15. G.R. Nos.

130634-35 March 12, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

PARDO, J.:

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan
City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty2 of six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day
to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,3 and to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death
of Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib.4

On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two
(2) separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 6012</P>

"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long
and with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him
the following physical injuries, to wit:

Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen

and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.

"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances
(sic) of evident premeditation."5

Criminal Case No. 6018

"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab
and wound his wife, as a result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.

"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code."6

The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both
cases.

On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities7 and was immediately detained at
the Iligan City Jail.8

On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations
against him and translating them into the Visayan dialect.9 He pleaded not guilty to both charges.

As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on
February 3, 1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.

In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the
place where her family lived.

At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were watching TV at
the salalocated at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a commotion
coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died
down, Edgardo went upstairs to check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants.
When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.

Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She
died on the way to the hospital.12

SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I,
Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he
received an information regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.13

At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several stab wounds in different
parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards,
he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the
killing of Jesus and Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138.15

On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus
and Tita.16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were
fatal.17 The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen."18

Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the
abdomen. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound."19

As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house
for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan
City, and rented the second floor.20 The rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was
arranged in a manner that if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from
the sala, directly to the door of the adjoining room.

Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of
the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her
relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito
confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just
ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.23

In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a
meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day,
Manolito went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.24

Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open
the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top
of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.

Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9"
in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down.
Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing
Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time
shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake."25

In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him
again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he
stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared
from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had
nothing to do with it.

Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of
his friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the
morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While
in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave
himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.26

When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-
defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so
they could live together.27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and having carefully observed the
demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No.
II-6018) and and appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:

"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:

To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as
Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of
Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.

2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:

To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.

"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.

"SO ORDERED.

"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.

"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge"28

On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial
court to the Supreme Court.29

Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances provided in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled
down to the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. 30 He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored
and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the
lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that
he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General
submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the exempting privilege under the Article. 31

We find the appeal meritorious.

At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present 'where the act committed is a crime but
for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed."'32

Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of
the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.33 Accused must prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused must be the proximate result of
the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing
by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery."34

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must
convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to
have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-
appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He
saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed
Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of
him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:35

"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as
a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante
delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted
only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in
Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2)
years and four (4) months of destierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one
hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan city.37

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

16. G.R. No. 211062

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital violence that leads to spousal killing is parricide.
Perceived as a horrific kind of killing, penal laws impose a harsher penalty on persons found guilty of parricide
compared to those who commit the felony of homicide.

For review is the June 28, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209 which
affirmed with modification the August 18, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch
6, convicting Manuel Macal y Bolasco (accused-appellant) of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
parricide in a February 13, 2003 Information3 that reads:

"That on or about the 12th day of February, 2003, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MACAL y BOLASO, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his wife,
AURIA MACAL y YTAC, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, armed with an improvised bladed weapon (belt
buckle) and a kitchen knife, stab said Auria Macal on the front portion of her body inflicting a fatal wound which
caused her death, which incident happened inside the bedroom of the house they are residing.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

On July 7, 2003, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge of parricide.4 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that Auria was the wife of the
accused-appellant.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented Angeles Ytac (Angeles) and Erwin Silvano (Erwin) as
witnesses.

Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got married in March 2000 and that out
of their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that, at the time of the incident, they were all living
together in a house located in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by her
brother, Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada.

Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica,
Auria and Arvin were walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so
that they could all feast on the leftover food prepared for the fiesta that was celebrated the previous day. Along the
way, Angeles and her group met Auria's husband, the accused appellant. The latter joined them in walking back to
their house.

When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the accused-appellant
who went straight to their bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles
heard her daughter Auria shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed."6 Upon hearing Auria's plea for help,
Angeles and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of the room locked.
Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to
Auria was the accused-appellant who was then trying to stab himself with the use of an improvised bladed weapon
(belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a vehicle owned by a neighbor, but was
pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped over the fence and managed to
escape before the policemen could reach the crime scene.

Erwin corroborated Angeles' testimony that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant. Erwin claimed that he was
part of the group that went to Angeles' residence on that fateful morning. From where he was seated in the living
room, Erwin recounted that he heard Auria's screaming for her mother's help. The cry for help prompted him to ran
towards the bedroom. Once the door was forcibly opened, Erwin became aware that the accused-appellant stabbed
Auria on the upper left portion of her chest with a stainless knife. Erwin testified that the accused-appellant stabbed
himself on the chest with a knife-like belt buckle and that soon after, the accused-appellant hurriedly left the house.

The prosecution formally offered in evidence the Certificate of Death wherein it is indicated that Auria died of
hemorrhagic shock secondary to stab wound.7

Version of the Defense

To substantiate its version of the fact, the defense called to the witness stand the accused-appellant, Benito Billota
(Benito) and Nerissa Alcantara (Nerissa). 1âwphi1

The accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he stabbed his wife, resulting in
the latter's death, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense that the stabbing was
accidental and not intentional.

The accused-appellant admitted that he was married to Auria in March 2000 and the wedding was held in Manila.
The couple had two children but one of them died. According to the accused-appellant, he was employed as a
security guard by Fighter Wing Security Agency which was based in Manila. While the accused-appellant was
working in Manila, his family lived with Angeles in Tacloban City. The accused-appellant came home only once a
year to his family in Tacloban City.

On February 12, 2003, the accused-appellant arrived home in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City from Manila. Before
the accused-appellant could reach the bedroom, he was warned by Arvin, his brother-in-law, not to go inside the
bedroom where his wife was with a man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin's admonition, the accused-appellant
kicked the door but it was opened from the inside. After the bedroom door was opened, the accused-appellant saw
his wife and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by what he had seen, the accused-appellant went
out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the man but the latter was shielded by Auria. In the
process, the stab blow landed on Auria. After Auria was accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and fled. The
accused-appellant testified that out of frustration for not killing the man, he wounded himself on the chest. He then
left the house and went to Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) for medical treatment.

Benito attested that he came to know the accused-appellant while they were seated next to each other on board a
Christopher Bus bound for Tacloban City. The bus they were riding reached Tacloban City past midnight of
February 12, 2003. Considering the lateness of the hour and there was no bus available that would take Benito to
his final destination, the accused-appellant convinced Benito to simply go home with him. Once they got home, the
accused-appellant went inside the house while Benito opted to stay by the main door. The accused-appellant asked
someone from the living room the whereabouts of his wife, Auria. Benito testified that a female informed the
accused-appellant that Auria was inside the bedroom but advised him not to go in as Auria was not alone in the
room. Undettered, the accused-appellant proceeded to the bedroom and was able to get inside the room. Moments
later, Benito heard a thudding sound coming from the bedroom. Then, Benito saw a man running out of the house.
Sensing trouble, Benito immediately proceeded to the bus terminal.
To support the accused-appellant's claim that he brought himself to a hospital on February 12, 2003, Nerissa, the
Administrative Officer/OIC Records Officer of EVRMC, was presented as witness for the defense. Her testimony
focused on the existence of the medical record concerning the examination conducted on the accused-appellant by
a physician at EVRMC. Per hospital record, Nerissa confirmed that the accused-appellant sustained a three-
centimeter wound located at the left parastemal, level of the 5th ICS non-penetrating and another lacerated wound
in the left anterior chest.8

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide and the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds accused MANUEL MACAL y
BOLASCOguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the heirs of the victim, Aurea Ytac Macal, P.50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P.50,000.00 for moral damages. And, to pay the Costs.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In contrast, the RTC found accused-
appellant's declarations doubtful and contrary to human experience and reason. The RTC was not persuaded by the
accused-appellant's argument that the stabbing incident was purely accidental after it took into account Auria's
terrifying wail that she was going to be killed. The RTC also refused to believe accused-appellant's claim that there
was a man with Auria inside the bedroom. Logic dictates that a man in that situation would normally run away the
first opportunity he had specifically when the accused-appellant stepped out of the bedroom to obtain a knife. The
RTC even went further by saying that the accused-appellant injured himself so that he can later on invoke self-
defense which he failed to do as there are witnesses who can easily disprove his theory of self-defense.

