ENH Umn.31951d022485215 1551957564 PDF

Balkan battlegrounds : a military history of the Yugoslav conflict,
1990-1995.
Washington, DC : Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis,
2002-2003.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d022485215
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UNIVERSITYOF MINNESOTA
Battlegrounds:
Balkan Battlegrounds:
A Military
A Military History
History of the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
Conflict, 1990-1995
Conflict,
Volume II
Volume
Central Intelligence Agency,

Central Intelligence Agency,
Office Russian and European
Office of Russian European Analysis,
Washington,
Washington, DC 20505
20505
May
May 2002
Digitize{! by Go gle OrigiMI from

Digitized by Go gle Original from
History of the
A Military History Yugoslav Conflict,
the Yugoslav Conflict,
1990-1995
1990-1995
Volume II
Volume
Contents
Page
Page
Foreword
Foreword xi
Preface
Preface
- -- ------ ---- ----------
xiii
xiii
Glossary
Glossary xix
Military Terms
Key Military Terms and Equipment
Equipment
The Balkan Crises:
The Significant Events,
Crises: Chronology of Significant Events, 1991-1995
1991-1995 1
Section
Section I: Introduction; Slovenia
I: Introduction; Slovenia 1990-199
1990-1991l 41
41
Chapter
Chapter I: Loosed Anarchy: The
1: Loosed The Origins of the the Balkan Conflict
Conflict 43
43
Chapter 2: "Brotherhood
Chapter 2: “Brotherhood and Unity?“ The Yugoslav People’s Army
Unity:" The Yugoslav People's Army 46
Within a Dying State
Chapter
Chapter 3:
3: Slovenia: Background to War
Slovenia: Background War 49
49
Chapter
Chapter 4: Slovenia: The IO-Day
4: Slovenia: 10-Day WarWar 57
57
Chapter 5: Goliath Defeated:

Chapter 5: Defeated: WhatWhat WentWent Wrong in the JNA?
in the JNA? 68
68
Section II: Croatia
Section 1990-199 l
Croatia 1990-1991 79
79
Chapter 6:
Chapter 6: 1990: The Origins of the
1990: The the Croatian
Croatian War War 81
81
Chapter
Chapter 7:
7: 1991: Extending Politics by
1991: Extending by Other Means
Other Means 85
85
Chapter
Chapter 8:
8: The
The JNA
JNA Fails To Halt Secession
Secession 86
Chapter
Chapter 9: The Croatian
9: The Croatian PotPot Boils
Boils Over 89
Chapter I10:
Chapter War: Croatia
0: War: Croatia Attacks
Attacks the JNA, September
the JNA, September 1991199 l 94
Chapter
Chapter l l:
11: The
The JNA,
JNA, Serbia,
Serbia, and
and the
the Croatian
Croatian War,
War, 96
96
Fall-Winter 199 1991l
Chapter
Chapter 12:
12: Ending the War:
the War: TheThe Vance Plan
Vance Plan 105
105
Chapter
Chapter 13:
13: Outcomes Evaluation of the
Outcomes and Evaluation the Forces
Forces 107
107
Section III:
Section III: Bosnia 1991-1992: Yugoslavia’s Time Bomb
1991-1992: Yugoslavia's 117
117
Chapter
Chapter 14:
14: Bosnia: Yugoslavia’s Time Bomb
Bosnia: Yugoslavia's 119
119
Chapter 15: Political Developments

Chapter 15: Developments Along the the Road
Road 122
122
to War, 1990-1992
to War, 1990-1992
Chapter Serbia, the
16: Serbia,
Chapter 16: JNA, and the
the JNA, Bosnian Serbs:
the Bosnian Serbs: 127
127
January
January 1990-April
l990—April I1992992
Chapter
Chapter 17:
17: The Bosnian Muslims in
The Bosnian in 1992: The "Patriotic
1992: The “Patriotic League”
League" 130
130
—Bosnia’s Muslims Begin
-Bosnia's Begin To Organize
Organize
Chapter
Chapter 18: The Bosnian
18: The Croat Militaries:
Bosnian Croat Militaries: HOSHOS and HVO HVO 133
133
Chapter
Chapter 19: The War
19: The War Begins:
Begins: The
The Bosnian
Bosnian WarWar inin 1992
1992 134
134
Chapter 20:
Chapter 20: Northeastern Bosnia, April
Northeastern Bosnia, April 1992: The Axe
1992: The Falls ____
Axe_F_a_ll_s l_3_7_
137
Chapter
Chapter 21: Bosnian Serb
21: Bosnian Serb War Aims Military Strategy,
Aims and Military 1992
Strategy, 1992 140
140
Chapter 22: Bosnian

Chapter 22: Government War
Bosnian Government War Aims
Aims and Military
Military Strategy
Strategy 142
142
Chapter 23:
Chapter 23: Croatian Objectives and Military
Croatian Political Objectives Military Strategy
Strategy 144
144
in Bosnia, 1991-1992
in Bosnia, 1991-1992
Chapter 24: Ethnic Cleansing
Chapter 24: Cleansing as as a Military
Military Operation:
Operation: 144
144
Sanski Most,
Prijedor, Sanski
Prijedor, Most, and Kljuc,
Kljuc, May-July
May-July 1992 1992
Chapter
Chapter 25: The Battle the Corridor: Operations
Battle for the in Posavina
Operations in the Posavina
the 145
145
iii
Ill
Digitized by Gol gle Origillill from

Chapter
Chapter 26: The VRS Assault
The VRS Assault on Jajce, July-November
July-November 1992 1992 147
147
Chapter
Chapter 27: The
The Bihac Pocket,
Pocket, 1992
1992 148
148
Chapter Battles on the Drina,

Chapter 28: Battles Drina, Round
Round One:One: April
April to
to 150
150
December 1992
December 1992
Chapter
Chapter 29: Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, 1992:
1992: The Siege Siege Begins
Begins 152
152
Chapter
Chapter 30: The Battles for Herzegovina,
The Battles Herzegovina, 1992 1992 154
154
Chapter
Chapter 31: Dress Rehearsal for a New War:
Dress Rehearsal War: The
The 1992
1992 158
158
Croat-Muslim Clashes
Clashes
Chapter Conclusions
Chapter 32: Conclusions 160
160
Section IV: Bosnia

Section IV: Bosnia 1993:
1993: Neighbor Versus Neighbor
Neighbor Versus Neighbor VersusVersus Neighbor
Neighbor 177
177
Chapter 33: The

Chapter 33: Bosnian War
The Bosnian War inin 1993:
1993: 179
179
Neighbor Versus Neighbor
Neighbor Versus Neighbor VersusVersus Neighbor
Neighbor
Chapter
Chapter 34:
34: Searching
Searching for Peace:
Peace : The
The Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen and 182
182
“Invincible” Plans,
"Invincible" Plans , 1993
1993
Chapter 35: Widening the
Chapter Serb Corridor: Brcko,
the Serb Brcko , January-July 19931993 183
183
Chapter Battles on the Drina,

Chapter 36: Battles Drina. Round
Round Two, December
December 1992
1992 184
184
to August 1993
to August 1993
Chapter
Chapter 37: The Siege Continues,
The Siege Continues , Sarajevo
Sarajevo 1993
1993 186
186
Chapter “The Man Who Would Be

Chapter 38: 'The King":
Be King ..: Fikret Abdic and 187
187
the Autonomous
the Autonomous Western Bosnia
Province of Western
Province
Chapter
Chapter 39: Neighbor Fighting
39: Neighbor Neighbor: The
Fighting Neighbor: The Croat-Muslim 189
189
Descent Into
Descent Into War
War
Chapter 40:
Chapter Central Bosnia
40: Central Bosnia Afire:
Afire: The The HVO’s
HVO 's Lasva
Lasva Valley
Valley 191
191
Offensive, April 1993
Offensive, April 1993
Chapter 41:: The Alliance Shattered: The
Chapter 41 The Mostar and Herzegovina
Herzegovina 194
194
Battles,
Battles, May 1993 1993
Chapter
Chapter 42: The Bosnian Army Fights
The Bosnian Fights Back:
Back: The Lasva Valley
The Lasva Valley 194
194
Counteroffensive, . June-July
Counteroffensive June-July 1993 1993
Chapter The Three—Sided
Chapter 43: The Three-Sided War: Zepce , Zavidovici,
War: Zepce, Zavidovici , 196
196
Maglaj, June-July
and Maglaj. June-July I1993 993
Chapter 44:: Zagreb
Chapter 44 Intervenes To
Zagreb Intervenes To Stem
Stern the Tide, July
the Tide, July 1993
1993 197
197
Chapter 45:
Chapter 45 : The Contest for the Southern
The Contest Southern Road:Road: Bugojno, 198
198
Gomji Vakuf,
Gornji Prozor, July-December
Vakuf. and Prozor, July-December 1993 1993
Chapter 46:: The
Chapter 46 The Croat-Muslim War War in Herzegovina, June-July
in Herzegovina, June-July 1993
1993 200
200
Chapter
Chapter 47:
47 : The
The Conflict
Conflict That
That Wasn’t:
Wasn't: The
The Croat-Muslim Alliance 201
201
Holds in Parts of Bosnia
Chapter Seesaw and Stasis
Chapter 48: Seesaw The Croat-Muslim War,
Stasis: : The War. 202
202
August-December
Augu st-December 1993 1993
Chapter Conclusion:: The
Chapter 49: Conclusion End of 1993
The End 1993 207
207
Section V:
Section V: Bosnia 1994: The Turning
1994: The Turning Point
Point_ _ _ _ __ ____ 217
217
The Bosnian
Chapter 50: The
Chapter Bosnian War War inin 1994: The Turning Point
1994: The 219
219
Chapter Bosnian Serb War Aims,
Chapter 51: Bosnian Aims, Military
Military Strategy,
Strategy, and 220
220
Political-Military Relations,
Political-Military Relations, 1994 1994
Chapter 52: Bosnian
Chapter Bosnian Government Objectives and Military
Government Objectives Military 223
223
Strategy inin 1994
1994
iv
iv

Chapter
Chapter 53: 53: Bosnian
Bosnian Croat War Aims
Croat War Aims and Military
Military Strategy
Strategy in
in 1994
1994 224
224
Chapter
Chapter 54: My
My Enemy,
Enemy, My
My Ally—The
Ally-The End of the
the Croat-Muslim War
War 226
226
the Washington
and the Agreement, January-March 1994
Washington Agreement, 1994
Chapter 55: Operation
Chapter “Drina 93":
Operation "Drina 93": The
The Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb “End
"End the
the War" 228
228
Offensive,
Offensive, November
November 1993 1993 to March 1994 1994
Chapter 56:
Chapter 56: The Bosnian Army's
The Bosnian "Spring Offensive”
Army’s “Spring Offensive" Commences,
Commences, 230
230
March 1994
1994
Chapter
Chapter 57: The The ARBiH
ARBiH Spring
Spring Offensive Continues, April-June
Offensive Continues, April-June 1994
I 994 232
232
____ Chapter 58: The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains, June-July 1994 __ 9_4
___ 235
C_h_a~p_te_r_5_8_:_T_he_B_a_ttl_e_o_f_Vi_o_z_uc_a_,_O_z_re_n_M_o_u_nt_a_in_s_,_Ju_n_e_-J_u~ly
235
Chapter 59: The
Chapter Northeast Bosnia Battles,
The Northeast Battles, August-November
August-November 1994 1994 235
235
Chapter 60:
Chapter 60: Last Standing-The ARBiH-VRS
Last Man Standing—The ARBiH-VRS Battles Battles in
in 237
237
Central Bosnia, August-November
Central Bosnia, August-November 1994 1994
Chapter 61:
Chapter Bosnian Army Operations
61: Bosnian Operations in Southeast Bosnia,
in Southeast Bosnia, 239
239
September-November 1994
Chapter
Chapter 62: Combined Croat-Muslim Operations
62: Combined Operations in West-Central Bosnia,
in West-Central Bosnia. 242
242
October-November
October-November 1994 1994
Chapter
Chapter 63: The The Western
Western Theater
Theater 244
244
Chapter 64: Conclusion
Chapter 251
251
Section VI:
Section VI: Croatia 1993-1994: Biding Its
Croatia 1993-1994: Time,
Its Time, Building Its Its Army
Army 265
265
Chapter 65: General
Chapter General Bobetko
Bobetko and the the Army Reorganization,
Reorganization, 267
267
November
November 1992 1992
Chapter 66: Back to the
Chapter the Frontlines: War Renewed,
Frontlines: War Renewed, 268
268
January 1993—March
January 1993-March 1994 1994
Chapter 67: Mladic’s
Chapter Mladic's Little Brothers—The
Brothers-The Krajina Serb Serb Army 269
269
Chapter
Chapter 68: The
The New HV—Doctrine,
HY-Doctrine, Training, and Force
Force Structure,
Structure, 272
272
1993-1994
1993-1994
Chapter 69: The
Chapter Diplomats Fail—Croatia
The Diplomats Fail-Croatia Irredenta
Irredenta and thethe 276
276
March 1994
1994 Cease-Fire
Cease-Fire
Section VII:
Section VII: The The Bosnian
Bosnian and Croatian
Croatian Wars
Wars inin 1995:
1995: 281
281
The Long and Bloody Path
The Path to Dayton
Dayton
Chapter 70: The
Chapter Bosnian Army
The Bosnian Army inin 1995
1995 283
283
Chapter 71: The
Chapter The I-IVO
HYO in 1995—Still Playing in
in 1995-Still the Minor
in the Minor Leagues
Leagues 285
285
Chapter 72: The
Chapter The Rocky Road Toward Croat-Muslim Federation,
Road Toward Federation, 287
287
March 1994—November
I 994-November 1995 1995
Chapter 73: The

Chapter The “Red
"Red Generals" Refuse to Bow—Political-Military
Generals” Refuse Bow-Political-Military 288
288
Relations
Relations and the Strategic Debate
the Strategic Debate in in Republika Srpska,
Srpska, 1995
1995
Chapter 74: Dudakovic Takes
Chapter the Initiative—The
Takes the Battles Around
Initiative-The Battles 292
292
Bihac City, January-February
Bihac January-February 1995 1995
Chapter 75: Abdic-Krajina

Chapter Abdic-Krajina Serb Operations in
Serb Operations Bihac, January-June 1995
in Bihac, 1995 293
293
---------- --------------------------------
Chapter
Chapter 76: The The Croatian-Serbian
Croatian-Serbian War Begins Again, January-June 1995
War Begins 1995 295
295
Chapter 77: The
Chapter The “Skok” Operations-The HV
"Skok" Operations—The HY Continues its Drive,
Continues its Drive, 295
295
Spring
Spring 1995
1995
Chapter 78: “Who

Chapter "Who Will
Will Rule the Airwaves?”—The
Rule the Airwaves?"-The Contests Contests for
for 300
300
Mts. Vlasic and Stolice,
Mts. Stolice, 1995
1995
Chapter 79: ARBiH
Chapter ARBiH 1st lst and 5th Corps
Corps Offensive
Offensive Operations,
Operations, 304
304
_____ March—July
Mar~h-July19951995
V
V
Digitize,d by Go gle Origir1al from

------- --------
Chapter 80: The Sarajevo
Chapter Sarajevo Breakout
Breakout Attempt,
Attempt, June 1995
1995 307
Chapter
Chapter Srebrenica, July l995—Bosnia’s
81: The Fall of Srebrenica, 1995-Bosnia's Darkest
Darkest Hour 316
Chapter
Chapter Srebrenica—The Military Forces
82: Srebrenica-The Forces 321
321
Chapter 83: The Battle, 6-11 July

Battle, 6-11 July 1995
1995 324
Chapter Srebrenica: After the Battle
84: Srebrenica: Battle 340
Chapter
Chapter 85: Srebrenica—Analysis
Srebrenica-Analysis and Aftermath
Aftermath 350
Chapter
Chapter Demise of Zepa—A
86: The Demise Second Safe
Zepa-A Second Area Falls
Safe Area 355
Chapter Srebrenica Aftermath—Gorazde
87: Srebrenica Aftermath-Gorazde and Operation
Operation 360
“Daring Lion”
"Daring Lion"
Chapter 88: The Fateful
Fateful Krajina Serb Offensive Against Bihac,
Offensive Against Bihac, July
July 1995
1995 361
361
Chapter 89:
89: Operation “Oluja”—The Fall of the Krajina Serb
Operation "Oluja"-The Serb Republic,
Republic, 367
August 1995
August 1995
Chapter "Deliberate Force”—-NATO
90: “Deliberate Force"-NATO Airpower Over Over Bosnia,
Bosnia, 377
30 August—20
August-20 September 1995 1995
Chapter 91: Operation
Operation “Maestral” Operation “Sana
"Maestral" and Operation "Sana 95”—~Decisi0n
95"-Decision 379
Western Bosnia
in Western Bosnia
Chapter 92: The ARBiH
ARBiI-I Offensive
Offensive Operations, September-October 1995
Operations, September-October 1995 384
Chapter
Chapter Game—The
93: End Game-The Fall of Sanski
Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad,
Grad, 390
October 1995
October 1995
Chapter
Chapter 94: Evaluation—The Cease-Fire Agreement
Evaluation-The Cease-Fire Agreement and thethe Final 391
391
Offensives
Offensives
Chapter 95: Conclusions—The
Conclusions-The Slovenian, Croatian,
Slovenian, Bosnian
Croatian, and Bosnian 396
Wars of 1991-95
Wars 1991-95
Appendixes
Appendixes
A.
A. Order of Battle:
Order Slovene Territorial
Battle: Slovene Forces (IO), June-July 1991
Defense Forces
Territorial Defense 1991 431
431
B.
B. Order
Order of Battle:
Battle: Yugoslav
Yugoslav People’s (JNA), Fifth Military District
People's Army (JNA), District 435
During Operations, June-July 1991
Slovenia Operations,
During Slovenia 1991
C.
C. Skeleton Order of Battle,
Skeleton Order Battle, Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)
Yugoslav People's (JNA) Strategic 441
441
Offensive,
Offensive, Late
Late September 1991 1991 to 1I January
January 1992
1992
D.
D. Skeleton
Skeleton Croatian (Croatian National
Croatian Army (Croatian Order of Battle,
Guard) Order
National Guard) Battle, 445
October 1991—January
October 1991-January 1992 1992
E.
E. The Organization Croatian Army, January
Organization of the Croatian January 1995
1995 447
F.
F. The Organization
The Organization of the Krajina Serb Army, January 1995
January 1995 455
G. Bosnian Serb Army Order
Skeleton Bosnian
Skeleton Order of Battle,
Battle, July
July 1995
1995 459
H. Bosnian Army Order
Skeleton Bosnian
Skeleton Order of Battle,
Battle, October
October 1995
1995 469
I.
I. Croatian Order of Battle,
Defense Council Order
Croatian Defense October 1995
Battle, October 1995 481
481
J.
J. Photos of
Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime
Wartime Commanders
Commanders 485
vi
vi
Digitized by o gle Origil\al from

Index
Index 493
493
Maps
Maps (In Separate
(In Separate Case)
Case)
l—Slovenia:
I-Slovenia: The
The Ten
Ten Day War, June-July
Day War, June-July 1991
1991
2—Croatia: Battle of Vukovar,

2-Croatia: Battle Vukovar, September-November
1991
3—Croatia: Eastern
3-Croatia: Eastern Slavonia,
Slavonia, September
September 199l—January
1991-January 19921992
4—Croatia: Western Slavonia,
4-Croatia: Western Slavonia, September
September 1991-January
1991—January 19921992
5—Croatia: Banija-Kordun-Lika Operations,
5-Croatia: Banija-Kordun-Lika October l99l—January
Operations, October 1991-January 1992
1992
6—Croatia:
6-Croatia: Knin-Zadar-North
Knin-Zadar-North Dalmatia
Dalmatia Operations, January
Operations, January 1992
1992
7—Croatia: Dubrovnik,
7-Croatia: Dubrovnik, October
October 1991—January
1991-January 1992
1992
8—Bosnia: Kupres, April
8-Bosnia: Kupres, April 1992
1992
9-Bosnia:
-------------~-------
Posavina Corridor,
9—Bosnia: Posavina Corridor, April-June
April-June 1992
1992 --------------
lO—Bosnia:
IO-Bosnia: Posavina Corridor,
Posavina Corridor, June-July
June-July 1992
1992
ll—Bosnia: Posavina Corridor,
I I-Bosnia: Posavina Corridor, August 1992—January
1992-January 1993
1993
12—Bosnia:
12-Bosnia: Bosanski
Bosanski Brod, J uly-October 1992
Brod, July-October 1992
13-Bosnia: JJajce,
l3—Bosnia: J uly-November 1992
ajce, July-November 1992
14—Bosnia: Zvornik-Srebrenica,
14-Bosnia: Zvornik-Srebrenica, April-December
April-December 19921992
lS—Bosnia: Foca-Gorazde, May-December
15-Bosnia: Foca-Gorazde, May-December 1992 1992
16-Herzegovina: Dubrovnik,
16—Herzegovina: Dubrovnik, April-June
April-June 1992
1992
17—Herzegovina: Dubrovnik,
17-Herzegovina: Dubrovnik, June-October 1992 1992
18-West-Central
18—West-Central Bosnia,
Bosnia, January 1994
January 1994
------------------- ------- -
19-Bosnia: Brcko,
l9—Bosnia: Brcko, July
July 1993
1993
20—Bosnia:
20-Bosnia: Srebrenica-Cerska,
Srebrenica-Cerska, January 1993
January 1993
21—Bosnia: Srebrenica-Cerska,
21-Bosnia: Srebrenica-Cerska, March-April
March-April 19931993
Gorazde-Tmovo, JJanuary-August
22—Bosnia: Gorazde-Trnovo,
22-Bosnia: anuary-August I 993
1993
23—Bosnia: Bihac,
23-Bosnia: Bihac, 1993
1993
24—Bosnia: Vitez,
24-Bosnia: Vitez, June 1993—January
1993-January 1994 1994
25—Bosnia: Kiseljak,
25-Bosnia: Kiseljak, December
December 1993 1993
26-Herzegovina:
26—Herzegovina: Jablanica-Konjic,
Jablanica-Konjic, 1993 1993
27—Bosnia: Vares-Stupni
27-Bosnia: D0,
Vares-Stupni Do, October-November
October-November 1993 1993
------------~---------------------
28—Bosnia: Sapna-Teocak,
28-Bosnia: Sapna-Teocak, November-December
November-December 1993 1993
29—Bosnia: Maglaj-Tesanj,
29-Bosnia: Maglaj::__~esanj, November-December
November-December 1993 1993
30-Bosnia: Olovo,
30—Bosnia: Olovo, November 1993-January 1994
November 1993—January 1994
3l—Bosnia: Bihac, February
31-Bosnia: Bihac, 1994
February 1994
32—Bosnia: April 1994
Gorazde, April
32-Bosnia: Gorazde, 1994
33—Bosnia: Cemerska, May

33-Bosnia: Cemerska, May 1994
1994
34——Bosnia: Cemerska, August-November 1994
34-Bosnia: Cemerska, 1994
vii
vii

35—Bosnia: Vozuca,
35-Bosnia: J une-July I1994
Vozuca, June-July 994
36—Bosnia:
36--Bosnia: Doboj-Gradacac,
Doboj-Gradacac, August-November
August-November 1994 1994
37—Bosnia: Bihac,
37-Bosnia: Bihac, August-September
August-September 1994
1994
38—Bosnia: Bihac,
38-Bosnia: Bihac, October
October 1994
I 994
39—Bosnia:
39-Bosnia: Bihac,
Bihac, November-December
November-December 1994
1994
40—Bosnia: Livno Valley,

40--Bosnia: Livno Valley, November-December
1994
41—Bosnia: Vakuf, 1994

41-Bosnia: Donji Vakuf, 1994
42—Bosnia:
42-Bosnia: Mount Vlasic, I1994 994
43—Bosnia: Tesanj-Teslic,
43-Bosnia: Tesanj-Teslic, 1994
1994
44—Bosnia: Mt. Stolice,
44-Bosnia: Stolice, 1994
1994
45—Bosnia:
45-Bosnia: Kladanj, May 1994 1994
46—Northern
46--N orthem Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, 1994
47—Bosnia:
47-Bosnia: Mt. Bjelasnica &
Mt. Bjelasnica & Mt.
Mt. Treskavica,
Treskavica, 19941994
48—Bosnia:
48-Bosnia: Kupres, October-November 1994
Kupres, October-November 1994
49—Bosnia: Bihac,
49-Bosnia: J anuary-August 1994
Bihac, January-August I 994
50—Croatia: Operation
SO-Croatia: Operation Oluja, 4-8 4-8 August 1995
1995
Sl—Western Bosnia,
51-Western Bosnia, September-October
September-October 1995
1995
52—Bosnia
52-Bosnia & Croatia: Livno Valley,
Croatia: Livno April-June 1995
Valley, April-June 1995
53—Croatia: Western
53-Croatia: Western Slavonia,
Slavonia, May 1995 1995
54—Bosnia: Orasje,
54-Bosnia: Orasje, May-June
May-June 19951995
55—Bosnia: Bihac,
55-Bosnia: J anuary-July 1995
Bihac, January-July 1995
56—Bosnia:
56--Bosnia: Bihac, July 1995
July 1995
57—Bosnia &
57-Bosnia & Croatia: Livno Valley,
Croatia: Livno 25-30 July
Valley, 25-30 July 1995
1995
58-Bosnia: Mt.
58—Bosnia: Mt. Vlasic, March 1995 1995
59—Bosnia:
59-Bosnia: Mt. Stolice, 1995
Mt. Stolice, 1995
60—Bosnia: Mt. Treskavica,
60--Bosnia: Treskavica, 19951995
61—Bosnia: Donji
61-Bosnia: Vakuf, 1995
Donji Vakuf, 1995
62—Bosnia: Srebrenica
62-Bosnia: Srebrenica & & Zepa, July
July 1995
1995
63—Bosnia: Ozren
63-Bosnia: Mountains,
Ozren Mountains, September-October
September-October 1995
1995
A: The Socialist Federal

A: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, 1990
1990
B: Republic of Croatia,
Croatia, 1990
1990
C: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
C: Herzegovina, 1990
D: Ethnic Composition
D: Composition in thethe Former Yugoslavia, Il99l
Former Yugoslavia, 99 I
E: Military
E: Terrain of Former
Military Terrain Former Yugoslavia
F: JNA Strategic
F: JNA Plan, 1991
Offensive Plan,
Strategic Offensive 1991
Sarajevo: The JNA
G: Sarajevo:
G: Attacks, 22 May 1992
JNA Attacks, 1992
H: Sarajevo:
Sarajevo: The Bosnian
Bosnian Army Attempts Key Hilltops, 8 June 1992
Capture Four Key
Attempts to Capture 1992
I: National
I: National Battalions in UN
Battalions in Forces in
UN Forces Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in Croatia Herzegovina, Early 1993
1993
J: Areas
J: Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 1993
Herzegovina, July 1993
K: Sarajevo and Vicinity,
K: Sarajevo January 1994
Vicinity, Early January 1994
L: Areas
L: Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, September 1994
September 1994
viii
Vlll

M: Corps
M: Corps Boundaries
Boundaries and Headquarters in Croatia,
Headquarters in Croatia, January
January 1995
1995
N:
N: Bosnian
Bosnian Army Offensive
Offensive Operations
Operations in
in Sarajevo Region, June 1995
Sarajevo Region, 1995
0: UN Forces Croatia, Early 1995
Forces in Croatia, 1995
P:
P: UN Deployments
Deployments inin Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, October
October 1995
1995
Q:
Q: Areas
Areas of Control in Bosnia and
and Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, 20
20 October
October 1995
1995
ix

Digitized by Go gle Origil\al from
Foreword
Foreword
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia has been identified
has been one of those
identified as one those places where they they produce
more history
history than
than they
they can
can consume locally.
locally. In
In the
the United
United States,
States, where
widespread and unapologetic ignorance of history
and unapologetic history is is commonplace,
commonplace, the the grip
of long-ago
long-ago battles
battles and long-dead kings
long-dead kings on the
the thinking
thinking of apparently edu-
edu
cated,
cated, cultured, Westernized people in
Westemized in the former Yugoslav federation can
former Yugoslav
baffling. William Faulkner
be baffling. Faulkner had the the old
old South
South in in mind when
when he he wrote,
“The past
"The past is
is not dead.
dead. It is
is not even
even past," but his observation certainly
past,” but certainly
applies to the
the former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia as as well.
well. To
To understand the the former
former Yugosla
Yugosla-
via’s present and
via's and future, therefore, a study of its history becomes essential.
its history
Thorough
Thorough and and accurate in in its and analysis, this work
its research and work aims to to
advance thethe reader’s
reader's understanding of the the military
military events
events that have shaped
that have
devolution of Yugoslavia
the devolution
the Yugoslavia andand the evolution of its
the evolution its daughter states.
states.
The United
The States really
United States has no choice but
really has but to
to try to the history
to understand the history of
the former
the former Yugoslavia. Since the
Yugoslavia. Since the end the Cold War,
end of the War, the
the former
former Yugosla
Yugosla-
via has
has been point of origin
been the point origin of new enemies and and potential allies. It
It is
is the
the
locus of open-ended US military
military deployments.
deployments. TheThe former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia has has
become thethe central issue of USUS relations with
with Europe,
Europe, east and west. All
east and All the
the
elements of US national
national security policy-military, diplomatic, developmen-
policy—military, diplomatic, developmen
tal, and intelligence—will
tal, intelligence-will most likely have have to
to engage the multifaceted real
engage the real-
of
ities thethe former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia more with
deeply than with
than those of happier lands.
To accept
To United States
that the United
accept that will be a vital
States will the postwar shaping of
vital part of the
the Balkan
the Balkan states, to be in ignorance of what actually went on in
yet to
states, yet in the
the
wars that
that turned Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia into the Yugoslavia, would
the former Yugoslavia, would bebe foolish.
foolish.
Imagine a traveler from
Imagine those lands stepping off the
from those the packet from
from Trieste
Trieste to
to
Baltimore in 1866,
Baltimore 1866, aware onlyonly of newspaper accounts of aa long long and bloody
bloody
He knows
civil war. He knows who has won,
who has won, but
but remains ignorant of the the military
military par
par-
ticulars of the
ticulars war. This hypothetical
the war. hypothetical traveler wouldwould have puzzled at refer
have puzzled refer-
ences to Pickett’s
ences Pickett's Charge, General Sherman and and his March to the Sea, or
the Sea,
Andersonville
Andersonville and would would have been unconscious
have been unconscious of the the many myths grow grow-
ing from
ing from their hard realities. He would would not understand that these wars would
that these would
shape American life,
shape American politics, and culture for
life, politics, for generations. The The wars of thethe
Yugoslavia had their own
former Yugoslavia own versions
versions of all these in full measure.
all these measure. Both
Both
myths and will shape
and realities will shape thethe futures of these
these countries.
We are all entitled to

We to our own opinion. We
own opinion. We are not entitled to
are not to our own
own his
his-
tory. The misuse of history
tory. history has
has been widespread in portrayals of events
been widespread events in
the former
the Yugoslavia. This applies not only
former Yugoslavia. to the mythmakers and self
only to self-
exculpators in the but also to those watching
region but
the region watching it from the United
from the United
xi
xi

States,
States, as any reading of newspaper
any reading pages during the recent
newspaper op-ed pages recent Kosovo
Kosovo
crisis would
would make
make painfully “lessons” of the former Yugosla
painfully obvious. The "lessons" Yugosla-
demonstrate a wide variety of propositions
via are regularly invoked to demonstrate
about an equally wide variety of topics, some
about appropriate, others
some appropriate, so. If,
others less so.
States, future
in the United States, future military and political analysts
analysts seek
seek to use
use these
these
lessons as more than rhetoric, they
lessons have to turn to the history of the
they will have the
recent Balkan wars.
recent
This work, the first

This comprehensive military analysis of the wars of the
first comprehensive
former Yugoslavia, present, objectively and analytically, such a his
Yugoslavia, aims to present, his-
tory. If the journalistic accounts
tory. If accounts and contemporaneous analyses of regional
contemporaneous analyses
specialists were the proverbial first
specialists first draft of history, then
then this two-volume
book is second. It has
is surely the second. used the full spectrum
has used spectrum of open sources
sources and
a plethora
plethora of maps
maps toto tell the story of the wars in the former Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia,
events leading to the first
from the events shots in Slovenia to the Dayton cease-
first shots cease
fire in Bosnia. It aims not least
fire least at military narrative
narrative but also at analyzing the
processes at work
complex parallel processes work on the battlefield and
the battlefield and in the
the emergence
emergence
of professional national armedarmed forces. It examines
examines the relationship of local
actions and
and regional actions trends within a national and
and trends and international
international context.
context.
These relations
relations and connections
connections may not have been obvious in the "first
have been “first
draft,” but they
draft," they are here, narrative of military actions
here, set out along with the narrative
and accompanied detailed maps.
accompanied by detailed maps.
The history of the most series of armed

most prolonged series armed conflicts
conflicts in Europe since
1945 those who will have
has obvious applicability to those
1945 has have to deal with the
to deal
region. Staff colleges, regional analysts,
analysts, and others will find
and others find this book aa
framework for contemplating the nature
for contemplating nature of contemporary
contemporary and and future war
war-
fare in the former Yugoslavia regions. They, like the lay readers,
Yugoslavia and similar regions. readers,
will have
have to deal results of such emotionally charged
deal with the long-lasting results charged
actions as the ethnic
military actions ethnic cleansing siege of Srebrenica,
cleansing in Bosnia, the siege Srebrenica,
and the Sarajevo marketplace
marketplace shelling incidents. In these
these pages they will
pages they
find the raw material
find events professionally researched,
material of such events researched, accurately
accurately
presented, and
presented, analyzed.
and soberly analyzed.
C. Isby
David C.
Washington DC,
DC, 1999
1999
xii
xii

Preface
Balkan Battlegrounds provides

Balkan Battlegrounds military history of the
provides a military conflict in the
the conflict the
former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia between 1990
1990 and 1995.
1995. It was produced by two military
military
analysts in the Central
in the Central Intelligence
Intelligence Agency
Agency who
who tracked military develop-
military develop
ments in the region throughout this period and
ments then applied their experience
and then
to producing
to unclassified treatise
producing an unclassified treatise for general use.
use.
******************
Since the breakup of the

Since Socialist Federal
the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia in the
Republic of Yugoslavia the
years 1990-92,
years 1990-92, much has has been
been written about thethe genesis of the crisis, the
the crisis, the
diplomatic
diplomatic efforts to end thethe ensuing wars, and the the war
war crimes that
that these
these
wars spawned. Many journalists, and a number of United
journalists, and United Nations
Nations military
military
officers, have
officers, published personal accounts of their time spent
have published spent in
in Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia,
Bosnia in
Bosnia particular. To date,
in particular. however, we know
date, however, know of no comprehensive anal- anal
ysis of the 1990-95 war in
the 1990—95 in Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia as military history. Our
military history. objective in
Our objective in
preparing this study was to to detail the
the military events of 1990-1995
military events 1990-1995 andand ana-
ana
why campaigns and battles proceeded as they
lyze why and whether they
they did and they
achieved the
the political
political objectives or war
war aims for which
which they
they were fought.
A key goal in our study was to

A to dispel the many myths that that have
have sprung up
with
with regard to the conflict.
to the conflict. Chief among these these myths is is the
the perception thatthat
the war
war was fought by hordes of heavily heavily armed "paramilitary"
“paramilitary” thugs, oper- oper
ating outside of any any government or only controlled by
loosely controlled
only loosely by a govem
govern-
ment,
ment, or that so-called "armies"
the so-called
that the “armies” consisted of nothing more than than loosely
loosely
regional warlords
organized regional militias and
warlords and militias that it was these
and that these thugs whowho
were responsible
responsible for the “ethnic cleansing"
the "ethnic that infamously
cleansing” that infamously distinguished
distinguished so so
many of the the campaigns. In In fact, virtually all
fact, virtually all of the fighting was done by
the fighting
professionally led, relatively
professionally relatively well-organized citizen armies, and the
well-organized citizen the contrary
view is
view is largely mirror-imaging by Western
largely the product of mirror—imaging officers who
Western officers who regu
regu-
larly disparaged the appearance,
larly appearance, discipline,
discipline, and professionalism
professionalism of the
armies involved.
involved. In In opposition
opposition to these
these superficial assessments, our
superficial assessments,
research showed that that each quickly developed a regular structure with
each army quickly with
a centralized staff controlling
controlling a
a hierarchy
hierarchy of formations
formations and units including
including
specialized tactical and support elements, such as air defense, transport,
specialized
training,
training, military
military police,
police, and communications. Each
and communications. Each force
force had a defined
defined
chain of command and all the the features of a regular army, including
including a general
that developed operational and tactical doctrines to
staff that to achieve strategic
objectives successfully,
successfully, a professional
a professional or professionalizing officer
professionalizing officer corps,
xiii
xiii

procedures for the
the promotion officers, and
promotion or replacement of officers, and a training
training
establishment for officers
officers and
and enlisted personnel. Having evolved from,
Having evolved from, in
in
many cases, territorial forces
cases, reservist territorial forces and locally formed
and locally ad hoc militias
formed ad militias
who
who learned their first the battlefield,
first lessons on the battlefield, these
these armies did not meetmeet
Western
Western professional standards. They
professional standards. They were notnot in
in business toto fight the West,
fight the West,
however, only
however, only each and gauging their military
other, and
each other, military effectiveness by the
standards of NATO
NATO or the former WarsawWarsaw Pact hashas led to view of
to a distorted view
conflict.
the conflict.
Although there
Although there were many highly publicized clashes between civilian and
highly publicized and
military leaders and
military occasional claims
and occasional claims of “rogue”
"rogue" military
military commanders act
act-
without political
ing without
ing authorization, all of the military
political authorization, military forces were subordi
subordi-
nate to their civilian
nate civilian leaderships and
and responded to political direction
to political direction on key
issues:
'• Professionalism
Professionalism and the Officer Corps: All
Oflicer Corps: All of the militaries succeeded in
the militaries in
professionalizing their officer
professionalizing officer corps and
and fighting
fighting forces-establishing
forces—establishing
full-time officer
full-time officer corps functioning authority and
functioning in obedience to higher authority
with aa common
with common doctrine. Professionalization
Professionalization was largely
largely aa "top-down"
“top-down”
beginning with
process, beginning with the
the senior military (usually former
military leadership (usually former
Yugoslav People's Army officers)
Yugoslav People’s and progressing down
officers) and down through the the
ranks. The military structures, established
formalized their military
The armies also formalized
and standards of conduct for their officers
and enforced standards and troops, and either
officers and
incorporated independent militias
incorporated militias or disbanded those that
that resisted their
control. Discipline
control. Discipline might be uneven
uneven within individual units of the
within individual the forces,
but police elements enforced obedience to orders from
military police
but military from general
to brigade level.
staff to level.
•' Military Doctrine: they lacked

Although they
Doctrine: Although the doctrinal
lacked the doctrinal history and sophis
sophis-
tication of Western militaries, the
Western militaries, the various
various armies eacheach developed combat
doctrines tailored toto their military capabilities for the
military capabilities the pursuit of defined
defined
political-military The manpower-short
strategies. The
political-military strategies. Bosnian Serbs, for
manpower-short Bosnian
example, sought to to use advantages in artillery,
use their advantages artillery, firepower,
firepower, mobility,
mobility,
and training to minimize
and training minimize casualties. Conversely,
Conversely, the Bosnian Army con
the Bosnian con-
sciously strategy of attrition and
sciously adopted aa strategy and limited
limited territorial
territorial gains that
that
employed light infantry tactics suited to
light infantry to its superiority in numbers and its
its superiority its
deficiencies in equipment.
deficiencies
'• Training:
Training: All the combatants worked
All of the worked actively
actively to develop a professional
professional
officer corps with
officer uniform program of education. They
with aa uniform They made thethe most
the personnel inherited
of the inherited from
from the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav People's
People’s Army (JNA) and
(JNA) and
used former JNA
either used JNA officer
officer cadre training schools
and training
cadre and schools or established
training centers for basic and advanced training,
own training
their own officer courses,
training, officer
xiv
xiv

schooling. All regularized
and a variety of other schooling.
and regularized their rank structures and
and
command organizations.
organizations. Troop
Troop instruction evolved from
instruction evolved ad hoc,
from ad hoc, personal
weapons training to moderately effective
effective regular programs including
including
small-unit exercises and
small-unit and preattack rehearsals.
•' Combat
Combat Operations:
Operations: The
The scope of combat operations steadily increased
during the
during the war, and the adversaries reached the
the capability
capability of planning
planning and
and
undertaking complex
complex military tens of thousands of
involving tens
military operations involving
combatants over frontages of dozens or hundreds of kilometers.
kilometers. Coordi
Coordi-
and execution of actual operations would
nation and would still be flawed,
still be flawed, but
but they
they
would be based on a well-established
would cycle of political
well-established cycle political direction,
direction, plan
plan-
ning, instruction,
instruction, logistic
logistic support, and combat.
so-called “paramilitaries”
The myth of the so-called has persisted, although few,
"paramilitaries" has few, if
if
any, paramilitary units operated after 1992.
any, major independent paramilitary 1992. Of
Of the
the origi
origi-
nal independent forces, nearly all incorporated into
all were either incorporated the contend
into the contend-
ing armies or disbanded; the restrest were only nominally independent. Many
only nominally Many
units that
that carried odd or irregular
irregular unit designators, such
such as the “Black
as the "Black
Swans" “Panthers,” were former paramilitary
Swans” or "Panthers," paramilitary units that
that had been
been
absorbed into
into the firmly
the regular armies and were firmly under their command
command and
and
control. Throughout
control. Throughout the
the war, all
all of the
the so-called
so-called Serb "paramilitaries"
“paramilitaries” were
in fact volunteer units formed by the Yugoslav and Serb armies and
the Yugoslav and attached
attached
to regular units or were military
military formations—such
formations-such as as Arkan’s Serbian Vol
Arkan's Serbian Vol-
Guard—covertly formed,
unteer Guard-covertly formed, trained, and directed by Serbian
Serbian State
State
Security.
Security.
In addition, we believe that

In addition, that misunderstandings regarding the nature of the
the nature the
forces involved have led to a perception in some quarters that
involved have that the
the 1990
1990-
1995 wars involved
1995 involved a large number of insurgents operating in the mountains
in the mountains
as part
part of a protracted guerrilla war. With the sole exception
guerrilla war. exception of the
the Ten-Day
Ten-Day
War Slovenia—which escapes
War in Slovenia-which classification—the Balkan
escapes classification-the Balkan conflict
conflict
conventional, positional
involved conventional,
involved positional warfare,
warfare, more akin to to World WarWar II than
than
Tito’s partisan struggles in World War
Tito's War II.
II. Trench bunker lines,
and bunker
Trench and lines, fronted
fronted
minefields, faced each
by extensive minefields, each other throughout Croatia
Croatia andand Bosnia
Bosnia
man’s land that
across a no man's would have
that would have looked
looked familiar
familiar to men of the
to men the
1914-18
1914-18 war.
war. Until late 1995 most combat operations were attempts
late 1995 attempts toto gain
control
control over key roads, hills,
hills, and villages few kilometers
villages a few kilometers
a or meters from
meters from
frontline,
the frontline,
the not rapid strikes deep
deep into enemy territory.
Finally, in detailing
Finally, the full extent
detailing the extent of the combat operations inin Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia,
we hope to take the spotlight off the
take the siege of
the siege Sarajevo and place it on the
of Sarajevo the
trenches lacing the mountains of Croatia
lacing the Bosnia. The
Croatia and Bosnia. status of
The status of Sarajevo
Sarajevo
XV
xv

the war
was key to the the Muslim-led Bosnian
war aims of both the Bosnian Government
Government and and
the Bosnian Serb Republic,
the Bosnian Republic, as
as well
well as a potent symbol
symbol in
in the
the West
West of the
the
wars’ brutalities.
wars' brutalities. The however, of Western
The presence, however, Western media in in the
the city—and
city-and
less frequently, elsewhere—distorted Sarajevo’s centrality
less frequently, elsewhere-distorted Sarajevo's centrality to the conflict.
the conflict.
We hope to refocus
We refocus attention on other battlefields the outcome of the
battlefields where the the
actually decided.
war was actually
Given the
Given the dearth
dearth of primary archival material,
primary archival material, the authors' research for this
the authors’
project relied heavily
heavily on local and
on local and Western
Western daily
daily press accounts—by radio,
accounts-by radio,
television, and wire
television, wire services-contemporary
services—contemporary local magazine
local newspaper or magazine
interviews with
interviews military commanders, articles in
with military in wartime postwar offi
wartime and postwar offi-
cial military
cial military journals,
journals, and
and the memoirs of some of the
the memoirs commanders. Many
the commanders.
of the local press reports, articles,
the local articles, and books provided
and books surprising amount
provided a surprising
of specific information on
specific information military operations, including
on military including geographic
geographic objec
objec-
battle, commanders, and the
tives, order of battle, the outcome
outcome and and aftermath of thethe
operations. The
operations. The challenge
challenge facing
facing the
the authors was to use use their experience as as
intelligence analysts to
intelligence to ensure that the various
that the various unclassified
unclassified sources they
they
used-primarily
used—primarily of Balkan origin—did not distort the
Balkan origin-did the record of events
events they
they
have attempted
have attempted to capture.
Typically, individual campaign

Typically, in researching an individual campaign or battle, the authors
battle, the
would cull
would cull the
the local daily radio
local daily radio and wire service reports, supplemented by
and wire by
Western press reports, to
Western to develop timeline of military
develop a timeline military events.
events. These events
events
were then
then tracked on 1/50,000-scale Comparison of the
1/50,000-scale terrain maps. Comparison the
opposing sides’ reports made it possible
opposing sides' possible to deduce the battle’s actual evolu
the battle's evolu-
tion and
and outcome. Contemporary
Contemporary and postwar accounts in military journals,
military journals,
magazines and newspapers, and and the
the published memoirs of leading
published memoirs leading partici-
partici
pants,
pants, were used fill gaps,
used to fill add unit information,
gaps, add and describe where the
information, and the
battle fit
fit into
into the overall campaign.
the overall
organized in two
This study is organized two volumes
volumes toto make it useful to both the
useful to the nonspe
nonspe-
cialist professional soldiers,
cialist general reader and to professional Balkan scholars, and mil-
soldiers, Balkan mil
Volume I is a narrative covering
historians. Volume
itary historians. the genesis of Yugoslavia’s
covering the Yugoslavia's
breakup in 19901990 through the the Bosnian
the end of the war in
Bosnian war in October 1995. It is
October 1995. is
divided into
divided into an introduction and
an introduction and sections covering
covering the Ten-Day War
the Ten-Day War inin Slo
Slo-
venia, the 1991 war
the 1991 war in Croatia, each year of the
Croatia, each the Bosnian
Bosnian war
war from
from 1992
1992
through 1994, the development of the
1994, the Croatian Army and the
the Croatian the progress of
the Croatian-Serb
the conflict, and a 1995
Croatian-Serb conflict, 1995 section that
that combines
combines Croatia
Croatia and
and
Bosnia. Volume
Bosnia. Volume II,II, which
which will
will appear within consists of aa set
year, consists
within a year, set of
annexes covering the
annexes covering 1991 War
the 1991 War in Croatia and
in Croatia and the
the 1992-1994 periods of the
1992-1994 periods the
Bosnian These
Bosnian war. These provide
war. provide more detailed accounts of individual battles,
individual
campaigns, and other topics, such as as the
the organization the Bosnian
organization of the Bosnian Serb
xvi
xvi

Army and the status
and the the UN
status of the UN Protection parts of
Force. Because many parts
Protection Force.
Volume I are summaries of an annex in Volume
Volume Volume II, the source references are
II, the are
frequently given inin the annex. For the
the appropriate annex. 1995, however,
the year 1995, however, the
with separate
authors dispensed with annexes and incorporated most of the
separate annexes the infor
infor-
that would
mation that included in
have been included
would have an annex within
in an the main text
within the text or in
in
supporting endnotes. A separate Map Case accompanies Volume
A separate Volume I.I.
recent book Knin Je

The recent Pao U
le Pao Beogradu (Knin Fell in
U Beogradu Belgrade) was
in Belgrade)
received as this study was being prepared for publication, and the
for publication, the authors
to fully incorporate information
were unable to from this book in Volume
information from Volume 1.I.
Written General Milisav Sekulic,
Written by Major General former Krajina Serb
Sekulic, a senior former
officer, this book
Army Main Staff officer, book sheds light on the Krajina Serb
sheds new light
Army—especially the
Army-especially 1995 operation against Bihac
the July 1995 Bihac and the Croatian
the Croatian
the Krajina in
offensive against the
offensive in August 1995. As time permits, an
August 1995. an adden
adden-
dum in Volume II will
Volume II will address this information.
information.
We gratefully
We acknowledge our debt
gratefully acknowledge BBC Worldwide
debt to BBC Worldwide Limited/Penguin,
Limited/Penguin,
and to Silber and Allan Little
to authors Laura Silber Little for allowing to quote liber
us to
allowing us liber-
ally
ally from
from their book,
book, Yugoslavia:
Yugoslavia: Death
Death of
of a Nation,
Nation, which
which helped provide
much of the political context for
the political for our military
military analysis. We We consider their
work the
work best overall account of the
the best the conflict
conflict yet
yet published, integrating polit
polit-
ical,
ical, military,
military, and events into an easily readable narrative. We
and humanitarian events We
particularly incisive analysis of the
particularly appreciate their incisive origins of the
the origins the breakup
and the
and the events
events preceding the the outbreak of the Croatian war in September
the Croatian
199 l. Their study was one
1991. one of the
the few
few to
to detect the splits between the
detect the the Yugo-
Yugo
Slobodan Milosevic in 1990-1991 and
People’s Army and Slobodan
slav People's and toto note
note that,
that,
at least initially, the
least initially, Yugoslav/Serb side was not a monolith.
the Yugoslav/Serb monolith.
The conclusions,
conclusions, judgments, and opinions we have
and opinions expressed in this book
have expressed
are solely and entirely those of the
are solely the authors and are not
and are not to be
be represented
represented
the Central
as emanating from the Central Intelligence Agency or the
Intelligence Agency the United
United States
States
Government.
Government.
The Authors
The Authors
McLean,
McLean, Virginia
December 2001
2001
xvii
xvii

Glossary
Glossary
Key Military
Military Terms
Terms and
and Equipment
Equipment
Military Forces and Organizations

Forces and Organizations
ARBiH
ARBiH Armija Republika Bosna ii Hercegovina
Republika Bosna –
Bosnian Army
Hercegovina-Bosnian Army
HY Hrvatska Vojska
Hrvatska –
Croatian Army
Vojska-Croatian Army
HRM
HRM Hrvatska Ratna
Hrvatska Ratna Mornarica —Croatian Navy
Mornarica-Croatian Navy
HRZ
HRZ Hrvatsko ratno
Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo -
zrakoplovstvo-Croatian
Croatian Air
Air Force
Force
HRZ i PZO
HRZiPZO Hrvatsko ratno
Hrvatsko
and Air
ratno zrakoplovstvo
Air Defense
zrakoplovstvo ii protuzracna
protuzracna odbrana –
Croatian Air
odbrana-Croatian Air Forces
Forces
HVO
HYO Hrvatsko Vijece
Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane —Croatian Defense
Odbrane-Croatian Defense Council
Council/Bosnian /
Croat Army
Bosnian Croat Army
JNA
JNA Narodna Armija
Jugoslovenska Narodna
Jugoslovenska Armija-Yugoslav -People's's Army ((prewar)
Yugoslav People prewar )
JRM Jugoslovenska Ratna

Jugoslovenska Ratna Mornarica — Yugoslav Navy
Mornarica-Yugoslav Navy
NDH
NOH Nezavisna Drzava
Nezavisna
WW II
((WW
Drzava Hrvatska
II. Croat
Croat state
state))
–
Hrvatska-lndependent State
Independent State of
of Croatia
Croatia
RSK Srpska Krajina

Republika Srpska
Republika Krajina-Krajina–
Krajina Serb
Serb Republic
Republic
RV
RV ii PVO
PYO Ratno
Air
vazduhoplovstvo ii protivvazdusna
Ratno vazduhoplovstvo
Air Defense Force
protivvazdusna odbrana
odbrana-Yugoslav–
Yugoslav Air
Air and
and
SSNO Savezni Sekretarijat

Savezni
National
Sekretarijat za Narodnu
National Defense
Narodnu Odbranu
Odbranu-Federal- Secretariat of
Federal Secretariat of
SVK
SVK Vojska Krajina
Srpska Vojska
Srpska –Krajina Serb
Krajina-Krajina Serb Army
Army
TO
TO Teritorijalna Odbrana –
Teritorijalna Odbrana-Territorial
Territorial Defense
VJ VojskaJugoslavija
Vojska -
Yugoslav Army
Jugoslavija-Yugoslav Army
VRS
YRS Vojska Republika
Vojska Republika Srpska
Srpska-Bosnian– Serb Army
Bosnian Serb
xix
XIX

V i PVO
ViPVO Vazduhoplovstvo ii Protivvazdusne
Vazduhoplovstvo
Air
Air Defense
Defense Force
Force
Protivvazdusne Odbrana –
Odbrana-Bosnian Serb Air
Bosnian Serb Air and
and
ZNG Zbor Narodne

Zbor Narodne Garde —National Guard
Garde-National pre-1992 Croatian
Corps ((pre-1992
Guard Corps Croatian military
military))
Interior Ministry,
Interior Ministry, Internal Security,, and
Internal Security and Intelligence Organizations
MUP
MUP Ministarstvo Unutrasnje
Ministarstvo Unutrasnje Poslova — Ministry
Poslova-Ministry of Internal
of Internal Affairs
Affairs
SBP
SBP Specijalne Brigada Policija
Specijalne -Special Police
Policija-Special Police Brigade
Brigade ([RS]
RS )
UB Uprava Bezbednosti -
JNA /VJSecurity
Bezbednosti-JNANJ Security Directorate
Directorate
KOS
KOS Kontraobavestajna Sluzba
Kontraobavestajna -
Sluzba-old for JNA
name for
old name JNA Security
Security Directorate
Directorate
SDB
SOB Sluzba Drzavne
Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti -State Security
Bezbednosti-State Security Service
Service ([Serb-old
Serb - term])
old term
RDB
ROB Rewr Drzavne
Rezor Drzavne Bezbednosti -State Security
Bezbednosti-State Security Department
Department (Serb
[Serb-new -
term])
new term
SJE
SJB Sluzba Javne
Sluzba Javne Bezbednosti -
Public Security
Bezbednosti-Public Security Service
Service
SIS
SIS Signurnosno Izvestajna
Signurnosno
( HV /HVO)
(HV/HVO)
/zvestajna Sluzba-
Sluzba-Security and Intelligence
Security and Intelligence Service
Service
SSUP
SSUP (Savezni Sekretarijat
(Savezni Sekretarijat za
za Unutrasnje
Unutrasnje Poslove )— Federal Secretariat
Poslove)-Federal Secretariat
of Internal
Internal Affairs
Affairs
Political
Political Parties
HDZ
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska
Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica — Croatian Democratic
Zajednica-Croatian Democratic Union
Union ((Croatia)
Croatia )
SDA
SDA Stranka
Muslim))
Demokratske Akcije
Stranka Demokratske Akcije-Party–
Party of Democratic
of Democratic Action
Action ((Bosnian
Bosnian
Muslim
sos
SDS Srpska Demokratska
Demokratska Stranka -
Stranka-Serbian Democratic Party
Party ((Bosnian Serb))
-
Srpska Serbian Democratic Bosnian Serb
SPS Socialisticka Partija

Socialisticka Partija Srbije
Srbije- Serbian Socialist
Serbian Socialist Party
Party
xx
XX

