated simply by the discovery of
disconfirming evidence, but rather when compet-
ing research programs offer greater explanatory
power (Lakatos 1978). Thus, a single ethno-
graphic study cannot disprove a research pro-
gram, but to the extent that the case refines an
existing program or contributes to a competing
program, an ethnographic study can make a the-
oretical contribution that indirectly warrants
claims applicable beyond the cases studied.
Ethnographies are less suited to falsify
grander, even a historical, theories, like the theo-
ries of neoclassical economics, new economics of
migration, and cumulative causation seeking to
explain the generation and persistence of migra-
tion across many contexts (Massey et al. 1993).
The inherently limited range of ethnographic
cases means they are poorly suited vehicles for
trying to reconfigure these broader theories, even
if ethnographic studies do generate important
insights into relevant processes and raise ques-
tions leading to more general formulations. Case
studies are most useful in pushing forward theo-
ries that are restricted in their historical scope, for
example, the “segmented assimilation” thesis
that seeks to account for the experience of the
contemporary second generation of American
immigrants. Theoretically oriented ethnographic
work is thus most useful when it is close to the
scale of the theory it seeks to refine.
References
Berk R (1988) Causal inference for sociological data. In:
Smelser NJ (ed) The handbook of sociology. Sage,
Newbury Park
Ethnographic Analysis
Blumer H (1939/1969) An appraisal of Thomas and
Znaniecki’s the polish peasant in Europe and America.
In: Blumer H (ed) Symbolic interactionism: perspec-
tive and method. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall
Burawoy M (ed) (1991) Ethnography unbound: power and
resistance in the modern metropolis. University of
California Press, Berkeley
de Munck VC (2002) Contemporary issues and challenges
for comparativists: an appraisal. Anthropol Theory
2:5–19
Eckstein H (1975) Case study and theory in political
science. In: Greenstein FI, Polsby NW (eds) Handbook
of political science, vol 7. Addison-Wesley, Reading
Emerson RM (ed) (2001) Contemporary field research:
perspectives and formulations, 2nd edn, Prospect
Heights. Waveland Press, Long Grove
Emigh RJ (1997) The power of negative thinking: the use
of negative case methodology in the development of
sociological theory. Theory Soc 26:649–684
Glick Schiller N (2003) The centrality of ethnography in
the study of transnational migration. In: Foner N -
(ed) American arrivals: anthropology engages the
new immigration. School of American Research
Press, Santa Fe
Gluckman M (1961) Ethnographic data in British social
anthropology. Sociol Rev 9:5–17
Guarnizo LE, S´anchez AI, Roach EM (1999) Mistrust,
fragmented solidarity, and transnational migration:
Colombians in New York City and Los Angeles.
Ethn Racial Stud 22:367–396
Hammersley M (1992) What’s wrong with ethnography?
Methodological explorations. Routledge, London
Hannerz U (2003) Being there . . . and there . . . and there!
Reflections on multi-site ethnography. Ethnography
4:201–216
Lakatos I (1978) The methodology of scientific research
programmes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
5
Levitt P (2003) You know, Abraham was really the first
immigrant: religion and transnational migration. Int
Migr Rev 37:847–874
Lieberson S (1992) Small N‘s and big conclusions: an
examination of the reasoning in comparative studies
based on small numbers of cases. In: Ragin CC, Becker
H (eds) What is a case? Exploring the foundations of
social inquiry. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Marcus GE (1995) Ethnography in/of the world system:
the emergence of multi-sited ethnography. Annu Rev
Anthropol 24:95–117
Massey DS (1987) The ethnosurvey in theory and prac-
tice. Int Migr Rev 21:1498–1522
Massey DS, Arango J, Hugo G, Kouaouci A, Pellegrino A,
Taylor JE (1993) Theories of international migration: a
review and appraisal. Popul Dev Rev 19:431–466
Merton RK (1972) Insiders and outsiders: a chapter in the
sociology of knowledge. Am J Sociol 78:9–47
Popperian KR (1968) The logic of scientific discovery,
2nd edn. Harper & Row, New York
Ragin CC (1987) The comparative method: moving
beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Univer-
sity of California Press, Berkeley
Sayad A (2004) The suffering of the immigrant. David
Macey (trans). Polity Press, Cambridge
Smith RC (2005) Mexican New York: the transnational
lives of new immigrants. University of California
Press, Berkely
Thomas WI, Znaniecki W (1927) The Polish peasant in
Europe and America. Knopf, New York
Tilly C (1998) Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of
California Press
Zhou M, Bankston CL (1998) Growing up American: how
Vietnamese children adapt to life in the United States.
Russell Sage, New York
M
Measuring Internal Migration:
Retrospective Self-Report
Matthew Hall
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Keywords
Internal migration; Domestic migration; Migra-
tion measurement
Definition
The direct retrospective self-report cross-
sectional method is a common approach for
detecting and measuring migration that is based
on a comparison of survey respondents’ current
and prior places of residence. In its most basic
form, “migrants” are those whose current and
former places of residence differ. The method is
highly flexible as it can be applied to various
observation units (e.g., persons and households),
can be easily aggregated (e.g., to those living in a
particular region or possessing some demo-
graphic characteristic), can identify both recent
and more distant migration events, and can cap-
ture moves at various spatial scales.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_93-1
Concept and Usage
The retrospective approach to migration is likely
the most widely used method for estimating
migration and is employed extensively to evalu-
ate gross and net flows across areas, particularly
in the United States where administrative data on
migration is limited. The widespread use of this
method is due to its many key strengths: First, the
approach is simple to implement, requiring, in its
simplest form, only two questions – i.e., where do
you currently live? and where did you previously
live? – that can be incorporated easily onto sur-
vey questionnaires. Second, the method allows
migration events to be detected without actually
observing them and can thus be applied as part of
a survey administered at only a single point in
time. Its ease of implementation and efficiency
allow it to be administered to large samples,
which make it possible to summarize migration
flows at and between different geographic scales
(e.g., across particular states, counties, or neigh-
borhoods). Another advantage of the retrospec-
tive approach is its use in constructing migration
histories. Like the more common marriage histo-
ries, migration histories allow researchers to
track the timing and locations of migration events
and can be constructed over a life history or a
more limited time span (e.g., since adulthood).
Despite these major strengths, the method has
several weaknesses that limit its complete
2 Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report
usefulness. Unlike panel-based migration
approaches (see “▶ Measuring Internal Migra-
tion Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data” in
this volume), retrospective survey instruments
are prone to recall error – i.e., the potential to
omit or misreport previous experiences or events
(Bound et al. 2001). While memory errors are less
common for physical moves than for other less-
significant life events (e.g., wage change, voting
behavior), they can bias migration estimates, par-
ticularly those assessing short-distance or tempo-
rary moves or those that occurred in the distant
past. Evaluation research has demonstrated that
migration-related recall errors are reduced for the
better educated and are less likely to occur when
migration events correspond with major life tran-
sitions (Smith and Duncan 2003). Memory errors
also increase as the number of episodes or events
grows – an important consideration in the design
of survey instruments (Dex 1995). An additional
limitation to the retrospective method is that, in
its most basic two-question format, multiple
moves are not captured and returning migrants
can be wrongly identified as non-migrants. As an
illustration, consider that a New York resident
who moved to Florida in 1996 before returning
to New York in 1999 would have been missed by
the question in the 2000 Census inquiring about
migration over the prior 5 years. In addition to
these limitations that threaten the validity of
migration estimates, cross-sectional approaches
typically do not collect sociodemographic infor-
mation on survey respondents preceding migra-
tion events. Thus, while retrospective questions
indicate that long-distance (interstate) moves are
more common among college-educated,
divorced, and higher-income persons (Ihrke and
Faber 2012), they do not indicate whether educa-
tion, marital status, and income are causes or
consequences of migration. Lastly, when used
to calculate migration risk pools (i.e., the denom-
inator in migration rates), the retrospective
approach assumes that the sample drawn from
the cross section (at time t) is the representative
of the population at risk of moving (at time t-k).
Application
Because the cross-sectional approach to measur-
ing migration is cost-effective and can be admin-
istered to large samples, its use is ubiquitous. In
North America, retrospective migration ques-
tions have been asked on censuses in Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. More recently,
1-year migration questions are included in both
the American Community Survey and the
National Household Survey, the replacements to
long-form census questionnaires in the United
States and Canada, respectively. It is also used
in the Current Population Survey, and most major
surveys will, at a minimum, include questions on
current place of residence and place of birth.
Survey questions typically ask, as on the Ameri-
can Community Survey, “Did this person live in
this house or apartment 1 year ago?” If the answer
is “no,” then survey respondents are instructed to
provide the address of past residence. The 2011
ACS shows, for example, that 1.5 % of New York
State residents migrated from another US state in
the last year. The ACS also collects data on place
of birth and show, again for New York, that
11.8 % of 2011 residents were born in another
US state. These aggregated data are used to cal-
culate gross in-, out-, and net migration flows and
rates and to assess streams across areas (e.g.,
patterns of migration between the 62 counties in
New York).
Demographers and other social scientists have
used the cross-sectional approach to explore a
variety of migration-related research topics. It
has been used to study the Great Migration of
blacks to northern cities (Tolnay 1998), their
more recent return to the south (Frey 2004), and
the movement of Latinos to new destination areas
(Lichter and Johnson 2009). The method has
been applied in research to understand whether
welfare policies trigger poverty migration
(Schram et al. 1998), how interstate moves affect
children’s educational progress (Long 1975), and
how migration induces social tolerance (Wilson
1991).
Measuring Internal Migration: Retrospective Self-Report
References
Bound J, Brown C, Mathiowetz N (2001) Measurement
error in survey data (pdf). In: Heckman J, Leamer
E (eds) Handbook of econometrics, vol 5. North
Holland, Amsterdam
Dex S (1995) The reliability of recall data: a literature
review. Bulletin De Methodologie Sociologique
49:58–89
Frey WH (2004) The New Great Migration: black Amer-
icans return to the south, 1965–2000, Living Cities
Census Survey. Brookings Institution, Washington,
DC
Ihrke D, Faber CS (2012) Geographic mobility: 2005 to
2010, Current Population Reports, P20-567. US
Census Bureau, Washington
3
Lichter DT, Johnson KM (2009) Immigrant gateways and
Hispanic migration to new destinations. Int Migr Rev
43:496–518
Long L (1975) Does migration interfere with children’s
progress in school? Sociol Educ 48:369–381
Schram SF, Nitz L, Krueger G (1998) Without cause of
effect: reconsidering welfare migration as a policy
problem. Am J Polit Sci 42:210–230
Smith JP, Thomas D (2003) Remembrances of things past:
test-retest reliability of retrospective migration histo-
ries. J R Stat Soc Ser 166:23–49
Tolnay SE (1998) Educational selection in the migration
of southern blacks, 1880–1990. Soc Forces
77:487–514
Wilson TC (1991) Urbanism, migration, and tolerance: a
reassessment. Am Sociol Rev 56:117–123
U
Using Registration Data to Measure
International and Internal Migration
in the European Union
Shushanik Makaryan
Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
PA, USA
Definition
The European Commission Regulation (EC) No
862/2007, issued in 2007, makes it mandatory for
all European Union (EU) member states to report
international migration statistics. In its recom-
mendations to make international migration sta-
tistics compatible with the United Nations (1998)
definitions, the Eurostat – the Directorate-
General of the European Commission in charge
of the statistical information from EU member
states – conceptualizes an international migrant
according to the United Nations (1998) definition
of a long-term migrant: a person who for at least
12 months changes his/her usual residence, i.e.,
“the place at which a person normally spends the
daily period of rest. . .” (Regulation (EC) No
862/2007). Because this definition is based on
the previous place of residence, the concept
I thank Jennifer Van Hook and Gordon De Jong for their
useful comments on earlier versions of this entry and
David Reichel for his advice on locating data sources and
most recent policy research on migration statistics of the
European Union.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_94-1
includes the international migration both from
one EU member state to another and from/to
European Union to non-EU states. Accordingly,
three categories of international migrants are
included in the statistic and are distinguished by
their citizenship. These three categories are EU
citizens who migrate to another EU member
state, citizens of a particular member state who
return to their country of citizenship (i.e., return
citizens), and non-EU citizens (Herm 2008). To
define short-term migration, which is not man-
datory to be reported to the Eurostat, the EU
member states again rely on the United Nations
(1998) definition: a change of place of residence
for at least 3 months but not more than 12 months.
In contrast to international migration, internal
migration statistics describe only the migration
contained within the same member state. The UN
(1998) definitions are also used to compile data
on internal migration. The Regulation (EC) No
862/2007 specifies the following sources for
migration statistics: administrative and judicial
records and registers, population registers,
censuses, sample surveys, and other appropriate
methods.
Overview
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has
initiated a number of policy initiatives to facili-
tate legal migration of EU and third-country cit-
izens within the EU. To emphasize the benefits
2 Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU
that migration can bring to EU local communities
and member states, the EU policies have increas-
ingly framed legal migration of labor migrants as
mobility. However, this conceptualization
should not be confused with statistical conceptu-
alization of migration upon which all migration
statistics of the EU are compiled.
Prior to 2007, the data on international immi-
gration and emigration flows in the EU were
submitted to Eurostat based on a “gentlemen’s
agreement,” with no legal binding (Eurostat
metadata n.d.a). Statistics on international emi-
gration were compiled by only sex and for immi-
gration also by country of birth (Eurostat
Metadata n.d.a).
In 2007 Regulation EC No 862/2007 aimed to
harmonize statistics on international migration
and made their reporting mandatory for all EU
member states. Since 2008 the data are reported
by age, sex, citizenship, country of birth, country
of previous/next residence of a migrant, and refer
to the calendar year (Eurostat Metadata n.d.a).
Many EU member states, among those the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Nor-
way, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom,
changed their migration collection systems to
achieve harmonization with the Regulation
(Eurostat 2011a).
These changes in how international migration
is reported created discontinuities in migration
statistics between pre- and post-Regulation
periods. Additionally, because the 2007 Regula-
tion aimed to collect more demographic variables
on migrants, the coverage period differs by the
variable, and the oldest series date to 1998
(Eurostat Metadata n.d.a). Moreover, interna-
tional migration statistics are not completely con-
sistent across member states even after 2007.
Even though the 2007 Regulation specified
acceptable sources of data on international
migration, the member states are free to choose
among these sources (Herm 2008), which reduces
comparability across EU member states. Further
inconsistencies arise from differences in how
international migration is operationalized, specif-
ically whether in applying the UN (1998) and EC
definitions the member states refer to the
migrant’s actual, intended, registered, or autho-
rized stay of 12 months (Eurostat 2011a).
Most member states rely on population regis-
ters (often used in combination with administra-
tive records and registers), followed by censuses
and sample surveys. Because other entries in this
volume discuss the measurement of international
and internal migration based on censuses and
surveys, this entry focuses on population registers
and administrative records.
Population Registers
Population registers are designed to maintain
demographic information on the population at
selected points in time, such as on a quarterly
basis. By tracking individuals over time and
across space, they can be used to generate both
migration stock and flow data. With improve-
ments in population registration systems, and in
some countries with transition to register-based
population censuses, population registers have
increasingly become an important source on
migration flow data. To date, most of the EU
member states rely on population registers to
generate migration statistics for both interna-
tional and internal migration of their own citizens
and noncitizen migrants.
One of the best examples is in Austria, where
the establishment of the Central Register of Res-
idence (CRR) in 2001 allowed a transition to a
full register-based population census in 2011.
Every resident of Austria is required to register
his/her place of permanent/usual residence in
Austria – i.e., the place of continuous residence
for at least 90 days – at the CRR local municipal
offices (Statistics Austria 2012:43). Homeless
persons register without indicating their dwelling
(Reeger 2009). Persons who change their place of
permanent residence are required in person or by
mail within 3 days to (de)register with the CRR
office (Reeger 2009). The registration documents
include the completed application form, the pass-
port, and the birth certificate (Reeger 2009).
Migration statistics are generated from the
population register data as follows (Lebhart
et al. 2007): upon registration at the CRR, each
Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU
individual is assigned a CRR identification num-
ber which is also the personal identification num-
ber (PIN) of the person, and the submitted
information is coded into variables about the
individual (the CRR identification number, citi-
zenship, sex, country, and date of birth), the place
of residence (record key, previous and next
address of usual residence, building ID numbers),
and the type of registration action (registration/
deregistration, birth/death, immigration/emigra-
tion within or outside of Austria, origin/destina-
tion country for migration, date and time of
record filing). The CRR submits data to the Sta-
tistics Austria, the authority in charge of national
statistics of Austria. Two files are submitted:
individual-level data on (de)registration of place
of usual residence for the previous quarter of the
calendar year (to calculate migration flows on
quarterly basis) and data on persons registered
by main place of residence (to calculate stock
population). The migration flow data include
one record for the registration in the new place
of usual residence and one record for
deregistering from the prior place of residence.
Based on the submitted data, the Statistics Aus-
tria compiles three statistical tables – of residents,
residences, and citizenships. This detail of infor-
mation allows analysts to generate statistics both
for international and internal migration by var-
ious territorial units at municipal, regional, and
national levels. The CRR data submitted to the
Statistics Austria do not contain the person’s
names, but instead include the person’s CRR
identification number. The time coverage start/
end dates for both quarterly flow and stock data
are harmonized to allow comparisons, and the
stock data are compiled along the same variables
as migration flow data.
Population registers omit illegal migrants who
do not possess residence permits. Another major
disadvantage of population registers is the
underreporting of emigration, especially interna-
tional emigration. Because the registration of a
change of place of residence is left on a self-
declaratory basis, persons who emigrate are
reluctant to register their move to continue
receiving various state benefits and to retain
their official status in the country (Reeger 2009)
3
because they are not aware of the legal require-
ments to deregister (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). In
contrast, in many EU member states, the migrants
are required to have a residence permit to work,
rent an apartment, use health and medical ser-
vices, or open a bank account (Lindhardt Olsen
2010). Thus, the incentives to register immigra-
tion are higher than the incentives to deregister
for emigration. Hence, EU international immi-
gration statistics are more accurate than the inter-
national emigration statistics.
Moreover, because migration of non-EU citi-
zens depends on the residence permit and thus is
regularly recorded, it is the migration of EU cit-
izens that is typically underreported. Usually,
data on emigration and on duration of stay abroad
are missing for their own citizens, i.e.,
co-nationals of EU member states (as high as
about 80 % in Germany in 2009; see Eurostat
2011b). Additionally, the deregistration require-
ments in EU member states also vary: in Austria,
for example, persons who emigrate abroad for
longer time periods are advised to deregister
from the place of usual residence, but this is not
obligatory (Reeger 2009), whereas in Denmark,
the person is required to deregister, but this is in
case the emigration is for more than 6 months
(Lindhardt Olsen 2010). This variation in defini-
tions and legal requirements creates additional
sources of error for emigration statistics and
cross-country comparisons within the EU. These
variations in definitions also affect immigration
statistics for return migrants as some EU member
states are not able to report return migration of
their own citizens (Herm 2008; Eurostat 2011b).
Thus, typically, EU data on international migra-
tion of non-EU citizens are more reliable than
migration data of EU citizens (Herm 2008), and
international immigration statistics are more
accurate than the international emigration
statistics.
Administrative Records
Many member states supplement or combine
population register data with alternative admin-
istrative records and registers – to estimate the
4 Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU
undeclared emigration or immigration both for
annual migration statistics and for register-based
population census results (Eurostat 2011b, c).
These administrative sources include records on
work or residence permits, national revenue and
tax service data, health insurance or social secu-
rity databases, dwelling or realty registers, unem-
ployment registers, etc. Data from the national
revenue service and the residence permits are
typically used to estimate migration of non-EU
citizens. Residence permits are authorizations
valid for a minimum of 3 months and issued to
non-EU citizens to stay legally in the EU
(Scarnicchia 2011). According to the Regulation
(EC) No 862/2007, the statistics on residence
permits are mandatory for EU member states,
should refer to the calendar year, and describe
the number of persons issued such permits (not
the number of acts issued; see Eurostat Metadata
n.d.b). However, because various administrative
registers use different definitions when recording
observations (Reinhard et al. 2010), some uncer-
tainty still remains when linking various admin-
istrative records with population registers to
estimate migration flows.
In EU Nordic countries, administrative
records play an important role in the production
of population statistics. In Denmark, for example,
population registers are linked to the Central
Business Register and the Dwelling Register
(Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Linking these three reg-
isters allows analysts to accumulate information
on the population size and the number of busi-
nesses and dwellings, to retrieve information on a
wide range of sociodemographic attributes of a
person, as well as to impute missing observations
on a variable (Lindhardt Olsen 2010). Because
emigration data are frequently underreported, as
discussed above, tax records can be linked to the
person through the Central Business Register and
the population register and can help reveal emi-
grations when no income tax is reported for the
person and the requests to submit tax report
remain unattended. But typically, this type of
information becomes available with some sub-
stantial delay (Lindhardt Olsen 2010), as can be
the case with tax data. These missing data are
imputed in the database eventually for previous
years. This is another reason that immigration
statistics have higher accuracy than
emigration data.
References
Eurostat (2011a) Migrants in Europe: a statistical portrait
of the first and second generation. Publications Office
of the European Union, Luxemburg. http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/5727749/KS-31-10-
539-EN.PDF/bcf27a60-7016-4fec-98c5-e8488491ebbd.
7 Oct 2015
Eurostat (2011b) Annual migration statistics data collec-
tion, reference year 2009: summary of data sources used
for immigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an9.pdf.
13 Mar 2013
Eurostat (2011c) Annual migration statistics data collec-
tion, reference year 2009: summary of data sources
used for emigration rates. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_flow_esms_an10.
pdf. 13 Mar 2013
Eurostat metadata (n.d.a) International migration flows:
reference metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_flow_esms.htm. Accessed
on 12 Mar 2013
Eurostat metadata (n.d.b) Residence permits: reference
metadata, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITY_SDDS/en/migr_res_esms.htm. Accessed on
12 Mar 2013
Herm A (2008) Population and social conditions. In:
EUROSTAT statistics in focus, 98/2008
Lebhart G, Neustadter C, Kytir J (2007) The new popula-
tion register at statistics Austria: conceptualization and
methodology for register-based flow and stock statis-
tics. Aust J Stat 36(4):277–289
Lindhardt Olsen A (2010) Information on migrants in
register-based censuses: migration data in the Danish
register-based statistical system. Working Paper
15 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert
Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The
Hague, 10–11 May 2010
Reeger U (2009) Austria. In: Fassmann H, Reeger U,
Sievers W (eds) Statistics and reality: concepts and
measurements of migration in Europe. IMISCOE
report. University Press, Amsterdam
Regulation (EC) No 862/2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023:
0029:EN:PDF. Accessed on 9 Mar 2013
Reinhard F, Schwerer E, Berka C, Moser M, Humer
S (2010) Quality of registers: quality assessment for
register–based statistics in Austria. Working Paper
4 presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat Expert
Group Meeting on Register-Based Censuses, The
Hague, 10–11 May 2010
Scarnicchia L (2011) Residence permits issued to non-EU
citizens in 2009 for family reunification, employment
Using Registration Data to Measure International and Internal Migration in the EU 5

and education. In: EUROSTAT Statistics in Focus, United Nations (1998) Recommendations on statistics of
43/2011 international migration, papers series M, No. 58 ⁄rev.1,
Statistics Austria (2012) Wanderungsstatistik 2011: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United
Herausgegeben von Statistik Austria, Wien Nations, New York
N
Naturalization
Sara Wallace Goodman
University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
Definition
Naturalization is the primary process by which
immigrants become citizens in a host society. It is
defined as any acquisition after birth of a citizen-
ship not previously held by a person and requires
an application and decision by public authorities.
While there are many procedures for obtaining
citizenship (e.g., registration, declaration, auto-
matic, and other ex lege procedures), naturaliza-
tion is the most visible because of its connection
to immigration policy and its regulatory effect on
the size and composition of the national political
community. In fact, naturalization is the most
densely regulated and most politicized aspect of
citizenship law. Its application ranges from ordi-
nary, residence-based immigrants to refugees,
spouses, as well as minors. The material and
procedural conditions that comprise this journey
can make acquisition either a liberal, relatively
easy progression from settlement to citizenship or
a restrictive, onerous process full of impediments
that may not lead to citizenship at all.
Detailed Description
Conceptually, naturalization is understood as a
transformative process whereby an immigrant,
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_101-2
or more generally someone outside of the
national political community, “becomes natural”
by becoming a full member of that community
through citizenship acquisition. However, “natu-
ralization” is a paradoxical expression; there is
nothing “natural” about this process of member-
ship acquisition. This contradiction is immedi-
ately visible when adopting a legal perspective,
where the process of naturalization requires legal
regulation. In this latter context, naturalization is
the process of acquisition where a person applies
for citizenship to the state represented by relevant
public authorities. This emphasis on the aspiring
citizen’s process of application is key. Unlike
other procedures which require only a unilateral
act of oral or written declaration, naturalization is
conditional on a decision by relevant public
authorities. In other words, applicants cannot
merely declare themselves to be citizens; their
applications are subject to conditions and evalu-
ations. Acquisition through naturalization can
either be a legal entitlement, by which public
authorities must grant citizenship to the applicant
if and when the relevant conditions specified by
law have been acknowledged as being success-
fully completed, or a discretionary act. Discre-
tionary naturalization is obviously the more
precarious and contingent of the two types,
where even upon successful completion of rele-
vant conditions, public authorities reserve for
themselves the right to deny citizenship to an
applicant. In both cases, naturalization is condi-
tional in the sense that it requires an individual
2 Naturalization

