1 - Mussolini&#39 S Military Diplomacy - 11-2-2012

Strategy & Tactics / World at War THE GLOBAL REACH OF 22-7-2011
MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY
THE GLOBAL REACH OF MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY,

1922-1940.
The popular image of the armed forces of Mussolini’s Fascist regime has been indelibly fixed by their poor
performance in the Second World War; photographs come to mind showing endless lines of lightly guarded
Italian prisoners stretching off into the horizon in the wake of early British victories in North Africa. Such
images overshadow the fact that during the two decades of the interwar period Fascist Italy gained an
impressive international reputation. This was the direct result of Mussolini’s efforts to cultivate an appearance
of strength, an appearance he manipulated to achieve economic, diplomatic, and propagandistic goals. Through
a combination of international exploits, training missions, and the sale of military hardware, Fascist Italy earned
prestige, gained influence, and raised revenue in almost every continent on the globe.
Benito Mussolini rose to power in an atmosphere of political, economic, and social upheaval that was a
product of the First World War. These same conditions also helped to make Fascism appear attractive to people
around the world. Many viewed Fascism as a possible solution to the problems of class conflict, as a bulwark
against the spread of another new ideology, Communism, and as a potential means by which small countries
could become strong through a radical program of modernization. Throughout the 1920s Mussolini’s apparent
success in transforming a largely agricultural nation into a modern, industrial state appealed to various countries
in the Balkans, the Middle East, Latin America, and even East Asia. This impression was further reinforced by
the seeming failure of western liberal democracies in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929. Thus Fascist
Italy was hailed by many as a progressive nation whose features were worthy of emulation.1 It wasn’t until the
mid-1930s, when the Duce’s fundamentally aggressive nature was revealed through his conquest of Ethiopia
(1935-36) and his intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), that these hard won feelings of good will
and admiration were fatally undermined.2 Nevertheless, many nations continued to turn to Italy to obtain
armaments and military guidance right up through the first years of World War II.
1
Carleton Beals. The Coming Struggle for Latin America. Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1938, pp.103-104; Mike Folcoff,
“Preface.” pp.ix-xvi. in The Spanish Civil War 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives. Edited by Mark Folcoff and
Frederick B. Pike. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, pp.xiii-xiv; Frederick Pike, “Introduction.”
pp.1-48. in The Spanish Civil War 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives. Edited by Mark Folcoff and Frederick
B. Pike. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, pp.22-23.
2
Claudio G. Segré. Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1987, p.263; Brian R.
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces, 1918-40.” pp.169-217. in Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period.
[1]
Among the three branches of Italy’s armed forces, it was the youngest that earned the greatest international
acclaim. In 1923, only a year after having come to power, Mussolini established the Regia Aeronautica (Royal
Air Force), the second independent air force in existence (Britain’s R.A.F. having been founded during the
war).3 Italy had already earned an impressive reputation in the realm of aviation, both military and civil. She
was the first nation to employ aircraft in battle, during the Italo-Turkish War (1911-12).4 In 1919 Lt. Antonio
Locatelli, a member of Italy’s short-lived Air Mission to Argentina, became the first pilot to complete a round-
trip flight over the Andes. The following year, the team of Arturo Ferrarin and Masiero managed to journey
from Rome to Tokyo by air.5 In 1925 Francesco De Pinedo and his mechanic Ernesto Campanelli did Ferarin
and Masiero one better when they guided their S.16ter (Mark III) seaplane Gennariello on a 34,000 mile long
journey from Rome to Tokyo by way of Melbourne, Australia.6 Italian pilots took both first and third place in
the world’s most prestigious flying competition, the Schnieder Cup, when it was held at Hampton Roads,
Virginia on 13 November, 1926. Maj. Mario De Bernardi reached the finish line before his American
opponents and, to top it off, set a world’s speed record four days later.7 Earlier that same year, on 13 May, Col.
Umberto Nobile, at the helm of the Italian airship Norge, became the first man to fly a dirigible over the North
Pole (he would repeat his achievement two years later in the Italia, but, tragically, this second flight would end
in disaster).8 In 1927 Col. Francesco De Pinedo conducted another long-range venture that became known as
the ‘Flight of the Four Continents’. Together with Capt. Carlo Del Prete and the mechanic Vitale Zaccetti, Col.
De Pinedo flew the S.M.55 seaplane Santa Maria from Sardinia to West Africa, across the South Atlantic to
Brazil and Argentina, then north to New York, and back to Italy, covering 29,375 miles in seven weeks. 9 On 3
July of the following year, Capt. Del Prete joined with Arturo Ferarin in a non-stop flight from Montecelio
Mershon Center Series on International Security and Foreign Policy. Edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray.
Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p.183.
3
Official History, “The Italian Air Force.” Aerospace Historian, Vol.20, No.4 (Winter / December 1973), p.180; Brian R.
Sullivan and Bernard M. Knox, “Air Force.” pp.8-9. in Historical Dictionary of Fascist Italy. Editor-in-Chief Philip V.
Cannistraro. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982, p.8; John Gooch. Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed
Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.54-55.
4
Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.178; Gooch, p.52.
5
Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.180.
6
Jonathan W. Thompson. Italian Civil and Military Aircraft 1930-1945. Los Angeles, California: Aero Publishers, 1963,
p.250; Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.181; Segré, p.194.
7
Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.180; Segré, pp.182-183, 191.
8
Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.181; Segré, pp.194, 197, 201, 216.
9
Thompson, p.252; Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.181; Segré, pp.194, 197, 201, 216.
[2]
airfield, outside of Rome, to Touros, Brazil, a journey of 4,468 miles that took fifty-one hours to complete.10
Altogether, between 1 April, 1927 and 1 November, 1939, Italian pilots set no less than 110 aviation records.11
Mussolini capitalized on these achievements, claiming that such feats in aviation highlighting attributes that
were specifically Fascist: courage, youth, speed, power, and heroism. He hoped that the exploits of men such as
De Pinedo, Del Prete, and Ferrarin would generate coscienza aeronautica (aerial awareness) among Italy’s
people and, by doing so, help prepare them for the military adventures that the Duce was planning for the
future. By far the most famous of the Italian aviators of the interwar period was the flamboyant and
controversial Italo Balbo, whom Mussolini appointed in 1926 as his Undersecretary of Aviation and, three years
later, as Italy’s Minister of Aviation. Balbo emphasized team work over individual accomplishments and,
towards that end, organized a series of long-range crociere (cruises) involving squadrons of seaplanes, relying
specifically on the Savoia-Marchetti S.M.55 series of ‘flying catamarans’. The first of these aerial cruises took
place between 26 May and 2 June, 1928, and involved a group of sixty-one S.M.55s carrying nearly 200
personnel flying around the western half of the Mediterranean with stops at Corsica, Spain, and France. The
sight of all sixty-one aircraft lifting off simultaneously in formation left a lasting impression on everyone who
witnessed it.12 The following year Balbo launched his second crociere, which covered the Aegean and the
Black Sea.13 This was followed up with a flight of twelve S.M.55As across the south Atlantic to Brazil, a feat
for which Balbo was awarded a gold medal by the International Federation of Aviators for the greatest
aeronautical undertaking of 1931.14 Italo Balbo’s final exploit was his Crociera del Decennale (Decennial Air
Cruise), intended to celebrate the first decade of the Fascist Regime. Initially he had wanted to conduct a
round-the-world flight, but prohibitive costs and unrest in East Asia forced him to scale back his plans. Instead,
beginning on 1 July, 1933, he led a group of twenty-five S.M.55X seaplanes across northwest Europe to Iceland
and, from there, to Canada, arriving in Chicago for the ‘Century of Progress’ International Exposition on 15
July. After attending various public ceremonies, Balbo and his compliment of some 100 crewmen flew to New
York and, following a visit to the White House, made their return journey by way of Canada, the Azores, and
Portugal, to arrive off the coast near Rome on 12 August.15
10
Thompson, p.255; Official History, “The Italian Air Force.”, p.182; Segré, pp.192, 216.
11
Capt. Henry H. Adams and the Editors of Time-Life. Italy at War. World War II. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life
Books, 1982, p.72; Segré, p.162.
12
Segré, pp.194-197.
13
Ibid, pp.204-210.
14
Thompson, p.254; Segré, pp.215-228. Thompson incorrectly dates this, Italo Balbo’s third crociere, to 1930.
15
Thompson, p.255; Segré, pp.230-257.
[3]
Many individuals, both at the time of Balbo’s exploits and since then, have questioned the value of his long-
range aerial cruises, particularly for an air force that was perpetually short of adequate funding. 16 The fact
remains, however, that Italian accomplishments in the realm of aviation such as Italo Balbo’s international
crociere not only served to promote Italy’s Fascist Regime in general, but, more specifically, they advertised
the skills of the Regia Aeronautica and the high quality of the machines that the Italian aviation industry was
capable of producing.17 This is precisely what led numerous countries to approach the Italian government with
requests for air missions that could help modernize their air forces and to place orders with Italian firms for the
latest warplanes. Moreover, the latter was facilitated by the former; when Regia Aeronautica officers advised
their host countries to purchase new aircraft as part of the process of modernization, they naturally
recommended Italian designs.18 Between 1922 and 1940, the military and / or naval air forces of at least
twenty-seven different nations acquired Italian warplanes, some in considerable quantities.19 It’s no
coincidence that six of these twenty-six countries hosted Italian Air Missions. While the majority were either
among the lesser European powers or Latin American nations, orders for Italian aircraft during the interwar
period were also placed by France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union (though, with the exception of
the U.S.S.R., these orders, for various reasons, went largely unfilled). In 1929 the American Aeronautical
Corporation (A.A.C.) undertook the licensed manufacture of the Savoia-Marchetti S.M.56 single-engine biplane
flying-boat, six of which were used by the New York City Police Department to intercept smugglers during
Prohibition.20
While the Regia Aeronautica, by establishing an international reputation, helped to generate the lion’s share
of Italy’s military exports, the two other branches of the armed forces also played an important role in
Mussolini’s military diplomacy. Various weapons, from small arms to armored vehicles, were supplied by Italy
to at least seventeen different countries between 1922 and 1940, three of which were hosts to Regia Esercito
(Royal Army) Advisory Missions. The navies of at least nine different nations purchased warships from Italy’s
yards during this period and the Regia Marina (Royal Navy) provided at least two countries in Latin America
16
Sullivan and Knox, p.9; Sergé, pp.146-147, 180-185, 213; Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, pp.190, 204; Gooch,
p.173.
17
Thompson, pp.251, 254; Segré, p.166.
18
Beals, p.99.
19
These included Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Chile, China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iraq,
Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, El Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, the
U.S.S.R., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia (Czechoslovakia and Switzerland may also have obtained some Italian aircraft).
Both Segré and Gooch state that Italy exported aircraft and aircraft components to thirty-nine different countries during
the interwar period (Segré, pp.162-163, 165; Gooch, p.387).
20
Thompson, p.250; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.56.
[4]
with advisory missions.21 Overall, Italy’s export of small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, aircraft, and
warships offered not only diplomatic dividends, but also foreign capital and material resources that the Duce
desperately needed for his programs at home, both civilian and military.22
MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE
Among the different continents of the globe in which Mussolini practiced his military diplomacy, Europe,
for obvious reasons, was the most important. The geo-strategic circumstances that he inherited in 1922 dictated
Italy’s main areas of concern. To the north there was the potential threat from France, the question of Austria’s
future, and unresolved territorial claims with the newly established state of Yugoslavia. The security of the
Adriatic was another cause of friction between Yugoslavia and Italy, as well as a source of concern over both
the status of Albania (which was an Italian protectorate until Mussolini invaded it in April, 1939) and the
attitude of the Greek government. The Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean was another
factor in Italo-Greek relations, as well an issue in Italy’s relations with Turkey. Lastly, there was the
Mediterranean, the link between Italy and her colonies in Africa, particularly Libya. The Duce famously liked
to refer to the Mediterranean as mare nostrum (our sea), but in the French and British Navies he faced threats
that could not be ignored.23
At least until he began planning for the conquest of Ethiopia in 1932, Mussolini’s attention was focused
primarily on the Balkans and the Danube region. He harbored a particular hatred for the Slavic people and his
ultimate goal was the elimination of Yugoslavia (though this didn’t prevent Italy from selling planes to her air
21
Weapons were sold by Italy to Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rico, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Yemen, while Albania, Bolivia, and Ecuador hosted
Italian Military Missions. Italian Warships were purchased by Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Paraguay, Sweden, Turkey,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Ecuador and Venezuela definitely hosted Italian Naval Missions, while one source claims that
Colombia also engaged a naval mission from Italy in the 1920s (Daniel M. Masterson. Militarism and Politics in Latin
America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso. Contributions in Military Studies No.111. New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991, p.15).
22
Thompson, p.5; Segré, p.166; Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.173; Gooch, pp.373, 383, 506. Between 1937
and 1943, for instance, half the value of the export of aircraft and parts came back to Italy in the form of raw materials
(Gooch, pp.419-420).
23
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.175.
[5]
force in 1938).24 The primary obstacle standing in the way of this goal, however, was France; Yugoslavia,
along with Czechoslovakia and Romania, were members of a French sponsored alliance, the so called ‘Little
Entente’. In an effort to counteract the ‘Little Entente’ and assemble allies with which to dismember
Yugoslavia, the Duce worked at creating a Balkan-Danubian pact by establishing strong ties with a number of
states, particularly Austria and Hungary.25 Having come out on the losing side in World War I, both nations
had had restrictions placed on the size and composition of their armed forces, restrictions that, naturally, they
resented. Mussolini was only too happy to offer his assistance with solving this problem.