Military Echelons
Echelons
General Staff/
Staff/ Genera/stab
Generalstab (JNA ARBiH),), Glavni
(JNA and ARBiH Glavni Stozer (HV /HVO),
(HV/HVO),
Main Staff
Staff Glavnistab (VRS
Glavnistab (YRS and SVK )
SVK)
Corps
Corps JNA , VJ
Korpus ((JNA, VJ,, VRS
YRS,, SVK
SVK,, ARBiH )/Zbor ((HV/HVO)
ARBiH)/Zbor HV /HVO)
Division Divizija
Brigade
Brigade Brigada
Brigada
Regiment Puk
Battalion
Battalion Bataljon JNA , VJ
Bataljon ((JNA, VJ,, VRS
YRS,, SVK )/Bojna ((HV/HVO)
ARBiH)/Bojna
SVK,, ARBiH HV /HVO)
Artillery or
or Air
Air Divizion
Defense
Defense Artillery
Battalion
Battalion
Company
Company Ceta (JNA
Ceta (JNA,, VJ
VJ,, VRS
YRS,, SVK
SVK,, ARBiH
ARBiH)/Satnija HV /HVO)
)/Satnija ((HV/HVO)
Artillery Battery Baterija

Baterija
Platoon
Platoon Vod
Vod
Primary
Primary Brigade Types in Yugoslav
Types in Yugoslav Conflict
Conflict
Guards Gardijska Brigada ((gbr)

Gardijska gbr )
Liberation
Liberation Oslobodilacka Brigada ((obr
Oslobodilacka obr))
Mountain
Mountain Brdska Brigada ((bbr)
Brdska bbr )
Motorized
Motorized Motorizovana Brigada ((mtbr)
Motorizovana mtbr )
Mechanized
Mechanized Mehanizovana Brigada ((mbr)
Mehanizovana Brigada mbr )
Armor Brigada ((okbr)

Oklopna Brigada
Oklopna okbr )
Infantry
Infantry Pesadijska Brigada ((pbr)
Pesadijska pbr)
Light Infantry
Infantry Laka Pesadijska Brigada ((lpbr
Laka Pesadijska lpbr))
хxi
xxi

Army/Yugoslav Army/Bosnian
People’s Army/Yugoslav
Yugoslav People's Army/Krajina
Army/Bosnian Serb Army/Krajina
Army
Serb Army Military Ranks
Army General Armijski

Armijski General (four stars)
General (four stars)
Colonel
Colonel General General-Pukovnik (three
General-Pukovnik (three stars)
stars)
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel General-Potpukovnik (two stars)
General-Potpukovnik stars)
General
Major General General-Major

General-Major (one star)
star)
Colonel
Colonel Pukovnik
Pukovnik
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel Potpukovnik
Major Major
Captain 1st
I st Class Kapetan
Kapetan II Klase
Klase
Captain Kapetan
Lieutenant Porucnik
Porucnik
Junior Lieutenant Potporucnik

Potporucnik
Croatian Army/Bosnian Croat

Croatian Army/Bosnian Army Military
Croat Army Military Ranks
Staff General General (four

Stozerni General
Srozerni (four stars)
stars)
Corps
Corps General General Zbora
General Zbora (three stars)
(three stars)
Colonel General
Colonel General-Pukovnik
General-Pukovnik (two stars)
stars)
Major General General-Bojnik star)

General-Bojnik (one star)
Staff Brigadier
Brigadier Stozerni Brigadir (no US equivalent)
Srozerni
Brigadier
Brigadier Brigadir (US colonel
colonel equivalent)
Colonel
Colonel Pukovnik (US lieutenant colonel
Pukovnik colonel equivalent)
Major Bojnik
Bojnik
xxii
XXII

Captain
Captain Satnik
Senior
Senior Lieutenant Natporucnik
Natporucnik
Lieutenant Porucnik
Porucnik
Army Military
Bosnian Army Military Ranks
Army General Armijski

Armijski General Bosnian Army Commander)
(overall Bosnian
General (overall Commander)
Division General Divizion General (two

Divizion General (two stars)
stars)
Brigadier General
Brigadier Brigadni
Brigadni General
General (one star)
star)
Brigadier
Brigadier Brigadir
Brigadir (no US equivalent—not officer rank)
equivalent-not a general officer
Colonel
Colonel Pukovnik
Pukovnik
Lt. Colonel
Lt. Colonel Potpukovnik
Potpukovnik
Major Major
Senior Captain
Senior Nadkapetan
Captain
Captain Kapetan
Senior
Senior Lieutenant Nadporucnik
Nadporucnik
Lieutenant
Lieutenant Porucnik
Porucnik
Weapons
Weapons
Tanks
M-47 US-manufactured MBT (90-mm
US-manufactured MBT (90-min gun)
M-84 Yugoslav-manufactured MBT ( 125-mm gun), variant of the

Yugoslav-manufactured MBT the T-72
T-72
T-72
T—72 Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured MBT ( 125-mm gun)
MBT (125-mm
T-54/55
T-54/55 MBT ( 105-mm gun)
Soviet-manufactured MBT
Soviet-manufactured
T-34
T-34 Soviet-manufactured WWIIII medium tank (85-mm
Soviet-manufactured WW (85-mm gun)
xxiii
XXlll

Light
Light Tanks
PT-76
PT-76 Soviet-manufactured light amphibious
Soviet-manufactured light amphibious tank (76-mm
(76-mrn gun)
Tank Destroyers
Tank Destroyers
M-l8 Hellcat
M-18 Hellcat US-manufactured WW II
US-manufactured II tank destroyer (76-min
(76-mm gun)
M-36BZ
M-36B2 US-manufactured
US-manufactured WW II
WW II tank destroyer (90-mm
(90-mm gun)
SU-IOO
SU-100 Soviet-manufactured WW II
Soviet-manufactured WW II tank destroyer ((lOO-mm
100-mm gun)
ACVs
ACVs
M-80 Yugoslav-manufactured IFV
Yugoslav-manufactured IFY (20-mm
(20-mm cannon)
M-6O
M-60 Yugoslav-manufactured APC
Yugoslav-manufactured APC (12.7-mm
(12.7-mm machinegun)
machinegun)
M-6O PB
M-60PB Antitank version
Antitank version of the M-6O with
the M-60 x 82-mm recoilless
with 2 x recoilless rifles
rifles
BTR-SO
BTR-50 Soviet-manufactured APC, used
Soviet-manufactured tracked APC, as command vehicle
used as vehicle
BOV
BOY Yugoslav-manufactured 4 xx 4 wheeled APC
Yugoslav-manufactured APC
BOV-l
M-83 BOY-1 Antitank the BOV
Antitank version of the BOY with AT-3 ATGM
with 6 xx AT-3 ATGM
BOV-M
BOY-M the BOV
Militia/police variant of the BOY
M-86 BOV-VP
M-86BOY-YP Military police the BOV
police variant of the BOY
Reconnaissance Vehicles
Reconnaissance Vehicles
BRDM-2
BRDM-2 amphibious scout car
Soviet-manufactured amphibious
Soviet-manufactured
Artillery
Artillery
203 mm
203mm
M2 US-manufactured 203-mm
US-manufactured (8-inch) towed howitzer
203-mm (8-inch) howitzer [alternate designator
for M115]
forMll5]
155mm
155 mm
M-l
M-1 US-manufactured 155-mm
US-manufactured howitzer [alternate designation for
155-mm towed howitzer for
M-114]
M-114]
M-65 Yugoslav-manufactured variant of

Yugoslav-manufactured US M-l/M-114
of US M-l/M-114 105-mm towed howitzer
105-mm towed howitzer
M-ll4
M-114 155-mm towed howitzer
US-manufactured 155-mm
US-manufactured howitzer [alternate for M-l]
[alternate designation for M-1]
xxiv
xxiv

M-59 "Long Tom”
“Long Tom" US-manufactured 155-mm towed field
US-manufactured 155-mm field gun
M-46/84
M-46/84 Yugoslav-manufactured 155-mm
Yugoslav-manufactured 155-mm gun-howitzer with a 155-mm
gun-howitzer [M-46 gun with 155-mm
barrel]
152mm
152 mm
D-20
D-20 Soviet-manufactured 152-mm towed howitzer
Soviet-manufactured howitzer
M-84 NORA
M-84NORA Yugoslav-manufactured 152-mm towed gun-howitzer
Yugoslav-manufactured 152-mm gun-howitzer
M-1937 Soviet-manufactured 152-mm

Soviet-manufactured 152-mm towed gun-howitzer
gun-howitzer [Soviet
[Soviet designator
ML-20]
ML-20]
130 mm
130mm
M-46 Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured 130-mm
130-mm towed field
field gun
[22
122 mm
mm
2Sl
251 Soviet-manufactured 122-mm
Soviet-manufactured 122-mm tracked SP howitzer
howitzer
D-30 Soviet-manufactured 122—mm

Soviet-manufactured 122-mm towed howitzer
howitzer
M-38 Soviet-manufactured l22-mm

Soviet-manufactured 122-mm towed howitzer
howitzer [Soviet
[Soviet designator M-30]
105mm
105 mm
M-56 Yugoslav-manufactured 105-mm

Yugoslav-manufactured 105-mm towed howitzer
howitzer [fires
[fires US-pattem
US-pattern
ammunition]
ammunition]
M2A1
M2AI US-manufactured
US-manufactured WW II
WW 105-mm towed howitzer
II 105-mm howitzer [alternate name for
[alternate name for
MlOl]
M101]
M-l 8/43
M-18/43 German-manufactured
German-manufactured WW II
WW II 105-mm howitzer
105-mm towed howitzer
M-l8/61
M-18/61 German-manufactured
German-manufactured WW II 105-mm
WW II 105-mm towed howitzer
howitzer [upgraded M-18/43
M—18/43
adapted
adapted to fire
fire US-pattern ammunition]
US-pattem ammunition]
M-101
M-101 US-manufactured WW
US-manufactured II 105-mm
WW II 105-mm towed howitzer
howitzer [alternate name for
[alternate name for
M2A l]
M2Al]
XXV
XXV

100
100mm
mm
T-12
T-12 Soviet-manufactured lOO-mm
100-mm antitank gun
76mm
76 mm
M-48Bl
M-4881 Yugoslav-manufactured 76-mm mountain gun [“Tito
Yugoslav-manufactured ["Tito gun"]
gun”]
M-42 ZIS-3 Soviet-manufactured 76-mm field

field gun
Surface-to-Surface
Surface-to-Surf ace Rockets
Rockets
FROG-7 Soviet-manufactured 544-mm unguided rocket launcher [450-kg warhead]
(9PI 13 "Luna-M")
(9P113 “Luna-M”)
Multiple Rocket Launchers
Multiple
262-mm/12
262-mm/ 12 tube
tube Yugoslav-manufactured truck-mounted MRL
Yugoslav-manufactured MRL
LRSV M-87 "Orkan•·
LRSV “Orkan”
128-mm/32 tube
tube Yugoslav-manufactured
truck-mounted MRL
M-77
M-77 "Oganj"
“Oganj”
128-mm/32 tube
tube Yugoslav-manufactured
towed MRL
“Plamen”
M-63 "Plamen"
128-mm/lZ
128-mm/ tube M91
12 tube M9 l MRL
Croatian-manufactured towed MRL
l22-mm/4O tube
122-mm/40 tube Romanian version of the MRL
the Soviet-manufactured BM-21 truck-mounted MRL
APR-40 BM-21
APR-40
“Grad”
"Grad"
lO7-mm/12 tube
107-mm/12 tube Chinese-manufactured towed MRL
MRL
Type 63 MRL
MRL
Single-Tube Rocket Launchers
LRL-l28-mm
LRL-128-mm Yugoslav-manufactured single-tube rocket launcher
Yugoslav-manufactured
M-7l "Partizan"
M-71 “Partizan”
LRL-107-mm
LRL-107-mm Chinese-manufactured single-tube rocket launcher
Type 85
Mortars
Mortars
M-69
M-69 Yugoslav-manufactured 82-mm mortar
M-74 Yugoslav-manufactured 120-mm mortar

M-75 Yugoslav-manufactured l20-mm

Yugoslav-manufactured 120-mm mortar
UBM-52 Yugoslav-manufactured
Yugoslav-manufactured lZO-mm
120-mm mortar
xxvi
XXVI

Recoilless Rifles
Recoilless Rifles
M60A
M60A Yugoslav-manufactured 82-mm recoilless
Yugoslav-manufactured rifle
recoilless rifle
M79 Yugoslav-manufactured 82-mm recoilless

recoilless rifle
Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM)

Antitank (ATGM)
l/9M l4
9K1 l/9Ml4
9Kl ATGM, l20-mm
Soviet-manufactured ATGM, 120-mm warhead
(AT-3 a.k.a..
(AT-3 Sagger a.k.a
Maljutka)
Maljutka)
9KI l/9M1 111

9K1 Il I/9MI 1 ATGM, 120-mm warhead
Soviet-manufactured ATGM,
(AT-4
(AT-4 Spigot a.k .a.
a.k.a.
Fagot)
9Pl48/9Ml l3
9Pl48/9MI 13 ATGM,, for
Soviet-manufactured ATGM for mounting on ACVs
ACVs
(AT-5
(AT-5 Spandrel a.k.a.
Konkurs)
Konkurs)
9Kl 15/9M l 15
9K1 l5/9Ml 15 ATGM, l20-mm
Soviet-manufactured ATGM, 120-mm warhead
(AT-7 Saxhom a.k.a.
(AT-7 Saxhorn a.k.a.
Metis)
Metis)
MILAN
MILAN ATGM, l25-mm
West European-manufactured ATGM, 125-mm shaped-charge
shaped-charge warhead
TF-8 Chinese-manufactured ATGM,

ATGM , 120-mm warhead
(Red Arrow 8)
8)
Antitank Rocket Launchers
Antitank
Armbrust
Armbrust German-manufactured disposable antitank rocket launcher
M57 Yugoslav-manufactured
Yugoslav-manufactured 44-mm rocket -propelled grenade
rocket-propelled grenade
RBR M80
RBRM80 Yugoslav-manufactured copy of 64-mm US
Yugoslav-manufactured LAW
LAW antitank rocket
(“Zolja'”)
("Zolja ")
RBR M79
RBR Yugoslav-manufactured 90-mm antitank rocket launcher
("Osa")
(“08a”)
Small Arms
Arms
M48 Yugoslav-manufactured rifle [copy of German WW
bolt-action rifle
Yugoslav-manufactured bolt-action WW II
II
Gewehr 98 k)
M53 Yugoslav-manufactured WW
Yugoslav-manufactured 7.92-mm machinegun [copy of German WW II
II
MG-42]
M56 Yugoslav-manufactured
Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm submachinegun
xxvii

M57
M57 Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm copy of the Tokarev
Yugoslav-manufactured Tokarev TT-33
TT-33
M59/66A1
M59/66Al Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm rifle,
Yugoslav-manufactured Simonov SKS
rifle, variant of the Simonov SKS
“Tromblon”
M60 "Tromblon" Yugoslav-manufactured rifle grenade
Yugoslav-manufactured rifle grenade
M70 Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm assault

Yugoslav-manufactured rifle, variant of the
assault rifle, AK-47
the AK-47
M72
M72 Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm light machinegun, variant of the
Yugoslav-manufactured the RPK
RPK
M76
M76 Yugoslav-manufactured 7.92-mm sniper rifle
M84 Yugoslav-manufactured 7.62-mm general purpose machinegun, variant of

PKM
the PKM
Aircraft
Aircraft
Jet Aircraft
G-2/N-60 Galeb
G-2/N-60 Yugoslav-manufactured trainer version of the
Yugoslav-manufactured J-21 JJastreb
the J-21 [two seats,
astreb [two seats,
straight wings]
wings]
G-4/N-62 Super Galeb

G-4/N-62 Yugoslav-manufactured fighter/ground
Yugoslav-manufactured attack aircraft [two
fighter/ground attack [two seats,
seats, swept
wings]
wings]
IAR-93
IAR-93 Romanian
Romanian version of the J -22 Orao.
the J-22 Orao.
IJ-22
11-22 Recce
Reece version of the Orao
Orao
INJ_22
INJ-22 Trainer/recce version of Orao
Orao
J-21 Jastreb Yugoslav-manufactured ground attack

Yugoslav-manufactured attack aircraft [one
[one seat,
seat, straight wings]
wings]
J -22 Orao
J-22 Yugoslav-manufactured ground attack
Yugoslav-manufactured attack aircraft [one
[one seat,
seat, swept wings]
wings]
Fulcrum
MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft. Twin tails.
Soviet-manufactured fighter
Fishbed
MiG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft. Turbojet
Soviet-manufactured fighter Turbojet engine in
in fuselage
NJ -22
NJ-22 the JJ-22
Two-seater trainer version of the -22 Orao
Orao
NJ ~62
NJ-62 Super Galeb combat capable trainer
N -62R
N-62R Super Galeb
Galeb trainer
xxviii
xxviii

Propeller Aircraft
Propeller
AN -2 Colt
AN-2 Soviet-manufactured aircraft. A
Soviet-manufactured general purpose aircraft. A biplane
biplane
J-20 K.raguj
Kraguj Yugoslav-manufactured light ground attack aircraft
Yugoslav-manufactured light aircraft
UTVA-60
UTVA-60 Yugoslav-manufactured utility aircraft. Resembles
Yugoslav-manufactured utility Resembles aa Cessna
UTVA-66
UTVA-66 utility aircraft. Resembles
Yugoslav-manufactured utility
Yugoslav-manufactured Resembles a Cessna
a
UTVA-75
UTVA-75 utility aircraft. Resembles a Cessna
Yugoslav-manufactured utility
Helicopters
Mi-8 "Hip C”/HT-40
“Hip C"/HT-40 Soviet-manufactured [57-mm rockets, door
Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter [57-mm door guns]
Mi-8 "Hip
Mi-8 E/F”
“Hip E/F" Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter
helicopter [3,000-kg
[3,000-kg payload]
payload]
M-17 "Hip H”
“Hip H" Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter
helicopter [4,000-kg
[4,000-kg payload]
payload]
“Hind”
Mi-24 "Hind" Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured attack helicopter [ 1,500-kg ordnance payload]
helicopter [1,500-kg payload]
SA-342/HN-42 Yugoslav license-manufactured

Yugoslav license-manufactured (French)
(French) “Gazelle” light attack helicopter
"Gazelle" light helicopter
SA-342/HN-45 Yugoslav license-manufactured

Yugoslav license-manufactured “Gazelle”
"Gazelle" light
light attack helicopter
attack helicopter
GAMA
GAMA [mounted with AT-3 ATGM
with AT-3 ATGMand/or SA-7 SAM]
SA-7 SAM]
SA-342/HI-42 SA-342 “Gazelle”

"Gazelle" recce version
version
Surface-to-Air
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)
(SAMs)
Guideline
SA-2 Guideline Soviet-manufactured
Soviet-manufactured towed SAM
SAM [1 missile per launcher,
[1 missile launcher, Fan
Fan Song
Song radar]
("Dvina")
(“Dvina”)
Goa
SA-3 Goa Soviet-manufactured towed SAM
Soviet-manufactured SAM [2 to 44 missiles
[2 to Low Blow
launcher, Low
missiles per launcher, Blow
("Neva")
(“Neva”) radar]
radar]
SA-6 Gainful Soviet-manufactured

Soviet-manufactured vehicle-mounted
vehicle-mounted SAM
SAM [tracked carrier, 33 missiles
missiles per
("Kub")
(6‘Kub99) launcher, Straight Flush
Flush radar]
radar]
Grai l1
SA-7 Grai Manpad SAM
Soviet-manufactured Manpad
Soviet-manufactured SAM [S-2M
[S-2M is the Yugoslav-manufactured
is the Yugoslav-manufactured
("Strela-2M")
(“Strela-2M”) variant]
SA-9 Gaskin
SA-9 Gaskin vehicle-mounted SAM
Soviet-manufactured vehicle-mounted
Soviet-manufactured BRDM-2 carrier,
[4 xx 4 BRDM-2
SAM [4
Strela-l”/
(“ZRK-BD Strela-1
("ZRK-BD "/ missiles per vehicle, IR
4 missiles vehicle, IR seeker]
seeker]
9M3 1)
9M31)
S-10
S—lO Croatian-produced copy
Croatian-produced the SA-l3
copy of the SA-13 (Strela-lO) [6 xx 66 wheeled carrier]
(Strela-10) [6 carrier]
xxix
xxix

Antiaircraft Guns
Self-Propelled Antiaircraft
BOV-3
BOV-3 Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft version of the BOV 4 xx 4 wheeled APC
the BOY with 33 x 20-mm cannon
APC with
M-53/59
M-53/59 "Praga"
“Praga” Czech
Czech wheeled SP antiaircraft gun with
with 2 x 30-mm cannon
ZSU-57-2
ZSU-57-2 Soviet-tracked SP antiaircraft gun with 2 xx 57-mrn
Soviet-tracked 57-mm cannon
Towed Antiaircraft Guns

Towed Antiaircraft
40-mm/l L-70/L-6O
40-mm/l L-70/L-60 Bofors (Swedish)_manufactured
Bofors (Swedish)-manufactured AA gun
AA
20-mm/3 M55 triple-barrel 20-mm

Yugoslav-manufactured triple-barrel
Yugoslav-manufactured AA
AA gun
(A2/A3/A4)
20-mm/l M75
20-mm/l Yugoslav-manufactured single-barrel
Yugoslav-manufactured single-barrel 20-mm AA
AA gun
XXX
XXX

Balkan Crises:
The Balkan Crises: Chronology
Chronology of
Significant Events, 1991-1995
Significant 1991-1995
1991
1991
28 March
March 1991
1991 The
The presidents Yugoslavia’s six republics meet
presidents of Yugoslavia's meet in Croatia to
to discuss the
the
country’s future.
country's future .
25
25 June Slovenia and
Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Fighting breaks out almost
independence. Fighting
these declarations when the
immediately after these the Yugoslav People's Army
Yugoslav People’s
(JNA) moves to maintain control over Slovene border stations.
55 July With
With fighting continuing in Slovenia,
fighting continuing the EC
Slovenia, the foreign ministers impose an
EC foreign an
arms embargo onon the former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia until
until the situation normalizes.
normalizes .
7 July The EC foreign ministers travels for its

EC troika of foreign its third visit
visit to
to Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
and
and arranges
arranges the accords. All
Brioni accords.
the Brioni All Yugoslav
Yugoslav parties agreeagree toto start negoti-
start negoti
ations on
on the country's
country’s future by by 1I August
August to accept EC
to accept EC monitors, to lift the the
blockades of Army facilities,
facilities , to the Army to
to restrict the its barracks, and
to its to
and to
deactivate the militias.
deactivate militias.
13-17
13-17 July sends 50 monitors to
The EC sends to Yugoslavia to begin work
Yugoslavia to Slovenia.
work in Slovenia.
18 July
18 The Yugoslav
Yugoslav Federal Presidency the JNA
Presidency orders the to withdraw
JNA to withdraw from
from Slove
Slove-
nia within three months, marking de
within three recognition of Slovenian
de facto recognition Slovenian inde
inde-
pendence and
pendence and an end to
to the military conflict. Army shifts focus to
military conflict. to fighting
fighting
in Croatia.
29
29 July EC
EC foreign ministers propose a new cease-fire Slovenia, more monitors,
cease-fire in Slovenia,
and joint
and joint patrols by the
the J NA
JNA and
and the
the local Serb forces.
4 August
August The Serbs and JNA reject the
and the JNA the efforts of another
another EC
EC troika visit trying
trying to
to
mediate cease-fire, expand monitors to Croatia, and
mediate a cease-fire. start negotiations
and start
Yugoslavs on
among the Yugoslavs political settlement.
on a political settlement.
August
27-28 August French President Mitterrand
Mitterrand hosts consecutive visits from
from Croatian Presi
Presi-
dent Tudjman and
dent Tudjman and Serbian President Milosevic in an effort to bring the two
bring the
sides together.
together.
Late Summer-
Summer— Serbian President Milosevic steps up financial
steps up financial and armed support to
to Serbs
Early Fall
Early Fall in the
in Krajina and
the Krajina Slavonian regions of
and Slavonian Croatia. Local
of Croatia. Local Serb forces sup-
sup
JNA wrest most of the
ported by the JNA the Serb-majority areas from
Serb-majority areas from Croatian
control.
control.
Digitized by o gle Origir1al from

11 September Dutch Foreign Minister van
Dutch Foreign van den Broek,
Broek, on behalf the EC,
behalf of the EC, travels to
to
Belgrade.
Belgrade. An agreement is
is reached on a new
new cease-fire,
cease-fire, an expansion of the
an expansion the
monitor
monitor teams,
teams, and
and a conference to be
conference to be held in The Hague.
The Hague.
7 September EC conference
An EC conference on peace negotiations opens in
peace negotiations in The Hague under the
The Hague the
chairmanship of Lord Carrington.'
chairmanship Carrington.*
18
18 September Macedonia declares independence.
Macedonia
25
25 September The UN Security
The Security Council imposes
imposes an arms embargo on the
an arms the former
former
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia (Resolution 713 ).
(Resolution 713).
October
1 October
1 The EC agrees
The EC agrees to extend its
its monitors
monitors into
into Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
October
3 October Serbia and
and Montenegro control of Yugoslavia’s
Montenegro seize control Yugoslavia's Federal
Federal Presidency.
Presidency.
18 October
18 October The Hague,
At The Hague, the EC offers
the EC offers a detailed plan for political settlement based
for a political based
on a loose association
association of states: voluntary participation,
states: voluntary protection for
participation, protection for
minorities, limited
minorities, limited common
common institutions (a court for human rights,
institutions (a an eco
rights, an eco-
nomic council to manage aa customs union,
nomic council union, and aa nonbinding council for
nonbinding council
political
political and cooperation). Only Serbia
and security cooperation). Serbia does not accept the the plan by
by
a deadline of 5 November, despite revisions
5 November, revisions offered
offered in
in subsequent
negotiations.
negotiations.
November
8 November The EC imposes sanctions against all
The EC all Yugoslav
Yugoslav states
states but says itit will
but says will
rescind
rescind them for republics that cooperate with
republics that with the
the peace
peace process.
25 November
25 November Yugoslav
Yugoslav and Croatian Army leaders agree
and Croatian comprehensive cease-fire
to aa comprehensive
agree to cease-fire as
as
deployment of UN
a prerequisite for a deployment UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia.“
forces to Croatia.••
'
• On 4 October at The Hague, Hague, EC EC ministers
ministers reach agreement with
reach an agreement with Serbian
Serbian President
President
Milosevic and
Milosevic President Tudjman to
and Croatian President to negotiate
negotiate a complete settlement for Yugosla
complete settlement Yugosla-
via. The EC
via. EC proposes
proposes that at the end of the
the end there will
negotiations there
the negotiations be recognition for
will be for those
those
republics that desire
desire independence,
independence, therethere will
will be
be a loose association of the
loose association the Yugoslav
Yugoslav states,
states,
minority rights will be protected,
rights will there will
protected, there will be
be nono unilateral changes in
unilateral changes in borders,
borders, thethe Croat
Croat-
ians will
ians blockades of the
their blockades
will lift their the Army
Army barracks,
barracks, and and the Yugoslav
Yugoslav ArmyArmy willwill withdraw
Croatia. When Serbia
from Croatia. Serbia stalls on the
stalls on agreement, EC
the 4 October agreement, EC foreign ministers
ministers on on
threaten to
6 October threaten to impose sanctions if
impose economic sanctions if there
there is not compliance by
is not by midnight on on
7 October.
October. They say that they
say that will resume
they will relations with those
cooperative relations
resume cooperative those republics thatthat
are working
working for peacepeace andand that they will
that they will seek
seek a trade the UN
through the
embargo through
trade embargo UN for
for those
those that
that
not.
are not.
" This follows UN
Secretary General
•• This follows UN Secretary General Perez
Perez de de Cuellar’s
Cuellar's announcement
announcement on on 1515 November
will send
that he will envoys Cyrus Vance
send envoys and Philip
Vance and Philip Goulding
Goulding to to Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia to explore the
to explore the fea
fea-
sibility of a UN
sibility UN peacekeeping operation. Authorized
peacekeeping operation. Authorized by by UNSC
UNSC Resolution 724, 724, an
an advance
advance
party arrives
party arrives in Yugoslavia on
in Yugoslavia 15 December
on 15 December to explore a UN
to explore peacekeeping role.
UN peacekeeping role. The
The Vance
Vance
Plan for deployment
Plan deployment of UN UN peacekeeping
peacekeeping forces
forces inin Croatia evolves out of this
evolves out this fact-finding
fact-finding
mission.
Digitized by Go gle Origiiial from

2 December EC ends
The EC ends economic
economic sanctions against all Yugoslav
Yugoslav republics
republics except
Serbia and Montenegro.
Montenegro.
16 December
16 December The EC Council of Ministers
The Ministers agrees recognize within
agrees to recognize within a month any repub-
any repub
lic
lic that
that meets EC criteria-protect
meets EC rights , support EC
criteria—protect human rights, and UN
EC and UN peace
peace
CSCE standards, accept financial
efforts, abide by CSCE financial obligations-in
obligations—in talks that
that
December..
had resumed on 88 December
23 December
23 December Germany Slovenia and Croatia.
Germany recognizes Slovenia Croatia.
24 December
24 December Macedonia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia
Croatia, , and
and Bosnia-
Bosnia- Hercegovina the EC
Hercegovina apply to the EC for
recognition
recognition as
as sovereign states.
states.
31 December
31 December UN envoy Cyrus
UN Cyrus Vance visits Belgrade
Vance visits Belgrade on aa peacekeeping mission as fierce
mission as fierce
fighting Croatia. .
fighting continues in Croatia
1992
2 January 1992
January 1992 Croatian military commanders and
Croatian and Serbian military political leaders agree
and political agree to a
UN
UN plan to deploy
deploy peacekeeping forces. (Vance
forces . (Vance Plan).
9 January
January EC reconvenes the
The EC peace conference in Brussels.
the peace Brussels .
10 January
10 January EC lifts
The EC lifts sanctions against Montenegro.
Montenegro.
15 January
15 January EC member states
EC states and 15
15 other countries, including the United
including the United States,
States,
recognize Croatia and
recognize Croatia and Slovenia
Slovenia as
as independent states.
states.
13 February
13 February EC-sponsored conference on
An EC-sponsored Bosnia opens in Lisbon.
on Bosnia Lisbon .
21 February
21 February UN SC passes
UNSC passes Resolution
Resolution 743 establishing aa peacekeeping force
743 establishing force in Croatia. .
in Croatia
27 February-
27 February— Bosnia holds a referendum on independence from
Bosnia Yugoslavia. Bosnian
from Yugoslavia. Bosnian
March
!1 March Serbs react violently
violently to the
the vote in
in favor
favor of independence. President
Izetbegovic tries to
Izetbegovic to mollify and engage including them in
the Serbs by including
engage the
his government.
March
7 March An team of UN
An advance team peacekeepers arrives in
UN peacekeepers in Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
9 March EC peace
The EC peace conference reconvenes in Brussels. .
in Brussels
10 March
10 United States
The United EC agree
States and the EC to coordinate
agree to coordinate on recognition
recognition of former
Yugoslav states.
Yugoslav states.

18 March
18 March During EC-sponsored talks in Sarajevo, Serb, Croat, and Muslim
During EC-sponsored leaders
Muslim leaders
agree
agree on a framework for establishing ethnic cantons
cantons (the Cutilheiro
Cutilheiro plan).
The plan states that there
there will be
be no change external borders;
change in external three can
borders; three can-
tons based largely on ethnic criteria will be
tons based created; and a weak central
be created; central
government will handle economic, foreign, and
government defense affairs. All
and defense other
All other
functions—including
functions-including administration, social security, culture, environment,
administration, environment,
and education—will
transport, and
housing, transport, education-will be controlled by the cantonal
the cantonal
governments.
governments.
6 April The EC agrees Bosnia-Hercegovina; itit delays a decision on

agrees to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina;
Macedonia. The Serbs move almost immediately to partition thethe republic.
27
27 April Serbia and Republic of Yugoslavia
and Montenegro proclaim a new Federal Republic Yugoslavia and
and
declare it the successor
declare successor state to Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
24 May
24May Unofficial presidential
Unofficial presidential and parliamentary elections in Kosovo
and parliamentary Kosovo result in a
landslide victory for the ethnic Albanian
Albanian party and its leader
and its leader Ibrahim
Rugova.
27 May adjoums the Lisbon

The EC adjourns conference on
Lisbon conference on Bosnia after the Muslims walk
the Muslims walk
siege of Sarajevo and
out. (The continuing siege
out. and Serbian military
military gains prompt
to abandon
Izetbegovic to Cutilheiro plan.) The EC also reimposes
abandon the Cutilheiro reimposes
economic sanctions
sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro, including
including stopping all trade,
trade,
freezing export credits and scientific cooperation,
and scientific and seeking an oil
cooperation, and
embargo in the UN.
embargo
May
30May
30 The UNSC
UNSC passes 757 imposing economic sanctions
passes Resolution 757 sanctions on Serbia
and
and Montenegro.
31
31 May Milosevic’s
Milosevic's Socialist
Socialist Party wins
wins local assembly elections in “the
local and federal assembly "the
Republic of Yugoslavia"
Federal Republic Yugoslavia” (FRY).
(FRY).
4 June
June A NATO ministerial meeting
A NATO meeting in Oslo
Oslo goes beyond NATO’s
NATO's traditional
defensive and proposes
defensive role and proposes troops and equipment for peacekeeping
and equipment peacekeeping opera
opera-
tions outside
outside the its members.
the area of its members.
15 June
15 June Dobrica
Dobrica Cosic is elected
Cosic is elected President of the new Federal Republic
Republic of
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
27 June
27 An
An EC accepts military
EC summit accepts operations under the UN
military operations to keep
UN to keep Sarajevo
airport open if
if necessary,
necessary, agrees
agrees to Macedonia only if
to recognize Macedonia changes
if it changes
name, supports
its name,
its suspension
supports suspension of "Yugoslavia"
“Yugoslavia” from the CSCE, and agrees
the CSCE, agrees
send observers
to send
to observers to Kosovo.
Kosovo.

28 June
28 June Mitterrand makes a quick
Mitterrand quick trip to
to observe the
the situation at the
the Sarajevo
Sarajevo airport
airport
airlift.
in preparation for a possible emergency airlift.
I July
1 Milan Panic Prime Minister
Panic becomes Prime the Federal
Minister of the Republic of
Federal Republic
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
2 July Planes EC countries join the airlift to the reopened Sarajevo

from EC
Planes from Sarajevo airport.
2 August
August Croatian
Croatian President Tudjman wins
President Tudjman and his Croatian
wins reelection and Democratic
Croatian Democratic
Union retains a majority
majority in
in parliament.
13 August
13 August The UN passes Resolutions 770, which
passes Resolutions which authorizes "all
“all necessary measures”
measures"
to facilitate
to facilitate delivery relief supplies, and
delivery of relief 771, which
and 771, which demands access to
access to
detention camps
camps..
14
14 August
August CSCE decides to send
The CSCE “missions of long
send "missions long duration" to the
duration” to former
the former
Yugoslav republics
Yugoslav to monitor
republics to monitor human rights.
26-28 August
August EC/U N conference in London
The EC/UN London on former Yugoslavia—which
Yugoslavia-which includes
includes
representatives of the Croatian, and
the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian
Bosnian parties-reaches
parties—reaches
agreement to dismantle detention camps, lift sieges
agreement major cities and
sieges of major
allow UN supervision
allow supervision of heavy weapons, start continuous negotiations on
start continuous
terms for a political
political settlement. It also supports "substantial"
settlement. It “substantial” withdrawal
withdrawal by
by
Bosnian Serbs, international monitors
Bosnian monitors of sanctions and and human rights, aa
tribunal violations, more UN escorts for aid
tribunal to investigate human rights violations,
convoys,
convoys, talks onon autonomy for Kosovo, permission for refugees to
Kosovo, permission to return,
FRY recognition of Bosnia,
FRY recognition Bosnia, more humanitarian
humanitarian aid, and lifting of sanctions
and lifting
and compliance. This conference sets up
and reconstruction aid to reward compliance. up subse
subse-
quent talks in Geneva to the crisis
to discuss the crisis and minority rights.
and minority
33 September Committee of the

The Steering Committee the International Conference on Former
International Conference Former
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia holds its first meeting in
its first in Geneva with
with envoys Vance and Owen
Vance and Owen
chairing the meeting
chairing the meeting..
29
29 September CSCE countries offer
CSCE offer to provide personnel for sanctions assistance missions
to provide missions
to Balkan
to Balkan states
states neighboring the former
neighboring the former Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
30
30 September At urging international mediators Vance
urging of international Vance and Owen, Croatia
and Owen, Croatia and the FRY
and the FRY
agree recognize existing
agree to recognize existing international borders, allow to return,
allow refugees to
and demilitarize the
and demilitarize the Prevlaka
Prevlaka Peninsula.
Peninsula.
6 October UN Security
The UN (UNSC) adopts Resolution
Security Council (UNSC) which estab-
Resolution 780, which estab
commission of experts to examine evidence of war crimes in former
lishes a commission former
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.

7 October The EC
The EC announces the availability of $160 million in
the availability in aid for
for refugees;
this brings total aid to million.
to almost $400 million.
8 October NATO announces it will

NATO will send
send 100
l 00 personnel to the UN headquarters
to the headquarters in
in
Bosnia.
Bosnia.
9 October UNSC adopts Resolution

UNSC 781,
Resolution 78 which establishes aa no-fly zone over Bosnia.
l, which Bosnia.
14
14 October NATO agrees
NATO to provide
agrees to AWACS data
provide AWACS data to to enforce
to help to the no-fly
enforce the no-fly zone.
27
27 October Vance and
Vance Owen propose draft constitution
and Owen constitution asas part of the
the Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen Plan
Plan
Bosnia, which
for Bosnia, which is
is to be
be organized into aa decentralized federation of 10
organized into l0
autonomous provinces.
provinces.
November
33 November FRY Prime
FRY Prime Minister
Minister Panic
Panic narrowly
narrowly survives
survives a confidence
confidence vote in
in the
the upper
house of the
the federal assembly.
16 November
16 November UNSC adopts Resolution
The UNSC Resolution 787, which provides for
which provides for naval interdiction of
naval interdiction
ships trying to
to evade Yugoslavia, tightens sanctions, and
evade sanctions against Yugoslavia,
calls for a study of safehavens.
22 November
22 November NATO and
NATO and WEU naval forces begin patrolling the Adriatic
patrolling the to enforce
Adriatic to enforce
sanctions.
11 December
11 December UN Security
UN Security Council resolution
resolution 795
795 approves sending 760 observers to
to
Macedonia.
Macedonia.
12
12 December An EC
EC summit in Edinburgh threatens further economic
Edinburgh threatens economic sanctions (“total
("total
isolation")
isolation”) and
and agrees
agrees to an aid package for Macedonia.
Macedonia.
20 December
December FRY holds republic
FRY and federal elections.
republic and defeats Milan
elections. Milosevic defeats Panic for
Milan Panic
the
the Serbian Presidency.
Presidency. Milosevic’s
Milosevic's Socialist
Socialist Serbian
Serbian Radicals
Radicals dominate
parliamentary elections.
29
29 December FRY Prime
FRY Minister Panic
Prime Minister vote of confidence
Panic loses aa vote confidence in the national
in the national
assembly.
1993
1993
January 1993
2 January 1993 Vance and
Vance Owen present a new plan for
and Owen l Oprovinces
for 10 that would
provinces that would carry out
functions in
most governmental functions in Bosnia. The boundaries are
Bosnia. The largely deter
are largely deter-
ethnicity, but
mined by ethnicity, geographical, historical,
but geographical, historical, and economic
economic factors areare
taken into account. They
taken framework for the
They also propose aa framework constitution and
the constitution
including aa cease-fire.
military arrangements, including
military cease-fire. Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats immediately
immediately

accept the
accept whole plan; Bosnian
the whole the constitutional
Bosnian Serbs accept the constitutional principles
principles
and the
and military accord; the
the military Bosnian Government accepts
the Bosnian accepts only
only the
the
constitution.
constitution .
14 January
14 January NATO
NATO offers its
its command and control structure for
and control for enforcing the no-fly
enforcing the no-fly
zone over Bosnia.
Bosnia.
30 January
January UN/EC-mediated
UN/EC-mediated Bosnian
Bosnian peace down in
peace talks break down in Geneva.
22 February
22 The UNSC
The UNSC adopts Resolution 808 initiating
Resolution 808 initiating the formation of
the formation an interna
of an interna-
tional war crimes tribunal.
27 February
27 Bosnian peace talks reopen in
Bosnian peace New York.
in New York.
5 March
5 March The
The United States begins airdrops of humanitarian aid over eastern
United States eastern Bosnia.
Bosnia.
8 March
8 March EC
EC foreign ministers agree to implement stronger sanctions if
agree to the FRY
if the FRY fails
fails
the Bosnian
to push the
to Bosnian Serbs to
to accept
accept the Vance-Owen Plan.
the Vance-Owen Plan.
25
25 March
March Vance-Owen Plan,
the Vance-Owen
Bosnian President Izetbegovic signs the
Bosnian Plan, isolating
isolating the
the
Serbs as the
it.
only warring
the only warring party not to sign it.
not to
28-30 March
March German and then the US-led program of
then French aircraft join the of airdrops for
for
humanitarian relief
relief over eastern
eastern Bosnia.
Bosnia.
March
30 March UNSC Resolution 815
UNSC Resolution mandate of
of UNPROFOR
UNPROFORin Croatia for
in
extends the
815 extends the mandate for
three months.
three
March
31 March UNSC Resolution 816 authorizes the
UNSC Resolution enforcement of
the enforcement no-fly zone over
of the no-fly
Bosnia.
Bosnia.
5 April WEU offers to help enforce sanctions by patrolling the Danube.

WEU
7 April UNSC Resolution 817 accepts

UNSC “Former Yugoslav
accepts the "Former Yugoslav Republic of
Republic of
Macedonia”
Macedonia" as UN member.
a UN member.
a
12 April
12 NATO begins air patrols to enforce the no-fly
NATO no-fly zone over Bosnia.
Bosnia.
17 April UNSC Resolution 820 imposes stiffer sanctions

UNSC sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro.
Serbia-Montenegro.
It ends transshipments except
ends transshipments humanitarian needs,
except for humanitarian needs, bans
bans passage of
passage of
It
vessels, trains,
“Yugoslav” vessels, trains,
"Yugoslav" aircraft, of UN
and trucks through territory of UN
freezes funds of
authorizes impounding violators, freezes
members. It also authorizes
members. of
It
entities, and forbids shipping through Yugoslav

Yugoslav entities,
Yugoslav waters.
Yugoslav waters.
Digitized by o gle Origirlill from

29 April
29 April Envoys Vance
Envoys and Owen
Vance and Owen convene talks between the
the Bosnian
Bosnian parties and the
and the
leaders of the
the other former
former Yugoslav republics
Yugoslav republics in Athens.
Athens.
1-2 May
1-2 The UN,
The the EC,
UN, the EC, Bosnian factional leaders, Serbian President Milosevic,
Bosnian factional Milosevic,
Federal President Cosic,
Federal Casie, and Croatian
Croatian President Tudjman meet in
Tudjman meet in Athens.
Athens.
In
In return for concessions
concessions on access
access corridors
corridors between the
the provinces,
provinces,
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic the Vance-Owen
Karadzic accepts the Vance-Owen Plan (the last
Plan (the
factional leader to do so), conditional
factional conditional upon ratification the Bosnian
ratification by the Bosnian Serb
assembly.
6 May
6May The
The Bosnian
Bosnian serb
serb assembly overwhelmingly to 22 with
(51 to
overwhelmingly (51 with 12
12 abstentions)
the Vance-Owen
rejects the Plan.
Vance-Owen Plan.
Secretary Christopher meets with

Christopher meets the EC
with the EC troika in
in Brussels.
Brussels. All agree
All agree on the
on the
importance of unity
unity and
and that
that no options are excluded.
options are excluded.
UNSC
UNSC Resolution
Resolution 824 declares Sarajevo and
and five
five other Muslim enclaves in
in
Bosnia
Bosnia “safe
"safe areas"
areas” under UN protection.
7
7 May NATO planning for
NATO authorizes planning for aa peacekeeping force in
in Bosnia.
Bosnia. Believes
Believes
60,000 troops would
would be needed.
needed.
JO May
10 EC foreign ministers,
EC foreign ministers, meeting in in Brussels,
Brussels, summarize their position:
position: the
the
Vance-Owen Plan is
Vance-Owen Plan is the political
political goal;
goal; the EC will
the EC will provide
provide personnel toto
hold Milosevic to
hold promise to stop aid to
to his promise to Bosnian the United
Bosnian Serbs; the United
and Russia
States and
States Russia should
should provide
provide troops to protect the “safe areas”;
the "safe areas"; no
options are excluded, but
options but any will have
any action will have to be under UN
to be UN auspices; and
and
they express concern about continuing
they continuing Croatian violence in Bosnia.
Croatian violence Bosnia.
15-16 May
15-16 A Bosnian Serb referendum confirms
A Bosnian confirms the Bosnian Serb assembly rejection
the Bosnian rejection
of the Plan, despite support from
Vance-Owen Plan,
the Vance-Owen Serbian President Milosevic.
from Serbian
19 May
19 WEU
WEU ministers Rome back UN
ministers in Rome UN and EC
EC efforts
efforts in Balkans and
in the Balkans and agree
agree
to how WEU
to study how WEU might
might assist, with focus
assist, with focus on sanctions monitoring
monitoring on the
the
Danube.
Danube.
22
22 May The
The United States, Russia,
United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom,
France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, meeting
and Spain,
in
in Washington,
Washington, agree
agree to
to a Joint Action Plan:
Plan: continue humanitarian
humanitarian aid,
rigorously
rigorously enforce sanctions and
and no-fly
no-fly zone, United
United States
States is
is to
to protect
UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR with airstrikes if
with airstrikes if it is
is attacked and requests help, offer
and requests offer to
to place
monitors
monitors on Bosnia’s
Bosnia's border with Serbia,
with Serbia, move quickly
quickly to set up war crimes
tribunal, view Vance-Owen
tribunal, view Vance-Owen process as foundation for a political
as a foundation political settle
settle-
ment, and not exclude tougher measures.
ment,

25
25 May UNSC Resolution
UNSC 827 establishes an international
Resolution 827 international tribunal to prosecute war
tribunal to war
the former
crimes in the former Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
June
2 June WEU-organized ships and
WED-organized arriving in
and personnel begin arriving in Romania
Romania to
to help
enforce sanctions. Later expanded to Bulgaria and Hungary.
to Bulgaria Hungary.
4 June
June UNSC Resolution
UNSC Resolution 836 authorizes troops for
for the areas in Bosnia
safe areas
the safe Bosnia and
and
permits them
them to use force,
to use force, including
including airpower, to defend themselves.
airpower, to
June
8 June EC foreign
EC foreign ministers,
ministers, meeting in Luxembourg
Luxembourg welcome the Joint Action
welcome the
Plan and
Plan and reaffirm
reaffirm their position stated in
position stated in May. urge others to
They urge
May. They to contrib
contrib-
ute troops to protect the
the safe
safe areas.
areas.
June
9 June and boats begin patrolling
WEU personnel and the Danube
patrolling the to enforce sanctions.
Danube to
10 June
10 June NAC meeting in
NAC Athens agrees
in Athens agrees to offer its
to offer its airpower to protect UNPRO
airpower to UNPRO-
FOR, if attacked.
FOR, if United States
attacked. United States announces willingness to send
willingness to send aa small
small force
force
to Macedonia.
Macedonia.
16-17 June
16-17 June Croatian President Tudjman,
Croatian Tudjman, Serbian President Milosevic, and Bosnian
Serbian President Bosnian
President Izetbegovic meet in
Izetbegovic meet in Geneva
Geneva with UN and EC
with UN EC envoys
envoys Stoltenberg
Stoltenberg
and Owen
and to discuss reworking
Owen to reworking the Vance-Owen Plan
the Vance-Owen Plan into
into an
an ethnic parti
parti-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
June
18 June
18 Bosnian President Izetbegovic
Bosnian walks out of the
Izetbegovic walks Geneva talks after objecting
the Geneva objecting
to proposals presented
presented to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
UN Security
UN Security Council resolution 842 authorizes the
resolution 842 the United
United States
States to
to
send Macedonia. Resolution
send troops to Macedonia. reinforcement of
Resolution 844 authorizes reinforcement
UNPROFOR to provide
UNPROFOR protection of the “safe
provide armed protection areas" with
"safe areas” with airpower.
airpower.
19 June
19 June Serbian President Milosevic presents
Serbian presents his plan to Bosnia into
to partition Bosnia into three
three
ethnic republics
republics at negotiations in Geneva.
June
19-20 June The Krajina Serbs overwhelmingly
The overwhelmingly vote in favor of unification
in favor unification with
with other
states in
Serb states in a
a referendum.
June
21-22 June EC its preference for
reaffirms its
EC summit in Copenhagen reaffirms keeping Bosnia
for keeping Bosnia
intact, unwillingness recognize changes in borders made by force,
unwillingness to recognize force, and
and
criminals. It also calls for
to prosecute war criminals.
desire to for more humanitarian
humanitarian aid
and implementation
and implementation of the UN “safe areas.”
UN "safe Chancellor Kohl
areas." German Chancellor Kohl urges
urges
lifting the arms
lifting arms embargo, but the others are
but the are not interested.

