1.

) Late payment of appeal fees, the case/appeal/petition was dismissed:

[G.R. No. 140858. November 27, 2001.]

Spouses PAPA and LOLITA MANALILI, petitioners, vs. Spouses ARSENIO and GLICERIA
DE LEON, respondents.

Gregorio D. Caneda for petitioners.

Pablito G. Baluyut for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners, to qualify for a million peso bank loan, entered into a contract of sale covering a
parcel of land originally mortgaged to a lending institution with respondents with the understanding
that the same property would be mortgaged with the bank and the proceeds turned over to
petitioners. The parties entered into two (2) other agreements, one embodying their real intention,
and the other a deed of sale in the amount of Php1.4M over the property. Thus, the second mortgage
was entered into between respondents and the bank. However, when petitioners failed to pay the
monthly amortization, the bank debited from respondents' account the installments due. Respondents
sued petitioners in another forum while petitioners filed Civil Case No. 11112 against respondents.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Notice of Appeal was filed on February 4,
1999. The Court of Appeals, noting the failure of petitioner to pay the appellate docket fees,
dismissed outright the appeal. Petitioners' motion was also denied. Hence, this recourse, petitioners
claiming that the Court has relaxed, in certain instances, the rules.
The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection
of appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the decision sought to be appealed from becoming final and executory.
The strict application of the jurisdiction nature of the rule on payment of appellate docket fees
may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances. The inadvertence of clients, who are laymen, in
following the rule is not a compelling reason to relax the rule.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE WITHIN