In 1927 Austria’s paramilitary organization, the Heimwehr, set out to organize a clandestine air corps and,
the following year, the Bundesheer (Federal Army) began secretly training pilots. By the early-1930s Austria
had begun purchasing arms from Italy, starting with five Fiat C.R.20 biplane fighters in 1933.26 Two years later
the Austrian Army placed an order for fifteen Fiat-Ansaldo CV.3 series ‘tankettes’ (small turret-less tracked
armored vehicles armed with one or two machine guns) for a total cost of 1,050,000 lire.27 Altogether the
Bundesheer would acquire forty-seven tankettes, enough to equip a battalion sized unit.28 In the spring of 1936
Austria embarked on a major expansion of its air assets through the purchase of a relatively large selection of
Italian warplanes. This included two Fiat C.R.30B two-seat biplane trainers, three Fiat C.R.30 fighters,
additional Fiat C.R.20s, and forty-five Fiat C.R.32bis biplane fighters. Considered to be one of the best fighters
of the 1930s, Austria used her newly acquired C.R.32s to equip the three squadrons of Jagdgeschwader II based
at Wiener Neustadt. On the eve of the Anschluss (Hitler’s annexation of Austria in 1938), the Austrian Air
Force contained over 100 aircraft from Italian firms, including a large number of biplane trainers, seventy-two
biplane fighters (consisting of an equal number of Fiat C.R.20 and C.R.32s), and a handful of medium bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft.29
24
Thompson, pp.265-266; Bernard Fitzsimons (ed.). The Illustrated Encyclopedia of 20th Century Weapons and Warfare.
24 Vols. New York: Columbia House, 1977, Vol.5, pp.507, 509, Vol.22, pp.2377-2378; Sullivan, “The Italian Armed
Forces.”, pp.176, 181, 184; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_C.a..310; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-
Marchetti_S.M.79.
25
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.184; Gooch, pp.70-72, 122, 128-129.
26
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_Air_Force.
27
Gooch, pp.270-271.
28
Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis. Pictorial History of Tanks of the World 1915-45. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:
Stackpole Books, 1972, pp.118-119; Andrea Tallillo, Antonio Tallillo, and Daniele Guglielmi. Caro L 3: Carri Veloci,
Carri Leggeri, derivati. Trento: Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di studio e ricerca storia, 2004, pp.111-112; Csaba Becze.
Magyar Steel: Hungarian Armour in WWII. Green Series No.4101. Mushroom Model Publications, 2007, p.44.
29
Thompson, pp.147, 148; Gianni Cattaneo. “The Fiat C.R.32.” pp.254-264. Aircraft in Profile, Volume One. Edited by
Martin C. Windrow. New York: Doubleday & Comapnay, 1969, p.259; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, pp.650, 651; George Punka.
[6]
The nation with which Italy developed its closest ties was Hungary.30 Like Austria, Hungary was forced to
begin rebuilding its air force in secret. While visiting Rome in April, 1928, the Hungarian Count, István
Bethlen, met with the Duce and requested 400 aircraft with which to re-establish the Magyar Királyi Honvéd
Légierő (Royal Hungarian Air Force).31 While Mussolini obviously didn’t have 400 planes to spare,
negotiations were initiated for the covert sale of warplanes to Hungary. Starting in 1930 the Magyar Királyi
Honvéd Légierő began receiving delivery of twenty Caproni Ca.101 tri-motor high-wing bomber / transports,
twelve unarmed Fiat C.R.20bis fighters, and four two-seat Fiat C.R.20 trainers.32 Like their Austrian
counterparts, the Hungarians clearly recognized the excellence of the Fiat C.R.32 when it appeared in 1933.
Two years later the first orders were placed, the Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő eventually obtaining a total of
seventy-nine C.R.32s, including a number of former Austrian examples that were supplied by Germany
following the Anschluss.33
The Hungarian Army also relied heavily on Italy to enable it to expand and modernize. Mussolini made a
gift to Hungary of 25,000 rifles and thirty-two 77mm artillery pieces. Like Austria, Hungary was forbidden
under article nineteen of the Versailles Treaty to possess tanks. Nevertheless, an order was placed with Fiat-
Ansaldo in 1935 for sixty tankettes, though at the time only thirty could be supplied. As was the case with
Austria, when deliveries commenced in January of 1936, the tankettes arrived in sealed boxcars labeled
‘Agricultural Tractors’.34 By 1938, when Hungary abandoned the secrecy surrounding her military buildup, its
army had acquired a total of 121 CV 3-35 tankettes, eleven of which were former Austrian Army vehicles
provided by Germany.35
FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action. Aircraft No.172. Carrollton, Texas: Squadron / Signal Publications, 2000, pp.4, 8, 18;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_Air_Force; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..20;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..30; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..32.
30
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.184.
31
Gyula Sárhidai, György [George] Punka, and Viktor Kozlik. Hungarian Eagles: A Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő
1920-1945. Aldershot, Hants.: Hikoki Publications, 1996, p.6; Gooch, p.131.
32
Fitzsimons, Vol.5, p.503; Sárhidai, Punka, and Kozlik, pp.7-8; Punka, p.21.
33
Thompson, p.148; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, p.651; George [György] Punka. Hungarian Air Force. Carrollton, Texas:
Squadron / Signal Publications, 1994, p.20; Sárhidai, Punka, and Kozlik, p.8; Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, pp.8,
18, 21. George / György Punka, in his 1994 book on the Hungarian Air Force, states that Germany provided Hungary
with three former Austrian Fiat C.R.32s in March, 1938, whereas, in his 2000 book on the C.R.32 and C.R.42, he states
that thirty-six former Austrian C.R.32s were sold by Germany to Hungary.
34
Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.111-112; Gooch, pp.270-271.
35
Chamberlain and Ellis, pp.118-119; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.111-112; Gooch, pp.270-271; Becze, p.44.
[7]
The Hungarian Army’s acquisition of a large number of armored vehicles from Italy, which was matched by
the purchase of a relatively large number of aircraft, reflected the growing awareness in the late-1930s that
another European war was on the horizon. By then, however, Italian aircraft manufacturers were no longer the
first choice of the Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő for new warplanes. This attitude was undoubtedly shaped by
their experience with the Caproni Ca.310 Libeccio (Southwest Wind). Hungary purchased thirty-six of these
up-to-date twin-engine light bombers in 1938, only to discover that they were so mechanically unreliable as to
be dangerous. After a number were lost in crashes, the remaining thirty-three were returned to their
manufacturer. Caproni compensated the Hungarians by replacing the defective planes with thirty-six Ca.135bis
light bombers, but these weren’t delivered until 1940.36
Attempts were made to obtain aircraft from German manufacturers, but they were too busy with the demands
of the Luftwaffe to fill any orders from foreign customers, so that there was little alternative but to rely on
Italy’s aviation industry. Mussolini made this option somewhat more attractive in 1939 by providing Hungary
with a 300 million lire line of credit. By then she was in desperate need of modern fighter aircraft, the C.R.32s
having been relegated to training purposes due to obsolescence. The Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő placed an
order for eighteen of the C.R.32’s successor, the Fiat C.R.42 Falco (Falcon) biplane fighter. The first three
C.R.42s were delivered by 17 June and, on 20 November, an additional order was placed, the Magyar Királyi
Honvéd Légierő eventually obtaining sixty-nine of these warplanes.37 Nevertheless, the C.R.42 was viewed as a
stop-gap; what the Hungarians really wanted was a modern monoplane fighter with retractable landing gear.
This is why, only a month after placing their second order for C.R.42s, the Hungarian government signed a
contact with the firm of Reggiane, a subsidiary of Caproni, for seventy Re.2000 Falco Is.
Designed by an engineer who had worked in the United States, the Re.2000 was modeled after the Seversky
P-35, but was equipped with a more powerful engine. Because the Regia Aeronautica had initially declined to
purchase any Re.2000s, the company turned, instead, to potential foreign customers. Finland entered into
negotiations for 100 Re.2000s, Spain attempted to purchase fifty, as did Yugoslavia, which also wanted to
acquire the manufacturing rights, while even Great Britain sought to obtain the Re.2000! In December, 1939, a
British mission led by Lord Hardwick and accompanied by Wing Commander H. Thornton of the Air Ministry
36
Thompson, pp.105, 108; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509; Punka, Hungarian Air Force, pp.5, 21, 35, 38. Thompson
states that Hungary purchased roughly 100 Ca.135 light bombers.
37
Thompson, p.154; Cattaneo, p.189; Punka, Hungarian Air Force, p.5; Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, p.21; Chris
Banyai-Riepl, “The Fiat CR.42 in Italian and Foreign Service.” http://www.cbrnp.com/profiles/quarter2/fiat_cr42.
[8]
visited the Caproni factories to consider the purchase of 20mm anti-aircraft guns, Ca.313 light bombers, Ca.311
trainers, and Re.2000 fighters. Britain’s efforts to buy Seversky EP-106s, the export version of the P-35, had
fallen through, which explains their particular interest in the Re.2000. Following test flights, a contract was
signed in January, 1940, for 300 fighters, which the R.A.F. planned to use to strengthen British defenses in the
Middle East. Remarkably, Italy’s ally, Germany, which had been at war with Britain since September, 1939,
waited until March to issue an official objection to this transaction. Nevertheless, plans to deliver the Re.2000s
by way of neutral Portugal were in the process of being finalized when they were cut short by Italy’s entry into
the war. Like Britain, attempts to obtain Re.2000s by Finland, Spain, and Yugoslavia also came to naught.38
Hungary, on the other hand, not only acquired a large number of Re.2000 fighters, but also manufactured
their own copies. In December, 1939, the same month that the British mission was in Italy, a Hungarian
committee was also present, evaluating potential new aircraft for the Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő. Having
determined that the Re.2000 fulfilled their requirements, Hungarian representatives entered into a contract on 27
December, 1939, that included an order for seventy Re.2000s to be delivered by 15 January, as well as a
manufacturing license at the cost of an additional two-million lire. By April, 1940, delivery had not yet taken
place, so that an agent of the Ministry of Defense traveled to Italy to investigate the delay, only to be
dumbfounded to find that, out of the seventy aircraft, only a single example had actually been assembled. A
shortage of raw materials was cited as the cause of the delay and, by year’s end, only seven Re.2000s had been
delivered. It was not until 29 May, 1943, that the order was finally filled. While the Re.2000, which the
Hungarians christened Héja (Hawk), was appreciated for its maneuverability, numerous mechanical problems
surfaced, particularly faulty throttles.39
MÁVAG (Magyari Állami Vas-, Acél Gépgyárak, the Hungarian State Iron and Steel Works) at Györ
undertook the assembly of Hungary’s copy of the Re.2000, christened the Héja II. Manufacture of the first
order of 100, to be equipped with a locally built engine, commenced in November, 1941, with eighty-six
completed by 1943, and nineteen more in 1944. Figures for the number of Héja IIs that were eventually built
vary, with some sources reporting the unlikely total of 203 aircraft.40
38
Cattaneo, p.7; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509, Vol.9, pp.905-906; George [György] Punka. Reggiane Fighters in
Action. Aircraft Number 177. Carrollton, Texas: Squadron / Signal Publications, 2001, p.5.
39
Thompson, p.237; Cattaneo, pp.8-9; Fitzsimons, Vol.9, pp.904-906; Punka, Hungarian Air Force, pp.5, 21; Sárhidai,
Punka, and Kozlik, pp.10-11; Punka, Reggiane Fighters in Action, p.11.
40
Fitzsimons, Vol.9, pp.904-906; Punka, Reggiane Fighters in Action, pp.16-17.
[9]
Along with warplanes, the Duce also provided the Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő with access to the
facilities of his air force for training purposes. In 1939 100 Hungarian officer candidates and 100 N.C.O.
candidates received instruction on Regia Aeronautica bases at locations such as Grottaglie and Taranto. Of this
first group, sixty were trained to fly fighters, ninety to operate bombers, and fifty to handle reconnaissance
aircraft. A second detachment of 200 Hungarian trainees arrived in Italy to receive similar instruction the
following year.41
In addition to Austria and Hungary, Mussolini also made an effort to enlist Bulgaria and Romania in his
Balkan-Danubian coalition. It’s no accident that Italo Balbo touched down at the Black Sea ports of Varna in
Bulgaria and Constanţa in Romania during his second crociere in 1929. Because Bulgaria, like Austria and
Hungary, had been a member of the Central Powers during the World War, its army was forbidden to possess
tanks. Therefore, when a consignment of fourteen CV.3-33 tankettes reached Varna in 1935, it arrived under a
cloak of secrecy.42 Yet, outside of Caproni building a factory in Bulgaria to produce trainers, the Italian
aviation industry had little or no involvement with the Bulgarian Air Force.43
By contrast, Italy did a considerable business selling arms to Romania, despite her membership in France’s
‘Little Entente’. In 1926 the Romanian Navy placed an order with Italy for four warships and twelve Savoia-
Marchetti S.M.59 single-engine biplane flying-boats. The warships, consisting of the destroyers Regele
Ferdinand and Regina Maria, the submarine Delfinul, and the submarine support ship Constanţa, were
delivered between 1930 and 1936.44 The tangible evidence for the impact of Italo Balbo’s call at the port of
Constanţa in 1929 was the Romanian Navy’s decision to purchase twenty-seven additional seaplanes from the
firm of Savoia-Marchetti. This order was completed between 1932 and 1936 with the delivery of six S.M.56
single-engine biplane flying-boat trainers, seven of the same S.M.55s used by Balbo, and fourteen S.M.62bis
single-engine biplane reconnaissance flying-boats.45 In subsequent years the Navy continued to look to Italy for
41
Punka, Hungarian Air Force, p.4; Sárhidai, Punka, and Kozlik, p.10.