June
21 June The Geneva negotiations are postponed to allow Bosnian
to allow Bosnian President
Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina to
to consult with
with his government
Milosevic’s proposal.
on Milosevic's
22 June Hadzic announces that

Croatian Serb leader Hadzic the Krajina referendum was
that the
only a test of will and
and that Krajina Serbs do not plan to
that the Krajina to unify rapidly
unify rapidly
Bosnian Serbs.
with the Bosnian
23 June Bosnian Croat member of the

Geneva talks reopen with Bosnian the Bosnian
Bosnian Presidency
Presidency
Franjo
Franjo Boras heading the
the government delegation.
The first
first round of talks in two months between
between Croatian Government and
and
officials opens in Geneva but
Croatian Serb officials but ends
ends after one day.
day.
24 June Lt. General Jean Cot replaces Sweden's

Frenchman Lt. Sweden’s Wahlgren com
Wahlgren as com-
UN forces in the former Yugoslavia
mander of UN Yugoslavia. .
25 June Bosnian Presidency

The Bosnian Presidency meets
meets in Zagreb to
to discuss the
the latest
latest proposal
tabled in Geneva outlining arrangement of nearly autonomous
outlining a confederal arrangement
states.
states.
elects Zoran Lilic—a

“Yugoslav” parliament elects
The "Yugoslav" ally—to
Lilic-a Milosevic ally-to
ousted federal president Cosic
replace ousted Cosic. .
28 June
28 June A joint
A Serb-Croat proposal for a confederal settlement
joint Serb-Croat forward in
settlement is put forward in
Bosnian Presidency sends
Geneva. The Bosnian to the talks although
sends a delegation to
Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic does
does not attend.
attend.
29
29 June Bosnian Presidency meets
The Bosnian meets in a closed session in Sarajevo to
to discuss
the various proposals tabled in Geneva on ethnic division
division of Bosnia
Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Herzegovina .
30 June The UN Council adopts a resolution extending UNPROFOR’s

UN Security Council UNPROFOR's
mandate in Croatia for three
mandate three months.
6-8 July Talks between

Talks between Croatian Government and officials on the
and Croatian Serb officials the
Krajina reopen in Geneva but end without
without an agreement.
agreement.
10
10 July A Bosnian Presidency delegation meeting with international mediators
A Bosnian
Owen and
Owen and Stoltenberg presents
presents a counterproposal to and Serb plans to
to Croat and
divide Bosnia-Herzegovina based on a federal arrangement.
Bosnia-Herzegovina based arrangement.
10
10

28
28 July Peace talks reopen in Geneva
Geneva after President Izetbegovic's boycott of the
President Izetbegovic’s the
ongoing Serb siege of Sarajevo.
negotiations over the ongoing The Muslims discuss
Sarajevo. The discuss
settlement at this round,
a confederal settlement round, abandoning their federal
federal plan.
30 July The Bosnian

The Government rejects the
Bosnian Government “union” peace
the "union" peace plan proposed by Owen
Owen
and
and Stoltenberg that combination of the
that was a combination the Vance-Owen and Serbian
Vance-Owen and Serbian
plans for
for a tripartite confederation.
confederation.
2 August
August NAC meeting in
NAC Brussels agrees
in Brussels to study US
agrees to US proposal
proposal to use NATO
to use NATO air
air-
to lift the
power to the siege of Sarajevo
Sarajevo and other cities.
cities.
33 August
August With President
President Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic again boycotting
boycotting the because of aa the
the talks because the
continuing Serb siege of Sarajevo,
continuing Sarajevo, the Croat members of the
the Croat the Bosnian
Bosnian
Presidency withdraw from
Presidency withdraw from the Presidency’s delegation and join the
the Presidency's the Croatian
Croatian
to protest Bosnian
delegation to Bosnian Government Croats in
Government operations against Croats in
Bosnia.
central Bosnia.
88 August
August Bosnian General Mladic reaches
Bosnian Serb Army commander General a partial
reaches a partial
agreement
agreement with
with the
the UN
UN on a phased Withdrawal
withdrawal from
from Serb
Serb positions on
positions on
mountains
mountains around Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
9 August
August Follow-up NAC
NAC meeting in Brussels approves operational
in Brussels operational plans for
for air
air-
strikes in Bosnia
Bosnia and agrees UN
and agrees General will
UN Secretary General have to authorize
will have
the first strike.
the first
16 August
16 August The warring
The parties-meeting again in
warring parties—meeting Geneva-agree “in
in Geneva—agree "in principle”
principle" to
to
turn Sarajevo
tum demilitarized, UN-administered
Sarajevo into aa demilitarized, city for
UN-administered city an interim
for an interim
settlement is
period after a settlement is reached.
reached.
18 August
18 August UN
UN officials that NATO
officials announce that NATO is ready to
to carry out airstrikes
airstrikes to
to support
UNPROFOR in Bosnia
UNPROFOR Bosnia if the Secretary General
if the General asks for
for them.
them.
20
20 August
August After presenting a draft settlement including a proposed map for aa
settlement package including
Bosnia~Herzegovina, international
confederal partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, international mediators Owen
Owen
and Stoltenberg adjourn
and the Geneva
adjourn the Geneva talks for
for 10 the EC
Owen asks the
l Odays. Owen EC to
to
administer Mostar
Mostar for
for two years as of
as part a peace
a peace settlement.
settlement.
27 August
27 August President
President Izetbegovic the Bosnian
Izetbegovic tells the Government Assembly
Bosnian Government Assembly that the UN/
that the UN/
EC peace proposal
EC peace proposal is the assembly decides to
is unacceptable; the to reject it and
and
push for
for more territory.
28 August
28 August The Bosnian Serb assembly unconditionally
The Bosnian unconditionally accepts the
the proposed peace
peace
accord. The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat assembly endorses the
the plan but
but stipulates the
the
11

Croats will have territory . The
have to be given more territory. The Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat assembly
Bosnian Croat republic.
also declares a Bosnian republic.
31
31 August
August Negotiations reopen for two days in
Negotiations in Geneva. Once again, lzetbegovic walks
again , Izetbegovic walks
out over territorial issues.
I1 September President Izetbegovic

Izetbegovic begins bilateral consultations with
with Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
leader Karadzic and Bosnian
Karadzic and Bosnian Croat leader Boban
Boban on territorial
territorial adjustments.
adjustments.
7 September WEU council authorizes planning for assistance

WEU council the administration of
assistance in the
Mostar.
Mostar.
9 September Croatian forces capture three Serb-controlled villages

three Serb-controlled villages in the Krajina,
Krajina, spark-
spark
ing intense fighting.
fighting.
IO September
10 Bosnian
Bosnian Serb soldiers protesting war profiteering
profiteering begin mutiny in Banja
a mutiny Banja
Luka.
Luka.
12 September
12 Informal meeting of EC
Informal EC foreign accepts idea of administering
foreign ministers accepts administering
Mostar will ask WEU
EC will
Mostar.. EC WEU to provide police.
police.
13
13 September Peace talks resume in Geneva.
14
14 September Presidents Tudjman
Tudjman and meet in Geneva in
lzetbegovic meet
and Izetbegovic in an effort to rebuild
effort to rebuild
trust between the Croats and the Muslims.
Muslims.
15
15 September
September and Croatian Serb leaders sign a cease-fire
Croatian Government and cease-fire agree
agree-
ment. UN forces are deployed to
ment. UN to implement it.
it.
NAC
NAC meeting in Brussels planning to participate in implementa
Brussels authorizes planning implementa-
tion of a peace
peace plan in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
16 September
16 September Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
Bosnian Karadzic and protesting soldiers negotiate an
an end to the
end to the
Banja
Banja Luka mutiny.
20 September Presidents Milosevic,

Milosevic. Tudjman,
Tudjman, and and Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic meet with mediators Owen
meet with Owen
and Stoltenberg on the aircraft carrier HMS
and Invincible in the Adriatic.
HMS Invincible Adriatic. The
The
Invincible Plan
Invincible Plan becomes the basic EC EC goal for the negotiations. Under
for the Under the
Bosnia goes to
plan, 49 percent of Bosnia to the Serbs, 33 Muslims, and
33 percent to the Muslims,
17.5 percent
17.5 to the
the Croats, with
with a figurehead
a figurehead central government. TheThe
Muslims will have access to the Adriatic
Muslims will have access to the Adriatic via a port on the
a on the Neretva River and
River and
the use Ploce
the right to use Place and Neum;
and Neum ; theythey will also have
have access the Sava
access to the
River. A 3-kilometer
River. A corridor will
3-kilometer corridor will connect the the Muslim enclaves in eastern
eastern
12

Bosnia.
Bosnia. Sarajevo will not be divided
Sarajevo will will be
divided and will be administered by the UN for
by the for
two years; there will be a similar
there will the EC
similar arrangement under the EC in
in Mostar.
Mostar.
23
23 September Croatian Foreign
Croatian Foreign Minister Granic
Granic tells Croatian
Croatian assembly members that that
Zagreb has initiated discussions
has initiated discussions with the Bosnian
with the Bosnian Government
Government to to unite
Croat and
and Muslim areas
areas of Bosnia and to
Bosnia and to provide
provide for
for the
the unified
unified territory’s
territory's
confederation with
subsequent confederation Croatia.
with Croatia.
27
27 September Bihac citizens'
The Bihac citizens’ assembly declares independence for the Muslim
for the
proposal put forth
enclave under a proposal forth by Bosnian Presidency member Abdic.
Bosnian Presidency
28
28 September Bosnian political, intellectual,
Bosnian Muslim political, intellectual, and
and religious leaders-meeting in
religious leaders—meeting in
Sarajevo-recommend
Sarajevo—recommend that that acceptance of the latest peace
the latest be con
proposal be
peace proposal con-
ditioned on the return of territory
ditioned territory seized by force.
force. The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Cabinet
Cabinet
accepts
accepts the
the plan unconditionally
unconditionally but calls for UN/NATO
but calls UN/NATO enforcement.
29
29 September The Bosnian
Bosnian assembly follows the recommendation of the
the recommendation the Muslim leaders’
leaders'
"assembly"
“assembly” andand votes
votes to accept the latest
accept the proposal with
peace proposal
latest peace the condition
with the condition
that territory seized by force be returned to
that territory to the Bosnian Government.
the Bosnian Government.
October
I October
1 Bosnian Croat
The Bosnian Croat assembly votes to withdraw
votes to withdraw territorial
territorial concessions
concessions made
to the Bosnian Muslims.
the Bosnian Muslims.
October
2 October Bosnian Serb assembly votes
The Bosnian votes to withdraw
withdraw territorial
territorial concessions
concessions made
the Bosnian
to the Bosnian Muslims.
October
4 October UN Security
UN Security Council Resolution 871 extends UNPROFOR’s
Resolution 871 mandate in
UNPROFOR's mandate in
Croatia for six months. The
Croatia resolution makes aa vague link between Serb
The resolution Serb
behavior in Croatia
behavior Croatia and any decision
and any to lift sanctions
decision to Serbia.
sanctions against Serbia.
October
6 October NAC meeting in Brussels
NAC Brussels authorizes planning to extend NATO
planning to NATO air cover
cover to
to
UNPROFOR units in
UNPROFOR Croatia.
in Croatia.
October
IO October
10 The Krajina Serb assembly votes
The hold legislative
votes to hold legislative and
and presidential
presidential elec
elec-
tions on 21 November. The
21 November. The assembly subsequently postpones the the elections
elections
to 12 December.
12 December.
16 October
16 October President Tudjman
President Tudjman is head of Croatian
is reelected head Democratic Union (HDZ)
Croatian Democratic (HDZ)
ruling party's
at ruling party’s congress.
20 October
20 October President Milosevic dissolves
President dissolves the
the Serbian assembly after apparently con
Serbian assembly con-
cluding that
cluding no-confidence motion
that the no-confidence motion against the proposed by
the government proposed by
the Serbian Radical
the Serbian Party was likely to pass.
Radical Party A new
pass. A legislative election
new legislative election is
for 19
scheduled for December.
19 December.
13
13

The Bosnian
The Presidency elects Muslim Nijaz Durakovic
Bosnian Presidency Durakovic and Croats
Croats Stjepan
Kljujic
Kljujic and
and Ivo
lvo Komsic
Komsic to fill
fill vacancies created by the
the withdrawal
withdrawal of Croat
Croat
members and the dismissal
and the dismissal of Bihac Fikret Abdic.
Bihac strongman Fikret
22 October
22 October Fikret
Fikret Abdic concludes
concludes peace agreement with
peace agreement with Bosnian
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
Karadzic
Belgrade. President Milosevic and
in Belgrade. and the recognize Abdic’s
the Serbs recognize Abdic's “Autono
"Autono-
Province of Western
mous Province Western Bosnia” the basis of the
Bosnia" on the the Geneva plan. Abdic
Geneva plan.
and Bosnian
and Bosnian Croat
Croat leader Boban
Boban earlier signed anan agreement ending their
agreement ending
confrontation in
confrontation in Bosnia
Bosnia and subordinating local
and subordinating local Croat military forces
Croat military forces in
in the
the
Cazinska
Cazinska Krajina toto Abdic.
25
25 October Bosnian
Bosnian Presidency
Presidency names Foreign Minister Haris
names Foreign Haris Silajdzic as
as new
new Prime
Prime
Minister. Muslims dominate new
Minister. 31 October;
new cabinet formed on 31 only four
October; only four
of 21 to Serbs and
21 posts go to and Croats.
Croats.
29
29 October At a special EC
EC summit in Brussels, community leaders appeal for a return
Brussels, community
to negotiations, promise more aid, and
and call the establishment of corri
call for the corri-
relief convoys
dors for relief and reinforcement of UNPROFOR.
convoys and UNPROFOR. The The leaders do
French proposal
not adopt a French proposal to use force
to use to open aid corridors
force to corridors or Owen’s
Owen's
plan for a "global" negotiation that
“global” negotiation that would all issues on the
would put all the table.
table.
November
33 November pull out of “secret”
Krajina Serbs pull negotiations with
"secret" negotiations with Croatian
Croatian Government
Government in in
Norway following announcement of Croatian
Norway Croatian President
President Tudjman’s
Tudjman's peace
peace
initiative, which
initiative, calls for restoration of Croatian
which calls Croatian sovereignty
sovereignty over the
the
Krajina.
Krajina.
November
10 November
10 Bosnian Croat leader Boban
Bosnian Croat Boban names Jadranko Prlic as
names Jadranko Prime Minister of
as Prime
"Herceg-Bosna." The
“Herceg-Bosna.” The Bosnian Croat assembly approves aa new government
Bosnian Croat
on 19 November, but Prlic is
19 November, is criticized
criticized for including ministers
for including ministers who are not
who are
Bosnia's HDZ
members of Bosnia’s HDZ party.
party.
12 November
12 November Boban replaces Slobodan
Boban Praljak with
Slobodan Praljak with General Ante Roso,
General Ante Roso, aa former
former
the commander of the
Croatian special forces commander, as the
Croatian the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat
Army (HYO).
(HVO).
22 November
22 November European Union
European foreign ministers
Union foreign ministers agree
agree to offer gradual suspension of the
to offer the
Serbia/Montenegro if
sanctions against Serbia/Montenegro if the Bosnian Serbs make territorial
the Bosnian territorial
concessions to the Muslims, aa peace
the Muslims, peace plan is implemented, and Belgrade
is implemented, Belgrade
with aa “modus
cooperates with vivendi" in
"modus vivendi” the Krajina.
in the Krajina.
29 November
29 November EU foreign
EU foreign ministers present proposal
proposal to the leaders of the
to the the various
various Bosnian
Bosnian
factions along with
with Croatian
Croatian President Serbian President
Tudjman and Serbian
President Tudjman President
Milosevic.
14
14
Digitized by Go gle OrigiMI from

30 November
30 November Croatian
Croatian President Tudjman
Tudjman and President Milosevic leave
Serbian President
and Serbian leave Geneva
Geneva
while the Bosnian
while the warring parties continue
Bosnian warring negotiations mediated by Owen
continue negotiations Owen
and
and Stoltenberg.
30 November
30 November tribunal announces it will
UN war crimes tribunal in April
will begin trials in April 1994.
1994.
l December
1 UNPROFOR Commander
UNPROFOR Commander Cot Cot says
says that the UN cannot put up indefinitely
that the indefinitely
with disruptions of the
with disruptions relief convoys
the relief convoys and
and threatens to reconsider
threatens to reconsider the
the
humanitarian effort in the
the spring.
22 December Talks end in Geneva without

Talks without an agreement, following discussions
an agreement, discussions on the
the
government’s map and aa Serb proposal
government's to divide
proposal to into “twin
Sarajevo into
divide Sarajevo "twin cities”
cities"
in which the Muslims would
which the would retain the city with
the central city the Serbs control
with the control-
ling the southern and western suburbs. The
ling faction leaders agree
The faction agree to
to
reconvene at an unspecified date.
unspecified date.
12 December
12 December "Republic Krajina” parliamentary and presidential
“Republic of Serb Krajina" presidential elections
elections are
are
mayor Milan Babic
held. Knin mayor falls just short of the
Babic falls the majority
majority necessary toto
avoid a second round of presidential
avoid elections scheduled for
presidential elections for 23
23 January.
January.
19 December
19 December French Defense Minister Leotard
French Leotard says
says that France will
that France will reassess its partici
reassess its partici-
pation in UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR in thethe spring 1994 if
spring of 1994 if no settlement is reached by
that time. The
that United Kingdom,
The United Spain, Canada, and Belgium
Kingdom, Spain, have similar
Belgium have similar
positions.
positions.
20-21
20-21 December Bilateral
Bilateral meetings between the warring parties and
the warring Serbian President
and Serbian President
Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman
and Croatian Tudjman areare held in
in Geneva
Geneva prior
prior to
to
broader meetings in with EU
Brussels with
in Brussels foreign ministers.
EU foreign ministers.
22
22 December The foreign
The ministers of the
foreign ministers EU meet
the EU meet with the Serb, Croat,
with the and Muslim
Croat, and
Bosnia and
leaders of Bosnia and urge them toto accept the Invincible
Invincible Plan.
Plan. The
The parties
will reconvene in
in Geneva on 1818 January.
January.
1994
4 January
January 1994
1994 French
French Foreign Minister Juppe
Foreign Minister calls on NATO
Juppe calls NATO to take firmer
to take firmer action in
in
Bosnia.
Bosnia. Paris NATO Summit
Paris wants a NATO supply routes for
Summit to open supply for humanitar
humanitar-
ian aid, endorse the Invincible Plan,
the Invincible and renew its
Plan, and its commitment
commitment toto help
help
enforce a peace
peace settlement.
settlement.
January
55 January British General Malcolm
British General Malcolm Rose to command UN
Rose named to forces in
UN forces in Bosnia
Bosnia
after Belgian
Belgian General
General Briquemont
Briquemont asks
asks to
to be relieved, citing insufficient
be relieved, citing insufficient
resources for
for his mission.
mission.
15
15

4-5 January
January Prime Minister
Bosnian Prime
Bosnian Minister Silajdzic and Croatian Foreign Minister
Croatian Foreign Granic fail
Minister Granic
to reach
reach agreement
agreement on territorial
territorial issues after two
two days of meetings in
in
Vienna.
Vienna.
9-10
9- 10 January
January Croatian President Tudjman
Croatian Tudjman and Bosnian
Bosnian President Izetbegovic meet in
Izetbegovic meet in
Bonn
Bonn with
with Tudjman claiming progress toward a cease-fire
Tudjman claiming cease-fire in
in central
Bosnia.
Bosnia. Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic disagrees, calling
calling the
the meetings a failure.
a failure.
11 January
11 January NATO
NATO summit in Brussels
Brussels states
states that there must be
that there political settlement
be aa political settlement
acceptable to
acceptable sides rather than
to all sides than continued attempts
attempts at military
military victory,
victory,
commends EU/UN peace peace efforts,
efforts. promises to
to help implement aa peace
peace
agreement, and reaffirms
agreement, and reaffirms willingness
willingness to use airstrikes to
to use the UN
to protect the UN safe
safe
areas possible for relief
areas and make it possible relief workers to do their jobs.
workers to jobs. France
France and the
the
United Kingdom call
United Kingdom for airstrikes if
call for Bosnian Serbs hinder UN
the Bosnian
if the UN opera
opera-
tions at Srebrenica and Tuzla.
Tuzla. Bosnian
Karadzic threaten
threaten to
to
rescind concessions to the Bosnian
to the Bosnian Government
Government if
if NATO
NATO attacks.
attacks.
Boutros-Ghali orders the

Boutros-Ghali the rotation of UN
UN troops in
in Srebrenica
Srebrenica and
and the
the open
open-
ing of the airport at Tuzla
Tuzla and Akashi authority to
and gives Akashi to approve close air
support if
if troops performing those missions
performing those missions are
are attacked.
attacked.
12
12 January
January Croatian Tudjman announces that
Croatian President Tudjman that Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat leader Boban
Boban
will
will no longer attend
attend peace
peace negotiations.
18-19
18-19 January
January Bosnian
Bosnian Government and Bosnian
Government and Bosnian Serb negotiators at EU-sponsored
EU-sponsored
peace talks in
peace in Geneva fail reach aa settlement,
fail to reach each other
settlement, accusing each of
intransigence.
January
19 January
19 Croatian Foreign Minister
Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and Federal
Granic and Republic of Yugoslavia
Federal Republic Yugoslavia
Minister JJovanovic
Foreign Minister
Foreign ovanovic sign an
an agreement
agreement to normalization of
to begin normalization
relations between Croatia the FRY.
Croatia and the They agree
FRY. They agree to
to exchange diplomatic
diplomatic
representatives in February.
representatives February.
21 January
21 January British Minister Rifkind acknowledges
British Defense Minister acknowledges London
London has been discuss
has been discuss-
withdraw its
ing whether to withdraw its troops from
from UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR but
but says the United
says the United
Kingdom will
Kingdom will not act unilaterally.
unilaterally.
23 January
23 January Republic of Serbian Krajina Interior
Republic Minister Martic wins
Interior Minister the Krajina pres
wins the pres-
idential elections in the second round of
in the voting. Knin
of voting. Knin Mayor Babic
Babic had
narrowly missed winning
narrowly the election in
winning the the first
in the first round in
in December.
26 January
26 January French Army General Bertrand de de Lapresele
Lapresele is to replace French
is named to French
General Cot Commander of UN
Cot as Commander Forces in the
UN Peacekeeping Forces the former
former
Yugoslavia. He
Yugoslavia. is expected
He is to report for
expected to for duty in
in March.
March.
16
16

6 February EU mediator Owen
EU Owen responds to the 5 February
February mortar attack on the the
Sarajevo market by urging
urging an
an acceleration of negotiations on demilitarizing
demilitarizing
Sarajevo and turning the city over to the UN
to the to administer. Boutros-Ghali
UN to Boutros-Ghali
NATO if it is ready to
asks NATO
asks to attack artillery firing
artillery firing on
on civilians
civilians in Sarajevo.
7 February EU foreign
EU foreign ministers reiterate
reiterate their call to
to use “all the means
use "all means necessary
including
including the use
use of airpower”
airpower" to lift the
the siege
siege of Sarajevo as a way
way to
to begin
implementation of the EU EU peace (the Invincible
peace plan (the Invincible Plan).
Plan) .
88 February Bosnian Croat leader Boban

Bosnian favor of a collec-
Boban announces his resignation in favor collec~
tive presidency to be formed to govern the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat republic.
republic.
9 February
February NATO Bosnian Serbs 10
NATO gives the Bosnian IO days to pull
pull heavy weapons 20 20 km back
them under UN
from Sarajevo or put them control; the Bosnian
UN control; Bosnian Government
Government isis
also to put their heavy weapons under UN
to put control. If
UN control. NATO will
If not, NATO will con
con-
sider the
the weapons legitimate targets
targets for airstrikes.
l 2 February
I 0-12
10- warring parties fail
The warring peace talks in Geneva
fail to overcome differences at peace
supervised by EU
EU negotiator Lord Owen.
Owen.
12 February
12 February Zagreb and formalizing their agreement
and Belgrade announce details formalizing agreement to open
representative offices in their respective capitals in late
representative offices February or early
late February
March. They
March. They also announce agreement
agreement toto reopen the
the Zagreb-Belgrade
Zagreb-Belgrade
highway.
highway.
17 February
17 February The United Kingdom, France, Spain,
United Kingdom, Spain, and
and Sweden agree
agree to redeploy some of
their troops in Bosnia
Bosnia to Sarajevo in to UNPROFOR
in response to UNPROFORCommander
Commander
Rose’s call for reinforcements.
Rose's
19 February
19 February Foreign Minister
Croatian Foreign Granic and
Minister Granic and Bosnian
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic
Prime Minister
meet in Frankfurt
meet Frankfurt to discuss a possible Croat-Muslim federation in
possible Croat-Muslim in Bosnia
Bosnia
and its eventual confederation with
and its Croatia. They
with Croatia. They make little
little progress but
but
agree
agree to
to continue expert level discussions in Zagreb the following week.
week .
20 February 400 Russian

Russian troops redeploy from
from UN-protected
UN-protected areas Croatia to
areas in Croatia to
Sarajevo as part
part of an agreement Russian Churkin
agreement negotiated by Russian envoy Churkin to to
ensure
ensure Serb compliance with NATO’s
compliance with NATO's ultimatum withdraw
to withdraw heavy weap
to weap-
ons from the 20-km exclusion
the 20-km exclusion zone or place them under UN UN control.
control. UN
UN
NATO officials
and NATO officials determine that Bosnian Serbs effectively
the Bosnian
that the effectively complied
complied
NATO ultimatum.
with the NATO
with
21
21 February The Bosnian
Bosnian Croat assembly elects former Bosnian Justice Minister
Bosnian Croat Justice Minister
Zubak to head an emergency presidential council
to head council to replace Mate
Mate Boban
Boban as
head
head of the government of the
the self-proclaimed Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
self-proclaimed Republic Herceg-Bosna.
l7
17

23
23 February
February Bosnian Government
Bosnian and Croat
Government and forces sign aa cease-fire
Croat forces cease-fire agreement
agreement to
to be
be
implemented on 25 February.
25 February.
28 February
28 February In NATO’s
In NATO's first-ever mission, US planes shoot down
first-ever combat mission, down four Bosnian
Bosnian
Serb aircraft violating the no-fly
violating the no-fly zone.
1 March
1 Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, Croatian
Bosnian Prime Croatian Foreign Granic and
Foreign Minister Granic
Bosnian Croat
Bosnian Croat leader Zubak
Zubak sign aa framework
framework agreement
agreement in Washington
Washington toto
Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia.
establish a Croat-Muslim Bosnia. The
The parties agree to meet
agree to meet in
in
Vienna to negotiate details of the
Vienna agreement.
the agreement.
Bosnian
Karadzic agrees to open Tuzla
agrees to Tuzla airport after Russia
Russia
offers to
offers send observers.
to send
12 March
12 March Negotiators meeting in
Negotiators in Vienna agreement on a Croat-Muslim
Vienna reach agreement Croat-Muslim federa
federa-
tion in Bosnia and plan to sign a final
Bosnia and final accord in
in Washington
Washington later in
in the
week.
13 March
13 March Bosnian Government and
Bosnian Government and Croat military commanders agree
Croat military agree at a meeting in
a in
guidelines for developing
Split on guidelines
Split developing a joint military.
military.
17 March
17 The Serbian
The confirms the appointment of Mirko Marjanovic
Serbian assembly confirms Marjanovic as
Prime Minister and
Prime Minister control all
Socialists control
and approves his cabinet. Socialists posts in
all key posts in
the new government with
the only token democratic opposition
with only opposition representation.
Businessmen
Businessmen also figure prominently in the new cabinet.
figure prominently
18 March
18 March Bosnian
Bosnian President
President Izetbegovic, Croatian President Tudjman
Izetbegovic, Croatian Tudjman and
and
Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat leader Zubak sign the Croat-Muslim
sign the Croat-Muslim federation accord
in
in Washington.
Washington.
22-23 March
22-23 March Russian-sponsored talks between the
Russian-sponsored Croatian Government
the Croatian Government and the Krajina
and the
without results. The
Serbs adjourn without agree to reconvene on
The parties agree 29 March.
on 29 March.
23 March
23 March A
A UN-sponsored
UN-sponsored agreement
agreement to allow freedom of movement in
to allow and out
in and
of Sarajevo
Sarajevo signed between thethe Bosnian Government and
Bosnian Government the Serbs on
and the
17
17 March takes Key roads and
takes effect. Key and Muslim
and a bridge linking Serb and
neighborhoods open.
neighborhoods
24 March
24 March The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Serb "parliament" participation in the
“parliament” rejects participation Croat-Muslim
the Croat-Muslim
federation and conditions
federation and participation in future peace
conditions participation peace talks on the lifting of
on the
UN
UN sanctions against the Yugoslavia.
the former Yugoslavia.
18

27 March
27 The assembly of the
The self-proclaimed Bosnian
the self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat republic of Herceg
Croat republic Herceg-
Bosna votes
Bosna the Croat-Muslim
votes to endorse the Croat-Muslim federation and
and send
send representa
representa-
tives to the
tives to Bosnian assembly for further debate
the Bosnian debate on the
the constitution.
constitution.
30 March
30 A constituent assembly of Croats
A Croats and the Bosnian
and the Bosnian assembly unanimously
unanimously
adopts the constitution
constitution for the Croat-Muslim
for the Croat-Muslim federation. The
The Bosnian
Bosnian
assembly approved the constitution before the
the constitution the constituent assembly was
was
called.
The Croatian
The Government and
Croatian Government the Krajina Serbs sign
and the sign aa cease-fire
cease-fire agree
agree-
the Russian
ment at the Embassy in
Russian Embassy in Zagreb.
31 March
31 UNSC extends UNPROFOR’s
UNSC mandate for
UNPROFOR's mandate six months, approves 3,700
for six
additional and asks NATO
additional personnel, and to UN
to extend close air support to
NATO to UN
troops in Croatia.
in Croatia.
April
4 April The Croatian Government
The Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs begin
and the implementation of
begin implementation a
a
cease-fire agreement.
cease-fire agreement.
8-9 April
April The UN Commander
The Commander in in Bosnia, General Rose,
Bosnia, General Rose, shuttles between Bosnian
Bosnian
Serb Army Commander General
Commander General Mladic and Bosnian
Bosnian Army General Com
General Com-
mander Delic toto negotiate aa cease-fire
cease-fire in the Muslim enclave of Gorazde.
in the Gorazde.
His mission is unsuccessful,
mission is unsuccessful, however, and Serb artillery
however, and artillery attacks
attacks against
Gorazde intensify.
Gorazde intensify.
10
10 April
April In NATO’s first-ever
In NATO's first-ever airstrike
airstrike against aa ground target, US
ground target, US planes bomb
bomb Serb
Serb
positions Gorazde. NATO
positions attacking Gorazde. NATO conducts aa second airstrike 11 April
airstrike on 11 April
following continued
continued Serb
Serb attacks the town.
attacks against the town. Russia complains it was
Russia complains
The Bosnian
not consulted. The detaining UN and NGO
Bosnian Serbs respond by detaining NGO per
per-
sonnel and threatening to down US
to shoot down US planes, but
but the
the fighting
fighting eases.
eases.
April
14 April
14 Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government and Croat representative
and Croat representative meeting in
in Sarajevo
Sarajevo to
to
discuss the Croat-Muslim federation agree
the Croat-Muslim agree on procedures toto nominate
nominate presi
presi-
ministerial candidates and
dential and prime ministerial and decide to
to call
call a constituent
assembly later in the
the month.
16 April
16 April A British jet is
A British is shot down Gorazde, as
down over Gorazde, the Bosnian
as the Bosnian Serb assault on the
the
enclave intensifies.
intensifies.
April
I177 April UN envoy Akashi
UN envoy Akashi negotiates a cease-fire agreement for
cease-fire agreement Gorazde with
for Gorazde with
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.
Karadzic. The
The Serbs agree
agree to release detained UN
to release UN
personnel and withdraw forces from
and withdraw the enclave although no deadline is
from the is
specified.
specified. The Serbs reject the immediate deployment of UN
the immediate UN troops to
to
Gorazde.
Gorazde.
l9
19

18 April
18 April UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asks NATO
Boutros-Ghali asks to launch
NATO to launch airstrikes to pro
pro-
tect the
tect UN “safe
the six
six areas” in
"safe areas" Bosnia.
in Bosnia.
April
18-19April
18-19 EU foreign
EU call for cease-fire
foreign ministers call cease-fire and demilitarized zone around
and demilitarized
Gorazde, release
Gorazde, release of detained UN personnel and access for relief
and unimpeded access relief
workers Bosnia, and
workers throughout Bosnia, diplomatic cooperation between the
and closer diplomatic the
EU, the
EU, the UN, the United
UN, the United States, and Russia.
States, and Russia. But they give no indication
But they indication how
how
these are to be achieved.
these goals are
21
21 April
April The "government of national unity"
The Krajina Serb assembly approves a “government unity”
under Prime Martic’s nominee.
Prime Minister Mikelic, President Martie's
22
22 April
April NATO
NATO orders Bosnian
Bosnian Serb forces immediately halt attacks
forces to immediately attacks on Gorazde
Gorazde
and
and pull
pull back 3 from Gorazde
3 km from 2001 EDT
Gorazde by 2001 EDT on 23 April or face air-
23 April air
strikes within
within a 20-km
20-km radius of the NATO also orders the Bosnian
the city. NATO Bosnian
Serbs to withdraw all heavy weapons from
to withdraw from a 20-km exclusion zone around
20-km exclusion
Gorazde by
Gorazde by 2001
2001 EDT
EDT on
on 26
26 April. NATO
NATO agrees
agrees to threat of air
extend the threat air-
strikes to cover all
all of the safe areas. The UNSC passes
the UN safe areas. The UNSC passes a resolution
resolution
demanding the Bosnian pull back from
Bosnian Serbs pull Gorazde, implement an
from Gorazde, an imme
imme-
diate cease-fire,
cease-fire, and allow unimpeded freedom of movement for UN
and allow
personnel in Bosnia.
in Bosnia.
UN special envoy Akashi

UN Akashi secures agreement from
secures agreement the Bosnian
from the Bosnian Serbs that
that
they will end
they will hostilities in Gorazde,
end hostilities Gorazde, withdraw from aa 20-km
withdraw heavy weapons from 20-km
exclusion zone, and
exclusion guarantee freedom of movement for UN and
and guarantee relief per
and relief per-
sonnel by 0600 EDT
EDT on 23 23 April.
April.
23
23 April
April Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government andand Croat representatives
representatives meeting in Sarajevo fail to
Sarajevo fail to
reach agreement on delineating cantons in the
reach agreement the Croat-Muslim
Croat-Muslim federation or
filling
filling leadership positions. They also cancel a constituent assembly of both
positions. They
the end of the month.
sides scheduled for the
sides
26 April
April The Contact
The Group-representatives of Russia,
Contact Group—representatives the EU,
Russia, the UN, and
EU, the UN, the
and the
United States-meets
United States—meets forfor the first time in
the first Sarajevo in an effort
in Sarajevo effort to
to bring
bring the
the
warring parties back to negotiations and
warring and work cease-fire in
work toward a cease-fire in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
27
27 April
April The UN
The extra troops for the
UN authorizes 6,550 extra the former
former Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, bringing
bringing
the approved total to
the to 44,870. There
There are 33,300 actually deployed,
deployed, including
including
17,000 in Bosnia.
17,000 Bosnia.
3 May
3 Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
Bosnian Karadzic agrees
agrees to UN proposal
to aa UN proposal to post military
military
observers around Brcko cease-fire in
Brcko and to aa cease-fire in the area.
area.
20
20

3-4 May UN Special Envoy Akashi negotiates an agreement
Special Envoy with Bosnian
agreement with Bosnian Serb
leader Karadzic to permit a British
Karadzic to British convoy to enter Gorazde
convoy to Gorazde and to allow
and to allow
Serb tanks to transit the
the Sarajevo exclusion zone under UNPROFOR
Sarajevo exclusion UNPROFOR
control.
control.
55 May The Contact Group diplomacy between Sarajevo and

Group resumes shuttle diplomacy and Pale.
Pale.
UNSC passes
The UNSC passes a resolution
resolution warning
warning all warring that offensive
warring parties that offensive
would result in
action around Brcko would calling for a
in serious consequences and calling
hostilities throughout Bosnia
cessation of hostilities Bosnia and aa resumption
resumption of negotiations.
6 May
6May French Foreign
French J uppe revives
Foreign Minister Juppe revives France’s
France's threat
threat to
to withdraw
withdraw its
its
forces
forces if
if there
there is
is no quick
quick progress toward peace.
peace.
7-11 May
7-11 Bosnian Government and Croat
Bosnian Government Croat representatives Vienna reach
representatives meeting in Vienna
agreement on details of delineating cantons in
agreement the Croat-Muslim
in the Croat-Muslim federation
filling federation leadership positions.
and filling positions.
13 May
13 Ministers
Ministers from Group countries meeting in
from the Contact Group in Geneva agree
agree on a
strategy
strategy to restart
restart Bosnian
Bosnian peace
peace negotiations. They
They call
call for a
a four-month
four-month
cease-fire, 51
cease-fire, 51 percent of Bosnian
Bosnian territory for the Croat-Muslim federation,
the Croat-Muslim
and
and continuation Serbia with
continuation of current sanctions against Serbia the prospect of an
with the an
easing if Belgrade with the
Belgrade cooperates with peace process.
the peace process .
17May
17May France will withdraw
France announces it will the 6,900 French
withdraw 2,500 of the French soldiers
soldiers
to UN
assigned to PROFOR in
UNPROFOR in the
the former Yugoslavia the next six
Yugoslavia over the six months.
months .
25-26 May Contact Group representatives hold

Group representatives hold bilateral
bilateral meetings with the Bosnian
with the Bosnian
Government and
Government Bosnian Serb parties in
and the Bosnian Talloires, France.
in Talloires, France. The parties
not reach an
do not an agreement but the
agreement but are scheduled to
the negotiations are to reconvene
in
in 10
10 days
days. .
30 May
30May Bosnian Constituent
The Bosnian Constituent Assembly names Croat leader Kresimir Zubak
Assembly names Zubak as
as
President
President of the Croat-Muslim federation and current Bosnian
the Croat-Muslim Bosnian Vice
Vice
Ganic as its
President Ganie Vice President.
its Vice President.
June
4 June The Contact Group
The holds bilateral
Group holds bilateral meetings with representatives of the
with representatives the
Croat-Muslim
Croat-Muslim federation and
and the Bosnian Serbs in
the Bosnian but fails
in Geneva but fails to bring
bring
them
them together.
together.
June
88 June Bosnian
Bosnian Government leaders sign a renewable monthlong
Government and Serb leaders monthlong cease
cease-
fire agreement at talks mediated by UN
fire agreement UN envoy Akashi. The agreement
Akashi. The agreement is
is to
to
take IO June.
take effect on 10 began only
June. The negotiations began only after the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian
21
21

complied with
complied the Bosnian
with the Bosnian Government
Government demand that
that they withdraw all
they withdraw
"police"
“police” forces from within
within the
the 3-km
3-km exclusion
exclusion zone around Gorazde.
Gorazde.
14June
14 June Croatian President Tudjman
Croatian and Bosnian
Tudjman and Bosnian President Izetbegovic meet in
Izetbegovic meet
Sarajevo and economic issues, foreign
and pledge closer cooperation on economic rela
foreign rela-
tions, and the Croat-Muslim
and integrating the Croat-Muslim federation and
and building its relations
building its
with Croatia.
with Croatia.
16 June
16 June The Contact Group meets in London
Group meets to discuss aa map to
London to to divide
divide Bosnia.
Bosnia. The
The
warring are not represented
warring parties are represented at the
the meeting.
23
23 June The Bosnian unanimously elects Bosnian
Bosnian parliament unanimously Bosnian Prime Minister
Prime Minister
Silajdzic to head
Silajdzic head aa cabinet composed of 1111 Muslims and six Croats. It will
Croats. It will
run both the Bosnian
Bosnian and the Croat-Muslim federation governments until
the Croat-Muslim
parliamentary elections in the
the fall.
fall.
28 June
28 June The Contact Group, in Paris,
Group, meeting in agrees on a map and a package of
Paris, agrees
incentives to use to convince
use to convince the
the warring
warring parties to reach settlement.
reach a settlement.
5 July
5 The foreign ministers of the Contact Group meet in Geneva and
Group meet and endorse the
the
group’s Bosnian settlement.
group's proposal for aa Bosnian settlement.
6
6 July
July The
The Contact Group
Group presents its peace
presents its peace plan to
to the warring parties in
the warring in Geneva
and them two
and gives them two weeks to respond to the
the proposal.
proposal.
JO July
10 The
The G-7 and Russia
G-7 and Russia endorse the Contact Group
Group plan and urge the
and urge the warring
warring
to accept it at a summit meeting in
parties to in Naples.
Naples.
11 July
11 The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government agrees to extend by one
agrees to one month the
the Bosnian
Bosnian
cease-fire
cease-fire that 10 July. The
that expired on 10 The Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the
agreed to the
extension on 88 July.
July.
NATO’s
NATO's North Atlantic Council reiterates
North Atlantic reiterates its willingness to
its willingness to take part in
take part in
implementing the
implementing the Contact Group and directs its
Group proposal and military authori
its military authori-
ties to
ties work with
to work withUNPROFOR
UNPROFOR to to update
update contingency planning
planning for such aa
role.
12-13
12-13 July
July French
French Foreign
Foreign Minister J uppe and
Minister Juppe and British Foreign Minister
British Foreign Minister Hurd
Hurd travel to
to
Bosnia to
Bosnia to meet with the warring
meet with warring parties in an effort
effort to convince them to
to convince to
accept the Contact Group
Group peace
peace plan.
18 July
18 July The
The Bosnian
Bosnian assembly approves the
the Contact Group
Group peace
peace plan.
22

18-19 July
18-19 Bosnian Serb parliament debates
The Bosnian the Contact Group
debates the but does
Group proposal but
not reveal
reveal its final position.
its final position.
20 July Bosnian Serbs "conditionally"

The Bosnian the Contact Group
accept the
“conditionally” accept Group peace
peace plan,
which
which the
the group interprets as a rejection.
23
23 July EU begins administration of Mostar.
The EU Mostar.
25 July The Contact Group meets in Moscow to

Group meets to discuss their response to
to the
the
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace
peace plan.
plan .
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali

UN Boutros-Ghali recommends the withdrawal of UN
the withdrawal
troops from
from the
the Balkans
Balkans and
and asks the Contact Group
asks the an intema
to organize an
Group to interna-
tional task force to
to impose a peace
peace plan.
plan .
27
27 July Bosnian the main route into Sarajevo to
Bosnian Serbs cut off the to all civilian and
all civilian and com
com-
mercial traffic.
mercial traffic.
28
28 July Bosnian
Bosnian Serb assembly convenes to to reconsider the
the Contact Group
Group peace
peace
plan and
and rejects it for
for a second time.
30
30 July Group ministers meet
The Contact Group meet in
in Geneva and
and agree
agree to tighten sanctions
on Serbia in response to the Bosnian Serb rejection of its
the Bosnian its peace
peace plan.
33 August
August Bosnian Serb assembly votes
The Bosnian votes unanimously to hold
unanimously to hold a referendum on
27-28 August
August on the Contact Group
Group proposal.
4 August
August President Milosevic announces an immediate political
political and
and economic
the Bosnian
blockade against the Serbs..
Bosnian Serbs
5 August
August NATO Bosnian Serb ground target
NATOplanes strike Bosnian target after Serbs remove heavy
weapons from a UN-monitored collection point near
UN-monitored collection near Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
5-6 August
August Bosnian Serbs return the weapons to the UN
The Bosnian UN depot to avert further
to avert
airstrikes.
Croatian and
and Krajina Serb officials but no
officials resume stalled negotiations but
progress reported
reported..
August
88 August UN commander Rose proposes a demilitarized
UN demilitarized zone around Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
August
11 August
11 UN commander Rose threatens
UN threatens both Bosnian
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Army
and Bosnian
forces with
with airstrikes as fighting near Visoko
fighting near spills into 20-km
Visoko spills 20-km exclusion
exclusion
zone around Sarajevo.
Sarajevo .
23
23

13 August
13 August UN dispatches ICFY
ICFY envoy Stoltenberg to Belgrade and Pale
Belgrade and Pale to meet with
to meet with
Serbian and Bosnian officials. Bosnian
Bosnian Serb officials. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
Karadzic again
the Contact
rejects the Contact Group
Group plan.
NATO aircraft
NATO aircraft fly
fly over aa weapons collection point near Sarajevo
collection point Sarajevo on
Saturday preventing Bosnian
Bosnian Serb units from
from removing
removing two
two tanks. Troops
Troops
on the block two
the ground block two other attempts
attempts to from UN
to remove weapons from UN-
monitored sites.
monitored sites.
14 August
14 August and Muslims sign a UN-brokered
Serbs and UN-brokered agreement sniping in
agreement to halt sniping in
Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
15 August
15 August UN firings in Sarajevo
UN announces weapons firings the weekend are
Sarajevo over the are the
highest in weeks with
with more than 1,400 incidents recorded.
than 1,400
Croatian they will

Croatian refugees announced they will end their blockade
blockade of crossings into
into
the UN-protected areas.
the UN-protected areas.
17 August
17 August Abdic declares aa unilateral cease-fire between rebel Muslim and
unilateral cease-fire and
government forces
forces in the Bihac
in the Bihac enclave.
18 August
18 August Bosnian Serb assembly session elects
Bosnian elects a new government.
19 August
19 August Muslim rebel leader Abdic surrenders to Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government forces
forces but
but
unconditional surrender and
later refuses unconditional and flees
flees Bihac.
Bihac.
20
20 August
August Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian a joint declaration
and Krajina Serb leaders sign a declaration calling
calling for aa
unified Serb state.
unified state.
20-21 August
20-21 August As many as 20,000 refugees flee flee the Bihac enclave into Krajina Serb-
the Bihac Serb
controlled territory.
controlled territory. Croatian
Croatian Government blocks their entry into Croatia.
Government blocks Croatia.
22 August
22 August stronghold in
Bosnian Army forces capture Muslim separatist stronghold
Bosnian the Bihac
in the Bihac
enclave.
24
24 August
August Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
Russian Prime Chernomyrdin pledges in in meeting with
with Serbian
Prime Minister Marjanovic
Prime Marjanovic to back efforts
efforts to ease
ease sanctions against Serbia
if
if Belgrade
Belgrade observes its
its commitment
commitment to break ties
ties to
to the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs.
Federation agree to establish a joint political

Federation parties agree commission to
political commission work
to work
with the federation leadership to
with the to implement thethe federation agreement.
agreement.
26 August
26 August Emergency
Emergency session of the Serbian assembly adopts declaration supporting
the Serbian
the Contact
the Contact Group’s
Group's peace
peace plan.
24

27 August
27 August Russian Foreign Minister
Russian Foreign meets with
Minister meets Serbian President Milosevic in
with Serbian in
Belgrade
Belgrade to to discuss easing of sanctions against Serbia and border monitor
monitor-
ing issues
issues. .
27-28 August
August Bosnian Serb referendum overwhelmingly
Bosnian overwhelmingly rejects Contact
Contact Group
Group plan.
30
30 August
August Bosnian and
Bosnian and Bosnian
Bosnian Serb Army commanders sign an antisniping
antisniping agree-
agree
Gorazde.
ment for Gorazde.
2-10 September Approximately 3,500 Muslims and

Approximately and other minorities
minorities are expelled from
from
Bosnia in the
northern Bosnia Bosnian Serb ethnic
the single most intensive week of Bosnian
cleansing since the intensified in mid-July.
the campaign intensified mid-July.
33 September Russian Foreign Minister

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
Kozyrev says Russia will
says Russia will withdraw
withdraw its
its troops
from Bosnia if
from Bosnia if NATO Bosnian Serbs or if
the Bosnian
NATO conducts airstrikes against the if the
the
Bosnia arms embargo is lifted.
Bosnia lifted.
4 September UN mediators Owen

UN Owen and Stoltenberg meetmeet with
with Milosevic to discuss
Belgrade's
Belgrade’s embargo on the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic tells Stoltenberg that
Bosnian Serbs . that
will to place international monitors
he will accept a plan to
he the border.
monitors along the
6-7 September Contact group meets in Berlin to discuss monitoring

meets in proposal arranged by
monitoring proposal
EU mediator Owen
EU Owen and accepted by by Milosevic. The group agrees
agrees to request
the UN
that the UN ease in exchange for Belgrade’s
ease some sanctions against Serbia in Belgrade's
monitors.
acceptance of border monitors.
acceptance
8 September French Foreign

French Belgrade will
Foreign Ministry announces Belgrade will accept an international
accept an international
humanitarian mission the federal border with
mission along the with Bosnia.
Bosnia. The contact
group agrees to recommend the
agrees to the Bosnian
the UN tighten sanctions against the Bosnian
Serbs and
and ease
ease some sanctions against Belgrade
Belgrade. .
9 September As many as 30,000 refugees from

from Velika Kladusa in
Velika Kladusa in the Bihac enclave
the Bihac
remain in the Serb-controlled area.
the Krajina Serb-controlled area.
l10-1
0-111 September EU foreign
EU foreign ministers
ministers approve in
in principle the contact group plan for easing
principle the
sanctions against Belgrade Belgrade's acceptance of inter
Belgrade in exchange for Belgrade’s inter-
monitors along its
national monitors with Bosnia.
its border with The EU
Bosnia. The EU is prepared toto send
send
135 monitors. The ministers also voice
135 monitors. opposition to lifting the
voice strong opposition the
Bosnian arms
Bosnian arms embargo.
14
14 September Bosnian
Bosnian President Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman
and Croatian Tudjman reach
agreement on
agreement on the Bosnian Muslim-Croat
the creation of a Bosnian military command
Muslim-Croat military
municipal and cantonal Federation
and of municipal Federation authorities.
25
25

15
Bosnian Serbs divert power from powerlines in Sarajevo
from powerlines to Pale,
Sarajevo to Pale, leaving
leaving
without electricity
Sarajevo without electricity or water.
water.
16 September
16 An advance team
team of 19 international border observers arrives in Belgrade.
19 international Belgrade.
mission, under the
The mission, the direction Swedish general Bo Pellnas,
direction of Swedish Pellnas, will
will moni
moni-
economic blockade
tor the economic imposed on the
blockade imposed the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs by Belgrade
Belgrade toto
verify whether it is
verify is being implemented.
18
18 September UN Commander
UN Commander Rose threatens both Bosnian
Rose threatens and Muslims with
Bosnian Serbs and with
NATO airstrikes after fighting
NATO Bosnian Army forces and
fighting between Bosnian and the
the
Bosnian Serb Army results in
Bosnian shelling of Sarajevo
in the shelling the Bosnian
Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs.
22 September US and
and British NATO fighter
British NATO Bosnian Serb tank in
fighter planes hit a Bosnian in the
the Sarajevo
Sarajevo
exclusion zone after Bosnian
exclusion Bosnian Serbs attack aa French
French armored personnel
carrier.
23 September UNSC adopts a resolution

The UNSC ease sanctions against Serbia
resolution to ease Serbia once
Boutros-Ghali verifies
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali verifies that
that Belgrade’s blockade of the
Belgrade's blockade the Bosnian
Bosnian
Serbs is
is effective. The Security
effective. The Security Council also passes
passes resolutions
resolutions to
to tighten
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and condemn ethnic cleansing.
the Bosnian cleansing.
27
Bosnian President Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic calls on the Security Council to
the Security to lift the
the arms
embargo but implementation for
but delay implementation for six months.
28
28 September UN personnel make repairs to
UN to a damaged transformer restoring electric
a electric sup
sup-
plies and
plies and water to Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
30
30 September The UN Security
The UN Security Council votes to extend UN PROFOR’s mandate for six
UNPROFOR's six
Bosnia, Croatia,
months in Bosnia, Croatia, and
and Macedonia.
Macedonia.
33 October UNSYG Boutros-Ghali

UNSYG sets in
Boutros-Ghali sets in motion
motion the
the process to phase one
to suspend phase
sanctions after receiving
receiving confirmation from ICFY
confirmation from ICFY chairmen
chairmen Owen
Owen and
and
Belgrade is meeting its
that Belgrade
Stoltenberg that its commitment
commitment to close the
the border.
The Belgrade
The will reopen and
Belgrade airport will cultural exchanges will
and sporting and cultural will
resume for
for 100 October.
I 00 days starting 5 October.
5
7 October NATO ambassadors urge

NATO urge UNSYG
UNSYG Boutos-Ghali
Boutos-Ghali toto allow swifter airstrikes,
allow swifter airstrikes,
possibly without
possibly warning, on aa wider
without warning, wider choice
choice of targets if
targets if the Bosnian
the Bosnian Serb
Serb
violate exclusion attack UNPROFOR.
exclusion zones or attack UNPROFOR.
28 October USUN Ambassador

USUN circulates aa draft UNSC
Ambassador Albright circulates UNSC resolution calling for
resolution calling for
the arms embargo in Bosnia
Bosnia to be lifted
lifted in
in six the Bosnian
six months unless the Bosnian
the contact group peace
Serbs accept the peace plan.
26

NATO
NATO andand the UN reach agreement
the UN agreement on the use of airstrikes
the use airstrikes in Bosnia. Air
Bosnia. Air-
strikes will
will be proportional the violation,
proportional to the timely, and without
violation, more timely, without tacti
tacti-
warning unless civilians
cal warning civilians are endangered. The UN retains the
The UN the authority to
to
initiate
initiate and
and stop airstrikes.
3 November
3 November The UN
The UN General
General Assembly
Assembly approves a nonbinding resolution to lift the
nonbinding resolution the
arms embargo against Bosnia
Bosnia inin six months if the Bosnian
if the Bosnian Serbs do not
accept the
the contact group peace UN Security
peace plan. UN Security Council members, who who
have sole authority to lift the embargo, endorse the
have the resolution five in
with five
resolution with
favor and IO
favor and 10 abstentions.
9 November
9 November A
A single Krajina Serb jet aircraft
aircraft takes from Udbina
takes off from airfield to
Udbina airfield to attack
two
two targets in Bihac,
targets in Bihac, violating no-fly zone in
violating the no-fly in Bosina.
Bosina. The
The jet's missiles
jet’s missiles
ammunition dump and a parcel of open ground in the
hit an ammunition the surrounding
surrounding
area.
area.
18 November
18 November Krajina Serb jets attack Bihac with missiles,
Bihac with missiles , napalm, and
and cluster bombs.
The UNSC
The UNSC issues a presidential statement
statement condemning
condemning the attack
attack and
and calls
for an end to actions that UN peacekeepers.
that endanger UN peacekeepers. Croatian
Croatian President
President
Tudjman the UNSC
Tudjman gives the UNSC permission
permission to allow NATO
to allow to fly over Croatian
NATO to Croatian
territory.
19 November
19 November The UNSC
The unanimously authorizes NATO
UNSC unanimously NATO planes to to strike targets
targets in
in
Croatia used
Croatia used by the
the Serbs to attacks on UN
to launch attacks UN safe The Krajina
areas. The
safe areas.
proposal initiated
Serb assembly rejects a proposal initiated by international Owen
international mediators Owen
and to restore economic
and Stoltenberg to links to
economic links Croatian Government.
to the Croatian Government.
21 November
21 November NATO planes, at UN
NATO UN request, Serb-controlled Udbina
request, attack Serb-controlled Udbina airfield
airfield in
Croatia, rendering it temporarily
Croatia, temporarily inoperable. is intended to stop
inoperable. The strike is
Serb attacks on the neighboring Bihac
the neighboring Bihac enclave in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
23 November
23 November NATO
NATO planes attack Serb surface to-air-missile
to-air-missile sites Bosanska
sites around Bosanska
Krupa Otoka in northwest Bosnia
Krupa and Otoka Bosnia and in the area of Dvor,
the area Dvor, in
in retaliation
retaliation
for Serb attacks British aircraft the
attacks against British previous day.
the previous day.
30 November
30 November UNSYG Boutros-Ghali arrives in
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali in Sarajevo cease-fire
Sarajevo to negotiate a cease-fire
Bosnia with Bosnian
throughout Bosnia with Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Serb leader
Izetbegovic and
Karadzic. Karadzic
Karadzic. Karadzic refuses to meet
meet the UNSYG,
the UNSYG, insisting
insisting that
that the
the meeting
take Serb-controlled land.
take place on Serb-controlled land.
2 December
2 December Croatia and
Croatia the "Republic
and the Krajina” (RSK)
“Republic of Serbian Krajina" economic
(RSK) sign an economic
agreement as a first
agreement first step utilities, reopening road links,
step to restoration of utilities, links, and
and
an oil pipeline
reactivating an pipeline between Croat Serb-controlled areas
Croat and Serb-controlled areas of
Croatia.
Croatia.
27
27
Digitized by Go gle Origiruil from

Contact Group Foreign Ministers
Group Foreign Ministers meet
meet in
in Brussels
Brussels to
to discuss
discuss new
new initiatives
initiatives
designed to the Bosnian
to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to
to sign the
the Contact
Contact Group
Group peace
peace
plan.
4 December British Foreign Minister

British Foreign Minister Hurd and French
Hurd and Foreign Minister Juppe
French Foreign Juppe travel to
to
Belgrade for talks with
Belgrade with Serbian President Milosevic. Milosevic promises
Serbian President promises toto
use his influence
use influence to
to press the Bosnian
press the Bosnian Serbs to accept the
the Contact
Contact Group
Group
plan.
5 December A
A delegation of Bosnian
Bosnian Serb assembly members led by Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb
Foreign Minister Buha
Foreign Minister urges other assembly members to
Buha urges to consider
consider accep
accep-
tance the Contact
tance of the Group plan, after aa meeting in
Contact Group in Belgrade
Belgrade with
with Serbian
Serbian
President Milosevic.
12 December
12 December Krajina Serb and/or rebel Muslim forces Bangladeshi UN
forces destroy a Bangladeshi
armored personnel carrier in
in Velika
Velika Kladusa with an
Kladusa with an antitank guided
missile. UNPROFOR Commander
missile. UNPROFOR Commander Rose and other UN
Rose and officials in
UN officials in Sarajevo
Sarajevo
deny Bangladeshi NATO air presence.
requests for NATO
Bangladeshi requests
14 December
14 December Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
Bosnian publicly invites
Karadzic publicly former US
invites former US President
President Carter
Carter
visit Bosnia
to visit
to Bosnia as
as aa mediator. Karadzic to free all
Karadzic pledges to allUN
UN peacekeepers
peacekeepers
and Muslim soldiers
and soldiers held prisoner
prisoner who are under the
who are age of 19,
the age 19, guarantee
guarantee
freedom of movement for UN convoys,
convoys, accept anan immediate cease-fire
cease-fire
Sarajevo, and reopen Sarajevo
around Sarajevo, airport.
Sarajevo airport.
18 December
18 Former
Former President
President Carter travels to Sarajevo for
to Sarajevo for an hour-long meeting with
an hour-long with
Bosnian
Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Carter recommends that
President Izetbegovic. the Contact
that the Contact Group
Group
plan serve the basis for further negotiations.
serve as the
19 December
19 December Former President Carter,
Former President Carter, after a meeting with
a with Bosnian in Pale,
Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale,
announces aa Serb proposal
proposal for
for an immediate four-month
four-month cease-fire
cease-fire and
and an
an
offer to continue talks based on
offer the Contact
on the Contact Group plan. The
Group plan. points of the
The points the
unilateral cease-fire are
unilateral cease-fire outlined in aa statement
are outlined statement issued byby Serb leaders.
Afterward, Karadzic denies he
Afterward, Karadzic he agreed
agreed to an immediate cease-fire
to an cease-fire but
but
expresses
expresses the
the need
need “to
"to explore the
the possibilities"
possibilities” of an
an immediate cease-fire.
cease-fire.
19-20
19-20 December Military chiefs of NATO
NATO countries and with peacekeepers in
and countries with in
Bosnia meet in The
Bosnia meet The Hague
Hague to discuss ways toto improve the UNPROFOR
improve the UNPROFOR
mission.
mission. The call for more resources but
The leaders call but do not
not discuss increasing
the number of
the of UN
UN troops or giving the mission
giving the authority for
mission authority for more robust
military action.
military
20 December Carter returns to Sarajevo

Sarajevo where he
he obtains Bosnian
Bosnian President
President Izetbegovic’s
Izetbegovic's
agreement cease-fire, and,
four-month cease-fire,
agreement to a four-month and, after a second meeting inin Pale,
Pale,
28
28

announces that Bosnian Serb leaders will
that Bosnian cease-fire
will accept a complete cease-fire
throughout Bosnia
Bosnia to be implemented on 23 23 December.
December. Carter then
then travels
to Belgrade
to Belgrade to
to hold
hold talks with
with Serbian President Milosevic before returning
to the United
United States.
States.
21 December
21 December Croatia’s Krajina Serbs allow
Croatia's allow the
the Zagreb-Belgrade
Zagreb-Belgrade highway
highway to
to reopen as
part of their mediated economic
economic agreement 2 December.
agreement signed on 2 December.
22 December
22 December UN
UN Special Envoy Akashi obtains commitments from
Special Envoy Bosnian Muslim and
from Bosnian
Serb officials
officials to
to enact cease-fire at noon
a cease-fire noon on 23
23 December, after meetings
in Sarajevo
Sarajevo and Pale.
23 December
23 December Bosnian
Bosnian President Izetbegovic Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
lzetbegovic and Bosnian Karadzic sign sepa-
sepa
rate
rate texts to a cease-fire
texts agreeing to cease-fire valid
valid until
until I1 January, which there
January, after which there
will four-month "cessation
will be an anticipated four-month “cessation of hostilities.”
hostilities."
24 December
24 December A cease-fire between Bosnian
A seven-day cease-fire and Serbs starts
Bosnian Muslims and starts at noon.
noon.
28 December
28 December Rebel
Rebel Muslim leader Abdic agrees “in principle”
agrees "in principle" to
to respect cease-fire and
a cease-fire
end Serb-controlled areas
end ethnic cleansing in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia.
Bosnia.
29 December
29 December The Bosnian
The Bosnian Serb assembly endorses the 19 December
the 19 December Carter agreement
agreement
and agrees
and agrees to based on the
to negotiations based the existing Group plan. Seven
existing Contact Group
who have
Serb deputies, who have maintained ties to Milosevic, break away from
ties to from
Karadzic's SDS
Karadzic’s SOS party to form their own
to form own independent group
group..
31 December
31 December Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government and Serb officials
officials sign separate
separate texts,
texts, agreeing to
to a
four-month comprehensive cease-fire
four-month cease-fire to take
take effect at noon on 1 1 January
January. .
The agreement follows the
The agreement the temporary truce signed on 23 23 December
December andand
calls for UN
UN troops to be positioned between the
be positioned the combatant forces in
in some
areas UNPROFOR will
areas. . UNPROFOR will set
set up commissions to monitor
up joint commissions monitor the cease-fire.
the cease-fire.
1995
1995
I January
1 January 1995
1995 The four-month
The four-month cessation of hostilities
hostilities agreement the Bosnian
agreement between the Bosnian
Government and Bosnian
Government Bosnian Serbs takes Sarajevo time.
takes effect at noon Sarajevo
January
2 January Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat political
political and military officials, led by
military officials, by Federation President
Zubak, sign the four-month
Zubak, four-month cease-fire
cease-fire agreement
agreement after a two-hour
two-hour meeting
in Mostar
Mostar with UN Commander
with UN Commander Rose.
Rose. Zubak
Zubak attaches
attaches a separate
separate annex
affirming
affirming that presented by Milosevic and
that plans presented and the Contact Group offer a
Group offer
good basis for reopening peace
peace negotiations. Karadzic however, that
Karadzic insists, however, that
land swaps and constitutional
constitutional issues must be formal accep-
be decided before formal accep
the plan.
tance of the
tance
29

