STUDIES IN

OTTOMAN HISTORY
IN HONOUR OF
PROFESSOR
V. L. MÉNAGE

Edited by
Colin HEYWOOD and Colin IMBER

The Isis Press

Sonderdrucke Istanbul
Klaus Kreiser
©The Isis Press

Published by
The Isis Press
§emsibey Sokak 10
Beylerbeyi, 81210 Istanbul

ISBN 975-428-063-0

First published 1994

1
j U n -iv .-B ib !-
E a rib e rq
 TO
PROFESSOR V. L. MENAGE

ON THE OCCASION OF
HIS SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY
15 APRIL 1995

THIS VOLUME OF STUDIES

IS D F D i r A T F r )
WITH RESPECT AND AFFECTION
BY HIS FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES
AND STUDENTS
 I. Metin KUNT

THE WAQF AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC

POLICY: NOTES ON THE KÖPRÜLÜ
FAMILY ENDOWMENTS

There was at best a blurred distinction between state and sultan in the
Ottoman polity during its early development. As in other Islamic states the term
devlet implied both state and dynasty, as one. The Ottoman sultan did not
proclaim that he was the state, as did the Sun King, Louis XIV; in the Ottoman
world that was a self-evident fact. The central institutions of the state, the
standing army and the bureaucracy, emerged as extensions of the ruler’s
household, serving the sovereign while administering his realm. The principal
officials, whatever their origin, were the servants {kuls) of the sultan so long as
they received their pay from him and were dependent upon his benevolence.

It is not surprising, then, that officials were also identified with the state.
The state allocated them revenue not only for their own necessities, but also to
allow them to maintain extensive households and numerous retainers to better
serve the sovereign, foL as an early seventeenth-century grand vizier reminded the
sultan in so many words' what was good for the servants of the sultan was good
for the state.^ It is because of this close identification of officials with the
sovereign and state that Ottomans extended the connotation of the term imâra:
while earlier Islamic thinkers like Ibn Khaldun used the term to connote the
political power of the sovereign, Ottoman writers such as Kınahzâde Ali and
Naîmâ included that of officials in its implication.^ Ottoman officials, because

Wemişçi Hasan Pasha, grand vizier in 1601*1603, in a memorandum {telhis) to Mehmed III:
"kullarunuzda mâl ve kuvvet ve kudret olıcak asla yabana gitmeyiip ol mâlun menfaati cânib-i din
û devlete râci olmak mukarrerdir" in Cengiz Orhonlu, Telhisler (İstanbul 1970), p. 18, no. 18.
^Ahlâk-iAlâi (Bulak 1248). 11:8; Tarih-i Naîmâ (İstanbul 1281), Vl;26-27. For an example of
changes effected by the Ottomans in the signification of earlier Islamic political ideas, see 1.
Metin Kunt, ’’Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-
Economic Theory and Practice.” Turcica, Vol. 9, no. 1 (1977), pp. 197-214.
190 1. M e t i n KUNT

they received remuneration from the state and directly served its interests, were
seen to share in the political authority of the sultan, or at least to represent it in
the realm.

With this political conception in mind Barkan has argued that waqfs
established by sultans and high-level officials should indeed be considered state
institutions, for they were founded by the state through its representatives, funded
by state allocations, and provided public services considered among the basic
duties of modem states.^ The following discussion about endowments made by
members of the Köprülü family of vezirs in the second half of the seventeenth
century will illustrate the use of the waqf institution in implementing public
policy. To prepare the background for the analysis of the awqdf, however, a
digression reviewing the political activities of the Köprülü vezirs is necessary.

Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, the first and most illustrious member of the
family, is one of the most famous vezirs in Ottoman history. He came to power
in 1656 at an especially difficult point in the early, turbulent reign of the child-
sultan Mehmed IV. The war with Venice over Crete had been dragging on since
1645. The Ottomans, their spirits high after the reconquest of Baghdad on the
eastern front, had hoped to find the conquest of Crete a relatively easy task. The
Venetians, however, took advantage of their naval superiority and turned the
struggle into a war on the seas. They first cut off Ottoman communications with
the invading force on the island and later attempted a blockade of the Aegean,
disrupting supplies from Egypt to Istanbul and from Anatolian ports to Crete.
Several Ottoman fleets had been destroyed since the war started, and it was
growing unbearably costly to construct and f t out yet another one which, many
Ottomans pessimistically felt, would fall prey to the Venetians in due course. In
the summer of 1656 the Ottomans suffered their worst setback. Not only was
their fleet destroyed, but the Venetians invaded Limni (Lemnos) and Bozcaada
(Tenedos), islands just outside the Dardanelles. With these two islands in their
possession the Venetians became a permanently established threat to the very
safety of Istanbul. That summer there was real fear in the Ottoman capital that
the Venetians would move against the city itself and many Istanbulites fled to
Anatolia.

Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was elevated to power that fall, after the sultan
agreed to allow him the full freedom of action and personal support grand viziers
traditionally expected."^ His career had not been particularly illustrious until then,

^For a concise statement of this argument, to be seen in some of his earlier publications as well,
see Ömer Lutfi Barkan and Ekrem Hakkı Ay verdi, İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri, 953 (1546)
Tarihli (İstanbul 1970), pp. XVI-XIX.
^1. Metin Kunt, "Naîmâ, Köprülü, and the Grand Vczirate,” Boğaziçi Universty Journal—
Humanities 1 (1973), pp. 57-64; see also T. Gökbilgin, ’’Köprülüler," İslam Ansiklopedisi.
 KÖPRÜLÜ FAMILY ENDOWMENTS 191

although he had served in almost every important office of the empire in both the
central and the provincial administration. That summer he had a circle of
supporters in Istanbul who were close to the sultan and, more important, to the
dowager, who hoped that his long-standing career as an official would enable him
to solve the immediate problems that had defeated so many vezirs in the previous
decade. The news of his appointment caused some surprise in Ottoman political
circles; Evliya Çelebi reports that one man sneered at the news, commenting that
a penniless and bankrupt old fogey who had not been able to help himself could
not be expected to help the state.^

Köprülü Mehmed Pasha indeed succeeded fairly well. Although he did not
solve any major problems, he took the offensive on the battlefield, and the sultan
was happy to leave the worries of state in the old veziVs hands while he himself
took to the hunt. After mobilizing all the empire’s resources during his first
winter in office. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha succeeded in the summer of 1657 in
recapturing Limni and Bozcaada and thus defusing the Venetian offensive in the
Aegean Sea. He spent the following winter in Edime with the sultan and the
imperial army, preparing for a direct overland assault on Venice itself. It had
become evident that the Ottomans would not be able to deal with the Venetian
navy in the short run, but pressure on the Republic’s land frontier in the form of
a grand imperial land campaign might bring Venice to her knees and provide a
swift solution to the problem of Crete.^

However, a newly developing situation on the empire’s northwestern

frontier, in the form of a bid for independence in the vassal Danubian
principalities, took precendence over Venice and Crete. The trouble was
instigated by Transyivania, the strongest and westernmost vassal, which was
encouraged by Austria and seconded by Wallachia and Moldavia. Preserving the
status quo along the central European frontier by bringing the vassals to heel was
more important than conquering a Mediterranean island, especially since Venice
was no longer an imminent threat. Therefore, the objective of the campaign of
1658 was shifted to Transylvania, The vassals were defeated on the battlefield,
but before the old vezir was able to establish stability in the troubled area,
developments elsewhere once again claimed his attention. The new problem was
a major revolt in southern Anatolia led by dozens of Ottoman officials against
the heavy-handed rule of the vezir. The bulk of the army had to leave the Balkans
and cross into Anatolia to deal with the rebellion. By the end of the next
campaign season the revolt had been suppressed, but in its wake Köprülü had to
concern himself with internal reorganization instead of turning either to Venice,

%vliya Çelebi, Seyahatname (İstanbul 1315), Vol. 5. p. 93.

^1. Metin Kunt, '’The Köprülü Years: 1656-1661,” unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, (Princeton
1971), Chapter 4.
192 1. M e t i n KUNT

still unconquered, or to Transylvania, still festering. Both of these foreign

problems remained unresolved at his death in 1661.

The sultan had been so pleased with the old Köprülü’s capable rule that in
addition to leaving him in office for more than five years until his death, he
appointed his elder son Ahmed Pasha, a young man of thirty, as his replacement.
Köprülüzâde Fâzıl Ahmed Pasha occupied the office of grand vizier until his
death, of natural causes, fifteen years later. Building on the policies of his father,
he began to deal with outstanding problems one by one, at a more deliberate
pace, now that they no longer constituted immediate threats, thanks to the older
Köprülü's successes. In 1664 the former status quo on the Central European
border was achieved after bringing Transylvania to heel and carrying the war onto
Austrian territory. Furthermore, to punish the defeated vassal and to check its
future communications with the Hapsburgs, western Transylvania was brought
under direct Ottoman rule. Next the energies of the empire were turned again to
Crete, with Venice finally capitulating in 1669. The Ottoman war machine,
well-oiled and evoking memories of the victorious armies öf Süleyman the
Magnificent, then turned to new conquests in the north: in 1672 Podolia was
annexed from Poland and in the following years the western Ukraine was brought
under Ottoman suzerainty.^

Fâzıl Ahmed Pasha was replaced by another family member, his brother-
in-law Kara Mustafa Pasha.® By then the empire was so self-confident that in
1683 Mustafa Pasha attempted what had eluded Sultan Süleyman himself, the
conquest of Vienna. The unsuccessful siege of the Hapsburg capital and the
ensuing rout cost the grand vizier his life but, much more important, proved that
Ottoman resurgence under the Köprülüs lacked a solid basis. The aftermath of the
siege was a long and disastrous war which ended only in 1699 when the
Ottomans gave up Hungary to Austria, Morea to Venice, and the area around the
Azov Sea to Russia.

In pursuing our present purpose, however, we are concerned not with

Ottoman defeat but with Ottoman conquest. We have digressed to retrace the
footsteps of the Köprülüs to their various far-flung battlefields, for these areas
figure prominently in the family’s awqdfy to which we can now turn.

^1. Metin Kunt, "Onyedinci Yüzyıl Osmanli Kuzey Politikası," Boğaziçi University Journal—
Humanities IV (1976-1977). pp. 111-116.
®Six members of the family served in the office of grand vizier in the seventeenth century:
Köprülü Mehmcd Pasha, 1656-1661; his elder son Fâzıl Ahmed Pasha, 1661-1676; his protégé
and son-in-law Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, 1676-1683; his slave, protégé, and son-in-law
Sıyâvuş Pasha, 1687-1688; his younger son Fâzıl Mustafa Pasha, 1689-1691; his nephew
Amcazâde Hüseyin Pasha, 1697-1702. The list continues into the the eighteeenth century.
"Family" here is taken to mean "household" rather than the natural family, as is appropriate in
the Ottoman socio-political context.
 TH^E K Ö P R Ü L Ü F A M I L Y ENDOWMENTS 193

Two waqf deeds will be discussed, both of which are preserved in the
Köprülü Library in Istanbul (MSS 1 and 4). The first was drawn up in the name

TABLE 1: BUILDINGS IN THE

KÖPRÜLÜ MEHMED PASHA ENDOWMENT

Mosque Mescid School Han Shop M ill M iscellaneous

Bozcaada 1 1 1 1 84 9 5»
Yanova 1 - 2 - 30 9 -

Rujnik 1 - 1- - - - -

Amasya 1 - 1 2 - -
2b
Karaoğlan Beli 1 - 1 1 - - -
Tarakliborlu 1 - 1 - - - -

Cîsr-i Sugur 1 1 1 1 - - 1^

TOTAL 7 2 8 5 114 18 8

^bathhouse, coffeehouse, stable, waterwheel {dolab), bakery

^fountain, prayer area (nam azg^)
^fort

TABLE 2: RURAL REVENUE SOURCES THROUGH IMPERIAL

GRANTS (TEMUK)

V illage Mezra a Nomad Dues Estate Pasture Market Dues

Limni 2 - - .. - - -

Yanova 1 1 - - - -

Amasya 6 - - - 1 1
Hüdâvendigâr 3 2 - > 3 -
Sultanönü 7 4 - 4 - 1
Bolu 3 - - -■ - -

Haleb 15 12 4 - - -

TOTAL 37 19 4 4 4 2

of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha on 18 Receb 1070/31 March 1660 (MS 1, p. 82).

The second w aqfiyya, dated 25 Safer 1089/18 April 1679 (MS 4, f. 63a),
contains endowments of both Fâzıl Ahmed Pasha and of his younger brother
194 i . Metin KUNT

Fâzıl Mustafa Pasha (then Bey). It is explained in the document that Ahmed
Pasha built many public and charitable works but died (in 1676) before he had
endowed them with sources of revenue. Mustafa Bey then added the library in
Istanbul that he himself had built and furnished with books,^ and endowed both
his own property and property he inherited from Ahmed Pasha (granted to him by
the sultan) for the support of the library and the charitable works his elder brother
had built. This waqfiyya, then, should be considered the joint endowment of the
two brothers.

First let us consider the endowments of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. The

w aqfiyya studied here concerns the pasha’s second waqf. Earlier, in less
prosperous times and apparently before he was appointed grand vizier, he had
made another endowment. We learn of the earlier waqf through reference to it in
the deed under review. The references indicate that this first endowment was quite
modest, comprising two hans and a water conduit in Turhal in the sancak of
Amasya, named among the beneficiaries of any surplus in the present waqfiyya
(p. 73).^^ The pasha’s later waqf was much more extensive. In various parts of
the empire he built a total of 6 mosques, 1 mescid, 1 bathhouse, 7 schools
{mekteb), 4 inns {han), 114 shops, 18 mills, a prayer platform (namazgah), a
public fountain, a coffeehouse, a stable, a bakery, a waterwheel, and a large
complex including a fort, a han, a mosque, a school, and a mescid (see Table 1).

Some of these buildings, namely the shops, the bathhouse, the

coffeehouse, the inns and the mills, generated revenue. All the rest of the revenue
for the endowment came from rural sources, again in various parts of the empire:
37 villages, 18 uninhabited villages (mezra'a), 4 summer pastures, 2 markets
(bdc ve bazar) and 4 estates (çiftlik), all of which were state revenues granted to
the pasha (see Table 2).

Of particular interest in the present context, i.e., the role of the waqf in
the implementation of public policy, is the distribution of the endowed buildings
throughout the lands of the empire. The buildings enumerated above were
concentrated in several centers: two hans, one mosque, one school, and one
prayer platform were located in the towns of Turhal, Köprü, and Hacıköy, all in
the Amasya district where the pasha had served for many years and settled before

^The document leaves no room for doubt that it was Mustafa Bey who built the library (MS 4, f.
20a). A plaque on the outside wall of the building bears the date 1661, on the mistaken
assumption that it was among the endowments of the father.
other reference (p. 46) is to cauldrons the pasha had endowed earlier, which were to be used
in cooking festival meals at the prayer platform in Köprü in Amasya sancak.
 KÖPRÜLÜ FAMILY ENDOWMENTS 195

TABLE 3: EXPENDITURES OF KÖPRÜLÜ MEHMED PASHA'S ENDOWMENTS

I (daUy) II (animal) TOTALa+H)

ûJtfcs/day x355=ûJti:es/year a kçe^ytss akçes/yess %

On Charitable Works
Bozcaada 150 5 3 ,2 5 0 2 .5 2 0 5 5 .7 7 0
Yanova 145 5 1 ,2 7 5 2 ,8 8 0 5 4 ,1 5 5
Rujnik 36 1 2 ,7 8 0 2 ,1 6 0 1 4 ,9 4 0
Amasya 111 3 9 ,4 0 5 2 ,8 8 0 4 2 ,2 8 5
Karaoglan Beli 132 4 6 ,8 6 0 1 ,8 0 0 4 8 ,6 6 0
Tarakhborlu 98 3 4 ,7 9 0 1 ,8 0 0 3 6 ,5 9 0
Cisr-iSugur 407 1 4 4 ,4 8 5 2 ,8 8 0 1 4 7 ,3 6 5
Subtotal 1,0 7 9 3 8 2 ,8 4 5 1 6 ,9 2 0 3 9 9 ,7 6 5 4 3 .5

Management and Family

Nûzir (overseer) 40 1 4 ,2 0 0 1 4 ,2 0 0
Ka/iT? (scribe) 30 1 0 ,6 5 0 1 0 ,6 5 0
Mütevelli (manager) 120 4 2 ,6 0 0 4 2 .6 0 0
Wife, Ayşe Hatun 120 4 2 ,6 0 0 4 2 .6 0 0
Daughter, Fatma Hatun 50 1 7 ,7 5 0 1 7 ,7 5 0
Subtotal 360 1 2 7 ,8 0 0 1 2 7 ,8 0 0 15.4

Alms to Mecca and Medina

1,000 gold pieces x 300 akges 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 41.1

TOTAL 827,565 100.0

returning to public life in 1656. A han, two mosques and two schools were
located in northwest Anatolia, at Tarakliborlu (Bolu sancak) and at Karaoglan
Beli (near Söğüt, in Sultanönü sancak), I cannot offer any reason why the pasha
chose to build in these locations but only note that Tarakliborlu, at least, was an
important station on the northern Anatolian route to Istanbul. The pasha also
built a mosque and school in Rujnik, Albania, which he specified as his
birthplace (p. 42: "benim vatan - 1 aslîm"). The bulk of the buildings, however,
were concentrated in three locations: Bozcaada, recovered from the Venetians in
1657, Yanova (Ineu) in western Transylvania, captured in the 1658 campaign and
severed from the rebellious vassal principality, and Cisr-i Sugur in Syria.