42
Kaloyan Matev. Armored Vehicles 1935-1945. Equipment and Armor of the Bulgarian Army. Sofia: Angela Publishers,
2000, pp.11-13; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, p.108.
43
Ronald Tarnstrom. Balkan Battles: Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania. Linsborg, Kansas: Trogen
Books, 1998, p.284.
44
Thompson, p.250; Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş, and Cristian Craciunoiu. Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed
Forces in the European War, 1941-1945. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995, pp.276, 327;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.59.
45
Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, p.276; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.55;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.56; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.62.
[10]
its seaplanes, placing an order for twelve CRDA Cant Z.501 Gabbiane (Seagull) single-engine light bomber /
reconnaissance flying-boats sometime between 1937 and 1938, an order that was filled in 1939.46
The Fortelor Aerieni Regal ale Romania (Royal Romanian Air Force), on the other hand, remained reliant
largely on the French aviation industry until 1937, when Italy succeeded in gaining a foothold with the sale of a
consignment of modern bombers. On 25 May, Romania signed a contract for twenty-four Savoia-Marchetti
S.M.79B Sparviero (Sparrow), the twin-engine version of the famous Gobbo Maledetto (Damned Hunchback)
tri-motor medium bomber used extensively by the Regia Aeronautica during World War II. The S.M.79B had
been developed specifically with an eye towards export sales, so that it was demonstrated to government
dignitaries and air force personnel in, not only Romania, but also Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, China,
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Iraq, the Soviet Union, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. As they began arriving in the
spring of 1938, the Fortelor Aerieni Regal ale Romania used their S.M.79Bs to equip Grup 1 Bombardament,
which consisted of Escadrila 71 and 72. 47
The satisfaction of the Fortelor Aerieni Regal ale Romania with these examples of Italian craftsmanship is
suggested by their purchase of additional warplanes from Italy, as well as the rights to manufacture their own
copies of the S.M.79B. The same year that the first S.M.79Bs became operational the air force ordered thirty
Nardi FN 305 IV advanced trainers / fighters, which were delivered between February and August, 1938.48 On
27 May of that year the Fortelor Aerieni Regal ale Romania placed an order with Industria Aeronautica
Romana of Brasov for thirty-six copies of the S.M.79B, which were designated ‘JRS’ 79B (‘J’ for their Junker
Jumo 211 Da 12-cylinder in-line liquid-cooled engines, ‘R’ for Romania, and ‘S’ for Savoia).49
The importance that the Duce attached to these arrangements with Romania is suggested by the official visit
of the Italian Minister of Aviation, Gen. Giuseppe Valle, to Bucharest in June, 1938. At that time Romania was
considering the United States as an alternative source for aircraft engines, but after six months of negotiations,
an agreement was reached in which she obtaining, among other things, a manufacturing license to produce the
46
Thompson, pp.62-53; Fitzsimons, Vol.10, p.1076; Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, p.276;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cant_Z.501.
47
Thompson, p.265; Gigio Apostolo. The Savoia Marchetti S.M. 79. Profile Publications Number 89. Leatherhead,
Surrey: Profile Publications, 1966, p.11; Fitzsimons, Vol.22, pp.2377-2378; Roberto Gentilli. Savoia Marchetti S.79 in
Action. Carrollton, Texas: Squadron / Signal Publications, 1986, p.20; Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, pp.266-67, 276.
48
Thompson, p.216; Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, p.274.
49
Thompson, p.265; Apostolo, p.11; Gentilli, p.20; Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, p.267.
[11]
Nardi FN 305 IV, along with the delivery of an additional thirty examples of this aircraft.50 The Air Force
arranged on 30 January, 1940, for the production of thirty-six more JRS.79Bs, but difficulties with the
instillation of a new version of the Junker Jumo engine led Romanian officials to request assistance from
Savoia-Marchetti. Despite delays caused by the competing demands of the Regia Aeronautica, the bombers,
designated ‘JIS’ 79B (‘I’ for Italy), were eventually delivered to the Romanian Air Force. 51
Italo Balbo’s second crociere may have influenced the decision by two other nations in the Black Sea
Region to purchase arms from Italy. The Turkish Navy had already acquired two submarines from Italy
sometime in the 1920s. In September, 1931, two years after Balbo’s stop in Istanbul, Turkey obtained twenty-
three Savoia-Marchetti S.16ter flying-boats.52 Despite the fundamentally antagonistic relationship between
Fascism and Communism, the arrival of Balbo’s squadron in the port of Odessa was warmly received and
Mussolini had no objections to the sale of warplanes to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets purchased twenty-four
Savoia-Marchetti S.M.62bis three-seat, single-engine biplane reconnaissance / bomber flying-boats, along with
a manufacturing license, and, in 1931, imported sixty-two Isotta Fraschini Asso 750 horse-power engines.
Sometime between 1935 and 1936 the Russian Air Force bought ten examples of the Breda Ba.65 monoplane
fighter-bomber, followed by the purchase of two examples of its predecessor, the Breda Ba.64, in 1938.53 As
this demonstrates, despite supporting opposing sides during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Mussolini
continued to approve transactions with the Soviet Union.
The acquisition of Italian aircraft by the Iberian nations may also have been influenced in part by visits made
by Italian airmen, including Col. De Pinedo’s ‘Flight of the Four Continents’ in 1927 that involved a stop in
Lisbon and Italo Balbo’s first crociere the following year, in which Spain was included. Such sales, at least
before the Duce’s intervention in Spain’s civil war, were less about achieving diplomatic goals than about
earning foreign capital. Sometime in the 1920s the Spanish Navy acquired a total of sixty flying-boats from
Italy: twenty Macchi M.18 A.R.s and forty Savoia-Marchetti S.M.62bis, along with the licensing rights to
manufacture the latter. The Spanish Army obtained an unknown number of the popular Fiat C.R.20bis biplane
50
Gooch, pp.424-425.
51
Axworthy, Scafeş, and Craciunoiu, pp.267, 276.
52
Segré, p.213; Tarnstrom, p.114.
53
Thompson, pp.31, 250-251; Fitzsimons, Vol.3, p.249; Segré, p.169; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-
Marchetti_S.M.62.
[12]
fighters.54 Neighboring Portugal followed Spain’s example with the purchase of eight Macchi M.18 A.R.s in
1928. Also during the 1920s Portugal acquired a number of Caproni Ca.100 biplane trainers and, in 1939,
bought ten Breda Ba.65 fighter-bombers.55 Portugal was also among a number of countries that sought to
purchase the Nardi FN.305 two-seat monoplane trainer, but their delivery may have been prevented due to the
outbreak of the war.56 Of course, during the civil war in Spain, Mussolini furnished Francisco Franco’s
Nationalists with lavish amounts of arms of every sort, but this was tied to direct military intervention, with the
commitment of the Aviazione Legionaria air contingent and the 80,000 Italian soldiers of the Corpo Truppe
Volontarie (C.T.V.).
As with the nations of Iberia, the sale of Italian arms to other European countries outside of the Balkans-
Danube region had less to do with the Duce’s foreign policy goals than with the acquisition of foreign goods
and currency. Significantly, most of these sales took place in the late-1930s, when the outbreak of another war
seemed increasingly likely.57 On more than one occasion attempts at rearmament occurred too late. In
September, 1939, Belgium signed a contract for the supply of thirty Fiat C.R.42 Falco biplane fighters at the
cost of forty million Francs. In addition, an order was also placed for twenty-four Caproni Ca.312 twin-engine
reconnaissance / light bombers, while the S.A.B.C.A. (Société Anonyme Belge de Constructions Aeronautiques)
obtained a license for the manufacture of the Bergamasca CA-335 two-seat monoplane reconnaissance / fighter.
The first ten C.R.42s began to arrive in January, 1940, with a further ten being delivered in June. These were
used to equip the two squadrons of the II.éme de Chasse (II Fighter Group) based at Nivelles. Nevertheless, the
order was still incomplete when the Blitzkrieg campaign in the west got underway. The German invasion also
curtailed both the delivery of the Caproni Ca.312s and the manufacture of any Bergamasca Ca.335s. Lastly,
Belgium sought to acquire some Nardi FN.305 trainers, but it’s unclear if any of these were delivered prior to
May, 1940.58
54
Thompson, pp.250-251; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, p.650; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macchi_M.18;
55
Thompson, pp.36, 81; Fitzsimons, Vol.3, p.249; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.100;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macchi_M.18.
56
Thompson, p.216.
57
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, 173.
58
Thompson, pp.117, 216; Cattaneo, “The Fiat C.R.42.”, p.189; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509, Vol.9, pp.904-905;
Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, p.46; Chris Banyai-Riepl, “The Fiat CR.42 in Italian and Foreign Service.”
http://www.cbrnp.com/profiles/quarter2/fiat_cr42; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.312;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R.42.
[13]
Poland, which had already obtained an undetermined number of Fiat C.R.20bis biplane fighters, placed an
order with the firm of C.A.N.T. (Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico) for thirty Z.506B Airone (Heron) float-plane
bombers in 1938. A single example from this order was present in September, 1939, when German forces
launched their Blitzkrieg; it was destroyed in the fighting.59 Norway, which had bought a few Breda Ba.28 two-
seat biplane basic trainers, placed an order for twenty-four Caproni Ca.310 twin-engine reconnaissance / light
bombers in the late-1930s. However, like their Hungarian counterparts, Norwegian Air Force officers found the
performance of the Ca.310 so disappointing that, after only five had been delivered, they requested that between
twelve and fifteen Caproni Ca.312s be substituted to fulfill the remainder of their contract. As was the case
with both Belgium and Poland, the aircraft failed to arrive before the Germans overran the country.60
Two other Scandinavian nations looked to Italy for warplanes in the late-1930s. In 1937 Finland embarked
on a five year program to strengthen its air force, particularly in the realm of interceptors and, towards this end,
placed an order for twenty-five Fiat G-50 Freccia (Arrow), Italy’s first all-metal monoplane fighter with
retractable landing gear. With the outbreak of the ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union in November, 1939,
Finland bought ten additional G-50s. All thirty-five were to be sent by train to a Baltic port, but this entailed
transit through Germany which, due to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, was being pressured by Stalin to prevent the
delivery of arms to Finland. Beginning in December, 1940, the first two G-50s were delivered without incident,
but the next six were seized and sent back to Italy by way of Switzerland. However, the Finns arranged for this
consignment to be diverted to Holland, from where they were shipped to the sympathetic neighboring country
of Sweden. Here the G-50s were assembled and flown to Helsinki. Although two aircraft were lost en-route
between 7 and 8 February, the last of the warplanes arriving on 19 June.61
By then the G-50s, which the Finns nicknamed Fijju, had been dueling with Soviet warplanes for four
months. Lentolaivue (Squadron) 26 had received their compliment of fourteen G-50s in February and it was on
the twenty-sixth of that month that they experienced their baptism of fire against enemy aircraft. The Fijju
proved their durability, with nineteen out of the original thirty-three still in service in 1945.62
59
Thompson, p.56; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, p.650.
60
Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507-509; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.25;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.310; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.312.
61
Thompson, p.167; Christopher F. Shores. Finnish Air Force 1918-1968. Arco-Aircam Aviation Series No.14. Osprey;
New York: Arco, 1969, p.5; Fitzsimons, Vol.10, pp.1029-1030; Kalevi Keskinen, Kari Stenman, and Klaus Niska. FIAT
G.50. Suomen Ilmavoimien Historia 8. Finland: Kustannusliike Tietoteos, 1977, p.93.
62
Shores, p.5; Keskinen, Stenman, and Niska, p.93.
[14]
Like Finland, Sweden’s Air Force initiated a plan for expansion and reorganization in 1936. It was
estimated that domestic manufacturers would not be able to satisfy the needs of the Flygvapnet (Swedish Air
Force) until 1943, so the government looked abroad for sources of warplanes to fill the gap. Sweden’s first
choice was the United States. In 1939 an order was placed for 120 Seversky EP-106 fighters, the export version
of the P-35. But, shortly after the arrival of the first sixty in early-1940, the United States adopted an embargo
on the exportation of arms that prevented the remaining aircraft from being delivered. As was the case with
Great Britain, Sweden’s inability to obtain further P-35s led them to look to Italy, the manufacturer of its
cousin, the Reggiane Re.2000 Falco I.63
In fact, the Swedish government had already begun the purchase of warplanes from Italy, having placed an
order for seventy-two Fiat C.R.42s. The first batch arrived by air in February, 1940, while the balance of the
order were crated and shipped to Sweden, where they were reassembled at the C.V.M. (Centrala Fly Malm,
Malmslatt Aircraft Depot and Central Workshop) between 20 December and 11 June of the following year.