4 January
January A joint commission
A commission of Bosnian
Bosnian Muslim and SerbSerb leaders fail
fail to
to reach agree
agree-
ment on implementing
implementing key aspects
aspects of the
the cease-fire
cease-fire agreement. The
The meet-
meet
ing, held at Sarajevo is suspended following Serb complaints
Sarajevo airport, is complaints over
over
the Bosnian Government's
Bosnian Government’s refusal to withdraw its
to withdraw its troops from
from Mt. Igman.
Igman.
6 January
January Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian and Serb leaders again fail to reach agreement
fail to agreement on imple
imple-
the cease-fire.
menting the they will
cease-fire. Serb leaders declare they will not reopen key
key supply
supply
Sarajevo until
routes leading into Sarajevo until they
they are the Mt.
are permitted to inspect the
Igman DMZ to verify
Igman DMZ verify the withdrawal of government troops.
the withdrawal
9 January
January UN officials
officials are
are unable to
to verify the Bosnian
verify the Government's withdrawal
Bosnian Government’s withdrawal
Igman after aa government guide argues
from Mt. lgman that snow
argues that snow conditions
conditions are
are
and refuses to lead UN
unsafe and UN officers
officers to the last Bosnian
to the Bosnian hideout.
hideout.
11
11 January
January Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government and officials sign an
and Serb officials an agreement providing for the
agreement providing the
withdrawal from Mt. Igman
withdrawal of government forces from Igman and the opening of sup
the opening sup-
ply routes into Sarajevo by
ply by 14 January.
14 January.
12
12 January
January Croatian President Tudjman
Croatian informs UNSYG
Tudjman informs UNSYG Boutros-Ghali
Boutros-Ghali by letter that
that
will not renew UNPROFOR's
Zagreb will UNPROFOR’s mandate
mandate in Croatia when
in Croatia when it expires
on 31 March. Tudjman
31 March. Tudjman states that UN headquarters
states that headquarters can remain in
in Zagreb,
but UN forces must withdraw
but UN withdraw before 30
30 June.
June.
The UNSC votes

The UNSC limited sanctions relief
votes to extend limited relief in Serbia for another 100
in Serbia 100
The vote
days. The mandates border monitors
vote also mandates monitors to prohibit fuel
to prohibit fuel shipments
to Serb-held
from Serbia to areas of Croatia.
Serb-held areas Croatia.
13
13 January
January The Contact Group
The Group holds
holds talks with Bosnian Serb leaders in
with Bosnian in Pale.
Pale.
14 January
14 January Bosnian Serb soldiers
Bosnian soldiers block the opening of supply
block the supply routes into
into Sarajevo,
Sarajevo,
charging that officials are
that government officials are abusing the agreement signed on 11
the agreement 11
January passage for commercial
January by seeking passage commercial traffic as well
traffic as as humanitarian
well as humanitarian
aid.
aid.
January
20 January Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government and Serb officials 101 prisoners in
officials exchange 101 in Sara
Sara-
The is first
jevo. The exchange the first prisoner swap
the since October
October 1994.
1994.
23 January
23 January Bosnian and UN
Bosnian Serb leader Krajisnik and official Muratovic
UN official Muratovic sign an agreement
sign an
to open key supply routes into
into Sarajevo
Sarajevo by January. The
31 January.
by 31 agreement also
The agreement
provides for freedom of
of movement for
for the of POWs,
population, exchange of
the population, POWs,
and evacuation of
and of wounded
wounded from Gorazde.
from Gorazde.
January
24 January British Major General Rupert
British Rupert Smith General Michael
Smith replaces General Michael Rose
Rose as
as
commander of UN forces in
UN forces in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
30
3O

24-25 January
January Group begins two days of shuttle diplomacy
The Contact Group diplomacy between Pale
Pale and
and
Sarajevo to further the
the peace
peace process. The group decides to
to suspend the
the
talks after the Serbs refuse to
to accept the
the Contact Group the basis for
Group plan as the
further negotiations.
26
26 January
January The Adria oil pipeline, extending from Croatia’s Adriatic
from Croatia's Adriatic coast to central
Europe opens under the
Europe economic agreement
the 22 December economic agreement between Zagreb
and the Krajina Serbs.
and
30 January
January The Zagreb Four (Z-4), the
Four (Z-4), United States,
the United EU, UN and
States, EU, and Russia,
Russia, presents
presents its
its
plan for a political settlement in Croatia to
political settlement to President Tudjman and Krajina
Tudjman and
“President” Martic.
Serb "President" Martic. The plan reestablishes
reestablishes Croatian control over all all
within its
territory within internationally recognized borders and gives consider
its internationally consider-
able
able autonomy to Serbs in areas areas where they
they form majority. Martic
form a majority. Martic refuses
to receive the plan, stating that Knin must first first receive guarantees
guarantees that
that
UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR will stay stay in Croatia, while
in Croatia. while Tudjman
Tudjman sayssays Zagreb will
will study the
the
plan before further decision.
31
31 January
January Serbian President Milosevic refuses to to meet with Z-4 mediators and
meet with and
declines to discuss their plan for a political settlement in
political settlement in Croatia.
Croatia.
I February
1 UN officials
UN officials announce that Bosnian Serb leaders will
that Bosnian allow the opening of
will allow a
key route into Sarajevo to humanitarian traffic. The road will
traffic. The will most likely
likely
remain closed to commercial
commercial traffic.
traffic.
5 February
February Senior officials of the
Senior officials the Muslim-Croat meet in Munich, Germany,
Muslim-Croat Federation meet Germany,
with
with US and
and Contact Group
Group representatives.
representatives. They
They agree
agree on
on a nine-point
nine-point
plan to strength the Federation and
to strength to nominate an international mediator to
and to
resolve disputed matters.
matters.
6 February
February UN officials
UN officials announce the
the opening of key supply routes around Sarajevo
Sarajevo
and traffic. Commercial
and across the airport to civilian traffic. traffic is still
Commercial traffic still excluded.
8 February
February The Krajina Serb "parliament" votes to
“parliament” votes political talks and further
to suspend political
steps
steps in implementing
implementing the 2
2 December economic
economic agreement with
agreement with Zagreb
until it reverses its
it reverses decision to expel UN
its decision UN forces. The vote
vote is
is accompanied by
a measure
measure declaring a war alert,alert, one step below declaring aa full state
step below state of war.
war.
13 February
13 February Bosnian Serb assembly meets
The Bosnian meets in Samac andand again rejects the
the Contact
Group plan. The assembly decides to
Group prohibit unauthorized contacts
to prohibit
between Bosnian individuals or groups with
Bosnian Serb individuals with the Group in
the Contact Group in an
effort to rein in dissident deputies who
who favor thethe Contact Group
Group plan.
31
31

14 February
14 The five-nation Group, at a meeting in Paris,
five-nation Contact Group, agrees to a new initia
Paris, agrees initia-
to lift sanctions against Belgrade in exchange for its
tive to recognition of
its recognition
Croatia, Bosnia,
Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovenia. In addition,
and Slovenia.
Macedonia, and addition, Serbian President
Milosevic must endorse the Z-4 Z4 plan providing
providing for a political
political solution
solution in
Croatia.
Croatia.
18-19 February
February Russian
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
Foreign Minister Kozyrev travels to
to Serbia for two
two days of talks
with Serbian President Milosevic concerning the
with the new Contact Group
Group initia
initia-
tive. Serbian
tive. officials refuse to
Serbian officials to consider the initiative
initiative until sanctions against
lifted.
Belgrade are lifted.
Belgrade
20 February
February Krajina and Bosnian Serb officials
and Bosnian form aa joint
officials form joint defense council,
council, headed
headed by
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic and Krajina Serb President Martic.
Karadzic and Martic. They
They
agree to
agree to pool military resources and
pool military military cooperation if
and pledge military if fighting
fighting
resumes.
resumes.
23 February
23 French,
French, German, and British representatives
German, and representatives of the
the Contact Group
Group present
present
Serbian President Milosevic with
with the group’s new plan offering
the group's offering sanctions
relief
relief to Serbia in exchange for its recognition of the other former
its recognition former Yugoslav
Yugoslav
states. No official
states. statements follow the meeting, but
official statements press sources indicate
but press
Milosevic has offer.
the new offer.
has rejected the
March
6 March Military commanders from
from the Croatian, Bosnian,
the Croatian, and Bosnian
Bosnian, and Bosnian Croat
armies meet
meet in Zagreb to
to sign an
an accord strengthening military
military cooperation.
The
The accord provides the framework coordination of Muslim
framework for possible coordination Muslim-
Croat military actions against Serbs in Croatia
Croat military and Bosnia.
Croatia and Bosnia.
March
88 March Deputies of the
the Krajina Serb Radical walk out of the
Radical Party walk the Krajina Serb
assembly after their demand for aa no-confidence
no-confidence vote Prime Minister
vote in Prime Minister
Mikelic is
is refused.
8-10 March
8—10 March Federation President Zubak andand Vice
Vice President Ganie in Bonn,
agree in
Ganic agree Bonn,
Germany, to
Germany, to take
take steps
steps to strengthen
strengthen the 15 April.
the federation by 15
IO March
10 March Bosnian Croat General Santic, commander of Bosnian
Bosnian Bosnian Croat forces in
in
Bihac, is
Bihac, is reported missing. Bosnian officials accuse the
Bosnian Croat officials the Bosnian
Bosnian
Government of detaining Santic, but
Government Bosnian Army spokesmen deny
but Bosnian
involvement.
involvement.
12 March
12 March Croatian
Croatian President Tudjman
Tudjman announces Zagreb’s
Zagreb's readiness toto negotiate a
new mandate the UN
with the
mandate with Security Council for an
UN Security an international force to
UN troops in Croatia.
replace existing UN Croatia. The would consist of
The new force would
approximately 5,000 troops, with
approximately soldiers stationed along Croatia’s
with 500 soldiers Croatia's
borders with
with Bosnia
Bosnia and
and Serbia.
32
32

15 March
15 March Bosnian Commander Delic announces that
Bosnian Army Commander three government soldiers
that three
are being detained in connection with the early March
with the disappearance of
March disappearance
Bosnian
Bosnian Croat General Santic. Delic states the incident
states that the incident was aa "settling
“settling
of personal scores"
scores” and not motivated by political
political or military
military reasons.
20 March
20 March Croatian and officials agree
and Krajina Serb officials agree to open a section of the
the Belgrade
Belgrade-
railway by mid-April. Croatian
Zagreb railway Croatian officials
officials agree
agree to perform repairs to
to perform
the railway
the March.
27 March.
railway by 27
March
24 March Bosnian Prime Minister
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and Croatian Prime
and Croatian Minister Valentic
Prime Minister Valentic sign
a federation agreement
agreement on economic and and customs cooperation, thethe return of
refugees, and abolition of visas. The two
and the abolition officials also review
two officials review an agree
agree-
ment guarantees the federation access to the sea through Croatian terri
that guarantees
ment that terri-
tory and
and Croatia access through federation territory.
Croatia access
26 March
26 March Bosnian
Karadzic orders the mobilization of the
the mobilization the entire Bosnian
Bosnian
Serb population to
to counter the Bosnian Government offensive,
the Bosnian offensive, now
now in its
its
second week.
27 March
27 March Group, meeting in London,
five-nation Contact Group,
The five-nation London, urges and Pale
urges Sarajevo and Pale
to extend the
to cease-fire and pledges to continue its
the current cease-fire its efforts to bring
about negotiations.
28 March
28 March Croatian Parliament endorses a set
The Croatian conclusions stating that
set of conclusions that any
any new
UN mandate for Croatia must explicitly
UN mandate Croatia in its
explicitly refer to Croatia its name,
name, estab
estab-
Croatia's borders, and provide for operational mea
lish effective control of Croatia’s mea-
sures
sures leading to peace.
peace.
29 March
29 March The Bosnian IO March
Bosnian Parliament endorses the 10 March Bonn
Bonn Agreement
Agreement to
to step
step up
Muslim-Croat federation.
implementation of the Muslim-Croat
implementation
31 March
31 March UNSC adopts
The UNSC adopts three the UN
three resolutions renewing the mandate in
UN mandate the former
in the former
Yugoslavia dividing UN
Yugoslavia and dividing UN troops into three separate commands for
three separate for
Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia. The new Croatian
Bosnia, and Macedonia. UNCRO (UN
Croatian force, UNCRO (UN
Confidence Restoration
Confidence Croatia), will
Restoration Operation in Croatia), be reduced in
will be in number
and
and tasked to monitor
tasked to Croatia’s borders.
monitor Croatia's
4 April Contact Group officials, meeting in London,

Group officials, London, agree to press
agree to press Sarajevo
Sarajevo to
to
Bosnian cease-fire
extend the Bosnian cease-fire when it expires on 1I May.
May. The group fails
fails to
to
on a strategy
agree on of Bosnia and
strategy to gain Serbian recognition of and Croatia.
88 April Bosnian and UN

Bosnian Serb and UN military
military generals sign an agreement
agreement pledging
pledging that
that
both sides will
will not interfere with
with the movement of people and traffic
traffic along
the main supply route between the and central Sarajevo.
the airport and Sarajevo. The agree
agree-
ment tense standoff in which
ment follows a tense Bosnian Serbs blockaded French UN
which Bosnian UN
troops behind mines on 77 April.
33
33

11 April
1 1 April Members
Members of the five-nation Contact
the five-nation arrive in
Group arrive
Contact Group Belgrade for talks on
in Belgrade on
the
the peace
peace process with
with Serbian
Serbian President
President Milosevic. No formal
formal statement
statement is
is
issued.
14 April
14 April A French
A is killed
French UN peacekeeper is an unidentified
killed by an sniper in
unidentified sniper in the
the Sarajevo
Sarajevo
suburb of Dobrinja.
Dobrinja.
15 April
15 April A second French
French UN peacekeeper is is killed fire in
killed by sniper fire in Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
French Defense Minister Leotard
French Defense Leotard goes
goes to Sarajevo discuss UN troop
Sarajevo to discuss troop
security and for emergency UN consultations,
calls for
and calls consultations, threatening a French
French
withdraw from
withdraw from Bosnia
Bosnia if Paris’
Paris' conditions
conditions for the continuation
for the the UN
continuation of the UN
mission are
mission are not met.
met.
15-16 April
15-16 The Bosnian
The Bosnian Serb assembly meets
meets in Sanski Most to
in Sanski to review
review the military and
the military
political situation in
political in Serb-held Bosnia. Military
Serb-held Bosnia. Military and political leaders blame
and political blame
each other for recent military
each military setbacks.
setbacks.
19 April
19 April The UNSC
The unanimously adopts a French
UNSC unanimously French resolution that calls
resolution that on all
calls on all warring
warring
parties in Bosnia
Bosnia to refrain
refrain from violence against UN forces,
from violence forces, urges the
the
extension of the cease-fire,
cease-fire, and requests
requests the resumption of negotiations
the resumption negotiations for aa
peaceful settlement.
settlement.
April
20-21 April UN Special
UN Envoy Akashi talks in
Special Envoy in Sarajevo and Pale
Sarajevo and Pale with
with Bosnian
Bosnian Govem
Govern-
ment and Serb leaders on renewing the four-month
renewing the four-month cease-fire.
cease-fire. Both
Both Sara
Sara-
and Pale
jevo and the cease-fire.
Pale refuse to renew the cease-fire.
21 April
21 April The United
The United States,
States, United Kingdom, Russia,
United Kingdom, Russia, France,
France, and
and Germany
Germany approve
approve
a resolution relaxation of minor
resolution to extend relaxation sanctions against Serbia,
minor sanctions Serbia, but with
with
controls. The
stricter controls. The draft calls
calls on Serbia to completely
completely seal its borders
seal its borders with
with
Bosnia, cut off communications
Bosnia, communications with with Pale,
Pale, and requires renewal
renewal every
every 75
75
days instead of 100.
I 00.
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali recommends a report to the UNSC
to the reorganizing UN
UNSC reorganizing UN
forces in Croatia. The
in Croatia. The plan,
plan, not yet
yet approved by Zagreb
Zagreb or Knin,
Knin, reduces the
the
number of troops inin the provides for monitors
the force, provides on Croatia’s
monitors on Croatia's borders
borders
with Bosnia, but
with Bosnia, the number of troops on
specify the
but does not specify the border
on the border or how
how
many crossings
crossings will
will be monitored.
monitored.
April
21-22 April US and German
German Contact
Contact Group officials are
Group officials are forced to spend the
forced to the night
night at
at
Bosnian Serb officials
Sarajevo airport after Bosnian
Sarajevo officials refuse to
to ensure their safe
safe pas
pas-
sage Sarajevo for
sage into Sarajevo for talks with
with the Bosnian Government,
the Bosnian Government, while
while Serb
Serb
Karadzic denounces the
leader Karadzic UN’s limited
the UN's limited easing of sanctions.
sanctions. The
The
envoys leave the airport
leave the for Zagreb on
airport for 22 April.
on 22 April.
34

April
24-25 April The Krajina Serb Army closes the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway
the Zagreb-Belgrade for 24
Highway for 24 hours
in
in reaction to alleged interference by the Croatian Government
the Croatian Government and
and
UNCRO officials
officials with
with commercial
commercial traffic. The Krajina Serbs reopen the
traffic. The the
highway
highway on 25
25 April.
I1 May Hostilities Agreement

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement expires in Bosnia
Bosnia amid low-level
low-level
fighting.
fighting.
Croatian Army troops attack across UN

Croatian UN lines into UN Sector West to
lines into to take
take
control of the
control highway following a weekend of Serb and
Zagreb-Belgrade highway
the Zagreb—Belgrade and
Croat killings along the road. Krajina Serbs respond by shelling
shelling nearby
Croatian towns
Croatian towns and 122 UN personnel hostage.
and taking 122 hostage.
2 May
May Krajina Serbs rocket downtown
downtown Zagreb and nearby Pleso retalia
Pleso Airport in retalia-
tion for the
the Croatian offensive in UN Sector West.
Croatian offensive West. Five are killed,
Five people are killed,
and
and more than
than 100
I00 are injured.
injured.
Croatians continue their push into Sector West,

The Croatians West, seizing virtually all
seizing virtually all
strategic points. President Tudjman
Tudjman declares victory.
victory.
3 May US
US Special Envoy Akashi
Special Envoy Akashi brokers a cease-fire
cease-fire between Croatia
Croatia and
and the
the
Krajina Serbs following another Serb missile
missile strike against Zagreb that
that hit a
children’s hospital and
children's and the national theater—killing
theater-killing one and wound
one person and wound-
ing 40.
40.
7 May Bosnian Serbs shell Sarajevo

Bosnian Sarajevo in the
the first
first major
major attack
attack on the city since the
the city the
expiration of a four-month
expiration cease-fire on 1I May.
four-month cease-fire are killed and
May. Ten are and 40 are
are
injured, according
injured, press accounts.
to press
according to
9 May
9May United Nations
The United Nations begins evacuating Serbs from
from Sector West to Bosnia
West to Bosnia
after Krajina Serb leaders threaten rocketing of Zagreb if
threaten further rocketing if they
they are
are
not allowed
allowed to
to go.
go.
JOMay
10 UN Commander
UN Commander General
General Rupert Smith requests
Rupert Smith requests airstrikes on Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
retaliation for the
gunners in retaliation the 77 May shelling Sarajevo. He
shelling of Sarajevo. He is overruled
overruled by
UN Special
UN Envoy
Special Envoy Akashi
Akashi who
who fears airstrikes will
will upset
upset the
the recently
brokered cease-fire
cease-fire in Croatia. Afterward, frustrated UN
Croatia. Afterward, officials in
UN officials
call for review
Sarajevo call for a review
a of their role in Bosnia.
in Bosnia.
15
15 May General Milan Celeketic, chief of the
Celeketic, chief the Krajina Serb Army,
Army, submits his resig
resig-
to RSK President Martic.
nation to RSK Martic . He
He blames not only
only the political leadership
the political
for losses in
in Western Slovenia but
Western Slovenia himself for
but also himself upholding his
for not upholding his prom
prom-
“centimeter” of Serb territory.
ise to defend every "centimeter"
ise
35

16 May
16May UNSYG Boutros-Ghali,
Boutros-Ghali, in a closed-door briefing the Security Council,
briefing of the Council,
suggests
suggests that UN
UN troops in Bosnia
Bosnia be
be reduced
reduced and
and regrouped in light the
the
escalation of hostilities and
escalation threats to
and threats to peacekeepers.
peacekeepers.
17 May
17 UNSC adopts
The UNSC adopts a resolution demanding that and Krajina
that Croatian and Krajina Serb
forces withdraw from UN UN separation in Croatia, including
separation zones in including aa warning
unspecified actions if
of unspecified if the
the two sides do not comply.
not comply.
20 May
20May The Krajina
Krajina Serb assembly votes unify with
votes to unify the Bosnian
with the Bosnian Serbs and
and calls
for ajoint
a joint session of the Krajina and Bosnian
Krajina and the end of
assemblies by the
Bosnian Serb assemblies
May to formalize the unification.
unification.
24 May
24May UN officials issue
UN officials issue an ultimatum to
to the parties in Bosnia
the warring parties Bosnia to
to cease
cease
They warn the
using heavy weapons around Sarajevo. They to return
the Serbs to return four
big guns taken UN depots
taken from UN depots by 25 May or face NATO
by noon 25 NATO airstrikes.
25 May NATO launches airstrikes against

NATO against two ammunition bunkers near Pale after
Bosnian Serbs ignore the ultimatum issued on 24 May. The Bosnian
24 May. Bosnian Serbs
retaliate by shelling UN
retaliate UN safe
safe areas, UN troops hostage
areas, taking UN hostage and killing 68
68
Tuzla.
in Tuzla.
26 May
26May NATO launches a second round of airstrikes against
NATO the Pale ammunition
against the
depot
depot at Jahorina Potok.
28 May Bosnian Foreign Minister

Bosnian Ljubijankic is killed
Minister Ljubijankic killed when the helicopter carrying
him is
is shot the Bihac
shot down over the Krajina Serbs claim responsibility.
Bihac region. Krajina responsibility.
29 May
29May leaders rescind all prior
Bosnian Serb leaders agreements with
prior agreements the United
with the United Nations.
Nations.
31 May
31 Lord David announces his resignation as EU
David Owen announces EU peace negotiator in the
peace negotiator the
Yugoslavia.
former Yugoslavia.
reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs have

Press reports have taken total of 372 peace
taken aa total peace-
keepers hostage
keepers hostage since the
the 25
25 and
and 26
26 May NATO
NATO airstrikes.
June
I June
1 UN
UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali presents
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali the Security Coun
presents options to the Coun-
cil for the future of peacekeeping Bosnia. His preference
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. preference is
is aa
reduction ofof UNPROFOR’s
UNPROFOR 's mandate, of UNPROFOR
mandate, consolidation of UNPROFOR troops,
eventual reduction of
and an eventual
and of force.
2 June A F-l6 is shot down by Bosnian

A US F-16 Banja Luka
Bosnian Serbs over Banja Luka while
while policing
policing
the Bosnian
the “no-fly” zone.
"no-fly"
8 June US Marines
Marines rescue F-l6 pilot
rescue F-16 pilot shot down
down on 22 June.
June.
36
36

7-13 June Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs release
release 258
258 UN hostages.
hostages. Twenty-six hostages remain in
Twenty-six hostages in
Serb hands, and 92 UN peacekeepers
and 92 are blocked
peacekeepers are blocked in place by Serb forces.
forces .
15
15 June Bosnian Serb "parliament"
The Bosnian “parliament” votes with its
votes to unite with its Croatian
Croatian Serb
counterpart
counterpart..
Bosnian Army troops massing north of Sarajevo remove weapons from

Bosnian from UN
and offices
depot at gunpoint. Shops, schools, and offices close in
in Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
16 June
16 June Heavy
Heavy fighting Bosnian Army begins prob
fighting breaks out around Sarajevo as Bosnian prob-
attacks for an offensive
ing attacks siege of Sarajevo.
offensive to lift the siege Sarajevo .
UN Security Council authorizes a British-French-Dutch

UN British -French-Dutch rapid reaction force
force
(RRF)
(RRF) to protect UN peacekeepers
peacekeepers in Bosnia.
Bosnia. Arrangements
Arrangements to
to pay for the
the
deferred.
force are def erred .
18 June
18 June Bosnian Serbs release
Bosnian 26 UN
release remaining 26 hostages in exchange for
UN hostages for four
four Serb
detained by United
soldiers detained United Nations.
Nations.
20 June EU envoy Carl

EU Carl Bildt arrives in Split
Split for his first
first visit to former
visit to former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
mediator..
as international mediator
28 June NATO gives provisional

NATO send thousands of troops to
provisional approval to a plan to send to
Bosnia to cover withdrawal
Bosnia withdrawal of UN peacekeepers if
UN peacekeepers if their mission
mission collapses.
June
30 June cabinet’s decision
German parliament approves cabinet's send soldiers
decision to send soldiers and
and fighter
fighter
aircraft to support the RRF in Bosnia,
RRF in Bosnia, which
which could be Germany's first
be Germany’s first
foreign mission since World
foreign combat mission War II.
World War II.
4 July logistic troops arrive in Split

US logistic prepare the ground for
to prepare
Split to the UN
for the UN Rapid
Rapid
Reaction Force.
Reaction
5 July UN Security Council

UN Council renews for another 75 the easing of some
75 days the
sanctions it imposed on the Yugoslav Republic
the Yugoslav in
Republic in 1992.
1992.
9 July Bosnian Serb tanks push to within

Bosnian within 1,500 meters of the
1,500 meters limits of
the town limits
Srebrenica. Bosnian seven UN
Bosnian Serbs detain seven UN Dutch
Dutch peacekeepers
peacekeepers during the
the
incursion and take
incursion the town of Bratunac in Serb-held
take them to the Serb-held territory.
territory.
11 July
11 NATO jets attack
NATO attack Bosnian tanks entering Srebrenica after UN
Bosnian Serb tanks UN troops
fire.
come under Serb fire.
37
37

Bosnian Dutch UN
Bosnian Serb troops break through Dutch UN defenses and overrun
defenses and
Srebrenica safe
safe area,
area, forcing thousands of Muslims
forcing thousands to flee north to
Muslims to to aa
UN
UN base
base at Potocari.
Potocari.
12
12 July UN Security Council
UN Council demands
demands Bosnian
Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from UN
withdraw from UN-
declared safe area of Srebrenica. The European Union and
safe area and NATO
NATO make
similar statements,
similar statements, and NATO demands
and NATO the immediate and unconditional
demands the unconditional
release of Dutch
release peacekeepers held by Bosnian
Dutch peacekeepers Bosnian Serbs.
14 July
14 Thorvald is named special UN
Thorvald Stoltenberg is to Bosnia.
UN envoy to Bosnia.
Bosnian Government refuses to

Bosnian cooperate with either Akashi
to cooperate Akashi or
Stoltenberg, blaming on UN
fall of Srebrenica on
blaming the fall UN inaction.
inaction.
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb forces launch a major attack
attack on the UN-declared
on the UN-declared safe area of
safe area
Zepa.
18
18 July Bosnian Serb forces press attack
Bosnian on Zepa with
attack on with tanks and artillery, while
and artillery, while
Bosnian Government troops disarm UN
Bosnian UN Ukrainian
Ukrainian troops, hoping
hoping toto use
use
them as hostages the Serbs. Serb atrocities associated
hostages against the associated with
with their cap
cap-
ture and Srebrenica eventually bring worldwide
ture of Zepa and worldwide condemnation.
19 July
19 Croatian Serb troops and their rebel Muslim allies
allies open concerted attack on
Bosnian positions in the
Bosnian Government positions the northwestern Bihac
Bihac enclave. The
The
number of refugees arriving in Tuzla
refugees arriving eastern Bosnia
Tuzla from eastern reaches 29,000
Bosnia reaches
with 13,000 still missing.
21 July
21 officials from
Senior officials from Contact Group and UN
Group and UN troop contributor
contributor nations meet
meet
London to try
in London save the UN
to save
try to UN mission Bosnia.
mission in Bosnia.
22 July Croatian President Tudjman,

Tudjman, Bosnian
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, and Federation
Izetbegovic, and
leader Zubak sign the Split Agreement for Croatia
the Split Croatia to provide Bosnia
to provide Bosnia-
military assistance
Herzegovina urgent military
Herzegovina assistance against the offensive in
the Serb offensive in Bihac.
Bihac.
25
25 July Croatian Army and Bosnian Croat forces begin an
and Bosnian an offensive the Livno
offensive in the
Valley Bosnia against the
Valley of western Bosnia the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs.
Krajina Serb leader Martic, Bosnian Serb General Mladic,

Martic, Bosnian and Bosnian
Mladic, and Bosnian
Serb leader Karadzic are
Karadzic are indicted by the
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Criminal Tribunal for
the Former
the Former Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
26 July The US Senate

Senate votes
votes to
to lift the
the arms the Bosnian
arms embargo against the Bosnian
Government.
38
38

4 August
August Bosnian Serb "President"
Bosnian “President” Radovan
Radovan Karadzic
Karadzic replaces General Ratko
Ratko
the Bosnian
Mladic as Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army
Army. .
Croatian forces launch an attack the Serb-occupied UN

attack against the UN Sectors
North and
North Croatia. .
and South in Croatia
55 August
August Croatian Army forces capture
capture the Krajina “capital” of Knin.
Krajina Serb "capital"
7 August
August Croatian Defense Minister announces that all military
Minister Susak announces military operations in
in
Sectors North and South are finished.
North and finished .
11 August
11 August Bosnian Serb "President"
Bosnian “President” Karadzic reinstates General Mladic as top
Karadzic reinstates top mili
mili-
tary
tary leader.
leader.
Clinton vetoes
President Clinton Senate bill lifting arms
vetoes Senate arms embargo, orders new
exploratory mission.
14 August
14 August United States
United States sends headed by US Assistant Secretary of State
sends a delegation headed State
Holbrooke on
Holbrooke on a tour of Balkan
Balkan capitals.
Bosnian Serbs begin a new wave of mass

Bosnian and Muslims
mass expulsions of Croats and Muslims
Banja Luka.
from Banja Luka.
15 August
15 August A headed by Richard
A delegation of envoys headed Holbrooke press
Richard Holbrooke peace initi
press new peace initi-
atives at a meeting in Split,
atives Split, Croatia Foreign Minister
Croatia with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic
Granic
and Bosnian
and Foreign Minister
Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey.
16 August
16 August Holbrooke meet with
Holbrooke and other envoys meet Croatian President Tudjman
with Croatian Tudjman to
the US initiative.
discuss the Tudjman says
initiative. Tudjman he will
says he will cooperate.
cooperate.
17 August
17 August US envoy Holbrooke
Holbrooke meetsmeets with Serbian President Milosevic to
to present
present the
the
US peace initiative. . Milosevic supports the plan.
peace initiative
19 August
19 August Council criticizes
The Security Council criticizes Croatia and Bosnia for blocking
and Bosnia blocking deployment
of the
the Rapid
Rapid Reaction
Reaction Force.
Force.
23
23 August
August Seventy-two Ukrainian UN
Seventy-two Ukrainian UN peacekeepers withdraw from
peacekeepers withdraw from the
the eastern
eastern
Bosnian Gorazde. .
Bosnian enclave of Gorazde
A Bosnian Serb artillery round kills

A Bosnian 37 civilians
kills 37 civilians and wounds 85 others near
85 others
the Merkale market in Sarajevo
the Merkale Sarajevo..
NATO against Bosnian

NATO forces begin airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets
targets near
near Sarajevo,
Mostar, Tuzla, Pale, and
Mostar, Tuzla, and Gorazde.
39

30 August
August Bosnian Serbs reluctantly give Serbian President Milosevic authority to
Bosnian to
negotiate for
for them.
them.
14
14 September NATO suspends bombing after Bosnian
NATO suspends Bosnian Serbs agree
agree to
to move heavy weap
weap-
ons away from Sarajevo.
15
15 September Croatian offensive
Croatian with Bosnian
offensive with wins back 4,000 square
Bosnian Army wins square kilometers
kilometers
tens of thousands of Serbs flee.
of territory; tens flee.
55 October Clinton announces breakthrough in

President Clinton Holbrooke talks; prospect of
in Holbrooke
fighting for last-minute land grabs.
cease-fire spurs fighting
cease-fire
14
14 October Frontline meetings of military
Frontline military commanders end most cease-fire
cease-fire breaches
breaches in
in
northwest Bosnia.
Bosnia.
12 November
12 November Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia,
Alija Izetbegovic Bosnia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia,
Franjo Tudjman Croatia, and
and
Slobodan
Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia
Serbia meet
meet at Wright-Patterson
Wright-Patterson Air
Air Force
Force Base in
in
Dayton,
Dayton, Ohio,
Ohio, for open-ended peace
peace talks.
40

Section
Section II
Introduction
Introduction
Slovenia
Slovenia 1990-1991
1990-1991
41
41
Digitize-d by O gle Origir1al from

Chapter
Chapter 1 result of regional
regional economic differences, had torn gaps
economic differences,
Anarchy:
Loosed Anarchy: the federal
in the fabric, primarily between
federal fabric, between thethe northwest
northwest-
The Origins the Balkan
Origins of the Conflict
Balkan Conflict Republics of Slovenia
ern Republics Croatia and the
Slovenia and Croatia the federal
federal
capital in
capital in Belgrade.
Belgrade. As early
early as the I1960s,
as the 960s, the Slov
the Slov-
Things
Things fall
fall apart;
apart; the
the centre cannot
cannot hold enes and Croats
Croats began objecting
objecting to what
what they
they per
per-
Mere anarchy
Mere loosed upon
anarchy is loosed the world
upon the ceived as Serb
ceived domination of the
Serb domination the federal
federal
The blood-dimmed
The loosed, and
blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and governmental
governmental systemsystem.2 .' This resentment was was aggra
aggra-
everywhere
everywhere vated by
by the
the fact that their
their comparatively
comparatively prosperous
prosperous
The
The ceremony
ceremony ofof innocence
innocence is drowned
drowned republics were making
republics making disproportionately
disproportionately large contri-
contri
lack all conviction,
The best lack
The while the
conviction , while the worst
worst butions to the
butions the federal
federal budget while receiving
budget while receiving compar-
compar
Are full of
full of passionate
passionate intensity
intensity . ..
. . atively little in
atively little in return.
return .
W. B. Yeats,
W. B. The Second
Yeats, The Coming
Second Coming In an effort to mollify
an effort mollify the
the discontented republics while
discontented republics
still preserving
preserving the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state, 1974 Yugoslav
the 1974
state, the
When a nation
When dies, its passing
nation dies, ought to be marked
passing ought marked byby Constitution—crafted while the
Constitution-crafted the Socialist Republic’s
Republic's
a signal
signal event-the
event—the abdication of a monarch,
abdication monarch, the
the sign-
sign creator, Josip Broz Tito.
creator, Tito, was still alive-massively
alive—massively
ing the lowering of a flag
ing of a treaty, at least the flag.. No such restructured
restructured the governmental system and devolved
the governmental devolved
ceremony
ceremony signaled the end of the
signaled the the 45-year-old
45-year-old Socialist tremendous authority from the
tremendous authority federal government
the federal government to
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Federal though its death sen-
Yugoslavia, though sen the republics. The
the republics. The new document created a federation
new document federation
tence was pronounced
pronounced in Slovenia's
Slovenia’s declaration
declaration of six constituent
of six constituent republics
republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia
(Slovenia, Croatia,
independence in June 1991.
independence 1991. By mid-July,, all
By mid-July all efforts
efforts to and Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Mace
Serbia, Montenegro, Mace-
save the nation had failed;
the nation failed; but, long
long after the
the demise
demise donia), , and two
donia) two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and
autonomous provinces,
of the Yugoslav Government,
the Yugoslav Government. the the country's
country’s death Vojvodina, which were
Vojvodina, were semi-independent
semi-independent but never never-
shook all
spasms shook all of Croatia
Croatia and later Bosnia with with theless integral Serbia. Each
integral parts of Serbia. republic and
Each republic
more than four years of violence,
violence, cruelty,
cruelty, and blood-
blood province was
province was represented by by one person in an an eight-
eight
shed. member collective
member collective presidency
presidency.3.3 The
The 1974 Constitution
1974 Constitution
also specified
also specified a system whereby Tito’s death)
whereby (after Tito's
The Yugoslav catastrophe that burst
Yugoslav catastrophe burst on the
the periphery
periphery the President would pass annually
the title of President from one
annually from
of Europe
Europe during
during the summer of 1991
the summer may have
1991 may have member of the
member collective presidency
the collective presidency to the next in
to the in a
occurrence, , but it had been a long
seemed a sudden occurrence long preset sequence
sequence..
time
time coming.
coming. A
A long powder train of ethnic
long powder differ
ethnic differ-
economic inequities,
ences, economic inequities , and faltering
faltering political In the
the end, the
the rewired
rewired governmental proved to
governmental system proved
arrangements had been smoldering
arrangements Decades
smoldering for years. Decades be no
no more
more than a pacemaker
pacemaker for the the Yugoslav
of effort
effort had forestalled
forestalled the explosion, , and, while
the explosion nation—it could
nation-it prolong its life but not stave off death
could prolong
some sought desperately-at
desperately—at least at at the end—to cool
the end-to cool indefinitely. Indeed,
indefinitely. many were
Indeed, many were surprised
surprised that the
that the
the volatile
the volatile elements that could could blow Yugoslavia elaborate system actually
elaborate actually worked Tito’s
all after Tito's
worked at all
were just
apart, others were just as consciously
consciously stirring the very
stirring the very 1980. But the
death in 1980. convoluted wiring harness of
the convoluted
ingredients that made the
ingredients mix unstable
the mix unstable and its federal and confederal
federal confederal arrangements,
arrangements, with
with a total
total of
*
detonation certain
detonation certain.l. 1 • nine semicompeting
nine governments, was
semicompeting governments, blueprinted for
was blueprinted
confusion and eventual
confusion eventual deadlock
deadlock. . The
The 1974
1974 Constitu
Constitu-
The Yugoslav political system had been redesigned
The redesigned tion had inked
tion differences amongst
inked over differences amongst thethe various
various
over for decades but was
and patched over was finally tearing
tearing
the seams. Political strains
apart at the strains,, some of them the
the
'
· Numbered endnotes
endnotes follow each Section.
follow each
43

republics ethnicities, but in no way
republics and ethnicities. way resolved
resolved their Communist
Communist Party chief, Slobodan
Party chief, Slobodan Milosevic, paid paid aa
fundamental
fundamental differences.
differences. visit to Kosovo Polje ("the
visit (“the Field of Blackbirds”),
Blackbirds"), the
battlefield marked the defeat of the
battlefield site that marked the medieval
medieval
The new constitutional
constitutional system not only failed failed to cure Serbs by by the Turks and the beginningbeginning of centuries
centuries of
the governmental
governmental ills of the 1960s I 960s but also came under Ottoman
Ottoman rule in in the region. In a
the region. classic Balkan
a classic Balkan para
para-
even greater stresses during 1970s and 1980s.
during the 1970s 1980s. dox, by 1987
dox, 1987 this
this most
most central of all Serb historical
all Serb historical
Political differences
differences among the republics
republics continued
continued to to sites lay
lay outside
outside thethe modern
modern Serbian heartland . No
Serbian heartland.
widen.
widen. and economic difficulties further
economic difficulties further aggravated more than 10 JOpercent of Kosovo Province’sProvince's people
people
internal
internal tensions. Each segment of the population
tensions. Each population Serbs; the rest were
were Serbs; were ethnic Albanians, who
ethnic Albanians, who
could be content enough during
could during the
the expanding
expanding years endured not only lowest average income
only the lowest income of any
of the 1970s,
1970s, when the the economic
economic pie was growing growing and Yugoslav
Yugoslav ethnic group group but also had suffered
suffered virtual
virtual
satisfied with
most were at least satisfied with the
the slice
slice they had. disenfranchisement in a Serbian-run
disenfranchisement Serbian-run police state that
police state
This changed in in the
the 1980s as unemployment
unemployment rose, pro pro- increasingly harsh. As
grew increasingly As the Albanians’
Albanians' discontent
discontent
duction fell.
duction fell, foreign inflation
foreign debts escalated, and inflation with
with this state affairs increased,
state of affairs increased, the
the resulting
resulting siege
chronic.44 Interrepublic
became chronic. lnterrepublic squabbling
squabbling over each mentality among the dominant
mentality dominant but vastly outnum
vastly outnum-
area’s fair share of the tax burden and federal
area's federal outlays
outlays bered Kosovo Serbs Serbs was tinder waiting for a spark.
tinder waiting spark.
grew
grew increasingly acrimonious, and many
increasingly acrimonious. many individuals
individuals struck it. In an
Milosevic struck an apparently unscheduled
apparently unscheduled
throughout
throughout Yugoslavia could could easily
easily be
be persuaded that address to to an unruly mob
an unruly mob of Kosovo Serbs,Serbs, Milosevic
own personal
their own personal woeswoes were the faultfault of another eth-eth told them,
told “No one should
them . "No should dare to to beat you!” "Niko
you!" ((“Niko
nic
nic group's duplicity and unfair
group’s duplicity unfair advantages. ne sme da vas vas bije. ") It was
bije! 1 ”) become a rallying cry
was to become cry
for the entire SerbSerb nation.
nation.
By the late 1980s, the failures
failures within the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
evident, and Communism
system were all too evident, Communism was was Two years later, on 28 June l989—the
1989-the 600th anniver
anniver-
rapidly
rapidly losing credibility as a political and ideological
losing credibility ideological sary to the battle-a million Serbs
the day of the epic battle—a Serbs
motivator.5 The
motivator.' country’s politi
The shrewdest of the country's politi- upon that same battlefield
turned out upon battlefield to hear
cians—most significantly,
cians-most Slobodan Milosevic in
significantly, Slobodan Ser
in Ser- Milosevic, by
by then the undisputed the new
icon of the
undisputed icon new
Tudjman in
bia and Franjo Tudjman Croatia—correctly foresaw
in Croatia-correctly foresaw Serb nationalism, speak.. And speak he did:
nationalism, speak did:
in the
the corresponding nationalism a new
corresponding rise of ethnic nationalism new
force that could
political force could replace it.it. Very
Very calculatingly,
calculatingly, Six centuries
Six later, again
centuries later, we are
again we are in battles and
in battles and
harnessing this ill wind for their own
they set about harnessing own quarrels.
quarrels. They
They are armed battles,
are not armed battles, though
though
political gains. They knew knew well the potential hurricane
potential hurricane such
such things
things should
should not be excluded
excluded yetfi
yet. 6
force of the
force whistling up:
the wind they were whistling up: ethnic
nationalism had been a forbidden
nationalism forbidden topic
topic inin Yugoslavia Milosevic’s words
Milosevic's words cannot strictly described as
strictly be described as pro
pro-
four decades precisely
for four precisely because its very discussion
very discussion phetic, he was
phetic. for he was not merely herald of things
merely the herald things to
cohesion of the Yugoslav
threatened the cohesion state. . When
Yugoslav state come but also their primary
primary composer
composer and arranger.
individuals stirred their virulent
these individuals viiulent strain of ethnic The chain
The chain of events setset in motion in Kosovo in
in motion in 1987
1987
hypernationalism
hypemationalism into the already volatile
into volatile mix
mix of eco-eco 1989 was
and 1989 was to have consequences
consequences greater and far far-
nomic dissatisfaction
nomic dissatisfaction and political unrest, they created ranging than probably
ther ranging probably even Milosevic imagined
imagined
witches’ brew
a witches· brew that could
could not fail to boil over the the Bal
Bal- time.. Within three years the rising
at the time rising tide of Serb
kan cauldron. Although there were
cauldron. Although forces capa-
were many forces capa— nationalism was to
nationalism from Kosovo Polje to the
to spread from
ble of tearing thethe country
country apart, more than any other streets of Belgrade,
Belgrade, to the self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed SerbSerb auton
auton-
single
single factor nationalism, and
factor was the rise of ethnic nationalism, omous regions
omous regions of Croatia, rings of artillery
Croatia, to the rings artillery
specifically nationalism, that brought
specifically Serb nationalism. brought about the pieces shelling the Bosnian
shelling the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. It
capital of Sarajevo. It was
was
death of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. to
to prompt counterrhetoric and equally
prompt counterrhetoric equally emotional
emotional
Yugoslavia's other ethnic
responses by Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups-most
groups—most
The beginning difficult
beginning of the end for Yugoslavia is as difficult
pinpoint as its ultimate
to pinpoint April 1987 is
ultimate demise, but 24 April is
as good a date as any. OnOn that day the young
young Serbian
Serbian
44

notably. Tudjman's
notably, Tudjman’s Croats-as
Croats—as each action
action begat an On 15 May 1991
On 15 1991 the
the creakily
creakily rotating
rotating Federal
Federal Presi
Presi-
equal and opposite
opposite reaction. When Slobodan
reaction. When Slobodan dency system broke
dency broke down
down completely
completely when
when Serbia
Serbia
the wind of Serb
sowed the
Milosevic sowed ethnic nationalism,
Serb ethnic nationalism. blocked the scheduled
blocked the rotation of Stipe
scheduled rotation Stipe Mesic (the
he unleashed a whirlwind of forces
forces that
that would ulti
ulti- Croatian representative)
Croatian representative) to
to the
the Presidency.
Presidency. Not only
only
mately encompass Yugoslavia's
encompass Yugoslavia’s destruction.
destruction. did this create aa fissure
did fissure between
between the
the Croats
Croats and Serbs
Serbs
their respective
and their respective republics,
republics, but itit also
also effectively
effectively
Contributing
Contributing to the highly charged setting of the
the highly the pushed the
pushed the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state into political crisis
state into crisis without
without
intensified rapidly
1980s, debates intensified rapidly toward the end of
toward the an executive
an executive branch.
branch. Nor were
were thethe federal
federal govem
govern-
the
the decade over whether
whether to allow the individual Yugo-
the individual Yugo ment's problems confined
ment’s problems confined to thethe executive.
executive. The
The legis
legis-
slav republics
republics to holdhold multiparty elections, develop
multiparty elections, develop effectively broken
lative arm had effectively
lative broken down
down inin January
January
Western-style
Western-style market economies, and assume
market economies, 1990 when
1990 when the the Slovenian
Slovenian delegation walked out of the
delegation walked the
increased political
increased political autonomy.
autonomy. On On the hand,
the one hand. 14th Extraordinary
14th Congress, visibly and dramatically
Extraordinary Congress, dramatically
Croatia and especially
Croatia Slovenia grew
especially Slovenia grew increasingly
increasingly marking the
marking facto death of the
the de facto the Communist
Communist PartyParty in
in
independent
independent and bold bold in their challenges to the
their challenges the federal
federal Yugoslavia. 7 For its part, the
Yugoslavia.7 the judicial branch
branch simply
simply
government on these issues. On the
government the other hand.
hand. the
the proved ineffective
proved time of governmental
during a time
ineffective during governmental cri cri-
progressively more moribund
progressively moribund and increasingly
increasingly Serb
Serb- sis. The
The Federal Constitutional Court had overturned
Federal Constitutional overturned
dominated
dominated federal
federal institutions fought these separatist
institutions fought the Slovenian
the Slovenian Assembly’s declaration of autonomy
Assembly's declaration autonomy on on
with diminishing
trends with diminishing success. The federal
success. The federal govern-
govem 14 January
14 January 1991,1991, but the pronouncement remained
the pronouncement remained aa
effective authority
ment retained effective only within the
authority only the dead letter because the the court
court had no mechanism for
no mechanism
spheres of foreign policy, the
foreign policy, economy. and defense.
the economy. enforcing its
enforcing ruling. So
its ruling. So the
the independence-minded
independence-minded
Even these domains
domains had begun begun to erode as as some of the the Republics of Slovenia
Republics Slovenia and Croatia continued to move
Croatia continued move
individual republics
individual republics undertook
undertook their own foreign
their own foreign and in direction of autonomy,
the direction
in the autonomy, and Slovenia
Slovenia crystallized
crystallized
economic
economic policies independent of—and
policies independent of-and at at times atat the
the debate over the future of the
the future the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state
state when
when
with—the federal
odds with-the federal government's.
govemment’s. The The time waswas announced that it would make
it announced make aa formal
formal declaration
declaration
fast approaching
approaching when when thethe last central bastion
bastion of the
the if its
if its secession
secession from the Federation
from the Federation on on 26 June 1991.
1991.
Federation. defense, would be challenged
Federation, challenged by by Slove
Slove-
nia’s and Croatia's
nia's Croatia’s determination
determination to establish
establish their Because of the
Because procedural convulsions
the procedural convulsions racking
racking thethe rest
own autonomous
own autonomous armed forces. forces. the Federation’s
of the central institutions,
Federation's central institutions, at at mid-1991
mid- I 99 I
the Yugoslav
the military was
Yugoslav military the last fully functioning
was the functioning
Croatia and Slovenia
While Croatia Slovenia werewere attempting to engi engi- federal
federal institution.
institution. The Presidency was
The Presidency was in in crisis,
crisis, the
the
neer their departure from from the Yugoslav federal
the Yugoslav federal system,
system. paralytic. and the
legislature paralytic,
legislature the constitutional
constitutional court
court had
the Serbian Government
the Serbian Government was focused focused on co-opting
co-opting the
the faded
faded into
into irrelevance.
irrelevance. TheThe Army was was the only instru
the only instru-
collective Federal
collective Presidency, which it accomplished
Federal Presidency, accomplished ment federal
federal authorities
authorities had left left to
to deal with
with the
the cen
cen-
by dictating the votes of Kosovo and Vojvodina and
dictating the trifugal forces
trifugal forces ripping country apart. But the
the country
ripping the the Army
securing
securing thethe cooperation Montenegro. Constitu
cooperation of Montenegro. Constitu- very blunt
was a very instrument, even for dealing
blunt instrument, dealing with
with
tional amendments railroaded
tional railroaded though
though thethe system in local armed insurrections;
local insurrections; its its leaders
leaders were
were even less less
March 1989
1989 allall but eliminated
eliminated the autonomy of Kos
the autonomy Kos- prepared to
prepared to combat amorphous political forces
combat amorphous forces of
ovo and Vojvodina,
ovo essentially giving Serbia
Vojvodina, essentially Serbia two
two democratic reform, ethnic
democratic reform, separatism, and popular
ethnic separatism, popular
additional proxy
additional proxy votes in in the Presidency. On all
the Presidency. all major
major sovereignty. For this
sovereignty. this and other reasons, the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
issues, tiny
tiny Montenegro
Montenegro proved loyal ally of Serbia,
proved a loyal Serbia, People's Army was
People’s was ill prepared and ill
ill prepared suited for the
ill suited the
providing unified bloc
providing a unified bloc of half the votes in
the votes in the
the eight
eight- challenges itit was
complex challenges
complex was about to to face.
face.
member Federal
Federal Presidency.
Presidency. At the the very
very least,
Milosevic could
could prevent the the passage of any motionmotion
that approve. With the
did not approve.
that he did support of
the support of any addi
addi-
tional member of
tional the Presidency,
of the Presidency, he could force
he could force a
decision in his
decision his favor. Yugoslavia was becoming
favor. Yugoslavia becoming
Serboslavia.
Serboslavia.
45