PRESCRIBED PERIOD, MANDATORY. — Time and again, this Court has consistently held that the
"payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this
principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance with provisions set by law. Rule
41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal to the CA from a case decided by the regional trial
court in the exercise of the latter's original jurisdiction shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Such appeal is made by filing a notice thereof with
the court that rendered the judgment or final order and by serving a copy of that notice upon the
adverse party. Furthermore, within this same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. The payment of docket fees within this period is mandatory for the perfection of
the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the action,
and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. In short, the payment of
the appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement,
without which the decision or final order appealed from would become final and executory as if
no appeal was filed at all.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICT APPLICATION OF RULE ON PAYMENT OF APPELLATE
DOCKET FEE MAY BE MITIGATED; CASE AT BAR, NOT AN EXCEPTION. — "The strict
application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be
mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice." In the present case,
petitioners have not presented any sufficient or satisfactory reason to warrant an exception from the
mandatory rule on the payment of appellate docket fees. Their late payment will not change the fact
that the trial court Decision, which they wanted the appellate court to review, has already become
final and executory. EaCDAT
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INADVERTENCE OF CLIENT IN PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE, NOT A
COMPELLING REASON TO RELAX RULE. — The explanation given by petitioners' counsel for
the late payment, which was almost 10-months after the reglementary period to perfect an appeal,
was that his clients, being laymen, failed to follow his specific instructions to personally file the Notice
of Appeal and pay the appellate docket fees to the clerk of court. Such inadvertence is not a
compelling reason for us to relax the strict requirement for the timely payment of appellate docket
fees. Besides, counsel cannot be excused for this lapse by simply passing the blame, as it were, to
his clients. It is his responsibility to see to it that the stringent requirements for an appeal are complied
with.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. It must be exercised
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and rules. Specifically, the payment of
docket fees within the period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory. In the present case,
petitioners have not given sufficient reason why they should be exempt from this stringent
rule.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 1 of the Rules of Court, praying that the two
Resolutions promulgated by the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) on August 10, 1999 and November 17, 1999
in CA-GR CV No. 62180 be set aside. The above Resolutions disposed as follows:
August 10, 1999 Resolution
"Considering the report of the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Las Piñas (Branch 254) that there are no official receipts evidencing payment of
appellants['] docket fee in Civil Case No. LP-97-0271 entitled Spouses Papa and
Lolita Manalili, plaintiffs vs. Spouses Arsenio and Gliceria de Leon, defendants; the
initial appeal is hereby DISMISSED for failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees
to the Clerk of said court within the period for taking an appeal as required by Rule 50,
Sec. 1[c] . . . ." 3
November 17, 1999 Resolution
"Having perused appellant's motion for reconsideration and finding that no
satisfactory reasons have been adduced for their failure to pay the docket fees, the
Court resolved to DENY the motion. Payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory and non-compliance therewith may cause the
dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . ." 4
The Facts
The undisputed antecedents were summarized by the trial court 5 in this wise:
"Evidence disclosed that herein plaintiffs [petitioners in the present case]
mortgaged their residential house and lot situated at No. 19 Aguirre Avenue, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Piñas City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40309 of the
Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City to a lending institution owned by Mr. Rey Camua
for PHP945,000.00. Unable to redeem said mortgage on its maturity date, herein
plaintiffs, foreseeing that they would not qualify for a million-peso bank loan,
approached and sought the help of their friends and business associates, herein
defendants to secure in their behalf a loan using herein subject property as collateral,
from China Banking Corporation, the defendants [respondents in the present case]
being depositors and clients in good standing of the said bank. As agreed upon by
 herein parties, for a lower capital gains tax, a Deed of Sale for a consideration of
PHP250,000.00 dated 10 July 1996 was executed by herein plaintiffs over herein
subject property in favor of herein defendants for and only [for the] purpose to facilitate
the transfer of title over herein subject property from the name of herein plaintiffs to
the name of herein defendants, which step was necessary for mortgaging the subject
property with China Banking Corporation for PHP1.4 million in the name of herein
defendants. Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55745 by the Registry of Deeds of
Las Piñas City in the name of herein defendants.
"To place everything safely in any eventuality, herein parties agreed and