Designated J 11 (‘J’ for Jakt or fighter), the C.R.42 found favor with their pilots and remained in service up
until March, 1945.64
It was on 20 November, 1940, that Sweden signed a contract with Reggiane for sixty Re.2000 monoplane
fighters in exchange for a payment of 18,700,0000 Swedish crowns, much of which would be in the form of
chrome and nickel ore (altogether, Sweden spent ninety-million crowns on the purchase of Italian warplanes).
The Re.2000s were crated and sent by train through Germany, with the first arriving at the C.V.M. in
September, 1941. The Re.2000, known as the J 20 in Swedish service, experienced problems with starting their
engines during the harsh Scandinavian winters. Nevertheless, Swedish pilots praised them for their speed and
maneuverability. Sixteen were lost during the war, but the survivors, unlike the C.R.42s, were not retired from
the Flygvapnet until 1955.65
63
Cattaneo, The Reggiane Re.2000, p.10; Official History, “The Swedish Air Force: An Official History.” Aerospace
Historian, Vol.22, No.4 (Winter / December 1975), pp.220-221; Punka, Reggiane Fighters in Action, p.21.
64
Thompson, p.154; Cattaneo, “The Fiat C.R.42.”, p.190; Official History, “The Swedish Air Force.” pp.221, 242;
Fitzsimons, Vol.9, pp.904-905; Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, p.47; Chris Banyai-Riepl, “The Fiat CR.42 in
Italian and Foreign Service.” http://www.cbrnp.com/profiles/quarter2/fiat_cr42.
65
Thompson, p.237; Cattaneo, The Reggiane Re.2000, p.10; Official History, “The Swedish Air Force.” pp.221, 242;
Punka, Reggiane Fighters in Action, p.21; Fitzsimons, Vol.9, pp.904-906.
[15]
Unlike the C.R.42 and Re.2000 fighters, the Flygvapnet found the ninety Caproni Ca.313 twin-engine
reconnaissance planes that it acquired not only a disappointment but an outright source of danger. The Ca.313s
were purchased with the intention of using them for long-range patrols to safeguard the country’s neutrality, but
their unreliability was demonstrated as early as their delivery, when eight of the ninety that were flown to
Sweden went down over Germany, while many of the eighty-two that arrived landed on only one engine!
Along with problems with its hydraulic and electrical systems, the special fuel required by the Ca.313 was
highly corrosive, so that it frequently ate through fuel lines, resulting in engine fires. As a result, the
Flygvapnet’s Ca.313s were involved in no less than twenty-three fatal accidents during the war, resulting in the
death of forty-four crewmen.66 Given these defects, it’s surprising to note that Britain, France, and Germany all
sought to acquire large numbers of this particular aircraft. The British placed an order for 300, the French for
200, and the Germans for 905. Five were delivered to France and none to Britain before the outbreak of
hostilities with Italy, while Germany received only a handful.67
In addition to aircraft, Sweden also turned to Italy for warships. By 1939 much of Sweden’s modest fleet
was obsolete, but it would take too long for her yards to build replacements to meet the looming danger of war.
As such, Sweden purchased a number of vessels from Italy in March, 1940, including two destroyers and six
torpedo boats. On their voyage through the Atlantic, these craft were temporarily detained by British authorities
at the Orkney Islands. Nevertheless, they arrived in Sweden on 1 July. Like the Ca.313s, these warships
proved something of a disappointment, exhibiting mechanical problems throughout their service.68
MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA
The extent of Mussolini’s military diplomatic activity in Latin America was second only to Europe. One
reason for this was that Italy was dependent upon the importation of a large quantity of goods, some of which
66
Thompson, pp.112-113; Official History, “The Swedish Air Force.” pp.221, 242; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.313.
67
Thompson, pp.112-113; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.313. Thompson
states that Germany ordered 1,000 trainer version of the Ca.313, the Ca.315.
68
Ronald Tarnstrom. The Sword of Scandinavia: Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. Armed Forces
Handbooks. Lindsborg, Kansas: Trogen Books, 1996, p.289.
[16]
came from different Latin American countries.69 Another factor was immigration. It has been estimated that in
1927 as many as one-fifth of all people born in Italy lived overseas, with the overwhelming majority residing in
the Americas. A large proportion of the populations of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay were
either from Italy or of Italian descent. Even in countries such as Peru and Chile, where the Italian population
was much smaller, they constituted influential minorities.70 With this in mind, the Duce created the
organization Fasci All’Estero (Fasci Abroad) to promote support for the Fascist regime within immigrant
communities, particularly those in the United States and Latin America.71 Among the factors that facilitated
Italian involvement in Latin America was a common Latin culture, with shared institutions, most notably the
Catholic Church.72
Long before Mussolini came to power, Italy’s armed forces and arms manufacturers had sought, with some
success, to forge connections with various Latin American nations. Although British and United States
influence predominated among Latin America’s navies, during the late-nineteenth century Italy had also
established itself as a source of both expertise and warships.73 In 1919 the Italian aviation industry attempted to
make inroads into the Latin American market. The firm of Ansaldo traveled throughout the Americas, putting
on flying exhibitions in the United States, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay, and Argentina in an effort to interest
potential customers, both military and civilian (the results, however, proved disappointing, with only Mexico
purchasing a single Ansaldo A.1. Balilla in 1920).74 Between 1927 and 1939 Italian pilots made four record
breaking flights across the Atlantic to South America, while in September, 1937, a squadron of eleven Fiat
CR.32s performed aerobatic displays in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay as part of the,
International American Aviation Congress.75 Beginning in September, 1938, L.A.T.I. (Linee Aeree
Transcontinetali Italiane) joined Air France and Lufthansa to become the third airline to establish a direct route
between Europe and South America. Until it ceased operations on 24 December, 1941, L.A.T.I. was able to
circumvent the British blockade to transport, not only passengers, but also valuable cargo such as platinum,
69
Gooch, pp.202, 349, 408. In 1939-40 Italy imported 79% of the raw materials needed by its war industries (Sullivan,
“The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.183).
70
Beals, pp.87-88,103; Henry G. Gole The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp.13, 72.
71
Philip V. Cannistraro, “Fasci All’Esteo.” pp.197-198. in Historical Dictionary of Fascist Italy. Editor-in-Chief Philip V.
Cannistraro. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp.197-198; Gooch, p.125.
72
Beals, p.96.
73
Masterson, p.15.
74
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.173; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansaldo_A.1.
75
Beals, pp.95-96; Thompson, p.149.
[17]
tungsten, quartz crystals, and industrial diamonds.76 In turn, Mussolini’s efforts to increase Italian influence in
Latin America found a sympathetic audience, since many political and military leaders who wished to see both
their countries and their armed forces undergo modernization held a favorable view of Fascism.77
At the same time that Ansaldo was attempting to interest Latin American customers in their aircraft, an
Italian Air Mission was seeking to establish itself in Argentina. The mission arrived in 1918, shortly after the
conclusion of the World War, equipped with three fighters and three bombers. Yet, the Italians were replaced
by a French Mission that arrived the following year.78 Italy had better luck with the Argentine Navy. In the
wake of the 1927 visit to Buenos Aires by Col. De Pinedo and Capt. Del Prete in the S.M.55 seaplane Santa
Maria during their ‘Flight of the Four Continents’, the navy decided to purchase ten Savoia-Marchetti
S.M.59bis single-engine biplane flying-boat trainers.79 More significantly, Argentina’s Navy made a substantial
purchase of warships from Italy. In 1926 the government had authorized seventy-five million gold pesos for a
ten-year naval modernization program. Among the eighteen vessels that were acquired, five originated in
Italian ship yards, including two small heavy cruisers that were delivered in 1931, the Almirante Brown and
Veinticinco de Mayo, and three submarines that were delivered in 1933, the Salta, Santa Fé, and Santiago del
Estero.80
76
Beals, p.90; Thompson, pp.163, 277-278; Segré, pp.168-169; Theresa L. Kraus “Clipping Axis Wings.” Air Power
History, Vol.37, No.1 (Spring 1990), pp.19, 23, 24.
77
Beals, pp.86, 103-104; R.A. Humphreys. Latin America and the Second World War, Volume One: 1939-1942.
University of London Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph No.10. London: The Athlone Press, 1981, p18;
David Bushnell, “Colombia.” pp.159-202. in The Spanish Civil War 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives.
Edited by Mark Folcoff and Frederick B. Pike. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, pp.159-202;
Thomas M. Davies, Jr. “Peru.” pp.203-243 in The Spanish Civil War 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives.
Edited by Mark Folcoff and Frederick B. Pike. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982, pp.219-220;
Sandra McGee Deutsch. Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 1890-1939. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1999., pp.101, 196, 235, 243, 250-252, 271, 290; Graeme S. Mount. Chile and the
Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet. Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2002, pp.72, 75; John F. Bratzel, “Introduction.” pp.1013.
in Latin America during World War II. Edited by Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2007, p.9.
78
John M. Andrade. Latin American Military Aviation. The Hollows, Leicester: Midland Counties Publications, 1982,
p.12; Adrian J. English. Armed Forces of Latin America: Their Histories, Development, Present Strength and Military
Potential. London: Jane’s, 1984, pp.49, 65; Robert L. Scheina. Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987, p.143.
79
Thompson, p.250; Andrade, p.32; English, p.39.
80
English, p.39; Robert L. Scheina. Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1987, p.143..
[18]
In the summer of 1936 the Argentine Air Force held a competition to choose a new bomber and the firm of
Savoia Marchetti responded by entering the first prototype of their S.M.79B which, as noted above, was created
specifically with exports in mind. Its rivals included Germany’s Junker Ju 86 and the United States’ Martin
139W. During the demonstration the pilot of the S.M.79B executed four consecutive loops shortly after takeoff,
displaying the plane’s excellent maneuverability. The officers of the Argentine Air Force were sufficiently
impressed with the aircraft’s performance, but, unfortunately for Savoia Marchetti, they were concerned that if
war broke out in Europe, they would not be able to obtain spare parts to maintain the S.M.79B. Therefore,
when the decision of the Argentine government was announced in the following spring, it was the Martin 139W
that was chosen as the winner, so that the S.M.79B was shipped back to Italy.81
Given the combination of promising conditions and vigorous efforts to promote the Italian aviation industry,
it’s surprising that Mussolini failed to establish stronger ties with Brazil. Like Argentina, Brazil had been an
attractive destination for Italian immigrants. By the late-1930s it was estimated that 1,353,700 Brazilians were
either immigrants from Italy or of Italian descent, with the largest concentrations in southern states such as São
Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul.82 Getúlio Vargas, the Dictator who came to power at the beginning of the 1930s,
identified Mussolini as one of the inspirations for some of his policies, while Plínio Salado, founder of Brazil’s
homegrown Fascist party, Ação Integralista Brasileira, had actually met with the Duce, whom he admired and
wished to emulate.83 Little wonder, then, that during their ‘Flight of the Four Continents’ in 1927, Col.
Francesco and Capt. Del Prete had also visited Brazil and that Brazil had been the final destination for three
long range journeys by other Italian aviators: Capt. Del Prete and Arturo Ferarin’s non-stop flight from Rome in
1928, Italo Balbo’s third crociere in 1931, and a flight by the Sorci Verdi (Green Mice) long distance flying
team in 1938.
As with Argentina, it was the naval branch of Brazil’s armed forced that had the most interaction with Italy.
Just before the outbreak of World War I, Brazil had received delivery of three Fiat-Laurenti ‘F’ class
submarines, along with a submarine depot ship, and during the war the navy had sent its pilots to Italy for
training.84 Nevertheless, during the interwar period Brazil decided to contract for a United States Naval
Training Mission. It was the members of this mission who advised on the need to purchase new warships. In
81
Apostolo, p.10; Gentilli, p.20.
82
Gole, p.91.
83
Beals, pp.86, 98; Deutsch, pp.250-252, 271, 290; Bratzel, p.9.
84
Andrade, pp.87-88; English, p.109.
[19]
particular, they suggested obtaining modern submarines to replace the ‘F’ class models, which had proved
mechanically troublesome. The Brazilian Navy accepted bids from companies in the United States, Britain, and
Italy. Naturally the officers of the naval mission urged them to choose one of the U.S. firms, but it was Ansaldo
San Giorgio of Spezia that provided the lowest bid. Despite the modest cost, Brazil could only afford a single
vessel when she placed her order in 1926. Sometime between 1927 and 1928, Ansaldo delivered a large, mine-
laying submarine that was christened the Humaytá. In 1934 Brazil initiated a naval expansion program that
called for, among other things, additional submarines. In February of 1937 the navy accepted delivery of the
former Italian subs, the Ascianghi, Neghelli, and Gondar, which were renamed the Tamoyo, Tupy, and
Timbyra.85
Italo Balbo and his squadron of eleven Savoia-Marchetti S.M.55 flying-boats made their celebrated arrival in
the port of Natal on the northeast coast of Brazil in 1931. From there he flew to Bahia, and then down to Rio de
Janeiro. The Italian aviators were greeted by enthusiastic crowds at each stop, crowds that contained a large
proportion of Italo-Brazilians. After a month of touring the country, during which they made a point of visiting
Italian immigrant communities in Rio and São Paulo, Balbo and his crew sailed for home. Their S.M.55 flying-
boats remained behind, having been traded to the government for a large shipment of coffee. These eleven
aircraft were assigned to the Corpo de Aviação da Marinha (Naval Air Corps), with which they remained in
service until 1936.86
In 1938 Brazil hosted a visit by another detachment of Italian aviators. This was the famed long range flying
team from the 12th Bomber Group, known as the Sorci Verdi (‘Green Mice’, Italian slang for ‘Incredible
Things’), which included among its officer pilots one of the Duce’s sons, Lt. Bruno Mussolini. On 24 January
the three Savoi-Marchetti S.M.79Ts (‘T’ for Trans-Atlantic) lifted off from Guidonia airport and, after a brief
stop at Dakar, Senegal, arrived in Rio de Janeiro on the evening of 25 January, having covered 6,116 miles in
twenty-four hours and twenty minutes. As with Balbo’s flying-boats, the S.M. 79Ts were left behind when the
crews returned to Italy, though, on this occasion, they were presented as gifts to the host country, which
assigned them to the army. It should be noted that none of the exploits of these Italian aviators succeeded in
persuading the Brazilian government to place orders for aircraft from Italian firms, though this didn’t stop the
Italians from trying. Later in 1938 a standard S.M.79 bomber was sent to Brazil as a further enticement, but
85
Beals, p.99; English, p.110; Scheina, p.136; Frank D. McCann, Jr. The Brazilian-American Alliance 1937-1945.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973, p.111.