Chapter 2
Chapter Because the Serbs controlled
Because the an even higher fraction
controlled an fraction
“Brotherhood and Unity:”
"Brotherhood Unity:" of the command positions,
positions. with
with the other ethnic
The Yugoslav People’s Army Within
Yugoslav People's Within a Dying
Dying State
State the staff and support functions,
groups relegated to the functions. the
the
real disparity
disparity was even more pronounced."
pronounced. 11
From
From the beginning of Socialist
the very beginning Socialist Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia’s his his-
tory, the Yugoslav People's Army (lugoshwenska
Yugoslav People’s (Jugoslovenska Despite imperfect ethnic balance, the Army never
Despite its imperfect never-
Narodna Armija—JNA) formed
Narodna Armija-JNA) formed the cornerstone and itself a vital
theless considered itself integrative factor
vital integrative factor in
in the
much of the
much binding mortar of the
the binding the nation and state.
state.88 Yugoslav state,
Yugoslav the onset of nationalism
state. and the nationalism in Slove
in Slove-
The JJNA
NA viewed
viewed itself as both the protector and the
itself as the nia and Croatia
Croatia in mustering of the
particular and the mustering
in particular the
embodiment of the Socialist
Socialist Federal Republic of
Federal Republic JNA against Yugoslavia’s
JNA Yugoslavia's own own constituent republics
republics
Yugoslavia (SFRY) with
Yugoslavia with a special role in in safeguarding
safeguarding would
would leave the the Army leadership
leadership aghast. ThereThere would
would
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state identity. As such,
state and identity. such. it was a be more and greater shocks
be shocks to morale: non-Serb offic
morale: non-Serb offic-
subsociety within the larger Yugoslav
nearly isolated subsociety Yugoslav ers turning against their own
ers turning humiliating JNA
own Army, a humiliating JNA
society. More than any other entity, the JNA
society. JNA actually
actually defeat in Slovenia blockade of Army barracks
Slovenia and the blockade barracks
sought to make the slogan of Bratstvo
the Titoist slogan Bratstvo i Jedin
Jedin- in Croatia. Finally, the federally
in Croatia. federally sanctioned secession
srvo (“Brotherhood and Unity”)
stvo ("Brotherhood reality. After Tito’s
Unity'') aa reality. Tito's of Slovenia from the SFRY—and
Slovenia from SFRY-and the the official admis
admis-
death the Yugoslav People's Army was in
Yugoslav People’s in many
many ways
ways sion
sion that
that the state that for four
the state four decades had been the
the heart of a dying
the state and would
dying state would be the the last organ JNA’s very raison
JNA's d'etre was no more—would
raison d’etre more-would rip rip the
to fail.
fail. heart out of thethe force.
force. By then thethe JNA could no
JNA could
longer maintain
longer maintain even the self-delusion that it was
the self-delusion
The JNA
JNA had an voice in
important voice
an important in federal decision
decision- Yugoslavia's territorial
fighting for either Yugoslavia’s
fighting integrity or
territorial integrity
making on defense-related issues, although it tradi
making tradi- political system. Despite
its political Despite the senior
senior leadership's
leadership’s
tionally did
tionally did not take sides in
in politics se. It
politics per se. It was also
also clinging belief
clinging belief in what remained of the the “Yugoslav”
"Yugoslav"
politically conservative,
politically Army’s senior
conservative, and the Army's senior leader
leader- ideal, the time full-scale
ideal. by the full-scale warwar broke
broke out in in Croatia,
Croatia,
ship in particular
particular clung to the ideal of Federal
clung to Federal Yugo
Yugo- the JNA really did not know
JNA really know what it was fighting
fighting for.
for.
slavia long
slavia long after most others had pronounced
pronounced it dead.9
dead. 9
Most notably. Yugoslavia's last Defense Minister,
notably, Yugoslavia’s Minister,
Gen. Veljko Kadijevic—one
Gen. Kadijevic-one of the the tragic actors in in the
the The
The Yugoslav People’s Army as a Fighting
Yugoslav People's Fighting
Yugoslav drama—would
Yugoslav drama-would at the the last be crusading
crusading virtu-
virtu Force
Force
ally
ally alone to
to save the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state.
state. even asas the polit
the polit-
ical leadership he
ical he served was acting in that could
in ways that could The JJNA
NA was a capable. professional, and generally
capable, professional, generally
only carve it apart. well-equipped military
well-equipped organization, and to some
military organization,
extent it was isolated from the political
from the political and economic
economic
By law
law the JNA was supposed to mirror
the JNA the ethnic
mirror the changes shaking
shaking the country. But
the country. But it was still affected
country, but in practice the mirror
composition of the country,
composition mirror the turmoil
by the turmoil of the beginning of
1980s, and by the beginning
the 19805,
distorted reality. 10 While Serbs comprised
reality.IO comprised some 36 the l 990s the force
the 1990s was in something of a decline.
force was decline. Its
population of Yugoslavia
percent of the population Yugoslavia and Montene
Montene- budget had been declining
declining steadily, although it still still
grins less than 3 percent, Serbs and Montenegrins
Montenegrins remained the the largest federal expenditure by far. far.
together held almost 70 percent of the JNA’s officer
the JNA's officer According to one estimate, the
According JNA’s budget fell from
the JNA's from
assignments. Conversely, Croats comprised
Conversely, Croats comprised some 20 70 percent of the federal budget (7 percent of Yugo Yugo-
percent of the Yugoslav population
the Yugoslav Slovenes
population and Slovenes slav GNP)
GNP) to to 50 percent of the federal budget (4 per per-
Croats and Slovenes
another 8 percent, but Croats Slovenes combined
combined GNP) during
cent of GNP) the decade before the war.
during the war.‘212 The
held only 15 percent of the

only 15 the officer
officer slots.
slots. Serbs and JNA’s peacetime manpower
JNA's manpower had also also been reduced
Montenegrins
Montenegrins held over 60 percent of the the general over thethe years—from
years-from some 220,000 220,000 at the
the beginning
beginning
officer posts, while Croats
officer Croats and Slovenes
Slovenes combined
combined of the 1980s to some 170,000 or so at the start of the
1980s to
Macedonians, Hungarians,
held only about 20 percent. Macedonians, Hungarians. l 990s-although it was still
1990s—although still one of the
the largest armies
Muslims, and Albanians—who
Muslims. Albanians-who together totaled a in
in Europe.13
Europe. 13
quarter of the country's population—held only
country’s population-held only 10IO per
per-
cent of the officer
officer positions
positions and general officer
officer posts.
46

Organizationally.
Organizationally, the JNA‘s Ground
the JNA's Forces had been
Ground Forces was intended
was intended to
to be
be the bastion of resistance
the last bastion resistance to
to an
restructured in the the late 1980s
19805 into
into three military
military dis-
dis invader
invader. .
tricts and one combined
combined military-maritime
military-maritime district
district
(going
(going from
from six
six Soviet-style
Soviet-style armies withwith boundaries
boundaries Much of the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav military’s
military's arguably
arguably excessive
excessive
that matched the individual republics
the individual republics to the the four
four heavy weapons inventory
weapons inventory was
was either aging
aging oror outright
outright
regional
regional districts
districts thatthat crossed republic boundaries), all
republic boundaries), all obsolete (for example, T-55 and even T-34 tanks)
example, T-55 tanks) and
subordinate
subordinate to the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav General
General Staff
Staff in Belgrade.
Belgrade. might
might have been knocked knocked out in in a straight-up
straight-up fight
fight
At the
the same time transforming itself
time,. it was transforming itself from
from a against a sophisticated
sophisticated Western military force,
Western military force. but itit
division-based
division-based organization
organization to flexible corps-
to a more flexible corps was to prove
prove perfectly
perfectly adequate in in a civil war
war against
against
brigade structure. The JNA had almost
The JNA almost,, but not quite, identical
identical equipment
equipment fromfrom the
the same inventories.
inventories.
completed
completed its reorganization
reorganization by the the onset of war war in Indeed, the
Indeed. the relative sophistication of its
lack of sophistication
relative lack its equip
equip-
1991. At thethe outbreak of the conflict. the
the conflict. J NA had one
the JNA ment frequently proved an
frequently proved an advantage because it
division and 16
mechanized division
mechanized 16 corps in three military
military employed minimum of hard-to-maintain
employed a minimum hard-to-maintain or unavail unavail-
districts
districts and thethe military-maritime
military-maritime district, with
district, with more able components
components. . This simple effective equipment
simple but effective equipment
mechanized, motorized,
than 40 armored, mechanized, motorized, and infantry
infantry proved
proved to be maintainable by a nation
be maintainable nation under
under anan arms
brigades;
brigades; two additional
additional mountain
mountain brigades;
brigades: and embargo. With limited
embargo. limited spare parts,
parts , itit could
could often
often be
numerous
numerous independent
independent artillery. antitank, . antiaircraft,
artillery, antitank antiaircraft, fixed without rear-area repair
fixed without maintenance facili
repair and maintenance facili-
and engineer regiments
regiments generally
generally subordinated
subordinated at ties and stood up in the the field through four consecutive
field through consecutive
echelon.l4
corps echelon . 14 years of combat. More advancedadvanced and more more complex
complex
equipment
equipment mightmight have given
given out much much earlier
earlier under
under
The JNA was adequately equipped
The JNA equipped in almost all cate-cate similar circumstances.
similar Moreover, even 40-
circumstances. Moreover, 40- or
or 50-year
50-year-
gories
gories, , and well outfitted some, notably
outfitted in some. artillery. It
notably artillery. It old weapons
old weapons such as T-34 T-34 tanks and ZIS-3 ZIS-3 field
field guns
was armed withwith a mix
mix of Soviet-pattern
Soviet-pattem weapons.
weapons. remained adequate for the
remained roles they were
the roles were used in in
Westem-manufactured
some Western-manufactured (including artillery
items (including artillery (bunker
(bunker busting.
busting, shelling
shelling from
from static positions
positions, ,
and radars), and domestically
domestically produced items of all
produced items all assaults on infantry
infantry lacking weapons), allow
lacking antitank weapons), allow-
types
types.. In general, the Army’s equipment
the Army's equipment waswas not thethe ing the more
ing the more modern weapons in
modem weapons in the
the inventory
inventory to to be
be
modern, but it was rugged.
most modem, serviceable, and
rugged, serviceable, elsewhere or for other tasks.
used elsewhere tasks .
dependable.
Yugoslavia had developed

Yugoslavia developed a fairly robust domesticdomestic The Territorial
The TerritorialDefense Concept
Defense Concept
arms industry-part Tito’s legacy
industry—part of Tito's legacy of political and
military self-sufficiency—capable of producing
military self-sufficiency-capable producing The "Territorial
The “Territorial Defense”
Defense" was intended to be the
was intended the com
com-
license-manufactured
license-manufactured Soviet-pattern
Soviet-pattem weapons
weapons and plement
plement of thethe JNA
JNA within the the bipartite
bipartite Yugoslav
Yugoslav
other weapons
weapons of indigenous
indigenous design. Most of the the national defense concept.”
national origins of Yugosla
The origins
concept. 15 The Yugosla-
JNA’s major
JNA's major weapon
weapon systems-tanks. artillery. MiG
systems—tanks, artillery. MiG- via’s Territorial
via's Territorial Defense
Defense laylay in
in the August 1968
the August 1968 Soviet
Soviet
21 MiG-29 fighters,
21 and MiG-29 surface-to-air missiles
fighters, surface-to-air missiles and invasion Czechoslovakia and Tito’s
invasion of Czechoslovakia Tito's subsequent
radars,, naval surface combatants, and so on-were
radars on—were fears that similar fate could
that a similar could befall
befall his nation. Tito’s
his nation. Tito ·s
Soviet imports
either direct Soviet imports or license-produced
license-produced vari- vari concerns led
concerns led directly
directly toto a major restructuring of the
major restructuring the
ants Soviet designs
ants of Soviet The Yugoslav
designs. . The Yugoslav defense industry.
industry, military and its underlying
Yugoslav military underlying defense concept.
concept.
however, was able to both design and produce
however, wide
produce a wide Concerned that
Concerned that his
his standing military could
standing military could be rapidly
rapidly
variety of other weapons.
weapons, including APCs and infantry
including APCs infantry crushed by by the
the numerically
numerically superior Soviet forces,
superior Soviet forces.
fighting vehicles, light
fighting vehicles, light subsonic aircraft, mul-
subsonic combat aircraft, mul Tito elected to establish
establish a two-tier
two-tier military
military structure
tiple rocket launchers, antitank rockets
rocket launchers, rockets, , antiaircraft
antiaircraft that included
that included both the JNA
both the JNA and a sustainable
sustainable “all
"all-
guns, and assorted smallsmall arms. Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia’s ·s defense people’s·s army"
people called the
army” called Territorial Defense
the Territorial Defense
plants were scattered throughout
throughout the country, , but a
the country a (Teritorijalna Odbrana—TO).
(Teritorijalna Odbrana-TO).
fraction of the
disproportionately large fraction
disproportionately indus
the defense indus-
Bosnia and Herzegovina
tries was located in Bosnia Herzegovina, , which
47

Under the new Yugoslav defense philosophy,
Yugoslav defense philosophy, the JNA JNA J NA’s Spring
The JNA's 1990 Efforts
Spring 1990 To Disable the
Efforts To the
remained the national armed
remained armed force: anan active-duty, con
active-duty . con- Territorial Defense
Slovenian Territorial Defense
military under centralized control from
ventional military from Bel
Bel-
grade.
grade. Itlt retained armor, mechanized fighting
retained all of the armor. fighting JNA’s first efforts to disable Slovenia's
The JNA's Slovenia’s defense
defense
vehicles, and heavy artillery. Its mission was to chal- chal by confiscating its republic-level
republic-level weapons came on
lenge any invasion and delay the enemy advance advance long 17 May 1990. The
17 The Army had selected the date
selected the date care
care-
enough for for the Territorial
Territorial Defense to mobilize
mobilize. . The TO,T0, fully
fully. . First 15 May the
First, , on 15 the leadership of the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
decentralized command structure
conversely, had a decentralized structure that
that Presidency was due to to shift from
from the Slovenian
Slovenian repre
repre-
could not be wiped out in a single blow blow and was essen-
essen sentative. Janez Dmovsek,
sentative, Janez Dmovsek, to to the Serbian one. Borisav
Borisav
tially
tially under the command of each each republic's
republic’s political
political Jovic, who took office
Jovic. office on 16 May . Jovic may have
16 May.
authorities. . The territorial defense
authorities defense system
system (much like like been the only member of the Presidency who
been who was
that Switzerland and Austria)
that employed in Switzerland Austria) relied upon informed of the JNA’s
fully informed Conveniently, the
JNA's plans. Conveniently.
military training for the entire male popu-
countrywide military popu elected Slovenian
recently elected Slovenian republic government did
lation and massive stockpiles of small arms, caches caches of office until
not take office 17 May and had been
until 17 seated for
been seated
mortars,. and vast quantities
light weapons such as mortars quantities of only a few hours of its first
only the confiscations
first day when the confiscations
ammunition. . The TO"s
ammunition TO’s military
military mission
mission was to mount a began
began.lg . 19
protracted, partisan-type war against
protracted, partisan-type against any invasion force
even if
even if much of the country was occupied. The real It is unclear to what extent
extent the
the entire eight -member
eight-member
objective of the TO, TO, however
however, , was to deter
deter invasion
invasion in Federal Presidency approved the JNA JNA operation to
the first
first place by making an invasion potentially so so confiscate the
confiscate TO inventories. Borisav
the TO Jovic’s' s diary
Borisav Jovic
would be deemed
costly that it would deemed more expensive than it indicates that
that there
there was a Presidency meeting on 16 16
was worth.“5
worth. 1" May to discuss “the "the situation in the country" and that that
the Presidency members adopted some sort of resolu
members adopted resolu-
The T0 was (in manpower terms) much larger than
The TO than Slovenian representative
tions over Slovenian representative Drnovsek’s
Drnovsek's objec- objec
the standing Army and could theoretically call upon
standing Army The following
tions. The following day.day, Jovic states
states that, “Formally,.
that, "Formally
some 1.2 million soldiers Yugoslavia
1.2 million -wide. 17 The
Yugoslavia-wide.l7 T0
The TO this was done by the the head of the General Staff Staff, , but it
inventories, however, were much smaller and much was actually under our order. Extreme reaction by the
cheaper.
cheaper, consisting almost entirely of small arms.arms, gre-
gre Croatians, but they have no recourse.”
Slovenians and Croatians. recourse."
launchers, and mortars. According
nade and rocket launchers.
nade According to Jovic’s diary entry from 21
Jovic's 21 May refers explicitly
explicitly to
one estimate, TO had a fully mobilized
estimate, the TO mobilized strength
strength of Slovenian Republic President Milan Kucan
Slovenian Republic Kucan and
that of the regular Army but was
five times that
four to five Dmovsek meeting himself
Dmovsek himself and Defense MinisterMinister
only about
funded at only about one-twelfth of its annual Kadijevic.
Kadijevic. He He says they met to to discuss thethe completed
budge1.
budget.'81x Slovenian TO weapons, "based
seizure of the Slovenian “based on the
Presidency decision that the weapons be seized from
that the from
Although the
Although Territorial Defense was intended to
the Territorial defenses and placed under
all republican territorial defenses
serve alongside and reinforce the federal Army.
serve Army, it was JNA control."
JNA control.”20 Dmovsek, on the other hand,
211Drnovsek, hand , later
becoming increasingly clear by the the end of the 1980s
19805 maintained that been told nothing of the JNA
that he had been JNA
that TO units were now semiautonomous military
that military plan and thatthat only
only Jovic knew about it. it. As
As Drnovsek
Drnovsek
the republics and were instead “My term expired on 15 17 May this
it,
forces answering to the instead put it. "My 15 May.

May. On 17
becoming threats to the the JNA.
JNA. At point. the Army
At this point, disarmament was done
disarmament They had waited for
done.. They for my term
began drafting plans to neutralize
leadership secretly began to expire informed about it and, for
expire. . Only Jovic was informed for
it
these hostile, rival

these potentially hostile. (specifically,
rival militaries (specifically. the Presidency. it was a fait accompli.
accompli. TheyThey never
it
Croatia) lest they be used against

in Slovenia and Croatia) against the voted on it."it?“21 The
The Federal Presidency probably
JNA in any future rebellion. In retrospect.
JNA JNA’s
retrospect, the JNA's adopted some sort of resolution on 16
adopted May, but Jovic
16 May, Jovic
move to disable the
the Slovenian
Slovenian and Croatian territorial likely left it vaguely worded and probably intended to
likely
it
seen as a turning point—one

defenses can be seen
defenses point-one of of the
many markers pointing down the the road to war.
48
48

use it
it as an justification for the
an ex post facto justification the confisca-
confisca few minutes,
few which stated that I
minutes, which I prohibited
prohibited the
the
tions. Jovic
tions. Jovic and the JNA General
the JNA General Staff
Staff undoubtedly
undoubtedly handing over
handing over of weapons and
of weapons and sent the telegram
the telegram
assumed that Drnovsek would not have knowingly
that Drnovsek off to
ofi' to the municipal bodies.”
the municipal bodies. 23
supported
supported the the disarming
disarming of his own
own republic's
republic’s Territo-
Territo
Defense, and most likely kept both him
rial Defense,
rial him and Thanks the new
largely to the
Thanks largely new leadership’s
leadership's prompt actions,
prompt actions,
Croatian
Croatian Presidency
Presidency member StipeStipe Mesic in in the
the dark the JJNA
the NA managed only about 60 percent of the
managed to seize only the
regarding
regarding the timing and nature of the
the timing JNA
the JNA Slovenian Territorial Defense
Slovenian Territorial Defense inventory.
inventory. Jansa indi
Jansa indi-
confiscation plans.
confiscation plans. cates that the
the Slovenian TO managed to retain
Slovenian TO retain all
all of
weapons from
its weapons from 1212 municipal
municipal headquarters and part
Naturally
Naturally enough,
enough, the
the new
new Slovenian
Slovenian republic leader-
republic leader of the
the inventory
inventory of a 13th,
13th, although
although he he does not spec
spec-
ship in Ljubljana had not been informed
informed atat all of the
the ify the
the total number
number of municipal depots
municipal depots.“ .24 The
The Slove-
Slove
JNA’s
JNA's plans Indeed, it first
plans.. Indeed, first learned
learned of the
the confisca-
confisca nian TO refused to to hand over any more weapons, and
more weapons,
tions
tions not through
through military from municipal
reports but from
military reports municipal President Kucan summoned
President summoned additional police to guard
additional police guard
authorities across the
authorities the republic, who began reporting
republic, who reporting the remaining
the remaining weapons stores. 25 2"
weapons stores.25 2728
26 27 28
that Army soldiers

soldiers had arrived
arrived and taken the TO
the TO
weapons
weapons away to to unknown
unknown locations. Slovenian Presi
locations. Slovenian Presi- Through efforts to seize Ljubljana’s
Through its efforts Ljubljana's military
dent Milan Kucan claimed
claimed to have heard of the the stocks, the JNA
stocks, JNA had damaged but by by no means cripcrip-
confiscations only
impending confiscations
impending informally and began
only informally pled the
pled the Slovenian TO’s ability to oppose
Slovenian TO's oppose thethe federal
federal
investigating when
investigating when he first got alarmed calls
he first from
calls from military. It had at the
military. the same time
time galvanized
galvanized thethe little
little
puzzled town mayors:
puzzled town mayors: republic and spurred its new
republic leadership into
new leadership into earnest
preparations for the
preparations very resistance the
the very JNA had
the JNA
. . . I
... I immediately
immediately tried to find General Hocevar,
to find Hocevar, sought to prevent.
prevent.
the
the commander
commander of of the
the Slovene
Slovene TO.
TO. He said they
were replacing
were the WWII
replacing the WW II arms with new ones. II
arms with Chapter 3
Chapter
was satisfied. I
was satisfied. I had
had no reason
reason to disbelieve
disbelieve him.
him. Slovenia: Background to War
Background to War
But thethe next morning
morning messages came in in from
from
many municipalities
municipalities that this
this was
was not
not at all what
what When,
When, in January 1992,
in January Slovenia was
1992, Slovenia was welcomed
welcomed into
into
was happening-that
was happening—that all arms arms had to to be handed
handed the
the European Community (EC)
European Community (EC) asas an
an independent
independent
in. I
in. I called General Hocevar again. again. He told
told me
me nation,
nation, it appeared to have sprung,
sprung, like Athena from
like Athena from
that he had had been ordered
ordered to the arms
to move the arms from
from Zeus, full-grown from
Zeus, from Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia. . It was
was not so.
so. The
The
the had an order from
stores, that he had
the TO stores, from groundwork for Slovenia's
groundwork Slovenia’s independence
independence bid bid had been
Belgrade to conceal
Belgrade conceal this from the the Slovene
Slovene months and years before,
laid months
laid in a series of carefully
before, in carefully
leadership.”
leadership. 22 chosen political, economic, and military
political, economic, military steps that
culminate in
would culminate in a sharp struggle that was
struggle that to last
was to
Slovenian Defense
Slovenian Defense Minister Jansa similar
Jansa had a similar less than two
two weeks.
weeks.
recounting of events that day:
recounting
Of vital
Of vital importance
importance to Slovenia’s
Slovenia's independence
independence prepaprepa-
During the
the meeting of the
meeting of Assembly on 17 May
the Assembly rations and eventual secession effort
rations effort was the fact
was the fact that
I/990, government, II
it,
990, where
where wewe elected the
the new government, it, unlike all the
unlike all the other Yugoslav republics, was
Yugoslav republics, ethni
was ethni-
received a telephone
received telephone call from municipal
from some municipal- cally
cally homogeneous.
homogeneous. Of Of the
the little
little republic’s
republic's population
population
mayors, who
ity mayors, who reported
reported toto me the Army
me that the of just under 2 million,
just under million, over
over 90 percent were were ethnic
ethnic
2
was
was driving the weapons of
the weapons of the T0 away
the TO away from Slovenes. This meant that
Slovenes. that Slovenia could prepare for
Slovenia could
municipal storehouses
the municipal storehouses to unknown locations independence without
independence without the rending internal
the rending internal problems
problems
... I telephoned
. . . I for
Secretariat for
the Republic Secretariat
telephoned the that confronted
confronted Croatia's
Croatia’s and Bosnia’s efforts to
Bosnia ·s efforts to do
People
People's’s Defense the Slovenian
[i.e. the
Defense [i.e. Slovenian Defense
Defense the same. For instance,
the Croatia and Bosnia had ethni
instance, Croatia ethni-
Ministry], where II had taken
Ministry], where not one hour
over not
taken over cally territorial defenses, intelligence
mixed territorial
cally mixed intelligence services,
services.
before, and
before, through to the
and got through the former
former secretary,
secretary,
Kusar. . ...
Janko Kusar . . .We
We composed telegram in a
composed a telegram
49
49

and police forces, all of which had divided
police forces. loyalties.
divided loyalties. its annual
annual levy conscripts for their
levy of conscripts year of service
their year service in
in
Even critical was the fact that
Even more critical that both Croatia
Croatia and the federal Army.“11
federal Army.
Bosnia also had large,
Bosnia large, Serb-majority
Serb-majority districts
districts that
that
would bebe declaring autonomy from
declaring autonomy from the republics at
the republics The issue of where
The issue where Slovenian conscripts would
Slovenian conscripts
the same time that Zagreb
Zagreb and Sarajevo
Sarajevo were
were working serve—in the JNA
serve-in Slovenian TO—had
JNA or the Slovenian TO-had long long
to break away
away from
from the Yugoslav
Yugoslav central government.
government. been aa point
point of conflict
conflict between
between Ljubljana and
and
Slovenia had none of these problems.
Slovenia addition,
problems. In addition, Belgrade
Belgrade and became symbol of the entire
became aa symbol entire sover
sover-
Slovenia's
Slovenia’s ethnic uniformity meant that
ethnic uniformity that the SFRY
the SFRY eignty
eignty debate. It It had first
first become
become an issue aa full
an issue full year
year
could
could let the future Slovenian state
future Slovenian state go without
without the earlier
earlier inin March 1990.1990, when
when the Slovenian
Slovenian parliament
parliament
political problem
problem of leaving
leaving a residual Serb minority
residual Serb minority began trying
trying to to gain
gain greater control
control over
over where
where itsits
in a newly
newly foreign
foreign country.
country. conscripts would serve and pressed the federal
conscripts federal
government
government to larger percentage of Slovenia’s
to allow aa larger Slovenia's
Industrially.
Industrially, Slovenia
Slovenia was the advanced of all
the most advanced all the conscripts to remain
conscripts remain stationed
stationed in republic. The
in the republic.
Yugoslav
Yugoslav republics.
republics. In 1991, just
In 1991, before the outbreak
just before outbreak Slovenian leadership
Slovenian leadership hoped
hoped to to gradually
gradually increase
increase the
war, the average per capita income
of general war. income in Slov
Slov- percentage serving
serving atat home,
home, until
until eventually
eventually all all Slove
Slove-
$12,618. By comparison,
enia was $12,618. Croatia—the
comparison, in Croatia-the nian recruits would serve within the
nian recruits republic. At
the republic. At this
this
republic—it was $7,179,
next most advanced republic-it $7,179, and in point, however, Ljubljana had no firm
point, however, firm legal
legal founda
founda-
Serbia $4,870, well under half the
Serbia it was only $4,870, the average tion for its
tion its demands-either
demands—either under under the federal
federal Consti
Consti-
income
income in Slovenia. 29 With slightly
Slovenia.29 under IO
slightly under percent
10 percent tution
tution oror under
under thethe republic’s
republic's own laws. The Yugoslav
own laws. Yugoslav
of the population.
population, Slovenia produced 20 percent of
Slovenia produced central government made some
central government some concessions
concessions during
during
Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia’s Gross
Gross National
National Product. 30 Westward-
Product.3°Westward summer and fall of 1990,
the summer
the agreeing to increase
1990, agreeing increase the
leaning.
leaning, the Slovenes
Slovenes not only sought
sought to get out from
from percentage serving
serving inin Slovenia
Slovenia first first to 15
15 percent
percent and
and
under Belgrade's
Belgrade’s thumb but also hoped hoped for closer eco-
closer eco percent. Slovenia,
then 20 percent. Slovenia, in in turn,
turn, sent part but but not
not all
all
nomic and political ties to
nomic adjacent Austria and Italy.
to adjacent Italy. of its annual
annual conscript
conscript levy the Army
levy to the Army during
during thethe
While still a Yugoslav
Yugoslav republic, Slovenia was also
republic, Slovenia also year. The dispute
year. dispute remained unresolved. 12
remained unresolved.32
making
making overtures
overtures to the European Community at aa
European Community
time when
when the tide of West
West European
European integration
integration The debate advanced
advanced to aa newnew level
level in
in October
October 1990 1990
seemed to be flood stage.
be at flood when the Slovenian
when the Slovenian Government
Government attempted to replace replace
Air
Air and Air
Air Defense Force Col.
Defense Force Col. Gen. Ivan Hocevar,
Gen. Ivan Hocevar,
Politically, Slovenia's
Politically. Slovenia’s drive
drive for independence
independence became
became the Belgrade loyalist who
Belgrade loyalist held overall
who held command of
overall command
more or less explicit April 1990,
explicit in April when the six-party
1990. when six-party the Slovenian Territorial Defense.
Slovenian Territorial Defense. On morning of
On the morning
center-right
center-right DEMOS coalition coalition defeated the former
the former October 1990,
4 October General Hocevar
1990. General Hocevar received
received aa letter
letter
Communists to
Communists win a parliamentary
to win majority in the
parliamentary majority directing him
directing him toto hand over
over all
all responsibilities
responsibilities to to his
his
republic's first multiparty
republic’s first multiparty elections. DEMOS lost
elections. DEMOS lost no
no Slovenian-designated successor, Janez Slapar,
Slovenian-designated successor, Slapar, the
the fol—
fol-
firing a political shot across Federal
time in firing Federal Yugosla-
Yugosla lowing day.
day. During thethe rest of the day both the JNA
day both JNA
via's bow, adopting
via’s bow. adopting a parliamentary declaration in
parliamentary declaration in and the Slovenian TO
the Slovenian TO and police
police alerted some of their
alerted some their
July 1990 that
July that asserted thatthat republic laws would take
republic laws units. On the
units. On the morning October, the JNA
morning of 55 October, JNA sent aa
precedence
precedence over the federalfederal Constitution
Constitution and that that detachment of the 14th
detachment Military Police Battalion
14th Military Battalion from
from
Ljubljana would form form its ownown foreign
foreign and defense Sentvid
Sentvid barracks
barracks to the Slovenian Republic TO
the Slovenian TO head
head-
policies. onward, Slovenia's
policies. From then onward. Slovenia’s move
move toward
toward quarters on
quarters Prezihova street
on Prezihova in Ljubljana. Forewamed
street in Forewarned
independence
independence would only gather more more momentum.
momentum. In In of the
the impending
impending operation, though unable
operation, though unable to prevent
prevent
it,
September
September 1990,1990, Ljubljana asserted its control control over
over or stop it, the
the Slovenians
Slovenians had removed
removed all all personnel,
personnel,
the
the republic
republic Territorial Defense. In
Territorial Defense. In December
December 1990 1990 arms, equipment from
arms, and equipment the facility beforehand.
from the beforehand.
the
the republic held a referendum
republic held referendum on outright indepen-
outright indepen Then
Then once the JNA
once the JNA detachment
detachment had had entered thethe build
build-
dence in which an overwhelming majority
an overwhelming majority of the pop-
pop ing, Slovenians cut off electricity
ing. the Slovenians electricity and telephone
telephone
ulation voted for an
ulation "independent and sovereign
an “independent sovereign
state,” and in
state," in March 1991 1991 the
the republic refused to
republic refused to send
50
50

service
service to the
the building and besieged
besieged the federal MPs
the federal MPs supervision of its future
supervision future opponent,
opponent, thethe JNA,
JNA, the
the Slove
Slove-
inside
inside the
the building.
building. The
The Slovenians listened anxiously
Slovenians listened anxiously nian
nian Territorial Defense was
Territorial Defense was a force
force inin being,
being, and its
its
for any reports of Army movements
movements fromfrom their intelli
their intelli- roughly 60,000 troops
roughly 60,000 troops constituted
constituted a reasonably
reasonably effec
effec-
gence sources in the JNA’s 14th
the JNA's 14th and 31st Corps,
Corps, for tive infantry force for limited
infantry force limited combat roles. Jansa
combat roles. Jansa also
they were in no no way
way ready for a serious
serious confrontation
confrontation had the nucleus of an
the nucleus an officer
officer corps,
corps, a body
body of both
both
if things
things had escalated any further. Fortunately for
further. Fortunately active-duty
active-duty Territorial Defense and retired
Territorial Defense retired Slovene
Slovene ex ex-
them, the
the Army made no further
further moves
moves, , and both JNA officers
JNA officers that
that could
could serve as as the
the brains back-
brains and back
sides settled down
down for anan extended waiting
waiting game that force .36 37
bone of his force.36 37
was to last six months. In the

six months. the JNA
the end, the JNA vacated the the
building after removing
removing everything
everything of value.33
value .33 vital for Jansa,
Most vital Jansa, though,
though , was
was the
the fact
fact that,
that, like
like
most of the Yugoslav TO's,
the Yugoslav TO’s. the
the Slovenian
Slovenian TO’s
TO's higher
higher
As 1990
1990 passed intointo 1991,
1991, relations
relations between
between loyalties
loyalties already
already laylay with the local
with the local government,
government, not not
Ljubljana and Belgrade
Belgrade worsened.
worsened. The The Slovenian
Slovenian Belgrade.
Belgrade.38 38 The
The Slovenian
Slovenian TO'sTO’s particular
particular advantage
authorities
authorities learned through their
learned through their intelligence
intelligence sources
sources vis-a-vis the JNA was its
the JNA its ethnic homogeneity . Croatia
ethnic homogeneity. Croatia
that the J NA was preparing
the JNA preparing to to forcibly appropriate
appropriate especially Bosnia could
and especially could not simply
simply transform
transform
their personnel records, which
personnel records. which would have allowed allowed thethe their republic
republic TO'sTO’s into national militaries,
into national militaries, since
since etheth-
Army itself to callcall up Slovenian
Slovenian recruits.
recruits. The republic
The republic nic
nic Serbs
Serbs in in both Territorial Defenses actively
Territorial Defenses actively
responded
responded firstfirst by increasing
increasing security
security around
around the the dis
dis- opposed
opposed the the republic governments. Slovenia,
republic governments. Slovenia, on on the
the
trict headquarters and later by hiding hiding thethe records
records in in other hand,
hand, started out with with a standing military that
standing military
police
police headquarters and other locations locations kept secret was
was almost
almost wholly loyal loyal to
to the
the secessionist
secessionist
from
from thethe federal
federal authorities.
authorities. TheThe debate intensified
intensified government.
government.
once again whenwhen the
the annual
annual conscript
conscript levylevy again came
due in March 1991. 1991. This time Slovenia refused out-
Slovenia refused out The JNA’s attempt to confiscate
The JNA's confiscate the Slovenian TO’s
the Slovenian TO's
right
right to send conscripts
conscripts to serve in the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav weapons
weapons had been a tip tip of Belgrade’s
Belgrade's hand hand and
Army.
Army.34 34 Ljubljana had thrown
thrown the the gauntlet directly
directly enabled Ljubljana to
enabled to flush all of the
flush out all the Territorial
into the
the lap of the
the federal
federal government.
government.35 35 Defense officers
Defense officers whose loyalties were
whose loyalties were with
with Belgrade.
Belgrade.
The Yugoslav Army
The Yugoslav Army had intended
intended to keep tabs on the
to keep the
Slovenian
Slovenian TO through
through thethe approximately
approximately 40 activeactive-
Jansa’s Army: The Emergence of the
Jansa's the Slovenian JNA officers
duty JNA officers assigned positions within the
assigned to positions the
Territorial Defense
Territorial Defense republic’s military—many
republic's military-many in in key
key headquarters
headquarters or or
command positions . A
command positions. A smaller number of Yugoslav
smaller number Yugoslav-
As the
the debate over who who would control
control the placement
the placement oriented officers served within the
oriented officers Slovenian TO
the Slovenian TO and
Slovenian conscripts
of Slovenian conscripts waswas playing
playing out on the the politi
politi- the forcing each TO officer
the reserves. By forcing show his
officer to show his
level, Slovenian
cal level, Slovenian Defense
Defense Minster Janez Janez Jansa was
Jansa was colors—for or against the
true colors-for JNA confiscations-
the JNA confiscations—
working tirelessly
tirelessly toto build the
the Slovenian
Slovenian Territorial
Territorial the May 1990
the 1990 weapons
weapons seizures allowed Ljubljana to
seizures allowed
Defense into
Defense into an autonomous military
an autonomous military force
force capable
capable of identify exactly who
identify exactly could and could
who could could not not be trusted
challenging
challenging the JNA. Jansa-only
the JNA. Jansa—only 33 old in
33 years old during
during the
the secret process planning for
process of planning
1991—was originally a reserve
1991-was reserve sergeant whom whom thethe independence.
independence.
JNA had accused of leaking
JNA documents and tried
leaking documents tried for
espionage
espionage in 1988. Despite ((or
1988. Despite or rather because of) of) this, After the
the spring confiscations in
weapons confiscations
spring weapons in 1990,
1990,
Jansa was named Slovenian
Jansa Slovenian Defense
Defense Minister by Jansa’s objective
Jansa's objective was nothing less than to
was nothing to establish
establish aa
Prime Minister Lojze Peterle
Prime when DEMOS
Peterle when DEMOS took took “shadow” command
"shadow" structure and, indeed,
command structure indeed, an
an entire
power
power in 1990.
1990. Almost immediately,
immediately, JansaJansa set himself
set himself “shadow” army
"shadow" that left
army that the normal
left the organization of
normal organization
the task of taking
to the over the
taking over the existing Slovenian TO
existing Slovenian TO the Slovenian TO
the Slovenian TO operating
operating asas normal
normal but that
and transforming
transforming it into into the future Slovenian
the future Slovenian army.
army. bypassed any officers
bypassed loyal to Belgrade
officers loyal Belgrade and instead
instead
answered back
answered back to the Slovenian leadership.
the Slovenian leadership. The
The plan
plan
Jansa took
As Jansa took up this
this seemingly
seemingly Herculean task, he
Herculean task. he at was essentially
was essentially to establish
establish a giant,
giant. hidden
hidden pyramid
pyramid of
good starting material
least had good to work with.
material to with.
lost some of its weapons
Although it had lost weapons thethe previous
previous
spring and was
spring still subject
was still subject to the administration and
the administration
51
51

underground
underground cells.
cells. with
with each individual establishing
establishing coordination knew
coordination knew of the
of the people
people only
only toto the
contact with
with a network
network of trusted subordinates.
subordinates. The
The regional level. The
regional level. The regional
regional chiefs
chiefs mainly
mainly knew
knew
mechanism
mechanism by which this plan plan was
was carried
carried out had the
the only<~{
only chiefs, and thereafter
of the municipal chiefs, thereafter the
unlikely title of the “Maneuvering
"Maneuvering Structure
Structure of the
the selection was
selection was left
left to
to themselves.
themselves . ..... . The
The majority
majority
National Defense” (Manevrska
National Defense" (Manevrska Struktura Narodne
Struktura Narodne o,f
of key duties
duties was
was accepted
accepted by ofi‘icers
officers of the per
of the per-
Zascite-MSND).
Zascite—MSND). manent composition
composition of of the TO,
TO, who
who had had refused
refused
surrender their
to surrender their weapons
weapons .. .... There
There were
were cases
cases
The
The "Maneuvering Structure of the National
“Maneuvering Structure National Defense”
Defense" where whole municipal or regional
where the whole regional head
head-
was actually
actually anan odd and obscure
obscure Slovenian
Slovenian legal
legal quarters
quarters ofof the T0 were included,
TO were included, except
except for
for the
the
clause that
that allowed
allowed the republic to form
republic to form an ad hoc
hoc commander; who
commander. who was
was an an active
active oflicer
officer ofof the
defense structure if necessary by calling for detailees
detailees JNA
}NA and who who suspected
suspected nothing.“
nothing_.io
from
from the
the Territorial Defense, Civil Defense,
Territorial Defense, Defense, police,
police,
and even civilians. It It had never been taken very
very seri
seri- scope of the
The speed and scope the Slovenian
Slovenian accomplish—
accomplish-
ously
ously and was regarded as as something
something of a historical
historical ments are
are truly remarkable. As
truly remarkable. Interior Minister
As Interior
anomaly—a sort of World War
anomaly-a War II
II Home
Home Guard:
Guard: Bavcar described it:
Bavcar described
it:
The Army had been quietly
The Army sneering at this
quietly sneering this Slov
SlcJV- We had
We had thought
thought about
about it before
before the
the election.
election. We
We
it
enian peculiarity all the time, as those that they
enian peculiarity knew when
knew when we
we came
came to the ministry
ministry that
that we
we
sall'
saw ll'ith
with this insignia truly arouse any
truly did not arouse would not
not know
know whom
whom to to trust
trust and
and that
that we
we
re.1pect with their ancient
respect with ancient weapons
weapons andand the eld
eld- would have to build a new
have to new kind
kind of
of organization
organization
a
erly
erly structure recruits. But the
of the recruits.
structure cif the legal foun-
legal foun that would be fully under
under our command.
command. In In three
three
months we built an
mollths army of 20,000
an army 20,000 armed
armed
of
dation
dation was
was such that in in case of of necessity
necessity
anybody
anybody could be called to perform perform tasks forfor people. didn't know."
people. And the JNA didn’t knoll'.-1,
national defense, regardless
national regardless o,f of their military sta-
sta
provisions that we found,
tus, and it is in these provisions
tus, found, Slovenian forces
Slovenian forces began
began toto conduct
conduct increasing
increasing numbers
numbers
after
after precise
precise scrutiny,
scrutiny, the legallegal foundations
foundations for for of exercises drills, improving
exercises and drills. improving proficiency
proficiency and
organizing the Maneuvering
organizing Maneuvering Structure of the
Structure o,f identifying weaknesses.
identifying weaknesses. Although the the troops
troops were
were
39
National Defense
Defense ...
. . . ·14 highly motivated,
highly the exercises
motivated, the exercises revealed
revealed a fewfew serious
serious
a
weaknesses in the Slovenian
weaknesses Slovenian Territorial
Territorial Defense.
Defense.
in
Shortly
Shortly after the
the mid-May 1990 1990 weapons seizures,
weapons seizures. Command and control
Command control still
still needed improvement,
improvement. and
Jansa and Interior
Defense Minister Jansa
Defense Interior Minister Igor antiarmor
antiarmor and airair defense capabilities were
defense capabilities were extremely
extremely
Bavcar
Bavcar (with President
President Kucan's somewhat reluctant
Kucan’s somewhat reluctant limited. serious was
Perhaps most serious
limited. Perhaps lack of mobility,
was a lack mobility. a
a
a
support)
support) began using
using the "Maneuvering Structure of
“Maneuvering Structure direct consequence
direct consequence of the original territorial
the original territorial defense
defense
the National Defense“ as a legal
National Defense" mechanism by
legal mechanism by which concept. These locally raised,
concept. These partisan-warfare forces
raised, partisan-warfare forces
could covertly
they could build the
covertly build Slovenian TO
the Slovenian TO and the the had never intended for mobile
never been intended mobile warfare
warfare and had
Interior Ministry’s special
Interior Ministry's special police into a secret army,
police into army, been expected to to remain
remain in in or
or near their
their hometowns.
hometowns.
right the noses of the federal
right under the authorities.
federal authorities. In a combat
combat situation
situation where
where the Slovenian T0
the Slovenian TO was
was
a
Descending from the

Descending from the republic
republic headquarters were were 13 13 required to gain
required gain and keep the initiative
keep the this could pose
initiative this pose
regional subcommands. each of whose
regional subcommands. whose leaders were
leaders were serious problem.42
a serious problem. 41
a
handpicked Slovenian leadership.

handpicked by the Slovenian These indi
leadership. These indi-
viduals. turn, selected local
viduals, in tum. local National
National Defense
Defense leadlead-
ers in each major municipality. and so on
major municipality, on from
from there: The Other Army:
The Other Army: The
The Role
Role of the
the Slovenian
Interior Ministry Police
Interior Ministry Police Forces
Forces
In a fell'
few weeks all cif Slovenia had
of Slovenia had been covered
covered
...
. . . We introduced strict
We introduced strict security measures. All
security measures. All At the same time
At the time asas the Slovenian Territorial Defense
the Slovenian Defense
documents and
documents and messages ll'ere
were carried person
person- was building itself
was itself into an autonomous
into an fighting force,
autonomous fighting force.
ally or directly passed on by word
directly passed 1mrd of mouth.
<~{
mouth . ..... .
The conspiracy
The was complete.
conspiracy was complete. The
The republic
republic
52
52

Slovenian Ministry of Internal
the Slovenian Internal Affairs
Affairs (Ministar-
(Ministar and the
Arms and
Arms Men: Slovenian
the Men: Arms Procurement
Slovenian Arms Procurement
stvo Unutarnjih Poslova—MUP)
Poslova-MUP) was was also
also preparing
preparing Efforts
Efforts
for war. The MUP played
war. The played a variety
variety of roles
roles in
in the Slo
the Slo-
venian
venian bidbid for independence.
independence . Slovenian
Slovenian police author-
police author Between
Between the the Slovenian
Slovenian TO and its special police
special police
collected intelligence
ities collected intelligence before the war,
before the war, special
special forces, Ljubljana had available
forces, body of capable,
available a body capable,
police troops
police participated in
actively participated
troops actively combat against
in combat motivated combatants.
motivated Defense Minister Jansa
combatants. Defense Jansa and
JNA
JNA forces,
forces, and the
the regular
regular police
police played
played an impor-
impor Interior Minister Bavcar
Interior were working to prepare
Bavcar were prepare
tant role
role in establishing
establishing roadblocks
roadblocks and maintaining
maintaining with improved
them with improved skills, organization, tactics.
organization, and tactics.
order.
order. The Slovenian forces,
The Slovenian forces. however, were still seriously
however, were seriously
lacking
lacking inin one vital
vital area:
area: arms.
In the
the Yugoslav system the MUP’s
system,, the MUP's "special police"
“special police”
were intended as specially
were intended trained, heavily
specially trained, heavily armed Although the J NA confiscations
the JNA confiscations had left left the Slovenian
the Slovenian
paramilitary forces tasked
paramilitary forces tasked with VIP protection,
with VIP coun
protection, coun- short of weapons,
TO short weapons , it started off less
less badly
badly than
direct military combat
terterrorism, and direct
terterrorism, combat roles. Because
roles. Because Croatia. Ljubljana managed to
Croatia. substantial
to retain a substantial
of the Yugoslav state's tradition of professional
state’s tradition professional inter
inter- fraction of its TO
fraction TO weapons
weapons inventories
inventories and had a far far
nal
nal security
security forces, the MUP
forces, the MVP troops were generally
troops were generally smaller force
smaller force to
to equip Zagreb. As
equip than Zagreb. result, Slove
As a result, Slove-
experienced and elite soldiers
experienced soldiers and could
could bebe used as as nia appears to to have needed a Jess less substantial
substantial arms-
arms
assault infantry
infantry toto spearhead combat operations in
combat operations in buying
buying program Croatia later
program than Croatia later did, trading for
did, trading
combination
combination with with Army units. The municipal
units . The municipal police,
police, modest amounts
amounts of weapons
weapons on the the international
international marmar-
by contrast. , were
by contrast much more
were much numerous and less spe-
more numerous spe ket. Slovenian President Kucan was also hesitant to
Slovenian President to
cialized. They carried
cialized. carried out largely
largely routine
routine law
law enforce-
enforce support JJansa's
support ansa’s covert weapons procurement
covert weapons procurement program,
program,
functions in
ment functions in each city, town, or village,
city, town, handling
village, handling viewing it as expensive risky. Kucan’s
expensive and risky. Kucan's opinion
traffic robberies, acts of civil violence,
violations, robberies,
traffic violations. violence. and changed when
when thethe October
October 1990 confrontation with
1990 confrontation with
the like.
the like. the JNA at the
the JNA the Slovenian
Slovenian TOTO headquarters
headquarters in Ljubl
in Ljubl-
jana revealed
jana revealed both
both the potential for hostilities
the potential hostilities and the
the
As with the
As with Slovenian Territorial Defense,
the Slovenian the Interior
Defense , the comparative weakness
comparative weakness of thethe Slovenian
Slovenian forces.
forces .
Ministry’s preparations appear to have begun
Ministry's preparations begun at least Shortly thereafter,
Shortly thereafter, Kucan approved Jansa’s program-—
approved Jansa's program-
as early July 1990-almost
early as July 1990—almost a year before the show-
before the show knowledge
knowledge of whichwhich was restricted only five
restricted to only six
five or six
down with
down with Belgrade began. A
Belgrade began. document enti-
A secret document enti leading members of the
leading members the government.
government.
simply “25
tled simply July” outlined
"25 July" outlined the Slovenian police’s
the Slovenian police's
contingency
contingency plans plans in the
the event the J NA attempted to
the JNA to Procurement began within Slovenia
Procurement Slovenia itself with
with sly
sly
intervene in
intervene in the republic. As
the republic. As circumstances
circumstances changed,
changed, recover individual small
steps to recover seized from
small arms seized from the
the
document was
this document was modified
modified over the course of the fol
over the fol- TO inventories
TO inventories and stored in JNA garrisons
in JNA garrisons in
in the
the
lowing year. By late NovemberNovember 19901990 the Slovenian
the Slovenian republic:
republic:
authorities had also
authorities also covertly
covertly drafted plan for
drafted a plan
securing Slovenia’s
securing Slovenia's international borders with
international borders with police
police . . . .in
... the first months,
.in the months, when
when TO T0 was
was still per
per-
units . 443-~
units. mitted entry into into some storage
storage sites in the the Army
complexes,
complexes, the the TO drove away
TO drove away automatic
automatic rifles,
rifles,
Besides
Besides drafting
drafting plans,
plans, the
the MUP began training
training and hand-held mortars,
hand-held mortars, pistols,
pistols , ammunition
ammunition and,and, inin
preparing its police
preparing forces for the
police forces most likely tasks in
the most in some cases,
cases, even rocket launchers, every day,
rocket launchers, day,
the event
the war. The
of war. The training
training tempo remained high
tempo remained high under various
under various guises. The rifles
guises. The rifles were wrapped in
were wrapped in
right up to the
right outbreak of the
the outbreak war, and the
the war, the entire spe-
spe sleeping
sleeping bags, guards were
bags, guards bribed, they used old
were bribed,
cial police
cial force had just
police force just completed additional training
completed additional training friends
friends in the barracks. . ..... . The
the barracks The commanders
commanders of of
in the
in the month before the
month before conflict. In addition
the conflict. addition, , the
the spe-
spe the Army ammunition
the stores usually
ammunition stores hushed up
usually hushed
cial police’s
cial “antiterrorist” unit
police 's elite "antiterrorist" unit was restructured
restructured the
the loss of weapons
loss of weapons to to their superiors, if they
superiors, if
training for new
and began training new missions—which
missions-which itit was
was to
successfully carry out in
successfully carry in the confrontation against the
the confrontation the
JNA’s own paratroops
JNA's own paratroops and special forces elements.
special forces elements.4444
53
53

noticed
noticed it, thereby
thereby attempting to avoid responsi- According to Jansa—whose figures
to Jansa-whose figures appear low but
it,
attempting to responsi
bility. In this way
bility. succeeded in returning
way we succeeded returning to
to still credible-even
credible—even by by the beginning of June 1991,
the beginning 1991,
good 5,000
the TO a good 5,000 pieces
pieces of various
various infantry Slovenian TO had only only about 23,000
23,000 infantry
infantry
of
infantry the Slovenian
a
45
weapons
weapons in year.. ..
in one year 5
. . -1 weapons (with
weapons (with limited
limited ammunition)
ammunition) and a littlelittle over
over
a
1,000
1,000 antitank
antitank weapons
weapons of all types. 50 Assuming
all types.50 Assuming
Additional weapons
weapons were purchased abroad. These These J ansa' s previous
Jansa’s figure of some
previous figure some 10,000
I 0,000 unconfiscated
unconfiscated
included
included probably
probably no more than a few few thousand infaninfan- weapons is accurate, plus
weapons plus the 5,000
5,000 he later says werewere
is
a
arms.466 Most noteworthy
try arms.-1 noteworthy and significant
significant was the the recovered by
recovered by theft from JNA garrisons,
from JNA garrisons, this
this implies
implies
Slovenian
Slovenian acquisition
acquisition of a number of Singaporean-
Singaporean that Ljubljana must have covertly
covertly imported
imported something
something
a
manufactured
manufactured Armbrust
Armbrust antitank rocket launchers
antitank rocket launchers in small arms between May 1990
8,000 small
like 8.000
like 1990 and June
December
December 1990. (The (The size of the the purchase is still 1991.
1991.
is
unknown
unknown but was probablyprobably not very large.)
large.) These
These
weapons
weapons had both symbolic
symbolic and military
military significance.
significance, The
The last, largest, and mostmost important
important covert
covert arms ship
ship-
as they gave the Slovenian
Slovenian forces
forces a chance of counter
counter- ment (dubbed
(dubbed Operation BOR) was
Operation BOR) was not to arrive
arrive in
in
a
JNA’s otherwise
ing the JNA's otherwise practically
practically invulnerable
invulnerable Slovenia until 21
Slovenia until June, only
21 June, only days before
before the outbreak
outbreak
armored forces.
forces. The
The Armbrust
Armbrust rockets were initially war. This consignment
of war. consignment reportedly included 5,000
reportedly included 5,000
Kocevska Reka
kept a secret, stored at the Kocevska Reka barracks,
barracks, more automatic
more rifles and 5 million rounds
automatic rifles rounds of ammu
ammu-
5
a
and issued to the newlynewly formed

formed Slovenian
Slovenian Special
Special nition,
nition, another 1,000
1,000 antitank weapons (including
antitank weapons (including a
a
Forces. Jansa and his deputy Jelko Kacin, however,
Forces. Jansa however, AT-4 antitank
few AT-4
few antitank guided missiles), and a few
guided missiles), few dozen
dozen
a
later opted to make a public,
public, confidence-boosting
confidence-boosting SA-77 antiaircraft
SA- antiaircraft missiles.
missiles. Jansa regarded this
Jansa regarded this final
final
a
show of defiance
show just before
defiance just before Slovenia's
Slovenia’s referendum
referendum on shipment-particularly the antiarmor
arms shipment—particularly antiarmor weap
weap-
sovereignty December—visibly advertis
sovereignty at the end of December-visibly advertis- ons-as critical
ons—as Slovenia's bid
in Slovenia’s
critical in bid for independence:
independence:
Slovenia’s capability
ing Slovenia's capability and intent to resist the Yugo
the Yugo-
slav Army if necessary. One could make a case that
One could I still ask
ask myself
myself today
today if tthe Presidency of
he Presidency of the
if
if
a
the first
first shots of thethe Yugoslav
Yugoslav war were not really really Republic could have proposed
proposed its decision
decision on
on
fired battlefield, but rather on
fired on the battlefield. Slovenian televi
on Slovenian televi- armed
armed resistance with a clear conscience
resistance with conscience onon
sion in the
sion final days of 1990:
the final 27 June, if w we had not
e had not received
received those
those weapons,
weapons,
in
1990:
2
7
if
which increased our capabilities

which increased capabilities for
for antitank
antitank
decided, would openly 5’
The
The republic,
republic, they decided, openly combat
combat by more than 100
more than percent.
JOOpercent. 51
declare itself ready to repel any

itself armed and recu~y
interfere with
attempt by the JNA to interfere with its new If
If Jansa’s
Jansa's figures are to be
figures are believed, the
be believed, the Slovenian
Slovenian
democracy.
democracy. Kacin flewflew toto Kocevska Reka in
Kocevska Reka in a forces more than 30,000
forces had no more 30,000 small
small arms and some
a
helicopter A Slovene
police helicopter. television camera-
Slovene television camera antitank weapons
2,000 antitank all types when
weapons of all the war
when the war
A
man was
was waiting
waiting for
for him. There, Slovene
him. There, Slovene troops
troops broke out.
broke 52 This appears to be
out.52 be inadequate to outfit
outfit
fired
fired two or three Armbrust
Armbrust missiles
missiles at an
an old even the
the generally figure of about 37,000
generally accepted figure 37,000
obsolete tank.
and obsolete tank. The
The film
film was
was broadcast
broadcast on Slovenian TO
Slovenian troops that were mobilized
TO troops mobilized during
during the
the
Slovene television two days later.
Slovene television later. The
The Slovenes
Slovenes war. However,
war. However, the the apparent shortfall
shortfall could
could be
were raising the stakesY
were stakes.” accounted for by
accounted by allowing for a number
number of possibly
possibly
a
unarmed troops used in

unarmed noncombat roles
in noncombat roles and others
addition to
In addition to weapons. delivery of secure
weapons. a secret delivery armed with
with personally owned hunting
personally owned weapons and
hunting weapons
a
communications equipment
communications (Operation KANAL)
equipment (Operation KANAL) the like.
like. Even
Even if Jansa·s figures are low,
Jansa‘s figures low, it is clear
clear that
if
is
it
arrived from
arrived from an unknown Western
an unknown Western country
country on 17 17 June the Slovenian
the Slovenian TO TO would have been incapable
incapable of arm
arm-
1991. Working frenetically
frenetically to
to set
set up the network, the
the network, the mobilized paper strength of 60,000
ing its fully mobilized 60,000 oror
Slovenian leadership
Slovenian was able to
leadership was the gear for
to use the for more had the conflict lasted longer
the conflict longer than it did.53
did.53
it
communications with
secure communications with the
the municipal headquar
municipal headquar-
ters across the republic. units. however,
republic. Most field units, however.
4"
lacked secure radios.-1H
still lacked radios.48 -1
9
54

