International Journal of Public Administration

ISSN: 0190-0692 (Print) 1532-4265 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/lpad20

The Multiple Bases of Social Return Platforms:

Evidence of a Brazilian Initiative

Vinicius Nardi, Felipe Zarpelon, Jorge Verschoore & Mariana de Araújo

To cite this article: Vinicius Nardi, Felipe Zarpelon, Jorge Verschoore & Mariana de Araújo (2018):
The Multiple Bases of Social Return Platforms: Evidence of a Brazilian Initiative, International
Journal of Public Administration, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2018.1440404

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2018.1440404

Published online: 23 Feb 2018.

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2018.1440404

The Multiple Bases of Social Return Platforms: Evidence of a Brazilian Initiative

a
Vinicius Nardi , Felipe Zarpelona, Jorge Verschoore b
, and Mariana de Araújob
a
Business Administration, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Sao Leopoldo, Brazil; bBusiness Administration, Universidade do Vale do Rio
dos Sinos, Sao Leopoldo, Brazil

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The literature on platforms emphasizes the balance between supply and demand as precursors to Platforms; e- participation;
network expansion, strategy development and strategy sustainability. This study questions this crowdsourcing – strategy
logic through the exploratory approach of a public platform based on social returns. Results
demonstrate that when an institutional force supports a platform concerned with diffuse and
collective interests, it is possible that the strategy could sustain and develop without the balance
of its forces. The study contributes to the strategic platform literature by pointing out the distinct
aspects of social platforms and underlining the support generated by institutions.

Introduction McDermott, 2010). Social media technologies, for

example, have aided the implementation of Open
Platforms as business models are not particularly a
Government initiatives, stimulating the e-participation
novelty in strategy. For example, shopping centers con-
of society in the political process (Mergel, 2012; Wirtz,
nect stores to consumers and newspapers connect
Daiser, & Binkowska, 2016). In the same way, the use of
advertisers to readers. The advent of information and
platforms has enabled the implementation of match-
communication technologies (ICTs) allowed the forma-
making systems to overcome market failures by pro-
tion and development of businesses based on a plat-
moting the meeting of two sides, as in the case of access
form in a simpler and faster way (Blank, 2013; Van
to the US education system or organ donation in
Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016). Platform busi-
England (Roth, 2015). This approach has been recog-
nesses connect consumers and developers interested
nized as an adequate strategy to enable social participa-
in the results of network interactions (Evans & Noel,
tion in public projects and extend the direct democratic
2008). On platforms, the value perceived by both parts
process (Brabham, 2009; Royo & Yetano, 2015).
is fundamental to the sustainability of the business
However, the understanding of the sustainability and
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). In general, the literature
development processes of these public platforms based
points to the perception of particular advantages as a
on essentially social returns is still incipient.
driver for the use of business platforms (Kohler, 2015).
Created in 2012, the “e-Cidadania” service hub of
Users of popular platforms, such as Uber, Airbnb, and
the Brazilian Federal Senate aims to approach social
eBay, seek the particular advantages of reducing costs
demands for legislative power using three tools:
and spreading the offer of services and products (Hagiu
“Consulta Popular,” “Evento Interativo” and “Ideia
& Rothman, 2016). In this context, there has been little
Legislativa.” The study restricts to the platform “Ideia
discussion about platforms whose outcome is essen-
Legislativa,” in which the citizen can suggest the crea-
tially social (Lee & Seo, 2016).
tion of legislation or changes in the current legislation.
The growth of social activism (Nalbandian, O’Neill,
By fostering the interaction between public power—
Michael, & Kaufman, 2013) combined with scarce
which seeks the legitimacy of its actions—and civil
resources and the amplification of economic, social
society aiming to participate directly in the political
and environmental challenges has motivated the search
process, the platform makes possible the diffusion of
for innovative solutions in public administration (Royo
common issues, and deals with the so-called “wicked
& Yetano, 2015). In this context, government agencies
problems” (Churchman, 1967). Citizens are therefore
have used ICT tools to bring public power closer to
engaged in an e-participation initiative motivated by
society in general (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015;
intangible and social returns. This research aims to

