Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BOOK REVIEW
The Progress of American Influence in South Vietnam
during the 1950s
Replacing France will surely become a reference work for the historiography of
the Indochina wars, not only for its undeniable scholarly contribution but for
the richness of its sources, which are drawn from France and Great Britain as
well as the United States. The work offers a perceptive analysis of the birth and
the disturbances of the Franco-American alliance, as well as of the origins of
the American commitment in Vietnam. Above all, Kathryn Statler has devel-
oped a long-neglected dimension—the economic and cultural field of the
relationship—one that has only recently become a subject of French histori-
ography of Indochina’s decolonization. The book, which is divided into three
sections, uses a chronological framework that allows the reader to follow the ten
years in which the United States managed to substitute its influence and trust-
eeship in place of the French in South Vietnam.
Statler begins her study by an examination of the years 1950–1954 (pp.
15–114), analyzing French efforts to attract the support and help of the United
States by exploiting—with a blend of sincerity and cynicism—the rhetoric of the
Cold War. Her research strengthens Mark Lawrence’s conclusions on the deci-
sive role French and British hawks played in the Truman administration’s
decision to provide political, military, and financial aid to the French war
effort in Indochina after the 1949 Elysée Accords (pp. 16–38).1 It shows the
*The author would like to thank Bethany Keenan and Christopher Goscha for their
read-through of this review.
1. Mark A. Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in
Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 283–84.
The Elysée Agreement was signed on March 8, 1949, by French President Vincent Auriol
and Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai. It recognized what the French had refused to Ho Chi Minh
in 1945–46—the unification of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina into the state of Vietnam—
and gave to the new state only a limited autonomy represented by the associate status within the
French Union.
Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2009). © 2009 The Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
361
362 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
2. Kathryn Statler quotes several French authors in her bibliography and footnotes
(Philippe Devillers, Bernard Fall, Georges Chaffard, Jacques Dalloz, Laurent Cesari . . .),
but her bibliography could be enriched by other important historians—both published
(Georges Boudarel, Pierre Brocheux, and Daniel Hemery) or nonpublished, like Pierre
Grosser—“La France et l’Indochine (1953–1956). Une ‘carte de visite’ en ‘peau de chagrin’?”
Ph.D. thesis, Institut d’études politiques of Paris, 2002. In the field of the American literature, the
reference books of Marianna W. Sullivan (France’s Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American
Relations (Westport, CT, 1973)—especially her chapter 2 which is devoted to “The Roots of
French-American Discord over Vietnam”) and the biography of Dean Acheson by Ronald L.
McGlothlen (New York, 1993) could have been useful.
The Progress of American Influence in South Vietnam : 363
and the Americanization of the war, had to be preserved. In other words, Saigon
had to deal with the French presence, in the name of the “Free World.”
As we have seen, the Franco-American rivalry in Vietnam—strongly empha-
sized in both French and American official and collective memories of the
Indochina wars—must be nuanced. One cannot contest that, in 1954 and 1955,
the Indochina policy of Eisenhower and Dulles ran against French interests and
that the dynamic of the American bellicose policy in Vietnam nourished the
South Vietnamese desire for rupture with France, whose policy of neutralization
was directly opposed to Washington and Saigon. Surely it was detrimental to the
French presence in general. However, it is also important to admit that not only
did some Americans work for good relations with the French in Vietnam, but
that the State Department also prevented the South Vietnamese from breaking
entirely with France between 1963 and 1964, and then strongly disapproved the
Franco-South Vietnamese rupture when it occurred in 1965. In the final analy-
sis, the American presence, by ensuring the survival of South Vietnam at such a
crucial a stage in its short life, certainly permitted the French presence, albeit
reduced, to last twenty years more in Vietnam.
These last remarks go beyond the chronological framework of Statler’s book,
and it should not alter the overall value of Replacing France nor the main
conclusion of its author: “To the extent that Americans aided in the forging of
a nation, it was on the northern side of the seventeenth parallel” (p. 11). In
attempting to save a Western-oriented Vietnam, the United States made the
same mistakes as France did, with the same catastrophic results.