Behind the
Behind Curtain: The
the Curtain: Intelligence War
The Intelligence War constitution held its
constitution held its own seat in the
own seat parliament.
the parliament.
Among other things, Aksentijevic passed KOS
things, Aksentijevic KOS the
the
Since the inception
Since the inception of the Yugoslav state,
the Yugoslav state, the
the federal
federal addresses of thethe delegates in the Republic Assembly,
in the Assembly,
intelligence
intelligence apparatus had directed much—perhapsmuch-perhaps enabling the federal
enabling the federal authorities
authorities to develop contin-
develop contin
most—of its attention against the
most---0f activities of ethnic
the activities ethnic gency plans (in
gency (in the
the end. implemented) for JNA
end, never implemented) JNA
nationalist groups
nationalist Yugoslavia. By the
groups within Yugoslavia. the end of military police
military police to all of the
to arrest all the dissident
dissident Slovenian
Slovenian
the
the 1980s, the the intelligence
intelligence directors
directors in Belgrade
Belgrade were were members of parliament.
members parliament.596059 w
receiving
receiving increasingly worrisome indications
increasingly worrisome indications that
that
trouble
trouble was brewing
brewing in in the
the northwestern
northwestern corner
corner of the the The intelligence
The intelligence war 17 May 1990,
war heated up after 17 1990,
country.
country. TheThe threat at the the time was not armed insurrecinsurrec- with both
with both the
the seating of the
the new
new Slovenian leadership
Slovenian leadership
tion but rather of creeping
tion agitation for multiparty
creeping agitation multiparty and the
the JNA’s confiscation
JNA's confiscation of Slovenian TO weapons.
Slovenian TO weapons.
democracy Slovenia—in some ways
democracy within Slovenia-in ways a greater The Belgrade's infiltration
The extent of Belgrade’s infiltration of Slovenian
Slovenian
threat to the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav state. The JNA
state. The JNA Security Direc-
Security Direc institutions the fact
institutions and the that Ljubljana had been com
fact that com-
Bezbednosti—UB), which
torate (Uprava Bezbednosti-UBJ, which was better pletely blindsided
pletely blindsided by the move
by the move came as a rude surprise
surprise
known
known by one of its Tito-eraTito-era designators.
designators, thethe Counter-
Counter the new
to the new Slovenian
Slovenian cabinet members:
members :
intelligence Service (( Kontraobavestajna
intelligence Service Kontraobavestajna Sluzba—
Sluzba-
KOS),
KOS), assigned one of its its very officers, Col. Ale-
very best officers. Ale staffing policies the
With its staffing
With the GHQ /General
GHQ [General
Vasiljevic 54 (who
ksander Vasiljevic54 (who had proved
proved his abilities
abilities dur-
dur Headquarters of
Headquarters the JNA]
of the tried, in
JNA] tried, manner
in any manner
ing
ing the 1980s in KOS
the early 1980s KOS operations
operations against the the could, , to
it could to replace
replace all those
those officers
officers in the Slov
in the Slov-
Albanians in Kosovo) to
ethnic Albanians monitor and combat
to monitor enian TO
enian TO who,
who, in the
the assessment
assessment of the military
of the
these underground liberal political movements.
underground liberal movements.55 55 intelligence service, would give
i11telligenceservice, Slovenia prece
give Slovenia prece-
Before the
Before the start of the war,
the war. KOS KOS reportedly
reportedly had more more dence over Yugoslavia . .... ..It
over Yugoslavia It was
was clear during
during
than 130 officers and NCOs
130 officers NCOs operating Slovenia, ,
operating in Slovenia the
the confiscations
confiscations how how far Belgrade had
far Belgrade had gone
gone
with presumably
with presumably an number of informants
an even larger number informants with this ...
with The secret police or national secu-
. . . The secu
sources.“.56
and sources rity
rity service
service passed loyalty—0r rather
passed its exam in loyalty-or rather
disloyalty—on this
disloyalty-on this occasion
occasion. . There
There was no
was no
first the
At first the battle for Slovenian
Slovenian independence
independence was was warning from it, although
although the almost one
the almost one-
it,
waged in
waged in the editorial rooms
the editorial rooms and across the the pages of thousand-strong
thousand-strong apparatus,
apparatus, with with its connections
connections
the
the newspapers
newspapers and magazines.
magazines. Probably
Probably the the most and sources
sources within the JNA.
within the JNA, most surely
surely knew of
of
important
important amongamong these was the influential weekly
the influential weekly at least
least the last stage of
the last the plan for
of the for disarming
disarminf?
magazine, Mladina.
magazine. Mladina . The
The Yugoslav intelli
Yugoslav civilian intelli- the Slovenian TO.“
the Slovenian T0. 61
gence organization,
organization, thethe State Security Service (Sluzba
Security Service (Sluzba
Drzavne Bezbednosti—SDB)57
Drzavne Bezbednosti-SDB) 57 was concerned concerned enough The Slovenians began to build up their intelligence
The Slovenians intelligence
“politically incorrect"
about "politically incorrect” writings
writings against the the fed
fed- infrastructure at the
infrastructure the same timetime they began to buildbuild and
eral system thatthat they reportedly
reportedly recruited
recruited the
the publica-
publica arm their military police forces.
military and police forces . The
The core
core of their
their
tion’s editor
tion's chief as an
editor in chief operative. In addition
an operative. addition, , the
the organization appears to have been a comparatively
organization comparatively
a
SDB bugged phones,

SOB phones, recorded conversations, and
recorded conversations, small but reliable
small reliable and capable group group of intelligence
intelligence
watched the
watched activities of numerous
the activities numerous journalists.
journalists.585K At officers
officers under
under Ivan Borstner. 62 According to Jansa,
Ivan Borstner.62 ansa, this
this
J
the
the same time the the civilian intelligence
intelligence organization group operated only conjunction with
partially in conjunction Slo
with Slo-
in
organization group only partially

was watching
watching thethe "subversive" political movements
“subversive” political movements normal republic-level
venia ' s normal
venia’s republic-level intelligence
intelligence organiza-
organiza
and journalists the KOS
journalists, , the KOS was watching dissidents
watching for dissidents tion,
tion, the
the Security
Security Intelligence Service (Vamostna
Intelligence Service (Varnostna
within thethe Army.
Army. /zvestajna Sluzba—VIS).
Izvestajna Sluzba-VIS) . The The latter appears to to have
been ambiguous
ambiguous in its its loyalties—at until May
loyalties-at least until
KOS also recruited
KOS Slovenian political fig
recruited at least one Slovenian fig- 1991,
I 991, when Jansa states
when Jansa states it began to actively report on
to actively
it
ure, Col. Milan Aksentijevic, Slove KOS activities

activities in Slovenia.
Slovenia. Despite Jansa’s lukewarm
in
Aksentijevic, a delegate to the

the Slove- KOS Despite Jansa's lukewarm
nian Assembly.
Assembly. At the Aksentijevic was
the time, Aksentijevic was both anan
active-duty JNA officer and the
active-duty JNA the assembly
assembly member
representing the
representing the Army, which
which under the Socialist
the Socialist
55
55

service, it appears to have been
endorsement of the service, According to Jansa,
Jansa, by
by approximately the end of April
approximately the April
fairly successful
successful at shutting down KOS operations
shutting down operations 1991:
1991:
immediately conflict itself. 636‘
itself. "·'
immediately before and during
during the
the conflict o-1
We had
We had the data and
and plans of the JNA and
plans of and its
After May 1990 the Slovenians
Slovenians appear to to have been counterintelligence service
counterintelligence service (( KOS)
KOS) inin our hands
hands
much more active in the the intelligence
intelligence war,
war, both defen-
defen for
for the
the rapid disllrmament
disarmament of
of the Slovenian
Slovenian TO
TO
sively
sively and offensively.
offensively. Defensively,
Defensively, the the Slovenes
Slovenes police as well as the ‘neutralization’
and police of part
'neutralizatio11· of
opposed thethe KOS with
with very careful security measures,
careful security measures. of
of the republic
republic leadership
leadership and
and the leaderships
leaderships of
of
especially regarding the distribution
especially regarding distribution and handling
handling of municipalities including
some municipalities including the delegates
delegates ofof
the
the military
military planning
planning documents
documents that would have pro- pro the republic parliament and
republic parliament and presidents
preside11ts ofof some
vided
vided a damning indictment of the Slovenian
damning indictment Slovenian Govern-
Govern parties.“
parties. 6 Y
ment had they been captured and exposed. The The most
extreme example
example of this security
security consciousness
consciousness per-per The Slovenes
Slovenes appeared to be informed of JJNA
be well informed NA
tained to Defense
Defense Minister Jansa's
Jansa’s comprehensive
comprehensive capabilities by
capabilities by the immediate
immediate runup
runup to war. All
to the war. All of
defense plan, which
which he had titled the "Possible
“Possible Vari-
Vari the collected information
the collected on unit locations,
information on locations, manning
manning
Dissociation from
ants of Dissociation from the Defense There
Aspect." There
Defense Aspect.” equipment,
equipment, and readiness
readiness was fed to a cadre of ana—
was fed ana-
never was a printed
printed copy document, which
copy of this document, lysts who
lysts who evaluated
evaluated itit and formulated
formulated their
their conclu
conclu-
listed Slovenia's
Slovenia’s timetables
timetables and planned responses to sions. The Slovenian
sions. Slovenian analyses turned out to to be
each potential JNA intervention
potential JNA contingency. Instead,
intervention contingency. Instead, remarkably prescient:
remarkably prescient:
Jansa himself kept a single
Jansa himself single copy
copy on an com
an encrypted com-
puter diskette and projected
projected the text onto a screen In
/11June
Ju11e1991, as a result
result of
of day-to-day
day-to-day analyses
analyses
when
when necessary during
during meetings."
meetings."55 and knowledge of
a11dour knowledge of conditions
conditions in in Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
a11dthanks
and tha11ksto our good intelligence data,
good intelligence data, we
Offensively, the
Offensively, the Slovenes
Slovenes began to to turn many
many of the the were
were almost convi11cedthat the JNA
almost convinced Army would
JNA Army would
Federal SDB’s and KOS's
Federal SDB's KOS’s own
own tactics against them. not be capable
11ot capable of
of carrying
carrying out an
a11 attack
attack deploy-
deploy
For at least a year before the war (and probably
the war probably muchmuch ing a great
ing enough number
great enough offorces during
number offorces during the
longer)
longer) the Slovenians actively
the Slovenians collected intelligence
actively collected intelligence declaration of
declaration independence of
of independence of Slovenia
Slovenia and
and
federal authorities-at
against the federal authorities—at the the time, still
still their and that it would
Croatia and only be intervention
would only intervention
own national
own national government Slovenian
military."6 Slovenian
government and military."6 pressure on some key points,
and pressure which could be
points, which
police
police and intelligence
intelligence organizations
organizations pored over the the escalated later
escalated later by introducing units of JNA
introducing new units JNA
documents of the Federal
documents Federal Secretariat National
Secretariat for National reserve forces.”
resen•e forces. 711
Defense, looking for relevant bits
Defense, information, and
bits of information,
monitored the
monitored JNA units through
activities of JNA
the activities through both Jansa refers to at
Jansa at least one intelligence source within
intelligence source
clandestine analysis of the
clandestine means and analysis JNA’s overt mil-
the JNA's mil the JNA’s
the JNA's own General Staff,
own General Staff, who
who appears toto have
itary journals Narodna Am1ija.
journals such as Narodna Armija. By such means been able
able to complement the Slovenians’
to complement Slovenians' existing
existing
the Slovenes noted increased federal
the Slovenes activity related to
federal activity to knowledge of JNA
knowledge capabilities by providing
JNA capabilities providing vital
vital
Border and Customs
the State Border Customs posts, including
including the information about JNA
information JNA intentions—specifically,
intentions-specifically, the the
arrival of additional
arrival additional personnel stockpiles of food
personnel and stockpiles food JNA’s
JNA's plan single, republic-wide
plan to have a single, show of
republic-wide show
and heavy weapons.
weapons.“7 67 force after Ljubljana’s
force declaration of independence:
Ljubljana's declaration independence:
authorities also monitored

Slovenian authorities
The Slovenian monitored the federal
federal . . . on the basis
... of additional
basis of additional information
information from
from
planning activities in the
planning activities own
the headquarters of their own our source
source in the GHQ of
the GHQ JNA, itit became
of the JNA,
Territorial Defense:
Territorial Defense: clear to the Army
to us that the Army was indeed not plan
was indeed plan-
ning any smaller
ning skirmishes like
smaller skirmishes like the one
one at Pekre
Pekre
contrast to
In contrast intelligence held by the JNA
to the intelligence JNA June, but
before 26 June,
before hut that it was
was planning
planning to
activities . ..
about our acti1·ities
about had regular
. . we had regulllr “solve all its problems
"solve problems in Slovenia in
in Slovenia i11one go. "7'
one go. " 71
intelligence
intelligence reports
reports 011on the activities at
llctivities lit
[[Belgrade-appointed Slovenian TO
Belgrade-appointed Slovenian T0
Commander] Hocevar
Commander} Hocevar'.1· headquarters; this was
’s helldquarters;
. . . .invaluable
.... inrnluable i11in helping correctly.“
helping to act correctly. ~8
56

Perhaps remarkable of all is an
Perhaps most remarkable an apparently com
apparently com- demanded that the Slovenian
that the Government stop its
Slovenian Government its TO
pletely
pletely successful
successful series of double-agent
double-agent operations
operations training activities at the
training activities recently established
the recently established centers at at
the
the Slovenians
Slovenians ran against the federal government
the federal government in in Pekre and lg.
Pekre lg. The
The Slovenians
Slovenians responded
responded by deploying
deploying
1990 and 1991. Reminiscent of the
1991. Reminiscent “Double
the British "Double- two “anticommando”
two ''anticommando " companiescompanies for their defense. defense. At
Cross” operation
Cross" operation against thethe German
German Abwehr duringduring the same time, Col. Gen.
the Gen . Blagoje Adzic,Adzic, Chief of the the
II, this
War II,
World War this double-agent program not only
double-agent program only kept JNA
JNA General Staff, personally
General Staff, personally issued
issued instructions
instructions to to
the
the Slovenians informed of Belgrade’s
Slovenians informed Belgrade's plans
plans against Kolsek and the commanders of both JNA
the commanders JNA corps
corps head
head-
the
the republic allowed Ljubljana to
republic but also allowed to plant
plant vital
vital quartered in Slovenia
Slovenia on how the two
how the two training
training centers
disinformation
disinformation that was factored
that was factored into
into those same would be down . IJNA
closed down.
be closed NA planning
planning focused
focused on thethe
plans:
plans: 710th Training Center
710th Pekre near Maribor—
Center at Pekre Maribor-
deemed the the easier of the two targets-and
the two targets—and incorpo incorpo-
We knew that KOS
We collaborators in some
KOS had collaborators rated the use of some special
the use JNA units
special JNA brought in
units brought in
republic bodies, , the
republic bodies the SDV,
SDV. companies,
companies, andand el'en
even from
from Varazdin
Yarazdin and Zagreb.
Zagreb. On 21 May, Kolsek met
21 May,
some editorial offices
ofi‘ices. . Through
Through this network
netH'ork it with
with Slovenian
Slovenian Prime Prime Minister PeterlePeterle to to demand the the
finding out that something
succeeded in finding something was
was republic's conscription
republic’s records and the
conscription records the closure
closure of both
both
going
going on, but luckily we planted
planted a counteragellt
counteragent training centers. The
training The Slovene delegation hoped to
Slovene delegation
time, and
on time, and the
the game rolled 011. We planted
on. We planted confrontation until
delay confrontation until they werewere better prepared
information
information that special
special units
units of
of the
the T0 were
TO were proposed further
and proposed discussion with
further discussion with a moratorium
moratorium on on
collecting
collecting in Kocevska
Kocevska RekaReka with
with new J NA intervention
JNA intervention until June. This was
until 26 June. was unacceptable
unacceptable
weapons 72
weapons. . 72 to the JNA,
to the JNA , which two days later sent six
which two six APCs
APCs and
seven T-55 tanks-probably from
T-55 tanks—probably from the the 31st Military
Military
The
The Slovenians
Slovenians had started out behind
behind in the
the intelli-
intelli Police Battalion
Battalion and the 195th Motorized Bri
the 195th
the the Bri-
gence game at thethe beginning
beginning inin May 1990.
1990. Slightly gade-to the
gade—to the 710th Training Center Center to demand the the
later, by June 1991,
over a year later. 1991, the Slovenians had
the Slovenians turnover of Slovenian
turnover Slovenian recruits
recruits to the federal
to the federal Army.74
Army. 74
trounced the
trounced the federal
federal military
military and civilian intelligence
intelligence
apparatus-game
apparatus—game, , set,
set, and match. The situation
The further on 24 May when
situation escalated further when thethe
JNA detained the
JNA the regional Slovenian TO
regional Slovenian commander
TO commander
Chapter 4
Chapter4 and several
several others because of the the dispute
dispute at the train
at the train-
lO-Day War
Slovenia: The IO-Day ing
ing center. Adzic had expected to hold hold the
the Slovenians
Slovenians
until the
hostage until republic authorities
the republic authorities agreed to close
close
training centers and to
the training
the sending recruits
to resume sending recruits to
The Eve of Battle JNA.. Instead,
the JNA
the Instead, the
the Slovenian Government
Slovenian Government
responded by
responded cutting off electricity
by cutting electricity and telephone ser
telephone ser-
Both sides had begun to gird
Both gird for battle by the
the vice JNA garrisons
vice to JNA garrisons throughout
throughout the republic—a tac
the republic-a tac-
beginning
beginning of May 1991.1991. In particular,
particular, the JNA began
the JNA tic
tic it was
was to to use again a month
use again month later when
when the war
the war
attempting to improve
improve the readiness of key
the readiness units in
key units in the
the began in in earnest. TheThe kidnaped
kidnaped Slovenians
Slovenians werewere
Fifth Military
Military District, especially in
District, especially border,
in its border, released after 14 14 hours negotiation and confronta-
hours of negotiation confronta
armored, and special
armored, operations units.
special operations units. The JNA’s
The JNA's tion, the disagreements were
tion , but the anything but
were anything
efforts to
efforts improve readiness were partially
to improve covered by
partially covered settled.7575 76
settled. 70
the
the actual exercise “OKOP” being
exercise "OKOP" conducted at the
being conducted the
time.73
time.73 Further afield, , the
Further afield J NA also began a large-scale
the JNA large-scale In retrospect,
retrospect, the JNA may
the JNA may have erred by forcing aa
by not forcing
callup reservists in Serbia
callup of Army reservists Serbia in
in early
early May 1991.
1991. confrontation did—either during
earlier than it did-either
confrontation earlier the
during the
October 1990
October confrontation at the
1990 confrontation the Slovenian TO head
Slovenian TO head-
Visible tremors
tremors were shaking Slovenia by late
shaking Slovenia late May in Ljubljana or during
quarters in the May 1991
during the 1991 dispute
1991. standoff escalated into
1991. as another standoff into open confron-
confron over the
the training centers.. On
training centers On both occasions, the
both occasions, the
tation between the Slovenian Territorial
the Slovenian Territorial Defense
Defense and
the JNA. On
the JNA. On 17 1991, Col. Gen.
17 May 1991, Kolsek,
Gen. Konrad Kolsek.
the JNA’s Fifth Military
the JNA's Military District commander.
commander.
57

Yugoslav Army limitedlimited its military actions, and the
military actions, the secure and occupy
secure occupy border
border posts
posts and
and other key facili
other key facili-
Slovenians
Slovenians responded
responded by by cutting the JNA’s
cutting off the JNA's power
power ties,
ties, with
with the
the enhanced legitimacy of aa parliamentary
enhanced legitimacy parliamentary
and telephone
telephone service.
service. But the JNA—and the political
the JNA-and resolution behind
resolution behind the
the occupying
occupying Slovenian
Slovenian forces.
forces.
leadership
leadership directing it—were unwilling to escalate
directing it-were
beyond
beyond this level.
level. As events later unfolded, JNA
unfolded, the JNA II was
was constantly
constantly warning
warning that the formal
formal resolu
resolu-
ended up having
having to make a major
major show
show of force
force any-
any tions
tions on
on the declaration
declaration of independence must
of independence
how, but against
how, against a muchmuch better armed and prepared prepared before 26 June, in
be passed before closed session,
in aa closed session,
Certainly in October
foe. Certainly October 1990, 1990, and even in May 1991, 1991, which would then allow us to
which would gain a lead
to gain lead on
on pos
pos-
the Slovenian
Slovenian forces
forces werewere not yet prepared
prepared for a direct
direct sible responses
sible responses of the Federation,
of the Federation, especially
especially
military
military confrontation
confrontation with with the JNA.
JNA.7777 Moreover,
Moreover. thethe military, establish our sovereignty
and that we establish
military, and sovereignty in
in
JNA would have had the initiative
JNA initiative in military
military opera-
opera triangle, border-customs-air
the key triangle, border-customs-air control
control
tions
tions at either time. When the conflict eventually
the conflict eventually ..... . One
One can
can imagine
imagine what the
the replacement
replacement of
of
began in June 199 1991, I, it was
was the Slovenians who
the Slovenians who were
were signposts on
signposts border or the seizure
0n the border seizure of
of the
the
able to select the
the time, locations, and terms of the
time, locations, the Brnikflight tower would
control tower
Brnik flight control would be like if, on
be like on 15
if,
fighting—to their great advantage
fighting-to advantage and the JNA'sJNA’s June, the the Army
Army placed
placed a detachment of of military
military
a
dismay.
dismay. police or paratroopers
police paratroopers armed
armed to to the teeth
teeth there
..... . despite just
just one day’s difference between the
days difference the
As the
the federal
federal government
government raised
raised the ante
ante and pushed
pushed announced
announced and
and the actual
actual passing
passing of
of the deci
deci-
closer war, the
closer to war, the Slovenes
Slovenes responded.
responded. A few few days sion for independence,
sio11for i11depe11de11ce,it was
was this
this one
011eday that
it
after the
the Maribor barracks confrontation. the JJNA
barracks confrontation. NA and was of
was importance. For,
of key importa11ce. 01125 June,
For, on Ju11e,immedi
immedi-
Federal
Federal Interior Ministry airlifted
airlifted more
more units
units to Slove-
Slove after the declaration
ately after of the laws,
declaratio11 of laws, we took
took
nia. Ljubljana , in turn, canceled
canceled all leaves for police
all leaves police the customs, border
over the
over border crossings, a11dair traf
crossi11gs,and traf-
Interior Ministry employees
and Interior beginning on
employees beginning on 20 June fic control
fic co11trolwithout
without letting 011eshot. In
off one
letti11goff /11Bel
Bel-
active and reserve police
and fully mobilized its active units
police units grade they were
grade were convinced
co11vi11ced u11tilvirtually
until the last
virtually the last
several
several days before
before the conflict began. On
the conflict 21 June,
On 21 June, the declaration of
second that the declaration of independence
independence
JNA confiscated
JNA confiscated the Slovenian
Slovenian TO'sTO’s lone squadron of
lone squadron would
would be on01126 June ..... . For
For this
this reason
reason they
combat aircraft, sending
combat aircraft, sending a group pilots and military
group of pilots planned their
pla1111ed their intervention for the early
intervention for early hours
hours of
of
police fly the IO
police to fly 10 antiquated
antiquated Kraguj monoplanes
monoplanes 27 June, for the time, they thought,
June, for thought, when
whe11the
from Bmik airport
from Brnik airport to Cerklje.
Cerklje.7878 Slovenian
Slovenian decision was still to have been on
decision was 011
paper. 79
79
By the last week June, both sides

week of June, sides had arrayed
arrayed all
all
their pieces
pieces on the board. now up to Ljubljana
board. It was now Slovenia had
Slovenia had prepared carefully for the hour
prepared carefully hour of its
its
to play
play its opening
opening gambit.
gambit. independence and had
independence had its
its new departments of govem
new departments govern-
ment not only established
ment established and ready
ready but also well pre
but also pre-
pared for what
pared what to do
do immediately
immediately after
after the
First Shots: The
First for the
The Battle for Border Posts,
the Border Posts, declaration. Most important,
independence declaration.
independence important, the Slove
Slove-
J une-Friday, 28 June
Tuesday, 25 June-Friday, nian
nian authorities
authorities were ready to seize
were ready control of previ
seize control previ-
ously identified
ously key facilities when
identified key when the time
time came
came and
and
announced six
Having announced six months
months earlier
earlier that intended
that it intended in most cases did
in most so within hours
did so hours of the independence
independence
from the
to secede from the Yugoslav Federation on 26 June
Yugoslav Federation declaration. Control of the border
declaration. posts was
border posts was central
central to
1991,
199 Slovenia actually
I, Slovenia declaration of inde
actually passed its declaration inde- both the Slovenian
both the Slovenian and Federal Yugoslav strate
the Federal
and the strate-
pendence June—a day earlier
pendence on 25 June-a earlier than expected.
expected. gies for both
gies practical and symbolic
both practical reasons. The bor
symbolic reasons. bor-
The seemingly difference was
seemingly trivial difference was in fact
fact aa critical
critical der posts customs revenues—of
generated customs
posts generated revenues-of which
and closely
closely held element of the
held element the Slovenian plan for
Slovenian plan those along Italian and Austrian borders
along the Italian borders were
were the
the
independence.
independence. The The Slovenian objective was
Slovenian objective was toto gain
gain most important—which
most important-which wentwent directly
directly to the federal
to the federal
surprise
surprise and time by secretly advancing what
secretly advancing the fed
what the fed- government and, indeed,
government and. some 40
represented some
indeed, represented 40 percent
percent
authorities expected
eral authorities expected to be their timetable. By
their timetable. By this
this
ruse they expected
expected to preempt federal actions
preempt federal actions to
58
58

of the
the federal
federal budget.
budget.8080 There
There was also the
the more the
the Federal Executive Council (SIV)
Federal Executive (SIV) in
in Belgrade
Belgrade
important
important issue of whether
whether Federal
Federal Yugoslav
Yugoslav or Slove-
Slove transmitted
transmitted a two-part ultimatum addressed
two-part ultimatum to Milan
addressed to Milan
nian troops,
troops, flags,
flags, and signs would be be seen
seen at those Kucan
Kucan at 1110
1110 that
that morning.
morning.
border
border posts-a
posts—a visible
visible representation
representation of the
the underly-
underly
ing sovereignty
sovereignty question.
question. As Jansa
Jansa explained
explained it:
it: Ominously.
Ominously, the JNA began showing
the JNA showing signs that itit was
signs that was
coming to life within Slovenia
coming Slovenia during
during the dayday on
Since
Since the
the plebiscite
plebiscite it had been clear to me me that 26 June
June. . Unusual activity was
Unusual activity was noted
noted at the major JNA
the major JNA
the national borders
the national borders were that concrete point
concrete point barracks
barracks in in the
the republic,
republic, and the
the first
first armored columns
armored columns
upon which national sovereignty
which national sovereignty was decided
decided in departed from their garrisons
from their to find
garrisons to find roadblocks
roadblocks bar bar-
the
the final
final sense
sense. . That
That is why thethe replacing
replacing of bor
of bor- ring
ring the
the routes to their
their assigned
assigned border
border crossings.84
crossings. 84
der signposts flags after
signposts and flags after the declaration of
the declaration of Also on 26 June the
Also the Federal
Federal Yugoslav
Yugoslav authorities
authorities
independence
independence was not only only a symbolic
symbolic act but a effectively isolated Slovenia
effectively isolated Slovenia from
from allall air traffic
traffic byby
key step across
across the
the Rubicon.
Rubicon. ThusThus a coordinated
coordinated closing
closing the two major
the two airports (ijik
major civilian airports (Brnjik intema
interna-
takeover of of the border; and other func-
the customs, horde,; func tional airport near Ljubljana, and Maribor airport).
tional airport airport).
tions which
which would at a specific
specific moment become aircraft, loaded
Yugoslav aircraft, loaded with weapons, flew
with weapons, flew low over over
alive
alive as functions
functions of of the independent
independent state of of a few
few locations
locations in Slovenia in apparent attempts at
Slovenia in at
Slovenia
Slovenia had to be organi-::,ed.
organized/31 x' intimidation but took
intimidation took no
no other hostile
hostile actions
actions atat the
the
time.K~
time.85
Having seized the initiative, the
the initiative, Slovenians had at the
the Slovenians the
same time maneuvered
maneuvered the J NA into
the JNA into a position where
position where The morning-Thursday, 27 June—armed
The following moming—Thursday, June-armed
move out of garrison
it had to move garrison and forcibly expel the the action began in
action in earnest between Slovenia's self
between Slovenia’s self-
now-established
now-established Slovenian
Slovenian defenders.
defenders. Not only only was it proclaimed military forces
proclaimed military forces and the Federal Yugoslav
the Federal
difficult for the
militarily more difficult J NA to attack prepared
the JNA troops
troops sent
sent to regain
regain control over key
control over key border
border crossings
crossings
Slovenian defensive
Slovenian defensive positions,
positions, but it it accomplished
accomplished the the facilities. The
and facilities. The Yugoslav People 's Army’s
Yugoslav People’s Army 's actions
actions
vital
vital political objective
objective of forcing
forcing the JNA to
the JNA to fire
fire the
the were publicly justified
were justified in communique read by
in a communiqué by JNA
JNA
first shots-thereby
first shots—thereby leaving
leaving the Slovenians as the
the Slovenians the Military District commander
Fifth Military commander Kolsek. The The brief
plucky
plucky defenders against Yugoslav
Yugoslav aggression
aggression in statement was formally addressedaddressed toto the Prime Minis
the Prime Minis-
international
international eyes
eyes:: ter of the
the Slovenian
Slovenian parliament Lojze Peterle,
parliament, , Lojze Peterle, and
indicated the
indicated the Army was acting to take control
was acting control over
over all
all
measures. . . . they [the
... . . due to our timely measures border crossings
border defend the
crossings and defend SFRY. It
the SFRY. It ended with
with a
JNA] could
JNAJ could not implement
implement things
things in such a wayway warning that “All
warning resistance will
"All resistance will be crushed,
crushed, and the the
that in thethe eyes ofof the
the public we . . . appeared
appeared consequence
consequence will will bebe borne
borne byby those who
who issued
issued com
com-
the use force}?2112
first to useforce.
the first mands
mands and executed
executed them.”
them." Federal
Federal aircraft
aircraft dropped
dropped
leaflets over Slovenia
leaflets over Slovenia with the same threat of vio
with the vio-
The last day of calm
The calm before
before the was 26 June
the storm was lence. (Sending
lence. (Sending a a somewhat contradictory mix
somewhat contradictory mix of sig
sig-
l99l—a remarkably
1991-a remarkably quiet day, day, under the circum
the circum- nals, the
nals, JNA’s leaflets
the JNA's leaflets concluded
concluded with
with statements that
The first
stances. The first confrontation
confrontation of the Slovenian war
the Slovenian war “We invite
"We invite you
you to cooperation!" and “All
to peace and cooperation!” "All
ended bloodlessly
bloodlessly at the Lazaret border
the Lazaret border crossing
crossing near resistance will
resistance will be
be crushed.
crushed”)86") 86
the
the Adriatic port of Koper.
Koper. At about 0600 on 26 June, June,
Slovenian construction
Slovenian construction workers
workers assigned
assigned to erect the
the On 27 June the
On 27 JNA began
the JNA began to move
move in in earnest as
as three
new signposts
signposts proclaiming independence were
proclaiming independence chal
were chal- armored columns
armored columns set set out from
from three bases. OneOne col
col-
lenged by Yugoslav soldiers, who
Yugoslav Army soldiers, who threatened to umn (a battalion
umn battalion of 12 BOV-3 self-propelled
12 BOV-3 self-propelled antiair
antiair-
fire if they continued
fire if continued.83 The Slovenians
.K.l The withdrew, and
Slovenians withdrew. craft guns from
craft from the 306th Light Air
the 306th Defense Artillery
Air Defense Artillery
the situation did not escalate, but similar
the situation similar confronta-
confronta Regiment
Regiment and 11 11 support vehicles) left
support vehicles) from Karlovac
left from
occurred at several other border
tions occurred border crossings
crossings during
during in Croatia
in heading for
Croatia heading for Ljubljana ~nd the center of
and the of the
the
the Meanwhile, the
the day. Meanwhile, Yugoslav political leadership
the Yugoslav leadership
laying the
was laying groundwork for more serious
the groundwork serious actions
actions. .
In what may be be the first declaration
the first war sent by fax,
declaration of war fax.
59

republic. Another column
republic. Another column (the I1st Battalion of the lst
st Battalion I st what going on,
what was going replied with
on, Vidmar replied with the single
the single
“
Armored Brigade.
Armored with possibly
Brigade. with possibly asas many as as 40 tanks word Brnik.” Armed with
word" Bmik." with this
this knowledge, the Slov
knowledge, the Slov-
and 20 armored
armored vehicles)
vehicles) left from Vrhnika heading
left from heading enians were
were able to position troops and obstacles
position troops obstacles
along two routes toward
along two toward Brnik airport.
airport. AA third
third column
column the tanks
between the tanks and their
their intended destination. As
intended destination. As a
comprising a battle group
comprising from the 32nd
group from 32nd Mechanized
Mechanized result, Brnik
result, airport was
Bmik airport was never
never occupied
occupied by the JNA.93
by the JNA. 9 '
Brigade (30 APCs,
Brigade APCs. possibly
possibly 10IO tanks, and 300 sol
300 sol-
diers)
diers) headed north
north from
from the
the JNA
JNA base at Varazdin
Varazdin in third JNA
The third JNA column,
column. from the 32nd Mechanized
from the Mechanized
Croatia
Croatia toward
toward the border crossings with
border crossings Austria. By
with Austria. Brigade at
Brigade at Varazdin
Varazdin inin Croatia,
Croatia. was blocked at a
was blocked
the early
early morning columns were
morning these columns already crush
were already crush- bridge near Ormoz on
bridge on the Slovenian-Croatian
the Slovenian-Croatian border
border
automobiles and crashing
ing automobiles through makeshift
crashing through barri
makeshift barri- barricade of tractor
by a barricade
by tractor trailers large earth
trailers and a large earth-
cades,
cades. while thethe Slovenian
Slovenian TO TO frantically
frantically threw
threw up mover. The JNA
mover. The JNA armored
armored column
column was unable to break
unable to break
more effective
effective blockades
blockades throughout 88
republic_x7 xx
the republic.87 through the obstacles, even after the
Slovenian obstacles,
the Slovenian the tanks
throughout the through
tried using their main
tried using main guns,
guns, although
although the bridge and
the bridge
The first clash of the long.
first armed clash long. bloody Yugoslav
bloody Yugoslav blocking vehicles
the blocking vehicles were badly damaged. 94
badly damaged.“
took place
wars took place between advancing JNA
between one of the advancing JNA
columns and elements of the Slovenian
columns TO.899 At 0115
Slovenian TO.x In addition
addition to the armored columns,
the three armored columns, the
the federal
federal
hours on 27 June.June, the 12 antiaircraft guns of the
12 antiaircraft the JNA’s
JNA's government began bringing
government in elements of the
bringing in the elite
elite
306th Light Air Air Defense Regiment crossed
Defense Artillery Regiment crossed JNA 63rd Airborne Brigade
JNA 63rd military airfield
Brigade to the military airfield at
at
from Croatia
from Croatia into Slovenia near Metlika. At about
into Slovenia Cerklje at about midday
midday on 27 June
on 27 as well as Federal
June as Federal
0400,
0400, they were blockedblocked and challenged
challenged by by elements Secretariat Internal Affairs
Secretariat of Internal (SSUP) and Federal
Affairs (SSUP) Federal
of the 2nd (Doljenska)
(Doljenska) Regional Command of the
Regional Command Slo
the Slo- Customs Administration personnel.
Customs Administration The JJNA
personnel. The NA para
para-
venian Territorial Defense.
venian Territorial Defense. After a brief exchange of troopers appear to have been assigned to secure the
troopers
fire
fire and protracted negotiations.
negotiations, a slightly
slightly injured J NA
injured JNA airfield against capture, while the SSUP
SSUP and customs
customs
second lieutenant
second lieutenant was evacuated to to the hospital. and
the hospital, personnel were
personnel were to be
be positioned
positioned to federal sov
to ensure federal sov-
the column
column was allowed advance. But not for long,
allowed to advance. long, ereignty over
ereignty over border crossings. The 461
border crossings. 461 SSUP
SSUP and
as the Slovenians
Slovenians had by established a second,
by then established second, 270 customs
customs personnel flew by
personnel flew transport aircraft
by transport aircraft into
into
stronger blocking position
stronger blocking Medvedjek. Here
position near Medvedjek. Here the
the Cerklje military
military airport, climbed directly
airport, then climbed directly into
into
JJNA
NA column
column was was again attacked and stopped by by the
the helicopters and were
waiting helicopters
waiting were ferried to their
ferried to their assigned
forces it
forces it had encountered earlier, now
encountered earlier. now reinforced
reinforced by locations
locations along the Slovenian
along the border. 95 96
Slovenian border.95 96
elements of the 52nd TO TO Brigade,

Brigade. the
the 174th
174th TOTO
Antidiversionary Unit,
Antidiversionary Unit, and several
several squads of Given the federal forces’
the federal complete air
forces' complete air superiority,
superiority. the
the
Slovenian Special Forces.°°°‘
Slovenian Special Forces. 90 91 JNA’s ability and willingness
JNA's ability to fly
willingness to over Slovenia
fly over Slovenia
military and a political problem
posed both a military problem for thethe
The JNA’s plans to
The JNA's airport at Brnik (home
to capture the airport (home Slovenian leadership. If
Slovenian leadership. If left unchallenged, the JNA
left unchallenged, JNA
of the customs
customs administration)
administration) with
with elements of the the could deploy forces
could deploy almost at will,
forces almost gaining the tactical
will, gaining tactical
Ilst Armored Brigade
st Armored might have succeeded but for
Brigade might undermining Slovenian
advantage and undermining Slovenian morale.
morale.
the collaboration senior officers
collaboration of some of its senior officers with
with planning failure
(Despite a planning
(Despite failure that left
left an inadequate
an inadequate
the enemy. Slovenian
the enemy. Slovenian attempts to to prevent the tanks number JNA helicopters
number of JNA helicopters available in Slovenia,
available in Slovenia,
leaving Vrhnika failed,
from leaving failed, and the
the news
news that armor
that armor control of the air
control allowed the Army to make up the
air allowed the
from powerful JNA
from one of the most powerful JNA units
units inin Slovenia
Slovenia shortage with
with multiple flights over the short
multiple flights short distances
was already on the road threw
was already threw the Slovenian
Slovenian leader
leader- involved.) Unfortunately for Ljubljana, the Slovenian
involved.) Unfortunately Slovenian
ship into a panic. Defense Minister Jansa
panic. Defense Jansa first called
first called defenders
defenders had at best very
very modest
modest antiaircraft
antiaircraft capabil
capabil-
the JNA’s
JNA's 14th commander, Major
14th (Ljubljana) Corps commander, ities—some
ities-some 20-mm
20-mm antiaircraft guns and fewer
antiaircraft guns fewer than
General Pavlov,
General who understandably
Pavlov, who understandably refused
refused to givegive SA-7 shoulder-launched
30 SA-7 shoulder-launched SAM's. Defense Minister
SAM’s. Defense
explanation for the vehicle
any explanation vehicle movements.92
movements. 92 Jansa Jansa Jansa
Jansa himself phoned unit commanders
himself phoned commanders demanding
demanding
calling the
then tried calling the former 14th Corps commander,
former 14th commander,
Maj. Gen. Vidmar—a Slovene—who
Gen. Marjan Vidmar-a Slovene-who appar appar-
ently was also still at the headquarters. When asked
60
Digitized by Go gle Origirial from

that something to stop or at least curtail
that they do something JNA
curtail JNA were able to block some JNA J NA units advancing toward
advancing toward
helicopter
helicopter operations. Shortly thereafter,
operations. Shortly J ansa
thereafter. Jansa the Austrian frontier.98
the Austrian JNA casualties
frontier .98 JNA casualties for the
the day
received Slovenian forces
word that Slovenian
received word forces had shot down
down a were probably higher than expected.
probably higher expected, but still modest:
modest:
JNA Gazelle
JNA helicopter over Ljubljana,
Gazelle helicopter Ljubljana. and several two officers
two officers and two soldiers killed,
enlisted soldiers
two enlisted killed. and four
helicopters were
other helicopters downed.
were damaged or downed. officers and 16
more officers soldiers wounded,
16 soldiers according to
wounded, according
the
the Fifth Military District’s
District's public
public statements
statements..
These helicopter
These helicopter losses hardly a dent in
losses made hardly in the
the
JJNA's
NA’s total aircraft
aircraft inventory,
inventory. but the Slovenian suc
the Slovenian suc- Although Croatia Slovenia had on 20 January
Croatia and Slovenia January
downing them had a psychological
cesses in downing psychological impact
impact agreed to to an alliance in the
an alliance the event of the the two
two republics'
republics’
out of proportion
proportion to their military
military significance.
significance. They
They secession, , in practical
secession practical terms thisthis was to amount to
helped reduce the defenders’ feeling
the defenders· feeling of helplessness
helplessness almost nothing
almost nothing once the the shooting
shooting started. The The Croat
Croat
against air attack and discouraged
discouraged the J NA’s pilots
the JNA's pilots leaders knew
knew that Slovenia's
Slovenia’s declaration
declaration of indepen-
indepen
from
from further flights. As Jansa
further flights. Jansa describes
describes it:
it: dence had irreversibly
irreversibly set them also on the the path to
secession-and
secession—and potential catastrophe . Even
potential catastrophe. Even when first
when first
..... . the
the helicopter
helicopter assaults
assaults of of any significance
significance Slovenia
Slovenia’s's and then Croatia's independence was
Croatia’s independence was pro
pro-
ended and were were not resumed until until the end ofof the
the claimed, the
claimed, Croat leadership
the Croat remained deeply
leadership remained deeply riven
riven
war
war. In /11only
only an hour '. ~time the
’s the situation
situation changed
changed about what exactly Croatia should
exactly Croatia should do during
during thethe Slov
Slov-
drastically. This
drastically. This was the first reversal
the first of the war
reversal of war then unfolding.
enian war Leading one faction
unfolding. Leading faction was
was
[for
[for the JNA] and was
the JNAJ was much more more significant
significallt activist Defense Minister Martin Spegelj,
activist Defense Spegelj , who
who on thethe
than it appeared
appeared at first. psychological bar
first. The psychological bar- opening day of the
opening Slovenian war
the Slovenian war argued vigorously
vigorously
rier was broken.
broken . From then on 011the
the aggressor
aggressor that moment had come
the moment
that the come for Zagreb
Zagreb to make its
had great trouble conri11ci11gits pilots to go 011
trouble convincing on strike for freedom
strike surrounding JNA
freedom by surrounding JNA garrisons
garrisons
missions ..... . 97
flying missions
flying 07 territory and arresting key JNA
within its territory command
JNA command-
ers.. Not only
ers only would Croatia
Croatia gain the the initiative
initiative in what
The helicopter
The helicopter lift of the SSUP and customs personnel
the SSUP personnel Spegelj
Spegelj regarded as an inevitable
as an conflict but it also
inevitable conflict
—originally
-originally intended
intended as the
the second and occupational
occupational would be moving without
be moving without the interference of the
the interference the
phase of the
the operation-was
operation—was actually
actually premature, as JNA’s embattled Fifth Military District in
JNA's in adjacent
isolated somewhat confused
isolated and somewhat confused confrontations
confrontations con-
con Slovenia. While most of President
Slovenia. President Franjo Tudjman
Tudjman’s's
tinued at many
many of the border crossings
the border crossings and at a variety
variety ministers
ministers seem to have sided with Spegelj on
with Spegelj cru
on this cru-
locations in
of other locations Slovenia throughout
in Slovenia throughout thethe day on cial issue,, Tudjman
cial issue apparently was
Tudjman apparently was not yet ready for
June. Some
27 June. Some were
were resolved
resolved through
through negotiation,
negotiation, war. He
war. He not only
only rejected Spegelj’s call for action
Spegelj's call but,
action but,
others degenerated into standoffs,s, and still
into armed standoff much
much to the Slovenians” ' chagrin,
the Slovenians chagrin, also did did nothing
nothing to to
others resulted in small but violent
in small violent battles. hinder JNA units based in Croatia
hinder JNA Croatia from
from deploying
deploying to to
attack Slovenia.
Slovenia . Spegelj, having made his case as
Spegelj, having
Casualties and confusion
Casualties confusion notwithstanding,
notwithstanding , the J NA
the JNA powerfully as he knew
powerfully how, resigned
knew how, resigned the the following
had largely accomplished its mission
largely accomplished mission of regaining
regaining day.99
day.99
control of the
control the border
border crossings
crossings by nightfall
nightfall on 27 June. .
27 June
All crossings
All crossings along the Italian
along the border had been cap-
Italian border cap the late morning
By the Friday, 28 June.
morning of Friday, June, thethe fighting
fighting
tured by midnight,
midnight, although
although the Slovenes retained
the Slovenes had escalated to to the level of full-scale
the level full-scale clashes across
control over at least three crossings
control along the
crossings along Austrian
the Austrian Slovenia. . While the
Slovenia JNA maneuvered
the JNA maneuvered to exploit its
to exploit
border. The JNA
border . The JNA also captured some of the the newly
newly advantages in armor and airpower
airpower to to break Slovenian
break Slovenian
established control
established control points
points along
along the Slovenian-Croat
the Slovenian-Croat- morale,
morale, the Slovenians threw
the Slovenians threw their forces into an
forces into all
an all-
ian border.. In
ian border the JNA’s
In part, the mixed success reflected
JNA's mixed reflected out effort
effort to the initiative
to regain the initiative by simultaneously
by simultaneously
the relative
the organization and readiness
relative organization levels of the
readiness levels the surrounding and engaging
surrounding engaging the JNA’s forces
the JNA's forces through-
through
JNA and Slovenian
JNA Slovenian TO T0 inin each area. JNAJNA forces
forces out the
the country.
country. Control of the the border
border crossings
crossings see-
see
advancing to the
advancing the Italian border had begun moving
Italian border moving thethe sawed Slovenian reinforcements
sawed as Slovenian arrived and
reinforcements arrived
previous succeeded, , whereas
previous day and succeeded whereas Slovenian
Slovenian TO TO
forces displayed
forces displayed better organization elsewhere and
organization elsewhere
61
61

federal
federal forces
forces had to surrender
surrender several
several of the posts As
As the
the JNA's aerial
aerial campaign
campaign scoured
scoured the
the skies
skies and
they had wonwon the previous
previous day.‘°"The JNA attempted
day. 1mThe JNA dominated
dominated newsnews bulletins,
bulletins. Slovenian
Slovenian Special
Special Forces
Forces
to push its own
own reinforcements
reinforcements across the the borders
borders into
into scored one of their
scored first victories—and
their first victories-and aa major
major morale
morale
Slovenia and the republic
Slovenia republic to traverse the
the international
international boost—with
boost-with an an attack onon aa JNA
JNA armored
armored column
column from
from
border
border crossings
crossings in the opposite
opposite direction.
direction. Slovenian
Slovenian the 253rd
the 253rd Motorized BrigadeBrigade at Nova Gorica, knock knock-
territorial
territorial defense and police
police forces
forces obstructed and
obstructed ing out three T-55
ing T-55 tanks
tanks and capturing
capturing three more
more
challenged
challenged all of these columns.
columns. intact. JNA soldiers
intact. Four JNA were killed in
soldiers were in the fighting,
fighting,
almost 100
and almost surrendered. 103 A
I00 surrendered.103 smaller JNA
A smaller JNA column
column
JNA 32nd
The JNA 32nd Mechanized
Mechanized Brigade's
Brigade’s column
column of under fire
came under fire as
as it moved reinforce the JNA
moved to reinforce JNA
about 30 tanks and vehicles from Varazdin
vehicles from Varazdin continued
continued forces hotly
forces hotly contesting
contesting the the Sentilj
Sentilj border crossing. In
border crossing.
its advance from
from the previous
previous day and eventually
eventually the same area a composite
the composite unitunit with
with two
two T-55
T-55 tanks
reached its objective,
objective, the Austrian border crossing
Austrian border crossing at (almost certainly
(almost certainly from
from the 195th Motorized Brigade)
the 195th Brigade)
Gomja Radgona.
Gornja Once there, the 32nd
Radgona. Once 32nd Mech found
found elements of the
accompanied by elements
accompanied Military Police
the 31st Military
itself locked
itself locked into engagements of the
into one of the largest engagements the Battalion
Battalion and probably
probably thethe 3lst Reconnaissance Com
31st Reconnaissance Com-
Slovenian conflict. The armored
Slovenian conflict. armored column
column ended up pany was
pany north. TO
advancing north.
was advancing TO forces
forces from
from the 7th
7th
fighting
fighting for most of the the day against
against Molotov cocktail
cocktail- (Vzhodnostajerska) Regional
(Vzhodnostajerska) Regional Detachment
Detachment disabled
disabled
wielding Slovenian
Slovenian local forces, and the border
local forces. border station both tanks with
with rocket-propelled
rocket-propelled grenades, and the
was all
all but demolished during the
demolished during the battle. rest of the
the column
column surrendered.
surrendered.
During the day on 28 June, the JNA made its first

the JNA first In one of the
the more
more important
important but
but barely
barely noticed
noticed suc
suc-
tactical airstrikes
attempt to use tactical airstrikes toto unblock stalled
unblock its stalled cesses of the war’s
war's beginning,
beginning, Slovenian
Slovenian forces
forces cap
cap-
armored
armored columns.
columns. One One column-elements
column—elements of the
the small JNA
the small
tured the JNA garrison at Borovnica with
garrison at with its
its
140th
140th Mechanized
Mechanized Brigade
Brigade from outside Zagreb—was
from outside Zagreb-was more than JOO
more tons of guns,
100 tons guns, ammunition,
ammunition, explosives,
explosives,
blocked
blocked near the the town
town of Trebnje northwest of Novo
Trebnje northwest vehicles. These
and vehicles. These vital
vital supplies
supplies were
were distributed
distributed to
to
Mesto.""
Mesta. JNA aircraft
101 JNA aircraft were called
called in, pair of
in, and a pair T0
TO units
units over
over the
the next few
few days."H
days. 104
MiG-21’s·s indiscriminately
MiG-21 indiscriminately attacked military
military and
civilian targets along
along the with cluster
the road with cluster bombs.
bombs. When
When fighting died down
fighting died on the 28th,
down on issue still
28th. the issue
JNA aircraft
JNA aircraft also bombed
bombed Slovenian
Slovenian positions
positions atat the
the hung in
hung in the balance—but Ljubljana’s
the balance-but Ljubljana's forces
forces appeared
Sentilj border crossing,
Sentilj border where a blockaded
crossing, where blockaded tanktank col-
col— to be gaining
to gaining the advantage. The Slovenian
the advantage. Slovenian TO
TO held
held
umn of the
the 195th
195th Motorized Brigade called
Brigade had also called only seven of the
only seven the border posts, but it had won
border posts, won some
some
airstrikes to clear its advance.
for airstrikes advance. victories and retained
military victories
military retained its high morale.'°5
its high morale. 105
Although the Yugoslav Army controlled
the Yugoslav most of the
controlled most
More widespread tactical airstrikes
widespread were the tactical airstrikes against identified
identified objectives forces still had clear
objectives and its forces clear supe
supe-
communications facilities
key transport and communications facilities in Slove-
Slove equipment, the JNA
riority in equipment, JNA was
was already
already beginning
beginning
nia on the 28th. In the most notablenotable air attack of the to show signs of the
show signs the internal weaknesses that would
internal weaknesses
war, J NA aircraft
war, four JNA aircraft bombed
bombed Ljubljana airportairport in the plague it throughout
plague throughout the Slovenian
Slovenian and
and Croatian
Croatian con
con-
morning, damaging four Adria Airways airliners
morning, damaging airliners and flicts. After its initial successes
flicts. successes on the 27th,
on the the JNA
27th, the JNA
two people.
killing two people. Two more JNA JNA aircraft
aircraft bombed
bombed seemed to lack
lack any plan to follow
any plan up or
follow up or sustain
sustain opera
opera-
Maribor airport
airport later that morning.
morning. JNAJNA aircraft
aircraft also
also tions
tions beyond the first
beyond the day. JNA
first day. JNA units
units and personnel
personnel
Slovenian military
attacked the Slovenian military headquarters at acted bewildered when military
bewildered when military action
action continued
continued after
Kocevska Reka.
Kocevska Reka, thinking
thinking (incorrectly)
(incorrectly) that the the Slove
Slove- they had occupied
occupied the border crossings, and they
border crossings, they
nian leadership relocated there. On
leadership had relocated On the same day uncertain what
appeared uncertain what to do
do next.
next.
the
the Yugoslav Government launched
Yugoslav Government launched an air campaign
campaign
specifically against the Slovenian
targeted specifically information
Slovenian information It was
It already evident
was already that the JNA’s
evident that JNA's most
most serious
serious
infrastructure, flying
infrastructure. flying multiple sorties against radio
multiple sorties radio and were not
problems were
problems material or
not material operational, but
or operational, but
transmitters at Krim,
television transmitters
television Krim, Kum,
Kum, Trdinov Vrh, Vrh,
and Nanos.
Nanos.102102
62
62

psychological. Most of the
psychological. JNA’s soldiers
the JNA's soldiers were 18
18- as wounded,
as wounded, and the
the Slovenians claimed to have
Slovenians claimed have cap-
cap
year-old conscripts
year-old with only
conscripts with only a few
few months' service.
months” service. tured some JNA soldiers
some 500 JNA received 250 JNA
soldiers and received JNA
They
They had been toldtold they were defending
defending the the country
country defectors.
defectors.
against anan invasion from Italy,
invasion from Italy, but it quickly became
became
was not the
apparent this was the case once
once they had occupied
occupied JNA unit
The JNA
The unit holding border post at Vrtojba—
the border
holding the Vrtojba-
objectives. Morale plummeted
theirobjectives.
their plummeted when when the rank and
the rank probably from
probably from the 253rd Motorized Brigade-turned
the 253rd Brigade—tumed
file realized
realized they were battling their
were battling own countrymen,
their own countrymen, back and surrendered
back surrendered on thethe 29th,
29th, after negotiations
negotiations
and most of the conscripts had no
the conscripts no idea
idea why
why they and without
without a single being fired.
single shot being fired. They gave up
should
should be doing it. The
doing it. JNA’s first
The JNA's first desertions
desertions began at not only the post but also
only the also several prized tanks
highly prized
several highly tanks
the border
the border crossings
crossings on the where isolated,
the 28th where isolated, con
con- to the
the Slovene forces. Late
Slovene forces. June, federal
Late on 29 June, forces
federal forces
fused,
fused, and demoralized
demoralized soldiers
soldiers gave up as soon as as at the
the Kostanjeva
Kostanjeva crossing between Ljubljana and
crossing between
surrounded. Some JNA
surrounded. Some JNA officers soldiers—prima
officers and soldiers-prima- Venice also
Venice surrendered, and Slovene
also surrendered, Slovene forces
forces took
took
ethnic Slovenians—went
rily ethnic Slovenians-went clear over to the the Territo
Territo- charge of the crossing and two
the crossing busloads of
two busloads
rial
rial Defense
Defense or simply abandoned their units.""‘
simply abandoned units. 100 prisoners.
prisoners.'°°w9
An uneasy
uneasy cease-fire
cease-fire waswas patched together near the the On the afternoon of the
the afternoon the 29th,
29th, the JNA troops
the last JNA troops at
end of the June. First came an
the day on 28 June. announce-
an announce the Austrian border
the Austrian border crossing
crossing of Sentilj
Sentilj surrendered
surrendered
ment byby Yugoslav PrimePrime Minister AnteAnte Markovic at at after a running
running 32-hour
32-hour battle. Despite
Despite repeated
1600 hours
hours local
local time that the Federal
that the Federal Executive
Executive attacks on Slovene
Slovene positions border post, includ
the border
positions at the includ-
Council (that is,is, the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav cabinet) called for a
cabinet) had called ing two unsuccessful
ing two unsuccessful sorties by MiG-21
sorties by MiG-21 jets, thethe
cease-fire to take effect
cease-fire effect no later than 1900 hours.
1900 hours. J NA’s T-55
JNA's T-55 tanks were
were unable
unable to advance, and they
to advance,
Ljubljana ignored
ignored thethe proposal. Later on, Slovene
proposal. Later Slovene were
were eventually
eventually abandoned the Slovenes.
abandoned to the “'
Slovenes."°110111
President Kucan and Admiral Stane Brovet—Deputy
President Brovet-Deputy
Secretary
Secretary of National
National Defense-made
Defense—made contact by by tele
tele- In one of the
the memorable
memorable small
small dramas of the Slove-
the Slove
phone and eventually
eventually agreed to a cease-fire
cease-fire commenc-
commenc nian conflict,
nian JNA Sergeant
conflict, JNA Dragomir Grujevic-
Sergeant Dragomir Grujevic-—
ing at 9:00
ing 9:00 pm local time, with
local time, meeting scheduled
with a meeting scheduled two days with
under siege for two with his
his unit the Army fuel
unit at the fuel
for the
the following day to settle precise
precise terrns.
terms.‘07
1117 depot at Mokronog (east of Ljubljana)—threatened
Ljubljana)-threatened to
the facility unless
blow up the unless his unit got food
his unit food and water.
water.
The 7,500 cubic
The depot stored some 7,500 cubic meters--over
meters—over a
The Cease-Fire
The That Wasn’t:
Cease-Fire That Saturday, 29
Wasn't: Saturday, 29 June--
June— quarter million cubic feet—of fuel.
cubic feet--of The Slovenes
fuel. The Slovenes
Monday, 1
Monday, July
1 July complied; Defense
complied: Secretary Kadijevic
Defense Secretary Kadijevic later promoted
promoted
Grujevic to
to Lieutenant.
Lieutenant."2111
The fragile
The arrangement agreed to the
fragile arrangement night of 28 JJune
the night une
was
was honored
honored more more in thethe breach
breach than in practice—an
practice-an Amidst the
the sporadic fighting. negotiations
sporadic fighting, negotiations for a perma-
penna
unhappy precedent for the
unhappy precedent countless future
the countless cease-fires
future cease-fires cease-fire sputtered along.
nent cease-fire along. On the morning
On the morning of
were to follow in
that were the former
in the former Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. As early early 29 June,
June. Lieutenant General Andrija Raseta—
Lieutenant Colonel General Raseta-
hours on 29 June,
as 0800 hours June, Yugoslav People's Army
Yugoslav People‘s representing
representing the JNA Fifth Military
the JNA District~arrived
Military District-arrived
soldiers and Slovenian
soldiers Slovenian police
police were exchanging fire
were exchanging fire at in Ljubljana for a meeting
meeting with
with Slovenian
Slovenian Defense
Defense
the Skofije
the Skofije crossing
crossing on the Italian border;
the Italian the firefight
border: the firefight Minister Jansa Interior Minister Bavcar
Jansa and Interior Bavcar to finalize
to finalize
ended with
with three JNA JNA soldiers
soldiers dead and the the rest
rest the
the terms of the cease-fire agreed to the
the cease-fire the previous
previous
threatening to blow up the
threatening border post if
the entire border if the
the evening. advanced a 12-point
evening. Raseta advanced 12-point list
list of require
require-
Slovenians did
Slovenians did not surrender.
surrender. JNA JNA special forces
special forces ments, including provision for the
including one provision removal of bar
the removal bar-
troops were ferried
troops were ferried toto the Italian border
the Italian border crossing
crossing at ricades that
ricades that the Slovenians refused
the Slovenians refused to JNA
The JNA
to accept. The
Hrvatini along
along the the Adriatic but were were caught by Slove-Slove also threatened on 29 June to
also mobilize troops
to mobilize neces
troops as neces-
nian forces
nian forces on landing, losing two
landing. losing two killed and three sary and to “decisive military
to take "decisive action” if
military action" Slovenia
if Slovenia
wounded.‘08
wounded . 108 That
That same morning
morning the the Slovenian Minis
Slovenian Minis- did not accede to to the stated terms. A
the stated A public
public statement
try of Defense claimed that
Defense claimed that 20 JNAJNA soldiers,
soldiers, eight by Assistant
read by Assistant Federal Secretary for
Defense Secretary
Federal Defense
Slovenian TO
Slovenian TO and police,
police, and 12 12 civilians had been Education Lt.
Morale and Education Lt. Col. General
General Marko
killed in the fighting up to
the fighting to that Some 50 JNA
that time. Some JNA
troops
troops and 35 35 Slovenian combatants were
Slovenian combatants were numbered
numbered
63