The CA 's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The fallo of the CA decision states:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the assailed Decision dated
August 18, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City in Criminal Case No. 2003-02-92. Accused-
Appellant MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO is found GUILTY of parricide committed against his legal wife, Auria Ytac
Macal, on February 12, 2003 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to
pay the heirs of Auria Ytac Macal the amounts of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral
damages, Php 25,000.00 as temperate damages and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards
for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.10

The appellate court ruled that all the elements of parricide are present in this case. Moreover, the CA reasoned out
that while Angeles did not actually see the accused-appellant stab Auria, the prosecution adduced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to sustain his conviction. From the viewpoint of the CA, the prosecution's case against the
accused-appellant was strengthened by the latter's own testimony and admission that he stabbed his wife. The CA
further held that neither can the act of the accused-appellant be covered under the exempting circumstance of
accident under Article 12(4)11 of the Revised Penal Code nor under absolutory cause found in Article 2412 of the
same Code.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue

The principal issue before the Court is whether the court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.

In the resolution of March 10, 2014, the Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs
within thirty (30) days from notice. However, both parties manifested that they will no longer file the required briefs
as they had already exhaustively and extensively discussed all the matters and issues of this case in the briefs
earlier submitted with the CA.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant with modifications.

All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the Prosecution
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused.13

Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial.14 This
relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide.15 In parricide involving spouses, the
best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate.16 Oral evidence may also
be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested.17

In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously
stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference. Such admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case.
Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be
a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original.18 Hence, the key element that qualifies the killing to parricide was
satisfactorily demonstrated in this case.

Just like the marital relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant, the fact of Auria's death is incontestable.
Witnesses, from both the prosecution and defense, were in agreement that Auria expired on February 12, 2003. As
additional proof of her demise, the prosecution presented Auria's Certificate of Death which was admitted by the
RTC and the defense did not object to its admissibility.

Anent the remaining element, there is no doubt that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant. The stabbing incident
was acknowledged by the accused-appellant himself during his direct examination by defense counsel Emelinda
Maquilan, to wit:

xxxx

Q: What is the name of your wife?

A: Aurea Ytac.

Q: You said you saw your wife in your room with a man. Now, what was the man doing when you saw this man
together with your wife?

A: They were conversing.

Q: They were conversing in what part of your room?

A: At one side of the room.

Q: So, what did you do upon seeing the man, if there was any?

A: Because of my anger, I stabbed the man.

Q: Were you able to hit the man?

A: No, because my wife shielded him.

Q: Since your wife shielded the man, what happened to your wife?

A: My wife got hit.

Q: Now, in what of the body of his wife was hit?

A: I cannot exactly tell where she was hit but he delivered a stabbing blow at the man.

Q: So, after your wife was hit by the stabbing blow to be directed to the man, what happened next?

A: Out of desperation because I was not able to kill the man, I wounded myself.

Q: How about the man whom you wanted to stab, what happened to him?

A: He ran.

Q: Since you said your wife was hit by that stabbing blow, what happen to your wife then?

A: She died.
Q: How about you, what happened to you after you yourself?

A: I left the place.19

The outright admission of the accused-appellant in open court that he delivered the fatal stabbing blow that ended
Auria's life established his culpability.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide as defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code are present in
this case.

Affirmative Defense of Accident as an Exempting Circumstance Must Fail

The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the accused-appellant from
criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are:
(1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without fault or intention of causing it.20

A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was not performing
a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered from the narration of the accused-appellant during
cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina:

xxxx

Q: Now, of course, when you saw the man and your wife, according to you, they were just conversing with each
other, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How far where they to each other?

A: They were beside each other.

Q: They were sitting?

A: Yes, sir, both were sitting.

Q: Of course, when you saw them, you got angry?

A: I became angry.

Q: That is why you got a knife and stabbed the man?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when you stabbed the man, you had the intention to kill him?

A: Yes, my intention was to kill him.

Q: But it was your wife who was hit?

A: My wife was the one hit.21

The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill.22 This certainly does not hold true in the instant case
based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then
within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to
be killed by the accused-appellant.

Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant's defense of accident is negated as he was carrying out an unlawful
act at the time of the incident.

It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident, the accused-appellant had the inescapable burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of accidental infliction of injuries on the victim.23 In so doing, the accused-
appellant had to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's
evidence.24 As aptly pointed out by the CA, the defense failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements of the
exempting circumstance of accident that would otherwise free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the
accused-appellant's self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will substantiate his defense of
accidental stabbing.
Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe, his actuations closely after Auria was
stabbed tell a different story. If Auria was really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-appellant's natural
1avvphi 1

reaction would have been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority was to come up with
an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself. Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran
away from the crime scene leaving Auria's relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative of his guilt.

The CA took one step further when it examined the applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code in this
case. For this purpose, the CA assumed arguendo that there is another man inside the bedroom with Auria.

Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.25 The defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2)
that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.26 Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court that he
killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.27

Having admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of Article
247.28As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside each
other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the
present case.

In sum, the Court agrees with the trial and appellate courts that the evidence of the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Penalty and Pecuniary Liability

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to
death. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited.
1âwphi1

Likewise significant is the provision found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Applying these to the case at bar and considering that there are no mitigating and aggravating circumstances
present, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and CA.

Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the commission by the
accused-appellant of the crime of parricide.29 Current jurisprudence sets civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00.
As such, the Court finds it necessary to increase the civil indemnity awarded by the trial and appellate courts from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.

There is no question that Auria's heirs suffered mental anguish by reason of her violent death. Consequently, the
award of moral damages is in order. Similar to civil indemnity, prevailing jurisprudence pegs moral damages in the
amount of P75,000.00. On that account, the Court must also adjust the moral damages from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00.

Given that this is a case of a husband killing his wife where relationship a qualifying circumstance, the award of
exemplary damages is justified. The exemplary damages of P30,000.00 awarded by the CA is maintained as it is
consistent with the latest rulings of the Court.

Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but definite proof of its
amount was not presented in court.30 In People v. De Leon,31 the Court awarded P25,000.00 as temperate damages
where the expenses for the funeral cannot be determined with certainty because of the absence of receipts to prove
them. In keeping with the said ruling, the Court affirms the CA's award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

On a final note, the Court upholds the imposition of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary
awards for damages reckoned from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.32 This is in accordance with the
Court's discretionary authority to levy interest as part of the damages and in conformity with the latest Court policy
on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the CA's decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209, finding accused-
appellant, Manuel Macal y Bolasco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Auria Ytac Macal, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. In
addition, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 July 26, 2017

17. G.R. No. 210615

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

There is never any justification for a husband to hit his wife with a maso (mallet).