Naturalization, Table 1 Comparison of naturalization policies across postcolonial and European states
Residence
duration Allows dual Citizenship Administrative Right of
Country (years) citizenship Language test fee appeal
Europe
Austria 10 No Yes Yes €1010 plus Yes
provincial fees
Denmark 9 No Yes Yes 1000 DKK No
(€133)
France 5 Yes Yes No, None Yes
assimilation
interview
Germany 8 Only for non-EU Yes Yes €255 Yes
citizens
Netherlands 5 If born in the Yes Yes €810 Yes
Netherlands or have
Dutch spouse
UK 5 Yes Yes Yes £851 GBP No
(€1018)
Postcolonial
Australia 4 Yes Yes Yes 300 AUD Yes
($316 USD)
Canada 3 (1,095 Yes Yes Yes 200 CAD Yes, but not
days) in the ($203 USD) of federal
past 4 decisions
New 5 Yes Yes No 470 NZD Yes
Zealand ($395 USD)
United 5 Yes Yes Yes $680 USD Yes
States

action by the applicant as well as a positive
response by public authorities.
Naturalization allows immigrants not only to
enjoy formal rights and protections through the
legal status of citizenship but also to become
members of a national political community
through citizenship status. Therefore, it holds
strong significance for both the receiving state
and the aspiring citizen. From the state’s perspec-
tive, naturalization enables people to join and
therefore expand the national political commu-
nity. Changes to citizenship rules – either the
loosening or tightening of them – yield a direct
effect on the contours of national membership.
From the immigrant’s perspective, naturalization
in most states is still the key to full rights of
citizenship. Citizenship matters for a number of
reasons, including obtaining voting rights and
other forms of political participation, access to
certain job opportunities, free movement, rights
to family unification, etc. Also, because citizen-
ship represents full membership to the state,
immigrants may aspire to achieve a sense of
civic belonging through naturalization.
The discipline of identifying, comparing, and
explaining citizenship policies across advanced
industrialized states is a growing preoccupation
among scholars of political science, sociology,
and legal studies. In its formative stage, this aca-
demic practice drew heavily from the nationalism
literature and concepts of nationhood. (For an
example of this, see Brubaker (1992).) This ren-
dered a classificatory system of citizenship policy
that was largely dichotomous, referring to state
policies as either ethnic or civic. More recent
works have presented alternatives to this nation-
hood framework by employing more
membership-neutral terminology where policies
Naturalization
are described not by invoking a sense of belong-
ing or by their outcome but by the process itself.
These works include the constellation of both
policies and practices that determine citizenship
acquisition. (Work illustrative of this approach
includes Bauböck et al. (2006); Bloemraad
(2006), Howard (2009), also see Koopmans
et al. (2005).) Many of the fine-grained descrip-
tions and nuanced comparisons of citizenship
today rely on a closer look at the mechanics of
naturalization, recognizing that the process is a
complex aggregate, comprised of many small
policies and procedures. These polices include,
but are not limited to, residency duration, renun-
ciation of previous citizenship, clean criminal
records, evidence of integration (defined by lan-
guage acquisition, knowledge of the country,
demonstration of values, etc.), sufficient income,
as well as procedures such as processing time,
administrative fees, and process/right of appeal,
all of which affect the ultimate experience and
rate of naturalization.
In comparing these different policy dimen-
sions across the major, immigrant-receiving soci-
eties, we see significant variation, portending
differences in both the priorities of and pressures
for inclusion. Table 1 compares a handful of
naturalization policies – both material and
procedural – for a select number of traditional
immigration countries (the “postcolonial” states)
and European states, who have only transitioned
into robust immigrant-receiver states in the post-
war period. (For more on policies of naturaliza-
tion in Europe, see the EUDO Citizenship
Observatory website eudo-citizenship.eu. For
more in-depth comparisons on polices across a
larger number of European countries, see in par-
ticular Goodman (2010), RSCAS/EDUO-CIT-
Comp. 2010/7.)
Beginning with residence, states exhibit a sig-
nificant amount of difference in the duration of
residence required of potential citizens. At a max-
imum level, Article 6 of the 1997 European Con-
vention on Nationality (ECN) stipulates that no
more than 10 years of residence should be
required. At a minimum, Belgium has required
3 years of residence since a 2000 revision to its
citizenship law (a 2012 change may raise this
3
period to 5 years). No other state in Europe main-
tains residence durations lower than 5 years. By
comparison, all postcolonial states boast low
durations of residence. Moreover, it should be
noted that the length of residence condition in
citizenship law does not mean that every immi-
grant who has lived in a country for so many
years can apply for naturalization. Many coun-
tries create additional hurdles by requiring
periods of uninterrupted residence or only
counting the years with a permanent residence
permit, which may itself take up to 5 years to
acquire in a number of European states (as is the
case in Austria).
Dual citizenship is a dimension of naturaliza-
tion that is often at the center of vigorous political
debate, both internally among political parties
and across borders between the conferring and
sending states. On the one hand, allowing citizens
to hold multiple passports provides increased
mobility and enables expatriates to maintain con-
nections with their country of birth or heritage
(as was vociferously advocated by former Presi-
dent Vicente Fox on behalf of Mexicans living in
the United States). Dual citizenship can also
facilitate integration by encouraging immigrants
to naturalize and participate politically in their
new country without compromising other con-
nections. According to this view, compulsory
renunciation may not only stymie one’s personal
integration but also generate a disincentive to
citizenship acquisition altogether. On the other
hand, critics of dual citizenship claim also that it
undercuts immigrant integration. In maintaining
a second citizenship or identity, immigrants are
never fully moored to their host country. Dual
citizenship raises not only the specter of dual
loyalty but is also said to create conflicts between
states or an unfair distribution of the benefits and
burdens of citizenship because of the multiple
rights or multiple duties that dual citizens have
compared to mono-nationals. In the sample of
countries in the table above, all of the traditional
immigration countries allow for dual citizenship.
The United States does not have a de jure provi-
sion requiring renunciation of other citizenship
and therefore establishes multiple citizenship de
facto. Within Europe, only Austria and Denmark
4 Naturalization
have firm requirements for renunciation. In the
Netherlands, after a period of allowing dual citi-
zenship (1992–1997), dual citizenship can still be
claimed by those applicants born in the Nether-
lands or by spouses married to Dutch citizens.
Language and citizenship tests can be catego-
rized together as types of integration or cultural
requirements for naturalization. While language
has long been a requirement for citizenship in
several states in Europe and beyond (Denmark
since the nineteenth century; the United States
since the early twentieth), the introduction of
citizenship tests to assess country knowledge is
a new facet of naturalization in many states.
Indeed, only the United States and Canada
could be considered experienced practitioners of
citizenship tests by comparison. Every European
state in Table 1 has only recently introduced a
citizenship test (as well as integration tests for
acquisition for permanent residence). (For more
on integration requirements in Europe, see Good-
man (2012).) Australia also is a recent addition to
the list of test givers. However, not all states use
citizenship tests to assess integration or knowl-
edge. France, for example, has long maintained
an assimilation interview in which the
interviewing officer assesses an applicant’s
adherence to Republican values as well as knowl-
edge of social and political rights. While former
President Nicolas Sarkozy passed legislation
introducing a citizenship test for naturalization
in France, plans were subsequently scrapped by
the new Socialist government. Attempts to
increase the period of residence and make more
onerous other conditions for British citizenship
(like adding a community service requirement)
under Labour leadership were also rejected when
the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coali-
tion came into power. These attempts at policy
change reveal the extent to which citizenship is
often politicized and thus susceptible to revision
with changes of government.
Finally, it is meaningful to consider and com-
pare variation in administrative practices for nat-
uralization. Most obviously, the “price” of
citizenship is quite divergent across states.
Where administrative fees are high, naturaliza-
tion is not only lengthy and difficult but also
costly. And considering that applicants’ decision
to apply is strongly influenced by their expected
chances of success, administrative fees factor
into this decision-making process. Only in Ger-
many and the Netherlands, from the list of Euro-
pean states above, is naturalization an entitlement
(instead of a discretionary procedure) if an appli-
cant satisfies all the conditions. In general, there
is an acknowledged norm to allow for a right of
appeal in response to a negative decision on an
application. Exceptions to this include Denmark
(an applicant can make a report to the ombuds-
men, but not appeal the decision of Parliament)
and the United Kingdom (which allows for judi-
cial review since 2002 and appeal for asylum
cases, but not on matters of naturalization).
This brief overview of naturalization policies
reveals patterns of both similarity and difference.
Generally speaking, some states provide for a
more facilitated naturalization process through
more inclusive policies while others maintain
higher barriers that impede a migrant’s political
incorporation. An accurate empirical picture of
naturalization policies identifies configurations
and constellations of policies, recognizing that
state practices are not dichotomously ethnic or
civic or inclusive or exclusive. Policy combina-
tions reflect a reality in which states pursue mul-
tiple policy goals for citizenship and immigration
through naturalization, and governments fre-
quently modify and reform citizenship laws to
achieve these goals. As states continue to use
naturalization to make citizens out of immigrants,
the many policy choices that shape this procedure
are consequential not just for the migrant but for
the democratic nation-state itself.
References
Bauböck R, Ersbøll E, Groenendijk K, Waldrauch
H (2006) Acquisition and loss of nationality. volume 1:
comparative analysis. Policies and trends in 15 Euro-
pean Countries, vol 1. Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam
Bloemraad I (2006) Becoming a citizen: incorporating
immigrants and refugees in the United States and Can-
ada. University of California Press, Berkeley
Brubaker R (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France
and Germany. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Naturalization
Goodman, SW (2010) Naturalisation policies in Europe:
exploring patterns of inclusion and exclusion.” In:
EUDO citizenship comparative reports. EUDO Citi-
zenship, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Stud-
ies, EUI, Florence
Goodman SW (2012) Fortifying citizenship: policy strat-
egies for civic integration in Western Europe. World
Polit 64(4):659–698
5
Howard MM (2009) The politics of citizenship in Europe.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York
Koopmans R, Statham P, Giugni M, Passy F (2005)
Contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diver-
sity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis
T
Temporary Labor Migration
Christopher Foulkes
International Organization for Migration
Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
Keywords
Circular migration; Seasonal migration;
Sojourners; Guest workers
Definitions
Temporary migration is migration to a country
that is not intended to be permanent, for a spec-
ified and limited period of time, and usually
undertaken for a specific purpose. Host countries
admit temporary migrants for the purposes of
employment, study, tourism, business activities,
and religious or cultural visits and exchanges.
This entry focuses on employment- or labour-
related temporary migration.
Temporary labor migration programs are
often referred to in host countries as guest-worker
programs. As Abella (2006, p. 5) says, “[t]he
term ‘guest workers’ is the generic label for all
migrant workers who have no right to permanent
settlement.” Within the guest-worker category,
circular migration programs are defined as pro-
grams that facilitate “the process of leaving and
then returning to one’s place of origin” (Newland
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_102-1
2009, p. 6). Again, this is a very broad term that
requires only that migrants leave their country of
origin and at some point return. Circular migra-
tion is often used in literature to describe cyclical
temporary migration, where migrants repeatedly
leave and then return to their place of origin.
In sociological literature, temporary labor
migrants are often referred to as sojourners, as
compared with settlers. Uriely defines a sojourner
as having both a general intention and concrete
plan to return to their place of origin, whereas a
settler is defined as someone with the absence of
either of these things. As such, it is possible to
equate temporary migrants with sojourners as
compared to settlers (Uriely 1994, p. 435).
Longer-term temporary migration programs
last longer than a year and do not necessarily
involve seasonal employment in the agricultural
or horticultural sectors. Under this type of guest-
worker scheme, migrants are generally annually
granted the right to remain, that is, contingent on
them remaining employed.
The Purpose of the Temporary Labor
Migration Programs
Temporary labor migration programs are used by
both countries of destination (receiving) and
countries of origin (sending) countries to address
their labor needs at various skill levels and can be
expanded or curtailed in response to changing
economic conditions, thus providing greater
2 Temporary Labor Migration
flexibility in the labor market (Abella 2006).
From the point of view of host countries, robust
and well-designed temporary labor programs for
migrants are often viewed as a safeguard mecha-
nism against illegal labor migration (e.g., the
United States of America) (Papademetriou
2013). These countries also rely on temporary
programs to satisfy labour supply shortages
when permanent immigration of foreigners, espe-
cially low-skilled ones, is not desired or socially
accepted. This is the case in many Middle-
Eastern states such as the United Arab Emirates
and Saudi Arabia (Baldwin-Edwards 2005).
Sending states, most of whom are developing
countries, participate in temporary labor pro-
grams to help their citizens find work abroad
when economic opportunities at home are lim-
ited, to tap into remittances for the country’s
economic development, and to benefit from
the enhanced qualifications and experiences of
temporary migrants who return home (Abella
2006). While generally considered a positive
phenomenon, temporary labor migration –
particularly of low-skilled migrants – tends to
leave migrants vulnerable to abuse in a foreign
country. Because temporary labor migrants’ right
to remain in their country of employment is con-
tingent on them continuing that employment,
these migrant workers are less likely to complain
when the employers violate labor and wage con-
ditions. This turns temporary migrant laborers
into “precarious workers” over whom employers
and labor users have particular and wide-ranging
mechanisms of control (Anderson 2010). In addi-
tion, local government bureaucrats and enforce-
ment agents may take advantage of the workers’
lack of language skills and cultural knowledge
and make them pay bribes. Formal temporary
labour migration programmes often come with a
contract of employment, predeparture cultural
orientation, and consular services in the country
of employment. These programmes go some way
to protecting migrant workers from being taken
advantage of by unscrupulous employers and
corrupt officials in host countries.
Temporary migration programs for employment
purposes generally take two forms: short-term,
seasonal migration programs and longer-term
migration programs.
Short-Term Programs
A subset of circular migration programs is sea-
sonal migration programs. These are circular
migration programs where the migrants are “per-
sons employed by a country other than their own
for only part of a year because the work they
perform depends on seasonal conditions”
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development 1998). Seasonal migrants typically
migrate in order to provide agricultural or horti-
cultural labor services in the on-season and return
to their country of origin in the off-season. While
seasonal migration is not a new phenomenon,
specific government policy responses to it are a
relatively recent occurrence. It has been argued
that seasonal migration “has only become a pol-
icy issue since governments have started to
expend great efforts to control movement across
their borders in ways that make spontaneous cir-
culation more difficult” (Newland 2009, p. 23).
Seasonal migrants generally do not remain in
their county of employment for longer than
9 months at a time. The governments of devel-
oped host countries are increasingly regulating
circular migrants through recognized seasonal
employer (RSE) schemes, seasonal work permits,
and specialized circular migrant visas.
One example of this is New Zealand, where an
RSE scheme has been in place since 2006 to
regulate low-skilled migrant workers from the
Pacific Islands Forum countries (including the
Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New
Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Republic of
Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu) and employers in
the horticulture and viticulture industries. Under
the scheme employers are required to be recog-
nized as seasonal employers by meeting certain
criteria, including being in sound financial state,
having human resources and workplace policies
and practices that follow a high standard, demon-
strating a commitment to hire New Zealand
Temporary Labor Migration
nationals, and having not violated relevant immi-
gration and employment laws in the past. Pacific
Island workers can then be recruited under the
RSE. There are up to 5,000 seasonal work visas
per year available under the scheme. These visas
require workers to attend predeparture orienta-
tion; are valid for up to 7 months, or 9 months
for workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu; and tie
workers to a specific location, type of work, and
employer (ILO 2008).
Longer-Term Programs
Longer-term temporary employment schemes are
common in Southeast Asia as well as in Europe
and North America and fall loosely into two
categories. One type of program facilitates the
movement of low-skilled, low-paid workers. For
instance, nationals of less developed Asian coun-
tries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Phil-
ippines arrive in more developed states such as
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia to
take construction, domestic, and manufacturing
jobs that the locals are no longer willing to do
(Appave and Cholewinski 2008, pp. 445–447).
Other programs facilitate the temporary
migration of highly paid, high-skilled workers
invited by host countries to fill skills shortages
in the information technology, aviation, engi-
neering, medicine, and academia (Appave and
Cholewinski 2008, p. 447).
The United States has in place a number of
guest-worker programs for low- and high-skilled
employment. For instance, the H-1B “specialty
occupations” visa program provides annually at
least 85,000 3-year visas to employ foreign sci-
entists, engineers, and computer programmers,
among other professionals. The H-2B program
issues 66,000 visas to foreign workers from eli-
gible countries to fill temporary nonagricultural
jobs, such as in construction, hospitality, and
landscaping.
Similarly, Singapore has well-established
longer-term temporary migrant programs for
both high- and low-skilled workers
(Abella 2006). There were an estimated
1,305,011 migrant labours in Singapore in 2010;
of them, the vast majority (87 %) were
low-skilled laborers that worked mostly in the
3
construction industry, domestic and household
services, and manufacturing and marine indus-
tries. These low-skilled workers generally come
from other Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries as well as from
China, India, and Sri Lanka. Singapore uses its
migrant-worker scheme as a policy lever to
ensure flexibility in the size of the low-skilled
migrant-worker population. Low-skilled workers
are admitted to the country provided they remain
in employment and are not allowed to bring
spouses or family members with them,
and employers are required to pay levies to the
government to retain them (Cerna 2010).
This stands in contrast with Singapore’s high-
skilled migrant laborers that mostly come from
the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and Australia, as well as from Japan and South
Korea. These migrants generally either hold
advanced degrees or specialized skills in particu-
lar fields and are granted employment passes
(types P, Q, or S) by the Singapore government.
These migrants are entitled to bring dependants
with them, and only family members of S pass-
holders are subject to a monthly levy of SGD50
(USD32). High-skilled migrants are also the only
category of labor migrant entitled to apply for
permanent residency or citizenship (Cerna 2010).
Working-Holiday Programs
Another form of temporary employment migra-
tion is the working holiday or overseas experi-
ence (OE). For instance, it is common for young,
university-educated people from Australia and
New Zealand to migrate to the United Kingdom
for up to 2 years on their OE after university
graduation. Working-holiday programs are avail-
able in many countries around the world, includ-
ing Argentina, Japan, Canada, the United States,
Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and many European
countries. These visa types are generally utilized
by well-educated young people around the world,
not necessarily for career advancement, but
rather to spend time traveling and experiencing
new places – while making enough money to
cover the basic necessities – before returning
home to begin their careers.
4 Temporary Labor Migration
References
Albella M (2006) Policies and best practices for manage-
ment of temporary migration. International Sympo-
sium on International Migration and Development,
Turin
Anderson B (2010) Migration, immigration controls and
the fashioning of precarious workers. Work Employ
Soc 24(2):300–331
Appave G, Cholewinski R (eds) (2008) World migration
report 2008: managing labor mobility in the evolving
global economy. International Organization for Migra-
tion, Geneva
Baldwin-Edwards A (2005) Migration in the Middle East
and Mediterranean. Global Commission for Migration,
Geneva, http://iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/
shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/gcim/rs/
RS5.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
Cerna (2010) Policies and practices of highly skilled
migration in times of the economic crisis. International
Labour Organization, Geneva, International Migration
Papers 99
International Labour Organization (2008) The
recognized seasonal employers scheme (RSE) New
Zealand. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/
@asia/@robangkok/documents/projectdocumentation/
wcms_120560.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2013
Newland K (2009) Circular migration and human devel-
opment, human development research paper. United
Nations Development Programme, New York, http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/newland_HDRP_2009.
pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (1998) Recommendations on statistics of inter-
national migration, revision 1, Statistical Papers,
Series M, No. 58. United Nations, New York. http://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2402
Papademetriou D (2013) The fundamentals of immigra-
tion reform. University of North Carolina, North Car-
olina, http://prospect.org/article/fundamentals-
immigration-reform. Access 18 Apr 2013
Uriely N (1994) Rhetorical ethnicity of permanent
sojourners: the case of Israeli immigrants in the Chi-
cago area. Int Sociol 9(4):431–445
Further Reading
Daly B (2005) Australian and New Zealand university
students’ participation in international exchange pro-
grams. J Stud Int Educ 9(1):26–41
Immigration New Zealand (2011) u.3.20, Immigration
New Zealand operational manual. http://www.immi
gration.govt.nz/opsmanual/43653.htm. Accessed
18 Apr 2013
Newland K, Agunias DR, Terrazas A (2008) Learning by
doing: experiences of circular migration. Migration
Policy Institute, Washington, DC
United Kingdom Border Agency (2013) Tier 5 (Youth
Mobility Scheme). http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.
uk/visas-immigration/working/tier5/government-au
thorised-exchange/. Accessed 18 Apr 2013
M
Measuring Internal Migration
Prospectively Using Longitudinal
Data
Randall Olsen1 and Elizabeth Cooksey2
1
Department of Economics, The Ohio State
University, Columbus, OH, USA
2
Department of Sociology, The Ohio State
University, Columbus, OH, USA
Definition
Internal migration may be defined as a change in
residence from one geographical unit to another.
Why Is Measuring Internal Migration
Important?
Accurately capturing a population’s spatial
mobility patterns is highly important because res-
idential moves have a direct effect upon popula-
tion distribution and are associated with
significant demographic processes across the
life course. These patterns and processes have
critical implications for policy makers at multiple
geographic levels. For example, young people
frequently move to pursue postsecondary educa-
tion or training, enter the armed forces, or take a
first step in their career. Household unions often
involve a change in residence of at least one of the
partners so that couples can live together, and this
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_104-1
may additionally involve on a job change for one
or both partners. As children near school age,
parents may decide on a different neighborhood
or city that will allow for better child outcomes,
also triggering migration. At retirement, oppor-
tunities for leisure activities or a desire to live
near grandchildren may take precedence. At the
oldest ages, there may be a need for assisted
living.
Why Is Measuring Internal Migration So
Difficult?
Whereas a birth or death is readily distinguish-
able, a move can be difficult to classify and hence
measure. This is especially true for internal
migration and most residential moves occur
within the United States. Whether a move counts
as migration will depend on how we choose to
incorporate other factors into our decision mak-
ing: the distance between origin and destination,
the length of stay at the destination, and the
reason for moving. Precise measurement may
also prove elusive. In 1970, a United Nations
manual on “methods of measuring internal
migration” United Nations, 1970 noted that it
would only be possible to tabulate moves by
distance covered if exact information was avail-
able on points of both origin and destination. At
the time, most data on people’s moves were gath-
ered retrospectively and hence were open to prob-
lems of recall error, a general lack of specificity
2 Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data
regarding location, and an inability to also collect
data on other life events that occurred both before
and after moving. In order to really understand
how migration fits into people’s life histories, the
complexity of migratory patterns demands com-
prehensive data gathered prospectively over the
life course.
The National Longitudinal Surveys
as a Data Resource
One of the best resources currently available to
measure internal migration over a significant
span of the life course is the geocode data in the
1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(http://www.nlsinfo.org/site/nlsy79/docs/79html/
Geocode79/geotoc.htm). Respondents provide
their address at each interview, and these have
since been geocoded to as precise a latitude and
longitude as possible. By applying to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, users can obtain a restricted
access version of the data containing created
“matrix-of-moves” variables that measure the
distance from each survey address to every other
reported address. Using these “matrix-of-moves”
variables makes it possible to summarize the
movement that occurs over many years. Further,
because social, economic, and behavioral infor-
mation were also collected contemporaneously,
moves of varying distance can be placed in the
context within which migratory decisions were
made. For example, when one considers the
depressed labor market in 2013, a feasible way
to find work if living in a chronically depressed
area may well be to move. However, are people at
higher risk of being out of work also less likely to
migrate? The NLSY79 data can help answer such
questions also taking past experiences into
account.
Descriptive Analysis of Internal
Migration Using the NLSY79
Moving and Returning
Although short-term studies that gather informa-
tion on every move made are important to
undertake, so too are studies that take a longer-
term life cycle orientation. For example, a person
who bounces back and forth between two loca-
tions every couple of years would appear to be
highly mobile which in a sense they are. How-
ever, a longer-term study with a life cycle orien-
tation may show this pattern of moving to be
closely connected to spells of employment and
to evidence a much more limited degree of mobil-
ity once return migration is taken into account.
Below we use the NLSY79 matrix-of-moves data
to assess the migratory behavior of 5,207 respon-
dents who had given an interview in each of the
24 rounds of interviewing from 1979 (at ages
14–21) through 2010. One might think this
restriction would rule out frequent movers. How-
ever, it is relatively rare that an NLSY79 respon-
dent cannot be found. Nonresponse is primarily a
problem of cooperation rather than a lack of
contact.
We begin with the question: how much do
people really move? For illustrative purposes
we classify a “change of location” to be a move
outside a radius of 25 miles, hypothesizing that
such a move would potentially cause a change in
labor market location and disruption to social
connections and hence be economically and
socially significant. We also characterize
“return” migration as any move to a location
within 25 miles of a previous location. Note that
if a person makes several short moves to the west
and then returns to their original location, which
is by now more than 25 miles from their most
recent location, that move will be counted as both
a “move” and a “return.” Using this standard,
more than half of our sample did not move more
than 25 miles between their mid/late teens and
their late 40s/early 50s. Another 19 % only
“move” once, 14 % twice, and 15 % three or
more times. Accounting for return migration
changes the story, however, as over 81 % of our
respondents have lived in two or fewer “places”
their entire adolescent and young adult lives,
where unique places are at least 25 miles apart.
Of those who move at least once, about half
return to within 25 miles of a previous residence.
Two-thirds of people, who had a long distance
move and never returned to a previous location,
Measuring Internal Migration Prospectively Using Longitudinal Data 3

Measuring Internal
70.0%
Migration Prospectively HGC 14 & over
Using Longitudinal Data,
Fig. 1 Number of 25-mile 60.0% HGC Under 14
moves by highest grade
completed 50.0%

40.0%

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

had only one 25+ mile move. For all the mobility
that occurs within the United States, it appears
that we stay pretty close to home base and only
about 8 % of our sample population moved four
or more times.
Patterns of Mobility by Population
Subgroups
Mobility for youth in the late 1970s over the next
30 years of their lives does not appear to be
gender linked or differ significantly by
income – at least when median income is the cut
point for two comparison groups. There are some
differences in the number of 25-mile moves
between blacks and whites where whites are
slightly more likely to report more moves. More
of a difference is seen by education, however, as
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Highly educated people are quite mobile while
those with fewer than 14 years of education are
more likely to stay put and about half as likely to
make four or more moves to new locations. These
patterns may reflect the fact that those with sub-
stantial education place themselves in a national
labor market and are more likely to move longer
distances not only to gain their education in the
first place but also to exploit post-educational
opportunities. A corollary of lower mobility by
the less educated is that local labor market dis-
ruptions in the form of losses of employment at
local employers generate problems for the less
educated as they are less likely to move toward
better labor market opportunities.
References
United Nations (1970) Manual VI: methods of measuring
internal migration. United Nations Publications, New
York
R

Refugees Defined a massive diaspora to the New World seeking

both political freedom and economic prospects.
Peter I. Rose (See Miller and Wagner 1994.)
Smith College, Northampton, MA, USA Still, the most common cause of sudden flight
is the targeting of individuals or groups – tribal,
racial, religious, political, or ideological – to
Definition which they belong. This may result in their actual
expulsion or more often the decision to escape
lest those singled out be arrested, segregated,
Refugees are people who have been forced to leave
their homelands due to persecution, war, or natu- incarcerated, or killed, sometimes in genocidal
ral disasters and seek asylum in other countries. campaigns known today as “ethnic cleansing.”
Sometimes people caught in the crossfire of
Other migrants are those who go from one coun-
wars and other conflicts that have little to do
try to another seeking economic opportunities
with who they are also seek safer havens in
where they are thought to abound. When such a
other lands.
contemplated move is anticipated to be a perma-
In popular parlance, those who are victims of
nent one, or what is commonly known as
calamities ranging from famine to earthquakes
emigration. Debating and planning to leave
and sudden storms – hurricanes, tornadoes, tsu-
one’s homeland usually involves a complex
namis, and floods – are also called refugees, but
calculus, weighing the centripetal attraction of a
the term is more commonly used to refer to those
particular destination as well as centrifugal fac-
who fit the formal definition recognized by the
tors, those that draw them away and those that
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
make people hesitate to leave hearth and home.
(UNHCR), that is, as border crossers “with a
Refugees rarely have a choice. Their departure is
well-founded fear of persecution,” in other
usually an absolute necessity in order to survive
words, those who are “forced to flee.”
either man-made conflicts or natural disasters.
According to reliable statistics, in 2013, there
To be sure, sometimes there is a conflation of
were 45.2 million forcibly displaced people
“push” and “pull” factors. One classic example is
worldwide at the end of 2012. At that time,
that of beleaguered Irish farmers, who, toiling
three quarters of the world’s refugees were to be
under the heavy-handed rule of English landlords
found in nations neighboring their countries of
under near serf-like conditions, were devastated
origin, with more than half (55 %) of all refugees
by the potato blight that swept Ireland in the
worldwide coming from five countries:
middle of the nineteenth century. Millions joined