86
Beals, pp.95, 99, 100; Andrade, p.88; English, p.117; Segré, pp.215-228.
[20]
nothing came of it. The four S.M.79s remained in army service until they were retired sometime between 1943
and 1944.87
The Brazilian Army, on the other hand, chose to purchase some Italian equipment in 1938 when its aging
French light tanks were joined by twenty-five CV.3-35 tankettes.88 In January, 1940, the government entered
into a major arms agreement with Italy that was worth twenty-six million in U.S. dollars. This amount was to
be placed in an Italian account in the Bank of Brazil on condition that it could only be used to purchase
Brazilian goods. In return, Brazil was to receive six Tupi class submarines, three of which were to be delivered
as soon as possible, 175 armored cars, and 250 Breda machine guns, along with licensing rights to manufacture
their own copies of the Breda.89 Italy’s entry into the war, however, prevented the fulfillment of this agreement.
Italy had an early association with aviation in Uruguay. Sometime in the period between 1911 and 1912 the
Italian pilot, Bartolomeo Cattaneo, conducted the first heavier-than-air flight in Uruguay, while one of the
country’s earliest advocates for aviation, Ensign Atilio Frigerio, completed his flight training in Italy in 1912.90
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the government turned to Italy to obtain its first military aircraft.
Between 1923 and 1924 Uruguay received delivery of one Ansaldo A.1 Balilla biplane fighter, two Ansaldo
SVA.5 biplane fighters, and one Ansaldo SVA.10 reconnaissance bomber.91 Yet, despite this promising
beginning, Uruguay subsequently chose to rely almost exclusively on France for her warplanes. The only
exceptions were the navy’s purchase of three Italian flying-boats in 1930 and the acquisition by the air force of
between six and ten IMAM Ro.37bis Lince (Lynx) two-seat reconnaissance biplanes in 1937.92 The Uruguayan
Navy also obtained three Italian ‘Submarine Chaser’ patrol boats in 1935.93
By Contrast, Paraguay came to rely heavily on Italy for both assistance and aircraft. Whereas the arrival of a
French Air Mission in Argentina in 1919 displaced its Italian counterpart, it was Paraguayan dissatisfaction with
87
Beals, pp.90, 95; Thompson, pp.264-265; Apostolo, p.6; Andrade, p.56; English, p.118; Gentilli, p.17. John Andrade
states that the flight of the Sorci Verde team to Brazil took place in February of 1939. It should be noted that a number of
sources, including Jonathan Thompson (p.265) and Giorgio Apostolo (p.11), claim that Brazil purchased three Savoia-
Marchetti SM.79Bs. It seems likely that this is simply a matter of confusing the gifting of the three Sorci Verde S.M.79Ts
and the sale of a single standard S.M.79 bomber to Brazil with the demonstration of the a S.M.79B to Brazilian authorities
sometime in the 1930s (perhaps the same aircraft that was entered into the Argentine competition in 1936).
88
English, p.100; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.107-108.
89
McCann, pp.180-181.
90
Andrade, p.254.
91
Andrade, p.255; English, p.435.
92
Thompson, p.198; Fitzsimons, Vol.20, pp.2216-2217; Andrade, p.255; English, p.435.
93
English, p.432.
[21]
their French advisors that led them to contact members of the Italian Air Mission in Argentina. Along with the
purchase of warplanes from Italy, the establishment of this connection led to the contracting of Italian advisors,
both of which were all the more needed with the outbreak of a brief civil war in 1922. In June of that year the
government contracted Sgt. Nicolá Bo, a veteran of the World War who was both a pilot and a mechanic. Sgt.
Bo was placed in charge of the Ñu-Guazú Military Aviation School with the goal of providing the government
with the beginnings of an air force with which they hoped to crush the rebels. In order to accomplish his
mission, Sgt. Bo arranged for the purchase of aircraft and, in July, hired a number of his fellow members of
Italy’s defunct Air Mission to Argentina, including the pilot Carlo Paoli and the World War I ace, Cosimo
Rizzotto. It’s interesting to note that the government’s opponents also turned to the members of the Italian Air
Mission in Argentina for pilots, hiring another World War veteran, Sgt. Angelo Pescarmona.94
The most pressing concern for Paraguay during the interwar period was its dispute with Bolivia over
ownership of a remote region known as the Chaco Boreal, a dispute that flared into war in 1932. Assistance
from Italy was specifically aimed at giving Paraguay credible air and naval forces during the approach to war.
In 1927, the second prototype of the SIAI Savoia S.52, an innovative all-metal biplane fighter, was brought to
Latin America for demonstration flights. The S.52 was purchased by Paraguay, presumably at the request of the
Italian director of her aviation school, Sgt. Bo, since this was where it was used as a trainer.95 The Paraguayan
Navy, a riverine force, placed an order with the Italian shipbuilding firm of SA Cantieri Navali Odero of Genoa
for two modern cañoneros (gunboats) and, in 1929, obtained a single SIAI Marchetti S.M.59bis single-engine
biplane flying-boat trainer. The warships, christened the Humaita and Paraguay, were completed in 1930 and
arrived the following year in Asunción to great public acclaim.96 In March of 1930 a press notice appeared
indicating that the government had purchased an unspecified number of Fiat C.R.20 biplane fighters. Delivery,
however, took some time, as they didn’t begin arriving until April, 1933, when the first of between five and
94
Andrade, p.222; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.359; Dan Hagedorn and Antonío L. Sapíenza. Aircraft of
the Chaco War 1928-1935. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Military History, 1997, p.73; Adrian J. English. Revolutions,
Civil Wars and Coups D’Etat: Internal Disturbances in Paraguay during the 20th Century. Newthorpe, Nottingham:
Partizan Press, 2011, pp.52-53, 63.
95
Hagedorn and Sapíenza, p.86; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia_S.52.
96
Beals, p.99; Andrade, p.226; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.355; Alejandro de Quesada and Philip Jowett.
The Chaco War 1932-35: South America’s Greatest Modern Conflict. Man-at-War No.474. Oxford: Osprey, 2011, p.8;
[22]
seven reached Paraguay.97 That same year two Macchi M.18 A.R. single-engine reconnaissance / bomber
flying-boats that the navy had ordered in 1932 also arrived.98
By then the repeated clashes between Paraguayan and Bolivian patrols in the Chaco Boreal had escalated
into a full-scale war. Although Paraguay succeeded in obtaining a single Breda Ba.44 light transport for use as
an air ambulance in 1933, her attempts to purchase additional arms were thwarted by international efforts to
block the sale of weapons to either side. Such was the case when, during the war, she attempted to buy between
twenty and thirty Caproni Ca.101 tri-motor high-wing bomber / transports.99 Hostilities were suspended in
1935, but a treaty ending the conflict wasn’t signed until 1939, so that in the intervening years both sides sought
to make good their losses and expand their forces in case the fighting resumed. In 1937, working through the
Italian broker Consprzio Italiano de Materiale Aeronatuiche (C.I.M.A.), Paraguay purchased four Breda Ba.28
two-seat biplane basic trainers, one of which was a float-plane version intended for use by the navy.100 Between
1938 and 1939 Paraguay, presumably with the assistance of C.I.M.A., received delivery of a relatively large
number of aircraft from Italy, including two Fiat C.R.30B two-seat trainers, two of the three Caproni Ca 309
Ghibli (Desert Wind) light bomber / transports that she had ordered, and seven Caproni-Bergamaschi AP-1
monoplane fighter-bombers, of which at least two were the float-plane versions. The Caproni-Bergamaschi AP-
1s must have found favor with the Paraguayans, as they placed an order for ten more, though these were never
delivered. In addition, some sources state that during this period Paraguay acquired five Caproni Ca.101s and a
few Breda Ba.65 monoplane fighter-bombers. The most important machines to arrive during this period,
however, were between four and five of the superb Fiat CR.32 biplane fighters.101
Paraguay’s opponent, Bolivia, was no less anxious to increase her military strength for a potential second
round in the Chaco Boreal. Italy was happy to oblige when, in 1937, Bolivia requested the assistance of a
Military Mission to reform its armed forces. Relations, however, were not always cordial, such as when, in the
midst of negotiations for the purchase of a consignment of Breda Ba.28s and Breda Ba.65s, the Bolivians
97
Andrade, p.222; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.360; Hagedorn and Sapíenza, pp.73-74.
98
Andrade, p.226; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.355; Hagedorn and Sapíenza, p.61;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macchi_M.18.
99
Thompson, p.29; Andrade, p.222; Hagedorn and Sapíenza, pp.103, 138-139; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.44.
Thompson mistakenly reports the purchase of a few Ca.101s in 1933 (p.83).
100
Thompson, pp.20-21; Andrade, p.222; Hagedorn and Sapíenza, pp.137-138; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.25.
101
Thompson, pp.31, 100, 102, 148; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509, Vol.6, p.651; Andrade, p.222; English, pp.356, 360;
Hagedorn and Sapíenza, pp.138-139; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni-Bergamaschi_AP.1.
[23]
discovered that Italy was making Paraguay an identical offer!102 Nevertheless, between 1937 and 1938 the
mission reorganized the Bolivian Staff College.103 However, aside from convincing Bolivia to purchase
between twelve and thirty CV.3-35 tankettes, the mission appears to have failed to persuade their hosts to place
any significant orders with Italian arms manufacturers.104 As the likelihood of the entry of the United States
into the Second World War increased, diplomatic pressure mounted on Bolivia, resulting in the cancellation of
their contract with the Italian Military Mission in October, 1941.105
Bolivia was one of three Andean nations that hosted Italian Military Missions during the interwar period, the
two others being Ecuador and Peru. Ecuador had engaged an Italian Naval Mission before Mussolini came to
power and, in 1920, the mission established a flying-boat school equipped with Italian seaplanes at Eloy Alfaro
on the banks of the Guayas River, opposite the port of Guayaquil. Despite a shortage of funds, the school,
under the command of an Italian officer, continued to train pilots up to 1936, when Ecuador decided against
renewing the mission.106
Long before then a separate Italian Military Mission had been engaged by Ecuador. On 24 January, 1922,
this mission, which included aviators, arrived in Quito.107 The officers of the mission created a school for
combat arms in the capitol and helped to improve existing schools in order to provide training for infantry,
cavalry, engineers, and pilots.108 It’s not entirely clear which or how many Italian aircraft Ecuador purchased;
they may have obtained at least one IMAM Ro.37bis Lince (Lynx) two-seat reconnaissance biplane and a few
Breda Ba.28 two-seat biplane basic trainers.109
By the late-1930s a border dispute with Peru was beginning to heat up. During this period the military
mission was headed by Col. Giaccomo Negroni. Col. Negroni promoted the formation of a Fascist style militia,
the Carbineros, and convinced the government to prepare for a possible war with Peru by investing in a major
purchase of arms from Italy. This included everything from helmets to 65mm mountain artillery and some
102
Hagedorn and Sapíenza, p.138.
103
Beals, p.99; Adrade, p.46; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.79, 86, 89.
104
English, Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.79, 86, 89; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.107-108; De Quesada and
Jowett, p.34.
105
Humphreys, pp.132-133.
106
Andrade, pp.160-161; English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.247; Scheina, p.141.
107
“Italian Airmen in Ecuador: Military Mission Arrives to Develop Aviation.” The New York Time, 25 January, 1922.
108
English, Armed Forces of Latin America, p.238; Ecuador – Foreign Influence http://www.country-data.com/cgi-
bin/query/r-4001html.
109
Thompson, p.198; Fitzsimons, Vol.20, pp.2216-2217; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.25.