This resolves the appeal1 of the Court of Appeals' July 17, 2013 Decision,2 affirming the February 4, 2010
Decision3of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, which found Abenir Brusola (Abenir) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the deceased the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity
and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.4

In the Information dated July 14, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia
Brusola (Delia), as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of July 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the husband of complainant DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO, now
deceased, with intent to kill and with the use of ball hammer (maso), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit his said wife, DELIA BRUSOLA y RAMILO with the said ball hammer on her head, thereby causing
fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death.

Contrary to Law.5

On August 1, 2006, accused-appellant Abenir was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued.6

The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:

Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer,7 testified that they, together with their parents and other
sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006, at around 6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and
had an open sala, a kitchen, and one (I) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was eating with her
back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were watching the television, with
Delia seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed
restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement wall.
Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said he saw a man in the bathroom with
Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no one. Kristofer was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom,
he saw his father still holding the maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was on the
floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir. Delia was rushed to the hospital by their neighbors. Joanne
lost consciousness but arose when their neighbors massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station.
The next day, their neighbor Joy Tabamo informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away.8 Dr. Joseph
Palmero, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, testified on the
cause of Delia's death.9

The defense's version of the events, as testified by Abenir, is as follows:

Abenir worked in Saudi Arabia as a mason, a steel man, and a pipe fitter from 1986 until he returned in 1992, when
his sister informed him that Delia had a paramour. He and his family lived in Muntinlupa City while he worked for the
Makati Development Corporation until 2001, when he moved them to Batangas where Delia's family could take care
of them, considering that he was often at work. Sometime in September 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., he was on his
way to their house in Batangas when he saw his brother-in- law on the road. When his brother-in-law saw him, he
ran inside Abenir's house and re-emerged with a shirtless man. When Abenir went inside, he asked Delia why she
was still awake and who the shirtless man was. Delia just nagged him so he slept as he was very tired. The
following day, he went to the store, and some men mocked him. Abenir later asked Delia about the shirtless man
again. Delia responded by throwing a glass at him. Thus, Abenir went back to Alabang in 2006 to avoid mockery
and a fight with his brother-in-law.10

On the night of July 12, 2006, Abenir came home at around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. Two (2) of his children were
asleep and one (1) was watching the television. While Abenir was preparing things, Delia went outside. She
appeared to be waiting for somebody. After taking a bath, she fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was going
somewhere, she said it was none of his business. Abenir went to the bathroom for his personal effects. While inside,
he heard people talking outside and looked out through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman
kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The man
embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went outside, and approached
them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward
Abenir, causing them to stumble on the ground. Delia went inside while Abenir chased the man. After a failed
pursuit, he returned to the house where Joanne hugged him and inquired what happened. Abenir answered that
Delia was having an affair. He noticed that Kristofer was carrying Delia whose head was bleeding. He instructed his
children to take her to the hospital. He informed Joanne that he would surrender and asked his children to call the
barangay officials and the police. He voluntarily went with the officers to the police station where he learned that
Delia was hit on the head. He asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but
accidentally hit Delia instead.11

In the Decision12 dated February 4, 2010, the trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Abenir Brusola y Baragwa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is likewise ordered to pay the children of the deceased, Delia
Brusola y Ramilo, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.13

Abenir appealed the trial court Decision to the Court of Appeals.14 He argued that there was inconsistency between
the testimonies of Joanne and Abegail.15 Moreover, Joanne, the prosecution's lone eyewitness to the attack,
purportedly had ill motive against him since he had opposed her plans of early marriage.16 Further, in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of passion, obfuscation,
and voluntary surrender.17

The Court of Appeals found no merit in Abenir's arguments. Thus, in the Decision18 dated July 17, 2013, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated February 4, 2010, of the Regional Trial Comt of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 206, in Criminal Case No. 06-650, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.19

Abenir filed a Notice of Appeal. In compliance with its Resolution20 dated August 23, 2013 which gave due course to
accused-appellant Abenir's notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court. In
the Resolution21 dated March 10, 2014, this Court directed both the Office of the Solicitor General and the Public
Attorney's Office to file their respective supplemental briefs. Both parties filed their respective manifestations that
they would not be filing supplemental briefs.22

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, this Court resolves to dismiss accused-
appellant Abenir's appeal for failing to show reversible error in the assailed decision.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.

The trial court appreciated the evidence presented by the parties, considered the credibility of their respective
witnesses, and found that all the elements of the crime of parricide were sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
There was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim.23 As for the act of killing,
the trial court held:

With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw
her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the
incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that
it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to
accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing
to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made
under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.24 (Citations omitted)

Thus, this Court quotes with approval the Court of Appeals' Decision:
It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is
that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grilling examination. Thus, the trial court's evaluation shall be binding on the appellate court
unless it is shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied. There is no reason to deviate from the rule.

The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the credibility of either witness.
What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise moment that appellant struck his wife with a maso is
absolutely insignificant and unsubstantial to merit consideration . . . Inconsistencies that refer only to minor details
do not weaken the credibility of witnesses but are rather signs that the witnesses were not rehearsed.

What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal occurrence and the identity of
the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and forthright manner how she saw appellant hit her mother with a
maso on the head and her testimony is supported by the physical evidence of the injury sustained by the victim.
While Abigail and Kristofer did not actually see appellant in the act of hitting their mother, nevertheless, they saw
appellant holding the murder weapon and their mother fallen on the floor with a bloodied head immediately after the
criminal act was committed ...

The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne and her siblings had lost their
mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison, leaving them virtual orphans. Assuming that appellant had
previously disapproved of Joanne's early marriage, such would not have been a sufficient motive for her to wrongly
accuse her own father of a heinous crime ...25 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, the trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are mitigating circumstances in a parricide case, the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.26 In People v. Sales,27 this Court explained:

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the presence of only one
mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as
follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

-...

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:

....

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

....

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating
circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.28(Citation omitted)

Accused-appellant Abenir cited People v. Genosa29 to support the imposition of a lower penalty in light of the
mitigating circumstance.30 True, this Court in Genosa applied Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Article
63, to determine the penalty for parricide:

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission
of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same
Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating
circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying
circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree - prision mayor - and
the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.31 (Citations omitted)
However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Articles 63 and 64 of the Revised Penal
Code provide:

Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. - In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law
in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
minimum period.

3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in
its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one
class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to
the number and nature of such circumstances.

6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater
penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.

Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties-reclusion perpetua to death-Rule
63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

In line with current jurisprudence,32 the civil indemnity and the moral damages awarded to the victim's children are
increased to ₱75,000.00 each and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages is added.

The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one's spouse. If anything, it is an obligation to love
and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a
manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. The accused-
appellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter the reasons. He committed a crime. He must
suffer its consequences.

WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals in its July 17,
2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04419. Accused-appellant Abenir Brusola y Baragwa is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the heirs of the victim are
entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

18. G.R. No. 180496 April 2, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROY SAN GASPAR, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the July 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00237, which affirmed
with modification the January 29, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat in Criminal Case No. 2679. The RTC convicted Roy San Gaspar (appellant) of the crime of Parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Factual Antecedents

On June 2, 2000, appellant was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC in an
Information3which reads as follows:

That on or about 11:30 o'clock in the evening of April 25, 1999, at Purok Ma-oy, Barangay Bambad, Municipality of
Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a [.12] Gauge Homemade Shotgun, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], [unlawfully] and
feloniously, attack, assault and shot IMELDA E. SAN GASPAR, his legitimate wife, thereby inflicting gunshot wound
upon the latter, which directly caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Republic Act 7659.4

Upon being arraigned on July 12, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The following witnesses testified for the prosecution: Joramel Estimo (Joramel) and Cherme Estimo (Cherme),
children of the victim Imelda E. San Gaspar (Imelda) and stepchildren of the appellant; Norman Estimo, the brother
of Imelda who spent for her wake and funeral services; PO3 Rannie Arroza (PO3 Arroza), the officer on duty who
investigated the incident; and Dr. Flocerpida V. Jocson (Dr. Jocson), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim. Their collective testimonies are summarized as follows:

In the afternoon of April 25, 1999, appellant, without informing his lawfully married wife Imelda, went to Norala,
South Cotabato together with his father to attend the funeral of a relative.6 At that time, appellant and Imelda were
not on speaking terms for about a week already.7

At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda and her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast
asleep, appellant returned home and pounded on their front door. The thudding sound roused the whole household.
Apparently, appellant was mad because nobody immediately opened the door for him. He got even more furious
when he entered the house and saw Imelda sleeping side-by-side with her grown-up children. Appellant thus kicked
Imelda on the leg while she was still lying on the floor and this started a heated altercation between them.8 Appellant
exclaimed, "What kind of wife [are you?],"9 to which Imelda retorted, "what kind of a husband is a person who just
leaves his family behind without asking permission or informing his wife of his whereabouts"? Imelda also told
appellant that her sleeping with Joramel and Cherme is without any malice as they are her children.

Still enraged, appellant went upstairs and returned with a .12 gauge shotgun. He loaded it and lit a kerosene lamp
which he placed near the door of their room.10 He then aimed the .12 gauge shotgun at his wife and in front of
Joramel and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head.11 Appellant thereafter immediately ran away.12 Imelda was brought to
Sultan Kudarat Provincial Hospital where she passed away.

The Municipal Health Officer of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Dr. Jocson, conducted an autopsy on Imelda’s body.
According to the Autopsy Report,13 the cause of death was craniocerebral injury secondary to gunshot wound.
Imelda suffered a fatal gunshot wound on the front left side of her head which penetrated her brain tissue with a
depth of six inches.14 Gunpowder residue surrounded the entry wounds, an indication that the distance of the barrel
of the gun from the victim could not have been more than six feet.15 In other words, Imelda was shot at close-range.

Version of the Defense

The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: Librada San Gaspar, the mother of the
appellant; Vicente Martinez (Vicente), the owner of the tricycle used in transporting Imelda to the hospital; and the
appellant himself. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

In the morning of April 25, 1999, appellant went to Norala, South Cotabato with his father to attend the funeral of a
relative.16 He returned home by himself at around 7:00 p.m. just to change clothes and again returned to Norala after
asking permission from Imelda.17 Imelda and her two children from her previous relationship, Joramel and Cherme,
were left behind in their house.

It was already around 11:00 p.m. when appellant came home. But as he pushed the door to enter their room, he
heard a gunshot from a .12 gauge shotgun.18 Since it was dark, appellant rushed downstairs to fetch a lamp to see
what had just happened.19 With a lit lamp, he saw Imelda lying on the floor drenched in her own blood. Joramel and
Cherme were beside her crying. Appellant thus immediately went out of their house to look for a tricycle to transport
Imelda to the hospital.20 Using Vicente’s tricycle, they then brought Imelda to the Sultan Kudarat Provincial
Hospital.21 Thereafter, PO3 Arroza brought appellant to the police station for investigation. After questioning, he was
detained at the Municipal Jail of Isulan.22

From the above narration, the defense postulates that when appellant pushed the door open, it hit the shotgun,
causing it to accidentally discharge and hit Imelda.

Ruling ofthe Regional Trial Court

The RTC in its Decision23 on January 29, 2003 convicted appellant of the crime of Parricide, viz:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Roy San Gaspar, guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE.

Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences the accused, Roy San Gaspar, to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify:

(a)- Norman Estimo the amount of ₱20,800.00, representing the total expenses he incurred by reason of the
death, wake and burial of the deceased victim, Imelda Estimo San Gaspar, who was buried in Midsayap,
Cotabato;

(b)- the heirs of the said deceased victim, the amount of ₱50,000.00, as statutory indemnity to death; as well
as, the reasonable amount of ₱30,000.00, by way of moral damages; and the further sum of ₱20,000.00, as
exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.

Being a detention prisoner, the accused, Roy San Gaspar, is entitled to full credit of the entire period of his
preventive imprisonment, pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127, provided
that the said accused had agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules and regulations imposed upon
convicted prisoners, otherwise, with only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

The RTC relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution particularly, Joramel and Cherme. Having
witnessed the shooting incident, both of them positively identified appellant as the person who shot their mother,
Imelda. To the RTC, such positive identification, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.25 On the other hand, the RTC found
appellant’s defense of denial doubtful and unreliable. It further held that denial is a weak defense and that the same
cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of appellant as the culprit.26

Ruling ofthe Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC through a Decision27 dated July 31, 2007, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of 29 January 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
Branch 19 in Criminal Case No. 2679 convicting appellant Roy San Gaspar of parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Imelda Estimo the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.28

The CA held that since appellant asserted that the shooting was accidental, it was incumbent upon him to prove the
existence of the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident.29 However, he failed to discharge this burden.
Furthermore, appellant’s version of the circumstances leading to Imelda’s death was incredulous. Contrary to his
claim of accidental firing of the shotgun, the trajectory of the gunshot and the gunpowder burns around Imelda’s
wound suggest that the shooting was intentional.30

Not satisfied, appellant now appeals to this Court asserting that the lower courts erred in not giving exculpatory
weight to the defense he interposed.

The Parties’ Argument

Appellant in his Supplemental Brief31 argues that the lower courts erred in not giving exculpatory weight to his
defense that the shooting of Imelda was entirely accidental. He alleges that it was when he pushed the door of their
room that he heard the bursting sound of the .12 gauge shotgun. Clearly, therefore, the proximate cause of the
discharge of the shotgun that hit Imelda and eventually led to her death was the movement of their bedroom door.
On the other hand, appellant labels the prosecution’s version of what transpired as "unnatural, implausible, and
contrary to human nature and experience."32 He asserts that his act of immediately taking Imelda to the hospital after
seeing her shot is contrary to the prosecution’s claim that it was he who shot her. He avers that if that was the case,
it would have been more plausible for him to immediately flee from the crime scene. But instead, he went out to find
any means of transportation to rush her to the hospital.