Negovanovic
Negovanovic thatthat evening presented
presented a deadline of headed
headed back toward the Croatian border. Most of the
the Croatian the
0900 hours the following morning
the following morning for acceptance
acceptance of JNA
JNA units’
units' Slovene
Slovene soldiers
soldiers by this time had deserted.
deserted,
the
the 12 Slovenian parliament met
12 conditions. The Slovenian met and the remaining troops—mostly
the remaining troops-mostly Serbs—were
Serbs-were intent
through most of that
that night to consider its options, vot-
vot only on getting out of Slovenia
only Slovenia with
with their lives
lives and
the JNA
ing early in the morning to reject the JNA ultimatum.H3
ultimatum. 113 preferably their equipment. The
The column
column advanced
about 60 kilometers the Ljubljana-Zagreb
kilometers along the Ljubljana-Zagreb high
high-
Scattered fighting continued on 30 June
Scattered fighting June as the JNA’s
JNA's without incident, but then encountered aa barri
way without
way barri-
acceptance of its cease-fire
unilateral deadline for acceptance cade of trucks near a woodline town of
woodline outside the town
terms came and went. Air
terms Air raid warnings
warnings sent
sent the
the popu
popu- Krsko. Surrounded
Surrounded in the Krakovski
in the Krakovski Gozd
Gozd (Krakovski
(Krakovski
lation of Ljubljana
Ljubljana underground in the morning.
morning, but Forest) to surrender, almost certainly
the unit refused to
Forest) the certainly
the planes were evidently recalled by Federal Prime Prime hoping for help from
from a relief
relief column.
column.
Minister Markovic
Minister Markovic shortly
shortly after takeoff. and the alarm
ended soon after 1000
I 000 hours. While this was going
going on. Also on 1I July,
July. Col. Gen.
Gen. Konrad
Konrad Kolsek (a Slovene)
Slovene)
Slovene forces mortared the runway the JNA-held
runway at the was removed fromfrom command of the JNA JNA Fifth Mili
Mili-
Cerklje airfield in an effort
Cerklje airfield effort to knock
knock out the landing
the landing tary District. He was replaced by Col. Gen.
District. He Gen. Zivota
Zivota
radar. Avramovic—a
Avramovic-a Serb who who had previously
previously commanded
District in southern Yugoslavia
the Third Military District Yugoslavia and
Meanwhile. the surrounded JJNA
Meanwhile. NA garrisons in their as an
enjoyed a reputation as an uncompromising
uncompromising hardliner.
hardliner.
barracks and at the the border crossings continued under
blockade, lacking
lacking electricity.
electricity, running short on food. food.
without guidance from
and sometimes without from above. Not Not sur
sur- The
The Debate Offstage—the
Debate Offstage-the JNA
JNA Considers
Considers Massive
Massive
prisingly, there were more surrenders
prisingly, there surrenders and desertions Intervention
Intervention
from the J NA forces over the
the JNA the weekend. The Slove
The Slove-
nians scored a major success when the the entire garrison As the sputtered on, the JNA—repre
cease-fire talks sputtered
the cease-fire JNA-repre-
of the Dravograd BorderBorder Guard Battalion surrendered,
Battalion surrendered. sented by Defense Minister
sented Minister Kadijevic—was
Kadijevic-was lobbying
lobbying
with 16
with officers and over 400 troops. '4 Slovenian unsuccessfully for an an all-out
all-out assault with
with the three
16 officers troops.‘ 114 Slovenian unsuccessfully three-
forces also took control of the garrisons at Tolmin and fold-objective
fold-objective of subduing Slovenia,
Slovenia, preserving the
Bovec (the llst
Bovee Battalions of the
st and 2nd Battalions JNA 345th
the JNA territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,
territorial Yugoslavia. and restoring the
Alpine Brigade,
Alpine Brigade, respectively) gaining more much much- JNA’s
JNA's prestige. In a cabinet meeting on 30 June, June,
needed arms.
needed Kadijevic
Kadijevic expressed
expressed thejudgment the JNA's
the judgment that the JNA's first
first
plan—a
plan-a limited
limited operation toto secure Slovenia’s
Slovenia's border
Scattered fighting resumed on 1l July despite the
Scattered fighting the crossings-had
crossings—had failed.
failed. It
It was therefore time to imple
imple-
ostensible cease-fire. TheThe day began spectacularly ment the JNA’s
JNA's second plan: a full-scale
full-scale invasion
invasion and
J NA ammunition depot caught fire and blew
when a JNA blew occupation of Slovenia.
Slovenia. To Kadijevic’s
Kadijevic's amazement,
amazement.
up. destroying thethe Crni Vrh arms depot and damaging the cabinet (then still headed by Serbia’s
Serbia's Borisav
Borisav
the town of that
most of the name."5
that name. 11' Through fighting or
Through fighting Jovic) decided otherwise.H7
otherwise. 117
negotiation. Slovenian forces regained control
negotiation, Slovenian control of the
Ratece. Korensko
Korensko Sedlo, Ljubelj, and Karavanke
Karavanke tuntun- General Adzic went public
public on 22 July to express his
nel border crossings. The Slovenians
Slovenians also inherited and the Army’s
Army's frustration with the federal govern
with the govern-
some 70 truckloads of ammunition and explosives ment and its policies—directly
policies-directly criticizing the Yugo
criticizing the Yugo-
from captured JNA JNA depots at Pecovnik.
Pecovnik. Bukovzlak,
Bukovzlak. slav political
political leadership:
and Zaloska Gorica.""
Zaloska Gorica. 11h
The
The federal organs continually
federal organs continually hampered
hampered us,
us,
That same
same day the
the column of 12
column of 12 BOV-3
BOV-3 self-propelled
self-propelled negotiations while
demanding negotiations
demanding [the Slove
while they [the Slove-
antiaircraft guns from the 306th Light Air
Air Defense nians] were
were attacking with all
attacking us with all means/’8
means. nx
Artillery Regiment-which
Artillery Regiment—which had been the JNA
the first JNA
the border from
unit to cross the Slovenia in
from Croatia into Slovenia in
the early hours ofof 27 June—now turned around and
27 June-now
64

Even
Even the Slovenians expected a larger
the Slovenians JNA counter-
JNA counter longer term. By all accounts the military
Slovenian military
the Slovenian
stroke than eventually
eventually materialized. During the
materialized. During the lull and people were prepared to carry on a partisan-style,
a
it,
that preceded it, analysts of the Slovenian military
the Slovenian military hit-and-run military
hit-and-run military campaign against a JNA JNA occupa-
occupa
a
intelligence staff in Ljubljana
intelligence assessment
Ljubljana produced an assessment tion force indefinitely . Under
force almost indefinitely. circum
Under such circum-
that the NA would
the JNA deploy two main battle formations
would deploy formations stances, probably
stances, probably the
the best that
that Belgrade could
Belgrade could
J
in
in two
two phases whose final final objective would be
objective would be nothing
nothing realistically have hoped for was a short-term military
realistically military
a
the occupation of the
less than the the entire renegade
renegade repub
repub- success that would
would have allowed
allowed thethe federal govem
govern-
lic. In the
lic. the first
first phase, the Slovenians expected six JNA
the Slovenians JNA ment toto negotiate from
from a dominating
dominating position.
position. Once
a
motorized
motorized or mountain brigades supported by two the situation had reached the
the level of war,
the level war, and without
without
engineer regiments to advance to a line Maribor
line Maribor- the political willingness
the political willingness to occupy Slovenia outright
occupy Slovenia
a
Celje-Grosuplje-Vrhnika-Postojna-Sezana. . Achieve-
Celje-Grosuplje-Vrhnika-Postojna-Sezana Achieve and indefinitely, the best the
indefinitely, the JNA might have won
the JNA won for
ment of this phase wouldwould almost exactly bisect the the would have been the
its government would possibility of dic-
the possibility dic
country along a diagonal line running southwest to
line running to tating the
the terms of Slovenia's secession, , but
Slovenia’s eventual secession
a
northeast. In the the second phase,

phase. the Slovenians
the Slovenians no more than that.
that.
expected three more brigades and two parachute bat- bat
talions
talions to spearhead attack, with
spearhead a further attack, with two
two more
a
brigades and another engineer regiment held in The Battle Resumes:

Resumes: Tuesday, July—
Tuesday, 2 July-
2
would most likely have com-
reserve.. This attack would
reserve com Thursday, July
Thursday, 4 July
4
menced in the the Ljubljana-Postojna
Ljubljana-Postojna area with
in
with the
the objec
objec-
tive of occupying
occupying the the remainder of the republic.""
the republic. 119 the uneasy three-day lull from
After the June through
from 29 June
I July, open warfare July.. That
warfare resumed on 2 July That morning,
morning,
1
2
What
What might have happened if the NA had actually
the JNA General Adzic formally
formally opened thethe hostilities with a
hostilities with
if
a
J
mounted a campaign like like the

the one postulated by the the statement delivered to and aimed at the
blunt statement the rebel
a
Slovenian analysts? Drawing

Slovenian Drawing only from units in
only from in and Slovenes:
Slovenes:
adjacent to Slovenia.
Slovenia. the JNA had almost five
the JNA five corps it
it
could have employed in such an enterprise. Two sta- strike so that the
We will strike the war imposed
imposed on us is as
in
could
is
sta We
tioned in Slovenia
Slovenia were already engaged (the 14th 14th in short possible .... . we will
short as possible. find even those who
ll'illfind who
Ljubljana JNA drew are now
now hiding in
in their
their holes ll'e will
. ... we will estah-
in
Ljubljana and the the 31st st in Maribor).

Maribor). The JNA are holes estab
1
3
.
some elements from from thethe three other corps in the Fifth
in the lish control and bring
lish things to an
bring things .
an end.”'
end.'"
Military District,
District, but the sent included
the total sent included only
only parts
of four brigades and one air defense regiment.‘20 ,o
regiment. 1 Full Several more JNA JNA garrisons had surrendered to
mobilization
mobilization of the 14th and 31st Corps
the 14th Corps, , plus major Slovenian TO
Slovenian TO forces during
during the the intermittent fighting
fighting
elements of the adjacent 10th, 13th, and 32nd Corps.
10th, 13th, Corps, between the morning of 29 June
the morning June and nightfall
nightfall on
would have given the
would the JNA NA at least 60 60,000
,000 troops to July.. By the
I July the time serious fighting
fighting resumed on 2 July.
2 July,
1
J
put into
into the field. However,
the field. mobilization of the
However. mobilization the the Slovenians
the Slovenians had through negotiation or combat
reservists to to fill
fill out these probably would
these corps probably would have control over a bit more than half
regained control the border
half the
a
‘23When
been impossible
impossible because of the the unlikelihood
unlikelihood that Slo- Slo crossings. 122 i,.1
crossings.‘22 Slovenian forces energetically
When Slovenian energetically
Croatian reservists would
venian and Croatian would have responded resumed the offensive at all
the offensive all points on 2 July, it was too
it
2
to a callup,
callup, combined with with the level of desertions
the high level much for most of the exhausted, surrounded, block
the exhausted, block-
a
from units.. In any event.

event, if the aded, and demoralized JNA outposts
demoralized JNA outposts. . In less than a
in
from conscripts already in units

if
the
a
JNA were able to

JNA to provide
provide the the personnel, man for man, day, the Slovenians captured all but a few of the
the Slovenians the
a
this would
would have given the the JNA
JNA parity or only only a slight remaining border posts.‘2“JNA
remaining garrisons in the
posts . 1' 4 JNA garrisons the sur
sur-
a
numerical
numerical advantage
advantage against the the fully mobilized Slov
mobilized Slov- rounded barracks were giving giving up as well. On On 2 July
2
enian TO. But, But, in

in strictly military terms, the
strictly military the JNA’s
JNA's the JNA
the Skofja Loka (home of the
caseme at Skofja
JNA caserne the 3rd Bat
Bat-
greater number of tanks, artillery,
vastly greater fighting vehi
artillery, fighting vehi- talion the 345th Alpine Brigade,
talion of the Brigade, two
two other battal
battal-
cles, and aircraft would
cles. would have made such a contest ions having surrendered on 30 June)
ions already having June) turned
a
completely unequal.
completely over the facility to forces of the
the facility the 3rd (Gorenjska)
(Gorenjska)
Regional Detachment.
Regional
Even the JNA
Even had the five full corps into Slovenia
thrown five
JNA thrown Slovenia
and occupied every key facility
facility in
in the republic. it
the republic,
it
probably “won” the

probably could not have "won" conflict in
the conflict in the
the
65

One particularly
particularly violent continued at Ajsevica
violent clash continued TO barricades
TO approximately 22 km
barricades approximately km outside
outside the town
town
near Nova Gorica (the site of a JNA JNA ammo
ammo dump),
dump), Brezice . The JNA
of Brezice. JNA forces were driving westward
forces were westward to to
ending
ending late in the
the day with
with the the Yugo
the surrender of the Yugo- rescue the retreating
retreating elements 306th Light Air
elements of the 306th Air
slav contingent.
contingent. The
The long-contested
long-contested Sentilj
Sentilj border
border Defense Regiment, which were
Defense Artillery Regiment, were still trapped
crossing finally went to the Slovenian
crossing finally Slovenian forces
forces after they in the
in the Krakovski Gozd.Gozd. One the M-84
One of the M-84 tanks waswas
the guns of captured JNA
turned the JNA T-55
T-55 tanks on the
the blown apart by by an antitank mine
an antitank mine and twotwo of the
the M-60
M-60
surrounded JNA
surrounded JNA contingent.
contingent. The
The press reported concon- APCs
APCs were
were destroyed
destroyed in in minutes
minutes byby Armbrust
Armbrust anti
anti-
fighting near the
tinued fighting Fernetici border
the Fernetici border crossing.
crossing. tank rockets
tank rockets fired
fired at close range . JNA
close range. JNA air
air attacks were
were
called in but failed
called in failed to break
break up the barricades
barricades or
or to dis
dis-
JNA combat aircraft
JNA aircraft went back into action
action on 2 2 July,
July, lodge
lodge Slovenian
Slovenian TO positions. The JNA
TO positions. JNA advance
advance waswas
targeting the radio
radio and television
television transmitters at cold, with
stopped cold, with dead and wounded
wounded soldiers
soldiers littered
littered
Nanos, Krvavec, Boc,
Nanos, Krvavec, Domazle. Ljubljana castle,
Boe, Domazle, castle , and around the
around burning vehicles.
the burning vehicles.
Pohorje damaging several of them. Ljubljana air-
Pohorje and damaging air
field was
field was again bombed,
bombed. despite verbal
verbal assurances object of the rescuers
The object rescuer s ambushed and routed routed near
from Federal
from Prime Minister Markovic to Slovenian
Federal Prime Slovenian Brezice. the retreating
Brezice. column of the 306th
retreating column 306th Light
President Kucan on 29 June that there would be
President be no
no Antiaircraft Regiment
Antiaircraft Regiment in in the Krakovski Gozd,Gozd, shortly
shortly
further Slovenia. . Tactical
further air raids against Slovenia Tactical airstrikes
airstrikes afterward
afterward foundfound itself surrounded
surrounded and attacked by by
Slovenian-held barracks
hit Slovenian-held Kocevska Reka
barracks at Kocevska Reka and the the Slovenian TO’s
elements of the Slovenian 2nd (Doljenska)
TO's 2nd (Doljenska)
barricades
barricades established Catez, Krakovski Gozd, and
established at Catez, Regional Detachment.
Regional Detachment. The Slovenian forces
The Slovenian forces opened
opened
Dravograd.
Dravograd. Despite JNA’s fairly vigorous
Despite the JNA's vigorous applica-
applica fire
fire on the
the blockaded
blockaded vehicles
vehicles with
with two
two 82-mm
82-mm recoil
recoil-
tion of airpower.
tion airpower, it was
was only moderately successful in
moderately successful in rifles, Armbrust
less rifles, launchers, and rifle
rocket launchers,
Armbrust rocket rifle gre
gre-
silencing Slovenian broadcasts
silencing Slovenian broadcasts and breaking down
breaking down One JNA
nades. One JNA BOV-3
BOV-3 antiaircraft
antiaircraft vehicle
vehicle was was
blockades.
blockades. blown up by an an Armbrust rocket, aa rifle
Armbrust rocket, rifle grenade dam dam-
aged another,
another. and a third fire. The JNA
third caught fire. JNA lostlost
Adzic’s threatening public
Adzic's public statement was made hol hol- four men—two
men-two killed and two two wounded—in
wounded-in the three
low by
by the
the simple
simple fact that by 2 2 July mobile JJNA
July most mobile NA vehicles . During the
damaged vehicles. JNA troops
the day, the JNA troops
forces Slovenia were
forces within Slovenia were attempting to to advance succeed in disarming a mine
in disarming mine blocking
blocking the road
road but
east themselves from
east and extricate themselves from the country
country, . while were
were unable to to clear
clear the barricade
barricade behind
behind it.it. The con
con-
JNA reinforcements
JNA reinforcements from
from the 10th and 32nd
the 10th Corps in
32nd Corps in commander called
voy commander
voy called for air support from
air support from twotwo MiG
MiG-
Croatia were
Croatia being mobilized
were being mobilized and sent westward only
sent westward only 21’s
21 and two
'sand two Jastreb aircraft, which attempted unsuc
Jastreb aircraft, unsuc-
JNA’s "second
to try to rescue them. The JNA's
to “second offensive"
offensive" cessfully
cessfully to to clear
clear the road
road with rocket attacks. The
with rocket
was really half-measure whose
really a half-measure whose purpose
purpose was hardly
hardly convoy advanced some distance into
convoy country late
into open country
more than the rescue of JNAJ NA forces
forces already
already committed
committed in
in the day but was was forced
forced to to stop for the night.
night.
now the JNA
Slovenia. . By now
and trapped in Slovenia JNA victory
victory orig-
orig
inally envisaged almost beyond
envisaged was almost beyond imagining.
imagining. Yet
Yet another reinforcement
reinforcement column
column of 20 to 25
25 tanks
tanks
from the 32nd
from the 32nd Mechanized Brigade departed Varazdin
Mechanized Brigade Varazdin
In Croatia
In column of 80 tanks,
Croatia a large column tanks. infantry fight-
infantry fight in Croatia on 2
in Croatia 2 July,
July, arriving in Ljutomir en route to
arriving in to
ing
ing vehicles (IFVs), and other vehicles'25
vehicles (IFVs), vehicles 125 was
was seen join brigade
brigade forces
forces at the Gornja Radgona
at the Radgona border
border post.
post.
'26
126 '27
leaving
leaving thethe Marshal barracks in Zagreb
Marshal Tito barracks Zagreb (home
(home of Even as they moved,
127 Even moved. however,
however, 13 tanks of the
13 tanks the
140th Mechanized
the 140th Mechanized Brigade) heading west on
Brigade) and heading 32nd Mech—blockaded
32nd Mech-blockaded at bridge and
at the Ormoz bridge
July.. Toward the end of the
2 July the day itit crossed the border
border unable
unable even toto cross into Slovenia—gave up and
into Slovenia-gave
into Slovenia and camped for the
into Slovenia the night Bregana. It
night at Bregana. It turned around
around after blasting the area with
blasting the with their
their heavy
heavy
fired on the town
fired town of Gornja Vas Vas the
the following mommorn- The third
guns . 128The
guns.‘28 deployed element
third deployed of the
the brigade—
brigade-
ing,
ing, but accomplished little else.
accomplished little the roughly APCs that had set
roughly 30 APCs set out on the first
first night
night
of the war—must
war-must have received order to withdraw,
an order
received an withdraw .
July, another column
Also on 2 July, column of vehicles
vehicles (from the
(from the and it abandoned the hard-contested at Gornja
hard-contested post at
Armored Brigade)
4th Armored Brigade) departed from Jastrebarsko. .
from Jastrebarsko
The brigade's vehicles (M-84 and T-55
brigade’s vehicles tanks,
T-55 tanks.
accompanied by M-80 IFVs
accompanied IFVs and M-60 armored per-per
carriers) attempted to advance past Slovenian
sonnel carriers)
sonnel Slovenian
66

Radgona."
Radgona.‘299 With thethe mechanized unit already
mechanized unit already at the
the (ironically,, the
(ironically “Brotherhood and Unity”
the "Brotherhood Unity" highway)
highway)
border pulling out, further
further reinforcement
reinforcement from
from Varaz
Varaz- destined for the
and appeared destined fighting. i,o In the
the fighting.130 the end,
din became pointless
pointless. . The
The day 's fighting
day’s fighting had cost the
the however, the JNA’s
however, the JNA's giant armored fist—from
giant armored fist-from the the lst
1st
JNA IO
JNA 10 killed and 13 13 wounded,
wounded, according
according to the
the Guards Mechanized Division—was
Guards Mechanized actually part of
Division-was actually
Federal
Federal Defense
Defense Ministry. the JNA preparations
the JNA preparations for thethe looming
looming war in Croatia
war in Croatia
and ended up parked
parked along the Serbian-Croatian
along the Serbian-Croatian bor-bor
Probably
Probably thethe most serious
serious obstacle to to JNA
JNA withdrawal
withdrawal der and did participate in
did not participate in the Slovenian conflict
the Slovenian conflict at
at
throughout
throughout the conflict was Slovenian
the conflict Slovenian insistence that
insistence that all. u1
all.l3l
JNA personnel
JNA personnel leaveleave the
the republic that J
republic but that NA equip-
JNA equip
ment remain behind. . In most cases, federal
remain behind federal troops The Sturm und Drang of the
The Sturm JNA column
the huge JNA column depart-
depart
refused to surrender theirtheir weapons.
weapons. Slovenian
Slovenian Defense
Defense ing Belgrade actually
ing Belgrade actually rang downdown thethe curtain
curtain on its Slo
on its Slo-
J ansa maintained
Minister Jansa maintained the the official position
position on venian drama, for military
venian military operations
operations had effectively
effectively
2 July that
that the
the troops must leave their weapons
weapons behind
behind ceased. The
The battles at thethe Brezice
Brezice crossing
crossing and in in the
the
when
when vacating
vacating the republic and asserted that
the republic that Ljubljana Krakovski Gozd—both conclusive defeats for the
Gozd-both conclusive the
would claim
claim thethe equipment
equipment as "war “war reparations
reparations”" for JNA—proved to
JNA-proved to be the
the largest
largest and bloodiest
bloodiest clashes
inflicted by the
damages inflicted the Army during
during the
the fighting.
fighting. the brief conflict.
of the conflict. When
When the the 32nd Mechanized Bri
32nd Mechanized Bri-
gade
gade’s's withdrew
withdrew fromfrom the Gomja Radgona
the Gornja Radgona post, the the
Slovenian
Slovenian TO commander
commander Janez Slapar Slapar and newly
newly J NA had already surrendered
JNA surrendered control the last border
control of the border
appointed District commander
appointed Fifth Military District commander crossing
crossing to Slovenians. With the
the Slovenians.
to the Slovenians in
the Slovenians in
Avramovic exchanged
exchanged newnew cease-fire
cease-fire terms on the the possession
possession of all all major objectives and the
major objectives the JNA
JNA with
with-
afternoon
afternoon of 2 July but could
could not come to to agreement. drawing
drawing to its bases or over the border,
over the the military
border, the military
Slovenian
Slovenian Prime Minister
Prime Mini ster Peterle
Peterle nevertheless contest was essentially
essentially decided
decided. . The
The war
war would go on
decided to announce a unilateral
to announce unilateral four-point cease-fire
four-point cease-fire for another week,
week, but it was was to bebe contested at thethe
offer effective
offer effective at 2100 hours
hours local
local time by which the the negotiating table and not on the
negotiating the battlefield.
battlefield.
JNA could
JNA could withdraw
withdraw unchallenged
unchallenged into into barracks
barracks with
with
its weapons.
weapons. Nothing
Nothing came of the proposal, but the
the proposal, the A tentative cease-fire took effect
cease-fire took effect on the
the evening
evening of
Slovenians
Slovenians scored a propaganda
propaganda coupcoup when
when thethe Army The Yugoslav
3 July. The
3 Collective Presidency
Yugoslav Collective Presidency called
called
ignored
ignored the offer.
the offer. upon Slovenia
upon Slovenia to all JNA
to release all units,, prisoners,
JNA units prisoners , and
equipment,
equipment, to withdraw Slovenian
to withdraw Slovenian militia by by noon
noon on
Sometime during
Sometime during thethe night July, Major Bosko
night of 2-3 July. 4th,, to lift all
the 4th
the blockades by
all blockades the 5th, and to relin
by the relin-
Prodanovic, , the
Prodanovic commander of the
the commander the wandering
wandering convoy
convoy quish control over the
quish control the border
border posts by the 7th. The
by the The
BOV-3’s from
of BOV-3's the 306th Light Air
from the Defense Artil
Air Defense Artil- Slovenes agreed only
Slovenes to release JNA
only to JNA prisoners
prisoners and to
Regiment, heard by radio
lery Regiment, radio that the
the rescue column
column allow JJNANA garrison
garrison units to return
return toto barracks
barrack s with
with
from 4th Armored
from Armored Brigade, which they were attempt-
Brigade, which attempt their arms. On July the
On 4 July the terms of yet another cease cease-
ing with, had been driven
ing to link up with, back. Major
driven back. fire were
fire were arranged, and the the JNA
JNA began withdrawing
withdrawing to to
Prodanovic reluctantly
Prodanovic concluded that
reluctantly concluded that further
further road
road its barracks.
barracks . Debate continued
continued at at the highest levels
the highest levels of
movement was
movement impossible, , and his
was impossible his troops abandoned government, but the
government. military situation
the military situation on the
the ground
ground
the
the 12 antiaircraft vehicles
12 antiaircraft vehicles during
during the
the night with all
night with all had reached its denouement.
dénouement.
their weapons ammunition. The
weapons and ammunition. The crews
crews escaped the the
immediate area on foot
immediate foot but were
were eventually
eventually captured
Slovenian special
by Slovenian police near Krsko.
special police Negotiation, Internationalization,
Internationalization, and Conclusion:
Conclusion:
J uly-Wednesday, 10
Friday, 5 July-Wednesday,
Friday, July
10 July
In the small hours of the
the small the morning
morning on 3 3 July, a massive
massive
column—approximately 150
armored column-approximately 150 vehicles
vehicles of all Although tensions remained high
tensions remained high in around
in and around
types-began
types—began rolling through
through the
the streets of Belgrade
Belgrade Slovenia,
Slovenia. open hostilities
hostilities actually did cease from
actually did from
itself, , amidst cheers of support from
itself from the
the city's
city’s July onward.
4 July onward. From 5 JulyJuly through
through 77 July
July intema
interna -
residents. TheThe column
column departed the city headed north-
the city north tional diplomats
tional mediating aa debate of
diplomats began mediating of terms of
west on the the main from Belgrade
main road from Belgrade to Zagreb
to Zagreb
67

reference toward an Formal negotiations
an agreement. Formal negotiations Chapter
Chapter 55
began 7 July on the Adriatic island island of Brioni. At At the
the Goliath Defeated: What
Goliath Defeated: What Went Wrong in
Went Wrong the JNA?
in the JNA?
Brioni talks, representatives of the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav Federal
Federal
government,
government, the Slovenians, and the Croatians
the Slovenians, Croatians met This intervention
This intervention is the beginning
is the beginning of
of the end
end for
for
under the auspices of a team of European European Community
Community the Yugoslav
Yugoslav Army.
Army.
foreign
foreign ministers
ministers making
making their third
third visit
visit to Yugosla-
Yugosla
via. After little
little more than three days of intense negoti- negoti Janez Jansa,
Janez Jansa, June
June 199 It))
1991133
ations—a very brief

ations-a brief time, by the later standards of
Balkan peace talks—the
Balkan talks-the Brioni Accord was signed on Jansa was right.
Jansa was right. When the JNA
When the took on Slovenia,
JNA took Slovenia, itit
10 July 1991. In it all
10 Yugoslav parties agreed to
all of the Yugoslav ended up tearing itself
itself apart.
start negotiations
negotiations on the the country's future by 1I August
country’s future August
1991, accept EC EC monitors,
monitors, lift the blockades of Army
the blockades looked like a David and Goliath
In what looked Goliath confrontation
confrontation
facilities, restrict the Army to its barracks, and deacti-
facilities, deacti in Slovenia,
in clearly emerged victorious
Slovenia, David had clearly victorious and
“militias.” Within hours of the final
vate ''militias." cease-fire,
final cease-fire, Goliath
Goliath had quit the field in
quit the disgrace. How and why
in disgrace. why
federal troops in Slovenia
Slovenia began helping land
helping to clear land- did
did the
the JNA fail? The
JNA The question
question is
is not as
as simple as itit
simple as
mines sown
sown during
during the conflict.
conflict. The Slovenians, how
The Slovenians, how- might seem, and there are
might number of answers.
are aa number answers. The
The
ever,
ever. never did make good their pledge to to return JNA went into
JNA into the conflict
conflict because it was the only
was the
equipment captured from JNA.
the JNA.
from the instrument available for the task of bringing
instrument available bringing Slovenia
Slovenia
into line. But it was
into line. was the wrong instrument: the JNA’s
wrong instrument: JNA's
When
When all the the bodies were counted, casualties in Slove
in Slove- fundamental problem was
fundamental problem was that it had been directed
directed to
nia were remarkably rivers of
light—in contrast to the rivers
remarkably light-in impose military solution
impose a military solution on what
what had become
become an an
blood would later flow
blood that would flow in Croatia and Bosnia.
in Croatia Bosnia. intractable political
intractable problem. If
political problem. If anything,
anything, the
Forty-four
Forty—four JNA JNA soldiers
soldiers were killed during
during the con-
con Slovenians arguably benefited
Slovenians arguably benefited by limited JNA
by aa limited JNA
flict, and 187
flict, 187 were wounded.
wounded. Almost incredibly,
incredibly, only
only intervention, for Yugoslav military
intervention, military action
action instantly
instantly
Slovenian soldiers
eight Slovenian policemen were
soldiers or policemen were killed in galvanized public
galvanized support for Slovenia
public support Slovenia and intemainterna-
the fighting.
fighting. Perhaps 15 civilians were
15 civilians were killed as tionalized
tionalized what
what had previously
previously been an internal Yugo
an internal Yugo-
we!J.132
well.132 slav political dispute.
slav political dispute. The conventional wisdom
The conventional wisdom is is that
that
the federal
the government declared
federal government declared warwar on the SloveSlove-
Slovenia was not about Slov
In many ways the war in Slovenia Slov- nians
nians and waswas the first apply force—which
first to apply force-which may may bebe
The real issue from
enia at all. The the very start was
from the was not correct. But it is probably
technically correct.
technically probably more more accurate to
the independence of Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia’s constituent repub
repub- that the Slovenians
say that Slovenians had built
built and set a mousetrap
set a mousetrap
lics per se but rather what would happen to the Serbs
lics INA, then baited the
for the JNA, the Belgrade leadership until
Belgrade leadership until
Bosnia if
Croatia and Bosnia
of the large ethnic enclaves in Croatia if it sent the JNA
JNA walking
walking into
into it.
those republics from the Serbian
republics separated from Serbian homeland.
homeland.
Once Belgrade
Once independence to the Slovenian
Belgrade granted independence Slovenian Implicit in
in the conventional
conventional wisdom
wisdom is the notion
notion that
that
Republic with
Republic with no alterations in its borders, the
the prece-
prece the
the JNA set out with
JNA set superior force,
with a superior intending or
force, intending or at
at
would be set for Croatia
dent would Bosnia, whose
Croatia and Bosnia, whose bor-
bor least ready to wage an an all-out
all-out war to crush
war and to crush the
the
numerous Serb-majority
ders encompassed numerous Serb-majority regions.
regions. Slovenian opposition if
Slovenian opposition that should
if that necessary; but
should be necessary;
The failure
The failure to deal with
with the underlying
underlying question of almost every aspect of this
almost perception turns out to be
this perception
minority self-determination within the boundaries
minority self-determination boundaries of incorrect in
incorrect way. The
in some way. The numbers
numbers do do much to tell
much to tell
republics was to have horrifying
seceding republics conse
horrifying conse- story. The JNA
the story. eventually had to withdraw
JNA eventually withdraw some
some
quences only months later when when Croatia Bosnia—
Croatia and Bosnia- 22,000
22,000 to 24,000 from Slovenia,
24,000 troops from Slovenia, a figure
figure that
that
forced by
their hands forced declaration—
Slovenia’s declaration-
by Slovenia's gives how much
gives some idea of how much force Belgrade could
force Belgrade could
own independence without
declared their own without any provi-
provi have employed
employed if
if it had been absolutely
absolutely determined.
determined.
resolving the status of their Serb
sion for resolving minorities.
Serb minorities. The JNA
JNA actually deployed, however,
actually deployed, however, no
no more
more than
Slovenia won
Slovenia won its independence quickly and on the the
cheap, but its neighbors would pay aa steep

neighbors would steep price inin
Slovenia’s
blood and treasure as a consequence of Slovenia's
blood
actions.
68

3,000 of these troops
3,000 troops into
into combat
combat during the I10-day
0-day The JNA’s airpower
The JNA's airpower waswas also
also largely
largely ineffective
ineffective in the
in
during the the
conflict. The
conflict. The Slovenians,
Slovenians, byby contrast,
contrast, mobilized
mobilized and conflict. Had
conflict. Had it chosen
chosen to. the Yugoslav
to, the Yugoslav military
military had
it
deployed
deployed more 30,000 troops
more than 30,000 troops during
during the
the same enough
enough aircraft
aircraft and bombs
bombs to to lay
lay waste
waste Slovenia’s
Slovenia ·s
period.
period. In what
what appears at first
first glance
glance to be a David cities
cities or military
military facilities.
facilities. Widespread destruction of
Widespread destruction
and Goliath struggle.
struggle, David actually
actually had more
more than I10
0 civil targets would again have have served no no purpose,
purpose. elic-
elic
times as many
many troops in the field as Goliath did.
the field did. ited international
international outrage,
outrage. and further
further rallied the popu
rallied the popu-
lation
lation against the the federal authorities. JNA
federal authorities. JNA aircraft
aircraft had
Although the the Yugoslav Army had an an overwhelming
overwhelming some success in striking critical infrastructure
in striking infrastructure targets,
targets ,
advantage in heavy heavy equipment-tanks,
equipment—tanks, armored
armored vehi-
vehi primarily telecommunications
telecommunications towers The JNA
towers. . The JNA Air
cles, artillery,
artillery, and aircraft-this
aircraft—this was not the the force
force it and Air Defense
Defense (RV (RV i PVO)
PYO) Force
Force proved
proved almost
almost
i
needed for the the mission
mission it was assigned.
assigned. The JNA
The JNA completely
completely ineffective,
ineffective, however,
however, when
when it attempted to to
it
found itself fighting
found fighting a type of warfare
warfare it was
was not support
support the JNA Ground
the JNA Forces in
Ground Forces in tactical
tactical operations.
operations.
designed
designed for against an opponentopponent it had not expected It had neither the types of munitions
neither the nor the
munitions nor the many
many
It
to
to fight.
fight. The JNA was
The JNA was intended
intended to conventional,
be a conventional.
to be hours training it would have
hours of training have required
required to effectively
effectively
it
armor-mechanized fighting
armor-mechanized fighting force
force that
that would engage advancing JNA
support advancing
support JNA troops
troops engaged at at close dis-
close dis
similar opponents
similar opponents in in open battle Instead, it confronted
battle.. Instead. confronted tances against Slovenian
Slovenian light
light infantry
infantry forces fighting
forces fighting
the
the Slovenian Territorial Defense-a
Slovenian Territorial Defense—a semiconven-
semiconven from
from covered positions. As
covered positions. As often as not,
not, the RV i PVO
the RV PYO
i
tional, partisan-type
tional. partisan-type forceforce that could
could fight where it
fight where it ended up striking nearby civilian targets or the
striking nearby NA‘s
the JNA's
J
chose and avoidavoid battle when could not win. The
when it could own forces by accident.
own forces accident.
JNA had been devised,
JNA built, and trained
devised, built, trained to fight a
to fight
mobile war
mobile war involving holding
holding actions
actions against superior
superior Given the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav military’s
military ' s almost unsolvable
almost unsolvable
conventional
conventional forcesforces but with
with the
the support
support of the
the local
local dilemmas of available
dilemmas available force
force versus
versus assigned missions,
assigned missions.
population. Instead,
population. Instead, the JNA advanced
the JNA advanced against a the JNA further
the JNA further compounded
compounded its its problems
problems withwith a
a
small, elusive
small, force, fighting
elusive force, fighting ambushes at locations
locations of series of serious failures in
serious failures in both
both planning
planning and
the
the enemy's
enemy’s choosing
choosing and perforce
perforce acting
acting as anan execution.
execution. These mistakes began
These mistakes began long
long before
before the
the
occupying
occupying army surrounded by
army surrounded hostile nation.
by a hostile nation. conflict, with
conflict, with intelligence
intelligence failures
failures and fundamentally
fundamentally
flawed working assumptions.
flawed assumptions. Poorly thought-out
thought-out
it,
With thethe number

number of troops
troops made available
available to it. thethe operational planning led
operational planning led to units
units being surrounded and
being surrounded
NA in Slovenia
JNA Slovenia had no no hope of isolating
isolating and destroy-
destroy cut off without plans for escape or
without plans or relief.
relief. Careless
Careless and
J
TO’s formations,
ing the TO's formations, whichwhich inin practical
practical terms left left haphazard logistic planning
haphazard planning left
left these
these surrounded
surrounded
the JNA always
the JNA always on the the defensive.
defensive. The JNA failed
The JNA failed toto units in untenable
units untenable positions
positions when
when their
their equipment
equipment
anticipate that it would be
anticipate surrounded and deprived
be surrounded deprived of broke down
broke down and supplies
supplies ran out.
out. When
When things
things began
began
it
mobility
mobility. . Its armored
armored columns
columns became little little more than to go wrong
wrong for the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav military,
military, the
the simple fact
simple fact
moving
moving targets, usually
usually with nothing for their heavy
with nothing heavy emerged that the JNA’s heart was
the JNA's was not in this war,
in this war,
weapons
weapons to engage, since since there were
were no comparable
comparable whereas
whereas thethe Slovenian
Slovenian TO TO had both
both discipline
discipline and
Slovenian forces
Slovenian forces to meet and destroydestroy.. When
When barribarri- motivation.
motivation.
caded in along
along the roads, the
the roads. the JNA’s armored vehicles
JNA's armored vehicles
frequently
frequently became not merely merely useless but in fact lia
fact lia- Slovenia—unlike Croatia later on—KOS
in
In Slovenia-unlike Croatia later on-KOS failed

failed
bilities, , vulnerable
bilities vulnerable to hand-held
hand-held antitank rockets. JNA
antitank rockets. JNA disastrously
disastrously inin its
its mission
mission of providing
providing timely
timely and
armored forces
armored forces had the firepower to destroy
the firepower whole
destroy whole accurate intelligence
intelligence on opposition capabilities and
opposition capabilities
villages, but—as the
villages, but-as the US US military
military eventually
eventually had plans. From mid-1990
plans. mid-1990 onward, the Slovenians
onward. the Slovenians were
were
Vietnam—such actions
discovered in Vietnam-such actions are ultimately step ahead of KOS
in
discovered ultimately one step KOS both strategically and tacti

both strategically tacti-
counterproductive.
counterproductive. The The fewfew times
times the JNA attempted
the JNA cally.
cally. Strategically, KOS assessed incorrectly
Strategically, KOS incorrectly that
that the
the
to apply
to massive firepower,
apply massive firepower, it only infuriated the
only infuriated local
the local
it
populace and made a political settlement even less

populace
a
achievable. .
achievable
69
69

Slovenians would not fight
Slovenians show of force
that a show
fight and that force JNA not made this cascade of mistakes,
JNA mistakes, it would have
would therefore
therefore be adequate to subdue
subdue them. Perhaps
Perhaps far more difficult
been far difficult for the
the Slovenian
Slovenian forces
forces to
to
most
most important. KOS erred in
important. KOS in its
its judgments
judgments about the the challenge and defeat their
challenge their opponents.
opponents. As Jansa
Jansa
capabilities of the
capabilities the Slovenian TO’s reservists—the
Slovenian TO's reservists-the himself
himself concedes:
concedes:
majority of the troops
great majority foundation of the
troops and the foundation the
force. Conversely, the Slovenians
force. Conversely, Slovenians appear to to have had aa We were
We were more
more than a match
than a match for
for the first
first armored
armored
good idea of what
good the INA
what the JNA would
would and couldcould do inin brigade at Vrhnika,
brigade Vrhnika, most certainly when they did
certainly when
response to the border post closures.
response Tactically. the
closures. Tactically, the not have complete
not crews and
complete crews and were
were demoralized
demoralized
JJNA
NA appears to have had poor poor knowledge Slove
knowledge of Slove- and while
while they were
were entirely
entirely dependent
dependent for
for their
their
nian force
force deployments.
deployments, especially
especially their capabilities.
capabilities. basic supplies
basic on our goodwill. But the
supplies on situation
the situation
The Slovenes,
The Slovenes. by contrast, had the
by contrast. the advantage of good good would have been completely
completely different for us if
different for if
intelligence
intelligence on
on federal
federal Army plans and movements.
movements. they had
had dispatched
dispatched their modern tanks,
their most modern tanks,
for
for example
example to Banja Luka,
Luka, fitted
fitted them
them up
up into
into
Lacking good the JNA
intelligence. the
good intelligence. JNA went on to make
make perfect working order,
perfect working order.filled
filled them
them with
with complete,
complete,
assumptions that in turn contributed
poor assumptions
poor contributed to
to seriously
seriously specially picked
specially crews, provided
picked crews, provided them with with the
flawed operational
flawed planning. Having concluded
operational planning. concluded that necessary infantry
necessary and air support,
infantry and support, and
and sent
the Slovenians
the Slovenians would not fight, JNA deployed
fight. the JNA deployed for to our borders.
them to borders. In that case the superiority
superiority
a show force and not a true combat
show of force combat mission.
mission. TheThe of armoured
of units would have
armoured units have been paramount,
paramount,
JNA’s
JNA's implicit failure
failure to anticipate
anticipate actual combat
combat led and we did not
and we not have enough
enough supplies
supplies for an anti
for an anti-
lack of adequate logistic
to a lack
to material prepara-
logistic and material prepara armour battle
battle over
over greater distances. 134
greater distances. 134
tions. Mobilization shortfalls

tions. shortfalls further impaired JNA
further impaired JNA
combat readiness.
readiness. Despite efforts to improve
Despite efforts improve readi
readi- Even
Even if all
all of these errors avoided, could
errors had been avoided, could a
ness in the JNAJNA Fifth Military District
District before
before the con-
con well-planned. well-executed JNA
well-planned, well-executed JNA campaign
campaign have won won
flict, there were still serious
flict. serious failures
failures that
that directly
directly the war for Belgrade?
the war Belgrade? Probably
Probably not. Better
Better preparation
preparation
impacted combat
impacted Tanks ran out of fuel,
operations. Tanks
combat operations. fuel. and execution
execution couldcould certainly
certainly have made Slovenia's
Slovenia’s
many units went
and many went into the field without
into the without basic com com- war for independence
war independence much costly for the
much more costly break
the break-
bat loads.
bat loads. Soldiers
Soldiers used up their foodfood and water
water in in as away republic and could
away republic could have prevented
prevented the operation
the operation
little as a day or two.
little two. When detachments were sur- sur from becoming the humiliating
from becoming humiliating debacle was for the
debacle it was
rounded at
rounded border posts or
at border or vehicle columns were
vehicle columns were JJNA.
NA. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, it would have been all all but impos
impos-
blockaded, there were
blockaded, were no clear plans for how
clear plans how to
to sible the JNA
sible for the JNA to to force
force a recalcitrant
recalcitrant Slovenia
Slovenia to to
resupply or rescue them.
resupply remain the SFRY
within the
remain within once Ljubljana had made the
SFRY once the
decision
decision to fight. The evidence
to stand and fight. evidence suggests that that
finally lost
What finally
What war for the
lost the war JNA was
the JNA was not a lack
lack of the Slovenians
Slovenians were prepared for—and indeed
prepared for-and indeed
firepower, nor
troops or firepower. lack of ammunition
nor a lack ammunition or supsup- expected-another,
expected—another, larger larger JNA
JNA offensive
offensive along
along the
the
plies. lack of will.
plies, but aa lack will. In the
the face of what must
must have lines of that
lines advocated by
that advocated General Adzic.
by General Adzic. The Slove
Slove-
like massive
seemed like massive incompetence
incompetence or lack lack of support
support nian leadership
leadership and military
military appear to to have been pre pre-
from above,
from above. it is no wonder
wonder that surrounded conscripts
that surrounded conscripts pared to conduct exactly
to conduct the sort of protracted,
exactly the protracted.
in the field rapidly
rapidly became bewildered demoral
bewildered and demoral- partisan war Territorial Defense
the Territorial
war the Defense was designed to
was designed
Because the rank
ized. Because
ized. rank and file the JNA
file within the JNA funda
funda- fight and would have done so if if events had required
required it.
it.
fight
mentally
mentally diddid not have a clearclear sense of whatwhat they were
were JNA could
The JNA could not have operated indefinitely
indefinitely under
under
fighting
fighting for (indeed. previously been told
(indeed. they had previously told such circumstances—especially
circumstances-especially with
with an
an even larger
larger
they were fighting
fighting an entirely different
an entirely enemy), it was
different enemy). civil war brewing behind
war brewing behind it inin Croatia.
Croatia. With mounting
mounting
it
very hard for their

very officers to
their officers motivate them to
to motivate soldier
to soldier international pressure, virtually
international virtually no
no popular support in
popular support in
on
on at
at the risk of their
the risk lives.
their Iives. Slovenia, and threatened lines
Slovenia, lines of communication
communication
through Croatia, the
through Croatia. NA would almost
the JNA almost certainly
certainly have
J
In sum, the JNA,

In sum. JNA, faced with a host of political
faced with political dilem
dilem- had to quit the the field
field eventually, only to regroup
eventually. if only regroup and
if
mas, flawed planning

mas. made flawed planning assumptions
assumptions that
that resulted
in inadequate
inadequate military
military preparations logistic fail
preparations and logistic fail-
ures, ultimately
ures. producing a military
ultimately producing military debacle. Had
Had the
the
70

better defend the
the boundaries
boundaries of "Greater
“Greater Serbia"
Serbia” or That Roared:
The Mouse That Roared: The Slovenian Victory
Victory
“Little Yugoslavia"
"Little Yugoslavia” as the J NA appeared to eventually
the JNA eventually Analyzed
Analyzed
view Ironically—given the
view it. Ironically-given popular impression
impression of
it.
the popular
an invincible,
an invincible, Yugoslav mechanized monster taking
Yugoslav mechanized taking We will
We will offer
offer resistance
resistance only
only when
when the balance
the balance of
of
on a heroic
heroic band of lightly
lightly armed Slovenian
Slovenian minute-
minute power
power is inin our favor
favor and the risk of human
of human
is is
the
a
men-the
men—the truth is that
that from
from the
the start the JNA
start the JNA was losses low. But we
losses is low. we will
will not give in.
is
in.
almost set up to lose.
Janez Jansa, June
Janez Jansa. 1991'35
June 1991 1-'5
The
The JNANA went intointo Slovenia
Slovenia intending
intending to awe the pop-
the pop
J
ulation with a convincing

ulation with convincing display
display of military
military might,
might, In striking
striking contrast to the the JNA,
JNA, the
the Slovenians
Slovenians manman-
it a
and, in fact, it was largely successful in

largely successful in accomplishing
accomplishing aged to to combine
combine careful planning, training.
careful planning, training, strategy,
its initial military
most of its military goals. The The military
military objec
objec- motivation, and luck into
motivation, into a successful bid for military
successful bid military
a
tives—strictly defined-were
tives-strictly defined—were generallygenerally met within and political independence. Planning and organization
independence. Planning organization
the first 48 hours (for instance,
the first instance, occupation
occupation of the the bor-
bor~ were the
were the first
first Slovenian successes—a victory
Slovenian successes-a largely
victory largely
der crossing
crossing points),
points), although
although the the Slovenian
Slovenian defenders won before
won before the first shots were
the first were even fired. The Slove-
fired. The Slove
managed to retain control
control over the the Ljubljana and nian intelligence
nian intelligence services were already
services were already setting thethe
Maribor airports
airports and to to surround isolated JNA
surround some isolated JNA stage for victory
stage victory months
months in advance.
advance . Both
Both military
military and
garrisons.
garrisons. The trouble was that
The trouble short-term, purely
that this short-term, purely forces were well organized
police forces
police organized in the year before
in the before
military
military success did absolutely
absolutely nothing further Bel
nothing to further Bel- the conflict.
the conflict.
grade's
grade’s primary
primary political goals.
goals. Regardless
Regardless of the the mili
mili-
tary success enjoyed
enjoyed byby the
the JNAJNA during the short
during the Ljubljana’s successful
Ljubljana's successful establishment
establishment and organization
organization
campaign,
campaign, the the Army failed
failed completely
completely to achieve the the of a fully fledged
fledged military
military was a remarkable
remarkable achieve-
achieve
a
a
over-all objective
over-all cowing the
objective of cowing Slovenian political
the Slovenian ment. Fully
Fully mobilized,
mobilized, thethe Slovenian
Slovenian Territorial
Territorial
leadership into submission.
leadership into submission. Instead, JNA actions
Instead, JNA Defense could
Defense could theoretically
theoretically have fielded (though not
fielded (though not
inflamed
inflamed the the population
population allall the
the more, as thethe Slovenian
Slovenian necessarily
necessarily armed) as many many as as 60,000
60,000 troops
troops across
leaders undoubtedly
undoubtedly hoped they would. would. the republic. As events actually
the republic. actually unfolded,
unfolded, Slovenia
Slovenia
mobilized approximately
mobilized approximately 35,000
35,000 to 37,000
37.000 troops
troops
Throughout
Throughout the the Slovenian conflict there was a wide
Slovenian conflict wide- during
during the the span of the conflict.1.16 Territorial
the conflict.136 Territorial defense
a
mistaken impression,
spread and mistaken impression, in the the press and training was
training surprisingly effective,
was also surprisingly effective. given
given the cir
the cir-
among many
many Western decisionmakers, that
Western decisionmakers, that the Yugo
the Yugo- cumstances the the Slovenian
Slovenian TO TO had to to operate under
under
slav Army had "run “run amok"
amok” and was operating unilat-
operating unilat and the
the very compressed time
very compressed time frame
frame in in which thethe
erally and outside of political control.

