PEOPLE V.

CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable

classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

FACTS:

Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found
guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one
bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-
Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called
native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory
and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper
exercise of police power.

ISSUES:

Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications.
The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real
and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way
to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-
Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which
hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the
said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood
that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA
TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in
turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement,
as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it
is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling,
but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon.
City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar
goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State
can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by
the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein
fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right
to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy
of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact
be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective
in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact
collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However
well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room
more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582
April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied
for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
“the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation
under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA

7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls
for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be
applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
SUBJECT: TOPIC: Date Made: Digest Maker:
PERSONS When law takes effect 8 Aug 2018 Alrick and Rikki
CASE NAME: Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation,

G.R. No. 179579PONENTE:

SERENO,
J.

Case Date:
February 1, 2012
Case Summary:
-
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued CMO 27-2003 to impose tariffs onwheat
imports based on grade classification.
-
Respondent, a wheat importer, filed for Declaratory Relief with the RTC on the groundof failure
to follow requirement of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003.
-
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
-
CA dismissed the appeal
-
SC denied the petition Rule of Law/Doctrine: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing
and publication under the Revised Administrative
Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.

Detailed Facts:
-

On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes,classifies
wheat according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and(3) port of discharge.
Depending on these factors, wheat would then be classifiedeither as food grade or feed grade
with a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7%respectively.-

On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition forDeclaratory Relief
with the RTC of Las Pinas contending that CMO 27-2003 was issuedwithout following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on publicparticipation, prior notice, and publication
or registration with the University of thePhilippines Law Center.-

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective fortwenty
(20) days from notice.-

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that, among others, was aninternal
administrative rule and not legislative in nature.-

On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to
follow thebasic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of the CMO.-
Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.-

CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights ofpetitioners and
other importers and that the petitioners should have observed therequirements of notice, hearing
and publication.

Issue:
W/N CMO 27-2003 is valid

Holding:

Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as animporter of
wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinentprovisions of Book
VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of theCMO.
Sec 3. Filing.
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center

three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date ofeffectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shallnot thereafter be the
bases of any sanction against any party of persons. Section
Sec 9. Public Participation.
- (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as faras practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interestedparties the opportunity to submit their views prior
to the adoption of any rule.(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless
the proposed ratesshall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2)
weeksbefore the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested casesshall
be observed.
Ruling:SC denied the petition, affirming the previous declaration that the CMO is invalid

Relevant ProvisionsRevised Administrative Code Chapter 2, Sec 3 and 9

MIRASOL V. DPWH
G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for
temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.

Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order
no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road)
toll Expressway under DO 215.

RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction
conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners
complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).

Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were
required to file their Memoranda.

The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?

Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD:

1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the
petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.

The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger
res judicata.

A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a
provisional remedy.

2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued
under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.

They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or
central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to
determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities.

The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and
Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic
Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the
DOTC.

Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption
of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party
assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The
Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or
deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety
and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities.

The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway.
Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode
in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that
could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this
privilege was heavily regulated.
Phil Association of Service Exporters Inc. vs Franklin Drilon
GR 81958.June 30, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc., afirm engaged principally in the
recruitment of male and femaleFilipino workers for overseas employment. Respondents are
FranklinDrilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment and Tomas Achacosoas POEA
Administrator. Petitioner challenges the constitutionalvalidity of DOLE Department Order No. 1
regarding the temporarysuspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and householdworkers.
The said order is being questioned for the particularly forthe following grounds: the
discrimination against males or females;that it applies only to female domestic helpers and not to
all Filipinoworkers; a violation of the right to travel and more importantly aninvalid exercise of
police power.

Issue:
Whether or not Department Order No.1 is valid under theConstitution.

Held:
Yes, the SC said that it is admitted that the assailed order isin the nature of a police measure and
police power is in the domainof the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority
maynot be lawfully delegated as in this case, the Department of Laborand Employment is vested
with such authority by the Labor Code.Police power has been defined as the state authority to
enactlegislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property inorder to promote the
general welfare. As a general rule, official actsenjoy a presumed validity and in the absence of
clear andconvincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logicallystands. The SC also said
that it being the caretaker of Constitutionalrights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation andin fulfilling that duty it must sustain the Government’s efforts.Discrimination in
this case is justified. Lastly, the Court understandsthe impact this order would have on the
business of recruitment butthe concern of the Government is not to maintain profits of
businessfirms which suffer because of governmental regulation, but rather toprovide a decent
living to its citizens. Petition is dismissed.
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995

Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa Rivera, Chief of the Records; Jose T.
Almonte, EIIB Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal Management Division
Chief; Respondent: Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez

FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all
evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing
on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen,
even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made for privilege resting on other considerations.
People vs. Jalosjos (G.R. No. 132875-76)

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of
a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention
of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices
to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the
latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives and to leave his cell.

