Sanger, David. ‘Frontier Cyberwars and what’s next. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

(video)
 In the video, the national security correspondent for The New York Times, David E.
Sanger, explains his ringside perspective on the evolution of the cyber arms race.
 On a visit to Henry Kissinger’s house, Sanger asked Kissinger what the difference is
between the new age of security and his experience during the Cold War. Kissinger
responded that the new age is far more complex and, in the long term, could be far
more dangerous. Per Kissinger, cyber is pushing the world into a domain that is far
more dangerous than the Cold War, with the Cuban Missile Crisis and US-Soviet
nuclear and ideological rivalry.
o In the Cold War, nuclear weapons had pushed the world into a space wherein
the worst-case scenario would be mass assured destruction, a consequence
much worse than that of the cyber domain. However, cyber is still as
dangerous, albeit in a different way from traditional or nuclear weaponry.
o Cyber differs from nuclear weapons for several reasons. Firstly, in cyber, the
source of attack is unlikely to be clear and difficult to attribute, leading to
debate and conflict among decision-makers and officials. Secondly, cyber-
attacks may be adjusted, and are usually being calibrated to operate just
below the threshold that will lead to active warfare. The various uses of
nuclear and cyber weaponry are also different. Unlike nuclear weapons,
which are used primarily only as threats, cyber-attacks are used every day,
for multiple purposes; espionage, data manipulation, or to affect equipment.
 Cyber is more dynamic than nuclear weaponry, and because of this, it
is also more dangerous because it can allow states to probe into and
attack deeper and more complex areas of security in adversary states.
o Cyber is more dangerous also because it relies on attacking at a level just
below the threshold of military retaliation. Where exactly this threshold lies
is difficult to discern and differs between different states and their changing
norms, interests and administrations over time.
 Sanger argues that cyber is the perfect weapon for the offensive; it is hard to trace,
deniable, cheap, and most importantly, due to its ability to be calibrated, it can be
used for a large variety of purposes.
o Cyber is the perfect weapon for levelling the playing field. For example, there
is no other domain from which North Korea could challenge the US. NK’s
attack on 70% of Sony systems for producing the film, “The Interview”, was
notable as it signalled the rise of the new cyber age in security and the new
ability for poorer states to challenge other states to achieve their interests.
 Sanger also argues that secrecy about cyber and the unwillingness to admit to
attacks hinders deterrence in the system. Revealing and making public who
committed an attack helps to build deterrence, and wrapping cyber in secrecy
hinders a state’s capabilities, as opposed to helping them like some states may think.
Curson, Peter and Brendan McRandle. ‘Plague Anatomy: Health Security from Pandemics
to bioterrorism’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2005. Chapter 1 and Chapter 6.

 The paper addresses two types of equally important challenges to security presented
by disease. The first challenge is naturally occurring diseases and the consequences
that they bring, major influenza pandemics and HIV/AIDS being the two main ones
considered. The second challenge addressed in the paper is the possibility of
deliberate use of disease as a weapon of terror. Disease as a weapon of terror can
not only claim innocent lives, but can effectively spread fear among general
populations. While an attack by conventional weapons is much more likely than
attack by biological weapons, the risk is real enough that it is important that states
realise their consequences and develop defences which safeguard them against
biological terror attacks.
 Adequate precautions must be made to protect against the risks of a major disease
outbreak, something that is not recognised enough by the government. For example,
around $6.2 billion of new investment has been made by the Australian government
to combat terrorism. In contrast, an influenza outbreak may be more likely to occur
and likely to claim and greater number of lives, however only approximately $311
million has been invested to defeat the next influenza pandemic.
 Per the paper, today Australia is faced by a three-fold threat. Firstly, the persistence
of a large variety of infections within the nation. Secondly, is the threat of emerging
or re-emerging infections which may harm Australia through trade or travel, Lastly,
there is the continuous possible threat of a bioterrorist attack on Australia.
o All three of the above threats will continue to plague Australia, however it
can be argued that risk of consequences from bio threats plaguing other
nations are just as significant, if not more. The chances of direct bio attacks
on Australia must be acknowledged and prepared against, however, they are
remote and not immediately foreseeable by any other state. Per the above
three threats outlined by the paper, threat two is the most severe one.
o The threat of bio consequences to Australia are the highest from risks faced
by neighbouring countries. Australia is a stable and relatively prosperous
nation; however, many regional neighbours do not bear the same prosperity
that Australia does. Infectious diseases that prospect Australia’s neighbours
may be passed into Australia, causing significant strain on the economy and
Australia’s ability to meet its security demands.
o Infectious diseases exacerbate existing problems of vulnerable neighbours,
leading to risk of failed states in the region. Biosecurity threats are a security
risk that should not be as overlooked as they are. This is because not only do
they present human security-related consequences in themselves, they can
also exacerbate and cause new political, diplomatic, economic and military
consequences to Australia and the entire region as well.