On the other hand, the appellee People of the Philippines, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), agrees with the lower courts in finding appellant guilty of the crime of Parricide. It argues that appellant’s
defense of denial is weak considering that he failed to rebut the testimonies of Joramel and Cherme that a heated
altercation between him and Imelda immediately preceded the shooting.33 Furthermore, appellant failed to establish
any ill motive on the part of his stepchildren to falsely impute a serious crime against him.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Elements of Parricide obtaining in this case; Factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, cannot be
disturbed.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is
the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused."34

In this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that Imelda was shot and killed by appellant based
on the eyewitnesses’ account. Joramel narrated the details of the shooting incident as follows:

[Fiscal Alamada]: Now what happened after your step[father], Roy San Gaspar, arrived and entered the house?

[Joramel]: He saw us sleeping and I was sleeping beside my mother.

xxxx

Q: And after he noticed that you and the rest of your sisters were sleeping together in that one room with your
mother, what did your step[father] do?

A: He got mad, sir.

Q: Why did you say that he got mad, how did you know that he got mad?

A: He got mad because [he was] not [on] talking terms with my mother x x x [and] because the door was not opened
for him immediately.

xxxx

Q: Upon entering the room [and] having seen that you were all sleeping together near each other with your mother,
what did your step[father] say[,] if [any]?

A: He said, it is [not] good that you were sleeping side by [side] with your children.

Q: And what was the remark of your mother?

A: My mother told him that do not give any malice because they are my children.

Q: And after that, what happened?

A: He kicked my mother, sir.

xxxx

Q: And now, what followed x x x after your mother confronted her husband of being kicked by him?

A: He got the firearm upstairs, sir.

Q: Now, what kind of firearm was that?

A: .12 gauge.

xxxx

Q: Now, after your stepfather [had] taken from upstairs this firearm xxx, what happened next?

A: He loaded it, sir.

Q: With what?

A: With bullet.

xxxx

Q: And what did he do with the firearm after getting it from upstairs and after loading the same?

A: He used that in shooting my mother.

Q: Was your mother hit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was [s]he hit?

A: On her head.35

Cherme, on the other hand, corroborated the testimony of her brother on material points. Thus:

[Fiscal Alamada]: After your step[father] kicked your mother, what happened?

[Cherme]: After my step[father] kicked my mother they discussed and my step[father] took the long firearm and [lit]
the lamp and placed [it] near the door, sir.

xxxx

Q: And after your step[father] took that firearm, what did he do?

A: He shot my mother, sir.

xxxx

Q: Where were you at the time when your step[father] shot your mother?

A: I was [beside] my mother.

Q: How about this [Joramel], where was he?

A: He was also [beside] my mother, sir.36

Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who shot and killed Imelda. Their
testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme
were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on
the part of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.37 On the other hand, appellant only
offered his bare denial of the offense. However, "[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a
weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses."38 The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. "It is a well-settled
rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts
have first-hand account on the witnesses’ manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not
supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
determine the issue of credibility."39 Furthermore, "in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of
discretion on the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge have been adopted and affirmed by the
CA, the factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed."40

Anent the relationship of appellant and Imelda as legitimate husband and wife, the CA correctly observed that the
same has been sufficiently established by appellant’s admission41 that Imelda was his wife and by a copy of their
Marriage Certificate42 presented during trial.43

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC are present in this case.

Appellant’s defense of accident deserves

no credence.

While appellant describes the prosecution’s version of events as "unnatural, implausible, and contrary to human
nature and experience,"44 the Court finds that it is his story of accidental discharge of the shotgun that is incredulous
and unbelievable. Contrary to what appellant wants this Court to believe, a .12 gauge shotgun will not go off unless
it is loaded, cocked, and its trigger squeezed. To this Court, appellant’s allegation is nothing but a self-serving
statement without an ounce of proof or a lick of credibility. Moreover, the same does not jibe with the result of the
autopsy conducted on Imelda’s body. As aptly observed by the CA:

x x x We reject appellant’s testimony for it failed to explain how and why the victim sustained a gunshot wound on
her forehead. If the .12 gauge firearm fell, why was the trajectory of the bullet frontal? And, why was there
gunpowder burns around the wound of the victim, suggesting that the assailant was not more than six (6) feet away
from the victim? There is nothing [nearer to] the truth than the testimony of the attending physician who examined
Imelda on this matter:

Atty. Ramos : Will you be able to know what was the trajectory of that injury sustained by the victim?

Dra. Jocson : It is in the front, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Court : Will you kindly tell us, [D]octor, about how far is the barrel of the gun from the victim in order that gunpowder
burn could be noticed around the wound?

A : At least not more than six feet from the victim, your [H]onor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q : Will you please point to us, [D]octor, the location of the gunshot wound on the face?

A : Left aspect of the frontal, your [H]onor. (witness pointing to the left portion of the forehead.

We thus entertain no reasonable doubt as to appellant’s culpability. The location of the gunshot wound with
1âw phi 1

gunpowder burns clearly shows that the shooting was not accidental, but rather indicative of an intentional killing. x x
x45

All told, the Court sustains the trial court’s conviction of appellant, as affirmed by the CA, of the crime of Parricide.

Penalties

Article 246 of the RPC provides that the penalty for the crime of Parricide is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. The RTC
and the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the lower of the two
indivisible penalties, due to the absence of any aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime.46However, appellant is not eligible for parole.47

The Court also affirms the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each.48 The
CA’s award of temperate damages must also be sustained. In People v. Andres49 and People v. Magdaraog50 the
Court said:
"[W]e declared in the case of People v. Villanueva, that:

x x x when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000.00, as in this case, the
award of temperate damages for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if
the amount of actual damages proven exceeds ₱25,000.00, then the temperate damages may no longer be
awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.

The victim's heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00."

Since the receipt presented during trial covering the funeral services only amounted to ₱15,0000.00, the CA's award
of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages is in order.

In addition and pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, an increased amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages on
account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance which was alleged and proved, must likewise be awarded in the
crime of parricide.51

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The July 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00237 which affirmed with modification the January 29, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of lsulan,
Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19 in Criminal Case No. 2679, finding appellant Roy San Gaspar guilty of the crime of
Parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications
that appellant is not eligible for parole and the award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition,
an interest of 6% per annum is imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

19. G.R. No. 216063 June 5, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs
MARLON SORIANO y NARAG, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It must be stated at the outset that appellant Marlon Soriano y Narag does not deny that he stabbed to death
Perfecto Narag (Perfecto), his 71-year old maternal uncle who was a retired Philippine Army officer, that fateful day
of February 9, 2004 at Linao East, Tuguegarao City. Appellant insists nonetheless that he killed Perfecto in
legitimate self-defense and that treachery did not attend the killing, hence he could not be convicted of murder.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was indicted for murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City under an Information
which states:

That on February 09, 2004, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused MARLON SORIANO y NARA.G, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, stab to death victim
PERFECTO NA.RAG, husband of complainant EDERUNA A. NARAG, inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which
caused his untimely death.

That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance[s] of dwelling, and in disregard of the respect due
to the offended party on account of ms age, being an old man.