[24]
thirty 20mm Breda anti-aircraft / anti-tank guns, though Italy’s entry into World War II cut short the delivery of
the totality of this order. Col. Negroni proved less successful in his attempts to help Ecuador’s military leaders
plan for war. Despite the efforts of the military mission, membership and promotion in the officer corps
continued to be determined by political affiliation rather than professional qualifications. With this in mind,
Col. Negroni drew up a contingency plan for a possible Peruvian attack that involved the abandonment of the
coastal plain for the refuge of the Andes, stating bluntly “You cannot fight against Peru.” Needless to say, the
proud Ecuadorian officers rejected this plan, labeling it defeatist. The performance of the Ecuadorian Army in
1941, when Peru did attack, completely vindicated Col. Negroni’s assessment.110 By then Italy’s Military
Mission had left the country. As early as 1935 Italian flight instructors were beginning to be replaced by pilots
from the United States operating under private contracts. The mission as a whole was finally concluded five
years later, in November, 1940, after Italy had become a combatant in World War II.111
Italy’s relationship with Peru was considerably more involved than those she had with either Bolivia or
Ecuador. Among the important contributing factors was the admiration among leading Peruvians for the Duce
and the Fascist Regime. Such was the case with Carlos Miro Quesada, the owner of the country’s leading
newspaper, El Comercio, who ensured that Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia received favorable coverage.112 The
most important Peruvian admirer of Italian Fascism, however, was Gen. Óscar R. Benavides. Gen. Benavides
had a personal connection with Italy, having served as his nation’s minister to Rome in 1917. It was later, as
the Peruvian Minister to Spain, that Gen. Benavides stated publically, “The peoples can be saved only by men
identified with Fascist doctrines.”113 As an avowed devotee of the Duce, it was only natural that Gen. Benavides
would turn to Italy for assistance during his term as President from 1933 to 1939.114
Ironically, while Mussolini was held in high regard by most of the country’s elite, Peru’s actual Italian
community was far less enthusiastic about the leader of their homeland and his political ideology. Although its
size was relatively small, numbering according to census figures some 7,618 in the early-1940s, the members of
110
David H. Zook, Jr. Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute. New York: Bookman Associates, 1964, pp.104,
164-165; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, p.238; Robert L. Scheina. Latin America’s Wars, Vol.2: The Age of
the Professional Soldier, 1900-2001. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003, p.118; “El Conflicto de 1941.”
geocities.com/conflictoperuecuador1941/guerra-1941.html.
111
Humphreys, p.121; “Ecuador – Foreign Influence.” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4001html.
112
Beals, pp.92-93; Daniel M. Masterson and Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, “Peru: International Developments and Local Realities.”
pp.126-143. in Latin America during World War II. Edited by Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel. Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, pp.138-139.
113
Beals, p.101.
114
Beals, p.101; Humphreys, p.18; Masterson and Sotelo, p.138.
[25]
the Italian community had a disproportionate influence in Peruvian society through their involvement in finance
and industry. For instance, Peru’s most important fiscal institution at this time was Banco Italiano. The
importance of Banco Italiano’s ties to the government can be gauged by the nickname by which its director,
Gino Salochi, was popularly known in Lima, ‘Viceroy of Peru’.115
In late-1933, not coincidentally the year Gen. Benavides became President, Peru began its relationship with
the Italian aviation firm of Caproni when it ordered twelve Ca.114 biplane fighters. The Ca.114 had been
beaten out in the Regia Aeronautica competition for a new fighter by the Fiat C.R.32, but the Peruvian Air
Corps appears to have liked this airplane, given that an order for twenty-four more was placed, an order that
was finally completed in January, 1935.116 It may also have been in 1933 that the air corps chose to purchase a
number of Caproni Ca.111 single-engine long range high-wing monoplane reconnaissance / bombers.
However, the Panchos, as they were known in Peruvian service, proved to be a disappointment and, by 1935,
the air corps was seeking to replace them.117 Despite their experience with the Ca.111, the government chose to
return to the firm of Caproni. Presumably it was at this time that Caproni initiated negotiations for a much
larger project than the sale of additional bombers. Sometime between 1935 and 1937 President Benavides
signed a ten year contract for the establishment of a subsidiary firm, Caproni Peruana S.A., which would
assemble and overhaul Caproni designs for the Peruvian Air Corps at a factory erected at the Las Palmas air
field, just south of Lima.118
It appears that it was also sometime between 1935 and 1937 that President Benavides contracted with Italy
for both an air mission and a police mission.119 One source suggests that it was the performance of the Italian
aerobatic squadron over Lima as part of the International American Aviation Congress in 1937 that may have
influenced Benavides decision.120 Given his admiration for Fascist Italy, it seems that Benavides would have
been predisposed to seek the assistance of the Regia Aeronautica in any case. Undoubtedly echoing his
President’s sentiments, F. Pardo de Zela, the Peruvian Consul General in the United States, declared, “We
believe that the Italian Air Force is one of the most efficient in the world. It is…natural and logic [sic] that our
115
Beals, p.102; Humphreys, p.18; Davies, pp.219-220.
116
Thompson, p.86; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.114.
117
118
Beals, p.100; Thompson, p.81; Andrade, p.228; Masterson, pp.16, 57.
119
Humphreys, p.19; Davies, pp.219-220; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.392, 400; Masterson, pp.16-
57; “Peru: Changing Foreign Military Missions and Impacts.” http://www.photius.com/countries/peru/national_security.
120
Beals, pp.95-96, 100; Masterson, pp.16, 57. Masterson refers to the International American Aviation Congress as the
Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference.
[26]
officers and pilots, who handle airplanes of Italian make, should be trained by Italian instructors and pilots.”121
Along with Italian instructors providing training in Peru, promising junior officers were sent to Italy for
advanced training in the Air Academy at Caserta. In 1939, for instance, a particularly large group of officers
left for Caserta to begin a rigorous three year program (which, with Italy’s entry into the war in 1940, they
presumably were unable to complete).122
Under the direction of the First World War veteran pilot, Adlo Bert, the work of Caproni Peruana S.A.
appears to have begun in 1935 with an attempt to build license copies of the Ca.100 trainer. Although their
target was twenty-five aircraft, they only managed to assemble twelve for a higher than average production cost.
This stands in stark contrast to the exaggerated figures provided by the journalist, Carleton Beals, in his exposé,
The Coming Struggle for Latin America (published in 1938). According to Beals ‘informed persons’ had told
him that Caproni’s Las Palmas facility had the capacity to produce no less than 300 warplanes a year, rather
than the more modest officially announced annual figure of fifty aircraft.123
The Peruvian Air Corps still needed to find a replacement for the disappointing Ca.111s. Caproni
recommended one of their latest designs, the Ca.135 twin-engine medium bomber. It was intended that six
completed models would be shipped from Italy to Peru, while an additional thirty-two would be assembled at
Las Palmas. However, in an effort to avoid a repeat of the debacle with the Ca.111s, a delegation from the
Peruvian Air Corps, lead by its commander, Ergasto Silva Guillen, was sent to Italy to personally assess the
Ca.135. In May, 1936, the Peruvian representatives watched the Ca.135 being put through its paces and
concluded from their observations that it was underpowered and lacked sufficient defensive armament. Silva
wrote a letter to Caproni stating that, unless these deficiencies were made good, the air corps’ order would be
cancelled. The firm’s founder, Count Gianni Caproni, personally responded to Silva’s letter, vowing that the
necessary modifications would be carried out. In July, 1937, the delegation witnessed the performance of the
upgraded Ca.135s, which were designated Tipo Peru (Peruvian Type). Indicating their satisfaction with the
more powerful engines and additional armament, the delegation accepted the six Tipo Perus, which were
disassembled and loaded onto a freighter. Upon arrival they were reassembled and, on 10 September, 1937,
entered operational service.124
121
Beals, pp.100-101.
122
Masterson, p.66; Scheina, Latin America’s Wars, p.118; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.135.
123
Beals, p.100; Thompson, p.81; Andrade, p.228; English, p.392; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.100.
124
[27]
Problems, however, soon arose with the new aircraft. It was found that they suffered from frequent oil and
hydraulic leaks, so that, on average, three of the five Ca.135s assigned to the 13th Escuadrilla were left
grounded. The officials of Caproni Peruana S.A. promised that these problems would be addressed in the
thirty-two Tipo Perus that were under construction at Las Palmas. In fact, Caproni Peruana S.A. only managed
to build twenty-six of the thirty-two aircraft that were contracted for and it’s not clear how many, if any, of
these entered service with the Peruvian Air Corps.125 As a result, despite their inadequacies, the Ca.111s
continued to serve in bomber squadrons alongside of those Ca.135s that could be put into the air, at least until
1940, when the remaining Ca.111s were relegated to use as transports.126
Given their repeated problems with Caproni, it’s surprising that Peru continued to do business with the firm.
Perhaps contracts had already been signed and aircraft paid for. Whatever the explanation, the air corps placed
an order for sixteen Caproni Ca.310 Libeccio (Southwest Wind) twin-engine light reconnaissance / bombers in
1938. Of these, fifteen were shipped to Peru, but Capt. Pedro Canga Rodriguez, who, presumably had been sent
to Italy with a party of officers to evaluate the new planes, decided to personally fly one of the Ca.310s back
home. On 2 August, 1939, Capt. Rodriguez, along with one other crewman, was killed when his plane
crashed.127
Overall, Peru’s experience with Caproni was disappointing. The performance of most of the aircraft
supplied to the air corps was unsatisfactory, while many proved to be mechanically unreliable, a problem that
was only compounded by Peru’s rugged conditions and inadequate maintenance on the part of air corps ground
crews. The program for assembling Caproni designs in Peru failed to live up to what was promised, resulting in
a considerable loss of investments by the government.128 It’s not surprising, therefore, that, beginning in 1938,
Peru turned to the United States for aircraft.
As for the Air Mission, its days were numbered with the approach of World War II. The likely need to
devote its resources to combating the Axis powers in Europe and / or the Pacific meant that the United States
wanted to forestall any threats to its security stemming from Axis involvement in Latin America. Therefore,
125
Andrade, p.228; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, p.392; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.135.
126
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.100.
127
Thompson, p.108; Fitzsimons, Vol.5, pp.507, 509; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni_Ca.310.
128
Andrade, p.228.
[28]
Washington sought to eliminate such involvement in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor. When President
Benavides contacted the U.S. in 1937 to request the reinstatement of its naval mission, which had been
cancelled back in 1933, Washington jumped at the chance to reduce Italian influence in the Peruvian Armed
Forces.129 As the passage of the years brought with it the outbreak of war in Europe and the increasing
likelihood of United States participation, growing diplomatic pressure was applied to Peru to cancel its contract
with Italy. Conscious of which way the wind was blowing, Peru finally terminated its Italian Air and Police
Missions in March, 1940.130
Regardless of whatever efforts the Duce may have made, Italian involvement in the remaining South
American nations was negligible. Despite sympathy among both the officer corps of the armed forces and the
Church hierarchy in Chile, as well as the presence of a much larger Italian community compared with Peru
(estimated at 52,000 in 1942), the Chilean government’s contact with Italy’s military and arms manufacturers
was, at best, very limited.131 Granted, sometime in the 1930s Chile acquired a small number of Nardi FN.305
basic trainers and twenty Breda Ba.65 monoplane fighter-bombers, including three trainers with dual
controls.132 But, outside of these exceptions, her air force remained almost entirely reliant on German suppliers.
Italian involvement with Venezuela was more substantial, but also very brief. A Naval Mission was present
in the late-1930s, which may have been why the Venezuelan Navy decided in 1938 to purchase two thirteen
year old Italian minelayers, the Dardanelli and Milazzo, which were paid for with Venezuelan oil. In February
of that year the twenty Venezuelan naval officers and sailors sent to Spezia to man the warships returned with
the newly renamed General Soublette and General Urdaneta.133
Venezuela’s Regímíento de Aviación Militar, the official title of her fledgling air corps, had little
involvement with either the Regia Aeronautica or Italian aviation firms outside of the purchase of a single Fiat
C.R.30 fighter in 1930. But in 1938 a purchasing mission was dispatched to Italy to obtain examples of modern
warplanes. When the purchasing mission returned that year, not only had they bought three Fiat C.R.32quarter
fighters and one Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna (Stork) twin engine medium bomber, they had also contracted for the
129
English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.382, 384; Scheina. Latin America: A Naval History, p.133.
130
Humphreys, p.123; Masterson, p.69; Scheina, Latin America’s Wars, p.118.
131
Deutsch, pp.72, 75; Mount, pp.11-12, 56.
132
Thompson, p.216; Fitzsimons, Vol.3, p.249; Andrade, p.96; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.65. Carleton Beals
states that Chile purchased sixty Italian aircraft in 1937 (p.100).
133
Beals, p.99; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, p.454; Scheina. Latin America: A Naval History, p.141.
[29]
assistance of an Italian Air Mission.134 Undoubtedly with the encouragement of the Air Mission, the
Regímíento de Aviación Militar placed an order for between nine and ten more C.R.32s, specially equipped with
large radiators to deal with the tropical climate. While the single B.R.20 bomber had to be retired in 1942 due
to a lack of spare parts, five of the C.R.32s were still operating in the 1° Regimiento de Aviación Militar del
Venezuela in 1943.135 The aircraft outlasted the air mission, which was recalled in 1940 due to Italy’s entry into
the war, while Italy’s naval advisors were replaced by a U.S. Naval Mission in March, 1941. It’s doubtful that
either accomplished much in the short amount of time they were present in Venezuela.136
Compared with Venezuela, Italian activities in Central America were even more limited. During the 1930s
the armaments firm of Breda managed to sell a modest number of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns to Costa Rico,
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and even Mexico.137 In March, 1937, the ruler of Nicaragua, Anastasio
Somoza Garcia, contracted for a shipment of 5,000 rifles, four Breda anti-aircraft machine guns, six 65mm
mountain artillery pieces, and a single CV.3 tankette, which arrived the following January on the Freighter
Leme. With a total price of only $ 300,000, many observers have viewed this as practically a gift by the Duce,
from one dictator to another.138 The acquisition of these weapons was probably the impetus for El Salvador’s
decision the following year to purchase three of its own CV.3 tankettes, as well as a small number of Breda
Model 1935 20mm anti-aircraft / anti-tank guns.139 El Salvador was also one of the few Central American
states to obtain aircraft from Italy, a circumstance that was tied to neighboring Honduras’ involvement with
Italian aviators.