CONTACT Vinicius Nardi viniciusamnardi@gmail.com Marechal Deodoro street, 220 Bento Gonçalves, Rio Grande do Sul State, 95700-010, Brazil.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/lpad.
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 V. NARDI ET AL.
answer the question: How can a platform strategy be
developed and sustained on essentially social returns?
Through the analysis of the platform statistics and
using interviews with stakeholders, this article intends
to contribute to the literature on platforms and public
governance. The traditional approach of platforms
emphasized the fact that the balance between creators
and consumers provides sustainability to the business.
The results show that collective returns might be the
basis of platform maintenance, even in a situation of
considerable imbalance in participation among its
actors. The analysis considers also the institutional pre-
sence as a tool to legitimize the strategy of platforms,
drawing up considerations about the asymmetric power
relations, the models of governance and their conse-
quences for the sustainability of the platform.
Additionally, the study offers some recommendations
for enhancement of the studied platform.
Strategic platforms
The platform is a simple but transformative concept
that has affected businesses, the economy and even
society (Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016).
Traditional sectors, such as hosting, transportation,
and retail have undergone significant changes following
the introduction of platform-based business models
(Kohler, 2015; Libert, Wind, & Fenley, 2014). Parker
et al. (2016) argue that eventually all industries will be
affected by business platforms, given that cooperative
work will produce the value through social networks.
Contemporary networks are not limited to sharing
what already exists, but can also produce and offer
goods and services (Hardt & Negri, 2005).
What makes the platform model successful is the
ability to connect people, organizations and resources
in an interactive environment in which value proposi-
tions are created and exchanged (Parker et al., 2016). In
this model, it is only possible to reach the necessary
scale to sustain the business with the use of ICTs. ICTs
allow the breadth of business to develop rapidly and
enable businesses to become successful players in con-
solidated markets or to create new markets (Hagiu &
Rothman, 2016). These business models can use collec-
tive knowledge and intelligence, to organize and filter
large amounts of information, and to use all these
things to create jobs and to keep collective records
(Brabham, 2013; Howe, 2008).
In general, four main players make up the platform
ecosystem: owners of platforms who control their intel-
lectual property and governance, providers who main-
tain the interface with users, producers who create their
offers and consumers who consume those offers
(Parker et al., 2016). The platform becomes active as a
business when it generates a value perceived by both
connected parts through its main assets, which are the
information and the interactions it makes possible
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Because they are con-
necting people, platforms benefit from network extern-
alities (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), that is, the product or
service utility increases as the number of consumers
and creators involved increases. Parker et al. (2016)
refer to these externalities as an essential part of the
platform architecture and go beyond, stating that not
only benefits occur with increasing numbers of users on
a platform. The authors identify negative effects of the
network, especially when an indiscriminate increase in
the number of users on a poorly-managed platform can
reduce the value produced for each user.
To define the best architecture for business pur-
poses, Kohler (2015) identifies three models of platform
operation defined by how stakeholders are connected,
business objectives, and the structure of power and
control: (a) two-sided or multiple-sided platforms
where users interact directly, (b) product platforms
where developers build product or service solutions
on a base technology and sell to connected consumers
and (c) integrating platforms where contributions are
captured and sold to consumers.
The two-sided connection is a feature not only of
platform strategies but markets with network external-
ities. The two-sided platforms can connect groups with
distinct and complementary objectives (Eisenmann,
Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Rysman, 2009).
Similarly, product platforms promote the meeting of
complementary objectives, but here the control and
direction of the platform manager are accentuated.
The owner has the technology on which its creators
develop the product or service. In integrative platforms,
the main activity is creation, performed mainly through
competitions. This operation also presents a variation,
that is, the collaborative communities whose main
objective is to gather a series of contributions from
the crowd into an original set of value (Kohler, 2015).
These different platform configurations can be success-
ful in their applications through new strategies where
the focus is on orchestrating resources and optimizing
internal processes to facilitate external interactions,
generate customer value and maximize the value of
the ecosystem (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Van
Alstyne et al., 2016).
The platforms traditionally focused on private initia-
tives were adopted by the public with the power to
respond to the demands of increasingly participatory
individuals, called Citizens 2.0, and to legitimize their
actions towards society (Brabham, 2008, 2009; Hilgers

& Ihl, 2010; Linders, 2012; Seltzer & Mahmoudi, 2013).
These initiatives arise from the belief that citizens with
experience, situational awareness and interest in parti-
cipating are potential sources of solutions for govern-
ments pressured to do more with less (Royo & Yetano,
2015). In recent years, driven by technological
advances, availability of information and social mobili-
zation, this development has become more widespread
(Thomas & Streib, 2005).
Governments need to legitimize their actions to
make their continuity and sustainability possible. To
this end, it is necessary that their actions are according
to the expectations of society and, in this sense, ICTs
have helped them to understand these demands
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015; McDermott,
2010). Societies are heterogeneous, and groups with
opposing interests often propose different ways to exer-
cise public power. Platforms, in this sense, might help
to conduct these discussions, fostering independence
and decentralization and enabling different groups to
find complementary solutions (Mannes, 2009; Roth,
2015).
The literature investigates the reasons for using plat-
forms (Kohler, 2015). In general, platform users seek to
achieve individual goals, either by reducing the costs of
products or services, by optimizing their resources or
by obtaining particular advantages (Choudary, Van
Alstyne, & Parker, 2016). Social motivations are still
underexplored in the literature (Lee & Seo, 2016).
However, the participation of individuals in public plat-
forms (McDermott, 2010) might indicate that the pur-
suit of particular advantages is not the only factor
determining whether users access and stay in a plat-
form environment. When articulated by public institu-
tions, citizens who take part seek information,
consultation and active participation (Yetano, Royo, &
Acerete, 2010). The platform “Ideia Legislativa” is an
example of a technological tool used for citizen engage-
ment and legislative co-production that operates
nationwide. It is, therefore, a unique case that justifies
its study and offers evidence for a better understanding
of the phenomenon of platform strategies. The upcom-
ing section describes the methodological aspects
adopted to deepen this case study below.
Methodology
The “e-Cidadania” service hub, created in 2012 by the
Brazilian Federal Congress, is an example of the use of
platforms for bringing governments and civil society
closer. With the objective of increasing the participa-
tion of society in political life, the portal connects the
demands of Brazilian society with topics for voting in
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 3
the Federal Senate (one part of the legislative power in
Brazil). The portal offers three tools for users:
“Consulta Popular,” “Evento Interativo” and “Ideia
Legislativa.” In “Consulta Popular,” polls are organized
on themes that will be voted on in the Senate, where the
citizen can express his opinion about the proposal. In
the “Evento Interativo” area, citizens can participate in
public debates about themes promoted by the legisla-
ture or suggested by users. Finally, the “Ideia
Legislativa” platform works as a system whereby any
person can suggest the creation of law or changes in the
current legislation.
Although the “Ideia Legislativa” platform is open to
social participation, it holds mechanisms to control and
to legitimize actions. To be analyzed by senators, ideas
need a minimum of social support. By stimulating the
participation of society as a whole, and not just activist
individuals, the platform becomes a tool of civic
engagement, in which the return to those who partici-
pate is essentially social.
Due to the complexity and rarity of the phenom-
enon, the “Ideia Legislativa” platform was depicted to
understand the context of the development and sustain-
ability of a platform with essentially social returns.
Because it is an incipient and essentially empirical
literature, the field lacks research able to respond in
an inductive way to theoretical implications. For this
reason, Miles and Huberman (1994) methodological
procedures guided the case study conduction, as well
as Corley and Gioia (2004) procedures guided the col-
lection and inductive interpretation of the evidence.
Data collection
In the initial stage of the research, it urged to under-
stand from the literature and the empirical approach to
the field, the fundamental concepts that define plat-
forms as a business strategy. The forms of organization
of the business in the platform, the creation, capture
and exchange of value and the role of each actor
involved were all identified as pillars for the under-
standing of platforms as a strategy. On these pillars,
instrument for data collection that served as the basis
for the continuity of this research was built.
The complexity of the phenomenon would prevent
proper appreciation of its operation with only one data
source. Therefore, the triangulation of data from sec-
ondary sources, non-participant observations and semi-
structured interviews was performed, all of which are
characteristic of case studies (Miles & Huberman,
1994). As secondary data, reports published by the
platform administration, news published in the media
and the legislation, which instituted and subsequently
4 V. NARDI ET AL.

regulated the service was considered. Between August Following the methodological propositions of Miles
and December 2016, an observation was held on the and Huberman (1994), this instrument remained flex-
participation of users of the platform through monitor- ible throughout the data collection, with re-editions
ing the evolution of the number of acceptances and the each time a new concept emerged from the intervie-
work of dissemination in social networks. The target of wees’ reports. Finally, the interviews were transcribed
the semi-structured interviews was the users of the and composed the database for the analysis.
platform and the management team (Table 1). The
groups were chosen as a result of the understanding
that the response to the development of the platform is Data analysis
to stimulate stakeholder participation. As senators are The data were analyzed according to their content,
obliged by legislation to participate in the initiative, the following previous categorizations (Bardin, 2011).
catalyst for the platform would be the proposal and However, when new concepts emerged in the examined
support of ideas by users (Brazilian citizens). Thus, sections, they became new categories (Corley & Gioia,
the group of senators did not take part in the semi- 2004). Figure 1 shows the organization of categories of
structured interviews. analysis.
The set of interviewees was chosen by identifying the The previous categories included the platform manage-
suggestions with the highest number of supports and ment (integrating, product or two-sided), and the creation,
also those most recently published on the platform. A capture, and exchange of value. Categories based on power
total of 54 possible respondents were identified, who symmetry, information flow and legitimacy of the platform
were the authors of the 20 ideas with the most support, emerged during the analysis. For each of these categories,
the authors of ideas that received more than 20,000 literature was recalled to support the construction of pro-
supports or the platform’s servers and managers. positions that seek to relate traditional concepts of organi-
These were counted by electronic means to schedule zational studies to this new platform business model. The
the interviews. At the scheduled dates, the interviews characteristics of connecting individuals and building social
occurred through video conferencing with duration networks, led us to develop the theoretical basis to support
between 20 and 40 minutes. After the 13th interview, the discussions on power in inter-organizational relation-
the redundancy of information provided by the inter- ships (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998; Huxham & Beech,
viewees was evident and the collection phase was closed 2003), social networks (Burt, 2002), and institutional legiti-
on the grounds of theoretical saturation. macy (Selznick, 1948; Zucker, 1977).
Held during October and November 2016, the inter- In the initial classification, emerging categories were
views shadowed an instrument of data collection. subdivided. Issues of power symmetry, for example,
referred to the structure of relationships within the
platform or the effective distribution of power and
Table 1. Respondents. therefore these formed different categories. The rela-
Code Description tionship structure was also relevant for the understand-
USU1 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the ing of the information flow in the platform. Data
time of the research. Private watchman, 29 years old
USU2 The author of legislative idea approved with more than 20,000
supports. Military, 47 years old
USU3 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the
time of the research. Student, 19 years old
USU4 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the
time of the research. Psychologist, 33 years old
USU5 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the
time of the research. Biomedic, 35 years old
USU6 The author of legislative idea approved with more than 20,000
supports. Student, 26 years old
USU7 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the
time of the research. Student, 29 years old
USU8 The author of an open legislative idea receiving support at the
time of the research. Business administrator, 34 years old.
USU9 The author of legislative idea approved with more than 20,000
supports. Business administrator, 30 years old
USU10 The author of legislative idea approved with more than 20,000
supports but not accepted by the special commission. Systems
analyst, 41 years old
USU11 The author of legislative idea approved with more than 20,000
supports. Public employee, 31 years old
GES1 Public employee. Member of support team
GES2 Public employee. Member of support team Figure 1. Categories of analysis.
Source: Data collection Source: Preliminary data analysis

regarding the sharing of information by users of the
platform were used to complement this category.
Finally, the legitimacy of the platform was evidenced
in two ways: by recognition of its results and by the
credibility of being administered by a public organiza-
tion. The article presents the collected evidence and
discussed it concerning the theoretical and empirical
implications of users’ interactions and responses by
platform management. These categories help in under-
standing the development and sustainability of an
essentially social returns-based platform.
Case discussion
The public platform “Ideia Legislativa” was created
from the mobilization of Federal Senate employees
and instituted on December 2011. The objective of the
public initiative is “Creating direct connections
between the people and the Federal Senate, serving as
a basis for the suggestion of new laws or propositions to
change existing laws.” The platform is available to any
Brazilian citizen with a previous registration. After
application, people can present their suggestion in the
form of a brief report that contains a title, a description
of a problem and the suggested solution. The registra-
tion of a legislative idea generates a preliminary analysis
by managers (who verify the adherence to the norms of
use of the tool) and, in the case of adequacy, it turns
published on the website of the platform. From the
moment of publication, the idea is available for
120 days, the deadline for receiving support. If the
idea receives the minimum support established within
this period (20,000 supports), the idea is accepted and
continues its progress. If it does not receive this amount
of support, the idea does not follow the procedure to
publication and leads to a repository available for
future access by senators.
After receiving 20,000 supports in the four-month
period, ideas go to the human rights commission and
participatory legislation committee registered as legis-
lative suggestions. In the committee, the ideas receive a
rapporteur responsible for quoting whether they are
plausive or not. After 5 years of platform existence, 11
ideas have crossed the barrier of 20,000 supports.
Among these, the human rights commission rejected
three, and another eight are still under evaluation in the
commission. Figure 2 shows the growth of legislative
ideas registered on the platform between 2012, the year
of its creation, and 2016.
During the research period, 2,629 legislative ideas
were open for receiving support on issues of collective
interest, such as the regulation of abortion, criminaliza-
tion of gender discrimination, ending of immunity
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 5
Figure 2. Number of ideas registered (2012–2016).
Source: e-Cidadania portal
from tax for religious entities, the liberalization of mar-
ijuana and consumer law issues. There were also topics
of interest to specific groups, such as professional
career enhancements.
Participation structure
The actors of a platform (Kohler, 2015) are present in
the case of legislative ideas. On the one hand, there are
the creators, that is, citizens motivated by their partici-
pation in associations and social groups or by a social
perception of problems, who actively use their social
capital to spread their proposition. On the other hand,
there are the managers and senators who by virtue of
their office and by force of law are obliged to receive
and analyze proposals that exceed the barrier of 20,000
supports. The provider team, equivalent to the com-
pany on a private platform, is responsible for enabling
the interactions between both sides.
The fact that presence is compulsory does not con-
stitute an element guaranteeing the effective participa-
tion of the public side (senators and managers). This
fact is evident in GES2’s perception stating that “The
opinions of the public do not bind the senators’ deci-
sion.” In the same way, GES1 states that “[. . .] I only
know that this interaction over the internet will grow a
lot. However, it will depend on whether the system will
allow it to advance.” Ideological aspects were also
reported by GES1 when stating that “The citizen’s par-
ticipation grows vertiginously. That should scare these
folks, you know? It is as if this threatens the represen-
tative system,” a point endorsed by USU8 who states
that “The majority either ignores or is afraid of the
issues addressed” and by USU3 who seems frustrated
when stating that “[the] Citizens participation does not
necessarily mean that proposals become propositions.”
In a complementary way, this perception stands on
USU11 opinion who states that “The e-Cidadania
6 V. NARDI ET AL.
portal, created in 2011, however, has already shown
limitations, either in the small number of proposals
that have reached 20,000 supports or in the refusal to
effectively submit the suggestions sent by society.”
These perceptions regarding the effective participa-
tion of both parts in the platform demonstrate a
fragility in the strategy used by the management
team. The work of dissemination and engagement is
only to stimulate the participation of the creators,
rather than affecting its reception by the senators.
Parker et al. (2016) emphasize that both producer
and consumer should have their roles explicitly
defined and understood on a platform. In unremun-
erated competition-regime platforms, there is greater
care in controlling the input and contributions of
participants. Otherwise, the growth of the platform
with the proposed new suggestions can affect the
quality of the solutions of legislation, due to the
noise, the uncertainties and even the confusion of
information and solutions generated (Boudreau &
Jeppesen, 2015). To alleviate these uncertainties, the
platforms use engagement. As individuals become
more engaged in a community, they receive better-
quality feedback from other participants (Bayus,
2013). Although the number of ideas diminishes
over time, maturation increases participants’ learning
and consequently the potential of these ideas to be
implemented, which results in greater process effi-
ciency (Huang, Vir Singh, & Srinivasan, 2014).
In this way, the development of a platform with
social returns requires the engagement of its creators
and consumers, as suggested by Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: The development of a social platform is
positively linked to the engagement and participation of
the constituent parts - creator and consumer.
Power and information exchange
In addition to engagement, the platform also faces
operational challenges. When the idea reaches 20,000
supports, it proceeds to the human rights commission
of the Senate. From this point on, there is no further
possibility of monitoring its progress for its author. The
proposal is then assigned into lots to one of the sena-
tors who endorses the continuing progress or the
achievement of the suggestion. Up to the date of com-
pletion of this research, no legislative idea has suc-
ceeded in creating or modifying a law. These
bureaucratic processes affect the efficiency of the plat-
form. Such a perception is evidenced in the analysis of
interviewees’ responses when questioned about the
usability of the platform.
For USU9, the procedure after overcoming the
20,000-supports barrier should change. “I understand
that there has to be a legal analysis, but the decision
should start from the public and not from a small
Senate committee. . .” Similarly, USU6 summarizes the
problems of following up his proposition, “I did not
like the fact that you cannot choose the senator who
will take the proposal . . . because you get a proposal,
then the guy is totally against this proposal, writes
something, and rejects it.”
Within crowds, it is observed that the more distinct
the members of the group are perceived to be, the
greater is the impact of their collective dimension. On
the other hand, different estimates may lead people to
choose similar judgments to their own, a so-called “big
lens trap” phenomenon, as discussed by Dahlander and
Piezunka (2014). Regardless of the number of opinions
that a participant receives from distinct groups, those
who do not agree with the participant opinion are
discarded, and only those whose judgment is redundant
are incorporated (Mannes, 2009). Nevertheless, cultural
aspects are also important, because when there is a lack
of cultural alignment between foundations and public
contexts, ideas are rejected (Chua, Roth, & Lemoine,
2015; Mollick, 2014).
In addition to these aspects, Parker et al. (2016)
propose the network effect as one of the ways to eval-
uate the performance of a platform. When a platform
grows in numbers of users, this can lead to either
positive effects on the network relations when it is
well managed and capable of producing significant
value for each user of the platform, or negative effects
on the network when the growth in the number of
users makes the platform inefficient. The distribution
of power among stakeholders and the flow of informa-
tion are evidenced in this case and seem to determine
the effectiveness of the platform.
Among other fields, the inter-organizational relation
studies the division of power in complex relationships.
Although the level of analysis of this area of study
stands in the relationship between organizations, the
networks formed by these relationships are very similar
to platforms. In general, the argument is that exagger-
ated power asymmetry tends to discourage cooperative
behavior (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998; Huxham &
Beech, 2003). The case of the “Ideia Legislativa” plat-
form shows that the final decision-making power of
promulgation or disapproval of proposed legislation
and therefore the power to make the platform effective
is limited to a single senator or a small group of
senators. The management team of the legislative idea

is not able to balance this power asymmetry and to
guarantee the efficiency of the platform. The challenge
of including users in the process (Brabham, 2009), in
order to respect and make effective their desires
(Hartley & Wood, 2005; Royo & Yetano, 2015; Sæbø,
Rose, & Flak, 2008) needs special attention, especially
in an integrative-model platform. Such evidence sup-
ports proposition 2:
Proposition 2: the development of a social platform is
positively linked to the symmetry of power between the
constituent parts - creator and consumer.
The flow and sharing of information are themes to
be considered in the architecture of a platform (Parker
et al., 2016). Evidence in this regard indicates that the
platform studied has presented operational difficulties
for the exchange of information that have caused cred-
ibility losses. USU7 reported frustrated access due to
system failures. “On the day that I posted the idea on
my Facebook, the platform went dead. No one could
access it.” The same perception was reported by USU4
when he stated that “[. . .] the team would contact me
after the analysis to inform me if the idea had been
accepted . . . I did not receive this contact . . . and only
realized that it had been approved and was already
online after almost 12 days.”
Another issue that affects the exchange of informa-
tion is the lack of disclosure about the platform. The
interviewee USU9 states that “[. . .] you only know, only
participate if you have access to the Internet. So, this
tool is interesting, but this is a limiting factor because
only those who have access to the internet will partici-
pate.” This perception is reiterated by USU6 when he
states that “I think that in a way, like almost everything
in Brazil, it is a platform that is still somewhat elitist . . .
you need a lot of knowledge to use it.” Being a partici-
patory and productive community is a challenge recog-
nized by the literature (Brabham, 2010). In this case,
the nonexistence of a public relations and marketing
plan implemented together with the platform amplifies
the challenge. This spontaneous and unplanned disclo-
sure process is recognized by GES1 when he states that
“A lot of users come because of some Facebook post,
they participate in the public consultation of an idea,
from there they present ideas.”
The lack of a dissemination plan for the platform
contributes to increasing the perception of exclusion.
This feeling, usually related to digital platforms, finds
support in the literature that recognizes a recurring lack
of access holders and usage skills (Brabham, 2009).
New alternatives were implemented by platform man-
agers to address this problem. This is the perception of
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 7
GES2, evidenced by the following statement: “In the
‘Ideia Legislativa’ platform people can even submit by
phone . . . so if she does not have access to a computer,
she can call free to the Senate and the idea will be
registered under her name . . . by the attendants of the
Senate . . . so we have already managed to get people
who do not have access to computers and cell phones
to get their ideas out.”
These new tools, however, do not seem to reach the
users, who all said they did not know of such possibi-
lities. Thus, the development of a platform with social
returns requires a constant exchange of information
between the creators and consumers, as suggested by
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3: the development of a social platform is
positively linked to the exchange of information between
the constituent parts - creator and consumer.
Platform support
Although the platform has operational problems and it
does not allow the balance between the sides of the
relationship advocated by the literature as the basis
for the success of a platform strategy (Hagiu &
Spulber, 2013), participation in the platform “Ideia
Legislativa” grows exponentially. The first factor cap-
able of explaining this fact concerns the presence of a
public institution as a platform manager. The statement
of USU5 evidences the relevance. “As it is a platform of
the government, we can say that it generates certain
credibility for people, which helps to obtain these sup-
ports, besides it represents to us a direct channel with
the federal Senate, which assists the break with the old
image of archaic politics.” This credibility of the plat-
form is understood in institutional theory as legitimacy
(Selznick, 1948). Authors, such as Zucker (1977) pro-
pose that participants in organizations endow with
greater credibility and legitimacy compared to a private
individual.
Essential social returns reinforce such credibility.
Unlike economic return platforms like Airbnb and
Uber, for example, where there is a clear individual
return (Hagiu & Rothman, 2016), on the platform
“Ideia Legislativa” the benefits are diffuse and collec-
tive. Outreach, although it extends to only a particular
population group (as in the case of proposals for
changes in career paths, for example), is not limited
to the individual who presents the idea and has the
catalytic power of support. In contrast to previously
unsuccessful social returns initiatives, such as the
“Myoo Create” platform (Rover, 2010), which was
8 V. NARDI ET AL.
based on environmental and social challenges and
which closed after a short period (Kohler, 2015), the