Contrary to law. 1

The prosecution presented the following as witnesses:

Ederlina A. Narag (Ederlina), widow of Perfecto; Villamor Pagulayan (Villamor), a tricycle driver; SP04 Avelino
Guinucay (SP04 Guinucay) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tuguegarao City; and Dr. Eugenio P. Dayag
(Dr. Dayag), former City Health Officer of Tuguegarao City.

Ederlina testified that on the afternoon of February 9, 2004, appellant arrived at their house and asked where her
husband Perfecto was. Surprised at his arrival, Ederlina asked appellant why he was looking for Perfecto. Instead of
replying to her query, appellant barged into their house and proceeded to Perfecto' s room. Seeing that appellant
was carrying a bladed weapon, Ederlina shouted to Perfecto to close the door to his room.
While Perfecto was attempting to close the door to his room, appellant grabbed his neck and immediately stabbed
him at the right chest while uttering the words "I will kill you." Ederlina tried to stop the appellant from stabbing her
husband but he pushed her away and stabbed her instead at the right wrist and forehead. She pleaded with
appellant to stop stabbing his uncle, Perfecto9 but appellant did not heed her plea. Perfecto also pleaded with him to
stop his stabbing frenzy, but he paid no attention to his pleas.

Ederlina narrated that at this point, Villamor, the tricycle driver in their employ, came in and forced appellant out of
Perfecto's room. However, appellant was able to return inside the room and stabbed Perfecto at the back again,
Ederlina added that after appellant left their house, she saw him and his brother Martin Soriano (Martin) at the
street, with appellant himself yelling "Winner."

Corroborating Ederlina's testimony, Villamor testified that he was at the garage of the victim's house when he heard
Ederlina's screams. He ran inside the house and saw appellant, Perfecto, and Ederlina inside Perfecto' s room. He
saw appellant stab Perfecto several times. So he grabbed appellant by the neck and brought him outside the room.
But appellant freed himself from his (Villamor's) hold and returned to Perfecto's room and again repeatedly stabbed
the latter until he died. Appellant also turned his ire against Villamor and tried to stab him, too, but Villamor
succeeded in avoiding serious injury by rushing out of the house. On his way out he ran into Martin, appellant's
brother, whom he entreated to help pacify appellant. But Martin instead grabbed Villamor's neck and warned him not
to report the incident to the police. However, Villamor broke off from Martin, and went to the police station where he
reported the incident.

SP04 Guinucay testified that he and a fellow police officer went to the scene of the crime to investigate the reported
incident. There they found the lifeless Perfecto in a pool of blood, with multiple stab wounds.

Dr. Dayag, testified that he conducted an autopsy upon the 71-year old Perfecto. His autopsy yielded the following
results:

Findings:

• Multiple stab wounds, head, chest & back region

• Laceration on the left hand

• Lacerated wound on the left side of the face Cause of Death:

Severe internal injuries due to multiple stab wounds, head, chest and back region

Dr. Dayag described the injuries, as follows:

• two (2) stab wounds on the forehead:

1. stab wound measuring .8 inches by 2 inches caused by sharp pointed instrument but non-penetrating;

2. stab wound measuring 1.02 inches by .2 inches deep hitting the skull but non-penetrating caused by a
sharp pointed instrument;

• one laceration on the cheek measuring 2 inches wide and 1.2 inches deep caused by sharp bladed instrument;

• three (3) internal hematomas on the chest which were not fatal or more or less, superficial;

• one stab wound just below the nipple measuring 3.2 inches that hit the lungs which could cause internal
hemorrhage; inflicted with use of sharp pointed knife; a fatal wound

• a stab wound on the abdomen just at the left umbilicus measuring 1.2 by 3 inches hitting the large and small
intestines; non-fa1al wound;

• contusions on the abdomen just below the rib; superficial;

• a stab wound caused by a knife on the inguinal area measuring 1.2 inches by 3 inches in thickness; possibly
caused by sharp pointed instrument; inflicted injuries to the large intestines and urinary bladder which, if not
immediately attended to, would be fatal;

• another stab wound measuring 1.2 inches by 3 inches caused by sharp pointed instrument; inflicted injuries to the
large intestines and urinary bladder which, if not immediately attended to, would be fatal

• four (4) stab wounds on the back region:

 1. stab wound measuring 2 by 2.4 inches hitting the lungs; possibly caused by a sharp pointed instrument;
fatal wound;

2. Stab wound measuring 2 x 2.2 inches deep hitting the left kidney; caused by a sharp pointed instrument;
fatal wound;

3. Stab wound measuring 2 inches deep and 2 inches wide; on level with the lumbar area on the left hitting
the large intestines; possibly caused by a sharp bladed instrument;

4. Stab wound measuring 2 inches by 3 inches deep on the right side of the lumbar area hitting the large
and small intestines; possibly caused by sharp bladed pointed instrument; non-fatal;

On cross-examination x x x Dr. Dayag [declared] that when he conducted the autopsy, [Perfecto's] cadaver was
already [in] rigos mortis xxx [; that it] is possible that the wounds [inflicted] on the back of the victim were caused by
a chisel [; t]he Autopsy Report does not bear the depths and sizes of the wounds but he had them in his notebook x
x x. 2

On the other hand, the appellant claimed that there had been a longstanding bad blood between his (appellant's)
family and his now deceased uncle, Perfecto, who was an elder brother of his mother; and that this family feud was
caused by Perfecto's desire to deprive appellant's mother of her legitimate share in the common residential
compound at Linao East, Tuguegarao City. He claimed that on that fateful day of February 9, 2004, Perfecto went
near a store he was tending right inside the common residential compound; that at a distance of about five meters,
Perfecto yelled at him to step outside; that when he stepped outside their store, Perfecto swung his knife at him and
injured his knee; that he ran inside the kitchen and armed himself with a chisel; that when Perfecto tried to hurt him
again, he was able to stab him first; that several persons witnessed the incident but nobody tried to interfere; that
after the stabbing incident, he surrendered to Barangay Councilman Benigno Lucas who brought him to the police
station in Annaturan, Tuguegarao City where he was investigated; and that afterwards, he was brought to a hospital
for treatment but said hospital did not issue a medical certificate.

On cross-examination, appellant admitted that Ederlina was present during the stabbing incident in question, and
that when Ederlina intervened, she was in fact injured by him; that later, Ederlina filed against him a criminal case
for frustrated murder before Branch I of the RTC in Tuguegarao City, to which criminal case he pleaded guilty,

Ruling of the Regiqnal Trial Court

The RTC of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, synthesized the evidence at bar in this wise:

The totality of the circumstances leads to the inevitable conclusion that the victim was caught unaware and unable
to defend himself and the accused deliberately chose a manner of attack that insured the attainment of his violent
intention with no risk tohimself.

The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not rule out the presence of
treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible danger to his person, [there is
treachery nonetheless when] the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to
retaliate, The case at bar typifies this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to defend himself precisely because
it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no
opportunity to put up a defense. It must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could
have been worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off the attack. It
is worthy to note the injuries sustained by the victim. According to Dr. Dayag, the victim sustained various injuries
not only in front of [his] body but also [on] his forehead and at his back and that the cause of his death is severe
internal injuries due to multiple stab wounds, head, chest, and back region.

The version of the accused that the stabbing incident happened outside their house cannot be given credence. First,
it is uncorroborated even if accused claimed that there were persons outside their house during the incident.
Second, the testimony of prosecution witnesses Villamor Pagulayan and Ederlina Narag that the accused [stab] the
victim inside the latter's room was corroborated by SP04 Avelino Guinucay who testified that he found the victim's
body with multiple stabbed wounds lying inside his room [in a] pool of blood. Defense conveniently did not present
evidence on what happened to the victim after the stabbing incident that should have explained why the victim's
body was found in his room even if the stabbing incident happened outside the house of the accused.

To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination [to commit the crime]; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Prosecution evidence [failed] to show when the accused planned to commit the offense and that he reflected on the
means to bring about its execution following an appreciable length of time. The Court cannot rest easy in
appreciating this aggravating circumstance.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has
not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy [that] the law accords to [the] human abode. He who goes to another's house to
hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. The offense of Murder may be
committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house.

The victim was killed not merely in his house but in his own room. The accused could have killed him elsewhere but
he decided to commit the crime at the victim's home; thus the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be
appreciated against the accused.

The Court is also convinced that the offense was committed in disregard of the respect due to the age of the victim.
The accused knew fully well that the victim was already old because he is his uncle. The accused perpetrated the
act against his ageing uncle knowing that by himself, said victim's physical condition due to old age would not allow
him to sufficiently defend himself anymore.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is appreciated in favor of the accused. Police officer Tangan
testified that police officers x x x Remolacio, Batulan and Abadu, who brought accused to PTU Don Domingo where
he was on duty informed him that he accused surrendered to Barangay Councilman Benigno Lucas, Linao East,
Tuguegarao City. The reason why the accused was no longer at the place of incident when police officer Guinucay
investigated and that the accused did not give himself up to any of the police officers was sufficiently explained by
the accused upon his testimony that he left the place of incident and proceeded to the barangay hall where he
surrendered to Barangay Councilman Benigno Lucas. It is significant to note that there is no evidence to show that
the police or any law enforcement agency exerted any effort to locate the accused. By 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
the accused was already turned over to PTU Don Domingo.

The information alleges two (2) qualifying aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery and evident premeditation
and two (2) generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disrespect to the victim who is already old. Only one
qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two generic aggravating circumstances were proved. Applying the
provision of paragraph 4, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
offsets one generic aggravating circumstance, thus leaving one more generic aggravating circumstance.Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659

murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same
Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance.
Under this state of facts, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused should be death.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua x x x

xxxx

Pursuant to the same law, the accused shall not be eligible for parole x xx. 3

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Judgment 4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused MARLON SORIANO y Narag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER
as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. Said accused is ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Perfecto Narag the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as stipulated actual
damages; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Aggrieved, appellant sought recourse before the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court however threw out the appellant's appeal ratiocinating as follows:

Testimonies of Prosecution's Witnesses More Credible than Accused-Appellant's

It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect because it had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. On the other hand, the reviewing magistrate has none of the
advantages peculiar to the trial judge's position, and could rely only on the cold records of the case and on the
judge's discretion. Thus, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies would not
be disturbed absent any showing that it has overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied certain facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. We assiduously
examined the records and We find no reason to either depart from this established doctrine or to review, much less,
overturn the factual findings of the court a quo.

Marlon tried to destroy the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses by belaboring on their relationship with the
victim, Ederlina and Villamor being Perfecto's wife and nephew, respectively. Such emphasis is misplaced. Blood
relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the witness. In fact, the
relationship with the victim would render the testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating ti11e crime to accuse somebody [else] other than the real culprit. There is absolutely
nothing in our laws to disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which said person's relative was
involved, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act.
Indisputably, Ederlina was with Perfecto in their home when Marlon attacked his uncle. She clearly described the
events that took place before, during, and after her husband was stabbed and her testimony remained consistent
and unwavering even on cross-examination. Thus, her positive testimony is enough to convict Marlon of the crime
charged.

Further, Marlon's claim that the stabbing occurred outside of their respective houses does not inspire belief. We
quote with approval the following disquisition of the RTC, viz.:

The version of the accused that the stabbing incident happened outside their house cannot be given credence. First,
it is uncorroborated even if accused claimed that there were persons outside their house during the incident.
Second, the testimony of prosecution witnesses Villamor Pagulayan and Ederlina Narag that the accL1sed stabbed
the victim inside the latter's room was corroborated by SP04 Avelino Uuinucay who testified that he found the
victim's body with multiple stabbed (sic) wounds lying inside his room [in] a pool of blood. Defense conveniently did
not present evidence on what happened to the victim after the stabbing incident that should have explained why the
victim's body was found in his room even if the stabbing incident happened outside the house of the accused.

There is also no merit in Marlon's contention that his testimony was corroborated by SPO 1 Tangan. It bears
stressing that SPO l Tangan did not witness the stabbing incident; his testimony surrounding Perfecto's killing was
purely based on Marlon's narration and not of his own personal knowledge. As such, his testimony regarding the
killing is inadmissible for being hearsay. It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify [to] the facts that he
knows of his own personal knowledge or those which are derived from his own perception. He may not testify [to]
what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. 6

With particular reference to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which according to the appellant did not at all
attend his stabbing-to-death of his uncle Perfecto, the appellate court postulated thus:

Treachery: Duly Established; Qualified the Killing to Murder

xxxx

It may be said, as postulated herein, that the suddenness of the attack would not, by itself, suffice to support a
finding of treachery. However, where proof obtains that the victim was completely deprived of a real chance to
defend himself against the attack, as in the instant case, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery
ought to and should be appreciated. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the
victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

As earlier discussed at length, the positive testimony of Ederlina established that Marlon purposely sought the
unsuspecting Perfecto with intent to inflict mortal wound on him. Perfecto was unarn1ed at that time and there was
no means of escape because he was trapped inside his room. In fact, Perfecto was about to close the door to his
1âwphi1

room when Marlon suddenly and swiftly stabbed him. Lastly, Marlon aimed at Perfecto's head, chest and back
ensuring that he would not have a chance to retaliate. Obviously, tl1e way it was executed made it impossible for
the victim to respond or defend himself. He just had no opportunity to repel the sudden attack, rendering him
completely helpless.

The following observation of the RTC is also apt:

The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not rule out the presence of
treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible danger to his person, in treachery
what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.
The case at bar typifies this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to defend himself precisely because it was
simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right inside his own abode and he was unanned, with no
opportunity to put up a defense. It must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could
have been worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off the attack. x
xx

Accordingly, We sustain the findings of the RTC that Marlon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. 7
The appellate court nonetheless modified the sums awarded by the RTC in concept of actual damages and
exemplary damages, to wit:

Damages

However, We find it necessary to modify accused-appellant's civil liability. The RTC correctly awarded ₱75,000.00
civil indemnity and. ₱50,000.00 moral damages but the actual damages should be reduced to.₱25,000.00 which is
the amount of expenses stipulated by Ederlina in her testimony. The awarded exemplary damages should also be
increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. 1âwphi1

All the foregoing monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this decision until fully paid. 8

The decretal portion of the appellate court's Decision 9 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the October 30, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court Branch 3,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 10121 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified,
accused-appellant MARLON SORIANO Y NARAG is hereby ordered to pay the Heirs of Perfecto Narag.
₱25,000.00 actual damages and. ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages, and all monetary awards are subject to 6% per
annum from the time of finality of this Decision until fully paid. All other aspects of the October 30, 2009 Judgment
stand.

SO ORDERED. 10

Our Ruling

It is almost trite to say that the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest
respect by the appellate court, whose revisory power and authority is limited to the bare and cold records of the
case. This explains why this Court, which is not a trial court, is loathe to re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence
that had been analyzed and dissected by the trial court, and sustained and affirmed by the appellate court. In the
case at bench, we see no reason at all to overturn the findings of facts and the conclusions of law made by both the
trial court and the appellate court relative to the fact that treachery or alevosia in fact attended the stabbing-to-death
of Perfecto by the appellant at the time and place alleged in the Infom1ation.

The awards for damages can stand some modification, however. Notably, the appellate court awarded ₱25,000.00
as actual damages which is the amount stipulated by the parties. 11 However, it is settled that "only expenses
supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the [victim]
may be allowed."12 Hence, the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual damages is deleted. In lieu thereof, "it is proper to
award temperate damages x x x since the heirs of the victim suffered a loss but could not produce documentary
evidence to support their claims." 13 In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages. As regards the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, it was held in People
v. Jugueta14 that for a felony like murder where the penalty imposed is death, but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of Republic Act No. 9346, the amount is fixed at ₱l00,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04241 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Marlon Soriano y Narag is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Perfecto Narag the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l00,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 171284 June 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not substantiate the
attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense if there was no unlawful aggression from the victim. The Case

Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification his conviction for the murder of Francisco Batulan rendered on December 29, 1997 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.2 In convicting him, the RTC had appreciated the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and had then sentenced him to "suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20
years." On appeal, the CA prescribed reclusion perpetua.

Antecedents

The information filed on January7, 1991 averred as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Alfredo Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed with a sharp
blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him several stab wounds
on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.3

During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson Macaraniag, (b) Alexander
Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their version follows. Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in
Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when a young man came
running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had
been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there
he saw Dulinstabbing Batulan who was already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with
his left foot touching the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at
the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the
victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them fighting in April
1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.4

Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when he
heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming
for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene, he found Batulanat the door of
Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he
rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the
Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.5

Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 to inform
her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house. She rushed to Danao’s house but fainted on the way.
Upon regaining consciousness, she learned that her husband had been rushed to the hospital. On her way to the
hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin killed your husband as he
vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the back and several stab
wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he had said to her
about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to confirm what he had told her
about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s response was: I’m sorry I cannot go and
declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill all those persons who will testify in their
favor.6

Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong Bancud, in front of
Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to stab her husband. Dulin
was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband, but she then heard Dulin saying: You will soon have
your day, I will kill you.7

Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by Dr. Macaraniag, who said
that the victim was in a state of shock from his 12 stab wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the three teams that
conducted the surgery on Batulan. He issued the Medico-Legal Certificate8 attesting that Batulan died on August
24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as follows:

Multiple stab wounds #12

(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.

(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL

(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line

(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula

(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand

(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand

(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left

(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm

(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist

(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot

(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh

(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.9

Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be "Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive Hemothorax secondary
to Multiple stab wounds."10 He clarified in court that there were clerical errors in the preparation of the Medico-Legal
Certificate because his handwritten records indicated that Batulan had sustained stab instead of lacerated wounds.
He surmised that one of the clerks could have misread his handwriting in the process of transcription.11

Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a monthly income of
₱8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one child; that she spent more or less ₱6,500.00 for Batulan’s
hospitalization, including his medicines, and ₱36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial attire and his coffin;
that during the wake she butchered one cow worth ₱6,800.00 and six pigsworth ₱15,000.00; that his death caused
her and her family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a total of ₱70,000.00, plus the ₱20,000.00
for the counsel’s services in bringing the criminal charge against Dulin.12

In his defense, Dulin testified thatin the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in Atulayan Norte,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that
Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto
Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with
Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and
Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get
a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to
go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his
(Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle,
you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of
Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the
weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they
struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained consciousness only
the next day at the hospital.

Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangay captain would
summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at night.

Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, authenticated
the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been injured.13 Judgment of the RTC
On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,14 to wit: WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and
appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance,
this Court hereby lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20
years and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount
of ₱36,000.00 and moral damages for ₱40,000.00.

Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.15

Decision of the CA

In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the RTC’s
appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if self-defense should
be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the victim who had first attacked by stabbing
him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had not been justified in killing the
victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was incorrect considering the absence of any aggravating
circumstance and the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil liability, decreeing:

The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification. The Court a quo
committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime committed by appellant in the case at bench is
murder qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the
medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty and
awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The award of ₱36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Francisco
Batulan ₱20,000 as temperate damages and ₱50,000 by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED.16

On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.17

Issues

In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE AS A

PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE
SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF FRANCISCO.18

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

I.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving self-defense rests
entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements
of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.19 The most important of all the elements is unlawful
aggression,20 which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the
victim committed unlawful

aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the
two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression
to prevent or repel.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described in People v.
Nugas,21 as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is

whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself;
the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the
attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression
means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with
intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor because all
its elements had been present in the commission of the crime.

In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack against Dulin the
unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. The CA
thus found and held in its assailed decision:

Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and ran
towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful
aggression against him effectively ceased. When

FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now became the armed
protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At
that moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from FRANCISCO.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered as unlawful aggressor.
Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was merely defending himself when he killed
FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would be no

basis for the second requisite of self-defense.22

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the
aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the
latter going inside the house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the
weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point.
Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In
this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already
ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused
injured the aggressor.23 As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing
by Dulin.

Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because the latter
followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that there was no gap in the
aggression initiated by Batulan.24
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then running away from
him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent threat against
Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab
wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the
accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.26

II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must prove
the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful aggression, being an indispensable
element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.27

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete self-defense, and must
be appreciatedas a privileged mitigating circumstance.28

Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of incomplete self-
defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s
aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be
any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in
order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

III.

The RTC and CA erred in appreciating

the attendance of treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying circumstance.
1âw phi 1

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.29 Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be
appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act
which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.30 Treachery, whenever alleged in the
information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder.31

Based on the established facts, Dulinand Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan had initially wielded
against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit.
They continued tograpple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed
Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan
because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of
Dulin’s impending assault,32 and being thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to
recover control of the weapon from Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is
done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.33 The mode of attack must
not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal.34 There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months
and one day to 17 years and four months). The indeterminate sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with full credit
of his preventive imprisonment, if any.

Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages
and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We modify the awards, and grant to the heirs of Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. Indeed, the current judicial
policy sets the civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at ₱50,000.00. In addition, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to moral damages of ₱50,000.00. The civil indemnity and moral damages are allowed even without
allegation and proof, it being a certainty that the victim’s heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate
damages of ₱25,000.00 should further be granted to the heirs of the victim for they were presumed to have spent for
his interment. It would be unjust to deny them this amount for the reason that they were not able to establish the
actual expenditure for his interment with certainty.35

In line with recent jurisprudence,36 interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of the civil liability fixed
and imposed herein, computed from the date of the finality of this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be
fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by finding ALFREDO DULIN
YNARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT
MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his preventive imprisonment; ORDERS
him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each item reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.