privately entered into an 'AGREEMENT' dated 10 July 1996, setting forth and
stipulating therein, to wit:
'f) That the SECOND PARTY has no interest whatsoever in
acquiring the property being sold by the FIRST PARTY, it being
understood further that the only purpose of the Deed of Sale of the
property executed by the FIRST PARTY in favor of the SECOND
PARTY is to secure a much higher loan from the Bank of the SECOND
PARTY and in order that the FIRST PARTY shall now be able to settle
the obligation of the FIRST PARTY to the SECOND PARTY, and that
the aforesaid Deed of Sale shall become null and void and without full
force and effect should the FIRST PARTY have fully complied with the
terms and conditions stipulated in this Agreement[;] however, in the
event the FIRST PARTY failed to pay the six (6) consecutive monthly
payments, the Deed of Sale over the property executed between the
FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY shall be honored and binding
upon the said parties';
"Also agreed upon, another unauthorized Deed of Sale also dated 10 July 1996
for PHP1.4 million over herein subjected property was executed by herein plaintiffs in
favor of herein defendants. ISCHET
"While awaiting approval and release of the bank loan, herein plaintiffs
requested and received from herein defendants cash-advances totalling
PHP246,542.00.
"Evidence adduced, further established that herein plaintiffs were able to pay
only the first monthly installment of the bank loan defaulting thereafter in the
succeeding installments. As a consequence thereof, the bank debited each monthly
installment of PHP25,000.00 due against herein defendants['] bank account with the
same bank for six consecutive monthly installments. Naturally, constrained by this
development, herein defendants decided to enforce their AGREEMENT with
plaintiffs via an ejectment suit now pending in another forum, to which suit herein
plaintiffs retaliated by filing this instant case." 6
After trial on the merits, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. This prompted petitioners to
file a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 1999. As already stated, the CA dismissed the appeal because
of nonpayment of the appellate docket fees.
Hence, this Petition. 7
Issues
In their Memorandum, 8 petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in outrightly dismissing
the Appeal of the Petitioners and in DENYING Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
despite the fact that the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee was
unintentional and was due to inadvertence; and
"II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in disregarding and
without giving due regard and consideration to existing jurisprudence and rulings of
the Honorable Supreme Court reducing the stringency by relaxing [some way]
somehow the strict application of the rules on the payment of docket fees." 9
 The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should not have outrightly dismissed
their appeal because the nonpayment of the appellate docket fees was due to inadvertence. To
demonstrate their good faith and willingness to pay, they even paid double the amount, as evidenced
by Money Order Nos. 3795488 and 3795489.
We are not convinced. Time and time again, this Court has consistently held that the
"payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of
an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory." 10
Appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this principle is that
the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance with provisions set by law. Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that an appeal to the CA from a case decided by the regional trial court in the exercise
of the latter's original jurisdiction shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. Such appeal is made by filing a notice thereof with the court that rendered
the judgment or final order and by serving a copy of that notice upon the adverse party. Furthermore,
within this same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
The payment of docket fees within this period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal.
Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the
decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
In short, the payment of the appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.
It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal was files at all.
Second Issue:
Relaxation of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Admitting their inadvertence, petitioners point out, however, that the Court has relaxed, in
certain instances, the stringent application of the rule on the payment of appellate docket fees.
We are not persuaded. True, "the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule
on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better
serve the interest of justice."
In the present case, petitioners have not presented any sufficient or satisfactory reason
to warrant an exception from the mandatory rule on the payment of appellate docket fees.
Their late payment will not charge the fact that the trial court Decision, which they wanted the
appellate court to review, has already become final and executory.
The explanation given by petitioners' counsel for the late payment, which was almost 10-
months after the reglementary period to perfect an appeal, was that his clients, being laymen, failed
to follow his specific instructions to personally file the Notice of Appeal and pay the appellate docket
fees to the clerk of court. Such inadvertence is not a compelling reason for us to relax the strict
requirement for the timely payment of appellate docket fees. Besides, counsel cannot be excused for
this lapse by simply passing the blame, as it were, to his clients. It is his responsibility to see to it that
the stringent requirements for an appeal are complied with.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
|||