presence of the institution can result in support for the
platform. This factor adds to a growing interest in new
forms of participation in public management, derived
from ICTs that stimulate communication and interac-
tion between citizens and governments (Ellison &
Hardey, 2014; Nam, 2012). In this way, the support of
a platform with social returns requires the legitimiza-
tion provided by organizations of recognized institu-
tional strength, as stated by Proposition 4:
Proposition 4: The support of a social platform is posi-
tively linked to the legitimacy conferred by organizations
of recognized institutional strength.
Although platforms can offer a new way to create
value between public power and the population
through a system of integrating external actors (citi-
zens) with administrative processes (Hilgers & Ihl,
2010), the great challenge of the “Ideia Legislativa”
platform is to capture the value created by its users
(Kohler, 2015). Although there is a constant creation
of value (represented by the full debate on and submis-
sion of proposals), it is not yet absorbed by the promot-
ing institution. GES2 states that “Some senators are
even interested in these ideas that have not reached
20,000 supports and they use them as a bank of legis-
lative ideas so they can submit projects inspired by
these ideas . . . however, this interest is recent, and
now they are beginning to analyze this bank of ideas.”
This barrier could diminish by changing the plat-
form management model (Kohler, 2015). Nowadays,
the platform can migrate to an integrator model in
the range of collaborative communities, promoting the
contributions of all creators in an original set of value
through direct interactions between producers (citi-
zens) and managers (senators), reducing the role of
the provider to operational maintenance of the system.
The solution could also lead to overcoming the follow-
up difficulties widely reported by the interviewees. In
this model, platform users perform a range of activities
that create value, including providing ideas, but also
improving existing ones, solving challenges, and even
collecting content (Kohler, 2015).
In this context, the platform has a role not only as an
intermediary for ideas but as a social intermediary
(Colombo, Franzoni & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015). The plat-
form can develop and support creators through the
creation of specific forums of ideas (Gleasure, 2015),
virtual communities with the aim of encouraging co-
production behavior creating a sense of community
benefit (Xu, Zheng, Xu, & Wang, 2016) and developing
functionalities that allow social interactions within gen-
eralist social networks, such as LinkedIn and Facebook,
generating a sense of presence among the participants
of the platform (Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra,
2015). The challenge is to engage, and devote sufficient
attention to, the central creators so that they remain
active on the platform (Kohler, 2015).
To date, people continue to use the platform because
they perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs and
feel that they are contributing to a cause greater than
individual interests (Franke, Keinz, & Klausberger,
2013). However, the lack of balance between the two
sides and the operational difficulties could jeopardize
the long-term sustainability of the strategy.
Concluding remarks
The platform “Ideia Legislativa,” as part of the e-citi-
zenship project of the Brazilian Federal Senate, has
demonstrated the real possibility of society’s engage-
ment in the political decisions of a country. Since its
implementation in 2012, the growth in citizen partici-
pation is evident, with ideas for changes in legislation
with a broad range of purposes. Although some moti-
vations are individual or confined to private groups
(i.e., specific professional career enhancements), the
vast majority of ideas for amending legislation stem
from issues of collective concern, (i.e., abortion regula-
tion, criminalization of sexual discrimination and con-
sumer rights issues). The evidence presented
demonstrates that a platform strategy can be developed
based on an essentially social return offer, in contrast to
business case success stories (Kohler, 2015; Parker
et al., 2016). Furthermore, the case study of the “Ideia
Legislativa” platform allows us to investigate the way in
which a strategy of this type sustains.
Although there has been growing participation by
civil society during the 5 years of operation of the tool,
no idea has been enacted by legislation modification.
This lack of effectiveness of the platform is due to some
of the challenges reported by users, especially regarding
the contribution of public participation. These reports,
together with the observation of the platform’s operat-
ing dynamics, allowed us to identify four points that
support the development of a platform with essentially
social returns: (a) active engagement of the involved
parts, (b) power symmetry, (c) information exchange
intensity, and (d) links with an organization with
recognized institutional strength.
The way in which the platform deals with these four
elements will inform the incipient literature on the
subject, being the basis for the theoretical contributions
of the study. Platforms are social constructions that

facilitate interaction between actors in society. For this
reason, power, information exchange, legitimacy and
capacity to generate relationships are all issues relevant
to platform analysis. As the main contribution of the
study, these observations are also evident in the propo-
sitions listed throughout the article.
About managerial contributions, this study indicates
that the most appropriate way to manage a platform
based on essentially social returns is via the integrative
form of collaborative communities. As the platform
“Ideia Legislativa” does not adopt this form, this study
proposes improvements so that the platform can
develop and find the effectiveness necessary for its
sustainability. Also, the results of the analysis seek to
inform managers of other social platforms, such as
those used to stimulate the participation of society in
public services, on the challenges relating to sustain-
ability over time.
Regarding limitations of the study, it is plausible to
mention the exclusion of senators as respondents of the
research, the exclusion of the contextual effect and the
lack of generalization of the results. Although it was
defined by the focus of the analysis in considering sena-
tors as legally bound to participate, it is appropriate to
exclude the point of view of one of the actors in the review
of a platform. A second limitation concerns the impact of
the environmental context of the analysis. Because it is a
specific case study, aspects, such as culture, political influ-
ences and ideologies, among other items that support the
cultural dimension of the phenomenon, were not
included in the analysis. For this reason, this research
limits to deepening understanding of the interactions
that occurred in the case of the “Ideia Legislativa” plat-
form, without the intention of proposing a possible
generalization.
From these limitations, opportunities arise to deepen
the theme in future research. Treating the phenomenon in
a longitudinal study, for example, may suggest relation-
ships not analyzed in this research, such as the willingness
to reuse the platform or the interaction between users over
time. Also, surveys that attempt to compare platforms,
whether public or private, based on essentially social
returns, can test the propositions raised in this article.
The inclusion of the political–cultural context in the ana-
lysis, to verify the influence of this construct in the rela-
tionships between the actors in the platform would also be
relevant. Finally, future research may seek to develop an
analysis of the preparedness of government agencies to
deal with the increased influence and participation of
society in the governmental decision-making process.
Analyses with this aim tend to broaden the understanding
of how platforms based on essentially social feedback are
developed and can achieve greater effectiveness over time.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9
ORCID
Vinicius Nardi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5363-876X
Jorge Verschoore http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7588-7871
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