The complex at Cisr-i Sugur, with a fort, mosque, mescid, han, and
school, formed one of the stations on the main route from Cilicia to
196 1. M e t i n KUNT

Damascus. The puq)ose of the fort was to provide protection to caravans of

merchants and pilgrims from the marauding bedouins. As can be seen in Table 3,
showing the expenditures of the pasha’s endowments, the complex at Cisr-i
Sugur constituted the single largest item, its expenses totalling almost three
times that of any building groups in other locations and 37.5 percent of all
expenditures on charitable works (Table 3, first subtotal). The employed 65
persons in the Cisr-i Sugur complex, more than three times as many as at any
other single l o c a t i o n . O f this number 40 were personnel for the fort, including
a commander {mustahfiz ağası), a steward (kethüda), two troop leaders
(bölükbaşı), a pursuivant (çavuş), a gatekeeper (kapıcı), and 34 guards
(mustahfiz). While building and endowing caravanserais is an old tradition,
supplying a way station with a fort and a company of guards whose pay came
from the endowment seems to be a new and much more direct use, at least in
Ottoman practice, of the waqf system in encouraging economic activity in the
r e a l m . H e r e the w aqf is used not only for the convenience, but also for the
safety and protection of travellers, a duty of the state in modem times as well as
in the Ottoman political conception.

It may be noted, by comparing Tables 1 and 2, that an effort was made to

provide revenue sources near each group of charitable buildings. For example,
Anatolian and Syrian mosques and schools were supported by rural revenues
collected in their vicinity. However, there were few rural revenue sources in the
newly conquered areas of Bozcaada and Yanova: only two villages on the island
of Limni, near Bozcaada, and two in Yanova, one uninhabited, are listed in the

^^The complex has been described by J. Sauvaget, "Les Caravansérails Syriens du Hadjdj de
Constantinople," Ars Islámica IV (1937), pp. 98-121. Sec also the review of Sauvaget's article
by M. Fuad Köprülü, Vakıflar Dergisi 2 (1942), pp. 468-472.
19
^“^Thc number of persons employed in each location was as follows: Bozcaada 18, Yanova 15,
Rujnik 6, Amasya 14, Karaoğlan Beli 15, Tarakliborlu 20.
^^Köprülü Mchmcd Pasha’s example was followed son afterwards by Enişte Hasan Pasha, an early
eighteenth-century grand vizier, who built another complex at a way station on the same route
including a fort and guards. See Sauvaget, " Caravansérails Syriens."
 TH" x Op r Clu fam ily en d o w m en ts 197

TABLE 4: CHARITABLE WORKS OF THE KÖPRÜLÜ BROTHERS

Mosque College School Houses for Fountain Miscellaneous

Employees

Uyvar 1 - - - - -

Kandiye 1 - 1 2 1 -
Kamaniçe 1 - 1 9 - -
Belgrade - 1 - - 3 1 han
Köprü - 1 - - - -
Istanbul - - - - - 1 library
Izmir - - - 55 -

TOTAL 3 2 2 11 59 2

TABLE 5: REVENUE SUPPORT FOR THE KÖPRÜLÜ BROTHERS' CHARITIES

Shop & Store House R oom ing M ill Plot ;Bostan Workshop
Market & Han House

Uyvar 175 - 16 2 15 2 -
la
Belgrade 2 1 1 2 - 1 - -
Kandiye 85 44 13 8 3 2 2
Kamani^e - 1 3 1 26 1 5
Izmir 93 6 4 2 - 1 - 3*^

TOTAL 355 52 37 15 44 7 7 5

^slaughterhouse
^unidentified workshop ikdrhane)
^2 candle factories, 1 bakery

waqfiyya. The charitable buildings in Bozcaada and Yanova were to be supported

by the income of shops, mills and some other commercial buildings. Should
such revenue be insufficient additional funds would be available from the rural
resources in the interior. This policy may have been due to a desire not to press
the peasants of the war-ravaged areas. Furthermore, the construction of shops and
other commercial establishments in Bozcaada and Yanova encouraged economic
development there. The underlying policy was clearly to establish Ottoman
presence and culture in these frontier areas as strongly as possible.
198 I. Met i n KUNT