In 1922 no less than three different efforts were made by enterprising Italians to establish a national aviation
school in Honduras. Sr. Giuseppe Villo purchased twelve wartime surplus aircraft with this intention, but he
wasn’t ready to sail until December, by which time he had lost the race. Earlier, in August, the team of Luigio
Sternacila, Enrico Massi, and Antonio de la Nocha arrived in Tegucigalpa. Sternacila appears to have financed
the venture, while Massi was a former naval pilot and De la Nocha was a mechanic. However, their aircraft
134
Thompson, pp.139, 148; Giorgio Apostolo, “The Fiat B.R.20.” pp.183-200. Aircraft in Profile, Volume Five. Edited by
Martin C. Windrow. New York, Doubleday & Company, 1970, p.191; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, p.651; Andrade, p.267; English,
p.460; Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, p.8; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..30.
135
Fitzsimons, Vol.6, pp.598-599, 651; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_B.R..20;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..32.
136
Humphreys, p.107; Andrade, p.267.
137
Beals, p.102; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.193, 283, 309, 407.
138
Beals, p.102; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, p.328; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, p.112.
139
English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, p.407.
[30]
took months to reach Honduras, so that they too lost the race. It was one Luigi Venditti (alternately Luiz
Vendetti) who was able to organize the country’s first flying school when he arrived in September with three
aircraft. Venditti hired Enrico Massi to work as one of his flight instructors, but he seems to have had difficulty
getting his school up-and-running since it doesn’t appear to have officially opened until 1924. Unfortunately,
Venditti’s flying school proved to be short lived. On 25 November of that year a commercial plane crashed into
the hanger containing the school’s entire collection of trainers, resulting in their complete destruction.140 It
should be noted that all of these efforts were private ventures, unaffiliated with the Italian government, much
less the newly established Fascist Regime.
El Salvador’s connection with Italian aviation began with a false start in early-1923 when a group of Italian
pilots offered their services as instructors, along with three warplanes. Their efforts were scotched by
diplomatic pressure from the United States. Enrico Massi, on the other hand, met with greater success when, in
July of 1923, he arrived from Honduras in an Ansaldo A.1 Balilla (presumably given to him by Venditti in
place of payment for his service as an instructor). But, no sooner had he sold his machine to the government
and been hired as an instructor when, on 4 October, Massi was killed in a crash. Not to be deterred, the Servicio
de Aviación Militar de El Salvador (El Salvador Military Aviation Service) established its Escuela de Aviación
Nacional at Ilopango in May of the following year. An Italian sergeant pilot, Aguiles Travaglinei, served as its
Chief Instructor, at least until October, when his contract ended, at which time Travaglinei chose to return to
Italy.141
The Servicio de Aviación Militar de El Salvador re-established its earlier association with Italy in August of
1938 when it bought four Caproni-Bergamaschi AP.1 monoplane fighter-bombers in exchange for a shipment
of coffee. The planes were delivered in December, accompanied by an Italian instructor who was to familiarize
his Salvadoran counterparts with the AP.1, Capt. Armando Chipoli (alternately Arnoldo Dipola). In turn, two
officers of the Servicio de Aviación Militar de El Salvador, Julio Sosa and Francisco Ponce, along with the
mechanic Belisario Salazar, were sent to Italy for training. Unfortunately, Capt. Chipoli destroyed one of the
AP.1s in an accident, though Caproni-Bergamaschi made good the Salvadoran’s loss. The AP.1s remained in
140
Andrade, p.184; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.289; Daniel P. Hagedorn, Central American and
Caribbean Air Forces. Tonbridge, Kent: Air-Britain Publications, 1993, p.61.
141
Hagedorn, pp.79, 81.
[31]
service until 1943, even though their wooden construction suffered from the termites that were ubiquitous in El
Salvador’s tropical climate.142
MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA
The Duce’s military diplomacy in the Middle East and Asia was on a far smaller scale that with Europe or
Latin America and was primarily, though not exclusively, aimed at promoting the sale of Italian arms,
particularly warplanes. This was because Italy had far fewer interests in and connections with these parts of the
world. The small kingdom of Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula was a minor exception. Italy’s African colonies
of Eretria, Ethiopia, and Somalia gave her an interest in who controlled the Straits known as the Bab el Mandeb,
which separated the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. Anxiety over the imagined expansion of British influence
from neighboring Aden in the late-1930s led Mussolini to provide a modest amount of aid to Yemen. In
October, 1937, a small number of CV.3-35 tankettes were sold to the kingdom and in August of the following
year additional arms, accompanied by Italian advisors, were dispatched to Yemen.143
Along with the profit motive, selling weapons to the armed forces of Iraq had the added benefit of making
the British mandate in that country less secure. Between 1937 and 1938, Iraq received delivery of sixteen
CV.3-35 tankettes, fifteen Breda Ba.65 fighter-bombers, and four Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79B medium bombers.
By 1941, when the Iraqis launched a pro-Axis bid for independence, there were eight remaining Ba.65s
operational, with four making up No.5 Squadron of the Iraqi Air Force, while No.6 Squadron was composed of
the four S.M.79Bs. Neither these aircraft nor the tankettes, however, enabled the Iraqis to succeed.144
Italy’s limited involvement with neighboring Iran was primarily naval. The Iranian Navy placed an order for
six warships from Italian yards in 1927. Presumably it was through the connections established by this
142
Beals, p.102; Thompson, pp.100, 102; Andrade, pp.247-248; English, The Armed Forces of Latin America, pp.406,
412, 415; Hagedorn, pp.79, 83; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caproni-Bergamaschi_AP.1.
143
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, p.184; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, p.112; Gooch, p.387.
144
Thompson, pp.36, 265; Apostolo, The Savoia Marchetti S.M.79, p.10; Fitzsimons, Vol.3, p.249, Vol.22, pp.2377-2378;
Gentilli, p.20; Christopher Shores. Dust Clouds in the Middle East: The Air War for East Africa, Iraq, Syria, Iran and
Madagascar, 1940-42. London: Grub Street, 1996, p.169; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.109, 111; Robert Lyman.
Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Bagdad. Campaign Series No.165. London: Osprey, 2006,
pp.26-27, 75-76; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.65.
[32]
transaction that it was arranged for the hereditary Prince of Persia to begin attending the Italian Naval Academy
in 1931.145 The following year saw the arrival of the navy’s new ships: two 950 ton sloops, the Babr and
Palang, and four 350 ton gunboats, the Chahbaaz, Karkas, Shahrokh, and Simorgh. These were supposed to
have been brand new vessels, but it was soon discovered that they were, in reality, older warships that had been
reconditioned.146 Such deceitful practices were undoubtedly the reason why there were no further purchases of
Italian arms by Iran.
Italy also had some minor dealings with the ruler of Afghanistan. Sometime in the 1930s the Afghans
acquired a few Breda Ba.28 two-seat biplane basic trainers and sixteen IMAM Ro.37bis Lince (Lynx) two-man
reconnaissance biplanes, the latter making up a large portion of its tiny air force of thirty aircraft in 1938.147
The previous year the Afghan Army obtained thirteen CV.3-35 tankettes, presumably its first armored
vehicles.148
By contrast, the Duce’s involvement with China was far more substantial. Among the reasons for this was
the existence of an Italian ‘Concession’ in Tianjin / Tientsin. China also represented a far more lucrative
market for arms than the countries of the Middle East, particularly with the demand created by the constant
fighting between rival warlords and, beginning in 1927, the attempts by the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek
to unify the country. The warlord Wu Pei-fu, for instance, relied primarily on Italian weapons to arm his forces,
the Chihli Army, while the warlord Feng Yu-hsiang strengthened his air assets with the purchase of twelve
Ansaldo SVA-5 fighter-bombers and employed at least one Italian advisor on his staff.149 In 1928 Italy
approached armament firms in Czechoslovakia in an effort to arrange a partnership aimed at potential Chinese
customers, though this initiative ultimately failed.150
145
Gooch, p.136.
146
Steven R. Ward. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2009, p.144.
147
Thompson, pp.20-21, 198; Fitzsimons, Vol.20, pp.2216-2217; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.25;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMAM_Ro.37.
148
Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.107.
149
Philip Jowett. Chinese Warlord Armies 1911-30. Men-at-Arms No.463. Oxford: Osprey, 2010, pp.11, 18, 22, 36.
150
Anthony B. Chan. Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928. Vancouver:
University of British Colombia Press, 1982, p.86.
[33]
In 1934, during his ‘Fifth Encirclement Campaign’ against Chinese Communist forces, Chiang Kai-shek
recognized the potential of airpower, which, in turn, led him to hire an Italian Air Mission.151 The mission was
headed by one of Italy’s top First World War aces, Gen. Silvio Scaroni, and at its peak consisted of fourteen
officers. Their primary accomplishment was the establishment of a flying school at Louyang / Loyang in Henan
Province.152
In an arrangement similar to the one reached with Peru, the air mission was accompanied by an offer to
manufacture Italian designs in China. However, unlike Peru, which dealt exclusively with the firm of Caproni,
the Sino-Italian National Aircraft Works (S.I.N.A.W.) was a consortium formed by four manufacturers: Breda,
Caproni, Fiat, and Savoia. Not surprisingly, these rival firms were less than enthusiastic about this
arrangement, but Mussolini’s insistence forced them to comply. A factory was constructed at Nanchang and the
assembly of Breda Ba.65 fighter-bombers got under way. However, S.I.N.A.W. officials complained that
interference from members of the Chinese Commission of Aeronautical Affairs (C.A.A.) was undermining their
efforts. It was decided that, as a temporary solution, the factory would focus on building a small number of
Savoia-Marchetti S.81B tri-motor medium bomber / transports.153
Until the factory at Nanchang was fully up-and-running, the Nationalist government would have to import
aircraft from Italy. Of course the representatives of the firms that made up S.I.N.A.W. didn’t need any prodding
to promote the products of their respective companies. According to some sources, China had already obtained
a number of Fiat C.R.32s in 1933, a year before the arrival of the air mission. In any case, the Nationalists
placed an order for between sixteen and twenty-four C.R.32s, fifteen of which were used to equip the 8th
Squadron of the 3rd Pursuit Group. Although Chinese pilots greatly prized their C.R.32s, the Nationalists
decided against ordering additional Fiats. This was because the C.R.32 used a fuel composed of alcohol and
benzole mixed with petrol and both of these additives proved difficult to import.154 Fiat also sold China an
151
Edward L.Dreyer. China at War 1901-1949. Modern Wars in Perspective. London: Longman, 1995, p.257.
152
Steven Weingartner, “Claire Chennault and Pursuit Aviation 1919-1941.” Military Chronicles, Vol.1, No.3 (December
2010), p.39; http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm.
153
Ibid.
154
Thompson, p.148; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, p.651; http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_C.R..32. Thompson identifies one Col. Lordi as the head of the Air Mission (p.137).
[34]
undetermined number of B.R.3 single-engine biplane bombers, which served alongside other aircraft in the 14th
(Light) Bomber Squadron of the 2nd Bomber Group.155
In 1935 a representative of the firm of Savoia employed a clever promotional gimmick when he presented
Chiang Kai-shek with the gift of a Savoia-Marchetti S.M.72 tri-motor high-wing monoplane to serve as his
personal transport. This resulted in an order for as many as twenty more S.M.72s, six of which were used to
equip the 10th Zhongdui (Medium Detachment) Bomber Squadron of the 8th Air Group. Unfortunately for the
Chinese, most of the S.M.72s were subsequently destroyed on the ground during Japanese air raids in 1937.156
The Nationalists also purchased aircraft from Breda. This included a small number of Ba.28 two-seat biplane
trainers and between eighteen and twenty-four Ba.27 monoplane fighters in 1935, though the actual number of
Ba.27s that arrived in China the following year was eleven.157 These were assigned to the 7th Squadron of the
3rd Pursuit Group.158 Lastly, Caproni may have sold the Nationalists a number of Ca.111s equipped as
bombers.159 Along with aircraft, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were in need of every other type of weapon. His
involvement with Italian representatives undoubtedly led to his decision, made sometime between 1935 and
1936, to purchase twenty CV.3-35 tankettes, which were used to equip the 3rd Armored Battalion, stationed in
the capitol of Nanking / Nanjing.160
By 1937 the S.I.N.A.W. factory at Nanchang was finally beginning to produce aircraft, though so far it had
only managed to deliver two Savoia-Marchetti S.M.81B bombers to the Nationalists, with a third awaiting
acceptance trials and three more in various stages of assembly. But with the growing ties between Fascist Italy
and Imperial Japan, Mussolini decided to end his assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. When the factory at Nanchang
was closed on 9 December, 1937, full-scale war had already broken out between Japan and China. The air
mission was withdrawn that same month, taking with it the aerial maps they had produced for the
Nationalists.161 Needless to say, this also ended the possibility of obtaining any additional arms from Italy.