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_105-1
2 Refugees Defined
Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan
(UNHCR 2012).
In addition to those who do find a way to cross
into other lands, there are many, many others
under threat or under fire who cannot exit from
their beleaguered countries. They are sometimes
said to be “in a refugee-like situation” and are
otherwise known by the apt phrase used by inter-
national agencies as being “internally displaced
persons,” or “IDPs.” Their plight is in many ways
the most precarious of all for they often remain
captives of the very regimes that may have driven
them from their homes and otherwise sought
ways to oppress them through humiliation, ostra-
cism, mass internment, and, in some cases, mass
murder. The same source cited earlier indicates
that, at the end of 2012, there were 15.4 million
people recognized as “official” refugees in the
world, plus 937,000 asylum seekers and 28.8
million internally displaced persons. By 2015
these figures had more than doubled.
Expellees and Escapees
In ancient times, many of those seen as threats by
those in power were chased into the
countryside – or “into the wilderness”– or sent
abroad. They were known as exiles. The word
itself comes from the Latin exilium, meaning
banishment.
Then as now others under threat of persecution
took it upon themselves to get away from oppres-
sive political regimes, powerful rivals, or racial,
ethnic, or religious persecution. Such acts, like
those of the classic exiles, are as old as human
history, and both forms of
dispossession – removal and flight – have been
clearly documented from the time of Moses’ exo-
dus from Egypt and the Babylonian exile of Jews
nearly 600 years before Christ. They are featured
in sacred texts as well as in the writings of Eurip-
ides, Sophocles, Virgil, and Ovid, in descriptions
of Muslims who escaped the wrath of zealous
Crusaders, and in the writings of Jews who fled
into the Levant to avoid forced conversion or the
flames of the Inquisitor’s pyre in Spain at the end
of the fifteenth century. All were refugees as
defined above, but they were never referred to
as such.
The term refugee did not appear until late in
the seventeenth century. It was first used in ref-
erence to Huguenots, a French Protestant group.
After the revocation of the Treaty of Nantes in
1685, a treaty which for almost a century had
guaranteed freedom of religion in France, many
fled the Catholic-dominated country and sought
asylum in other lands, especially in England,
Holland, and Switzerland. They said of them-
selves that they were in Le Refuge and called
themselves réfugiés since they had gone in search
of havens of security where their right to worship
as they chose was not impeded. The term would
soon be applied to others belonging to persecuted
groups who found themselves in a growing dis-
persion of stigmatized people subjected to intim-
idation, maltreatment, and discrimination.
While it is often assumed that all refugees are
persons wanting to live under democratic rule,
and this is generally the case, there are excep-
tions. For example, a century after the Huguenots
left France, pro-British loyalists who escaped
from New York and New England fled to Nova
Scotia and other parts of Canada because of their
unwillingness to live under the new Republican
administration or because of fear of being
maltreated by it. They were mentioned and
referred to as refugees in the pages of the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica as early as its 1797 edition.
Throughout the last three centuries, the world
has witnessed domestic upheavals and national
conflicts that have coerced or compelled the emi-
gration of millions. The mass movement of asy-
lum seekers that has already occurred in the early
decades of the twenty-first century, highlighted
by the millions who have fled Afghanistan and
Syria for neighboring countries and by hundreds
of thousands crossing the dire straits of the Med-
iterranean trying to get to European shores, does
not bode well for the present era. Still, there is
little question that to date no period has been as
bloody nor caused more upheaval than the twen-
tieth century. That was an era marked by Russian
pogroms and the Bolshevik Revolution; a world
war from 1914 to 1918 that left nine million dead
and millions of displaced and stateless people;
Refugees Defined
genocide in Armenia; an exchange of population
of ethnic Greeks born in Turkey and Turks born
in Greece; World War II and the Holocaust gen-
erated by the Nazi regime, which left six million
Jews dead and many more displaced persons; the
Hungarian Uprising in mid-century; the mass
exodus of Cubans beginning with the “Triumph
of the Revolution” in the 1960s, exodus that has
never ceased; the war in Vietnam and the panic of
losers eager to get away lest they be placed in
“reeducation camps” or worse; the Cambodian
genocide and the struggles of those who survived
it; the brutalities of various factions in the after-
math of decolonization of many states in Africa
as well as between tribal groups on that continent;
and the Balkan Wars at the end of the century.
Even before it was over, the German novelist,
Heinrich Boll, described the twentieth as “a cen-
tury of refugees and prisoners” (Mooneyman
1980) and many others addressed the matter as
one of mass flight and asylum (see Kahn and
Talal 1986). And it is small wonder that
Samantha Powers described the same century as
“the age of genocide” (Powers 2003).
Refugees in Law
After World War I, attempts began to be made to
give a clear universal definition to the dispos-
sessed. But aside from providing League of
Nations’ sponsored “Nansen passports,” interna-
tionally recognized identity cards for stateless
persons (named for the Norwegian explorer,
Nobel Prize winner, and refugee advocate,
Fridtjof Nansen), little else was done until the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948
affirmed in one of its articles that “Everyone has
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.” That principle was
reaffirmed in 1951, when the United Nations
sponsored a convention on the status of refugees.
On January 31, 1967, an amended version of what
was drawn up earlier became the basis for the
famous United Nations Protocol on the Status of
Refugees, which defined refugees as being per-
sons who, owing to “a well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of race, religion, nationality,
3
membership in a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion, are outside the country of their
nationality and are unable to avail themselves of
the protection of that country.” Even with such a
seemingly clear definition, ambiguities
remained – and still remain. As Kathleen
Newland put it:
The technical and sometimes tiresome question of
who is and who is not a refugee has enormous
significance for the displaced people themselves.
The answer determines the degree of support and
protection the individuals receive as well as the
long-term resolution of their plight. The fundamen-
tal right that refugee status gives people is the right
not to be sent back against their will to the country
from which they have fled; the right, in legal par-
lance of “non-refoulement.” Nations that ratify the
U.N. Convention and Protocol obligate themselves
not to expel refugees from their territory without
due process of law, and, if grounds for expulsion
are found, to give the refugee time to seek legal
admission to another country of asylum. The obli-
gations of the host country also include issuing
identity papers and travel documents, allowing ref-
ugees at least the same civil rights as those enjoyed
by other legal immigrations, and facilitating as far
as possible the refugees’ assimilation and natural-
ization. (Newland 1981)
In the United States, there was no official
mention of refugees in law until the McCarran-
Walter Act dealing with immigration and natu-
ralization was passed by Congress in 1952. This
meant that during the mass migration of Jews
from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries, motivated by the anti-Jewish riots
known as pogroms, Jews were free to come to
the United States and passed through Ellis Island
from 1880 to 1924 just like predominantly eco-
nomically motivated immigrants coming from
Poland, Italy, Greece, and other European coun-
tries at that time. But, with severe restrictions
imposed through the highly restrictive “Quota
Acts of 1921 and 1924” and the lack of recogni-
tion of those in special circumstances and desper-
ate flight of those targeted by Hitler, many who
could have been saved were refused entry into the
United States in the 1930s and early 1940s. Even
those fleeing other right-wing and often fascist
regimes after World War II were not welcomed
for the McCarran-Walter Act only officially
4 Refugees Defined
recognized refugees as those who were fleeing
communism or were from the Middle East.
This narrow definition did, however, open the
door to those fleeing the failed Hungarian Upris-
ing against Soviet domination in 1956 and the
Cuban Revolution that took place several years
later and some Czechs in 1968 and hundreds of
thousands at the end of the war in Vietnam in
1975. Exceptions were sometimes granted by
what was known as the “parole authority” of the
Attorney General as had been the case in World
War II, but the United States did not accept the
United Nations’ broader, nonpartisan definition
of who is a refugee until the Refugee Act of 1980
was passed by Congress, with language matching
that of the UN Protocol.
The Dependency of the Dispossessed
In addition to the continuing general problem of
defining refugees in international law and by
national governments, equally long-pressing has
been what to do with them once they are legally
recognized.
The plight of refugees does not end once a
border crossing is successful. In some ways it
compounds it, as it puts special burdens on
those in the host societies; the organizations
drawn in to provide aid and assistance, care, and
succor; and other, much larger cohorts of those
who see their own precarious situations threat-
ened by the presence of foreigners on their soil
and by competition for jobs and scarce resources.
At the time many refugees were trying to leave
Vietnam on boats operated by traffickers; Bruce
Grant succinctly noted that, to many people,
A refugee is an unwanted person. He or she makes
a claim upon the humanity of others without
always have much, or even anything to give in
return. If, after resettlement, a refugee works hard
or is lucky and successful, he may be accused of
taking the work from someone else. If he fails or
becomes resentful or unhappy, he is thought to be
ungrateful and a burden on the community.
A refugee is especially unwanted by officials: his
papers [if he has them] are rarely in order, his
health is often suspect, and sometimes, although
he claims to be fleeing from persecution, he is
simply trying to get from a poor overpopulated
country to a rich, under-populated one. (Grant
1980)
Today the vast majority of refugees, especially
those leaving oppressive or failed states in Africa,
the Balkans, Latin America, and the Middle East
and hoping to go to countries in Europe and North
America, tend to be found in lands that are imme-
diately contiguous to those they have left. These
are known in the international community as
“countries of first asylum.” With the Cuban exo-
dus that began around 1960, the United States
became, for the first time, a country of first asy-
lum. The recognition that they were, as then
President Lyndon B. Johnson put it, “victims of
communism,” impelled the United States to cre-
ate the multifaceted Cuban Refugee Program to
help them “translate” their education and occu-
pations into valuable American credentials
(Pedraza 2007).
Even in those nations where governments
willingly allowed their entry, the worry is that
they might stay. And for good reason, they cannot
go home; in many cases, others will not take
them. They end up waiting and languishing in
overcrowded camps or in new enclaves some-
times for months, sometimes for years, or even,
as in the case of the Palestinians, for decades.
Local residents often feel overwhelmed as they
see their own scarce resources dwindle; they also
find themselves under additional stress created by
imported factionalisms. Moreover, foreign agen-
cies concerned with the protection and care of the
refugees resent the fact that donors and agency
officials often fail to take their needs, wants, and
fears into sufficient account. Thus, at times, the
term refugee becomes pejorative – and those
encamped on such foreign soil have a new stigma
to contend with. They are often viewed and even
referred to as “the unwanted.” (See Marrus 1985.)
A well-known poster used by the UNHCR
shows a displaced person in front of a wall on
which were painted the words “REFUGEES GO
HOME.” Beneath it are typed the telling words,
“They would if they could.”
It is not unusual for host governments, espe-
cially those driven by political tensions of their
own, to worry when confronted with large
Refugees Defined
cohorts of people who look, act, or pray in ways
similar to their own minorities and to see them as
a threat to the status quo. A recent example is the
situation in Jordan, which borders Syria. But it is
also true that refugees ensconced just inside the
border of the new place of asylum or scattered
throughout it often become convenient scape-
goats for those with grievances that have little
to do with their presence or the reasons they felt
compelled to seek asylum.
“Third-country resettlement” is quite differ-
ent. It is what happens to those who, having fled
from their own countries, spend only a short
period of time in bordering lands and then move
on to another haven. This is what occurred when
nearly one million refugees from Southeast Asia
managed to get to the United States in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Despite the publicity,
such movement is rare and, when it does occur,
is often related to geopolitical or ideological con-
cerns, not just humanitarian considerations.
After the fall of Saigon in 1975, policy makers
in the United States felt a special obligation to
assist those who were their allies throughout the
war in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese were
fleeing the newly installed communist regime
that had reconquered the whole of the country
and renamed the southern capital, Ho Chi Minh
City. Since they were escaping from the yoke of
communism, they could readily attain refugee
status under the then-extant US law. Once in
this country, most were welcomed by the felt
responsibility of both the war’s supporters and
its critics. On the one side were the “hawks”
who had supported the war and felt that the US
government and its troops had let the South Viet-
nam regime down by failing to win the war. On
the other side were the “doves” who had opposed
the war and felt the US government and its troops
were responsible for the incredible destruction in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many on both
sides came to the conclusion that “We owe them
something.”
While having positive results for those from
the former states of Indochina, as well as for the
Hungarians and for the Cubans, the policy
reflected what the political scientists Gilbert
Loescher and John Scanlan called “calculated
5
kindness” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) in regard
to the making and implementing of US refugee
policy. And the United States was not alone in
exercising a kind of willful altruism based on
“strategic considerations.”
Of Madonnas and Maestros
For Americans and others around the world, the
whole refugee experience is often compressed
into an evocative representation of “The
Madonna of the Refugee Camp” (Rose 1984),
an iconic Pieta of a wan, empty-eyed ragged
woman clutching her tiny infant to her breast. It
is a poignant image frequently used by interna-
tional organizations to highlight the plight of the
dispossessed. But not all refugees are the same.
Not all are poor. Not all are destitute.
While it is true that the vast majority of refu-
gees in today’s world are “low skilled,” there are
many who are highly trained and well educated
(Koser 2007), some of the latter being academics,
musicians, and artists – once referred to as “the
maestros in exile” (Rose 1997) – and others being
businesspeople, scientists and engineers, and, not
infrequently, leaders of opposition parties and
political factions. Yet they share certain common
characteristics with those who are less worldly
than they. Most significant is the dependence
upon others to rescue them from their plight, to
provide them with assistance to meet immediate
physical needs, and, for those who are fortunate
enough to be resettled in another country, to aid
them in making a new life once the initial trauma
of escape has been addressed.
Political and Personal Causes
and Effects
In addition to examining both international and
national definitions and laws relating to their
situation, a number of issues are relevant to the
study of refugees: a critical examination of the
root causes of flight; the disorientation that results
from dispossession and deprivation and being
abruptly alienated from all that is familiar; the
6 Refugees Defined
politics of rescue, relief, and resettlement; the
impact refugees have on their host countries,
their new homes; the continuing search for what
are called “durable solutions” to the general
plight of refugees and ways to address
them – usually specified as “voluntary repatria-
tion” and “local resettlement”; the role of refu-
gees in international law today (Rodriquez 2013),
as well as how refugee policies transform socie-
ties (Essed et al. 2005); and a closer look at the
psychology of altruism itself. The last asks the
age-old question, “Are we really our brother’s
keeper?” If so, what are states and individuals
prepared to do for those seeking assistance and
protection because they are dispossessed?
Finally, when one experiences the trauma and
tumult of exile, when, if ever, does a person
stop being a refugee?
Some say not until they die.
Without a fatherland
the landless find
all brown earth an insult,
all soil rootless.
The exile is a stranger
even to his grave. (Zaroukian 1985)
Put another way but expressing the poignant
spirit of that poem by the Armenian exile,
Antranik Zaroukian, the sociologist Lewis
Coser, a Jewish escapee from Nazi Germany
who became an American citizen, offered his
own illuminating answer: “I will always be a
refugee. But my children speak without accents”
(Rose 1986).
References
Boll H, as quoted in Mooneyman WS (1980) Sea of
heartbreak. Plainfield Logos, p 207
Essed P et al (eds) (2005) Refugees and the transformation
of societies: agency, policies, ethics and politics,
vol 13, Forced migration series. Refugee Study Centre,
Oxford University, Oxford
Grant B (1980) The boat people. Penguin, New York, p 2
Khan AS, Bin Talal H (eds) (1986) Refugees: dynamics of
displacement: a report for the Independent Commis-
sion on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books,
London/New York, pp 9–19
Koser K (2007) International migration: a very short intro-
duction. Oxford University Press, London, p 17
Loescher G, Scanlan J (1986) Calculated kindness: refu-
gees and America’s half-open door, 1945 to the pre-
sent. Free Press, New York
Marrus M (1985) The unwanted: European refugees from
the First World War through the Cold War. Oxford
University Press, New York/London
Miller KA, Wagner P (1994) Out of Ireland: the story of
Irish emigration to America. Elliot and Clark, Wash-
ington, DC
Newland K (1981) Refugees: the new international poli-
tics of displacement. Worldwatch, Washington, DC,
pp 7–8
Pedraza S (2007) Political disaffection in Cuba’s revolu-
tion and exodus. Cambridge University Press, New
York/London
Powers S (2003) A problem from hell: America in an age
of genocide. HarperCollins, New York
Rodriquez S (2013) Immigration and refugee law and
policy: 2013 Supplement. West Group, Los Angeles
Rose P (1984) The harbor masters: American politics and
refugee policy. In: Lewis M (ed) Social problems and
public policy. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp 273–312
Rose P (1986) Toward a sociology of exile. Int Migr Rev
19(Winter):768–773
Rose P (1997) Tempest-Tost: exile, ethnicity, and the
politics of rescue. Soc Forum 8(1):5–24
UNHCR (2012) Global trends: refugees asylum seekers,
returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons.
http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013
Zaroukian A (1985) Let there be light. In: Bouvard MG
(ed) Landscape and exile. Rowan Tree Press, Boston,
p 18
Further Readings
Abella I, Tropem H (1983) None is too many: Canada and
the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948. Lester and Orpen
Dennys, Toronto
Agier M (2008) On the margins of the world: the refugee
experience. Polity Press, Cambridge/Boston
Agier M (2011) Managing the undesirables: refugee
camps and humanitarian government (trans: Fernback
D). Polity Press, Cambridge, UK/Boston
Balakian P (2004) The Burning tigress: the Armenian
genocide and America’s response. Harper Collins,
New York
Coser LA (1984) Refugee scholars in America: their
impact and their experiences. Yale University Press,
New Haven
Dinnerstein L (1982) America and the survivors of the
Holocaust. Columbia University Press, New York
Edwards JK (2007) Sudanese women refugees: transfor-
mations and future imaginings. Palgrave Macmillan,
New York
Fermi L (1968) Illustrious immigrants: the intellectual
migration from Europe, 1930–1941. Chicago Univer-
sity Press, Chicago
Gil Loescher G et al (2008) UNHCR: the politics and
practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first cen-
tury. Routledge, London
Refugees Defined
Gold SN (1991) Refugee communities: a comparative
field study. Sage, New York
Goodwin-Gill GS, Jane McAdam J (2007) The refugee in
international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Hein J (2006) Ethnic origins: the adaptation of Cambodian
and Hmong refugees in four American cities. Russell
Sage, New York
Helton AC (2002) The price of indifference: refugees and
humanitarian action in the new century. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York/London
Howe I (1976) World of our fathers: the journey of the
East European Jews to America and the life they found
and made. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York
Hughes HS (1975) The sea change: the migration of social
thought, 1930–1965. Harper and Row, New York
Karadawi A, Woodward P (1999) Refugee policy in
Sudan, 1967–1984. Berghahn Books, New York/
Oxford
Lewis B (2010) In Ishmael’s house: a history of Jews in
Muslim lands. Yale University Press, New Haven
Mertus JA et al (eds) (1997) The suitcase: refugee voices
from Bosnia and Croatia. University of California
Press, Berkeley
Nasser R (2004) Palestinian identity in Jordan and Israel.
Taylor and Francis, Oxford/New York
Nikolic-Ristanovic V (2000) Women, violence and war:
wartime victimization of refugees in the Balkans. Cen-
tral European University Press, Budapest
Parsoun SK, Zacharia CE (1997) Palestine and the
Palestinians. Westview Press, Boulder
Pedraza P, Rumbaut R (eds) (1996) Origins and destinies:
immigration, race, and ethnicity in America.
Wadsworth, Belmont
Rieff D (1995) Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of
the West. Simon and Schuster, New York
7
Rieff D (2003) A bed for the night: humanitarianism in
crisis. Simon and Schuster, New York
Rose PI (ed) (1983) Working with refugees. Center for
Migration Studies, Staten Island
Rose PI (ed) (2005) The dispossessed: an anatomy of
exile. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst
Rose PI (2014) They and we: racial and ethnic relations in
the United States – and beyond, 7th edn. Paradigm
Publishers, Boulder
Roumani M (1977) The case of Jews from Arab countries:
a neglected issue. World Organization of Jews from
Arab lands, 1983, Tel Aviv
Said E (2002) Reflections on exile and other essays. Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge
Sanders R (1988) Shores of refuge: a hundred years of
Jewish emigration. Henry Holt, New York
Schulz HL (2003) The Palestinian diaspora. Routledge,
London
Smith-Hefner NJ (1999) Khmer Americans: identity and
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of California Press, Berkeley
Tabori P (1972) The anatomy of exile: a semantic and
historic study. Harrap, London
Wyman D (1984) The abandonment of the Jews: America
and the Holocaust, 1941–1945. Pantheon Books, New
York
Wyman M (1998) Europe’s displaced persons,
1945–1951. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Zolberg AR et al (1989) Escape from violence: conflict
and the refugee crisis in the developing world. Oxford
University Press, New York
Zucker NL, Zucker NF (1987) The guarded gate.
Houghton Mifflin, New York
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ing refuge in America. M.E. Sharpe, New York
R
Refugee Integration: Issues
and Challenges
Theo Majka and Linda Majka
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and
Social Work, University of Dayton, Dayton,
OH, USA
Definition
Since integration depends on the adaptation by
both refugees and host communities and includes
participation in the wider community by refugees
as well as increasing social relations outside
one’s ethnic group, we adapt Alba and Nee’s
updating of the assimilation approach to define
refugee integration as “the decline of an ethnic
distinction and its corollary cultural and social
differences” (Alba and Nee 2003, p. 11).
Integration is multidimensional and dependent
on both the efforts of refugees and the willingness
of individuals, communities, organizations, and
institutions for the host society to accept and
incorporate the newcomers. The key component
of integration is the ability to participate in the
institutions of the larger society. Achieving inte-
gration is also dependent on immigrants and ref-
ugees absorbing important cultural norms of the
Linda Majka: Deceased
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_106-1
society, learning the dominant language, and
developing interpersonal ties and contacts out-
side their particular group. Integration for both
immigrants and refugees is attained when they
are able to participate in their new country eco-
nomically, socially, politically, and culturally,
without necessarily losing their cultural distinc-
tiveness and ties with their homeland (Ives 2007).
For refugees, English language proficiency,
acculturation, employment, education, and
access to health care are all considered to be
vital elements of the resettlement and integration
process (Ives 2007; Gilbert et al. 2010).
Background
Refugees who seek to build a new life in a differ-
ent country face distinct challenges. Many of the
findings of the extensive literature on the assim-
ilation of immigrants apply to refugees. How-
ever, there are crucial differences as well that
are based on the nature of the refugees’ experi-
ences and their insufficient preparation for
becoming residents of specific societies.
We focus on those fleeing their country of
origin who have been officially classified as ref-
ugees by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and were resettled in
Western countries, particularly the USA. The
USA has resettled over three million since 1975,
far more refugees than any other nation. For
example, of the 69,000 refugees resettled in
2 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges

2012, the USA took in 53,000 or 77 %, even as before being resettled beginning in 2008, primar-
Norway and Australia had slightly higher per ily in the USA, Canada, and Australia. Due to the
capita resettlement rates (UNHCR Global limited opportunities for employment and educa-
Resettlement Report 2012). The challenges to tion in camps, refugees that have spent a longer
integration are also relevant for many asylum time in them tend to have more difficulties
seekers who flee their country due to violence establishing themselves after resettlement.
and locate in Western countries via other means,
such as a temporary visa.
Resettlement agencies receive refugees as
Challenges to Integration
they arrive and assist them in obtaining services
that are crucial to their integration, including
Research on the process of refugee resettlement
employment services, housing, school enroll-
has identified several factors that have contrib-
ment for children, English as a Second Language
uted to and facilitated successful integration into
(ESL) enrollment, applications for public assis-
the refugees’ new communities. Although their
tance, and health screenings. Resettlement agen-
importance can vary among communities and for
cies may often serve as cultural mentors to help
refugee groups, there is consistent mention of
with the transactions among refugees and local
adequate employment, satisfactory and afford-
institutions (Nawyn 2010). As a variety of prob-
able housing, and access to education and health
lems can arise concerning the adequacy and
care as crucial elements of the process of incor-
accessibility of services refugees need, it
poration. Language barriers often create difficul-
becomes important to evaluate the roles that insti-
ties for refugees. Also, a lack of community
tutions play in the resettlement process. In partic-
support expressed by, for example, institutions
ular, the ability and willingness of institutions to
that do not accommodate non-English speakers,
accommodate refugees are crucial to the integra-
can significantly inhibit the process of successful
tion process since institutional policies and prac-
and comprehensive resettlement and integration.
tices can facilitate or inhibit incorporation.
Unlike some immigrant populations, refugees
Moreover, at present, the US Office of Refugee
have fewer problems with respect to law enforce-
Resettlement expects refugee households to be
ment, the legal system and the courts, proof of
financially self-sufficient within only eight
identity, and, of course, immigration status. In
months after arrival, and federal assistance is
contrast, issues related to mental health and
similarly limited to that time period.
knowledge of institutional practices and norms
In comparison with voluntary immigrants, a
(“how things work”) are considerably more
greater divergence in the experiences of
prominent among many refugee populations.
resettlement and adjustment exists among refu-
gee populations, even when controlling for char-
acteristics such as level of education, age, and Employment
occupational experiences. Refugee populations Employment issues illustrate the interrelated
vary with respect to their knowledge and expo- nature of these challenges. Employers frequently
sure to Western cultures and languages, educa- require job applications and supporting docu-
tional levels, transferable skills, and experiences ments to be submitted in English. Initially, refu-
useful in the job market. Also, their exposure to gees have assistance from resettlement agency
violence and traumatic events varies consider- case managers in preparing the necessary mate-
ably. For those who spent time in refugee rials, but time limits on aid place the burden of the
camps, the amount of time there can range con- application process on refugees. Sometimes, case
siderably. For example, many Burundian refu- managers need to accompany refugees to their
gees were in refugee camps in Tanzania for jobs for several days so as to explain to them
more than three decades, and many Bhutanese what they are supposed to do. Also, many
were in camps in Nepal since the early 1990s employers make English language fluency a
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges 3