The same resolve to encourage economic activity and provide facilities for
the establishment of Ottoman culture in newly conquered towns is the dominant
feature in the endowments of the old vezir's sons. The information on their
endowments summarized in Tables 4 and 5 shows this policy very clearly. The
Köprülü brothers established a medrese (college) in Köprü» their hometown
Cvatan-i aslileri" f. 5b)» a lending library*"^ in Istanbul» and many fountains in
Izmir» which had grown rapidly in the course of the seventeenth century as
Anatolian exports became a major element in the Levant trade. All other
charitable works were in Uyvar in Hungary; in Kandiye, the chief town of Crete;
and in Kamaniçe» the seat of Podolia—all conquered during Fâzıl Ahmed Pasha’s
fifteen years as grand vizier. Belgrade, the main center for the operations of the
Ottoman army in the west, was also given new buildings. The interesting feature
of this waqfiyya is that very few rural revenue sources were supplied; only some
estates and villages in Estergon sancağı in Hungary are entered among the
endowments. A great part of the endowment was supplied by the income of
shops, stores, fia/ij, houses, and other urban sources in the same towns where the
charitable works were located. The only exception is that many urban resources
in Izmir were provided for the new fountains in the city and, presumably, for the
public buildings in the newly conquered areas. As a result of this building
activity, the new Ottoman towns of Uyvar, Kandiye and Kamaniçe would, it was
hoped, prosper through sharing in Ottoman culture.

The Köprülü endowments provide a striking illustration of the use of the

waqf institution in the service of state policy, Ottoman officials like the
Köprülüs were not only servants of the state but a part of it. As such, through
their charitable works they provided security and protection to long-distance
travellers, as witnessed by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s complex at Ci$r-i Sugur,
and, above all, they tried to provide prosperity and Ottoman culture to towns
they themselves had conquered for the glory of the sultan and the state.

University o f Cambridge

Sm derdm cke
Klaus Kreiser

^^The tenns were quite liberal: Books were to be lent out for up to six months. The librarian,
however, was instnicted to seek guarantees from borrowers (f. 52a).
 Rudi Paul LINDNER

BEGINNING OTTOMAN fflSTORY·

D as Studium d er ä lte ste n O sm anischen

Geschichtsquellen ist bis a u f den heutigen Tag noch
nicht energisch in Angriff genommen.
Friedrich Giese (1921)

The publication of Hammer’s grand Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches

established many precedents, indeed models, for interpreting the early chronicles
of the rise of the Ottomans, and his appeal is still strong, since reprints of the
original German edition and of a French translation may be purchased today, well
towards the second centennial of their first publication.^ The great power of
Hammer's work rested upon his amalgamation of both Ottoman Turkish and
Byzantine Greek sources in order to construct a full and chronologically ordered
account.^ Hammer appreciated the complementary advantages these disparate
sources afforded the scholar: the Ottoman chronicles provided a fairly complete
recounting of appealing tales, and while the Byzantine authors were largely
ignorant of the internal history of the Ottoman enterprise, their chronicles set
forth a coherent chronology within which to place the heroic foundation

wrote this as a Fulbright Senior Research Fellow in Rome, and 1 would like to thank the
Commissione per gli scambi cultural! tra Htalia e gli Slate Uniti for their generosity and
hospitality. I also thank the staff of the Tabula Imperii Byzantini project in Vienna for allowing
me to consult their card file of source references to place names, as well as the staffs of the
Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana, the Accademia dei Lincei, and the Pontificio Istituto Orientale.
Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. 1 (first edition, Pest,
1827; second edition. Pest, 1834). The 1963 reprint is still listed in the Verzeichnis lieferbar
Bücher. Histoire de I'empire Ottoman, transí. J.-J, Heilert, vol. 1 (Paris, 1835); transí. M.
Douchez from the second German edition, Paris, 1844). The Isis Press of Istanbul is in the
process of republishing the Hcllcrt edition.
^Hammer was not the first to discuss the Ottoman and Byzantine sources in the same context, but
neither Leunclavius nor de Guigness nor Gibbon had as many of the sources at their disposal.
When Babinger prepared his account of the growth of Ottoman studies in Europe, he clearly
marked out Hammer's career as the watershed dividing two quite different eras.