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2.) Relaxation of the rule: late payment of the appeal fees and yet the court considered the
appeal/petition

[G.R. No. 186102. February 24, 2016.]

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF TEODULO EBESA, namely:
PORFERIA L. EBESA, EFREN EBESA, DANTE EBESA and CYNTHIA EBESA,
and ATTY. FORTUNATO VELOSO, respondents.

The implication of the timely payment of docket fees cannot be overemphasized. "The
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is a sine qua non requirement for the
perfection of an appeal. The court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees."
Indeed, there are instances when the Court relaxed the rule and allowed the appeal to
run its full course. In La Salette College v. Pilotin, 33 the Court ruled:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the
requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great
deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the
payment of the docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, but the late
payment was accepted, because the party showed willingness to abide by
the Rules by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v.
Court of Appeals saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein
that "the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket
fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x
the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the
prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a
similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant." 34 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
[G.R. No. 158992. January 26, 2007.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Philippine Orthopedic

Center) and VICTOR S. CLAVEL, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE and AMELIA
LURIZ, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Having satisfactorily shown that they have complied with the rules
on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper and just disposition of their cause.
The Case
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the
annulment of the July 10, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65073.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
December 7, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 denying
the Petitioner-Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is
hereby accordingly AFFIRMED.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an ejectment Complaint filed by respondents at the Quezon
City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 37, against Petitioner Victor S. Clavel, as occupant
of Lot Nos. 8 and 10, Block 260, located at No. 68 Maria Clara St., Quezon City. In their
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 37-17388, respondents alleged that they were the owners
of the disputed lots on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1297 issued in the name
of Yoichi Urakami and two deeds of sale. The first deed of sale dated February 12, 1948
conveyed the transfer of the contested lots from Yoichi Urakami to Tomas Balingit. The second
deed dated January 31, 1975 contained the transfer of the lots from Balingit to Amelia Luriz.
In his Answer, Clavel averred that the lots in question were owned and possessed by the
Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC), a government medical facility, which had built four (4)
cottages on said lots and had been in possession of the said lots since 1953. He alleged that the
POC had authorized its administrative officers, including Clavel, to use the cottages as their
residences. He also averred that respondents could not rely upon TCT No. 1297 as the basis of
their claim because its original copy had allegedly been burned during the fire in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City in 1998. He said that said title was deemed non-existent unless
reconstituted. Moreover, he stressed that the deeds of sale relied upon by the respondents were
not registered and hence, were of questionable character until duly proven. He then prayed that
the case be dismissed.
On September 15, 1997, after trial on the merits, the Quezon City MeTC rendered a
Decision in favor respondents, thus:
From the foregoing, this Court finds that [respondents'] claim has been duly
established by satisfactory evidence, and therefore hereby renders judgment in
favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioner] Victor S. Clavel, ordering him
and all persons claiming rights under him, or whoever is found in possession of
subject properties;
a) to immediately vacate Lots 8 and 10 of Block 260 located at No. 68-A
Maria Clara Street, Quezon City, and restore peaceful possession thereof to herein
[respondents];
b) to pay [respondents] the sum of P10,000.00 per month as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of subject parcels of land to be
computed from February 14, 1997 and every month thereafter until subject
properties shall have been finally vacated;
c) to pay respondents the sum of P20,000 for and attorney's fees; and
d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 3
Thereafter, on October 9, 1997, respondents moved for the immediate execution of the
MeTC Judgment. Further, through the Office of the Solicitor General, Clavel filed a Notice
of Appeal on October 13, 1997.
On October 20, 1997, the MeTC granted the motion for execution and ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of respondents. On October 24, 1997, Clavel
subsequently filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution and moved ad cautelam for the
fixing of the supersedeas bond. On October 27, 1997, he moved for reconsideration and
suspension of the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
 On October 28, 1997, the MeTC dismissed petitioners' Notice of Appeal for failure to file
the required appeal fee and denied their Motion to Fix Supersedeas Bond. Thereafter, on October
29, 1997, the MeTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution.
On October 30, 1997, Deputy Sheriff Efren P. Luna, accompanied by policemen, took
possession of the disputed lots, ejected all POC personnel from these lots, and padlocked the
cottages on them.
On November 5, 1997, Clavel filed another Motion for Reconsideration questioning the
dismissal of his Notice of Appeal, but the motion was consequently denied on November 11,
1997.
On November 13, 1997, Clavel filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
special civil action for certiorari, Mandamus, and prohibition, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-
32370, to annul the Order and Writ of Execution and subsequent orders of the MeTC.