precondition for employment, even for jobs that floors (Majka and Majka 2012). The lack of
do not really require interaction in English. acceptance of educational degrees earned in
Part-time jobs tend to be more readily avail- their country of origin appears to be particularly
able to refugees than full-time ones. Part-time significant. These obstacles can be overcome if a
schedules do allow more time to address family particular program is designed to do so, as was
needs, attend ESL classes, and even continue the the case with the Cuban Refugee Program that
search for more adequate jobs, but the short hours was put in place from 1960 to 1974, to enable
frequently do not provide sufficient income to Cubans then coming to the USA to “translate”
cover all the necessities. their educational and occupational credentials in
Employment difficulties are exacerbated by Cuba, making them valuable in America. As a
the difference in kinds of employment between result of retraining programs and recertification
home countries and the USA. For those living in efforts, former Cuban lawyers became librarians
refugee camps, opportunities for employment or social workers; former Cuban professionals
were very limited. Culturally, many refugees went on to become Spanish teachers in the USA
need to adjust to what to them seem like very (cf. Pedraza-Bailey 1985).
formalized and routinized work schedules.
Studies have found that refugees are often
Language
forced to take entry-level jobs, regardless of pre-
Compared to other immigrants, a lower percent-
vious employment or education history. Many
age of refugees come to the USA with a familiar-
have to work long hours in multiple low-paying
ity of Western cultures and knowledge of the
jobs, and unlike their previous experiences, they
primary language of their new country. Research
recognize that at least two incomes are required
consistently shows language to be the primary
per household to insure economic survival
barrier to better integration. Gilbert et al. (2010)
(Hume and Hardwick 2005; Ives 2007; Smith
found that the most important indicator of refu-
2008). Their employment situations are also
gee integration in the USA was acquiring an
dependent on the general employment pattern
adequate level of English language fluency.
and economic activities of the region where
Acquisition of the English language plays a cru-
they live.
cial role in long-term prosperity and well-being
Employment nevertheless provides benefits in
for refugees. For example, higher levels of
addition to income and résumé building. Some
English proficiency, as well as education, were
refugees report that their jobs provide their pri-
associated with lower levels of acculturation
mary sources of contact with native-born Amer-
stress among Bhutanese refugees living in the
icans and they used these opportunities for
southwestern USA (Benson et al. 2012). Refu-
interaction to improve their English and knowl-
gees often feel that a lack of English proficiency
edge about American norms, culture, and institu-
can create serious problems when searching for
tions and “how things work” (Gahimer 2013).
and retaining employment (Ives 2007). Although
For better-educated refugees, their educa-
the vast majority of foreign born becomes
tional credentials (e.g., a college degree in a par-
English proficient over time, the rate of English
ticular field) or occupational credentials (e.g.,
language acquisition is a factor influencing
prior work as a doctor or judge) are frequently
opportunities for mobility and success (Portes
not recognized or accepted by American institu-
and Rumbaut 2006). Refugees and immigrants
tions, so they are unable to obtain a job in their
who are overwhelmingly concentrated in ethnic
field (Ager and Strang 2008; Gilbert et al. 2010;
enclaves, however, need to rely less on English
Nawyn 2010). Thus, many refugees with a col-
language proficiency to be successful than those
lege education and even with advanced degrees
who are resettled at large or who constitute a
end up employed in unskilled occupations. For
minority in their area of settlement (Portes and
example, in our study, two Iraqis with engineer-
Bach 1985).
ing degrees and computer skills were sweeping
4 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges
In our own research on refugee integration,
language issues also emerged as the primary bar-
rier to better integration (Majka and Majka 2012).
A higher proportion of agency officials, refugee
leaders, and participants in refugee focus groups
chose language issues and barriers as the most
frequently mentioned obstacles to becoming inte-
grated into our communities than any other fac-
tor. This was also the finding of a prior study we
conducted on the integration of immigrants in the
Dayton area (Majka and Majka 2011).
Acquisition of English (or any other language)
is more difficult for those who are older, have
fewer years of formal schooling, and lack expo-
sure to or fluency in another Western language.
Motivation to learn English varies considerably
as well. Those lacking employment or employed
in jobs that do not require English and offer little
prospect of advancement have less of an incen-
tive to learn. In her study of Bhutanese refugees
in Dayton, Ohio, Winslow (2013) found these
patterns pertain mostly to adult women. For
some, the hope and expectation that they will
eventually return to their homeland makes it dif-
ficult to justify the investment required to learn
English.
Refugees are enrolled in ESL classes shortly
after their arrival by the resettlement agency.
Attendance, however, cannot be enforced.
Access to classes is influenced by the times and
places the classes are offered, the capacity of the
classes to accommodate the demand, and, for
some, adequate and affordable transportation
and child care. Class times may also conflict
with work hours. They may be taught at a level
that is too advanced or too basic for individual
refugees. Some refugees feel that classes that
focus on conversational English would be more
useful, as would classes that make connections
between texts and their lives (Sarroub et al. 2007;
Baynham 2006). Local organizations often lack
the resources to provide bilingual ESL classes for
specific language groups. Nevertheless, ESL
classes are generally the most effective way to
gain a basic knowledge of English.
Health Care
The refugee experience is one of loss. Many still
carry physical and psychological injuries from
their experiences in their homeland, trauma
which led them to become refugees. Conse-
quently, health-care issues are particularly salient
concerns for refugees. These include access to
treatment of previously undiagnosed conditions
(e.g., intestinal parasites), lack of insurance, lack
of knowledge regarding how to negotiate the
system, availability of trained medical inter-
preters, and cultural misunderstandings.
Access to adequate health care is influenced
by a variety of factors, many of which refugees
share with other Americans. As noted previously,
many refugees take low-paying, entry-level
employment, and most of their employers do
not provide health-care insurance. Nevertheless,
some of those with low-paying positions that
included health coverage were less motivated to
look for jobs that were more commensurate with
their skills and experiences because of the uncer-
tainty of future access to health care (Ives 2007).
Like many other foreign-born residents, refugees
frequently encounter difficulties with language
barriers when trying to communicate with health
professionals, and they generally experience a
great deal of difficulty navigating the health-
care system (Ager and Strang 2008). For exam-
ple, many refugees report that they have not had a
physical exam or received dental care for a while
or received medical information in their native
language. Instances where a physician did not
understand them are too common, and many
had to reschedule medical appointments due to
the lack of an interpreter (Mukunzi 2011).
Mental health issues are regarded as particu-
larly important among both refugees themselves
and service providers. It can be difficult to ade-
quately address mental health needs since there is
no systematic screening or evaluation of resettled
refugees for mental health problems. Also, some
leaders of refugee communities may lack an
awareness of mental health problems within
their group, even though others recognize them
as significant.
As Pipher described in her study of refugees in
Lincoln, Nebraska, there are different cultural
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges
interpretations of mental health problems and the
appropriate means for treating them. Even when
accessible, Western psychotherapeutic methods
are not often utilized by refugees from
non-Western cultures. Sometimes the reasons
are practical, such as language barriers, access
to health insurance, more pressing demands, and
scheduling difficulties. But more important are
the cultural reasons. Some refugees come from
cultures where discussing problems outside the
family, especially mental ones, is simply never
done. Also, some issues, such as rape and family
violence, are taboo to discuss even within the
family, let alone to anyone else. Finally, mental
anguish may be thought to be due to physical or
spiritual problems. Sometimes, talking to a tradi-
tional healer or a trusted member of their cultural
community, such as a spiritual or religious leader,
is the most effective way to begin the healing
process. Participating in cultural rituals and fes-
tivities, sharing positive emotions, and nurturing
and being nurtured by family and friends are
ways that help individuals move beyond the
traumas (Pipher 2002; Stein 1986).
Examples from a study of Rwandan and
Burundian refugees in the Dayton, Ohio, area
illustrate some of the mental health issues many
refugees experience (Mukunzi 2011). Slightly
over half reported that stress was their number
one health issue. Rwandans mentioned that they
still carry psychological wounds from the loss of
many relatives during the 1994 genocide and
later mass killings in the neighboring Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Similarly, Burundians
reported stresses due to the loss of their relatives
during the 1972 and 1993 genocides and other
losses during their decades in refugee camps in
Tanzania and elsewhere. Also, both groups
reported many post-migration stressors, such as
unfamiliarity with the culture and norms, lack of
adequate English fluency, unemployment, unpaid
medical bills, and housing expenses.
How important integration is for refugees is
emphasized by these kinds of traumas and, for
some, lingering conditions of what we now term
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Failure to
integrate these refugees could delay recovery and
5
in effect prolong the consequences of the viola-
tion of human rights that they experienced.
Some refugees understandably manifest post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, such
as flashbacks, unsettling dreams, emotional
numbness, inability to concentrate, anger, self-
destructive behavior (including substance
abuse), and hopelessness about their future
(Pipher 2002). One consequence is what Kai
Erikson called “collective trauma,” stemming
from the erosion of communality accompanying
the loss of a particular community. It is often
manifested in the feeling that time is suspended
and the inability to put shattered lives back
together and plan for the future (Erikson 1978).
As Pipher (2002) noted, the integration of
refugees into their new society and communities
is a critical aspect of recovery from traumatic
experiences. Institutions have a crucial part to
play in this regard. By making research-informed
efforts to accommodate refugees, they can facil-
itate recovery and create conditions for refugees
and their children to become productive members
of their new communities. Refugees who remain
unintegrated risk prolonging their mental health
problems, and this can have detrimental impacts
on their families, especially on the children.
Housing
For housing, research presents a mixed picture. In
their study of Cuban refugees in Texas, Barnes
and Aguilar (2007) found low-income refugee
housing conditions to be crowded, squalid, and
neglected, and they were almost always in the
undesirable parts of town with higher crime
rates. In contrast, Ager and Strang (2008) found
that refugees generally were less concerned with
the physical conditions or size of a house than
they were concerned with the ability to form a
community with fellow refugees and close rela-
tionships with neighbors. Belonging to a commu-
nity often provides refugees with a much-needed
sense of being “settled,” as well as opportunities
to learn from each other. A study of refugees in
Utica, New York, showed that refugees helped
revitalize neighborhoods, buying older run-down
houses for a low price and subsequently renovat-
ing them, resulting in an increase in real estate
6 Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges
values in these neighborhoods of around 25 %
between 2003 and 2006 (Smith 2008). This con-
tribution led to a more positive perception of
refugees by both community members and land-
lords. Moreover, former refugees often became
landlords themselves, renting to newer refugees,
often of different nationalities.
Housing issues also interact with employment.
The cost of housing, transportation to jobs, long
commutes, and the limitations of public transpor-
tation and carpooling all constitute obstacles.
Housing tends to be less expensive in the central
city, and many refugees live there. Nevertheless,
the more desirable jobs are often located outside
the radius of public transportation.
Sandoval et al. (2011) note that research has
consistently shown that cars have a significant
impact on the ability of individuals and house-
holds to attain economic self-sufficiency.
Obtaining a car can be more complicated for
many refugees, however, since it requires suffi-
cient English proficiency and obtaining a drivers’
license, along with the expenses of auto owner-
ship (such as insurance, fuel costs, and mainte-
nance/repairs), which can be particularly
expensive for older cars.
Youth and Education
In general, the integration of refugee youth has
been largely successful, both for those who came
to the USA as children and those born in the
USA. The resettlement process places a priority
on enrolling refugee children and adolescents in
school as soon as possible, and this contributes to
rapid English language understanding and usage.
School environments also offer social incentives
that cause refugee youth adapt quickly. In fact,
their acculturation contrasts strongly with the
cultural distance experienced by many of their
parents.
Refugee parents tend to have high expecta-
tions for their children’s education. In our study
(Majka and Majka 2012), many parents praised
the city’s public schools and noted the efforts of
schools and some individual teachers to accom-
modate their children, make them aware of
opportunities (e.g., summer programs), and facil-
itate their learning of English.
Similar to many immigrant groups, the differ-
ent rates of acculturation and English acquisition
do result in parents relying on their children to be
translators and cultural mediators for them.
Sometimes children get in trouble at school for
absences due to their parents’ demands for
translation.
Responses
In general, refugee populations face distinctive
situations and challenges due to their experiences
in their homeland and the frequently unplanned
nature of their migration to the USA or other,
mostly Western, countries. The studies cited
above illustrate similar issues and challenges for
refugee groups or resettled refugees. Taken
together, they show that while progress is being
made, many refugee populations still experience
difficulties dealing with some local agencies and
organizations due to both their own circum-
stances and agency practices. Since the issues
and challenges are interrelated, improvements in
one area can be expected to have positive impacts
on the others.
Similar to other immigrants, refugee commu-
nities and networks are important forms of
mutual support and information, and members
facilitate each other’s integration. All else being
equal, the cohesiveness of refugee communities
is important for the adaptation and success of
their members.
For both immigrants and refugees, the institu-
tional context is important for the trajectory it can
set for either incorporation and generational
mobility or marginalization and prolonged gen-
erational disadvantage.
Some communities and organizations have
responded in conscious ways to assist refugees.
Often this is part of more general efforts to attract
immigrants to cities with declining populations
(Davey 2014; Preston 2013). Some of this
involves changes in institutional policies and
practices among both public and private organi-
zations to make them more accommodating. It
also involves recognizing and appreciating the
resources, strengths, and benefits that
Refugee Integration: Issues and Challenges
immigrants/refugees bring to communities and
the positive aspects of their cultures and values.
For example, in receiving an All-American City
Award in 2009, the city of Fort Wayne, Indiana,
was recognized for its “efforts in assisting refu-
gees and helping them integrate and succeed in
the community” (MacLachlan 2012). In 2011, the
city of Dayton, Ohio, adopted an “immigrant
friendly city” plan, officially called “Welcome
Dayton,” and undertook a number of initiatives
to assist the integration of immigrants/refugees
(Sewell 2011). It is in part an evolving response
to refugee resettlement that endorses improving
cooperation between governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. It recognizes
that no single institution bears responsibility for
and can alone accomplish successful refugee
resettlement in their community (City of Dayton
Human Relations Council 2011).
Our study of refugees in Dayton, Ohio,
resulted in an assessment report for the local
community (Housel et al. 2012) and a conference
on refugee integration. In addition, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) website is a rich source of information
on how best to respond to the challenges that
refugees bring to their new communities. Two
other websites listed are also good sources.
The UNHCR’s summary report titled “The
State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Sol-
idarity” (2012) called for a new paradigm to
respond effectively to the fact that refugees
increasingly live in cities and towns where they
struggle to survive as highly diverse populations.
The report stated: “To respond to the protection
and assistance needs of refugees living in urban
areas, humanitarian agencies, development agen-
cies and host governments will need to work
together more closely and more consistently”
(p. 25). Solidarity is viewed as managing chal-
lenges “in a way that distributes costs and bur-
dens fairly” (p. 29). To make the principle of
solidarity more concrete, the report underlined,
“Responsibility sharing is the expression of soli-
darity in practice” (p. 30).
The UNHCR report concluded:
7
. . .the nature and scale of refugee flows, internal
displacement and statelessness puts national and
international systems under considerable
pressure. . . But solidarity is not only a matter for
states. Civil society organizations, communities
and individuals often make the most meaningful
contributions to improving the state of the world’s
refugees. (p. 31)
Refugees do need specific programs to address
their needs, as well as supportive local initiatives
and advocates. Integration into the new society is
blocked both by refugee circumstances and
agency practices, but these are for the most part
surmountable obstacles. Churches, mosques,
synagogues, and other faith-based organizations,
as well as local public schools, local libraries, and
police departments, can and should take up ini-
tiatives to assist refugees in becoming integrated
into their new communities and the larger
society.
Acknowledgments This entry is dedicated in loving
memory to my spouse and co-author Dr. Linda Majka
(1947–2014). It represents the last of many works
we collaborated on during our careers as professional
sociologists.
Cross-References
▶ Asylum and Human Rights
▶ Citizenship
▶ Forced Migration, Natural Resources, and
Violence
▶ Forced Migration: Detention
▶ Integration Policies
▶ Refugee Mental Health
▶ Refugee Roulette
▶ Refugees Defined
▶ Social Assimilation
▶ Women at Risk Refugee and Humanitarian
Visas
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www.unhcr.org
R
Refugee Mental Health: Child
and Adolescent Refugees
Eugenio M. Rothe1, Andrés J. Pumariega2 and
Hector Castillo-Matos3
1
Herbert Wertheim College of Medicine, Florida
International University, Miami, FL, USA
2
Department of Psychiatry, Cooper Medical
School, Camden, NJ, USA
3
Nueva America Community Mental Health
Center, Miami, FL, USA
Definition
A refugee is a person who is outside their home
country because they have suffered (or feared)
persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, and political opinion or because they are a
member of a persecuted social category of per-
sons or because they are fleeing a war. Such a
person may be called an “asylum seeker” until
recognized by the state where they make a claim.
Unaccompanied immigrant children sometimes
fit the definition of “refugee,” because they arrive
at a host country to escape domestic abuse, gang
violence, human trafficking, or extreme poverty
in their home countries and seek asylum in the
host country. In contrast, other unaccompanied
children arrive in the host country to seek better
opportunities and some simply to reunite with
family members already living in that host
country.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_107-1
Child Development and Psychological
Trauma in Refugees
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
has estimated that 80 % of victims of modern
wars are children and women, many of whom
will become refugees. The United States admits
from 20,000 to 27,000 child and adolescent refu-
gees each year (UNHCR 2013). Mental health
experts have framed the problems that result
from these experiences under the diagnosis of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); its treat-
ment now constitutes a separate field of investi-
gation (Lustig et al. 2004). In spite of this,
accurate data on the mental health status of
young refugees is still lacking, as is information
on their help-seeking and service utilization. Fur-
thermore, controversy is ongoing as to whether
mental health care is among the primary needs of
refugees and, particularly, what a child refugee
needs and how to provide it. Our focus here is on
the types of mental health issues that affect child
and adolescent refugees around the world today,
the diagnosis and treatment that have been uti-
lized to treat these children and adolescents in
Europe and the United States, and the risk factors
and protective factors that may influence their
mental health outcomes (Rothe and Pumariega
2010). Due to differences in samples, methods,
and instrumentation, we lack consistent preva-
lence rates for psychiatric disorders in refugee
children. Also, there is a wide variability in the
exposure to different forms of trauma in these
2 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees
children. Nevertheless, there seems to be agree-
ment that refugee children are at a higher risk of
developing multiple, coexisting psychiatric dis-
orders than the general pediatric population, risk
which is calculated at around 20 %
(US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
(USCRI) 2013). Persecution, violence, war, kill-
ing, or torture as well as the losses suffered by
these children and adolescents increase the risk of
psychological distress and psychiatric disorders.
PTSD can be understood as a neurophysiological
disorder characterized by an exaggerated
response to the “fight-flight” reaction, though
such distress is expressed differently culturally.
Given the multiple losses experienced and the
violent and traumatic nature of the events,
depression, anxiety, and grief are also commonly
found among young refugees. Other commonly
reported, but less well-researched, problems
include physical complaints, such as sleep prob-
lems, social problems, and conduct disorder;
emotional problems, such as social withdrawal,
attention problems, generalized fear,
overdependency, restlessness, irritability, and
eating disorders; and learning problems, such as
those involved with school functioning, peer rela-
tionships, defiance, hyperactivity, and aggres-
sion. Among child refugees, there can be a loss
of previously acquired skills, such as loss of blad-
der control with secondary bedwetting, soiling,
intense separation anxiety, and nail-biting. Sad-
ness, introversion, tiredness, suicidal ideation,
attempted suicide, and violent self-harm have
also been reported. The risk for developing psy-
chosis (becoming out of touch with reality) has
been found to increase in adolescent refugees.
Even more, a syndrome of pervasive devitaliza-
tion has been found, characterized by a refusal to
eat, drink, talk, walk, engage socially, or accept
help. Other preexisting conditions such as atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may
become exacerbated by the trauma of migration.
It is important to note that the presence of PTSD
is related to earlier experiences of war trauma and
resettlement stress, while depression is exacer-
bated after arrival in the receiving country, as it
consists of mourning the multiple emotional
losses experienced, as well as the life difficulties
and acculturation stress initially encountered in
the host country. Despite these many difficulties,
refugees oftentimes demonstrate remarkable
resiliency and resourcefulness (Rothe and
Pumariega 2012).
Phases of the Refugee Experience
Refugee children and adolescents are often
exposed to experiences of war, persecution, vio-
lence, torture, killings, disrupted attachments,
and emotional losses which increase the risk for
psychological distress and may contribute to the
risk of their developing psychiatric disorders.
These young refugees may undergo a series of
very stressful experiences prior to arriving to the
host country that fit within the three phases of the
refugees’ experience: preflight, flight, and
resettlement (Lustig et al. 2004).
Preflight
This phase before the escape from the country of
origin is often fraught with uncertainty and dread.
Refugee families begin to experience the disrup-
tion of their lives and increasing chaos. Children
may face changes in their daily routines and
limited access to schools, with both their educa-
tion and social development being disrupted. At
times, they encounter threats to their safety; they
suffer the separation from their parents and care-
takers; and many even witness or engage in
violence.
Flight
This phase begins with the displacement of the
refugees from their home environments; it often
entails being at the mercy of external circum-
stances that they cannot control. The children’s
emotional state and stability depend in large part
upon the availability and emotional state of their
caretakers. One of the most common effects of
war and persecution is the separation of children
from their caretakers. In a clinic sample of
300 Cuban child and adolescent refugees seen in
an infirmary located inside a refugee camp, 58 %
of preschoolers and 31 % of elementary school
boys had been separated from their fathers during
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees 3

the process of flight (Rothe 2005). In another are unaware of their legal rights (Women’s Com-
sample of 100 Cuban adolescents released from mission for Refugee Women and Children 2013).
refugee camps and seen after arrival in the United Once refugees resettle in the new host country,
States, 69 % had left behind grandparents and they need to undergo a process of acculturation
79 % had left behind aunts, uncles, and other which brings about inherent stressors. Families
members of their extended families, many of often need to learn a new language and to adjust
whom were the child’s primary caretakers while to new values, beliefs systems, social mores, and
their parents worked (Rothe et al. 2002). family roles. In the process of resettlement and
acculturation, the child and the family need to
work through a process of mourning similar to
Resettlement and Access to Care
the one that is experienced when people are faced
The resettlement phase is characterized by mas-
with the loss of a loved one, but in this case, the
sive losses of the person’s homeland, family,
losses are multiple and simultaneous (Rothe
friends, and material possessions. Refugee
et al. 2010). Continued psychological distress in
camps are oftentimes situated on foreign soil. In
this stage may result from delays in processing
these camps, inhabitants are depersonalized:
asylum applications, uncertainty about asylum
becoming numbers without names and
status, negotiation with immigration authorities,
experiencing traumatic events are common. In
obstacles with obtaining employment and ade-
the massive exodus of balseros (rafters) that
quate housing, frequent moves, language prob-
took place in the summer of 1994, Cuban children
lems, racial discrimination, and social isolation.
and adolescents who left the island on rafts and
Oftentimes, traditional Western mental health
boats were later detained in the Guantanamo ref-
services and treatment approaches have not been
ugee camps for months, prior to arriving in the
effective with immigrants and refugees, who
United States. These refugees reported they had
underutilize traditional mental health services as
faced storms at sea, witnessed people drowning,
a result of the stigma associated with mental
and had observed corpses floating being
illness in their culture, the lack of clinicians
devoured by sharks. Inside the refugee camps,
who speak the language, the more pressing
fully 80 % witnessed acts of violence, and 37 %
human needs, and the lack of finances or insur-
saw someone attempt or commit suicide (Rothe
ance coverage to pay for the services. Most
et al. 2002). Many children and adolescents expe-
recently, standardized principles for culturally
rienced involuntarily soiling themselves and
competent mental health services and
bedwetting at night, as well as nightmares, sepa-
community-based systems of care applicable for
ration anxiety, aggression, and other disruptive
child and adolescent immigrants and refugees
behaviors (Rothe 2005).
have been developed (Pumariega et al. 2013).
Many young refugees are unaccompanied and
Upon arrival in the host country, many child
lack identifiable adult guardians when they arrive
refugees and their families are undergoing signif-
in the host country. They may have traveled long
icant turmoil in their lives, so a treatment
distances and experienced many traumatic events
approach that fluctuates back and forth between
without adult supervision. Political violence may
the different phases of treatment is the most
sometimes render entire villages devoid of adults
appropriate intervention. These phases are estab-
(Lustig et al. 2004). Children who come to the
lishment of safety and trust, trauma-focused ther-
United States without a guardian are faced with
apy, and reintegration.
having to negotiate the legal system without
advocates. Children awaiting asylum hearings in
Establishment of Safety and Trust
the United States are sometimes held up to
The first goal of the therapeutic intervention is to
2 years in detention facilities or juvenile jails.
help the child and the family to develop a sense of
Resources for refugee children are scarce, and
stability and safety and a sense of control over
many who may have legitimate asylum claims
their lives. Liaison work with agencies is
4 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees
necessary to provide for their basic needs and to
focus on solving housing, educational, and finan-
cial problems through the use of attorneys as well
as educational, health, religious, cultural, and
leisure organizations.
Trauma-Focused Therapy
For children suffering from symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which results
from being exposed to overwhelming life circum-
stances that produced damage to the central ner-
vous system and resulted in psychiatric
symptoms, this phase of treatment involves work-
ing through the trauma experienced (at a pace that
is emotionally manageable). Alternative inter-
ventions may be offered for a range of difficul-
ties, including depression, anxiety, sleep
problems, somatic complaints, and behavioral
difficulties.
Reintegration
During this phase, the focus is on creating future
goals and aspirations and integrating into a new
community and culture. Young refugees usually
begin this process with help from their schools
and community resources. Sometimes, geograph-
ical relocation is considered (Ehntholt and Yule
2006).
Psychological Development of Child
and Adolescent Refugees
Children and adolescents depend on adults for
guidance and safety, and if the child’s trust in
the adult’s ability to care for them is shaken,
this may complicate or derail the stages of their
normal psychological development. The trauma
they experienced during war and persecution and
the inability of adults to protect them under these
circumstances may result in the children’s feel-
ings of mistrust, betrayal, humiliation, and a
sense of vulnerability in children and adoles-
cents. However, some controversy exists in that
the concept of psychological vulnerability is
based predominantly on Western values and
may well exaggerate the psychiatric pathology
of refugees and lead to an increase in mental
health service utilization while downplaying
their resiliency and strengths (Summerfield
1995, 2000, 2001, 2003). The most recent models
of mental health care for refugees utilize the
principles of Brofenbrenner’s (1979) ecological
systems theory, which explains that human
beings develop in an interaction with their envi-
ronment at four levels: the macrosystem (societal
rules and beliefs), the exosystem (community and
neighborhood factors), the microsystem (the fam-
ily), and the ontogenic level (individual factors).
The interplay between these four levels deter-
mines the adaptation of the refugees to their
new environments in the host country. This
model is useful in designing treatment interven-
tions that will take into account different cultural
views of traumatic events, life cycles, and family
systems (Hodes 2002).
Risk Factors and Protective Factors
“Resilience” is the term used to describe a set of
qualities in people that foster a process of suc-
cessful adaptation and transformation despite the
risk and adversity faced. We are all born with an
innate capacity for resilience, by which we are
able to develop social competence, problem-
solving skills, a critical consciousness, auton-
omy, and a sense of purpose. Longitudinal studies
over the lifespan have consistently documented
that from half to two-thirds of children growing
up in families with mentally ill, alcoholic, abu-
sive, or criminally involved parents, or in
poverty-stricken or war-torn communities, do
overcome the odds and turn a life trajectory of
risk into one of adaptation and success. However,
a number of risk factors and protective factors
also contribute to determine these outcomes
(Garmezy 1991).
Factors that have been found to increase the
risk of mental health problems and PTSD in
young refugees are experiencing a large number
of traumatic events; being in close proximity to
the traumatic events; witnessing someone being
injured, tortured, or killed; the perceived degree
of personal threat; separation from family mem-
bers; immigration detention; and being an
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees
unaccompanied child refugee. The political per-
secution or incarceration, injury, torture, or loss
of a parent or close family member has been
found to have a devastating effect on young ref-
ugees. Also, the stresses inherent in the asylum-
seeking process, the effects of acculturation and
resettlement stress, and if the social support sys-
tem in the receiving country is inadequate have
all been found to increase the risk for mental
health problems. While traumatic events contrib-
ute to PTSD, problems related to loss, lack of
social support, and acculturation stress all con-
tribute to depression.
Yet many refugee children have been found to
be free of mental health problems. What accounts
for their resilience is only now beginning to
receive attention (Hodes 2000; Summerfield
2000). Some of these protective factors include
being of a young age at the time of the trauma,
having good self-esteem and an easy tempera-
ment that allows them to respond well and effec-
tively to new situations, having religious faith,
and holding a strong ideological commitment to a
political or national cause. In addition, character-
istics of the family and peers also have been
found to be protective during the flight as well
as the resettlement period, such as adaptability
and cohesion within the family, the positive psy-
chological well-being of caregivers, and good
peer group and social supports.
Unaccompanied Child and Adolescent
Refugees
Unaccompanied child refugees are typically
exposed to a higher number of traumatic stressors
prior to fleeing than their accompanied counter-
parts. These children flee their nations alone after
the death of parents or guardians during the war
or political strife. They also flee alone to avoid
threats of persecution or violence toward them or
their families, the threat of war and resulting
victimization, the threat of enslavement or
recruitment as child soldiers, or the threat of
ideological reeducation. A great number of
them were raped, including some males, or have
been subjected to other forms of subjugation and
5
humiliation – events that oftentimes continue to
occur even after they have been placed in refugee
camps, group homes, or foster homes with little
supervision or support where they continue to be
victimized. Uncertain legal status can also com-
plicate their emotional adjustment and contribute
to their being further isolated in detention facili-
ties for extended periods, interfering with their
resettlement adjustment and acculturation pro-
cess. Unaccompanied child refugees may also
encounter ambivalence and even rejection by
their natural family when they reunify. Their
natural family may also hardly believe the extent
of their psychological problems and distress – in
part out of denial and guilt at their having made
the decision to allow them to emigrate alone
(Ehntholt and Yule 2006).
In the early 1960s, close to 15,000 unaccom-
panied children and adolescents fled the island of
Cuba and arrived in the United States in what
became known as Operation Pedro Pan. This
exodus was precipitated by the panic that ensued
after the newly installed communist dictatorship
on the island announced that the parental guard-
ianship of all children (Patria Potestad) no longer
belonged to the parents but to the state. Fearing
that these children would be conscripted into the
militias or sent to communist-run boarding
schools, parents allowed the children to immi-
grate alone with the help of the Catholic Church
and the US government. These children were
placed in youth camps and in Catholic boarding
schools or foster homes. Many of their parents
were unable to leave the island until years later,
when many of these children were already adults.
Although no systematic empirical studies have
been done on a good sample of this population,
the existing reports paint a mixed picture of the
outcomes, alternating between those that harbor
deep psychological scars and those that have
demonstrated admirable resilience and success
in the United States (Eire 2003; Triay 1999;
Torres 2003).
6 Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees
Child Soldiers
Approximately 300,000 child soldiers under
18 years of age are actively fighting in 14 different
countries around the world today. Child soldiers
are at risk of rape, torture, and war injuries and
may later suffer from substance abuse, depres-
sion, and anxiety. In addition, child soldiers lose
trust in authority figures and also may lose their
moral perspective, engaging in stealing, looting,
and killing when being ordered to do so and told
that killing for political reasons is morally justi-
fied. The complex psychodynamic factors
involved in being a child soldier often translates
into feelings in which the military becomes a
surrogate family, particularly in children sepa-
rated from their biological families. We have
scarce information regarding the long-term men-
tal health outcomes and efforts at reintegration
into society of these child soldiers, including
where they end up seeking asylum and what
happens in their lives when they become adults,
given that many chose to remain silent about their
past experiences (Human Rights Watch/Child
Soldiers Worldwide 2012).
Assessment and Treatment
Although a number of diagnostic mental health
instruments for child and adolescent refugees
have been identified, only extensive, open-
ended interviewing and assessment have proven
accurate to establish a diagnosis. Standardized
diagnostic questionnaires tend to overidentify
pathology and have been designed for main-
stream populations with Western values, which
often prove useless for populations of developing
countries (Kinzie et al. 2006).
Different models of types of psychotherapy
have been found effective in addressing the men-
tal health needs of refugee children and their
families. Some of these are trauma-focused
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT); testimonial
psychotherapy, which works by helping the refu-
gee transcend grief, anger, and resentment
through using testimonies for purposes of educa-
tion and advocacy; narrative exposure therapy,
which combines elements of testimonial psycho-
therapy with cognitive-behavioral therapy; and
the more experimental eye movement desensiti-
zation and reprocessing (EMDR), which uses
bilateral stimulation when processing traumatic
memories in individuals with PTSD (Lustig
et al. 2004).
Psychodynamic psychotherapy has recently
been shown to be as efficacious as cognitive-
behavioral therapy for the treatment of depres-
sion and generalized anxiety (Leischenring
et al. 2009). The goals of psychodynamic therapy
in refugee children and adolescents include pro-
viding a safe place within therapy for the adoles-
cent to express affect and experience
containment and tolerance; facilitating the
mourning process associated with the migration,
including the expression of grief which may not
be allowed by their family members because they
think it expresses ingratitude for their sacrifices
or because it may exacerbate their own grief;
allowing identification by the immigrant adoles-
cents with the therapist, so as to rehearse new
aspects of their identity from the host culture
while dropping aspects that are no longer useful
in the receiving country; allowing transferences
to develop and to be analyzed, utilizing the ther-
apy as a new, reconstructive emotional experi-
ence; mediating affects between the adolescent
and his family, allowing for both to complete
their process of adaptation to the new culture;
and serving as the mediator between the adoles-
cent’s family and the new culture while
empowering the family and enabling them to
create a new supportive milieu within the host
culture (Rothe 2004). A number of community-
based interventions have been identified as
increasingly important for helping immigrant
youth improve academic achievement, stay in
school, and avoid risky behaviors such as preg-
nancy and substance abuse (Rothe and
Pumariega 2010).
Preventing Mental Health Problems
Dealing with sudden refugee crises, the receiving
community may find itself besieged by their
Refugee Mental Health: Child and Adolescent Refugees
massive arrival, which may overwhelm the avail-
able mental health infrastructure. To avoid this
situation, it is advisable to compose teams of
mental health professionals, including transla-
tors, that take into account the particular circum-
stances of the refugee crisis, composed by
culturally competent professionals (Sack
et al. 1997). A preventive model of intervention
to treat refugee children while they are still inside
refugee camps aims to minimize their psycholog-
ical damage (Rothe 2008).
Psychiatric symptoms and mental health diffi-
culties in young refugees have been found to
persist over many years (Sack et al. 1999). It is
important to take into account that symptoms of
emotional distress in child and adolescent refu-
gees may sometimes be experienced subjectively
even though the child may function well socially
and academically, without the parents and
teachers becoming aware of the child’s internal
suffering (Rothe 2005).
Refugees have historically been a significant
proportion of the immigrant population in the
United States, and it is reasonable to expect that
large numbers of refugees will continue to emi-
grate to the United States and other developed
nations seeking safety, security, and freedom.
Mental health and support services are most
effective in the context of a refugee and immi-
gration policy based on rational national interests
rather than on reactions to crises. Part of such a
policy should be to actively prepare all Ameri-
cans for the demographic changes resulting in
increased cultural diversity, which may well cul-
minate in the lack of any numerical majorities by
the middle of this century.
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F
Forced Migration: Global Trends
and Explanations
Jeremy Hein and Tarique Niazi
Department of Sociology, University of
Wisconsin-Eau Claire, Eau Claire, WI, USA
Definitions
World War II still exerts a great influence on
definitions and explanations of forced migration.
The policy makers who established the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in 1951 believed that forced migration
was caused by extreme nationalism, which led to
wars that pushed people from one country to
another. The 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, therefore, defined a refugee
as a person “outside the country of his national-
ity” due to “a well-founded fear of persecution”
(UNHCR 2000). Its most important guarantee
of protection is that refugees may not be
forcibly returned to the country from which they
fled – non-refoulement. But the 1951 Convention
only covered refugees from events that occurred
in Europe before January 1, 1951. At the time,
58 % of the world’s refugees resided there. Once
they were taken care of, policy makers assumed
that forced migration would not be a problem
because the new international system expressed
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_108-1
in membership in the United Nations (UN) would
never again allow nationalism to disrupt Europe.
Two developments disproved this assumption.
First, in 1964, the number of refugees in
Africa and Asia surpassed those in Europe for
the first time. Forced migration was now a global
problem due to the independence struggles of
countries that had been European colonies.
Thus, in 1967, the UN removed the geographic
and time limitations from the 1951 definition.
Second, in the early 1990s, the number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) surpassed
the number of refugees for the first time. IDPs
are people who flee from violence but they stop
moving when they reach a safer place within their
own country. Refugees are people who flee for
the same reasons but seek safety by crossing an
international border and residing in a neighboring
country.
In 1998, the UN adopted the Guiding Princi-
ples on Internal Displacement (Cohen and Deng
1998). With regard to protection, these are much
weaker than the 1951 Convention. UN members
were reluctant to intrude on a country’s sover-
eignty when it concerned treatment of its own
citizens. By contrast, the UN extends more pro-
tections when citizens of one country flee to
another country since these refugees then become
part of the international political system.
2 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations
Statistical Overview
In 1978, the number of refugees in the world
surpassed 5 million for the first time since
World War II. It reached 10 million in 1981 and
15 million in 1990. In 2012, the UNHCR’s man-
date covered 46.3 million people (UNHCR 2013,
2015). The largest concentration resides in Africa
(30 %) with the second largest concentration in
the Middle East and North Africa (27 %). There
are large populations of forced migrants in Asia
(19 %) as well as in Latin America (14 %).
Today, Europe accounts for only 6 %, although
in 1996 and 1997, Bosnia produced the second
largest number of refugees in the world.
The populations of concern to the UNHCR are
primarily IDPs (56 %) and refugees (28 %). The
UNHCR is less able to assist IDPs since they
remain under the territory and jurisdiction of
their national government, which either foments,
condones, or cannot control local violence. The
UNHCR provides far more assistance to refugees
because they live in someone else’s country and
are, thus, covered by international law. Most ref-
ugees reside in UN-operated camps for many
years until political conditions improve and they
can return to their homeland. This protracted
waiting is termed “warehousing” and places a
great burden on host countries such as Pakistan,
Iran, and Kenya (each of which allows more than
500,000 refugees to live in its territory). Some
refugees apply for permanent resettlement to a
third country. In 2012, the USA accepted 66,200
refugees who applied for admission while resid-
ing overseas. Other major resettlement countries
include Canada (9,600), Australia (5,900), and
Sweden (1,800).
The UNHCR also advocates for several other
types of forced migrants: IDPs and refugees who
have returned to their homes but still need assis-
tance (5 %), stateless persons (8 %), and asylum
seekers (3 %). Asylum seekers resemble refugees
in the conditions that push them and their moti-
vations. But unlike refugees who first move to an
adjacent country, asylum seekers flee directly to a
potential place of permanent settlement (usually
Europe, North America, and Australia) and then
request retroactive refugee status from
immigration officials. Asylum seekers argue
that they would suffer persecution if they had to
return to their homelands. On average, about
25 % of asylum seekers receive a positive deci-
sion. In 2012, the USA granted asylum to 25,200
people who applied while already residing in the
country. Other major asylum countries include
Germany (17,000), Sweden (13,700), and Canada
(10,200).
People deemed “stateless” are the most vul-
nerable people on earth. At present, the world is
divided into 211 independent countries and terri-
tories. The international system expects every
person to be a member of one of them. But
some governments never recognize or even
revoke the citizenship of its people so as to dis-
criminate against unpopular groups. The collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and
then the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,
created large stateless populations as the newly
independent countries established their own citi-
zenship criteria that often excluded ethnic minor-
ities. In 2012, there were still significant numbers
of stateless people in Latvia (280,000), the Rus-
sian Federation (178,000), and Estonia (94,000).
The largest population of stateless people, how-
ever, are the approximately 800,000
Rohingya – the Muslim population in the Myan-
mar state of Rakhine, bordering Bangladesh.
Myanmar does not recognize their citizenship
even though the Rohingya were born there. It
also does not give citizenship to the children
born in Thailand to Myanmar refugees, nor does
Thailand provide them with birth certificates.
There is little the UNHCR can do for stateless
people other than advocate that they be granted
citizenship and make sure the world does not
forget them.
Explanations of Forced Migration
A number of explanations have been offered for
the various types of forced migration. The geo-
political explanation emerged after World War II
with the onset of the Cold War between the for-
mer USSR and the USA. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the ethnic conflict and
Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations 3

failed state explanation became influential. The forced migration (Betts and Loescher 2011;
natural resources explanation and the climate Haddad 2008). But many scholars think that the
change explanation have gained support since refugee crises that began in the 1990s do not fit
2000. this geopolitical model. They argue that the
global dynamics of forced migration changed in
1991 with the end of the Cold War between the
The Geopolitical Explanation
USA and the former Soviet Union. Instead of
To explain the increase in forced migration since
conflict between states, the underlying cause of
the 1960s, social scientists first studied interna-
most forced migration is now ethnic or religious
tional politics and conflicts between states (Hein
conflict in fragile, failing, or failed states (Keely
1993; Zolberg et al. 1989). They concluded that
1996; Nurussaman 2009).
refugees were primarily produced by decoloniza-
The case of Afghanistan is very important for
tion, revolutions, and proxy wars in which the
debates about the causes of forced migration and
USA and USSR provided weapons and training
its solutions. At its peak in the late 1990s, about
to allies around the world. The UNHCR (2000)
8 million people had fled the country creating an
reached similar conclusions. It used types of geo-
Afghan diaspora that stretched across Pakistan,
political conflicts to summarize the main refugee
Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Europe, the USA,
crises it addressed during the mid to late twenti-
Canada, and Australia. Estimates suggest that
eth century:
from one-third to 64 % and possibly even
two-thirds of all living Afghans have been refu-
The 1950s Cold War in Europe
gees at one point in their lives (Kronenfeld 2008).
The 1960s decolonization in Africa
The conflict first erupted in 1979 with the Soviet
The early 1970s birth of the state of Bangladesh
Union’s invasion. Now Afghanistan is cited as an
The mid 1970s communist revolutions in former
example of a failed state that is too weak and
Indochina
destabilized to protect its citizens from ethnic
The 1980s proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin
power struggles (Rubin 2002).
America
The failed state explanation of forced migra-
The early 1990s separatist conflicts in the
tion assumes that citizens need a strong central
Caucasus
government to protect them. Afghan refugees
The late 1990s ethnic cleansing in Iraq, Balkans,
disprove that assumption (Hein and Niazi 2012).
and Rwanda
Since 1973, a series of different
regimes – socialist, Islamist, and
Although refugees from Cuba did not receive
capitalist – have used repression in failed
assistance from the UNHCR, their migration to
attempts to create various states in Afghanistan.
the USA following the Cuban Revolution in 1959
From 1979 to 1992, the USSR targeted rural and
is significant and merits a place on this list. It was
religious segments of society as it pursued social-
the first time that the USA became a country of
ist modernization and secular modernity. From
first asylum (Pedraza 2007). Currently, about
1992 to 1996 in the new Islamic Republic of
20 % of Cubans live outside of Cuba. The Syrian
Afghanistan, the targets were the urban middle
refugee crisis (which errupted in 2014 and is
class, the feminist movement, and the Shiite reli-
currently the largest in the world) can also be
gious minority. Under the Taliban (1996–2001),
explained by the geopolitical theory (Russia and
all women were repressed and the Tajik minority
Iran v. the US and Saudi Arabia).
singled out for persecution. Since 2001, the Pash-
tuns have been discriminated against because
The Ethnic Conflict and Failed State some have links to the Taliban. The fact that
Explanation virtually every group in Afghan society has
Studies of international relations and state sover- been subject to state persecution at some point
eignty continue to define some explanations of since 1979 indicates that the underlying cause of
4 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations
forced migration is not a state that is too weak but
one that is too strong. Contrary to the ethnic
conflict and failed state explanation, no ethnic
group in Afghanistan has sought independence
and sovereignty.
The Natural Resources Explanation
State-centered explanations of forced migration
have limitations because they are primarily
informed by the lessons drawn from World War
II. An alternative approach emphasizes globaliza-
tion’s environmental impact and conflicts over
natural resources (Hein and Niazi 2009). From a
demographic perspective, the increasing size of
the world population and expanding middle-class
consumption causes competition for scarce
resources (Homer-Dixon 1999). From a political
economy perspective, the conflicts are caused by
private and sovereign wealth corporations seeking
ownership and quick profits from natural resources
all over the world (Peluso and Watts 2001).
The two perspectives are in fact complemen-
tary. Demography explains demand for natural
resources while political economy explains the
supply. Controlling natural resources is therefore
central to almost all the world’s conflicts which
produce forced migration (see Table 1).
The groups in these conflicts often use ethnic
names to define each other, but what they are
really fighting over is wealth production from
nature (Niazi and Hein 2013). Globalization has
vastly increased the value of land, fresh water,
wood, metals, gems, energy sources, and the
transportation routes to move these commodities.
Competition over access, appropriation, develop-
ment, and shipping of natural resources leads to
conflicts among resource-dependent local com-
munities, resource-extractive states, and elites
that seek profits from resources. Often, the result
is human rights violations followed by forced
migration. The state and elites coerce subnational
communities in resource rich areas in order to
rapidly produce wealth for the global market.
This pattern of resource extraction, violence,
and forced migration is very evident in Sudan.
The conflict is so severe that in 2005 the UN
investigated charges of genocide in the country’s
Darfur region (de Waal 2007). But the conflict is
Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations,
Table 1 Seven largest producers of forced migrants in
2012 and natural resource conflicts
Origin Numbera Natural resource conflicts
Colombia 4.356 Oil, metals, cattle, and
agricultural produce
Afghanistan 4.122 Land transit for oil and
natural gas
DRC 3.613 Metals and diamonds
Syria 2.846 Land transit for natural gas
Sudan 2.574 Water, pasture, cattle,
arable land, and oil
Somalia 2.313 Mogadishu as entrepot and
transit site
Iraq 2.203 Oil and water
World 61.5%b
a
In millions of people of concern to the UNHCR (2013).
Population of concern comprises refugees, returned refu-
gees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons,
returned internally displaced person, stateless persons,
and others of concern
b
Percent of total world population of concern to UNHCR
originating from Colombia, Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq
not new (Collins 2008). Independence in 1956
led to a civil war between the Arab and Islamic
dominant group which controlled the capital of
Khartoum and minority groups in the south. The
north–south conflict is part of a larger pattern
resulting from Sudan’s extreme ecological and
cultural regionalism. Some of the main ethno-
ecological groups are Fur farmers and herders
from the west (Darfur means land of the Fur
people), Nuba farmers and herders in the Nuba
Mountains, and Dinka and Nuer pastoralists in
the south. These groups became forced migrants
as the state and economic elites in Khartoum
exploited regional resources. Pasture and water
are of great value in arid Darfur, oil reserves are
in the south, while the Nuba Mountains are val-
ued for their strategic location along the
north–south oil pipelines. South Sudan became
an independent country in 2011 but its oil
resources are still a source of conflict.
The Climate Change Explanation
The UNHCR (2009) and the US Department of
Defense (2010) predict that climate-induced nat-
ural disasters will cause massive population
Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations
displacement. In fact, forced migration due to
climate change has already begun in Asia
among island nations and coastal populations
(Niazi 2013). On 8 November 2013, Typhoon
Haiyan caused massive destruction in the Philip-
pines, displacing more than 3 million people from
their homes. It was the largest and most powerful
tropical storm to ever hit land. More are likely to
occur. Bangladesh predicts that 20 million of its
coastal residents are threatened. The country’s
policy makers propose their “managed migra-
tion” to western nations before future disasters
strike. Since the migration is inevitable, the
country’s leaders advocate that Europe and the
USA accept Bangladeshi “climate refugees” now
rather than wait until forced migration occurs.
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change supports this proposal.
The concept of environmental refugees
(El-Hinnawi 1985) first called attention to this
problem. During the 1990s, scholars began to
systematically document how deforestation, ris-
ing sea levels, desertification, drought, and other
forms of environmental disruption were forcing
people from their homes. By the early 2000s, it
appeared self-evident that nature, not state perse-
cution, was to blame for uprooting people
throughout the world (Myers 2001). Numerous
neologisms are now used to describe these
populations, such as climate refugee, environ-
mentally displaced people, and eco-migrant. Pro-
ponents of these terms argue that flight from
catastrophic ecological problems should be
added to the United Nations’ definition of refugee
(Environmental Justice Foundation 2011).
Climate change explanations of forced migra-
tion are quite complex and can lead to oversimpli-
fication. The perspective sometimes
unintentionally naturalizes displaced people – i.e.,
conceptualizes them as a problem, like a flood.
Some scholars argue that many “natural disasters”
are, in fact, not caused by nature but by
maldevelopment in pursuit of economic growth at
all costs (Freudenberg et al. 2009). In 2005, Hurri-
cane Katrina displaced 800,000 people in New
Orleans. It was indeed a “natural” phenomenon,
but a deeper analysis showed powerful economic
interests were also a root cause. The destruction of
5
wetlands and diversion of rivers to accommodate
housing developments proved unsustainable when
the hurricane hit. Blaming only nature for causing
this destruction neglects the interaction between
social systems and ecosystems. At present, we
have been warned that carbon-fueled climate
change is raising sea levels and sea temperatures,
both of which will lead to more frequent and
more destructive hurricanes and typhoons
(Environmental Justice Foundation 2011).
Conclusion
At the end of World War II, there were about
42 million forced laborers, prisoners of war, and
displaced civilians all over Europe (Marrus
1985). The UNHCR was established in 1951 to
assist them and by 1954 there were less than one
million. Now the UNHCR seeks to protect about
36 million forced migrants in 79 % of the world’s
211 countries and territories. Rather than being
due to episodic instability in a subset of countries,
forced migration is now a continuous by-product
of globalization. There is a global level of vio-
lence comparable to, but far more dispersed than,
the most destructive war in world history. While
revolutions and proxy wars still occur, the under-
lying cause of forced migration at the start of the
twenty-first century is society’s unbalanced rela-
tionship with the environment. World War II and
its aftermath in the Cold War showed that
extreme nationalism can disrupt the international
state system and lead to human flight for survival.
This geopolitical perspective is now only one of
several explanations for forced migration. Some
scholars and policy makers focus on the ethnic
conflicts that lead to failed states. Others empha-
size that the causes of violent conflict and flight
can be found in globalization’s demand for natu-
ral resources and its attendant commodity trans-
portation routes. The climate change explanation
also focuses on the environment. Geopolitical
and failed state explanations of forced migration
should be complemented by explanations empha-
sizing the damage done to humans and the envi-
ronment by the rapid production of wealth from
natural resources.
6 Forced Migration: Global Trends and Explanations
References
Betts A, Loescher G (eds) (2011) Refugees and interna-
tional relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cohen R, Deng FM (1998) Masses in flight. Brookings
Institute, Washington, DC
Collins RO (2008) A history of modern Sudan. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
de Waal A (2007) Sudan: The turbulent state. In: de Waal
A (ed) War in Darfur and the search for peace. Global
equity initiative. Harvard University, Cambridge,
pp 1–38
El-Hinnawi E (1985) Environmental refugees. United
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files/public/EJF_climate%20change%20and%20migra
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Freudenberg WR, Gramling R, Laska S, Erikson K (2009)
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ecology of twenty-first century refugees. Harvard Int
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Hein J, Niazi T (2012) State-society incompatibility and
forced migration: the violent development of Afghan-
istan under Socialist, Islamist, and Capitalist regimes.
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lence. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Keely CB (1996) How nation-states create and respond to
refugee flows. Int Migration Rev 30:1046–66
Kronenfeld DA (2008) Afghan refugees in Pakistan: not
all refugees, not always in Pakistan, not necessarily
Afghan. J Refugee Stud 21(1):43–63
Marrus MR (1985) The unwanted: European refugees in
the twentieth century. Oxford University Press, New
York
Myers N (2001) Environmental refugees. The Royal Soci-
ety, London
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storms. Asia-Pacific J 11: 5 Dec. http://www.
japanfocus.org/-Tarique-Niazi/4043/article.html
Niazi T, Hein J (2013) Political economy of the world
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Peluso NL, Watts M (eds) (2001) Violent environments.
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Rubin B (2002) Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Yale Uni-
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Changing Contexts: From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism?

Stephen Castles*
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Definition
When migrants come to another country, they become part not only of the economy but also of the society
of that place. This is obviously the case where immigration is regarded as permanent, but applies even to
temporary movements: despite the ideas of governments and employers who plan “guest worker”
systems, you cannot have workers without people. In any case, many forms of migration are not primarily
motivated by economic concerns – even though all migrations have economic effects. Migrants have
widely varied experiences of reception and settlement, according to the policies, attitudes, and practices
prevailing in the destination country. These differing contexts of migration affect the way migrants
become incorporated into society, which in turn shapes processes of social and cultural change affecting
both migrants and nonmigrants.
This entry explores the historical background to varying migration contexts, discusses some of the
dynamics of migratory processes, and then looks at the way migration contexts have changed over the
period of accelerated mobility since 1945 with special reference to the emergence of global migration
flows in the phase of neoliberal globalization since the mid-1970s. Two key conclusions are emphasized.
One is that the growth of temporary mobility in the latest phase of the evolution of the world labor market
presents a challenge to all existing forms of incorporation, whether they are labeled as assimilation,
integration, or multiculturalism. The other is that the growth of transnational consciousness requires new
ways of understanding and responding to migration and minorities. (Much of this text is based on Castles
et al. 2014, where more detail and references are to be found.)

Nation-State Formation and the Treatment of Minorities

“National models” for the treatment of immigrants and minorities depend on varying historical experi-
ences of nation-state formation, which in turn gave rise to differing concepts of nationality and citizen-
ship, and the extent to which these could include newcomers. Even countries as close as Britain, France,
and Germany had quite different approaches. The British history of territorial expansion and responding
to religious diversity led to a state that accepted difference: political loyalty was required, but a person’s
group identity could be Welsh or Scottish, Protestant or Catholic. Thus, immigrants could become citizens
without losing their cultural and religious distinctiveness. In France, the 1789 Revolution established
principles of equality and the rights of man that rejected group cultural identity and aimed to include
individuals as equal political subjects. Immigrants could be incorporated, but group difference was
unacceptable. Germany by contrast was not united as a state until 1871, and the nation – defined on the
basis of shared language and culture – came before the state. This led to a form of ethnic or folk belonging
that was not consistent with incorporation of immigrants or minorities as citizens.
Quite different approaches are to be found in the white settler societies of the New World. The nations
of North and South America, of Oceania, and of some parts of southern Africa and Southeast Asia were
built through the dispossession of indigenous peoples and through immigration from Europe.

*Email: stephen.castles@sydney.edu.au

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Incorporation of immigrants as citizens was part of their national myths. In such settler societies, civic
belonging was thought to lead to national identity, so that differing identities were acceptable as a passing
phase on the way through the “melting pot” which led to “Americanization” (or the equivalent in other
places). It was thought that only white people could be assimilated: nearly all of these emerging nations
had racially selective immigration laws.
Today in Northeast Asia, emerging immigration countries like Japan and South Korea have strong
beliefs in ethnic homogeneity and find it very hard to incorporate people of different backgrounds.
Southeast Asia countries like Malaysia have culturally mixed populations – often the result of colonial
labor recruitment schemes – but the public and politicians often fear that incorporating newcomers could
upset existing ethnic balances. Gulf oil countries recruit large numbers of migrant workers from
Asia – often these outnumber local populations – but have strict rules to prevent family reunion and
long-term settlement, so that migrants remain marginalized and politically excluded. Similarly, in
postapartheid South Africa, immigration from other African countries is often seen as a threat and has
led to violent clashes. In North Africa, increasing presence of sub-Saharan migrants is largely seen as an
undesirable phenomenon.

The Social Dynamics of the Migratory Process

The problem of “national models” of migrant incorporation (apart from their inherent “methodological
nationalism”) (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) is that they are based more on ideological principles than
on a real understanding of the migratory process. Governments believe that they can divide migrants up
into neat categories and make differential rules that will allow them to maximize the economic benefits of
immigration while keeping social costs down. But migration and settlement are parts of a long-drawn-out
process that will be played out for the rest of the migrant’s life and affect subsequent generations too.
Migration is often not an individual decision but a collective action, arising out of social, economic, and
political change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. Moreover, the
experience of migration and of living in another country often leads to modification of the original plans,
so that migrants’ intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behavior.
Macro-social factors that lead migrants to revise their original intentions lie in the economic and social
development of both origin and destination areas, and in the relationships between them. Migration
systems approaches are very useful in understanding such issues, but cannot be dealt with here
(Castles et al. 2014, pp. 43–46). Equally significant are micro-level factors: most migrants do indeed
believe when they first arrive that they will return home, but as their stay in the new country lengthens,
they get older, form relationships, and have children; their life goals often change. Virtually, every
temporary movement leads to some settlement. Democratic states are rarely willing or able to adopt the
draconian measures needed to prevent this, while more authoritarian states often lack the capacity to
enforce departure and prevent a shift into irregular status – particularly, when employers are eager to
retain experienced workers. Few circular or temporary programs provide opportunities for transition to
permanent status yet the transition takes place nonetheless, and often under very difficult circumstances.
That is why the “circular migration schemes” so favored by European Union countries at present, or the
temporary employment schemes used not only by the Gulf oil countries but increasingly also by the USA,
Canada, and Australia, often have unexpected results (Castles and Ozkul 2014).

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Migration Since 1945 and the Evolution of Incorporation Models

Ideas on the position of immigrants in society changed rapidly in the post-1945 period, with the great
majority of industrial (and later postindustrial) countries allowing immigration for various economic,
demographic, and political reasons. Yet incorporation of the newcomers was not seen as a major issue, and
there was little or no long-term planning. The numbers were not expected to be large, and there was a
strong belief in the efficacy of existing national models for controlling cultural and religious difference.
The “classical immigration countries” (such as the USA, Canada, and Australia) only wanted white
settlers from their “mother countries” or other Western European countries and saw no problem in
assimilating them. Assimilation meant that immigrants were to be incorporated into society through a
one-sided process of adaptation. They were to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural, or social
characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. Britain, France, and the
Netherlands also expected to be able to assimilate immigrants from their colonies (or former colonies)
and from other European countries such as Spain and Italy.
Germany and other “guest worker” importers (e.g., Austria and Switzerland) did not permit family
reunion or long-term settlement and therefore pursued polices of temporary admission to the labor market.
The “guest worker” model can be described as differential exclusion: migrants were to be temporarily
incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labor market and work-related social insurance
schemes) but denied access to others (especially citizenship and political participation).
But the belief in the controllability of difference proved misplaced. In the post-1945 boom, immigration
grew in volume and became a structural feature of Western societies. Racially selective immigration rules
broke down, and migrants increasingly came from more distant or culturally different countries. When the
economic boom faltered in the 1970s, family reunion took place – even in “guest worker” countries. Then,
the end of the Cold War and globalization brought new migrations from ever more diverse origins.
In the classical immigration countries, migrants from non-Western European backgrounds (Southern
and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) tended to have disadvantaged work situations and
to become concentrated in specific neighborhoods: generally inner cities or industrial peripheries. This led
to separation from majority populations, community formation, and the maintenance of minority cultures,
languages, and minorities. Assimilation had failed for many immigrant groups and new approaches were
needed. Even in the European “guest worker” countries, settlement was taking place despite official
denials. The absence of measures to assist incorporation often led to social exclusion and an enduring link
between class and ethnic background.
Governments replaced assimilation (initially at least) with the principle of integration, which meant
recognizing that adaptation was a gradual process that required some degree of mutual accommodation.
Acceptance of cultural maintenance and community formation might be a necessary stage, but the final
goal was still absorption into the dominant culture – integration was often simply a slower and gentler
form of assimilation. Today, of all the highly developed immigration countries, France comes closest to
the assimilationist model. Elsewhere, however, there was a shift to approaches that recognized the long-
term persistence of group difference. In some countries, such models were referred to as “multicultural-
ism”; in other places, terms like “minorities policy” and “equality and freedom of choice” were used.
Multiculturalism meant that immigrants (and sometimes nonmigrant minority groups) should be able to
participate as equals in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion,
and language, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values. There have been
two main variants. In the USA, cultural diversity and the existence of ethnic communities are officially
accepted, but it is not seen as the role of the state to work for social justice or to support the maintenance of
ethnic cultures. Access to the “American Dream” of individual advancement (and even wealth) is
supposed to be provided by free public education and an open labor market. The second variant is

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multiculturalism as a public policy. Here, multiculturalism implies both the willingness of the majority
group to accept cultural difference and state action to secure equal rights for minorities. Multiculturalism
originated in Canada and was taken up under various labels between the 1970s and the 1990s in Australia,
the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and elsewhere.
All of the different approaches to incorporation have proved problematic in one way or another, leading
to perceptions of a “crisis of integration.” In recent years, since violent attacks in the USA on 11 September
2001 and in other western countries in the following years, immigrant incorporation has been
overshadowed by concerns about security. At the same time, anxiety about loss of national identity has
become prominent, often linked with hostility against Muslim migrants. Since 2008, the global economic
crisis and the eurozone crisis have added fears about economic competition from migrants, leading to a
negative climate toward newcomers and the rise of extreme-right anti-immigration groups. The pendulum
has swung back from celebrating diversity to insisting on policies of “civic integration” based on often
rather unclear ideas about social cohesion and national values.

Temporary and Circular Migration: A Challenge to Assimilation and

Multiculturalism
All of the types of migrant incorporation discussed in the previous section share a common feature: they
are premised on citizens who belong to just one nation-state. Migrant settlement is seen as a process of
transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence. This process is
symbolically marked by naturalization and acquisition of citizenship of the new state. But key global
trends question this premise. The neoliberal economic model, which has become dominant over the last
30 years, is based on dividing up work processes so that they can be carried out in the most cost-effective
way, often over multiple sites in several countries. Many products, from electronic devices to garments,
are now the result of transnational production processes giving rise to global value chains (Elms and Low
2013). Often, control of finance and marketing (and the capture of value) remains mainly in postindustrial
countries like the USA, while much of the production work is done in emerging, low-wage economies.
In this new model, medium- and lower-skilled migrants are generally only admitted to industrial and
postindustrial countries to do jobs that are unattractive to generally well-educated locals. Examples are the
recruitment of domestic workers to release educated women from home and child care duties in Singapore
(Huang et al. 2012), the employment of farm laborers from Mexico in the USA, and temporary visa
schemes for building workers in Germany or Australia (Castles and Ozkul 2014). Typical of such schemes
is the lack of migrant rights – either because workers are admitted with strict time limits and no right to
bring in dependents or because they have to enter or work as irregulars, that is, without official permission.
Highly skilled personnel, by contrast, are welcomed by most destination countries, since they are in
short supply, while recruitment from poorer countries saves education and training costs. This category of
personnel – often seen not as “migrants” but as “professional transients” or even as “cosmopolitan
experts” – is generally encouraged to bring in their families and stay permanently, and yet they are the
least likely to do so. Since they are in demand everywhere, they often remain highly mobile, chasing
opportunities wherever they find them, including in their countries of origin.

From Multiculturalism to Transnationalism

Whatever the skill category of migrants and their migration situation, it is clear that they do not fit easily
into the old model of transferring primary loyalty from the state of origin to the new state of residence.