Held:
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will
virtually make him a free man.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment?
Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer
of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act,
among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a

treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented
an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme
Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA
3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave
to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The
provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class
legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years
of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
“forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which
reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of
the term “other emoluments.”
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part
of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698
December 1, 2009 Equal Protection Clause, Appointed Officials

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that
the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early
printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not
automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners
further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is
Section 13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at
the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding
appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when
they are already treated by law as candidates.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane
to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
RTC, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, et.al.

[G.R. No. 179267; June 25, 2013] Constitutional Law| Equal Protection Clause

Background of the case:

In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.

FACTS:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be
a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
“person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships.

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true
equality.”
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)

Facts:
In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4,
imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1%
per export sale to the United States and other foreign countries. The
company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case
seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.

Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and

exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only sugar central in
Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not
be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set
up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009
DAVID TIU v.COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

The case stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo Postanes
(Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal
charge for grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the two criminal cases were
consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC of Pasay City.

After trial, MeTC rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency of
evidence.

Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. Afterwards, Tiu, through
his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay City
rendered a decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC and ordered the case to be
remanded in the MeTC. Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.

Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of
the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the two
cases. In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon
the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of
acquittal which right the government does not have.

Issue:

Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.

Held:

Yes. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant, through his counsel.

Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Tiu, the offended party in the criminal case is without legal
personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court. Nothing
shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before the
Court. On this ground alone, the SC says the petition must fail.

However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy.

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against Postanes
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over
the criminal case (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC
dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and order
the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress
the Constitutional proscription not to put any person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Oscar Parba y Solon (Parba)
assailing the Decision[2] dated May 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05266, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated September 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CBU-44139, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

The Facts

Parba and a John Doe were charged with the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248[4] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in an Information[5] dated March
14, 1997, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 1997 at about 6:55 A.M. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and shot one
Mark P. Navaja with the gun, hitting the latter on his head and inflicting upon him the following
wounds:

"SHOCK, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND ON THE HEAD (L) OCCIPITAL AREA."

and as a consequence of said injuries Mark P. Navaja died few minutes later.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Parba pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.[6]

The prosecution alleged that at around 6:55 in the morning of January 6, 1997, Jesus Catapan
(Catapan), a security guard of the Salazar Institute of Technology (SIT) in Natalio Bacalso
Avenue, Labangon, Cebu City, was buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed near the main gate
of SIT Elementary Department. Suddenly, Parba, who was then seated beside the vendor, stood
up, pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back of the head while the latter was
helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle.[7] At that instance, the victim, later on
identified as Mark P. Navaja (Navaja), fell to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited
towards the highway, chased by Nestor Buenavista (Buenavista) and Fernando Cuizon (Cuizon),
fellow security guards of Catapan.[8] As they were running, Parba pointed a gun at Buenavista
and Cuizon, prompting the two to seek cover. Parba then boarded a jeepney while Buenavista
and Cuizon followed via a separate jeepney and continued their pursuit.[9] Eventually, Parba
disembarked at Tabada Street and the two security guards lost sight of him.

The following day, the policemen, who were only able to arrest Parba, subjected him to a
paraffin test, where the casts taken off his hands tested positive for the presence of gunpowder
residue.[10] Likewise, Dr. Jesus Cerna, the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of
Navaja, reported that the latter died due to a gunshot wound at the back of the head.[11]
In his defense, Parba denied committing the crime and interposed alibi, denial, and set-up as
defenses. He averred that on the date of the incident, he was sleeping in his house until 10
o'clock in the morning as he came from a drinking spree with his brother the night before.[12]
Later in the afternoon, Jose Leeway Rivera (Rivera), a police officer, arrived and allowed Parba
to test a gun which the former promised to give him. After firing the gun, Rivera invited Parba to
the police headquarters where he learned for the first time that he was suspected of killing
Navaja.[13] Parba admitted that he knew Navaja since they were neighbors and had been friends
since childhood, claiming that the latter was known as a tough guy who had many enemies
because of his attitude.[14] However, Parba maintained that he held no personal grudge against
Navaja.[15]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[16] dated September 22, 2011, the RTC convicted Parba as charged, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of Navaja P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[17]