On November 21, 1997, petitioner Republic filed its Motion for Intervention with the trial
court, alleging ownership of the disputed lots by virtue of Proclamation Nos. 438 (series of 1953)
and 732 (series of 1961) praying that it be allowed to adopt Clavel's petition as its petition-in-
intervention, and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from
disposing, alienating, or encumbering the properties in question.
On December 7, 2000, the RTC denied the petition for certiorari, Mandamus, and
prohibition for lack of factual and legal basis; and petitioners eventually appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA on December 22, 2000. SIcTAC
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the December 7, 2000 RTC Decision, the CA held that petitioners belatedly filed
the appeal fees. It noted that petitioners admitted to have received the September 15, 1997
Decision of the MeTC on October 10, 1997. However, they paid the appeal fee only on October
28, 1997 or three (3) days beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Thus,
the appeal was not perfected and the assailed MeTC Decision had become final and executory.
Consequently, it was ministerial upon the MeTC judge to issue a writ of execution.
Moreover, the CA observed that petitioners erred when they failed to oppose respondents'
motion for execution. Agreeing with the RTC, it sanctioned petitioners for not attending the
hearing for the Motion for Execution although they were notified a day before the hearing. Also, it
observed that the writ of execution could not be stayed because petitioners failed to post the
required supersedeas bond.
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not the issuance by the [MeTC] Quezon City, Branch 37 of the
following:
(1) Order dated October 20, 1997 (Granting the Motion for Immediate
Execution);
(2) Writ of Execution dated October 20, 1997;
(3) Order dated October 28, 1997 (dismissing the notice of appeal filed by
petitioner Clavel);
(4) Order dated October 29, 1997 (denying the "Motion for Reconsideration
[of the October 20, 1997 Order] and Motion to Suspend Implementation of Writ of
Execution") and
(5) Order dated November 11, 1997 (denying the Motion for
Reconsideration [of the October 28, 1997 Order] filed by Petitioner Clavel)
were erroneous and improper and in grave abuse of the [MeTC] Judge's discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
 II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the Decision dated
July 10, 2003 (denying petitioners' appeal and affirming the Decision of the RTC-
Quezon City, Branch 80 (which denied petitioners' Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition). 4
In gist, the petition revolves on the following issues: (1) the timeliness of the payment of the
docket fees; and (2) the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Execution.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
Timeliness of the Payment of Docket Fees
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial process. As such, courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, 5 particularly if the appeal is
meritorious. However, the right to appeal is merely a statutory right. For this reason, it should be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 6
In an appeal from a judgment or final order of a municipal trial court to the regional trial
court, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. When to appeal. — An appeal may be taken within fifteen (15) days
after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. How to appeal. — The appeal is taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. — Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof shall be transmitted to the
appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be.
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal, the following must be complied with: first, a
notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from the notice of final judgment or final order
appealed from; second, such notice of appeal must be filed with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order, and served upon the adverse party; third, within the same
period, payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees to the clerk of
the court which rendered the judgment or final order.
Notably, full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory, even jurisdictional. Otherwise, the appeal is deemed not perfected and the decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. 7
In the instant case, petitioners do not deny that they paid the appellate docket fees on
October 18, 1997. However, they maintain good faith, averring that such payment was
seasonably filed. They clarified that what was stated in their Notice of Appeal as the date of
receipt of the MeTC Decision was a mere inadvertence. They aver that it was petitioner Clavel
who received the Decision on October 10, 1997. However, he forwarded said Decision through
fax message to their counsel. 9 The latter, upon receipt of the message, immediately prepared a
Notice of Appeal and mistakenly stated that they received the MeTC Decision on October 10,
1997. They alleged that as shown in the stamp receipt on their counsel's copy of the MeTC
Decision, it was only on October 13, 1997 that the latter officially received said Decision. They
explained that as soon as their counsel received the Decision, on the same day, the latter filed
the prepared Notice of Appeal without correcting the date of receipt of the MeTC Decision, as
already stated in said notice. Thus, relying on their counsel's date of receipt of the Decision, they
paid the appellate docket fees on October 28, 1997.
We find that petitioners seasonably paid the appellate docket fees.
 It is a hornbook doctrine that when a party is represented by counsel, notice to the client
and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not a notice in law.10 The only exception, as
provided in Section 2 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is when service upon the
parties themselves is ordered by the court. Indisputably, in their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order denying their Notice of Appeal, petitioners submitted a photocopy of the notice of decision
which the trial court served on their counsel. The said copy had an October 13, 1997 stamped
receipt. Unfortunately, the trial court offhandedly dismissed the petitioners' explanation without
taking into account the said proof.
Relying on the date when the counsel of petitioners received the notice of judgment, the
period to commence appeal should be reckoned on October 13, 1997. Accordingly, they had
fifteen (15) days to perfect their appeal. Having paid the appellate docket fees on October 28,
1997, petitioners had validly perfected their appeal.
Liberal Construction of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Even assuming that petitioners belatedly filed the appellate docket fees, the
circumstances of the case would have warranted a liberal construction of the rule on
nonpayment of docket fees.
In the exercise of its impartial jurisdiction, the Court allows a liberal construction of
the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals in order to serve the demands
of substantial justice. Specifically, on the payment of docket fees, the Court in Buenaflor v.
CA qualifies that:
The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit:
First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the appeal;
Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Court's sound discretion
"in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of
circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. 11
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, 12 the payment of the
docket fees was delayed by six days but the Court excused the late payment because the party
showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying the docket fees. Also, we ruled
in Yambao v. Court of Appeals that "the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of
the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for . . . failure to pay
the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant." 13
In the same manner, the Court in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement
of an appeal previously dismissed for failure to pay the docket fees. It held that the appeal was
dismissed not because the appellant lacked interest in the case, but because of lack of proper
notice. Thus, it considered the reinstatement of the appeal as just and proper because the
"interest of substantial justice far outweighs whatever negligence" was
committed. cDHAES
Although the CA found that the docket fees were belatedly paid, it should have taken
cognizance of the persuasive reasons attendant in this case that merit a relaxation of the
rules. Notably, the Notice of Appeal was immediately prepared and filed before the
expiration of the period to file said notice. It would seem thus, that the alleged three-day
delay in the payment of appellate fees was not a result of petitioners' inexcusable lethargy
to pursue the case.
More importantly, petitioners should not be denied of their right to the proper and just
disposition of their cause. The gravamen of the complaint at the MeTC is the rightful possession
of the disputed land. Petitioner POC had been in peaceful possession of said land by virtue of a
law long before the claims of ownership of respondents. On the other hand, relying on a
certificate of ownership and deeds of sale, respondents suddenly alleged that they merely
tolerated the occupation of petitioners on the disputed land.
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the
category of unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of
the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of
the former's right to hold possession under a contract, either expressed or implied. 16 Where the
plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the
defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that s/he will vacate on demand, failing
which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie. 17
The assailed MeTC Decision gave credence to the certificate of title of respondents.
However, considering that petitioners had prior possession of the land, it is important to squarely
rule on whether such prior possession was merely by virtue of an implied agreement, and
whether such tolerance had already ceased. A reading of the MeTC Decision, on the contrary,
reveals that no such findings were made. Hence, it appears that a thorough review of the case is
merited.
Propriety of the Issuance of the Writ of Execution
Petitioners assail the issuance of the Writ of Execution on the ground that it was hastily
issued without affording them the right to oppose respondents' motion for execution. 18 They
aver that contrary to the prescribed rule, the execution of the MeTC judgment was ordered even
before the period to file an appeal had lapsed.
We agree. It should be noted that the appellate court relied on Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure in affirming the trial court's issuance of the writ of execution. However, the
applicable rule in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is Rule 70, which states, thus:
Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment
is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time
to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court. . . .
The foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately
executory. It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas
bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites are mandatory
and concurrent. 19 Thus, if not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. AaHcIT
In this case, the appellate court held that petitioners' failure to perfect the appeal and to file
a supersedeas bond warranted the immediate execution of the MeTC judgment. However, a
review of the records reveals that even before petitioners had the opportunity to perfect
their appeal and file a supersedeas bond, the writ of execution had already been issued.
Petitioners received the MeTC Decision on October 13, 1997; thus, they had until October 28,
1997 to perfect their appeal. Petitioners' Notice of Appeal filed on October 13, 1997 should have
cautioned the trial court to await the expiration of the reglementary period for filing an appeal
before issuing the questioned writ. However, the writ of execution was issued as early as October
20, 1997.
Public policy dictates that ejectment cases must be resolved with the least possible delay,
and judgments rendered in favor of plaintiff be immediately executed. However, the rules of
procedure prescribe trial courts to strike a balance between the plaintiffs' and defendants' right to
relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the July 10, 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court is directed to give due course
to the appeal in Civil Case No. 37-17388 and approve the amount of supersedeas bond as
required in Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, the Writ of Execution issued by
the Metropolitan Trial Court on October 20, 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Spouses Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, [January 26, 2007], 542 PHIL 137-151)