155
Thompson, p.137; Fitzsimons, Vol.4, pp.417-418; Punka, FIAT CR 32 / CR 42 in Action, p.11;
http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm.
156
Thompson, pp.257-258; Fitzsimons, Vol.22, p.2355; http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm;
157
Thompson, pp.20-21, 25; Fitzsimons, Vol.3, p.248; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breda_Ba.27.
158
159
Thompson, pp.84-85.
160
Chamberlain and Ellis, p.238; Steven J. Zaloga, “Armour in China.” Military Modelling 1983 Manual, p.7; Steven J.
Zaloga. Armour of the Pacific War. Vanguard Series No.35. London: Osprey, 1983, p.4; Tallillo, Tallillo, and Guglielmi,
pp.106, 108-109.
161
Barbara W. Tuchman. Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45. New York: Macmillan, 1970, p.192;
[35]
When Chiang Kai-shek sought to purchase twenty-five more CV.3-35 tankettes from the firm of Fiat-Ansaldo,
they declined to fill the order.162
Of course, the Italian aircraft that had already been supplied continued to be used by the Nationalist. The
three S.M.81Bs produced by the S.I.N.A.W. factory, along with a single Heinkel He 111A, were used to equip
the 18th Squadron of the 8th Bomber Group, stationed at Yichang in Hubei Province. Here, air crews began the
process of familiarizing themselves with their Savoia-Marchettis. By May, 1938, all three had been lost in
training accidents.163 The Fiat C.R.32s of the 8th Pursuit Squadron, on the other hand, continued to prove their
worth. In an encounter with Japanese planes above the capitol of Nanjing on 15 August, 1937, fourteen enemy
aircraft were claimed to have been shot down with no Chinese losses.164
The costly failures of the Chinese crews who trained on the Savoia-Marchetti bombers, as opposed to the
veteran pilots who manned the C.R.32 fighters, substantiates the harsh criticism leveled at the Italian Air
Mission by, among others, Capt. Claire L. Chennault. Capt. Chennault was hired by Chiang Kai-shek in 1937
to reorganize the Nationalist Air Force and he immediately set out on a tour of inspection. His conclusion was
that the Italian Air Mission had “all but wrecked” the air force. Aside from the fact that, in his view, they had
sold the Chinese obsolete aircraft at inflated prices, their training program at Louyang / Loyang had produced
crewmen who were, according to Chennault, “a menace to aviation.”165 On one occasion, for instance,
Chennault witnessed on a single day with perfect flying weather six out of a total of thirteen aircraft destroyed
in takeoff and landing accidents.166 The reason for this was simple. Because the cadets at the school came
primarily from influential upper class families, the Italian instructors had followed a policy of graduating every
pupil, regardless of their performance, in order to ingratiate themselves with the Chinese elite, whose support
they needed in order to continue their mission.167
162
Chamberlain and Ellis, p.238; Zaloga, “Armour in China.”, p.7; Zaloga. Armour of the Pacific War., p.4; Tallillo,
Tallillo, and Guglielmi, pp.106, 108-109.
163
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.81; http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm.
164
165
Weingartner, pp.40, 41.
166
Don Moser and the Editors of Time-Life Books. China-Burma-India. World War II. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life
Books, 1978, p.59.
167
Tuchman, p.192; Don Moser and the Editors of Time-Life Books. China-Burma-India. World War II. Alexandria,
Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978, p.59; Weingartner, p.39; http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm.
[36]
At the same time that the Duce was withdrawing his support for Nationalist China he was also aiding its foe,
Imperial Japan. Japan, of course, had developed a powerful aviation industry of its own, so that, with only
slight exceptions, there were no business contacts with its counterpart in Italy. A single example of the Savoia-
Marchetti S.M.62bis biplane reconnaissance flying-boat was acquired for research purposes, while the firm of
Aichi obtained a manufacturing license for the C.A.N.T. Z.506B Airone (Heron) float-plane bomber, though
they don’t appear to have actually produced any.168 However, when war erupted in 1937 between China and
Japan, the Imperial Army lacked a modern long-range bomber. Mitsubishi was putting just such an aircraft, the
Ki-21 Type 97, through its test trials, but this meant that it would be some time before production models were
actually delivered to the army. A stop-gap was needed, and so Japan turned to the friendly power of Fascist
Italy. Following their evaluation of two rival twin-engine medium bomber designs, the Caproni Ca.135 and the
Fiat B.R.20 Cicogna (Stork), the Imperial Army chose the latter.169 In late-1937 an order worth 182 million lire
was placed for between seventy-two and seventy-five B.R.20s, with much of the payment to be made with
shipments of Manchurian soy beans. The first B.R.20s arrived in February, 1938, at Talien, from where they
were transported to Chushuitzu, where they were reassembled and flight tested. In 1939 an order was placed for
ten additional B.R.20 at the cost of twenty-five million lire. The Japanese Army bestowed upon their new
bombers the designation of Type I (for Italy) Yi-shiki Model 100 (although they had been withdrawn from
active service by 1941, the Allies gave Japan’s B.R.20s the code name ‘Ruth’). The Type I Yi-shiki were used
to equip the 12th Sentai and 98th Sentai, both of which operated over China.170 Ironically the long-range of the
B.R.20 proved to be a mixed blessing, as they were sent deep into enemy country without fighter escorts,
resulting in heavy losses to Chinese interceptors.171
ASSESSING MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY
Viewed in its entirety, the results of Mussolini’s military diplomacy, both for Italy and for the foreign
nations towards which it was directed, were, at best, mixed. The propaganda exercises conducted by the Regia
168
Thompson, pp.58, 250-251; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_S.M.62.
169
Thompson, p.105; Apostolo, “The Fiat B.R.20.”, p.191. Thompson states that the evaluation took place in May, 1938.
170
Thompson, p.139; Apostolo, “The Fiat B.R.20.”, p.191; Fitzsimons, Vol.6, pp.598-599;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_B.R..20.
171
Christopher Shores F. Regia Aeronautica Vol.1: A Pictorial History of the Italian Air Force 1940-1943. Carrollton,
Texas: Squadron / Signal Publications, 1976, p.5.
[37]
Aeronautica certainly earned both that organization and the Fascist Regime considerable international prestige.
Indeed, it appears that at least some of the nations visited during these long-range flights were persuaded by
these exploits to purchase Italian warplanes. The Argentine and Portuguese Navies’ orders for aircraft from
Italy followed shortly after De Pinedo and Capt. Del Prete paid a call during their ‘Flight of the Four
Continents’. Similarly, Romania, the Soviet Union, Spain, and Turkey all decided to obtain Italian planes in the
wake of Italo Balbo’s visits during his crocieres. By contrast, none of the flights to Brazil led to orders for
Italian aircraft. The causal connection between aerial exploits and aircraft sales is further reinforced by the fact
that in each case the nation in question decided to purchase Italian seaplanes, the very same type of aircraft that
were used in these exploits.
As for those countries that hosted advisory missions from Italy and that purchased Italian arms, it’s clear that
they benefitted at least in some respects. It was through Italy, for instance, that the nations of Austria, Hungary,
and Bulgaria were able to skirt restrictions on rearmament and, thus, re-establish their air forces and re-equip
their armies. Whether, according to Capt. Claire Chennault, Italy sold countries ‘obsolete arms at inflated
prices’, is a more difficult question to answer. In all fairness, the quality of the weapons Italy exported (which
were no different from those which were provided to its own armed forces) varied considerably. The Fiat
C.R.32 won praise as one of the best fighters of its day, though by 1939 this was no longer the case, while the
Reggiane Re.2000 Falco I was an above average interceptor. The series of CV.3 tankettes, on the other hand,
were next to worthless, while nearly every product of Caproni seems to have been sub-standard, something
which Hungary, Peru, and Sweden learned at considerable cost. The arrangement to build Italian designs in
both China and Peru also proved to be a waste of money for the host countries. Of course, by the late-1930s
many nations around the globe were seeking to rearm in the face of the growing likelihood of a second world
conflict. The options for countries that didn’t possess their own arms industries were increasingly limited.
Thus, the purchase of weapons from Italy was often a case of ‘something is better than nothing’.
The question of whether Italian advisory missions were beneficial for foreign armies, navies, and air forces
is also difficult to answer. Undoubtedly the experience that Italian officers brought with them and the access
provided to Italian facilities, not to mention the availability of Italian arms and equipment, would have had
some beneficial effects on foreign personnel, particularly with regard to individual training. The results,
however, were varied to say the least: whereas Hungarian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian pilots don’t seem to have
been disadvantaged by learning from Italian instructors, their Chinese counterparts were a danger to themselves
and others precisely because of their Italian training. The extremely poor performance of the Ecuadorian armed
[38]
forces in their brief border war with Peru in 1941, despite the presence of multiple Italian missions for some two
decades, does not reflect well on the Italian instructors who had been engaged by Ecuador to improve its
military forces. However, this example serves to illustrate the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of
advisory missions in general. Whatever the qualities of the Italian officers who staffed the missions to Ecuador
may have been, they were not working in a vacuum. The lack of competency within the Ecuadorian officer
corps had far more to do with the political instability of the country and the accompanying politicization of the
armed forces than with the failure of the Italian instructors to do their job. It seems more than likely that no
military mission, Italian or otherwise, could have accomplished much in such an environment.
In terms of what benefits Fascist Italy derived from Mussolini’s military diplomatic efforts, the record is also
mixed. The Duce certainly succeeded in gaining influence in the Balkan-Danube region through his supply of
arms, but ultimately this proved to be ephemeral. Despite his initial opposition to German annexation of
Austria, Mussolini eventually acquiesced to Anschluss. But this only represented one step in the Führer’s
efforts to safeguard his southern flank. Hitler was able to bring the states of the Balkan-Danube region into
Germany’s orbit and, having committed himself to an alliance with the Third Reich, there was little the Duce
could do to stop him.172 Nor, despite seemingly favorable conditions, was Mussolini able to establish any
lasting influence in Latin America. As noted above, when the United States recognized the growing likelihood
of becoming involved in another world war, it took steps to eliminate Axis influence in this region.
By contrast, Mussolini would appear to have achieved his economic goals through military diplomacy. Italy
desperately needed both foreign capital and a wide range of imported goods, such as iron ore, coal, and oil, to
expand and modernize its armed forces. The Duce oversaw the sale of weapons for both cash and the
arrangement of barter agreements to obtain raw materials. Between 1937 and 1938 alone, Italy sold over two
billion lire worth of warplanes and aircraft parts to foreign customers.173 In December, 1938, for instance, Italy
signed an arms trade agreement with Romania: in return for twenty-six million lire worth of planes and parts,
she would receive delivery of 160 million lire worth of petroleum products, along with large shipments of
grain.174 While lopsided deals such as this one were probably the exception, it seems safe to say that on the
whole Italy’s sale of arms was substantially profitable.
172
Sullivan, “The Italian Armed Forces.”, pp.182, 184, 185; Gooch, p.393.
173
Gooch, pp.373, 383, 419-420.
174
Gooch, pp.424-425.
[39]
Yet, even this beneficial outcome proved to be a double-edged sword. Despite the efforts of the Fascist
Regime, Italy’s industrial base remained very limited. As a result, the export of arms competed directly with
the needs of the different branches of the Italian armed forces, so that filling orders from foreign customers
often interfered with the modernization efforts of the military.175 This was particularly true in the late-1930s,
when the demand for newer equipment and weapons coincided with the purchase of increasing numbers of
Italian arms by foreign governments. For instance, in 1939, as the Regia Esercito (Royal Army) was creating a
growing number of new divisions, it encountered repeated delays in the supply of 81mm mortars and 47mm
anti-tank guns from Italian factories due to prior commitments to foreign customers, such as Romania, which
had ordered 400 of the same model anti-tank guns.176 The Regia Aeronautica embarked on a program of
modernization in which it sought to equip itself with three-thousand aircraft, all of the latest designs. Instead,
the combination of losses due to involvement in the Spanish Civil War and the demands on the aviation industry
from foreign purchasers meant that the air force was far short of its goal when Mussolini committed Italy to war
in 1940.177
In the end, Italy simply didn’t have the resources to match the Duce’s ambitions. What it had to offer to the
armed forces of various nations was never as worthwhile as it was made out to be and generally failed to
establish significant enough influence for Italy to benefit. Whatever influence Italy gained was effortlessly
swept away by the likes of Germany and the United States. Even the success that Mussolini experienced with
the sale of arms served to interfere with his goal of expanding and improving his own military forces because of
Italy’s limited industrial capacity. The Duce’s efforts at military diplomacy suffered from the same
fundamental problem that would doom his efforts at waging war; he pursued policies that could only succeed if
Italy was on par with the likes of Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States,
when, in fact, Italy simply lacked the means to compete with the world’s great powers.
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[44]

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Strategy & Tactics / World at War THE GLOBAL REACH OF 22-7-2011

MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY

THE GLOBAL REACH OF MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY,

MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA

MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

ASSESSING MUSSOLINI’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY

“Ecuador - Foreign Influence.” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4001html

“El Conflicto de 1941.” geocities.com/conflictoperuecuador1941/guerra-1941.html

“Peru: Changing Foreign Military Missions and Impacts.”

Banyai-Riepl, Chris. “The Fiat CR.42 in Italian and Foreign Service.”

Time-Life Books, 1978.

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