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Temporary or circular migrants can use new forms of electronic communication and social media to
remain actively involved in their communities of origin, wherever they are living at one particular time.
The lack of residential security offered to the lower skilled keeps them mobile whatever their long-term
intentions, while the opportunities available to the highly skilled also lead to repeated movements.
Paradoxically, one reason why governments like temporary migration is because they believe it will
save social costs, but it may also lead to a much greater social issue: the lack of commitment of many
residents to a particular community and society.
Thus, an additional type of migrant consciousness may be emerging: a transnational model in which
the identities of increasing numbers of people transcend national boundaries, leading to multiple and
differentiated forms of belonging. Transnationalism could have important consequences for democratic
institutions and political belonging in the future.
In the multicultural model, easy access to citizenship and continued acceptance of dual citizenship are
important for building feelings of belonging. But trends to repeated mobility and transnational relation-
ships make it vital to think through the consequences of multiple belongings. In future, many people may
divide their careers and lives between several places. Citizenship will need to include portable civil,
political, social, and health rights, to reflect the growing flexibility of social identities. One could imagine
distinctions between active and dormant rights, to avoid privileging mobile people over those who stay
put. The biggest adjustment will be to move away from singular national identities and jealously guarded
borders to a much more open model that corresponds with our increasingly integrated and more mobile
world.

References
Castles S, De Haas H, Miller MJ (2014) The age of migration: international population movements in the
modern world. Palgrave and Guilford, Basingstoke/New York
Castles S, Ozkul D (2014) Circular migration: triple win, or a new label for temporary migration?
In: Battistella G (ed) Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. Cham, Heidelberg,
New York, Doordrecht and London:Springer 27–49
Elms DK, Low P (2013) Global value chains in a changing world. World Trade Organization, Geneva
Huang S, Thang LL, Toyota M (2012) Global networks special issue: transnational mobilities for care:
rethinking the dynamics of care in Asia. Blackwell, Oxford/Malden
Wimmer A, Glick Schiller N (2003) Methodological nationalism, the social sciences and the study of
migration. Int Migr Rev 37(3):576–610

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Group-Specific Effects of Contexts of Migration

Suzanne Model*
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

Definition
As the number of immigrant destinations grows, cross-national comparison becomes an increasingly
popular research strategy. Most cross-national research on immigrant integration assumes that the policies
and practices of destinations affect all immigrants equally. While this is often the case, in many situations,
destinations privilege some groups over others. “Group-specific effects of contexts of migration” refers to
the differential treatment that immigrant groups encounter within a single destination. Scholars comparing
the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are more likely to acknowledge this
phenomenon than are researchers comparing one or more groups in two or more destinations. Perhaps this
asymmetry occurs because the emphasis of the former is differences between immigrant groups, while the
emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations. Whatever the reason, a more balanced
perspective is needed.

Detailed Description
Since the Second World War, international migrants have settled in an increasing number of destinations.
Yet, until relatively recently, few migration scholars thought in cross-national terms. Intra-Europe
comparisons did not appear until the 1990s, when Europeans began worrying that non-EU nationals
were failing to integrate (Niessen 2000). Since then, cross-national research has increased rapidly, with
contemporary students of integration comparing migrants in the Old World with the New (Reitz
et al. 1999; Heath 2007; Thomson and Crul 2007) and migrants in Asia with migrants in the West
(Xi 2002; Skrentny et al. 2007).
These comparisons have emphasized four explanations for cross-national variation in receiving
country’s responses to foreigners: differences in demographic history, ideologies about national belong-
ing, social policy, and institutional structure. To be sure, these explanations offer useful insights; yet, they
can be misleading when translated into hypotheses for research. The reason is that they implicitly assume
that the customs and laws of a given receiving country affect all immigrants similarly. This is rarely the
case; rather, responses at destination vary with the characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Although
this interaction is rarely a problem for cross-national studies in which the object of analysis is “immigrants
in general,” when research focuses on migrants with particular characteristics – for instance, those with
the same national origin, race, or ethnicity – then the potential for differential treatment within host
societies increases.
This is hardly a new insight. Interactions between origin and destination form part of the “context of
reception” that Portes and his collaborators introduced to explain variation in immigrant outcomes in the
United States (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Some reviews of cross-national
differences in immigrant adaptation have also acknowledged it (Schmitter-Heisler 2000; Lahav 2004;
Alba and Waters 2011). In addition, several quantitative analysts have included interactions between
origins and destinations in their multi-level models (Kogan 2007a; van Tubergen 2006; Levels

*Email: model@soc.umass.edu

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et al. 2008). Yet, researchers studying the integration of two or more groups within a single destination are
more likely to consider the implications of differences among immigrants than are researchers comparing
two or more destinations. Perhaps this happens because the emphasis of the former is differences between
immigrant groups, while the emphasis of the latter is differences between destinations.
This entry highlights five theories that anticipate differences in how particular host societies respond to
specific types of immigrants as opposed to how they respond to “immigrants in general.” The first three
are broad; the processes they emphasize are expected to affect most dimensions of integration. Yet,
integration is multifaceted and often proceeds unevenly (Freeman 2004; Bean et al. 2012). This imbalance
is illustrated by the fourth and fifth theories, which have a narrower purview. One identifies some reasons
for cross-national differences in economic integration, reasons that do not necessarily affect other
dimensions of integration. The last posits that social integration is inversely related to political integration.
From this perspective, progress on one dimension is associated with stagnation in the other. These
differences aside, all five provide grounds for expecting host societies to privilege some groups and
penalize others.

Segmented Assimilation
Probably the most debated theory in migration studies today is segmented assimilation. As proposed by
Herbert Gans (1992) and elaborated by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes and Zhou 1993;
Portes and Rumbaut 1996), it predicts that the offspring of some American immigrant groups will
assimilate into the ghetto underclass rather than into the mainstream. Among those at risk, the children
of black and Latino immigrants rank high. The reasoning behind this prediction is complex.
Since the 1980s, the number of well-paying, low-skilled jobs in America has been declining. Increas-
ingly, a middle-class livelihood requires more than a high school diploma. Yet, residential segregation
forces some dark-skinned immigrants to share neighborhoods with poor African Americans, Mexicans,
and Puerto Ricans; hence, some immigrant children attend ghetto schools. In such schools, aspirations are
low and education is substandard; large proportions of the student body do not graduate. Some African
American, Mexican, and Puerto Rican students subscribe to an “oppositional subculture” that valorizes
gangs, drug dealing, teenage parenthood, hustling, and honor. Unsurprisingly, this motivates some
children of black and Latino immigrants to embrace these values too. “From their perspective, immigrant
jobs are demeaning; moreover, illegal jobs and scams may pay more and look better socially – especially
when peer pressure is also present” (Gans 1992, p. 182).
Of course, immigrant parents hope “to promote educational success and to ward off threats posed by
discrimination, narrowing labor market options and street culture” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, p. 62). And
some parents do prevail. However, Portes and Rumbaut identify two factors that weaken parental
influence: single parenthood and dissonant acculturation. Single parents have less time, less money,
and less authority than two parents do. Dissonant acculturation results when adolescents abandon their
parents’ customs, values, and language for American ways, while the parents remain enmeshed in the
customs, values, and language of the homeland. The resulting intergenerational conflict rarely resolves in
the parents’ favor.
Recently researchers have found that some children of black and Muslim immigrants in Europe also
exhibit high rates of school dropout, idleness, and encounters with the criminal justice system (Sansone
1992; Batalha 2004; Alba and Silberman 2002; Silberman 2011). They also report experiencing labor
market discrimination and police harassment. This discovery has triggered debate over whether seg-
mented assimilation is occurring in Europe.
But, in order to apply, segmented assimilation requires the presence of a marginalized and disaffected
native minority. It is into their subculture that the children of nonwhite immigrants are expected to
assimilate. This logic makes the adaptation uniquely American. No European host society houses a

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stigmatized, long-resident minority into whose subculture black and Muslim youth can assimilate. Nor are
Europe’s immigrant neighborhoods as ethnically homogeneous and socially isolated as American
ghettoes (Paulle 2005; Wacquant 2008). Thus, if a subset of Europe’s immigrant youth are participating
in an oppositional subculture, a mechanism other than segmented assimilation must be responsible. In
short, from the perspective of segmentation theory, the vulnerability of the children of black and Latino
immigrants occurs only in the United States.

Legacies of Colonialism
A second theory that addresses variation in ethnic outcomes within host societies draws on the conse-
quences of colonialism. It assumes that imperialist nations denigrate the peoples they colonize and that
decolonization has done little to diminish this propensity. If this expectation is correct, in their respective
mother countries, immigrants from colonies and former colonies stand at the bottom of the ethno-racial
ladder (Rex 1983).
World systems theorist Ramon Grosfoguel (2003) uses this idea to create a three-tiered hierarchy. At the
bottom are immigrants from past or present colonies who have relocated to their respective mother
countries. Grosfoguel labels them “colonial/racialized subjects.” Next on the scale stand “colonial
immigrants.” Their homelands are colonies or former colonies, but they have settled in host societies
other than their respective mother countries. At the top sit “immigrants,” movers whose homelands have
never been colonies. Since these sending countries have a relatively unblemished geopolitical position,
their nationals outrank ex-colonials in any ethno-racial hierarchy.
What about the United States? Although it never defined any of its “territories” as colonies, several of
its minorities have been described as “internal colonials,” including African Americans, Native Ameri-
cans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos (Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979). Other groups to which the
label applies include Maoris in New Zealand, blacks in Brazil, or Palestinians in Israel. According to
Grosfoguel, internal colonials experience exclusion on a par with “colonial/racialized subjects.”
To sum up, according to world systems theorists, negative stereotypes about conquered and enslaved
peoples were part and parcel of the expansion of Europe. If these peoples reside in a Western country,
whether as migrants or internal colonials, negative stereotypes continue to undermine their integration,
especially in comparison to the reception accorded other international migrants.

Ethnic Returnees
A third category of movers who elicit a special response is ethnic return migrants. This is a label used for
people who, after living abroad for a generation or more, return to their real (or imagined) homeland.
Compared to other migrants, ethnic returnees face lower barriers to entry and may enjoy other advantages.
Their privileged status is an extreme case of the general principle that the greater the similarity between
the culture and phenotype of natives and newcomers, the warmer the relationship between the two groups
(Lynch and Simon 2003).
Still, similarity does not explain why countries initiate policies to attract return migrants. The most
frequent motive is to protect co-ethnics from persecution. Israel was founded for this reason. Both Jews
and their non-Jewish kin can establish permanent residency and, having done so, are eligible for a variety
of benefits. Most non-Jews qualify only for temporary residence.
Refugees from the wars for colonial independence were similarly favored. In 1968 the United Kingdom
created a new category for admission: persons whose parents or grandparents had been born, adopted, or
naturalized in the United Kingdom. Soon, persons not meeting this criterion – e.g., nonwhites – had
difficulty attaining permanent residency. France introduced similar policies toward its Pied-Noirs from
Algeria and Portugal toward its Retornados from Africa. Both these groups were white settlers displaced
by decolonization.

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In other cases, ethnic groups migrated to neighboring regions without the protection of empire and were
later ejected. The most prominent example are Aussiedlers, ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe,
often for generations, but who were persecuted after Germany lost the Second World War. The German
government was so generous in its assistance that, after the fall of the Eastern Bloc, hundreds of thousands
applied for resettlement (Joppke 2005). The Chinese too had a major presence abroad, primarily in
Southeast Asia. But when Ho Chi Minh and the communists conquered Vietnam, Chinese were no longer
welcome in that country. Although many relocated in the West, China accepted 270,000, resettling many
close to the border over which they fled (Lam 2000).
In Asia, scholars have identified a different motive for welcoming returning co-ethnics: economic
development (Skrentny et al. 2007). In both Korea and Japan, co-ethnics are desired for their labor power.
Because these countries are unusually homogeneous, neither government was eager to alleviate labor
shortages by recruiting “foreigners.” To minimize these fears, they turned instead to co-ethnics. Korea
introduced policies to attract persons of Korean ancestry from China (Joseonjok); Japan introduced
policies to attract persons of Japanese ancestry from South America (Nikkejin).
In sum, several nations have extended a warmer welcome to co-ethnics than non-co-ethnics. These
policies are intended to benefit the state economically and/or politically. Though this goal is often
accomplished, research indicates that ethnic return migrants are disappointed with their reception
(Tsuda 2009). Despite expectations that cultural and phenotypical similarities foster integration, ethnic
returnees are not on a par with natives, socially or economically. At the same time, they register better
outcomes than non-co-ethnic migrants (Alba and Silberman 2002; Kogan 2007b). Perhaps this fact offers
little solace because return migrants take their native-born counterparts as their reference group.

Queuing Theory
The discussion now turns to queuing theory, a perspective that predicts within-destination differences in
the economic realm. It is especially helpful in understanding ethnic and racial differences in unemploy-
ment and occupational status but has less relevance for earnings (Hodge 1973; Lieberson 1980). Its name
reflects the assumption that motivates the theory, namely, that native employers rank racial and ethnic
groups in a hierarchical fashion, favoring their own group over others. The theory does not specify the
basis for assigning ranks to the remaining groups. It assumes only that native employers within a given
locale agree on the ethno-racial composition of the hierarchy.
From these principles, it follows that native employers view applicants for vacancies or promotions as
arranged in a line or queue, with members of the most favored group at the front, followed by the second
most favored, and so on, down to the least favored at the back. Controlling for credentials and skills,
queuing theorists expect employers to start hiring (or promoting) at the front, moving down to the second
ranked group only after members of the first are exhausted. Members of the least favored group are rarely
hired but rank first when layoffs occur.
An obvious implication of queuing theory is that, in every country, some ethnic and racial minorities
experience more attractive economic opportunities than others. But there is a more subtle implication: the
sizes of the competing groups also affect their economic well-being. The larger the proportion of the labor
force ranked below a given group (or the smaller the proportion ranked above), the more successful that
group will be. To offer a simple example, in a locale where only two groups compete, the larger the more
favored group, the poorer the opportunities open to the less favored group and vice versa. Since most host
societies house more than two groups, developing appropriate hypotheses about the trajectory of any
specific group is a demanding task.

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Trade-Off Perspective
Very recently an intriguing hypothesis has been proposed to explain ethno-racial variation in political
integration. This argument, sometimes called the “trade-off” perspective, takes political participation and
electoral representation as the main indicators of political integration. The theory holds that, the more
socially segregated an ethnic minority – as measured by indicators like language, religion, and
intermarriage – the more politically integrated it is likely to be (Maxwell 2012). Segregation is helpful
because groups that are socially separate create their own institutions – voluntary organizations, religious
centers, media outlets, etc. – which, in turn, facilitate political mobilization (Fennema and Tillie 1999).
Conversely, groups that are socially integrated participate in mainstream associations and institutions, a
pattern that discourages the emergence of leaders or organizations committed to benefiting group
members. In other words, groups cannot have both social and political integration; they must “trade”
one “off” for the other.
Research designed to test this hypothesis finds that South Asians and Muslims in the United Kingdom,
France, and the Netherlands exhibit high levels of social and geographic segregation and high levels of
political activity. Conversely, Black Caribbean immigrants in these three host societies exhibit low levels
of social and geographic segregation and low levels of political activity (Maxwell 2012).
Black Caribbeans in the United States provide a useful extension of this relationship. In New York City,
they have a high voting rate and strong representation in city offices, both elected and appointed (Kasinitz
1992; Mollenkopf et al. 2001; Kasinitz et al. 2008) As the trade-off hypothesis predicts, Black Caribbean
Americans are also more segregated than Black Caribbean Europeans, usually sharing neighborhoods
with African Americans (Peach 1999). These neighborhoods nurture a range of institutions, including
churches, voluntary associations, civil rights groups, and “political clubs.” The latter are especially
important because their purpose is to identify and support local candidates for political office and to
distribute patronage to supporters. Although African Americans and Black Caribbeans sometimes
compete for leadership roles, residence in or near African American neighborhoods has given Black
Caribbeans an infrastructure for politics that is unavailable to their European counterparts (Foner 1985;
Rogers 2006).
Of course, social segregation has both a voluntary and an involuntary component. But, as the Black
Caribbean example illustrates, host societies respond differently to different groups. On the one hand, the
cultural gap between native whites and Black Caribbeans is modest on both sides of the Atlantic. On the
other hand, antiblack sentiment is much stronger in the United States than in Europe, due in part to
America’s legacy of slavery and institutionalized segregation (Vermeulen 2002). Consequently, despite
their shared culture, America offers Black Caribbeans far fewer opportunities to interact socially with
native whites than does Europe (Foner 1985, 2005).
In many ways, the trade-off hypothesis challenges existing theories about integration. The assimila-
tionist perspective, for instance, argues that integration brings ethnic minorities more advantages than
does segregation (Alba and Nee 2003). In a similar vein, segmented assimilation theory associates the
segregation of blacks in America, native or foreign born, with alienation, poverty, and crime (Portes and
Zhou 1993). Yet, advocates of the trade-off hypothesis perceive segregation as politically advantageous
because it facilitates mobilization. This example illustrates the multidimensional, nonlinear quality of the
integration process.

Research Implications
To conclude, cross-national comparisons are a useful tool for understanding the factors that promote
immigrant integration. Understandably, the hypotheses that motivate cross-national comparisons operate
at the level of nations. When the object of analysis is “immigrants in general,” this is the appropriate
approach. Frequently, however, the relationship between a specific immigrant group and its host society is

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“special.” This special relationship may affect one or several dimensions of integration. And the result
may help or harm the integration process.
The goal of this article is to show that hypotheses formulated at the level of nations overlook these
special relationships. Nor do the five theories outlined above provide the sole grounds for cross-national
variation. Depending on the nations under scrutiny, a myriad of factors may produce special relationships.
For example, applicants for refugee status in the United States must demonstrate “a well-founded fear of
persecution. . .” unless they are Cuban, in which case their presence on American soil justifies granting
them asylum. In this example, geopolitics trumps a level playing field. Exceptions like this mean that
when scholars engage in cross-national comparisons of specific groups, they must consider hypotheses
that operate both across host societies and within host societies. That integration is so complex is
unfortunate, but ignoring this complexity diminishes scholars’ ability to understand it.

Cross-References
▶ Employment-Based Immigration
▶ Guest Workers
▶ Points-Based Immigration

References
Alba R, Nee V (2003) Rethinking the American mainstream. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Alba R, Silberman R (2002) Decolonization immigrants and the social origins of the second generation:
the case of North Africans in France. Int Migr Rev 36:1169–1193
Alba R, Waters MC (2011) Dimensions of second-generation incorporation. In: Alba R, Waters MC (eds)
The next generation: immigrant youth in a comparative perspective. New York University Press, New
York, pp 1–28
Barrera M (1979) Race and class in the Southwest. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
Batalha L (2004) The Cape Verdean diaspora in Portugal. Lexington Books, Lanham
Bean FD, Brown SK, Bachmeier JD, Fokkema T, Lessard-Philips L (2012) Immigrant incorporation and
its dimensions: comparisons among U.S. and European Cities. Int J Comp Sociol 53:181–209
Blauner R (1972) Racial oppression in America. Harper and Row, New York
Fennema M, Tillie J (1999) Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and
ethnic networks. J Ethn Migr Stud 25:703–726
Foner N (1985) Race and color: Jamaican migrants in London and New York City. Int Migr Rev
19:708–727
Foner N (2005) In a new land. New York University Press, New York
Freeman GP (2004) Immigrant incorporation in Western democracies. Int Migr Rev 38:945–969
Gans H (1992) Second-generation decline: scenarios for the economic and ethnic futures of the post-1965
American immigrants. Ethnic Racial Stud 15:173–192
Grosfoguel R (2003) Colonial subjects. University of California Press, Berkeley
Heath A (2007) Crossnational patterns and processes of ethnic disadvantage. In: Heath A, Cheung SY
(eds) Unequal chances: ethnic minorities in Western labour markets. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp 639–695
Hodge RW (1973) Toward a theory of racial differences in employment. Soc Forces 52:16–31
Joppke C (2005) Selecting by origin. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

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Kasinitz P (1992) Caribbean New York. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY

Kasinitz P, Mollenkopf J, Waters MC, Holdaway J (2008) Inheriting the city. Russell Sage, New York
Kogan I (2007a) A study of immigrants’ employment careers in West Germany using the sequence
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Kogan I (2007b) Working through barriers. Springer, Dordrecht
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Lieberson S (1980) A piece of the pie. University of California, Berkeley
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R
Role of Contexts and Political Culture Institutional Accounts of Political
in Political Incorporation: A Case Incorporation
Study of Chilean Migration
to Toronto Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven,
Patricia Landolt
Department of Sociology, University of Toronto,
Toronto, ON, Canada
Definition
Immigrant political incorporation is an uneven,
institutionally embedded, and context-contingent
social process associated with political learning
and political participation in the country of set-
tlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). Migra-
tion contexts and institutional opportunity
structures affect the form and orientation of
immigrant political incorporation in various,
sometimes contradictory, ways. This entry exam-
ines the role of political culture and political
learning to help account for these seemingly con-
tradictory relations between migration contexts,
institutional opportunity structures, and political
incorporation. The focus of discussion will be a
case study of the political incorporation of
Chileans in Toronto for the forty-year period
from 1973 to the 2000s. The case illustrates how
political culture and political learning mediate
the impact of context on political incorporation.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F. D. Bean, S. K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_113-1
institutionally embedded, and context-contingent
social process associated with political learning
and political participation in the country of set-
tlement (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). It
includes informal civic and grassroots organizing
and participation in formal, electoral politics and
can intersect with transnational engagement in
homeland politics or politics in diaspora
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). The relationship
between civic engagement, grassroots organiz-
ing, and formal politics and between these and
the incorporationist, transnational, and diasporic
orientations of political incorporation is complex
and multidirectional and typically changes
over time.
Migration contexts and institutional opportu-
nity structures affect the form and orientation of
immigrant political incorporation in various,
sometimes contradictory, ways. Mainstream
political parties may marginalize immigrants
even when the immigrants themselves maintain
dynamic community-based organizations
(Siemiatycki and Isin 1997; Odmalm 2005;
Wong 2006). Civil society organizations such as
labor unions, religious congregations, hometown
associations, refugee resettlement organizations,
and political parties may extend or restrict the
pathway to citizenship for immigrants, as well
as encourage passive or active forms of
2 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
citizenship (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Rogers 2006).
Government policies for immigrant selection,
and for multiculturalism and citizenship, are
sometimes associated with active transnational
politics (Faist 2000; Koopmans and Statham
2003), while in other cases they are associated
with incorporation (Bloemraad et al. 2008).
Home-country state policies and non-state actors
may promote transnational politics but do not
guarantee it (Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt and de la
Dehesa 2003). Participation in transnational
grassroots or electoral politics may preclude
immigrants’ interest in politics in the settlement
society, but more often than not it serves as a
stepping-stone for engagement in
incorporationist politics (Karpathakis 1999).
To help account for these seemingly contra-
dictory relations between migration contexts,
institutional opportunity structures, and political
incorporation, the following discussion will focus
on the role of political culture and political learn-
ing (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Landolt and
Goldring 2010). Migration contexts and institu-
tional opportunity structures set the stage for
political incorporation, but political cultures
interact with contexts to chart the process of
political incorporation. Political culture refers to
a group’s ways of doing politics and its
established basis for organizing (cf. Swidler
1986). A group’s political culture shapes the
types of alliances, partnerships, and dialogues it
is likely to sustain, to which types of actors and
institutions it is drawn and to which it is legible.
As well, migrant political cultures vary and
change further through the process of incorpora-
tion. Over time, encounters or interactions among
actors generate political learning or reflection and
evaluation of past experiences to adjust present
and future political action. The distinct character
of migrant political cultures and the group’s eval-
uations and adjustments over time shape the form
and orientation of immigrant politics and explain
why similar contexts and opportunity structures
can easily lead to different incorporation
outcomes.
The focus of discussion will be a case study of
the political incorporation of Chileans in Toronto
for the forty-year period from 1973 to the 2000s.
This case illustrates how political culture and
political learning mediate the impact of context
on political incorporation. The entry draws on
materials previously published in Landolt and
Goldring (2009) and Landolt and Goldring
(2010). The form and orientation of Chilean
immigrant politics have had three phases, each
of which was marked by distinct migration con-
texts and institutional opportunity structures. The
three phases were: first, the formation of grass-
roots transnational organizations focused first on
political change in Chile and later on bridging
Chileans to Canadian society; then, participation
in the creation of pan-ethnic, social service orga-
nizations; and, finally, migrant participation in
electoral politics in Canada and Chile. In each
phase, Chilean migrant political culture and the
political learning that occurred over time
informed how Chileans interpreted each moment,
developed political priorities and strategies of
action, and identified possible allies and partners.
The presentation of the Chilean case is followed
by a discussion of the broader implications for the
study of contextual effects on political
incorporation.
Context of Exit and Reception
Chilean migration to Canada began in 1973 and
was sparked by the overthrow of the Popular
Unity coalition government of socialist president
Salvador Allende. Just under 10,000 Chileans
came to Canada between 1973 and 1978, includ-
ing 4,000 who settled in the City of Toronto. By
the 1990s, there were an estimated 10,000
Chileans in Toronto and 30,000 in Canada (Diaz
1999). The migration context for Chileans was
characterized by forced migration from Chile, a
chilly reception by the Canadian government,
and a warm welcome by a well-organized and
resource-rich civil society.
During the Allende years (1970–1973), for-
eign relations between Chile and Canada were
strained because of the Canadian government’s
ideological hostility toward Marxism and its alli-
ance with the United States. After the coup, the
federal government in Ottawa refused to respond
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
to the human rights crisis occurring in Chile and
referred to the country’s growing refugee popu-
lation as “Marxist riff-raff.”
In contrast, civil society relations between
Canadians and Chileans were extremely produc-
tive both during and after the Allende years.
Canadian social justice groups organized student
exchanges, interchurch dialogues, trade union
visits, and a host of other activities. They also
formed local chapters of the Committee in Soli-
darity with Socialist Chile. When the coup
occurred, social justice and faith-based refugee
rights groups lobbied Ottawa to respond to the
human rights crisis. They launched a successful
media campaign to shame the government and
make Canadians aware of the situation in Chile.
Lobbying was preempted and support for refu-
gees accelerated when Chileans stormed the
Canadian embassy in Santiago and demanded
asylum.
Pushed by social justice and refugee rights
groups in Canada along with the events in
Chile, the federal government launched Opera-
tion Chile, which granted Chileans the right to
emigrate to Canada under relaxed criteria. How-
ever, the Canadian government lacked both the
contacts and expertise to oversee the initiative
and was required to partner with refugee rights
activists to manage the selection and resettlement
process. Rejecting the federal government’s
“first-come, first-serve” approach, activists
imposed their own criteria on the selection pro-
cess. They identified people who were most at
risk, visited jails in Chile to select 100 political
prisoners for migration to Canada, and demanded
that those at risk be able to migrate with their
families.
Migration contexts are dynamic moments of
political action that set the stage for the process of
political incorporation. In this case, the coup in
Chile and the targeted nature of political repres-
sion resulted in the forced and unplanned migra-
tion of a politically homogeneous population.
The political battle between the federal govern-
ment and refugee rights activists had a direct
impact on the demographic character and politi-
cal tenor of Chilean migration to Canada. It deter-
mined the size of the first wave of Chilean
3
migration and generated a migrant population
with a large proportion of educated working and
middle-class families with strong roots in Chile’s
left-wing political party system and a clearly
defined political culture.
Chilean migrant political culture echoed the
political landscape of the Allende years. Chileans
considered political party affiliations important,
respected the hierarchical decision-making pro-
cess of Marxist party structures, and had a strong
culture of activism as a mode of civic engage-
ment. In turn, forced migration from Chile con-
tributed to the socially expected duration of
migration as temporary. Chileans refused to call
Canada “home” and planned for an imminent
return to Chile: they lived out of suitcases, bought
used cars, and made no effort to learn English.
The framing of migration as a temporary exile
cemented pre-coup Chilean ways of doing poli-
tics as a legitimate point of reference for doing
politics “while in Canada.” As such, migrant
strategies of action rested on organizational
habits rooted in pre-coup Chilean politics and
drew on a diasporic network of exile contacts
and resources.
Transnational Politics of Exile
and Settlement
The first phase of Chilean political incorporation
includes two aspects, both involving transna-
tional organizations. One is focused narrowly on
transnational opposition politics organized
through a diasporic network of political parties
in exile and through partnerships with the Cana-
dian social justice activist community. The other
saw an expansion in the agenda of transnational
organizations to include a concern with social
incorporation and the formation of partnerships
with a broader range of institutions in Canadian
society.
Chileans’ first political act in Toronto was to
constitute political parties in exile. Their princi-
pal goals were to fundraise for the underground
resistance in Chile, provide support for families
of political prisoners, and raise local awareness
about human rights violations. Political parties in
4 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
exile had a dual structure that included a semi-
clandestine group of militants with links to a
party leadership in exile and a sociocultural arm
that organized public education and fundraising
events. Over time, the number, size, and
resources of Chilean political parties in exile
have waxed and waned, but it has never ceased
to be a relevant feature of Chilean political
incorporation.
Chilean party militants constituted an activist
umbrella organization: the Toronto Chilean
Association-Popular Unity (TCA, 1974–1980),
later renamed the Toronto Chilean Society
(TCS, 1981–1990). The TCS brought together
local representatives from each political party in
exile. The umbrella structure of the TCS allowed
Chileans to overcome some of their ideological
differences and to present a common political
front vis-à-vis Canadian institutions. The TCS
membership included Chileans and Canadians,
although the latter were excluded from central
decision-making. Canadians grew frustrated
with the verticalism of the TCS, the expectation
that Canadians learn and be tested on Chilean
history, and what they perceived as ideological
squabbling and paralysis generated by the fact
that the TCS political agenda was set by distant
political parties in exile.
Eventually, a small group of Canadians and
Chileans left the TCS and formed Toronto Action
for Chile (TACH), an independent transnational
solidarity organization. TACH had a diverse net-
work of Canadian supporters including aca-
demics, lawyers, and both union and church
leaders, as well as provincial and federal mem-
bers of parliament. TACH also developed an
independent network of political contacts in
Chile and coordinated activities with Canadian
transnational activist organizations such as the
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in
Latin American (ICCHRLA) and local OXFAM
chapters.
The establishment of TACH shifted the terms
of political dialogue between Chilean and Cana-
dian activists because it enabled the TCS and
TACH to work as political equals. Collaboration
between the TCS and TACH bridged and
extended the reach of Chilean activist actions to
a larger web of contacts in Canadian institutions.
High-impact political events resulted from this
collaboration. In 1977, TACH and the TCS
co-organized the Canadian Inquiry into Human
Rights in Chile. The event marked the first time
that members of the Association of Families of
the Detained and Disappeared were able to leave
Chile to denounce publicly the dictatorship’s
human rights violations and impunity. In 1980,
TACH and the TCS co-organized the Canadian
Conference for Justice in Chile at the University
of Toronto’s Faculty of Law. These two confer-
ences provided the basis for a legal challenge to
the Chilean Constitution of 1980. The findings of
the two events were sent to the United Nations
and, in 1990 (post-dictatorship), served as evi-
dence for Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation
Committee.
By the late 1970s, Chileans’ transnational
political party organizations began to develop a
dual orientation and served as the base for com-
munity projects of social incorporation. Chilean
cultural clubs sponsored soccer teams for
Toronto city leagues at the same time that they
raised funds for the underground resistance in
Chile. Chileans participated in the city’s cooper-
ative housing movement and secured affordable
housing for many Chilean families. The Arauco
Housing Complex cemented the socio-spatial
concentration and visibility of Chilean exile pol-
itics in Toronto. The Toronto Chilean Society
(TCS) created the President Salvador Allende
School (EPSA, Spanish acronym) to teach the
children of exiles Chilean history and Spanish in
preparation for an eventual return. The EPSA
partnered with teachers and elected school
trustees to access the resources of the Toronto
District School Board (TDSB). The EPSA and
its Canadian allies eventually played an impor-
tant role in the establishment of the heritage lan-
guage program of the TDSB.
In this first phase of political incorporation,
Chilean exile political culture shaped the form
and orientation of migrant organizations and the
range and character of migrant contact with
nonmigrant institutions and individuals.
Chileans’ shared narrative of leftist solidarity
and exile from dictatorship resonated with the
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
ideals and concerns of the Canadian social justice
community. Chileans’ modes of organizing were
intelligible to Canadian social justice activists
and, with minor adjustments, convertible to the
Canadian institutional context. The TCS-TACH
partnership generated a resource-rich social net-
work for political incorporation and political
learning for both Chileans and Canadians. In
turn, transnational political organizations served
as the platform for Chileans’ shifting political
priorities, which began to include a concern
with sports, housing, and schooling. This
expanded orientation of political incorporation
required the development of new partnerships
and a new political vocabulary. Thus, the shifting
form and orientation of Chilean political engage-
ment generated new experiences of political
learning and modifications in Chilean exile polit-
ical culture.
Canadian Multiculturalism and the Rise
of Pan-ethnic Politics
The second phase of Chilean political incorpora-
tion in Canada was shaped by the new multicul-
turalism policy of 1971. This policy redefined the
relationship between the Canadian state and both
recently arrived immigrants and Canadian-born,
multigenerational, ethnolinguistically distinct
groups (Fleras and Elliott 1992). The policy
emphasized cultural and linguistic differences,
at the same time that it elided other dimensions
of diversity such as race, class, and gender
(Bannerji, 2000). Over time, the implementation
of the official policy encouraged pan-ethnic
forms of organizing clustered around shared lan-
guage (e.g., Hispanics) or shared geography (e.g.,
South Asians, Asians). Political recognition
vis-à-vis the state and the societal mainstream
required an ethnic vocabulary of political
engagement (Landolt and Goldring 2009). In
this context, the structure of state funding shifted
considerably. Of particular relevance to new-
comers, the federal and provincial government
encourage the use of a pan-ethnic framework for
the design and delivery of immigrant settlement
5
and social service programming (Lanphier and
Lukomskyj 1994).
Multiculturalism prompted a diversification of
Chileans’ political repertoire as community
activists participated in the formation of the Cen-
tre for Spanish-Speaking Peoples (CSSP). The
CSSP was created originally by a group of Span-
ish women with financing from the Communist
Party of Spain to offer solidarity to arriving Latin
Americans. The CSSP provided refugee families
with childcare, social support, and settlement
information. Given political affinities between
Spanish and Chilean exiles, Chileans went
quickly from being recipients of assistance to
frontline workers and leaders in the agency. The
Centre was transformed into a well-funded,
pan-ethnic organization with diverse partnerships
and programs, including a legal clinic, English
language classes, and a women’s program. Under
Chilean leadership, the CSSP gained a reputation
as an innovative and progressive community set-
tlement and social service agency.
The Latin American Women’s Collective
(LAWC, 1983–1991) is a second example of the
shift from ethno-national to pan-ethnic politics.
After years of working within male-dominated
organizations, Chilean women became aware of
the contradictions between the progressive rhe-
toric of political parties in exile and their lived
experiences of patriarchal decision-making, sex-
ism, silencing, and violence. When women
militants made instances of domestic violence
known to the political leadership, it dismissed
such violence as an inevitable effect of men’s
traumas of exile. Women’s experiences of
domestic and political violence were thus mini-
mized and left unaddressed (Landolt and
Goldring 2009).
The LAWC was the first explicitly feminist
Latin American organization in Toronto. Its
membership included exile political party
militants, first- and second-generation women,
and both grassroots activists and frontline
workers employed in social service agencies.
The LAWC recognized the intersectional speci-
ficity of Latin American women’s political prior-
ities and ways of doing politics (San Martin
1998). It advocated for the rights of Latin
6 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
American women and children with a focus on
equal access to culturally competent social ser-
vices. The LAWC encouraged members to take
the organization’s strategic priorities into other
arenas in which they did political work. The
LAWC also connected Latin American feminist
activists to other migrant and nonmigrant
women’s groups in the city, across Canada, and
transnationally in the members’ countries of ori-
gin and beyond.
In the 1980s, multiculturalism had a transfor-
mative effect on Chilean political incorporation.
Chileans participated in the creation of
pan-ethnic organizations that sat comfortably
within Toronto’s multicultural landscape. How-
ever, the organizational structure and political
mandate of these groups also embodied the dis-
tinct political culture and dual orientation of Chil-
ean migrants. Both the CSSP and LAWC had an
incorporationist agenda with a commitment to
social justice and grassroots strategies of activ-
ism. Further, while the focus of their work
remained local, their symbolic orientation and
social networks reflected members’ transnational
orientation to doing politics.
The formation of Chilean-led pan-ethnic orga-
nizations reflected a diversification of political
agendas and new forms of political learning.
Chileans’ commitment to the CSSP implied mov-
ing away from Chilean-only spaces of political
engagement to increased dialogue with other
immigrant groups and the state. The formation
of the LAWC, a product of intra-community con-
flict (cf. Trinh Võ 2001), generated a political
dialogue and partnerships with other migrant
and nonmigrant women’s organizations. Both
experiences further extended and transformed
Chilean political culture.
Changing Contexts, Declining Activist
Politics, and Entrance into Electoral
Politics
Beginning in the 1990s, the political and social
context changed considerably in Chile and Can-
ada resulting in a third phase of political incor-
poration of Chileans. In Chile the end of the
dictatorship redefined Chilean cross-border poli-
tics. In Canada, Chileans faced a new landscape
of restricted opportunities for civic engagement
resulting from fiscal austerity and government
cutbacks. Changes in the institutional landscape
prompted a redefinition and diversification of
Chilean transnational politics, as well as an atten-
uation of Chileans’ distinct style of
incorporation-oriented activist politics. This was
also a period in which Chileans entered electoral
politics at the municipal level. Each dimension of
this transition reflects the layering of new modes
of political engagement onto Chileans’
established trajectory of political incorporation.
Regarding changes in Chile and the transition
to democracy, transnational politics took three
overlapping forms. There was a continuation of
transnational oppositional politics (Bolzman
2011). Chilean and Canadian social justice activ-
ists provided evidence to Chile’s National Com-
mission for Truth and Reconciliation. They also
continued to fundraise and advocate for Chilean
organizations that were largely excluded from the
democratic transition. Chilean exiles also advo-
cated for the rights of migrants themselves. They
sought redress and compensation for forced dena-
tionalization and lobbied for changes to the Chil-
ean Constitution to allow for dual citizenship,
relaxed criteria for naturalization for children of
Chileans born abroad, and the right to vote from
abroad (Pereyra 2003). Finally, they participated
in new arenas of transnational solidarity in Chile
including the Mapuche land struggle in the south
and the environmental movement against the
Barrick Gold mining project in Pascua Lama.
In Canada, government cutbacks in social ser-
vice funding, restrictions on advocacy work by
state-funded agencies, and increased require-
ments for reporting and accounting for the use
of state funds curtailed activism in the immigrant
settlement sector (Richmond and Shields 2005).
The arrival of new waves of Latin Americans
with an aversion to formal political party and
activist politics weakened the contestatory spirit
of pan-ethnic organizations. In this context, the
Latin American Women’s Collective disbanded,
and the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People was
required to mainstream services to ensure
Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
continued funding; community members became
clients of services and horizontal consultation
weakened.
Chileans in Toronto also made inroads into
electoral politics. Using the tight-knit exile
community’s resources and the President Salva-
dor Allende School (EPSA) partnership with
equity-minded school board officials as a spring-
board, one Chilean woman, a leading figure in the
EPSA, was elected as a public school board
trustee in 1990. The first Latin American to be
elected to this post, she held the position for three
terms until 1997. A second case is that of a
second-generation daughter of Chilean exiles
who ran for city council in 2006 and 2014. Raised
in the midst of Chilean transnational politics, the
candidate proudly attributes her passion for pol-
itics and commitment to social democracy to her
family’s exile experience (Nice 2011). She has
drawn heavily on the material and symbolic sup-
port of a rich network of first- and second-
generation Chileans to run her campaign.
More than 40 years after the coup in Chile, the
dual orientation of the Chilean migrant political
agenda in Toronto continues to generate a pro-
ductive tension. The political priorities and ways
of doing politics captured in the present period
are layered onto decades of political action. Also
part of the mix are many of the networks and
resources created through 40 years of political
engagement. Further, the present pattern of polit-
ical incorporation continues to embody features
of Chilean exile political culture – namely, a left-
wing orientation and the ability to move comfort-
ably between grassroots ways of organizing and
political party structures.
The Lessons of a Longitudinal Case
Study for Understanding Contexts
This brief case study illustrates that the impact of
contexts of exit and reception may be understood
by reference to political cultures and processes of
political learning. Chilean migrant political cul-
ture first emerged as a mix of pre-coup organiza-
tional capacity and party militancy and an exile
narrative of forced migration. This deeply rooted
7
political culture mediated Chileans’ interpreta-
tion of the migration context and institutional
landscape when they first arrived and the form
and orientation of the organizations they created.
In tandem with the political learning that
occurred over time, Chilean political culture
informed how Chileans adjusted to changes in
the context and institutional opportunity struc-
ture, the possibilities it afforded, or political ges-
tures it required. Political culture also framed
how other social actors interpreted Chilean poli-
tics and Chilean organizations and thus impacted
the types of alliances and partnerships that
Chileans were able to create.
Chileans first came to Canada as political
exiles hoping for a quick return home. This polit-
ical agenda led them to focus on transnational
politics of change in their country of origin. It
also encouraged them to connect with particular
kinds of Canadian and migrant organizations,
namely, social justice and international solidarity
groups. Chilean transnational political organiza-
tions and Canadian social justice groups had
mutually intelligible political cultures, allowing
for very productive alliances and partnerships
that often lasted for decades, even as political
priorities and strategies changed. Over time and
in response to multiculturalism policies, Chileans
restructured their organizations and become
increasingly pan-ethnic, less overtly political
and transnational in focus. Pan-ethnic organizing
took different forms including: the development
of a mainstream immigrant social service organi-
zation, the Centre for Spanish-Speaking People,
and the formation of social justice-oriented,
grassroots organizations such as the Latin Amer-
ican Women’s Collective. Pan-ethnic organizing
required forging new partnerships and again the
affinities of political culture were relevant. After
1990, the end of the dictatorship in Chile
prompted significant changes in Chilean migrant
political priorities. While never completely aban-
doned, transnational politics become a secondary
focus and participation in Canadian electoral pol-
itics gained ground. Chilean participation in elec-
toral politics in Canada drew on the networks,
resources, and ways of doing politics developed
decades earlier under a different context and with
8 Role of Contexts and Political Culture in Political Incorporation
a very different set of priorities. This connection
over time highlights the organizationally layered
and path-dependent nature of the process of polit-
ical incorporation.
The focus on migrant political culture through
an in-depth study of the forms and orientation of
immigrant politics over time captures the rela-
tional, dynamic, and contingent nature of the
process of political incorporation. While
Chileans in Toronto have been my specific
focus, the framework thus applies readily to
other cases of political incorporation.
Longitudinal studies capture change over time
and confirm the cumulative, path-dependent, and
multidirectional character of political incorpora-
tion. A diachronic approach illustrates how the
forms and orientations of politics shift over time,
making it possible to map interactions between
grassroots and electoral forms of political
engagement and between local, transnational,
and diasporic orientations. Changes in contexts
and institutional opportunity structures across
multiple locations impact political forms and ori-
entations, priorities, and initiatives and may even
produce a retreat from political engagement. The
layering of organizational experiences is revealed
as a key mechanism of cumulative causation.
Contextual changes do not erase past organiza-
tional forms and political experiences; rather,
new forms and orientations are layered onto the
existing landscape of political engagement.
Capturing this layering of experiences in
changing contexts is aided by the focus on polit-
ical culture and political learning. Migrant polit-
ical culture is a critical determinant of political
incorporation because it regulates the form and
orientation of migrant political priorities, as well
as the modes and basis of the group’s organizing.
Premigration experiences with politics and col-
lective action shape the ways of organizing to
which immigrants are disposed (White
et al. 2008; Ginieniewicz 2009). Migrant modes
of exit – lone or family migration, authorized or
undetected – and the symbolic meaning of exit
and return also feed into migrant political culture.
In turn, the convertibility of premigration politi-
cal culture frames the possibility for and charac-
ter of alliances and partnerships with other groups
and institutions in the country of settlement. Over
time changes in migrant political culture alter the
character of dialogues and convertibility in rela-
tion to places of origin and in diaspora.
Political learning involves reflection and eval-
uation of past experiences to adjust present- and
future-oriented political actions. It occurs
through encounters among individuals and orga-
nizations, each of which operates within a partic-
ular political culture. Encounters may occur
between migrants and nonmigrants, within dif-
ferent institutional arenas and across multiple
geographies. Contexts and institutional opportu-
nity structures shape political encounters. Politi-
cal learning, however, transforms the political
culture of migrant and nonmigrant actors at the
same time as it generates changes in the form and
orientation of migrant political incorporation.
Political learning also transforms the political
vocabulary of migrant groups and thus their polit-
ical legibility vis-à-vis other political actors in the
country of origin and the place of settlement.
Understanding political incorporation thus
may be enhanced with a move toward an
expanded temporal frame for research and iden-
tification of a broader range of relevant actors.
Mapping organizational interactions for a single
case and over an extended period offers important
conceptual lessons for studies of immigrant polit-
ical incorporation.
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M
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare pressing for recognition and accommodation of
State their differences. But are these tensions real?
Keith G. Banting
School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University,
Kingston, ON, Canada
Definition
One of the most compelling challenges facing
western democracies is how to maintain and
strengthen the bonds of community in ethnically
diverse societies. How can we reconcile growing
levels of migration and multicultural diversity
with the sense of a common identity and mutual
support which underpins generous welfare
states? In recent decades, a growing number of
analysts argue that migration and growing ethnic
diversity erode trust and a sense of community
among citizens and that contemporary democra-
cies face a trade-off between the accommodation
of ethnic diversity on the one hand and support
for redistribution on the other. This concern has
been labeled the “progressive’s dilemma”
(Goodhart 2004), which holds that reformist
forces face a tough choice between pursuing
greater redistribution or supporting a more
diverse, multicultural society.
If these trade-offs are real, the welfare state is
in considerable trouble. Migration is a reality in
virtually all western democracies; and there is no
reason to assume that ethnic minorities will stop
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_114-1
More importantly, are they universal? Or do the
cases of tension that we do observe reflect partic-
ular contexts and circumstances?
This essay examines the evolution of research
and scholarly debate on these questions. It begins
by setting the debate in the larger context of
research on the welfare state and then summa-
rizes the trends in recent literature. A concluding
section then draws together the general patterns
and suggests some implications for future
research.
Origins of the Debate
Students of social policy have long argued that
the welfare state was built on and can only be
sustained by a strong sense of community and
associated feelings of trust, reciprocity, and
mutual obligation. An early expositor of this
view was T.H. Marshall, who argued that the
expansion of social rights reflected the emer-
gence of a national consciousness in Britain.
“Citizenship,” he argued in an oft-quoted pas-
sage, “requires a bond of a different kind, a direct
sense of community membership based on
loyalty to a civilisation that is a common posses-
sion” (Marshall 1950/1992, p. 8). In recent years,
however, analysts have increasingly argued that
ethnic/racial diversity will erode the sense of a
common community. They fear that the public
2 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State

may withdraw support from social programs range of findings and uncovered a terrain of
that redistribute resources to people they regard considerable complexity. Nevertheless, some
as “strangers,” or “outsiders” who are not part general patterns are beginning to emerge. We
of “us.” explore them here in several categories: public
Traditionally, researchers interested in the attitudes, political processes, the design of public
welfare state paid relatively little attention to policy, and social policy outcomes.
such factors (Swank 2002; Huber and Stevens
2001; Esping-Andersen 1990). However, the
issues surfaced in other fields. For example,
Public Attitudes
development economists increasingly pointed to
ethnic and tribal diversity in attempting to
Does migration and ethnic diversity weaken sup-
explain the poor economic performance and
port for redistribution among the general public?
limited provision of public goods such as educa-
In the US, Robert Putnam famously concluded
tion in a number of developing countries,
that trust and community engagement, which he
especially in Africa (Easterly 2001).
argues is critical for collective action, is weak-
More importantly for current purposes,
ened by ethnic diversity; individuals living in
analysts began to extrapolate from US experi-
more homogeneous parts of the country are in
ence. The crippling effects of race run through
effect “hunkering down” in social isolation
the history of social policy in that country, from
(Putnam 2007). Putnam did not extend his anal-
Civil War pensions to the Social Security Act in
ysis directly to support for welfare spending. But
1935 to the Great Society programs in the 1960s
Luttmer concludes that support for welfare
to welfare reform in the 1990s (Schram
spending is lower in diverse neighborhoods
et al. 2003). Traditionally, the politics of race
(Luttmer 2001); Gilens has demonstrated how
was seen as contributing to American exception-
the interaction between racial attitudes and
alism (Lipset and Marks 2000). Increasingly,
media-driven images of poor blacks as lazy
however, the racialized dimension of US welfare
explains “why Americans hate welfare” (Gilens
politics is seen as evidence of a normal, even
1999); and Fox (2004) has found that a greater
inevitable, reaction to ethnic/racial heterogeneity
proportion of Latinos in a state is correlated with
and a warning to other countries being
lower public support for welfare spending.
transformed by migration. Gary Freeman
Comparative research, however, suggests that
described migration as a “disaster” for the wel-
US story is not universal. Cross-national findings
fare state and predicted that it would lead to “the
have been mixed at best, with contradictory
Americanization of European welfare politics”
results reflecting different outcome measures,
(Freeman 1986: 62). Alesina and Glaeser worried
different migrant populations, different control
that “As Europe has become more diverse,
variables, and different time periods. Nonethe-
Europeans have increasingly been susceptible to
less, cross-national studies tend to find either no
exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare dem-
relationship or, at most, a weak negative relation-
agoguery that worked so well in the United
ship between migration and public support for the
States. We shall see whether the generous welfare
welfare state. Certainly, negative effects seem
state can really survive in a heterogeneous soci-
smaller than one might expect from simply
ety” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, pp. 180–181).
extrapolating from US experience and tend to
Since the early 2000s, research on these issues
fade when a number of moderating factors are
has exploded. Scholars in more and more coun-
included in the analysis. Other factors are clearly
tries are asking whether such warnings might be
more important in predicting welfare attitudes
right. They also ask what governments can do to
(See, e.g., Brady and Finnigan 2014; Senik
mitigate any tensions between migration and
et al. 2009; Finseraas 2008; Mau and Burkhardt
social solidarity. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the
2009; Crepaz 2008).
rapidly growing literature has generated a diverse
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State
Case studies of other individual countries are
similarly varied. In Canada, one the most diverse
countries among western democracies, Soroka
et al. (2006) find that although interpersonal
trust tends to be lower in racially diverse neigh-
borhoods, echoing Putnam, trust in government
institutions and support for the welfare state are
not strongly related to racial diversity. A more
recent study qualifies this rosy image of multicul-
tural Canada: perceptions of heavy migrant use of
social assistance are not associated with a general
rejection of redistribution, but perceptions
of welfare dependence among aboriginal people
are (Banting et al. 2013). In Germany,
Stichnoth(2012) found greater opposition when
he asked whether the native population supported
state help for the unemployed in regions where
the proportion of foreigners among the unem-
ployed is high. However, after adjusting for indi-
vidual differences such as income and East
German origins, the negative association
between migration and public support was
relatively weak.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the effects of ethnic
diversity are especially sensitive in Scandinavia.
The Nordic model of the welfare state was
constructed in the context of striking homogene-
ity, but migration is transforming these countries,
most notably Sweden, where the proportion of
the population born outside of the country has
grown the fastest. Once again, the evidence is
mixed. Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) study the
ways in which the distribution of refugees across
Danish municipalities affect voting patterns, and
find no clear indication of a decline in support for
the welfare state. In contrast, two studies in
Sweden are less reassuring. Eger (2010) finds a
negative association between the proportion of
migrants in different regions and support for
social spending, although the relationship is
much weaker for universal social programs such
as health care; and Dahlberg et al. (2012) report a
negative impact of migration from nonwestern
countries on public support for social benefits.
In retrospect, the idea that the public would
abandon social programs they value simply
because of migration seems a bit implausible.
Not surprisingly, several alternative hypotheses
3
have emerged. Some studies have found support
for a “compensation hypothesis,” which holds
that anxiety about migration actually increases
support for the welfare state. High levels of
migration generate economic insecurity in the
majority population, especially among
low-skilled workers, increasing their support for
social programs (Finseraas 2008; Brady and
Finnigan 2014). In effect, antimigrant attitudes
and proredistribution views can and often do go
together.
Importantly, however, the compensation
effect does not guarantee an inclusionary
approach to social solidarity. In many countries,
there is considerable support among the majority
population for maintaining the welfare state but
denying its benefits to newcomers. Migrants are
consistently seen as the least “deserving” group
of beneficiaries (van Oorshot 2006), and there is
substantial support for what is, in effect, a
two-tier welfare state, generous for natives but
restricted for migrants. This exclusionary
approach, often called “welfare chauvinism,”
can take several forms: lower levels of support
for social programs thought to disproportionately
benefit migrants and support for lengthy resi-
dency requirements which delay access to gen-
eral programs for newcomers (Sainsbury 2012;
Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012; Koning 2013).
It is worth underscoring that the compensation
effect and welfare chauvinism are entirely com-
patible with each other. Interestingly, Brady and
Finnigan (2014) find support for both in their
cross-national analysis. Moreover, as we shall
see next, this combination of support for the
welfare state but exclusion of newcomers from
its benefits resonates in the political processes of
many countries.
Political Processes
Scholars have asked whether diversity has weak-
ened social movements and political parties
which were traditionally the primary champions
of the welfare state, indirectly undermining it
over time. Once again, the classic case comes
from the US. In the 1960s, racial politics swirled
4 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State
around Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and the Great Society programs. As wel-
fare rolls expanded, the profile of the poor
became racially charged: black families
represented close to half of the AFDC caseload,
and Hispanic groups were also increasingly over-
represented. Resentment against these programs
helped fracture the New Deal coalition and the
electoral base of the Democratic Party. White
union members, white ethnics, and southerners
deserted their traditional political home,
especially in presidential elections, in part
because of its image on race and welfare issues.
The effect was so powerful that the Democratic
Party sought to insulate itself in the 1990s by
embracing hard-edged welfare reforms, which
President Clinton signed in 1995. Clinton’s
strategy may have helped his re-election in
1996, but it failed to alter Americans’
racialization of and opposition to welfare (Dyck
et al. 2008).
Migration has also had a dramatic impact on
the party systems in Europe. A potent public
backlash against migration has contributed to
electoral volatility, voter realignment, and the
rise of radical right parties. This backlash has
placed immense pressure on mainstream parties,
especially social democratic parties which tradi-
tionally have supported both the welfare state and
cultural diversity. The voters most attracted to
radical anti-immigrant parties have been white,
low-skilled male voters who traditionally
represented an important part of the base of left
parties, which might suggest that US commenta-
tors about Europe’s future were right. However,
as anti-immigrant parties became more depen-
dent on working-class votes, they have moved
left, increasingly defending the welfare state for
the majority population and pledging to protect it
from the “burden” of supporting migrants
(Bay et al. 2013; Oesch 2008; Lefkofridi and
Michel forthcoming). Welfare chauvinism is
now the dominant position among these parties.
The Mediating Role of Policy Regimes
Some researchers have asked whether there is
anything states can do to mitigate the progres-
sive’s dilemma. In particular, they have investi-
gated whether the structure of the welfare state
itself or the nature of multiculturalism policies
matter to the compatibility of migration and
solidarity.
Since Marshall (1950), the welfare state has
been seen as an instrument of social integration,
which can strengthen the sense of cohesion and
solidarity in divided societies. Contemporary
analysts, however, insist that such integrative
potential depends heavily on the actual design
of the welfare state. Some argue that heavy reli-
ance on means-tested benefits lock societies into
an unending conversation about the legitimacy of
particular groups of recipients, such as migrants,
while universal programs dampen discussion of
which recipients are deserving and which are not.
Others caution that easy access to the welfare
state for newcomers reduces their incentive to
integrate socially and economically and courts
majority backlash as newcomers become associ-
ated with welfare dependence (Koopmans 2010).
To date, the empirical evidence suggests that the
public in countries with highly selective welfare
states is more inclined to welfare chauvinism and
that egalitarian policies and institutions can help
in fighting such sentiments (van der Waal
et al. 2013; Larsen 2006).
Others argue that support for redistribution
depends more on trust in government than inter-
personal trust and that such trust is sustained by
the quality of government, especially fairness and
effectiveness in the administration of government
programs (Rothstein 2011). Indeed, Rothstein
(forthcoming) argues that a high quality of gov-
ernment institutions generates high levels of
social trust even in societies with high levels of
ethnic diversity, dampening down welfare
chauvinism.
Similar debates arise over the state’s own
approach to diversity policy, especially the role
of multiculturalism policies. Some countries
have responded to growing ethnic diversity with
the adoption of multiculturalism policies that
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State
recognize distinctive rights or entitlements for
ethnic and religious groups. (Despite political
rhetoric about a “retreat” from multiculturalism
policies, there is strong evidence of their persis-
tence, including in Europe (Banting and
Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012).) How-
ever, multiculturalism policies have been contro-
versial, and some countries have steadfastly
resisted that approach. Not surprisingly, much
of the debate has centered on their implications
for social solidarity. Critics insist that multicul-
turalism policies exacerbate the tension between
diversity and redistribution, by encouraging iden-
tity politics which crowds out redistributive
issues from the policy agenda, corrodes trust
among vulnerable groups who would otherwise
coalesce in a proredistribution lobby, or misdiag-
noses the real problems facing minorities, leading
them to believe that their problems reflect their
culture rather than economic barriers they con-
front (Barry 2001). Defenders of multicultural-
ism policies reply that such policies do not create
distrust among groups but that such policies can
ease intercommunal tensions over time and
strengthen the sense of mutual respect, trust, and
support for redistribution.
Given the intensity of the debates, there has
been surprisingly little empirical research on the
impact of multiculturalism policies on support for
redistribution. (Schaeffer 2014 notes the virtual
absence of such studies. For analyses of the
impact of multiculturalism policies on other
aspects of integration, see Bloemraad and Wright
2014; Koopmans 2013.) Nevertheless, the studies
that are available provide little evidence that
multiculturalism policies weaken public support
for the welfare state. Countries that have adopted
such programs did not experience an erosion of
their welfare states or even slower growth in
social spending than countries that have resisted
such programs (Banting et al. 2006). This finding
has been replicated with updated data (available
on request) and has been confirmed by Brady and
Finnigan 2014.
5
Policy Outcomes
Finally, research has analyzed the impact of
migration, not on public attitudes or the political
process but on actual social spending. Once
again, there are two possibilities. The first is that
migration increases social spending, especially
in generous welfare states, because low-income
migrants are drawn to countries with expansive
social programs and rely on benefits when they
arrive (Borjas 1999). The second possibility is
that migration decreases social spending,
because of the political mechanisms discussed
earlier: migration tends to reduce support for
social spending generally and/or increase support
for excluding migrants from benefits.
As discussed earlier, there is substantial
evidence from the US that racial diversity
weakens redistribution. Alesina and his col-
leagues demonstrate that public spending tends
to be lower in cities and states with higher levels
of racial heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 1999;
Alesina and Glaeser 2004). However, a growing
body of cross-national research suggests that neg-
ative effects on social spending are limited or are
offset by other factors. Lipsmeyer and Zhu’s
analysis of EU countries (Lipsmeyer and Zhu
2011) suggests that increased migration may
increase social spending if left parties are strong
or union density is high (also Taylor-Gooby
2005). Other studies suggest that the design of
the welfare state is important, not only to public
attitudes as discussed earlier but also to the
impact of migration on spending levels (Mau
and Burkhardt 2009). In short, the relationship
between migration and welfare spending is com-
plex and mediated by a variety of factors.
One distinction that deserves more attention is
that between levels of migration and change in
migration. Consistent with much existing cross-
national work, Soroka et al. (forthcoming) find no
relationship between the proportion of the popu-
lation born outside the country and the level of
social spending. However, they find a negative
relationship between the rate of increase in
migration and the rate of increase in social spend-
ing over time. Countries with large increases in
the proportion of their population born outside
6 Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State
the country tend to have smaller increases in
social spending. This suggests that public reac-
tions take time to develop. The public needs to
notice the change and react, and their reactions
need to work through political processes. In addi-
tion, Soroka et al. find it useful to disaggregate
social spending into subdomains, such as pen-
sions, employment benefits, and so on. In most
domains, there is only weak evidence of a rela-
tionship between changes in migration and
changes in spending, but negative effects do
emerge in the case of unemployment benefits
and labor market programs.
Conclusions
What can we conclude from the diverse and
sometimes contradictory findings that populate
this terrain? Most obviously, one needs to be
cautious about sweeping statements about a
toxic relationship between migration and social
solidarity. The evidence is mixed at best. In many
studies, there is no impact of migration on public
attitudes about social programs or levels of public
spending. In other studies, there is evidence of a
relationship, but the association is often weak and
the direction varies. In general, estimates of the
impact of migration, positive or negative, tend to
be small, and other factors emerge as more
important in explaining the views of the public
or the spending decisions of governments. (For a
similar conclusion, see Stichnoth and Van der
Straeten 2013.) (Similarly, in a related debate
not discussed here, estimates of the net impact
of migration on the fiscal position of government
tend to be small (Rowthorn 2008).
Interestingly, this pattern of mixed findings is
consistent with research on the implications of
ethnic diversity for social capital or social cohe-
sion more generally. A survey of 464 findings
found that “there are nearly as many studies
rejecting the negative effects of diversity as argu-
ing for them” (Schaeffer 2014, p. 4 and
Table 2.1). A meta-analysis of 90 articles testing
Putnam’s conclusions found that 26 articles tend
to support his findings, 25 articles reject them,
and 39 studies provide mixed or neutral evidence
(Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). In the words of
two leading scholars “the debate about the con-
sequences of ethnic diversity on social cohesion
has reached a stalemate” (Stolle and Allison
2015, p. 117).
Yet the progressive’s dilemma has not been
laid to rest. Serious tension between migration,
ethnic diversity, and the welfare state is clearly
possible. The key challenge in future research is
to identify more systematically the conditions
which mitigate or exacerbate such tensions. To
advance the debate, we need more differentiated
understandings of both of our core concepts,
migration and the welfare state. Which types of
migrants are seen as “other”? Much of the litera-
ture assumes simply being foreign born is what
matters. But other studies focus on low-skilled
migrants, illegal migrants, racialized minorities,
or religious minorities. A systematic comparison
of the implications of different categories of
migrants in different contexts would help. Simi-
larly, we need more a systematic analysis of the
dimensions of the welfare state at stake. Is it total
social spending, the generosity of benefits, inclu-
sive access to benefits, or the redistributive
impact of the state?
Relatedly, we need a finer-grained under-
standing of the politics of migration. How does
the public decide who is "us" and who is a
"stranger”? We need a fuller understanding of
“othering” and of how to overcome it. In partic-
ular, more attention needs to be paid to the role of
the media and political parties in framing migra-
tion and newcomers. Much of the “flash” poten-
tial of migration as a political issue undoubtedly
flows from such processes. Future research
should also pay more attention to the political
agency of migrants themselves and their attitude
to redistribution. As the size of the migrant elec-
torate grows, their views and political behavior
will increasingly shape the future (Koopmans
et al. 2012). There are likely to be tipping points
in this process. When the size of the migrant
electorate reaches a critical mass, political parties
will find it harder to win power by attacking
migrants. Countries such as Canada are already
at that stage. The Republican Party in the US is
Migration, Diversity, and the Welfare State
struggling with the electoral calculus. This too
will be part of Europe’s future.
Context clearly matters in all of this. Part of
that context is the structure of the welfare state
itself. The evolution of the welfare state reflects
considerable path dependence, and welfare states
at different stages of development respond differ-
ently to common social pressures. We therefore
need to be cautious about simple extrapolations
from the US to other contexts. There is consider-
able difference between the American experience
of racial diversity constraining the development
of a welfare state from its very beginning and
European countries coming to terms with new
forms of diversity in the context of mature wel-
fare states which are well embedded in national
cultures and voters’ expectations (Crepaz 2008).
In the European context, the compensation
hypothesis and welfare chauvinism clearly
deserve primary attention.
Finally, we should ask why migration has
emerged so dramatically in debates about the
future of the welfare state. Clearly, the redistrib-
utive state is subject to a wide range of pressures,
rooted in globalization, economic restructuring,
dualization, neoliberalism, and on and on. If the
effects of migration appear small at best, why
does the issue command so much attention? Is
migration really a proxy for wider fears about the
future? Does migration policy rise to the surface
because it appears to be one final domain in
which the nation state, so constrained elsewhere,
can actually have an impact?
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C
Citizenship in the Context
of Immigration – Comparative
Perspectives
Thomas Faist1, Kerstin Schmidt1 and Christian
Ulbricht2
1
Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University,
Bielefeld, Germany
2
Bielefeld Graduate School in History and
Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University,
Bielefeld, Germany
Definition
Citizenship defines membership in bounded
states, and migration across borders raises the
question: who is a member? The recent evolu-
tion in citizenship policies must be assessed in
the context of divergent trends. The greater
value placed on human rights, skilled migration,
and the emphasis on global markets in national
policies, have produced a shift toward more
liberalized citizenship access. But such inclu-
sionary processes have been accompanied
by exclusionary tendencies based on specific
cultural criteria, so that illiberal attitudes toward
immigrants are increasingly accepted in public
and policy discourses.
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
F.D. Bean, S.K. Brown (eds.), Encyclopedia of Migration,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_115-1
Converging Trends of Access
to Citizenship
Across countries, immigrants’ access to citizen-
ship has been eased; concomitantly, legal oppor-
tunities for participation in all walks of life
(Kivisto and Faist 2007) and tolerance of dual
citizenship (Faist 2007) have increased. The
1980s and 1990s saw major debates over
ethnonational understandings of nationhood (ius
sanguinis: blood principle, parental lineage) and
legal-rational understandings of political mem-
bership (ius soli: territorial principle, birthright;
ius domicilii: residence principle, permanent
abode) (Brubaker 1992; based on Meinecke
1908). But this debate is largely over: “we all
are republican now” (Faist 2007). Access to citi-
zenship focuses on individual skills and the self-
responsible individual who possesses or is eager
to learn competences necessary to integrate in a
political community, rather than on collective
reciprocity, solidarity, and trust. This change is
reflected in the increasing emphasis on human
capital when admitting migrants.
Paradoxically, such inclusionary processes
have been accompanied by exclusionary tenden-
cies in civil society, raising the questions of how
citizenship and communal relations interact, and
how this interaction has evolved. Exclusionary
tendencies vary from religious issues in Europe
to linguistic issues in the USA (cf. Zolberg and
Woon 1999). While religious differences and
social distance matter in most countries, the
2 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
institutional channels for dealing with such het-
erogeneities differ. For example, the corporatist
German system sets high hurdles for access of
Muslim organizations in public policy, whereas
the British system does not require such elaborate
institutional inclusion (Faist and Dörr 1997). The
extension of the rights of citizens from civil,
political, and social rights (Marshall 1964) to
include cultural rights of national minorities
(Kymlicka 1995) also varies. Most major Euro-
pean countries have turned away from “multicul-
turalism,” but cultural rights continue to cause
conflicts in civil society. Other issues include
the significance of “securitization” in migration
control and in civic life more generally; the impli-
cations of the fiscal, financial, and economic cri-
sis for inclusion; and the penetration of economic
criteria into the discourse of citizenship policy.
Increasing liberalization of access to citizen-
ship for migrants in western democracies is part
of a shift from “ethnic” to “civic” nationalism,
whereby membership based on descent (ius
sanguinis) has been complemented by birth in
the immigration country (ius soli). Moreover,
almost half of all world states now tolerate some
form of dual citizenship. Basically, a “rights rev-
olution” underway since the 1960s is being
expressed in citizenship legislation.
Yet this trend runs counter to a second one
which is twofold: (1) the prioritization of
migrants who contribute actively to economic
productivity, especially the highly skilled, and
(2) the illiberal culturalization of undesirable
migrants as the other. Merit-based citizenship
and cultural devaluation represent opposite ends
of a spectrum: at one end are migrants who are, to
paraphrase Aristide Zolberg, “wanted and wel-
come” (Zolberg 1987); at the other are those
“wanted but not welcome,” wanted for economic
reasons but not welcome for cultural ones. The
focus on the ends leaves out many other catego-
ries in an imagined middle, for example, those
categorized legally as asylum seekers or those
who immigrate in the context of family
reunification.
The so-called liberal paradox is one aspect of
the opposing trends. The principles of liberal
economies call for the opening of borders for
capital, goods, services, and people in the eco-
nomic sphere. At the same time, the principles of
political communities demand some closure
against the outside, thus enforcing a logic of
inclusion/exclusion of newcomers (Freeman
1986; Carens 2013). Political communities need
boundaries to create a desired social order and
lessen the ubiquitous, yet diffuse, threat of vio-
lence. Besides the fundamental Hobbesian idea
of social order, the production and redistribution
of collective goods for purposes of justice,
including welfare, also requires a bounded com-
munity. Only by the monopolization of power
through the nation-state (Tilly 1990) and by
curtailing the liberty of individuals falling out-
side the nation-state can the liberty of those
within be guaranteed (Bosniak 2008). In short,
citizenship is both internally inclusive and exter-
nally exclusive.
Developments in Major Immigration
Countries
In what follows, we discuss the nexus between
immigration and citizenship policies, taking a
brief look at recent developments in several
major migrant receiving countries: Germany,
the UK, the Netherlands, France, the USA, Can-
ada, and Australia (cf. Reitz 1998).
Germany
In 2000, Germany made a leap from being a
historically restrictive country with respect to
immigration and citizenship access by introduc-
ing the ius soli principle alongside ius sanguinis,
making it possible to acquire German citizenship
by being born on German soil, provided one
parent had a permanent residence permit.
Requirements for citizenship acquisition were
lowered, and the general attitude toward natural-
ization, traditionally considered the most impor-
tant result of immigration, was revised. The
length of the residence period to qualify for nat-
uralization dropped from 15 to 8 years. In 2008 it
was further reduced to 7 years for applicants
completing integration courses containing a lan-
guage test (higher language skills reduce
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
residence requirements to 6 years) and a natural-
ization test to demonstrate knowledge of German
society. While restrictive, the civic integration
courses are well within “the ambit of liberalism”
(Joppke 2010, p. 68), as they relate to the
individual level, implying they can be met by
every individual. Yet with their language require-
ment, they are used as “an instrument for the
selection of (more highly) skilled migrants”
(Michalowski 2010, p. 191). Several exceptions
to the rule of rejecting dual citizenship were also
established, although Germany still does not tol-
erate dual citizenship as a rule, except for other
EU member states with whom reciprocity rules
apply.
UK
In contrast to Germany, the UK is a long-term
immigration country and often defines itself as a
multicultural nation, based on its colonial history
and Commonwealth system. Yet since EU
enlargement, particularly the inclusion of Eastern
European countries, skepticism about the free
movement of people within the EU and immigra-
tion has risen. Fears of an economic decline
caused by immigrants occupying jobs needed by
British citizens and their perceived abuse of the
welfare system have created a climate of exclu-
sion. The majority of British citizens oppose
migration, believe too many migrants enter the
UK, and perceive migration as a problem, not an
opportunity. Public opinion of immigrants with
skills required for the functioning of society, such
as doctors or nurses, is less hostile (Blinder
2012). Government policies have contributed to
the perception of migrants, especially asylum
seekers, as a threat to be addressed by severe
border protection and measures preventing
migrants from overstaying or staying for pur-
poses other than stated in their visas (Mulvey
2010). The British Government recently defined
British citizenship as “a privilege and not a right,”
demanding advanced language skills and knowl-
edge about British culture (UK Government
2013). In theory, “citizenship is more esteemed
and valued if it is earned, not given” (Crick Com-
mission 2003, p. 3). At the same time, in the
points system established in 2010, the highly
3
skilled can enter more easily if they fulfill
specific criteria considered important for British
society.
The selection criteria for becoming a UK cit-
izen by naturalization became more rigid in
October 2013. Along with some vague character-
istics (“good character” and “sound of mind”),
applicants must be 18 years of age or older, will-
ing to live in the UK, and pass a test proving
knowledge of the English language and about
life in the UK (UK Government, 2014).
The Netherlands
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch government
considered immigration – mainly guest workers
and their families from Morocco and
Turkey – would be temporary. In 1980, a para-
digm shift in policies on naturalization and inte-
gration of migrants led to the creation of the
“Minorities Policy” based on the recognition
that immigration was often a lasting phenomenon
and “immigrant integration would be assisted by
a secure residence status, equal rights, family
reunification and full participation in education
and the labour market” (OECD 2011, p. 336).
During this time, the Netherlands defined itself
as tolerant and multicultural.
Over the last 15 years, this very liberal Dutch
approach to immigration and citizenship
(compared to other European countries) has
been replaced by a narrow and restrictive one
(Vasta 2006). Populist views saw the laissez-
faire attitude as endangering “native Dutch”
values and many citizens as unwilling/unable to
integrate. The 2002 murder of the leader of anti-
immigrant party Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 mur-
der of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, known for his
islamophobic statements, increased anti-
immigrant sentiment among the self-defined
“autochthonous” parts of the Dutch population
(ibid.).
These developments were mirrored at the pol-
icy level. The conservative government, elected
in 2002, introduced an immigration (culture and
language) test to acquire a visa. Unlike the inte-
gration courses offered since 1998, organized and
financed by the government, the new test is
offered by private institutes and paid for by the
4 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
immigrants. Fines and residence status sanctions
are imposed on those who do not pass it in time
(OECD 2011).
Policies promoting “naturalization as a right”
for children of immigrants born in the Nether-
lands and the right to obtain dual nationality,
established in 1984, resulted in a peak of
applications for citizenship in 1996. In the
context of a more critical policy and public
debate on immigration, this right was revoked
by the introduction of a naturalization test in
2003 framing Dutch citizenship as “something
to be proud of, not a consumption article”
(OECD 2011, p. 340).
France
The French case is an example of the republican
principle, with nationality intricately connected
to a confirmation of political values (Nicholls
2012). The double ius soli principle of citizenship
acquisition, applied from 1899 until 1993,
ensured the third generation (both parents born
in the country) was automatically naturalized,
while the second generation (at least one immi-
grant parent) was naturalized upon reaching
maturity. French republicanism is related to a
version of laicism; for example, in 2004,
headscarves were outlawed in schools. In 2008,
the highest court (Conseil d’E´tat) denied a burka-
wearing woman French citizenship because of
“insufficient assimilation,” a case showing the
fear of the destruction of the republican ideology
(Lefebvre 2010). In 2003, under Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy, a compulsory integration
course was introduced, emphasizing language
training and knowledge about institutions and
values of the French republic. Completing it
meant establishing a “relationship of trust and
mutual obligation” between the individual and
the state. The government has since passed the
law of immigration and integration, making civic
integration courses obligatory to obtain a 1-year,
renewable resident permit. After 2 years,
immigrants can apply for a 10-year permanent
residence card. As Sarkozy put it, the law facili-
tates a fundamental change in immigration poli-
cies from the “unwanted” (subie) to the “chosen”
(choisie).
USA
In the USA, debate has focused on citizenship
status for undocumented migrants, mainly from
Mexico. In 2013, the Obama administration pro-
posed the 11 million undocumented immigrants
in the USA could earn citizenship by passing
national security and criminal background
checks, paying taxes and a penalty, and learning
English. At this point, this type of earned citizen-
ship is the answer to include certain categories of
Mexican immigrants, the highest proportion of
undocumented immigrants with the lowest natu-
ralization levels.
Current legislation is based on amendments of
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act; no
new and comprehensive immigration law has
been created (Giovagnoli 2014). In 2010, the
Senate rejected the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act to
provide temporary legal status and potentially
US citizenship to children of undocumented
migrants wanting to pursue tertiary education.
A number of immigration bills introduced by
Congress in 2013 and 2014 reflect the state’s
intention to facilitate the permanent stay of
highly qualified people, for example, foreign
graduates at US universities. At the same time,
fears about national security and a decline of
employment opportunities in the economic
downturn are leading to enhanced border protec-
tion measures and identity checks of prospective
immigrants. Furthermore, new legislation crimi-
nalizes unauthorized stay, resulting in more depor-
tations of undocumented migrants (IPC 2014).
US naturalization rates are lower than in most
OECD countries, and citizens of high-income
countries renounce their right of becoming a US
citizen despite qualifying, arguably because US
citizenship will not provide increased benefits
over their current citizenship. Yet US citizenship
can have beneficial economic outcomes, includ-
ing higher average salaries compared to nonciti-
zens; that said, those applying for citizenship
often possess a higher level of education
(Sumption and Flamm 2012). For less privileged
migrant groups, barriers to citizenship include a
lack of knowledge of the application process,
language difficulties, and prohibitive costs.
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
Canada
Canada is considered a classic example of an
immigration country, defining itself as a settler
society with a welcoming attitude toward new-
comers and corresponding legislation facilitating
citizenship acquisition and ius soli citizenship for
children of immigrants born in the country
(Bauder 2014). With about 85 % of legal immi-
grants becoming naturalized, the Canadian rate is
among the highest in the world (NHS Canada
2011). It is the immigrants’ “way of showing
thanks” to Canada’s open multicultural policies
(Bloemraad 2002, p. 218).
Immigration has historically been perceived
crucial to Canadian economic well-being. Corre-
spondingly, the points-based immigration
scheme for highly skilled foreigners is based on
criteria of education, work experience, financial
independence, language proficiency in English
and/or French, age, offer of employment by a
Canadian employer, and personal or family
links to the country. Recent changes have
increased the importance of employment-related
criteria; the citizenship test has also been revised
to include more information about Canada and
“Canadian values” (Reitz 2014).
Australia
Australia is another country with strong multicul-
tural policies. At 80 %, the naturalization rate is
close to Canada (Australian Government 2011). In
2007, Australia introduced civic integration
requirements for immigrants to qualify for natural-
ization, with residence time doubled from 2 to
4 years and the addition of a citizenship test,
requiring immigrants to demonstrate English
language competence and familiarity with the
Australian way of life. Immigrants also need a
penal clearance certificate to prove they are of
good character. Australia operates a points-based
scheme based on skills and qualifications needed
in the country. While Australia welcomes highly
skilled migrants, its policies toward refugees
and asylum seekers, including housing people for
long periods in detention centers, is internationally
criticized. In the public discourse, refugees and
asylum seekers are framed as a threat to national
security and identity (Bleiker et al. 2013).
5
Other Countries
Generally speaking, highly qualified workers are
welcomed by rich, industrialized, and democratic
countries, with mobility conceptualized as a fea-
ture of a highly skilled workforce possessing
sufficient financial and human capital to move.
The new mobile cosmopolitans, mainly highly
skilled young urban populations, are recognized
as a distinct type of migrant: “Eurostars,” for
example, are young persons mobile within the
European Union (Favell 2008). Their migration
intentions are often temporary and circular, as
opposed to migrants who establish long-term or
permanent links to their destination countries.
Mobile migrants from rich countries are also
less interested in naturalization in other rich
countries. For citizens of EU member states, it
is easy to explain: migrants working or studying
in other EU countries enjoy the same civil and
social rights as national citizens, so their rate of
naturalization is understandably low. In addition,
acquisition of the citizenship of the immigration
country has become legally less important for the
internationally mobile, highly skilled migrants
who are wanted and welcome, and who do not
plan to stay in the destination country for an
extended period. For many, citizenship in the
host country is neither desirable nor necessary.
Yet for migrants from poor countries, acquiring
citizenship of rich countries remains important
(see Rutter et al. 2008 for the UK). A main benefit
of immigration country citizenship, and implic-
itly dual citizenship, is the ability to travel with
fewer restrictions, such as the need for a visa.
Liberal and Illiberal Paths: Dual
Citizenship Versus Citizenship Tests
Toleration of dual citizenship in immigration
countries is usually legitimated by positing that
legal equality should be a prerequisite for sub-
stantive citizenship, that is, full participation in
economic, political, and cultural life in the place
of residence. Instrumentally, the claim hinges on
the observation that those states tolerating dual
citizenship have proportionally more immigrants
who have naturalized. Citizenship as a human
6 Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
right also comes into play. First, in international
law, for example, citizenship is increasingly
viewed as a human right, as in the case of state-
less persons (Chan 1991). Second, gender equal-
ity as a human right entered international law in
the Convention on Nationality for Married
Women in 1957 and later found its way into the
law of national states. According to this body of
law, women do not have to cede legal citizenship
when marrying a spouse of another nationality. In
a further step, taken by a Convention of the
Council of Europe (1993), children from bina-
tional marriages have dual or multiple citizen-
ships. Countries with significant shares of
emigrants have adapted their citizenship laws,
verging toward more tolerance of dual citizenship
among their citizens abroad. However, in such
cases, the abovementioned factors have played a
less important role than maintaining and
reforging ties to (former) citizens abroad (e.g.,
Górny et al. 2007). Third, it causes normative
problems of legitimation if immigrants with per-
manent residency are denied access to citizenship
in the long run (Bauböck 1994).
The increasing toleration of dual citizenship is
reflective of multiple belonging, whereby inser-
tion in the country of settlement is not necessarily
accompanied by dismantling ties in countries of
origin. Affiliation to transnationally connected
families, religious communities, and transna-
tional networks of entrepreneurs is, thus, not an
anomaly but one of many pathways to incorpora-
tion (Faist and Gerdes 2008).
Dual citizenship has different implications for
political systems, depending on their design. It
derives, above all, from the acquisition of citi-
zenship at birth: from parents with different
nationalities or a combination of ius sanguinis
transmission by state of origin and ius soli acqui-
sition in the state of residence. Moreover, dual
nationality increasingly stems from naturaliza-
tion without renouncing previously acquired
legal citizenship. While dual citizenship may
raise certain problems, it does not violate demo-
cratic principles. Some say dual citizenship vio-
lates equality of representation by giving people
two votes, but even assuming they can also vote
by absentee ballot in a country where they do not
presently live, dual citizens still have one vote
only in each election. These separate votes are
never aggregated in the process of electing rep-
resentatives or in a referendum. Dual citizens
have a stake in two different states, but their
votes do not count twice in any decision. This is
different in federal states, such as the USA, or
protofederal systems, such as the EU. If a resident
of both Germany and France were enfranchised
in both countries for elections to the European
Parliament, her vote is counted twice in deter-
mining the representation of these countries
(more precisely, districts of these countries).
Dual citizenship is not the only form of multiple
citizenship. On the substate level, there are forms
of local citizenship, and on the suprastate level,
incarnations such as European Union citizenship.
In the overall liberal framework, however, we
observe restrictive countertrends. After 2001,
many countries raised the bar for naturalization,
with the implementation of assimilatory elements
like language and citizenship tests, integration
courses, and citizenship ceremonies (Green
2012). Obligatory civic integration points to
concerns about liberal-democratic norms and
principles being shared by all (Triadafilopoulos
2011). Consider, for example, the increasing
securitization of citizenship and public concern
about the compatibility of Muslim immigrants
post 9/11. Finally, in the sphere of emigration,
we see a re-ethnicizing, whereby home country
governments promote dual citizenship to foster
the affiliation of emigrants to their country of
origin (Lafleur 2013).
Conclusion
Despite tendencies toward re-ethnicization, rules
of acquisition for citizenship depend less on eth-
nic criteria. This does not mean exclusionary
tendencies are less pronounced. Instead, they
have changed shape to focus on economic com-
petitiveness and cultural modernity. This conclu-
sion is borne out by the imposition of new rules
for access to citizenship and more restrictive
immigration rules, applying not only to labor
migrants but also to asylum seekers and refugees.
Citizenship in the Context of Immigration – Comparative Perspectives
As the debate focuses less on the ethnic versus
civic distinction in the legal status dimension of
citizenship and more on the normative realm of
the political community, it becomes crucial to
understand the shifting boundaries of the political
sphere, which go far beyond the migration field to
touch on the principles of democracy. The liber-
alization/restriction of citizenship and the impli-
cations for state-citizen relations are often
discussed in terms of the withdrawal of the
nation-state and the erosion of social rights.
A rights revolution occurred after World War II,
especially in the late 1970s; this revolution is now
considered by some observers in danger, with the
reciprocity of rights and duties challenged by
plural citizenship. Some argue the incorporation
of highly diverse migrants will create a thin citi-
zenship or cheapen citizenship (Schuck 2000;
Spiro 2007) as the rights accruing to citizenship
status and the obligations flowing from it become
increasingly thin. It is up for debate whether this
cheapening of citizenship is caused by plural
citizenship and immigration. Be that as it may,
the loss of a meaningful citizenship is observed
by research noting the perpetuation of negative
rights (protection rights against the state) and the
decline of positive rights (the state must actively
provide material and other resources to realize
these rights), changes induced by government
policies enforcing a civic and liberal universalis-
tic orientation. As various authors have observed,
the new social project in Europe favors a citizen-
ship model that privileges individuals as bearers
of human capital and draws a close link between
work, economic productivity, and social justice
(Soysal 2012, p. 4; M€ unch 2012; Somers 2008;
Rose 1996). The free-floating individual in the
market sphere only enjoys contract with a nation-
state if she contributes to the community and is
not a burden to the social welfare system. By the
same token, individual migrants are evaluated as
bearers of human capital; this is borne out by the
spread of point systems in European immigration
laws to favor young, highly skilled immigrants
(Boucher and Cerna 2014).
Increasingly, liberal democratic states are not
per se directed against foreigners but against a
specific type which seems incompatible with
7
liberal ways of life. “Liberal nationalism” or
identity liberalism practices a particularized uni-
versalism: “The liberal state is only for liberal
people” (Joppke 2010, p. 140). The selection of
immigrants has shifted from openly discrimina-
tory group-level exclusion to an individualistic
skills approach, in addition to criteria based on
human rights, such as family reunification
and asylum. The blurring of racial, ethnic, and
religious boundaries is enforced by a human
rights discourse that stigmatizes group-level
exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclu-
sion based on language, culture, and human
capital.
The nation-state that relies on and enforces
liberal norms and universalistic rules can legiti-
mately demand loyalty to the inside and auton-
omy and support to the outside. This represents
both a liberalization of citizenship law and a
liberal cultural discrimination of immigrants at
the lower end. Empirical research must consider
the management of this liberal paradox, including
how nation-states incorporate universalistic
norms, for example, through marketization at
the upper end of the social status of the immi-
grants which then becomes the norm to create
identity and difference. Researching the liberal
nationalist architecture (Levey 2014) will yield
further insights into the relationship between cit-
izenship, inequality, and democracy.
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