The RTC refused to give credence to Parba's alibi finding the same to be weak and
unsubstantiated, noting that Parba failed to present his wife or his brother to corroborate his
testimony and to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the incident.
In fact, the short distance of 100 meters between the crime scene and Parba's house, where he
said he was, did not foreclose the possibility of his presence at the crime scene since it would
only take around 20 minutes to get to the place.[18]

On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses - Catapan, Buenavista, and Cuizon - who saw the
crime, positively identified Parba as the one who shot Navaja at the back of his head. It is
undisputed that immediately after the shooting, Buenavista and Cuizon chased Parba and had a
good look at him when he pointed a gun at them.[19] Moreover, Buenavista was familiar with
the face of Parba since he was a former barangay tanod of Labangon City where he often saw the
latter.[20]

Further, the RTC appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since the attack was so
sudden and unexpected, which rendered Navaja totally defenseless. However, the other
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not appreciated since the prosecution
failed to prove the same with certainty.[21]

Aggrieved, Parba appealed[22] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[23] dated May 19, 2014, the CA affirmed Parba's conviction but modified the
award of damages.

It found the elements of Murder to have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. It also found the alibi of Parba weak for
failure to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. More importantly,
the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses greatly outweighs his uncorroborated
alibi.[24]

However, the CA modified the awards of damages in favor of Navaja's heirs and ordered Parba
to pay P17,000.00 as actual damages which was amply supported by receipts, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[25]

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Parba's
conviction for Murder.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.[26]

One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[27] In People v. Gunda,[28] it was explained that when the attack against an unarmed
victim is so sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant was about to do,
there is treachery.[29]

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Parba's attack on Navaja was so sudden and
executed in such a manner that Navaja was caught off-guard on what Parba intended to do.
Eyewitnesses testified that at the time of the attack, Navaja was helping his child alight from the
motorcycle when Parba, without warning, shot him at the back of his head. It is inconceivable
how Navaja could have expected the attack since clearly, he merely intended to take his daughter
to school. As the RTC and CA correctly pointed out, the treacherous nature of the attack
rendered Navaja completely defenseless, noting that the attack was from behind.[30] Thus, in
view of the principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
deserve great weight and respect,[31] the Court concludes that treachery was correctly
appreciated.

Anent Parba's alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a
defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove.[32] To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime.[33]
In People v. Marquez,[34] the Court explained that "physical impossibility" refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.[35]

Thus, a distance of one and a half (1 1/2) to two (2) kilometers[36] was held not too far to
traverse by walking.[37] Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers,[38] three (3)
kilometers,[39] or even five (5) kilometers[40] were consistently held not too far to preclude the
possibility that the accused was present at the locus criminis.[41] Surely then, a distance of 100
meters, as in this case, is not the "physical impossibility" contemplated to satisfy the defense of
alibi.

Moreover, considering its doubtful nature, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to
support the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of weight in law.[42] Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, especially in cases where the
testimonies of the witnesses are categorical, consistent and untainted by ill-will.[43]

Here, Parba failed to satisfy the aforementioned requisites to establish his alibi. Other than
Parba's bare assertions that he was at home sleeping in late and doing household chores at the
time of the incident,[44] there was no proof and no other witness showing the physical
impossibility of his presence at SIT, which was only 100 meters away. On the contrary, the
positive, straightforward, and convincing testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the
details of that fateful morning incident heavily outweigh Parba's alibi.

As narrated, Catapan personally witnessed Parba pull out a gun and shoot Navaja in the head,
which led to his untimely demise, while Buenavista and Cuizon immediately chased Parba after
the shooting and further encountered him face-to-face when he turned around and pointed a gun
at them. Thus, there was no break in the chain of events that would cause any doubt as to the
truth and veracity of the facts which point to the guilt of Parba. Moreover, the prosecution
witnesses, who were merely bystanders at the time the crime occurred, were not impelled by any
improper motive to falsely testify against Parba. Thus, Parba's alibi fails to convince the Court.

Finally, on the matter of damages, when death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs
of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime;[45] (b) actual or
compensatory damages to the extent proved,[46] or temperate damages when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty;[47] (c) moral
damages;[48] and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.[49]

Thus, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the amount of moral
damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 and to sustain the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.[50] The Court also deems it proper to award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount, i.e., P17,000.00.[51] Considering further
that the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 is
also granted. Lastly, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality
of this Resolution until fully paid is imposed on all monetary awards.[52]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05266 finding accused-appellant Oscar Parba y Solon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION ordering
accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Mark P. Navaja the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED.