SUMMARY

Following on from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the Japanese government
is now in the throes of reviewing its power policy. Under continuing policies of economic revival
and greenhouse gas reduction, it is crucial to consider scenarios for the country to realize reliable,
low-carbon, and economic electricity systems in the future. On the other hand, the social
acceptance of nuclear power will affect the final political decision significantly. Therefore, in the
present study, proposed power generation scenarios in Japan in light of the Fukushima accident
were reviewed comprehensively from economic, environmental, technological, resource, security,
and social perspectives. The review concludes that in Japan, (i) renewable energy mainly solar and
wind needs to be developed as fast as possible subject to various constraints, (ii) more gas power
plants will be used to absorb the fluctuations of intermittent renewable energy and supply
electricity gap, (iii) nuclear power will be reduced in the future, but a 0% nuclear power scenario
by 2030 is unlikely to be a reasonable choice on most measures and (iv) the effective
communication with the public is vital important.

INTRODUCTION

Japan is a country that has been of significant interest in regard to energy usage for a long period.
Apart from leading in many fields of electric power technology research and production, and being
one of the largest importers and consumers of energy, as a country consisting of islands with a
high population relative to land area and a very small domestic resource base, Japan has been a
focus for research in energy security [1]. Additionally, for the historical reason of having the
international convention on climate change signed in Japan, and subsequently given the moniker
of the ‘Kyoto Protocol’, Japan has also made strong commitments to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions. At present, Japan has again become a key focus point because of the earthquake,
tsunami, and subsequent nuclear accident of March 11 (2011). Since the oil crisis in 1973, nuclear
power has long been a cornerstone of energy policy in Japan [2–4], a country with few natural
energy resources of its own. Electricity supply in Japan was highly dependent on nuclear power,
which provided 30% of their electricity demand in 2010 from a total of 54 nuclear power plants
(NPPs). Installed capacity of nuclear power was expected to reach 68 GW by 2030 to supply 40%
electricity and reduce CO2 emission under the strategic energy plan released by the government
in 2010 [5,6], although phaseout of nuclear power was considered for Japan [7]. However, on
March 11, 2011, a devastating magnitude 9.0 earthquake, followed by a tsunami, struck
Northeastern Japan, triggering a nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi NPPs. All of the nuclear
power reactors in the Kanto and Tohoku areas stopped, and the subsequent coolant losses in the
reactors and spent fuel ponds at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant led to hydrogen explosions,
fuel rod meltdown, contamination of the local environment, and evacuation of local residents. It is
quite certain that at least 1 to 4 nuclear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi will be closed permanently,
and the remaining reactors are unlikely to resume operation in the near future in light of public
concern. NPPs in other areas of Japan were also suspended gradually in the wake of the March
2011 accident, and finally on May 4, 2012, with the stop of the last reactor, Tomari-3 in Hokkaido,
all NPPs were shut down in Japan [8]. Only recently in July, the 3 and 4 reactors in the Oi NPP in
Fukui Prefecture were reactivated to help alleviate potential summertime power shortages in
areas serviced by the Osaka-based utility, Kansai Electric Power Company, despite lingering public
concerns over nuclear safety [9]. At present, although it is very difficult to assess the ultimate
impact on Japan’s nuclear program, the Japanese government has released the tentative data of
economic loss from the nuclear accident and the increased risk cost of nuclear power [10].
Furthermore, after the Fukushima accident, Japan has had to use more fossil fuel to supply enough
electricity, which has led (and will continue to lead) to economic and environmental damage.
Many studies focusing on electricity best mix, economic, environmental, and energy security
perspectives have been conducted including some multi-objective analysis studies [11,12]. In
response to the current energy crisis, the Japanese government has published a proposal for
public consultation, detailing three potential future scenarios with, respectively, 0%, 15%, and 20–
25% nuclear power [13]. At present, 70% of Japanese government supports the 0% scenario in
which nuclear power will be reduced to zero by 2030 [14]. However, apart from the safety issues
of nuclear power, Japan also faces very serious problems of energy security [15], targets of
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions [16], and economic, potential, and technological
bottlenecks to renewable energy penetration [10,17]. Energy supply in Japan is 96% dependent on
overseas imports [18], and the price of energy resources is still increasing in international markets
[19]. The domestic CO2 emissions in Japan have increased by 20% compared with 1990 levels in
the electricity generation sector up to 2009 [16] despite commitments to emissions reductions.
Renewable energy development has been focused in Japan since tens of years ago [20–22],
especially solar power [23–25] and wind power [26], as well as biomass [27–29], and some future
scenarios of renewable energy in Japan were also proposed to meet electricity demand and
reduce CO2 emission [30–33]. Feed-in tariff (FIT) policies also were focused to incent the
renewable energy development [34,35]; however, the ratio of renewable energy (except hydro) in
electricity supply is only less than 2% in 2010 [36] and 20% in 2030 at maximum due to the
economic, physical potential, and technological constraints [13]. Therefore, renewable energy still
needs tens of years at least to become the possible backbone of electricity supply. With more
intermittent renewable energy penetration, more clean gas power plants are expected to absorb
intermittent renewable energy and supply electricity gap, but the import liquefied natural gas
(LNG) is also subject to resource, price, and energy security constraints [37–39]. On the other
hand, the safety performance of advanced nuclear power technologies has been improved greatly
[40], especially the passive safety of AP1000 [41], and inhere safety of high temperature gas
reactor and small molten reactor [42–44,40]. However, the public acceptance for the advanced
nuclear power technologies is crucial important for their future. Therefore, the electricity
generation technology selection issue needs to be considered from comprehensively from not only
technology, security, economic, and environmental perspectives but also social and political
perspectives. The nuclear safety issue is particularly sensitive in Japan, and the social acceptance
and political influence will ultimately decide the nuclear power policy. It is crucial to consider the
energy policy across the whole country in the mid-to-long term to realize a future clean and safe
electricity system considering constraints from various perspectives. Therefore, the present study
provides a comprehensive review from the technological, economic, environmental, energy
security, nuclear safety, social, and political perspectives. The results show that renewable
energy—particularly solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal—should be developed as fast as
possible subject to various constraints, and more natural gas power plants are necessary to absorb
fluctuations of intermittent renewable energy; however, removing nuclear power entirely by 2030
was not recommended, and the open and effective communication with the public is crucial
important to effectively move forward with energy policy selection.
PROPOSED SCENARIOS IN LIGHT OF FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

Because Fukushima has brought the urgency of energy policy consideration back to the forefront
of public and academic discussion, a number of examinations of Japan’s energy policy and energy
supply options have been published—for example, [11–15,30–33]. Some papers have raised the
potential of largely or entirely renewable energy supplied electricity in Japan. Tsuchiya [30]
showed that a mix of 75% solar and 25% wind would minimize required storage to balance for
instability or demand-generation timing differences, whereas the optimal supply was 50% solar,
20% wind, and 30% other renewable and back-up power. These figures support previous studies
indicating that solar-wind power systems with appropriate back-up and storage can provide a
significant level of reliability [33]. A number of groups have further examined the potential for 80%
cuts in emissions by 2050, in line with high-end government targets, which they have shown to be
achievable with the retention of nuclear power, and with the substitution of natural gas for
nuclear meaning a 65% cut in emissions would be possible [32]. Others have examined the
potential for emissions reductions without carbon capture and storage or nuclear energy, showing
potential by 2100 to be approximately 50% reduction for Japan without these technologies—only
a marginal disadvantage [31]. On the other hand, in some studies, removing nuclear entirely by
2030 was not suggested because of a weighing up of economic, environmental, and energy
security perspectives [11,12,15]. Without nuclear power, under current conditions, the emissions
per unit of electricity in Japan have already risen and started to impact on the economy. The
question of whether nuclear power can be eliminated from the energy mix is most important to
the current policy decisions, but it is a multifaceted problem, and the answer derived is largely
based on the underlying assumptions. Given the changed supply situation, the ongoing problems
at Fukushima, and heightened anti-nuclear power opposition, the government has released a
document for discussion, entitled ‘Options for Energy and the Environment ’[13]. This document
attempts to frame the public discussion by first introducing the pre-Fukushima energy policy, then
presenting key points to be considered and finally three energy scenarios based on different
nuclear power development strategies and some analysis of these scenarios. Similar to the
previous energy policy outlined in Japan’s ‘Basic Energy Plan’ [5], the document puts forth ‘three
viewpoints to promote drastic energy structure reforms that need to be addressed whatever
options are chosen’:

(1) Shifting to clean energy sources and securing green growth

(2) Reforming the energy system led by demand side actors

(3) Multifaceted international contribution for energy and the environmental field

The document then outlines ‘four important perspectives in choosing energy options’:

(1) Securing nuclear safety and reducing future risks

(2) Strengthening energy security

(3) Contributing to the solution of global warming

(4) Restraining costs and preventing hollowing out of industry

Again, these are followed by explanatory subpoints, which emphasize safety for nuclear
operations and the risk of spent fuel, balancing nuclear reduction with energy security, the
importance of technology and the balance of emissions and offshore offsets and ensuring that jobs
are not lost and the economy not adversely impacted by nuclear power reduction. It is apparent
therefore that, despite the changed situation in terms of perceptions of nuclear safety, many of
the underlying policy assumptions of the previous decades are still dominant. Perhaps the two
major changes (apart from re-emphasis on nuclear safety) are a focus on decentralization and
liberalization of energy supply and on the ‘green development’ strategy that has been adopted in
other countries in recent times.

The three scenarios outlined as potential energy futures out to 2030 are summarized in Table I and
Figures 1 and 2 [13], in which hydro power is included into renewable energy. As shown in
Figures1 and 2, in the first scenario, all NPPs will be closed permanently, and thus nuclear power
contributes zero electricity by 2030; on the other hand, renewable energy contributes 35%
electricity; in the second scenario, new NPPs will be cancelled, and existing plant will be closed
with a 40-year lifetime; thus, nuclear power contributes 15% electricity at 2030, at the same time,
renewable energy will contribute 30% electricity; in the third scenario, new NPP construction plans
will be continued at a slower pace than previously forecast, and at 2030, nuclear power will
contribute 20–25% electricity supply, at the same time, renewable energy contributes 30–25%
electricity. Three scenarios assume that the government’s planned reduction in electricity demand
from 1.1 to 1 trillion TWh is achieved linearly from 2012 onwards through to 2030. Also, each of
these scenarios is still predicted to achieve between 15% and 25% reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions by 2030, although these levels of reductions as well as the economic impacts (in the
analysis presented in the document) may largely be attributed to the specific set of assumptions
prescribed by the government when it tendered out the analysis.

REVIEW OF THE POLICY SCENARIOS

In order to clearly understand the implications of these alternative scenarios, in this section, we
review the options from the perspectives of technology, safety, energy security, environment,
economy, and society. By using this breakdown, we seek to clarify the key issues and highlight
advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of alternative scenarios.

-Technology and safety perspectives

The first point of review is the viability of technology under the government proposals. With
regard to the state of maturity of technology, Japan’s energy sector has some of the best available
technology in the world—especially, for instance, supercritical and ultra-supercritical coal
technology, making the fossil fuel power fleet one of the highest efficiency globally [45]. Likewise,
Japanese companies have been among the leaders in development and production of wind
turbines and photovoltaics (PVs), as well as electricity system devices globally [20–25]. The
required lead time for new fossil fuel power plant—especially LNG combined cycle plant would be
sufficiently short as to allow the additional construction to be achieved, as long as land could be
found to house it. Examining the required electricity generation under the given scenarios by
source (Figures 1 and 2) shows that in fact the main constraint in capacity is the renewable energy
except hydro—which has to increase by at least sixfold in its output in order to fulfill any of the
proposed strategies. Coal generation will decrease, although there may be replacement of old
plants with newer, more efficient ones and gas must only expand its output marginally. With the
large scale penetration of intermittent renewable energy, more gas power capacity is necessary to
absorb the fluctuations of the electricity system, for example, in 0% scenario with 17% solar and
wind power, if no more storage device capacity, about 100 GW, gas power plants are necessary to
keep the stability of the system compared to 60 GW in 2010 through the calculations using hour-
by-hour simulation model [11]. Therefore, electricity storage technologies and smart grid
technologies and control strategies are very necessary to realize a reliable electricity system with
high penetration of intermittent [22].

Maintaining nuclear power in the mix, under the 15% and 20% scenarios, is also an important
technical consideration. One of the exacerbating factors in the safety of nuclear power in Japan
particularly is the prevalence of earthquakes. In the Fukushima accident, the subsequent massive
tsunami also played a major role in disabling the plant cooling system. In the proposed electricity
system, nuclear power will be reduced to a greater or lesser extent. The root reason for the
phaseout of nuclear power is the concern about the safety of NPPs, which was triggered (or
reinvigorated) by the Fukushima accident. All the technology reasons for the Fukushima Daiichi
NPP accident have been explained very well elsewhere [46,47], especially, three points have been
highlighted: (i) the height of the seawall defending the plant was too low (new estimates show
that this is the case at most of the NPP facilities on the Pacific coast of Japan), (ii) the emergency
diesel generators were insufficient in number and were vulnerable to the tsunami because of
location and (iii) the Mark 1 containment design technology of the NPPs had been pointed out to
be vulnerable before the accident and was damaged in the earthquake [48]. By some estimates,
the core damage frequencies from internal events for existing plants have dropped by 80% since
the early 1990s. The preparation of off-site power sources like emergency diesel generators will
definitely strengthened after the Fukushima disaster. Furthermore, the new technologies will have
legislated passive safety and inherent safety features [40–44] that can provide coolant function to
avoid accidents in disasters such as the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. Therefore,
the safety performance of advanced nuclear power technology has undoubtedly been improved
greatly in the 40 years since Fukushima Daiichi was built, and in the proposed electricity system
scenarios, the technology improvement should be considered thoroughly.

Safety of the electricity generation system is a crucial issue and has been emphasized in Japanese
energy policy a number of times over the past decades—especially because of the distrust of
nuclear power and opposition to its usage. Fukushima brought this issue an even greater level of
importance. However, it is important to note that there are safety risks inherent in every form of
energy provision to society—although of course factors such as scale and the inherent toxicity or
flammability (for instance) of certain fuels tend to make certain systems more vulnerable or
hazardous [49]. All energy systems have some weakness—but proper assessment, training, and
mitigation measures can alleviate much of the risk (although certainly not all). In the proposed
electricity system scenarios, the safety was evaluated only using the ratio of dependence on
nuclear power, and the safety of nuclear power was only evaluated for the generation phase (not
the full fuel cycle). As mentioned, with the technology improvement and experience accumulation,
safety performance can definitely be strengthened—although it is not clear whether this will be
sufficient for operation to be accepted in a country with high earthquake activity such as Japan.
Furthermore, nuclear power safety does not only include the operation of NPPs but also the
storage, transportation, recycle, disposal of spent nuclear fuel [50,51], and decommissioning to
the current sites. At present, there are about 20,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel that is stored
inside of NPPs or interim storage facilities in Japan. The management and disposal of the spent
nuclear fuel requires nuclear power technicians, experts, various advanced technologies, and large
financial support. If nuclear power is removed entirely by 2030 in Japan, it is likely that there will
be a very serious problem of the lack of skilled technicians to operate NPPs and manage spent
nuclear fuel in the near future, and it will be very difficult to save and develop many advanced and
important technologies of nuclear power. While the NPPs and the storage of spent fuel continue,
and with the reduction in the skilled workforce, removing nuclear power entirely by 2030 is
unlikely to improve the safety of nuclear power and electricity system in the midterm. It will lead
to the losses of important expertise and technologies, which have been obtained through long-
term commitment and large financial investment. These will be very difficult to recover once lost.
On the other hand, in the 15% scenario in which nuclear power is reduced to half in 2030
compared with 2010 [13], the economic and environmental performance can be improved greatly
comparing with the 0% scenario, while also providing a practical way to ensure nuclear power
safety comprehensively. From 2010 to 2030, the reduced output of spent nuclear fuel will be more
readily reprocessed or disposed, leading to less strain on limited facilities. The spent nuclear fuel
can be partly reprocessed and partly direct disposed, then after 2030, nuclear power development
policy needs to be evaluated again. If renewable energy can provide sufficient, reliable, and
economic electricity supply, nuclear power can be reduced to zero by 2050 at that time.

-Energy resource and security perspectives

In the proposed electricity system scenarios, renewable energy will be expanded greatly. The
remaining key constraints must be considered in terms of renewable energy, as the fossil fuel
components do not have significant expansion issues. Land area is one key constraint in Japan—
and in particular, suitable land area for renewable energy (typically diffuse) given that around 66%
of the country is forested, and much of that is mountainous. The penetration of renewable energy
is highly dependent on renewable energy resource availability. Japan will have to increase
substantially the amount of electricity provided by renewable sources, especially ‘new’ sources
such as wind, solar, and biomass, because the country’s hydroelectric potential has already been
largely exploited [52]. At present, the installed capacity of hydro power is 21 GWe, and pumped
storage hydropower is 27 GWe, and the potential of undeveloped small and medium-scale hydro
power is only about 2 GWe at FIT purchase price of 20 yen/kWh and 10 GWe at FIT purchase price
of 30 yen/kWh [17]. The potentials of solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal electricity subject to
various constraints are listed in the following

Table II [17,52–54]. Of course, there must be many arguments concerning the preconditions of
potential estimation, and it is quite different from people to people. For example, the potential of
PV power is estimated on the basis of the available space with assumption of 20% average

conversion efficiency; on the other hand, if the conversion efficiency can be improved to 40%, the
potential capacity can also be doubled with the same area. So beyond the physical limitation, one
of the major restrictions on expansion is the limitation in production capacity—the scenarios for
2030 predict an increase of around 20 times the current installed capacity of both wind power and
PV. Estimates are that Japan can produce between 4 and 5 GW of PV cells domestically on an
annual basis, making the PV target achievable, whereas the wind power target is also in line with
other estimates.

Therefore the technical limitation is found to be consistent, although it may stretch the limits of
capacity. Auxiliary equipment limitations such as batteries and transmission lines are also not
included, which is likely to make the scenarios a little less easy to achieve. Apart from renewable
energy, the proposed scenarios will lead to the need to import fossil fuel—especially LNG—from
overseas. For example, the analysis indicates that 10% additional LNG will need to be imported for
power generation compared with 2010 in the 0% scenario [13]. The broader context of fossil fuels
as an ultimately limited resource—whether domestic or global—is also important in regard to
energy security. The conventional gas resource is 187 trillion cubic meters at the end of 2010, and
the reserve/production ratio was only 58 years [55]. The International Energy Agency predicts that
global gas demand will increase by more than half between 2010 and 2035 [56]. Fortunately,
unconventional gas comprising mainly shale gas, tight gas, and coal-bed methane will make up
32% of the total supply, up from 14% today. For example, shale gas reserves in 14 countries have
been estimated tentatively as more than 180 trillion cubic meters [39], which is equal to the total
reserve of conventional gas. Russia and the Middle East hold the largest reserves of conventional
gas, whereas available sources of unconventional gas are spread across the world and can be
found in countries that are currently net importers, such as China and America as shown in Figure
3 [39]. But the ease of accessibility will vary from well to well. Extracting shale gas (which is
trapped between layers of shale rock) and tight gas (found in sandstone) involves bombarding the
rock with water and chemicals, a technique known as ‘fracking’. However, it is uncertain whether
costs will ultimately be higher or lower because of the technologies employed in extraction, and
whether growing competition in the market will outpace production expansion.

Therefore, the LNG import requirements in the proposed electricity scenarios of Japan are
expected to be met by unconventional gas especially shale gas [57,58]. However, whether
renewable energy mainly including solar and wind can supply 20% electricity by 2030 is the most
important challenge. So, reducing even removing nuclear power will worsen the energy security in
Japan, with the help of domestic renewable energy and overseas shale gas, the energy security
issue in Japan is expected to be solved successfully. However, still more energy needs to be
imported from overseas, and thus, more uncertainties of energy security are unavoidable.

Coal, on the other hand, has much larger reserves, and is a cheaper fuel, so is unlikely to be a
constraining factor in the energy security equation. Furthermore, although Japan has coal
reserves, these are largely inaccessible or of poor geological quality, but these may be useful in
terms of carbon capture and storage or may become economically mineable later in the century if
global reserves continue to be depleted. Japanese companies are also heavily involved in coal
resources production in countries such as Australia.

Overall, from the perspective of energy security, the use of the largest possible share of renewable
in Japan is the only option that can lead to energy security in a ‘pure’ sense of the term, whereas
the use of nuclear and the ownership of resources overseas may constitute secondary options (but
under a compromised definition of energy security). However, renewable energy potential is
limited, and the current economic performance cannot make it penetrate fast, although strong
subsidy and FIT supports have been used [34–36]. Furthermore, some studies recommended that
Japan should follow German and European countries to phase out nuclear and to develop
renewable energy as much as possible [59–61], the authors are not against this viewpoint, but just
want to mention the very important differences between these two countries. Germany has much
better geography condition and wind situation than Japan, and the most important is that Europe
has a very advanced electricity grid network, which can ensure the supply reliability even when a
large scale intermittent renewable energy; however, Japan’s electricity grid is isolated with other
countries, even the inter-transmission capacity is very limited between east part and west part
with different frequency. Although some electricity and energy interconnection proposals of Japan
with other North-East countries have been made [62–64], it unlikely can be realized in the near
future because of complicated geography-political and technological reasons.

Economic and environmental perspective

-Economic perspective

Economic performance of the electricity system scenarios can be measured using some key
indicators including power generation cost, household electricity charge, and impacts on gross
domestic product. Following on from the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, new cost
estimations for nuclear power generation in Japan have been conducted as shown in Table III
[10,13]. The estimate factors in the possibility of a core meltdown at a nuclear plant and includes
societal costs such as the cost of dealing with future accidents and policy costs related to
governmental budgets for the first time. The newest estimates mainly include 1.3 yen/kWh
societal cost and 0.5 yen/kWh for dealing with future nuclear risks. The 0.5 yen/kWh for future
nuclear risks is a minimum: the cost would increase by 0.1 yen/kWh for each additional one trillion
yen of damage that occurs at Fukushima [10]. Therefore, nuclear power generation cost is
changed from 6.8 yen/kWh to about 9 yen/kWh. However, still at present, the PV power cost is
about four times the cost of nuclear power or thermal power and is expected to still be almost two
times at 2030 as show in Table III. Furthermore, in the three government-proposed scenarios,
reducing nuclear power to zero by 2030 will lead to two trillion yen per year for fossil fuel import
and power generation cost increase from current 8.6 yen/kWh to more than 15 yen/kWh as
shown in Figure 6 [13], and subsequently the household electricity charge from 5000 to 10,000
yen/month, while also causing gross domestic product losses of 10–50 trillion yen/year [13]. This
does not include the indirect impacts of purchasing and construction work for installations.

There are many studies focused on economic performance of renewable energy mainly solar and
wind [10,52,54]. However, renewable energy still needs decades to reduce its cost to a
comparable level with nuclear and thermal power; if electricity system improvement expenses and
the storage/back-up generation capacity costs are considered, it will become more difficult. This is
one reason why, at present, the Japanese government has introduced a high FIT policy to support
solar power penetration [34–36]. However, there are also some problems associated with the
electricity price increase burden on the whole of society—especially those who do not have
enough money to pay the millions of yen required to install solar panels on their houses.
The future price of energy resources in the global market is quite uncertain (but likely to rise); for
example, in the proposed scenarios, the import price of LNG was $12/mmbtu in 2010, $14/mmbtu
in 2020, and $15/mmbtu in 2030 [14]; however, as shown in Figure 4, Japan imported LNG at a
price of $14.7/mmbtu in 2011 [37]. Although the LNG price is expected to become cheaper in the
future because of the production of shale gas and the change of supply-demand balance situation
[37–39,57,58]; there are too many uncertainties, in the global market to estimate accurately.

In the three scenarios to 2030, LNG power only needs to supply up to 10% more electricity even
when there is no nuclear power. However, using the hour-by-hour simulation model [11], the
obtained results show that about 40-GWe LNG power generation capacity is required to be added
compared with 2010 so that the power generation system can absorb intermittent renewable
energy including solar and wind. In other scenarios with intermittent renewable energy and base
supply nuclear power, more LNG power generation capacity is necessary to absorb electricity
fluctuation, but the capacity factor is relatively low. Ultimately, greater capital and management
costs are necessary for the LNG power plants than would be predicted by a static assessment.
Electricity storage technologies and smart grid control technologies can be used to reduce the
peak generation requirement effectively [25]; however, the cost of devices and infrastructure is
estimated to be huge.

-Environmental perspective

The CO2 emission factors of various power generation technologies are shown in Figure 5 [45].
According to the assumptions, in 2030, most coal-fired power plants will be ultra-supercritical
technology with >600 oC steam temperature, and LNG-fired power plants will be combined cycle
plants (rather than open cycle) in Japan.

In the published three scenarios, 16–25% CO2 emission reductions were estimated to be realized
across the whole energy sector [13]. However, if only the power generation sector is focused on,
the 0% scenario cannot reduce CO2 emissions compared with the 290 million tonnes, which
represent the 1990 level as shown in Figure 6.

Furthermore, although compared with coal, greenhouse gas emissions from combustion of gas are
much less; greenhouse gas emissions from leakage of shale gas during production may be more
than coal [65]. Therefore, the greenhouse footprint needs to be considered across the full fuel
cycle (which should also include the full nuclear fuel cycle), and shale gas production technologies
need to be improved to reduce the leakage as much as possible.

-Social and politics perspectives

From the social perspective, a variety of burdens will be imposed under any of the selected
scenarios. Because the scenarios involve decreasing nuclear dependence, the communities hosting
NPPs are likely to lose direct jobs and subsidies, as well as flow-on effects. A 10% reduction in
electricity consumption is also required, indicating that the community must continue energy
austerity measures or purchase higher efficiency appliances. However, ideally, the community
should be given a chance to decide clearly, but after having had the opportunity to hear a
balanced and objective debate or presentation of the issues.
The Japanese society is very sensitive to the issue of nuclear safety [66,67], and the special nuclear
safety regulation system decided by social culture is criticized for responsible for the accident [68–
71]. At present, there are more than 70% people expressing their support for the zero nuclear
power scenario and, on the other hand, only about 15% people supporting each of the other
scenarios, respectively [14]. Despite the evidence of potential economic and environmental
damage caused by such a scenario, such distant and indirect effects are difficult to incorporate in
decision making. It must therefore be considered how best to communicate the scenarios to non-
specialists in a way that enables an informed choice. Such issues are not new to the energy
sector—for example, with regard to carbon capture and storage, this issue has been widely
evaluated. Some of the main points that require explanation are shown in Table IV.

Politically, if the government wished to run on a popular policy platform, they would be
campaigning for total abolition of nuclear power. However, the Japanese government is in a
tenuous situation regarding its ability to pass legislation or even remain in power for the next few
months. Likewise, the government must take into account the competing interests of business and
the economy, as well as dealing with a large national debt and pension-scheme problems
promoted by an aging society [72]. The critical issue regarding any of the proposed scenarios is
that there is little leeway for implementation—all scenarios require a firm decision and a
commitment that starts investment in the very short term in order to achieve the 2030 outcomes.
One major question for the Japanese government (which has been particularly unstable over the
past 6 years) is whether they can make such a firm commitment without backsliding before the
scenario is achieved.

CONCLUSIONS AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The energy option selection considering Fukushima nuclear accident is a very complicated and
difficult issue. It needs to be considered from economic, environmental, technological, nuclear
safety, energy security, social acceptance, and political perspectives. The published scenarios were
analyzed in this study from multiple perspectives. The obtained results show that (i) renewable
energy mainly solar and wind needs to be developed as fast as possible subject to various
constraints, especially cost reduction and system integration using smart grid technologies, (ii)
more gas power plants will be used to absorb the fluctuations of intermittent renewable energy
and supply electricity gap, but the resource availability, uncertainties of global market price and
environmental problems of shale gas need to be considered, (iii) nuclear power will be reduced in
the future, but policy needs to be robust and dynamically adjustable—once nuclear power
becomes zero in Japan in an early stage, it will be very difficult to restart it if renewable energy
and fossil fuel cannot meet demand successfully. Therefore, the middle range targets of reducing
nuclear power to 15% by 2030 are recommended, from which point, the next step in energy policy
should be decided upon according to the developments of renewable energy technologies and
available and affordable fossil fuel resources. The effective communication with the public to
clearly explain the energy scenarios and their implications is the most important, with very strong
and stable political leadership necessary to solve this complicated issue in Japan.