erally control. In fact,
fact, the
the Slovenian
Slovenian military
military had to ready . Not realizing
to get ready. realizing how
how
opposite Consciously or unconsciously.
opposite was true. Consciously unconsciously, much
much progress the T0 was
the TO was able to makemake in in only few
only a few
a
Western leaders conjured
Western conjured up images of Hungary Hungary in in months, the
months, the JNA
JNA consistently underestimated the
consistently underestimated cali
the cali-
1956 Czechoslovakia
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The reality,
1968. The how
reality. how- ber of the Slovenian reservists
the Slovenian reservists and paid dearly for this
paid dearly this
in
ever, was thatthat the JNA had been directed

the JNA politi
directed by its politi- error later.
later.
cal masters into domestic action
into a domestic action for which
which it had
it
a
little enthusiasm
little enthusiasm. . Once
Once engaged-and losing—the
engaged—and losing-the Besides good
Besides good organization
organization and training, the Slovenian
training, the Slovenian
JNA found
JNA found itself denied the ability to crush the
the ability the oppo-
oppo TO had a sound
sound doctrine
doctrine and tactics that matched the
tactics that the
a
sition with
sition with a massive decisive military
massive and decisive military interven
interven- capabilities of the available
capabilities available force.
force . The
The Slovenian TO’s
Slovenian TO's
a
tion on the
the orders of the the same political leadership
leadership that overarching strategy was
overarching was to make
make maximum
maximum use of its
had sent thethe tanks into the morass in
into the in the first place.
the first own advantages—surprise
own advantages-surprise and strong popular popular sup
sup-
Thereafter, the
Thereafter, the best the JNA could
the JNA hope for was to
could hope port—to
port-to prevent the the JNA
JNA from effectively utilizing its
from effectively
itself from
extract itself from an unwinnable situation
an unwinnable situation with
with as
little life, time, equipment,
little loss of life, equipment, and prestige as as
possible.
possible.
71
71

strengths in armor and artillery.
artillery. Tactically,
Tactically, the units of
units of the TO would shut
the TO shut off
off the path
path of of the
Slovenes
Slovenes emphasized blockading, surrounding, and
blockading, surrounding, attackers behind,
attackers behind, cut
cut ofl
off their
their supplies,
supplies, prevent
prevent
ambushing vulnerable columns, using shoulder-fired
vulnerable columns, shoulder-fired the arrival of reinforcements and surround
of reinforcements surround it.
it.
the
antiarmor weapons at close range to neutralize the the They would find
They find themselves
themselves in in aa vise.
vise .... . In
In many
many
JNA’s armor advantage.
JNA's cases during the war precisely
precisely such
such a situation
situation
appeared and
appeared and a number
number of of detachments
detachments of of the
the
a
Ljubljana effective use of its Interior
Ljubljana also made effective Interior Minis
Minis- JNA surrendered
surrendered after
after being surrounded. ‘37
being surrounded. 137
try police
police forces for both combat and noncombat func func-
The Slovene
tions. The Slovene special police force served as an
police force From the start,
start, the Slovenians
Slovenians combined
combined their military
military
important combat element during conflict, and
during the conflict, operations with
operations with a well-thought-out
well-thought-out and effective
effective pub
pub-
a
special police
police troops served alongside the Territorial
alongside the Territorial lic relations campaign, directed at
relations campaign, at both domestic
domestic and
Defense forces assaulting the the border posts and later Western public
Western opinion. Within a week
public opinion. week of the war’s
war's
a
blockades. Regular
manning the blockades. police forces
Regular police forces were outbreak, the Slovenians had established a fully outfit
the Slovenians outfit-
a
vital in performing
also vital performing less glamorous
glamorous but equally
equally featuring a 200-seat auditorium,
ted press center featuring auditorium, sepa
sepa-
a
establishing blockades
important tasks, such as establishing blockades and working and eating areas, and a continuous
rate working
rate continuous
a
roadblocks. As JNA
roadblocks. JNA units attempted
attempted to to move
move out of stream of multiple-language
multiple-language news
news bulletins.
bulletins. A mea
mea-
A
Slovene police
their garrisons, Slovene police established barricades sure of the Slovenians’
the Slovenians' success was the fact that there
with vehicles, trees, and concrete cones. Some mili
with vehicles, mili- were some 800 Western
Western and 350 domestic
domestic press per
per-
convoys were trapped by double barricades, with
tary convoys with sonnel at the press center at
sonnel registered at time. The
at this time.
a second roadblock
roadblock set up behind an blocked
an already blocked professionalism
professionalism of the
the Slovenians
Slovenians contrasted com
com-
column. addition, the
column. In addition, the regular police
police were to con-con pletely with
pletely with the ham-fisted
ham-fisted media efforts of the Bel
media efforts Bel-
tinue their routine lawlaw enforcement responsibilities
responsibilities grade government, which
which came across as
as a backward
backward
a
during
during the brief conflict, handling
brief conflict, inconsider
handling the not inconsider- unreformed Communist
and unreformed state. Bellicose
Communist state. Bellicose state
state-
able task of maintaining
maintaining order during
during a wartime
wartime General Adzic’s
like General
ments like Adzic's 2 July
July threats may have
2
setting as well as processing the thousands of been intended to
to intimidate
intimidate the Slovenian
Slovenian populace,
populace,
surrendering and deserting federal troops. but instead rallied
rallied the opposition
opposition and made the
the JNA
JNA
look like oppressors. The JNA’s
like heavyhanded oppressors. JNA's use of
formulate Slovenia's
As he helped to formulate Slovenia’s overall
overall strategy, tanks—partly function of a shortage of infantry,
tanks-partly a function infantry,
a
Minister Jansa attempted

Defense Minister attempted to study relevant partly also an
partly an effort at intimidation—similarly
effort at intimidation-similarly back
back-
military forces
historical examples of smaller military
historical success
forces success- fired,
fired, inevitably calling up images of Budapest
inevitably calling Budapest in in
powerful opponents. In
fully resisting larger and more powerful 1956, Prague
Prague inin 1968, Tienanmen Square just
1968, and Tienanmen just two
two
his memoirs, he he makes special note of Finland's
Finland’s resis
resis- years earlier.
earlier.
tance against vastly superior Soviet forces during
superior Soviet during the
the
invasion of 1939-1940.
invasion Relevantly, Jansa noted how
1939-1940. Relevantly, how It was the successful combination of both military
successful combination military and
It
Finns used their territory

the Finns territory to maximum
maximum advantage, political
political strategy that reaJly won
that really war for Ljubljana.
won the war Ljubljana.
allowing the columns
allowing columns of Soviet
Soviet tanks into
into the interior
interior While the
the Slovenians’ military successes were
Slovenians' military
blocking and destroying
and then blocking destroying them. Jansa's T0
Jansa’s TO undoubtedly significant, in
undoubtedly significant, in many ways their crucial
many ways crucial
was to successfully
successfully employ similar tactics against the
employ similar victories
victories were won
won not on the battlefield
battlefield but on the
the
J NA in the conventional engagements of
few major, conventional television
television news and minds of Western
the minds Western decision
in
JNA the few in the decision-

Slovenian war. As he describes the TO's
the Slovenian TO’s training
training makers. The
The Slovenians
Slovenians managed to to maneuver the
and subsequent use of this technique: JNA
JNA such that outflanked, literally
that it was outflanked, literally and figura
figura-
it
tively,
tively, at level of
at every level the conflict.
of the conflict.
The acting
The headquarters of
acting out by the headquarters if
of events if
the units
units of JNA really
of the JNA broke through
really broke to the
through to
border crossings surrounded members of
crossings and surrounded of
proved to be particularly wel
the border police proved wel-
come. In this example
example previously determined
previously determined
72

Slovenian Endgame: The JNA Quits
Quits the Field
the Field tactics, and then Miran
tactics, and Miran Bogataj would normally
normally
secure everything
secure everything we planned.
planned. We
We acquired
acquired
The broken
broken jug . ..
. . cannot
cannot be put together
together again.
again. more than
more tanks and
than 200 tanks and other
other armored
armored vehicles
vehicles
and means
and of transport,
of transport, which
which we
we so urgently
urgently
Milan Kucan, July 1991
Kucan, 2 July 1991138
1) 8 needed . .... We were very
We were very well
well acquainted
acquainted with
with
the position of
the position of the command, which
the supreme command, which due
The JNA units
The JNA units remaining
remaining in Slovenia
Slovenia after the Brioni to the unfavorable
to development of
unfavorable development of events in
in the
agreement was signedsigned on 10 July 1991
10 July 1991 were effec-
effec Croatian battlefields
battlefields had decided
decided that its
its bottom
bottom
tively besieged
tively besieged in a hostile
hostile foreign
foreign country
country and line in negotiation
line negotiation waswas the withdrawal of
the withdrawal of the
trapped inside
inside their own
own garrisons. Seeking to
garrisons. Seeking to ratchet remaining troops
remaining troops and oflicers,
officers, and
and then anything
anything
up the
the pressure, the Slovenians
Slovenians cut off electricity
electricity to
to get. "‘2
else it could get. 142
the
the five
five major JNA garrisons
major JNA garrisons on 17 July.
17 July.
The Yugoslav Federal

Federal Presidency’s order for the
Presidency's order the
The
The following day-18day—18 JulyJuly 1991-the
1991—the Yugoslav Col
Yugoslav Col- Yugoslav Army
Yugoslav Army to withdraw
withdraw from
from Slovenia marked
Slovenia marked
lective
lective Presidency
Presidency issued
issued an order for the JNA to
JNA Belgrade's de facto
Belgrade’s acknowledgment of Slovenian
facto acknowledgment Slovenian
withdraw
withdraw from from Slovenia
Slovenia over a a three-month
three-month period
period independence
independence and an end to the military conflict
the military conflict
into
into other garrisons
garrisons in Bosnia and Serbia.
Serbia. (According within Slovenia. The JNA’s
Slovenia. The withdrawal, however,
JNA's withdrawal, however.
to the provisions
provisions of the Yugoslav
Yugoslav Presidency's
Presidency’s original represented not only Slovenian
represented Slovenian independence
independence but also
also
IlO-point decision, all
0-point decision, all elements of the JNAJNA 31st
3lst Corps the final,
final, undeniable
undeniable death knell
knell for Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
withdraw to
were to withdraw Serbia, while the 14th
to Serbia, 14th Corps was
to withdraw to
to withdraw to Bosnia.
Bosnian") 139) Officially, JNA with-
Officially, the JNA with On 15 January 1992,
15 January was formally recog
Slovenia was
1992, Slovenia recog-
drawal was to be
drawal be completed
completed by 26 October 1991.
October 1991. nized
nized as independent country
as an independent country by the European
European
Effectively, the withdrawal
withdrawal was completed
completed muchmuch Community
Community and its member nations. By
member nations. this time,
By this time,
sooner—most troops and equipment
sooner-most left Slovenia
equipment left Slovenia by widespread begun in
widespread fighting had begun in Croatia
Croatia between
between the
the
the end of July, hardly
hardly more than a week week after the end self-proclaimed Serb
self-proclaimed autonomous regions
Serb autonomous regions and the
hostilities.
of hostilities. government, the JNA
Zagreb government,
Zagreb JNA had demolished
demolished the
Croat-held city of Vukovar,
Croat-held city Vukovar, and the first UN peace
the first peace-
were fired,
Even after the last shots were fired, Slovenia's intelli
Slovenia’s intelli- keepers had arrived
arrived to implement the Vance
to implement Vance Peace
Peace
gence capabilities continued to
capabilities continued to serve Ljubljana well.well. Plan in
Plan in neighboring Croatia. The Yugoslav Republic
neighboring Croatia.
The Slovenians
The Slovenians managed to retain and expand at the the Macedonia had
of Macedonia declared its own
had declared independence. The
own independence.
negotiating table the gains made by their victories
negotiating victories on
on then Republic of Bosnia—Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina was was preparing
preparing
battlefield. Successful
the battlefield. intelligence work appears to
Successful intelligence to own referendum
for its own referendum on which would
independence, which
on independence,
have given Slovenian negotiators
given the Slovenian negotiators an an inside
inside edge at plunge it
eventually plunge
eventually over the
it over precipice into
the precipice into armed
armed
the
the talks. Jansa claims, believably,
Jansa claims, believably, that:
that: conflict.
conflict. For Slovenia,
Slovenia, the war over-but for most
was over—but
war was most
of the rest of Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, it had only just
had only just begun.
begun.
technicians and counterintelligence
Our technicians counterintelligence agents
had cracked
cracked the JNA-coded communications
the ]NA-coded communications
listened to
system and listened conversations between
to conversations
'Zagreb
Zagreb and Belgrade rather between Andrija
Belgrade or rather
14'
Brovet, 141
Raseta,
Raseta,140140 Stane Brovet, Sljivic, and
S/jivic, and other
other gen-
gen
erals and admirals.
erals admirals. WeWe knew precisely where we
precisely where
had to
to apply pressure to make them
apply pressure yield. Before
them yield. Before
each round
round o_fof negotiations
negotiations we worked
worked out our
73

Endnotes, Section II
notwithstanding, the popular assertions

1 Deep-seated differences notwithstanding,
lDeep-seated assertions l0“As regards the composition of the officer
"'"As regards otliccr corps and the promo promo-
that the Yugoslav
that the conflict was the
Yugoslav conflict the inevitable product of centuries centuries of tion to senior commanding and directing posts posts in the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
hatreds are
ethnic hatreds are at
at best
best only partially true. For instance,
true. For instance. it is principle of the most proportional representa
Army. the principle
People ·s Army,
People’s representa-
worth noting that, at the
that, at Yugoslavia’s creation
the time of Yugoslavia's creation as a state state in tion of the Republics and Autonomous
the Republics Autonomous Provinces Provinces shall be applied.”
applied."
1918, there
1918, there had beenbeen no prior history of any Serb-Croat wars. Article 242,
Article 242. Federal Constitution of the the Socialist
Socialist Federal Republic
Republic
(Indeed, one might also observe
(Indeed. observe that that France and Germany fought of Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, 1974.
more major conflicts
conflicts between
between 1870 and 1945 than than did the the Serbs “"Gow.
Gow, James,
James. “Deconstructing IISS Sun-ii-al. July/
Yugoslavia," 1155Survival,
"Deconstructing Yugoslavia,"
and Croats.) There is no question
and question that the Second World
that the World War War was August 1991,
August 291-31 I.
1991. pp. 291-311.
exceptionally brutal and and divisive within Yugoslavia and that
within Yugoslavia that as ‘2
" Anton
Anton A. A. Bebler,
Be bier, “The
..The Yugoslav
Yugoslav People’s
People's ArmyArmy and the Frag Frag-
many as as a million Yugoslavs died at
million Yugoslavs at the hands of other
the hands other Yugoslavs
Yugoslavs mentation of a Nation,”
mentation Nation," Military
Military Review, August 1993, pp. 38-51.
Re1·iew,August
between 1941 and 1945. But,
between Yugoslavia is by no means
But. Yugoslavia means unique in '3
,., Ibid.,
Ibid .. pp. 38-51.
having had a divided state, state, a Nazi
Nazi client government,
government. or a civil civil war ‘4
14 This
This tally does not include the numerous cadre-strength reserve
numerous cadre-strength reserve
during this time frame. formations in force. many of
in the force, of which
which were later activated
activated by the the
3
'In
In this text
text the terms “Slovene,”
the terms ..Slovene." “Croat,”
"Croat," ..“Serb,”
Serb," and “Muslim”
..Muslim" various warring factions or which served as the nucleus of other
which served
will be used denote ethnic/religious identities and not the
used to denote the repub
repub- fighting formations.
fighting
lic
lic they reside nationality. ...“Slovenian,”
reside in or nationality Slovenian," “Croatian,”
..Croatian," "'Bos-“Bos ‘5 turned out, since to a greater
Ironically as it turned
" Ironically greater or lesser degree
degree the
nian,” “Serbian” will be used
nian ... and "Serbian" used to denote
denote persons hailing from
persons hailing Territorial Defense in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia
Territorial Bosnia ended
ended up
each
each of the the respective geographic areas.
respective geographic areas. Thus, terms terms such as “Bos ..Bos- becoming the the opponent of the JNA. JNA.
“Croatian Serb”
nian Croat" or "Croatian Serb" would designate, first,
would designate, first. the
the geo geo- '6 Bebler, pp. 38-51.
"Behler,
graphic area area the
the individuals hail from and, second, second, their ethnic ‘7
17 Belgrade Narodila
Narodna Armija (supplement) 3 July 1986, “Report
Armija (supplement) "Report on
background. The terms
background. terms .. “Macedonian”
Macedonian" and “Montenegrin”
..Montenegrin" are are gen
gen- Speech by MiodragMiodrag Ivanovic
Ivanovic in in the All-People's Defense and
the All-People’s
used here
erally used here for both the the ethnic group and the the republic/national
republic/national- Social Self-Protection Commission of
Self-Protection Commission of the 13th LCYLCY Congress in in
ity. Conversely, the the terms
terms .. “Albanian”
Albanian" and “Hungarian”
"Hungarian" are are used
used Belgrade on 26 June.” June." FBIS Vienna 22 l 933Z July 1986.
Vienna 221933Z
solely to indicate the the ethnic affiliation
affiliation unless
unless otherwise indicated. '8
" Bebler, pp. 38-51. This This appears consistent with the
appears consistent the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
'Technically, in addition to the
3Technically, the eight republic and and provincial
provincial repre- repre press figures that
press figures that are
are cited from NarodnaNamdna Armija.
Armija.
sentatives (who could serve
sentatives president of
serve as president of the
the SFRY)
SFRY) there
there were '9
19 Silber and Little.
Little, p. 118.
other members
also two other members of of the
the Federal Presidency: the the President of of 2° Borisav Jovic,
'" Borisav Jovic, The LastLast Days
Days of of the Socialist
Socialist Federal
Federal Republic
Republic of of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
the Yugoslavia and the the Federal Minister
Minister Yugoslal'ia. entry for
Yugoslavia, for 16 May
May 1990.
of Defense. The collective presidency presidency in turn selected selected thethe Federal 2‘
" Silber and Little,Little, p. 118.
Prime Minister.
Minister. 22 Silber and Little,
"Silber I06.
Little, p. 106.
’4 Zametica,
Zametica, John
John The Yugoslav
Yugoslal' Cmiflict. IISS, Adelphi paper 270,
Adelphi paper 23
'' Janez Jansa, The Making Making of the Slovenian
,,[the Slovenian State 1988-] 992: The
The
Conflict. IISS, 270. 1988-1992:
p. 10. Collapse
Collapse of of Yugoslavia, Ljubljana: Mladinska
Yugoslm·ia, Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga
Knjiga Publishing
Publishing
5This partly, but not entirely,
5 This was partly. entirely. thethe result of the collapse of
of the of House, 1994. p. 44.
Soviet-Bloc
Soviet-Bloc Communism throughout throughout Eastern Europe at the the same
same 2"
24 Jansa actually lists 16 municipalities that that were able to retain their
time. ToTo some extent, political
some extent, change in Yugoslavia
political change Yugoslavia was spurred spurred follows: Brezice,
weapons, as follows: Brezice, Jesenice, Kranj Kranj (partly), Krsko,
Krsko,
by the political winds sweeping through Eastern
the new political Eastern Europe. Litija,
Litija, Mozirje, Murska Subota, Radlje
Mozirje. Murska Radlje ob Dravi, Radovljica. Slov
Dravi. Radovljica, Slov-
Yugoslavia had not been
Yugoslavia been partpart of thethe Soviet Bloc Bloc since 1948. 1948, how how- enske Konjice. Smarje pre Jelsah,
enske Konjice, Skofja Loka,
Jelsah, Skofja Trbovlje, Trzic,
Loka, Trbovlje, Trzic.
ever,
ever, and had charted
charted its own political
political and economic course course that that Velenje, and Zalec. Jansa, p. 48.
Velenje,
left it substantially isolated from the
substantially isolated the political developments behind
political developments 25 Estimates of
" Estimates of the percentage seized range
the percentage range between
between 40 and 60 per per-
the Iron
the Iron Curtain. cent. stated in his memoirs and is also cited in
cent. Jansa stated Silber and Lit
in Silber Lit-
6 Laura Silber and
'Laura Allan Little,
and Allan Yugoslal'ia: Death of
Little. Yugoslavia: a Nation.
<it'a Nation. tle’s Yugoslal'ia: Death
tle's Yugoslavia: Death ofa,if a Nation claiming the Slovenian TO
Nation as claiming TO
Penguin. 1996,
Penguin, 1996. p. 72. lost some 70 percentpercent of of its stockpile and started started with only 10,000
with only I 0,000
7 The legislative branch of
7The of the Yugoslav Government consisted
the Yugoslav consisted of of weapons. This This latter figure of
latter figure of 10,000 weapons seems
I 0,000 weapons seems somewhat
somewhat
the
the Federal Assembly,
Assembly, a two-chamber legislature legislature with representa
representa- low,
low. eveneven allowing
allowing forfor arms smuggling between between spring 1990 and
tives from the the various republics and provinces. The Federal Jansa’s
Jansa's later figurefigure ofof 23,000 weapons available at the beginning of
23.000 weapons of
Assembly responsible for
Assembly was responsible passing the
for passing the laws and the the federal June.
June. MostMost available estimates
estimates indicate that that the
the Army
Army captured
captured
budget.
budget. about percent of
about 60 percent of the
the weapons for for a force of of 60,000—presum—
60,000--presum-
8The People's Army
Yugoslav People’s
'The Yugoslav Army included three three services-the
services—the ably indicating that the JNA
that the JNA took something like like 36,000 weapons
Ground Forces (KOY). (KOV). the the Air
Air and Air Air Defense Force (RV (RV i PVC),PYO), and the the TO retained up to 24,000 small arms. It
TO retained It is
is most likely
likely that
that
the Navy
and the Navy (RM). Of Of these,
these, thethe Ground Forces was the the largest
largest percentage of
the percentage of heavy weapons—mortars,
weapons-mortars, antitank
antitank weapons, and
and most important.
important. light artillery pieces—confiscated
pieces-confiscated the JNA
by the JNA was higher than it
9 1991—a year
9 In 1991-a year after
after multiparty elections had ousted ousted the the Com
Com- was for infantry arms.
munists in Slovenia and Croatia-over
munists Croatia—over 95 percent percent of the JNA
of the JNA
officer
officer corps were still still Communist Party members. members. (Anton (Anton A. A.
“The Yugoslav
Bebler. 'The
Behler. Yugoslav People’s
People ·s ArmyArmy and the Fragmentation of
the Fragmentation of a
Nation," Military
Nation," Military Review, August 1993,
Rel'iew. August 1993, pp. 38-51.)
74
Digitize<fby Go gte Origi11alfrom

1‘
'" In Croatia, by contrast
In Croatia. the JNA
contrast.. the JNA was able to vinually all of
to seize virtually of 5‘
" Vasiljevic
Vasiljevic later rose rose lOto the
the rank ofof major general
general in the JNA and
the JNA
the Territorial Defense arsenals-with
the Territorial arsenals—with obvious and far-reaching headed KOS for a time before being forced out of
headed of his position.
position .
consequences when fighting did start
consequences start there.
there. - 55 Jansa, pp. 13-15
" Jansa.
27
'' Janer /111elligenceReview,
Jane :vIntelligence “Slovenia—Territorial
Rel'ie11-."Slovenia-Territorial Defense a 56Jansa,
'"Jansa. The Making Making of Slovenian State [988-1992;
the Slm·enian /988-/992: The Col- C0!
ofthe
Year On:·
Year On.” July 1992. pp. 305-308. lapse,~(
lapse of Y11gosl11l'i11. Ljubljana : Mladinska
Yugoslavia, Ljubljana: Knjiga Publishing
Mladinska Knjiga Publishing
28
'' The Slovenian presspress reported
rcponed that the JNA
that the demanded TO
again demanded
JNA again TO House, 1994. p. 130.
House.
weapons in late November 1990.
weapons 1990, but there
there docs appear to be
does not appear "57After the breakup of Yugoslavia,
After the Yugoslavia, the Serbian Republic
Republic State
State
evidence to substantiate
other evidence
any other substantiate this
this.. Department (RDB)
Security Depanment (RDB) emasculated
emasculated the SDB, taking
the federal SDB.
2"
'" Dragnich. Alex N.
Dragnich. Alex “Yugoslavia in Historical
N. "Yugoslavia Perspective." Medi
Historical Perspective:· Medi - over its building and archives in 1992.
terranean Quarterly, Summer /992.
Q11arterlv.S11111111er 1992. pp. 5-19. 5*
'' Jansa. p. 16.
3°
-'" Thompson,
Thompson. MarkMark, . A Paper
Paper House:
Ho11se:The Ending Yugoslavia.
Ending"(of Y11goslal'ia. 5" A
'" A firm
firm believer in the Yugoslav ideal,
the Yugoslav ideal. Aksentijevic remained
Aksentijevic remained
New York: Pantheon
New York: Books . p. 9.
Pantheon Books. with the JNA after
the JNA after Slovenia's
Slovenia‘s secession
secession and was eventually
eventually pro-pro
3'
" Zametica,
Zametica. John
John The Y11goslal' Pap.:r 270,
Conflict. 1155
Yugoslav Cm,jlicr. IISS Adelphi
Adelphi Paper moted to Major
moted Major General ((one star) and served
one star) served as Assistant Com- Com
p. 14. mander for
mander for Moral
Moral Education and Legal Affairs the Fifth
Affairs in the Fifth Military
Military
32
-'' Jansa, pp. 63-68. District. Dogged by misfonune wherever he went,
misfortune wherever went. he left his home
33
'' lbid.
Ibid . in Slovenia after after the
the JO-day serve in Croatia during the
lO-day war to serve the out
out-
3‘
·" A parliamentary resolution to this effect was passed
A parliamentary passed on 8 March
March break of there, and after
of war there. after enduring the the JNA‘s
JNA's ordeal in that that
1991. challenging whether
1991, whether thethe federal Constitution or republic laws republic he was reassignedreassigned yet again to to serve
serve in Bosnia
Bosnia when the the
held precedence. According to the
precedence. According the Slovenian resolution. military Fifth Military
Fifth Headquarters was moved to Sar.ijevo
Military District Headquarters Sarajevo and and
service in the the JNA
JNA was no longer mandatorymandatory for citizens of the the redesignated the
redesignated the Second. 1n In Bosnia at the beginning of 1992, he
at the
Slovenian Republic Republic from that date forward. Normally,
that date about 3.000
Normally, about witnessed a third republic of
witnessed of his beloved Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia go up in
Slovenian conscripts were called up for service service in thethe JNA
JNA eacheach flames..
flames
March.
March. Between the the lifting
lifting of the
the obligation on 8 March March 1991 and 6“Jansa. pp. 79-80
"' 79-80,. 111.
the outbreak
the outbreak of war that June.. there was reportedly
that June reportedly only a single 6' Jansa. pp. 46-47.
'''
Slovenian volunteervolunteer for service in the the JNA.
JNA. °2Jansa. pp. 78-79.
"'
35
" Jansa,
Jansa , pp.
pp . 63-68. ‘3 lbid.
• -1 Ibid.
’6
·16 Jansa did not attempt attempt to useuse many active-duty JNA JNA officers to 6" During
64 During thethe conflict
conflict itself. VIS VIS appears have cooperated
appears to have cooperated with
build his military. Before the outbreak of
the outbreak the war,
of the war. most active—duty
active-duty MUP
MUP police forces to rapidly shut Belgrade‘s intelligence
shut down Belgrade's
officers remained
Slovene officers remained in the the JNA,
JNA. although many deserted dur
deserted dur- effort. Even if
effon. if the
the networks of informants were unknown. unknown, the Slov
the Slov-
ing or immediately after after the
the conflict.
conflict. enians were able
enians able to effectively blind the the federal authorities
authorities by sim sim-
37 Gow, pp. 291-311.
" Gow. ply rounding up and arresting identified KOS Federal SDB
arresting all identified SDB
33 the fact that
that unlike the JNA (which used
the JNA them for the
detaining them the war.
" One small illustration is the used operatives and detaining
operatives the duration of the
Serbo~Cr0atian exclusively).
Serbo-Croatian each republic TO used
exclusively), each the com:-
used the corre 06‘' Janez p. 112.
sponding national language language (for example,
example, Slovenian). 66
""At At least suggests the
least one item suggests the Slovenians also collected intelli intelli-
3"
" Jansa. p. 49. gence on US
gence US decisionmaking as as well.
well. In
In his memoirs. Jansa menmen
4°Jansa, “
"' Jansa. p. 49-50. tions thatthat .. . ..
. . we received
received a report
repon from the the intelligence
4‘ Silber and Little.Little, p. 106. Baker,,
41 department, according to which
department. which ([US
US Secretary
Secretary of State)
State] Baker
‘2
4 Gow, pp. 291-311.
' Gow. after being presented
after presented with the the ratio ofof forces between
between the the defense
defense
‘3 Neodvisni Dnevnik,
Ljubljana Neodl'i.mi
4 ·' Ljubljana “The Army‘s
Dnernik. "'The Army's Intervention Did Did Not
Not capabilities of of Slovenia and and the
the units ofof the JNA, which was pre-
the JNA. pre
Surprise Us," Us." 17 August
August 1991. paring itself for intervention,
intervention. convinced himself of of the
the possibility
possibility
‘4
44 lbid.
Ibid . that the
that the federal bodies could put Slovenia in order in a little over
‘5
4 ' Jansa, p. 62 two hours." Jansa Jansa,. p. 93.
‘6
'" Silber and Little, Little, pp.
pp . 106-107. 67 Neodvisni Dnevnik,
Ljubljana Neod1·is11i
• 1 Ljubljana D11e1·nik.op cit.
‘7 Silber and Little.
"Silber Little. p. 107. 6“
"' Jansa,
Jansa . pp.
pp . 60-61.
‘8
" Jansa cites the the lack of of secure communications in battle battle as one of of 6"Jansa .
secure communications •• Jansa. p. 111.
111.
the force's
the deficiencies. To
force·s major deficiencies. some extent,
To some extent , the
the Slovenian mili-mili 7°
70 Jansa. p. 139.
tary appears
appears to have overcome this shortcoming in combat
have overcome combat by 7‘ Jansa, p. 140.
" Jansa.
cooperating with police units and routing critical communications
cooperating communications 72 Jansa, p. 61.
" Jansa.
through the
through the Interior Ministry‘s
Ministry's network. 73
' ·' Jansa. p. 114.
114.
‘9
49 Jansa, pp. 140-141. "7"Jansa.
Jansa, pp.
pp . 116-124.
5°
'" The latter
latter figure
figure probably includes not only the the more famous 75 Ibid. .
" Ibid
Armbrust rockets rockets but also Yugoslav-manufactured 90-mm "Osa" “Osa” 7" Gow,. pp. 291-311.
1• Gow
antitank rockets
antitank rockets and 82-mm recoilless rifles. rifles . " For instance,
7"For instance. the first class
the first of Slovenian soldiers trained
class of trained at thethe
5‘ Jansa . pp. 140-141.
" Jansa. centers at
centers at Pekre and lg did not graduategraduate until 2 June 1991-1991—
52
'' A A Western press report from the
press repon the same
same time cites a figurefigure of of scarcely threethree weeks before the the onset of hostilities. Janez JJansa.
onset of ansa,
40,000 total light arms
40,000 arms but lacks subsourcing and Jansa Jansa‘s of
's level of The Making
Making ofthe Slovenian State [988-1992;
of the Slovenian Collapse of
/988-/992: The Collapse of
detail. The Economist, “Slovenia’s's Self-Defense:·
Economist. "Slovenia Self-Defense.” 6 July 1991. I 991. Yugoslavia.
Y11gosla1·ia. Ljubljana: Mladinska
Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga Publishing House. 1994.
Knjiga Publishing
53
' ·' At least,
At least . not without capturing substantial
substantial stocks of weapons
stocks of p. 131.
weapons
from its JNA JNA opponents.
opponents. As As it happened, captured JNA
happened. captured weapons
JNA weapons 78 Jansa. p. 143.
"Jansa.
stocks appear
appear to have important role in even
have played an important even the
the brief 7°Jansa,
79 pp.. 146-147.
Jansa. pp
conflict that
contlict that occurred.
occurred. Among other things.
Among other things, the
the Slovenian forces
appear to have
appear used up a large fraction of
have used of their antiarmor
antiarmor weapons
weapons
in thethe opening days of of the fight. and thereafter
the fight. thereafter relied on captured
captured
stocks.
75
75

'3° Thompson, Mark,
" Thompson. Mark. A Pa1>er House: The Ending
Paper Hou.I'<': Ending of Yugoslaria.
of Yugoslavia. '“6 "' Susnik and Valentine,. p. 72.
and Valentine
New York: York: Pantheon Books. p. 8.
Pantheon Books. “7 Silber and Little,
117 pp . 106-107.
Little . pp. 106- 107.
"1“Jansa.
Jansa, p. 134. “8
' " Reuters. Yugoslav Anny
Reuters. "“Yugoslav Army Says It It Will Crush Slovenia
Sloven ia in Short.
'‘2' Jansa.
Jansa, p. 147. Sharp Blitz," Blitz." 2 Jul 1991.
'‘3·' English translation by Dejan Susnik and Mark Mark Valentine,
Valentine . The "9• Jansa.
Jansa, pp
English translation 11 I 91-193.
pp.. 191-193.
Ba111t,
Battle for Slovenia, Ljubljana:
Ljubljana : Cankarjeva Zalozba, '2‘)Approx imately one battalion
for 5/m-enia. Zalozba . p. 9. " 0 Approximately battalion each
each from the the 13th Motorized
Motorized Bri
Bri-
"3‘ Ibid.
lhid. gade
gade ((13th Corps), . 4th Armored
13th Corps) Armored Brigade ((10th Corps), 140th
10th Corps).
"3’ Ibid.
lhid . Mechanized Brigade (I 0th Corps). and the
(10th the 32nd Mechanized
Mech anized Bri
Bri-
8"
' " Susnik and and Valentine,
Valentine. pp. 17-18. gade (32nd Corps) Corps), . as as well
well asas the
the battalion
battalion ((l2 12 BOV-3 antiaircraft
BOV-3 antiaircraft
‘7
" Susnik and and Valentine. p. I14 4 guns) from the Light Air Defense Artillery
306th Light
the 306th Anillery Regiment.
J ansa,. The Making
"88Jansa of the Slm
Making oft/re Slovenian
·e11ia11 State 1988-1992:
State l9lili-l992: The Col
lhe Col- ‘2‘ Reuters.
'" Reuters, op cit. cil.
lapse ,if Ljubljana: Mladinska ‘22Sources differ on who controlled how many posts the
of Yi,!(oslaria.
Yugoslavia, Ljubljana: Mladinsk a Knjiga Publishing
Knjiga Publishing '" posts during the
House, 1994. p. 152.
House. period 29 June—2 June-2 July July. . The cited figures
figures (16( 16 held by thethe Slove
Slove-
••‘9 More
More properly the clash between
properly,, the between the the JNA
JNA and the the Slovenian TO nians
nians.. 14 by the the JNA)
JNA) areare taken
taken from Janez Jan sa ·s memoirs,
Jansa’s the
memoirs. as the
near Metlika
near Metlika was the the first
first o((icial battle, between
oflicial battle. between regular armed armed most detaileddetailed listing from the the most credible sourcesource.. The Dejan SusSus-
forces, of
forces. of the
the Yugoslav conflict. The first true
Yugoslav conflict. true armed
armed clash was nik and Mark Mark Valentine book, book. The Battle
Battle for Slovenia, states
for Slol'enia, states that
that
almost three
almost months earlier on 31 March
three months March when Tudjman
Tudjman‘s·s Croatian the Slovenian police had control over all the
the the international
international border
special police units battled Martic’s's rebel militia
battled Martie militia over Easter week~
week - crossings on 29 June (p. 41 41),). which appears plainly
which appears plainly incorrect. The
end in the
end the Plitvice
Plitvice National
Nation al Park. Susnik/Valentine book states
Same Susnik/Valentine that the
state s that Slovenianss had only
the Slovenian
“0Jansa, pp. 152-153.
• 0 Jansa. captured I13
captured 3 of thethe 15 Austrian
Austrian crossings by the the 30th (p. 58). and
9‘
• 1 Susnik and Valentine, p. 16.
and Valentine. even this latter figure
even seems
figure seem s high.
"'91General Pavlov is one of the the many ill-fated figures in the JNA
the JNA ‘23On 1
'" I July. partial restoration
July, in a panial restoration of of normalcy, cross
normalcy . six border cross-
senior leadership.
leadership. He had had arrived in Ljubljana take over his new
Ljubljana to take ings betweenbetween Slovenia and Austria reopened although with
reopened,. although with huge
command only weeks before
command before thethe war broke out and proved mani mani- lines and delays.
festl the task
task when it did did.. As onejoke after the '24Jansa,
Jansa , p. 194.
festlyy unequal
unequal to the As one joke put it after the '"
JNA was defeated
JNA defeated and Slovenia, General Pav-
and forced to pull out of Slovenia. Pav "'25 5 As counted by a Western new
As counted newss cameraman.
cameraman.
lov was the the most
most successful general in the
successful general the Yugoslav Army . since he
Yugoslav Army, ‘26
"" Reuters,
Reuters. "“Fresh
Fres h Columns of of Yugoslav
Yugoslav Tanks Head for Slove Slove-
Ljubljana with only a briefcase
arrived in Ljubljana briefcase but left after only one nia,"
nia I 991.
2 July 1991.
," 2Ju1y
month with the
month the entire
entire Army.
Army . '"'27Susnik and Valentine,Valentine . p. 84.
“3
''· Jansa,. pp. 154-155
' Jansa 154-155.. '"‘28Susnik and Valentine,Valentine . p. 101. IOI .
"'9“Jansa
Jansa,, p. 160. '29
" 9 Ibid.
Ibid .
95
9 ' L.L. K.
K. "Osa Has Fallen.
Fallen."" Belgrade Nin Nin 13 August 1998. p. 16. ‘3‘)
"" Reuters, Yugoslav Armored
“Huge Yugoslav
Reuters . "Huge Column Heads for Trouhled
Armored Column Troubled
AU0109085698 0I0856Z
FBIS Vienna AU0109085698 0108562 September
September 1998. This This arti-
arti North,“ 2 July 1991.
North."
cle claims that that the
the detachment
detachment from the the 63rd Airborne
Airborne Brigade at at '3'
"' Susnik and Valentine, Valentine . p. 92. 92 .
Cerklje co mprised 18 personnel
comprised personnel underunder the
the command
command of of then
then appar-
appar '" ‘33Most of of these
these were foreign drivers whose trucks had been used
been used
ently Captain Goran Ostojil.:. Ostojic. Ostojic.
Ostojic, as as a Major killed in
Major, . was killed in the the Slovenian
Slovenian barricades.
barricades. Since they they were financially responsi-
financially responsi
action in KosovoKosovo during 1998 while serving as chief of staff of the the ble for their vehicles and and produce, they they had refused
refused to leave
leave them
them
63rd. Susnik and
63rd. and Valentine, 17-18; Belgrade
Valentine. pp. 17-18: Tanjug, 27 June
Belgrad e Tanjug. even during the
even the fighting.
fighting .
1991, FBISFBIS LondLondonon 2800252
2800252 June 1991. ''33 '' Reuters,
Reuters. 30 June I1991. 99 I.
“6One source
"" source claims thatthat 252 Special Police Police troops-prohably
troops—probably a a '3‘ Jansa, pp. 239-240
1 " Jansa. 239-240..
reference to the
reference the SSUP-eventually
SSUP—eventually surrenderedsurrendered,. and 33 more '35
" 5 Reuters,
Reuters . 30 June June 1991.
199 I.
‘3‘
,.,. Jane Review,
changed to <.:ivilian
changed civilian clothing and and surrendered
surrendered to Italian police near near Janes’sIntelligence
l111e/lige11ce Rei-ie11·. “Slovenia—Territorial
"S lovenia-Territorial Defense a
Femetice.
Fernet ice. Year On.
Year On,"" July 1992, 1992. pp. 305-308.
9" Jansa, p. 164.
" 7 Jansa.
‘37 Jansa,, p. 113.
1' 7 Jansa
9‘ Susnik and
"' and Valentine,
Valentine . pp. 22-23. ,.‘18
.. Reuters, “Kucan calls for Military
Reuters . "Kucan Military and Civil Observers
Obs ervers for
for
9"
""Belgrade jug. 13 February I1991,
Tanjug, London Yugoslavia:· 2 July 1991.
Yugoslavia,” 199 I.
Belgrade Tan 991. FBIS London
LD130212089I; Silber and Little
LDl302120891: Little, . pp. 165-166. 169. ‘39Presidency
119 Presidenc y decision as cited in a State State Department
Department cable.
'00
1 "' Susnik and Valentine, p. 34.
and Valentine. “0 LI. Col.
l.\n Lt. Col. General,
General. Fifth District Deputy Commander and
Military District
Fifth Military
'0' Susnik and
101 Valentine, p. 28.
and Valentine. head of
head of the J NA’s negotiating
the JNA's negotiating team.team.
"’1Susnik and
"" and Valentine,
Valentine. pp. 28-34.
28-3,t "“1' Admiral,
Admiral. Federal Deputy Minister Minister of of Defense.
Defen se.
1°:Multiple sources. "2 Jansa,. p. 242.
'" Jansa
"'' Multiple sources.
‘0‘
111 Jansa, p. 178.
' Jansa.
'°5Jansa.
"" Jansa, p. 174.
"1‘"Multipl
""' sources.
Multiplee sources.
“’7Susnik and
'"' Valentine, p. 41.
and Valentine.
'“Ibid..
""Ibid
“’9Reuter
"" Reuters, s. 30 June I1991.
99 I .
“0 Susnik and
1111 Valentine, p. 41.
and Valentine.
"' Micheletti, Eric.
111 Micheletti. Eric, The Balkans
Balkans At \¼tr:War: Yugoslavia Dil'icle cl 1991,
Yugoslal'ia Divided /99/.
Hong Kong Kong: : Concord Publications Company, . 1992.
Publications Company
“2 Reuters,, 30 June 1991.
' " Reuters
“3·' Jansa
11 Jansa,. p. 181.
“4
11 Susnik and
' Susnik Valentine, p. 57
and Valentine. 57..
"5' The explosion left a crater
11 crater 18 m.:tcr,
meters long andand 6 meters deep..
meters deep
76
76

l“>'t -».‘ f'\"_1'lu};"> '~ -'
"Guas Brigades 01‘ the Croatian Army: .1199 1'
BBIGADA
DI
DI Design
Design Center/MPG
Center/MPG 384095 04-02
384095 04-02
77
77
Digitized by o gle Origil'lal from

Digitized by Gol gle Origiiial from
Section
Section II
II
Croatia
Croatia 1990-1991
1990-1991
79
79
Digitized by Go g e Origirlill from

Digitized by Gol gle Origiiial from
Chapter 6
Chapter6 Turkish expansion. Granted political autonomy
expansion. Granted autonomy from from
Origins of the
1990: The Origins
1990: Croatian War'
the Croatian War" Croatia, for 500
Croatia, 500 years these Serbs
Serbs and their
their descen
descen-
dants paid
paid allegiance
allegiance toto and received
received direct
direct support
support
Croatia's
Croatia’s road toto warfare
warfare and ultimate independence
ultimate independence from the
from the imperial capital in
imperial capital in Vienna
Vienna or,
or, latterly,
latterly, the
the
ran alongside
alongside Slovenia's
Slovenia’s path for part of the the way,
way, but Yugoslav federal
federal capital in Belgrade.
capital in Belgrade.
the
the two
two secessionist republics ' routes were to
secessionist republics’ to diverge
diverge
early and proceed different directions.
proceed in quite different Indeed,
directions. Indeed, Although Croat narrations of their
Croat narrations history will
their history will extend
violence
violence came earlier
earlier to
to Croatia
Croatia than toto Slovenia
Slovenia and back
back to the Middle
to the Middle Ages, Ages, most
most Serbs date their
Serbs date their aware
aware-
would not end until
until years after the
the Slovenes
Slovenes had made ness of Croatia from the
Croatia from the Second
Second World War. War. When
When
their successful
successful exit from Yugoslavia.
from Yugoslavia. Hitler’s Wehrmacht
Hitler's Wehrmacht rolled into Yugoslavia in
rolled into in April
April
1941, most
1941, most Croats
Croats saw not not an invasion force
an invasion force but anan
The
The roots of Croatian
Croatian nationalism-and
nationalism—and the Serb fears
the Serb fears opportunity for independence
opportunity independence from from Serb-dominated
Serb-dominated
of a resurgence
resurgence of that nationalism—lie in
that nationalism-lie in the
the distant Belgrade.
Belgrade. Croat resistance was
Croat resistance was marginal,
marginal , and most most
past. Unlike its
its neighboring
neighboring republics
republics of Slovenia
Slovenia and Croats
Croats welcomed
welcomed the the Germans
Germans as as the enemy of their
the enemy their
Bosnia -Herzegovina, Croatia
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia could
could claim
claim a long
long his-
his enemy. Within days of the
enemy. the German
German invasion (even
invasion (even
tory
tory of either independent
independent statehood (beginning
(beginning with
with before their military
before military campaign
campaign had ended), ended), the Ger
the Ger-
the reign of King
the reign King Tomislav
Tomislav in in the
the early
early 900s)
900s) oror con
con- mans announced
announced the establishment of an
the establishment an “Independent
"Independent
stitutional
stitutional semi-autonomy under the
semi-autonomy under Hungarian. Hab-
the Hungarian, Hab State
State of Croatia" (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska—
Croatia” (Nezavisna Hn 1atska-
Austro-Hungarian monarchies.
sburg, and Austro-Hungarian monarchies. For this NDH), headed by the
NDH), the puppet leader Ante Pavelic.l
Ante Pavelic. 1
reason,, the
reason the Croatian
Croatian national
national consciousness
consciousness was well days, “Poglavnik” (Fuhrer)
Within days , "Poglavnik" (Fuhrer) Pavelic's
Pavelic’s political -
developed
developed, , and the
the republic’s
republic's perceived
perceived subsumation
subsumation military movement,
military movement , the Ustashe (Croatian
the Ustashe Fascists)
(Croatian Fascists)
to Serb
Serb interests rankled
rankled for generations
generations. . had taken over the the government
government and had begun begun imple
imple-
menting
menting anti-Jewish laws. laws. Mass intemments
internments of the the
Under thethe Austro-Hungarians.
Austro-Hungarians, Croatia
Croatia was a self-self population in Nazi-style concentration
Jewish population concentration camps camps
governing
goveming province
province on thethe empire's
empire’s embattled
embattled south-
south followed over the next few
over the few months.
months . In In addition
addition to to the
the
eastern border with the
border with the Ottoman
Ottoman TurksTurks. . To defend
defend the
the persecution
persecution of the the relatively
relatively small (perhaps 14,000)
small (perhaps 14.000)
border,, the
border Austrians,s, Hungarians,
the Austrian Hungarians, and the the Croats
Croats Jewish minority
minority in in Croatia,
Croatia, thethe NDH
NOH began attempt attempt-
sought to to recruit
recruit Serbs who
who had fled fled the
the Turkish occu-
occu ing to "solve
ing to “solve”" the problem of the
the problem far larger
the far larger (some
(some
pations
pations of Serbia
Serbia and Bosnia in in the
the late 1300s
13008 and 1.9 million) population
1.9 population of ethnic Serbs within the
ethnic Serbs the new
new
early 1400s.
14005. These
These displaced
displaced Serbs were a tough,
Serbs were tough. state’s
state borders.
's borders.
hardy
hardy warrior people with a vicious
people with vicious hatred of the the
Turks, , and they proved
Turks ideal buffers
proved ideal buffers between
between thethe Accurate figures will
Accurate figures probably never
will probably be known,
never be known, but it
Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires
Austro-Hungarian empires whenwhen they is clear that Pavelic’s Ustashe massacred
Pavelic's Ustashe massacred huge
huge num
num-
encouraged to settle along
were encouraged along the border zone
the border bers of Serbs
Serbs wherever
wherever they could be
they could be found.
found. Country
Country-
between Croatia
between Turkish-occupied Bosnia.
Croatia and Turkish-occupied The
Bosnia . The wide, various
wide, various estimates suggest that at at least 200,000
200.000
result was the creation in
the creation in the 15th century
the 15th century of the Serb
the Serb- many as 600,000
and as many 600,000 “undesirables”
"undesirables" dieddied at the
the
majority
majority Krajina regionregion within what is now Croatia.
is now Croatia. hands of the Ustashe. At
the Ustashe. At the
the Jasenovac camp alone,
Jasenovac camp alone,
The eventually became known as
The Serb settlements eventually as the
the Croatian Fascists
Croatian Fascists executed at at least 120,000
120,000 Serbs,
Serbs,
Vojna Krajina, or "military
Vojna Krajina, frontier,” with
“military frontier," the Krajina
with the Gypsies, , Jews,
Gypsies Jews, and political prisoners.
prisoners . Many years
Serbs serving
Serbs human barrier
serving as a human barrier against further
further later, however, President Franjo Tudjman
Croatian President
however, Croatian Tudjman
'
ofthe
Manyy of
· Man issues discussed
the issues of the
discussed in this history of the Croatian war in
are dealt with in more detail in a series of
1991 are of supporting annexes
annexes
Volume II.
in Volume II, which the full
which also contain the full source
source material
material for the
the
sections in this study.
sections
81
81

would make an an early himself by
early name for himself by publishing
publishing a Franjo Tudjman
Tudjman was retired JNA
was a retired JNA general
general who
who had
had
a
revisionist
revisionist book claiming that
book claiming that Serbs
Serbs had vastly
vastly fought with the Partisans
fought with Partisans and had risen
risen through
through the
the
inflated
inflated the numbers
numbers and that
that probably
probably no more
more than Army ranks
ranks in
in postwar
postwar Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. He had been jailed
He had
60,000
60,000 people
people had been executed atat Jasenovac.
Jasenovac.2 2 twice—once in the 19705
twice-once once in the 1980s—for
1970s and once I 980s-for
in
in
Croatian nationalist activities.
Croatian nationalist activities. After being
being released
released the
the
Reluctantly liberated from
Reluctantly liberated Hitler’s hegemony
from Hitler's hegemony and second time,
second time. Tudjman
Tudjman began cultivating
cultivating emigre
emigre
reincorporated
reincorporated intointo Yugoslavia as as part of Marshal
Marshal Croatians (many of whom
Croatians (many whom had fled after Tito’s
fled after Tito's 1971
1971
Tito’s Socialist
Tito's Socialist Federation,
Federation. Croatians found them
Croatians found them- crackdown
crackdown on on the Maspok nationalist
nationalist movement)
movement) and and
selves once more under Belgrade's
Belgrade’s yoke, still
yoke, but still tapping them for the
tapping the funds
funds so crucial
crucial to a nascent
nascent
a
strove at least to loosen
loosen the bridle.
bridle. As early
early as 197 I
as 1971 political movement.
movement.
a Croatian
Croatian nationalist movement called
nationalist movement called Maspok-
Maspok3 1
developed
developed within Croatia's
Croatia’s ruling Communist
Communist party.party. Like Milosevic,
Like Milosevic, Tudjman
Tudjman knew
knew that
that ethnic
ethnic national
national-
Tito crushed movement without
crushed the movement without hesitation
hesitation or delay
delay ism would be
ism engine of the coming
be the political engine coming
and purged or jailed anyone
anyone in any way associated
way associated decade,
decade, and he he too
too had the rhetorical skills to rally his
the rhetorical his
with
with it. After the crackdown, federal
the Maspok crackdown, authori
federal authori- people
people in the
the necessary manner. Milosevic
necessary manner. Milosevic had already
already
in
it.
ties worked
worked ruthlessly
ruthlessly to quash any hint of CroatianCroatian into Krajina to
reached into raise the specter of Serbian
to raise Serbian
nationalism, and Croatian
nationalism, Croatian political agitators were
agitators were nationalism
nationalism in Croatia.
Croatia. Tudjman
Tudjman only needed to tap
in
either driven
driven abroad or forcedforced to operate deep underunder into the fears
into fears the Serb
Serb demonstrations
demonstrations had created in in
ground.
ground. Federal
Federal internal
intemal security
security agents infiltrated
infiltrated Croat minds to
Croat minds to create an
an equal
equal and opposite
opposite reaction.
reaction.
nationalist
nationalist movements
movements and monitored
monitored anyone
anyone sus-sus As
As one
one Croatian
Croatian political leader
leader noted.
noted,
pected of contacts with Croatian groups
with Croatian groups abroad.
Thanks
Thanks to their highly effective efforts, the
effective efforts, the first seri-
first seri Milosevic 's aggressive
Milosevic aggressive policy
’s policy was
was the strongest
ous expressions
expressions of overt Croatian
Croatian nationalism
nationalism did did not propaganda
propaganda for Tudjman. Milosevic
for Tudjman. Milosevic was send
send-
appear until Slobodan Milosevic
until late 1989, well after Slobodan Milosevic ing his gangs to to Croatia,
Croatia, where
where they were
were danc
danc-
had begun waving
waving the banner of SerbdomSerbdom and conven conven- inx and singing: 'This is Serbia,
singing: ‘This Serbia, ' which
’
ing which
is
rallies in Serbia.
Serbia. provoked and liberated the national
national pride
in
nationalist rallies
ing mass nationalist provoked and liberated pride and
and
the nationalist
the reaction of
nationalist reaction Croats and
of Croats and was
was ejfec
ejfec-
tive/_vused by
tively Tudjman. ~
hy Tudjman.‘
HDZ and Croatian
The HDZ Nationalism:
Croatian Nationalism:
Croat Actions ...
. . . But the ardently nationalist
the ardently nationalist Tudjman
Tudjman advocated
advocated more
more
the full independence
than the independence denied
denied the then-Croatian
then-Croatian
Twenty nationalist activity
Twenty years of suppressed nationalist not
activity not- Republic. Repeatedly
Republic. Repeatedly he emphasized his
he emphasized his desire
desire (and
(and
withstanding. Croatia’s road to
withstanding. Croatia's independence effec
to independence effec- implicit right) annex parts of adjacent
right) to annex adjacent Bosnia
Bosnia-
tively with the formation
tively began with formation of the the Croatian
Croatian peopled by Croats.
Herzegovina peopled
Herzegovina Croats.
Democratic (H
Democratic Union (Hrvatska rvatska Dernokratska
Demokratska Zajed
Zajed-
nica—HDZ), led by Franjo Tudjman.
nica-HDZ). Tudjman. The HDZ HDZ was was Accepted as
Accepted legitimate political party
as a legitimate party in
in December
December
a
first openly
the first Croat political movement
openly Croat movement to to appear 1989, Tudjman's HDZ
1989. Tudjman’s established itself as
HDZ quickly established as the
since the crushing
crushing of Maspok two two decades earlier.
earlier. The
The preeminent political organization
preeminent organization in
in post-Communist
post-Communist
movement held
movement held its first
first public meeting on 28 February
public meeting February Croatia. By
Croatia. the end of February
By the February 1990, first HDZ
the first
1990. the HDZ
constituted as legal political party drew 2,500
Zagreb drew
in
1989
1989 but was not constituted as a legal party congress in Zagreb
congress 2.500 delegates,
delegates, including
including
a
until that
until December. As 1990 began.
that December. began, the HDZ was
the HDZ was many of the all-important
many emigres. and the party
all-important emigres, party
well positioned
positioned to take advantage of both the the legaliza-
legaliza claimed 200,000
claimed members. Unlike
200,000 members. reformed Com
Unlike the reformed Com-
non-Communist political parties and the
tion of non-Communist the power
power munists,
munists, who hedged on
who hedged on the key issue of the
key issue the hour,
hour. the
the
vacuum created by the
vacuum the declining fortunes of
declining fortunes of the HDZ
HDZ came out openly in
out openly favor of Croatian
in favor Croatian indepen
indepen-
former Communist
former Communist party. dence and campaigned strongly on
campaigned strongly on this
this issue.
issue.
82
82

Croatian Republic’s
the Croatian
In the first multiparty
Republic 's first elections in
multiparty elections removed
removed the the prefix “Socialist” from
prefix "Socialist" from thethe republic's
republic’s
April-May
April-May 1990, the HDZ
1990, the HDZ demonstrated
demonstrated its domi-
domi designation. At
designation. the same time,
At the time, itit "derecognized"
“derecognized” the the
nance of the
the post-Communist landscape. . In
post-Communist political landscape Cyrillic alphabet within Croatia.
Cyrillic Croatia. In practical terms,
practical tenns,
two
two rounds
rounds of voting, the HDZ
voting. the HDZ captured 205 of the the
the legislation
legislation may have meant little: little: probably
probably more
seats in
356 seats in the new Croatian
the new Croatian Assembly.
Assembly. TheThe main
main than half of Croatia's
Croatia’s Serbs
Serbs used the the same Latin alpha-
alpha
opposition
opposition party, the reformed
party, the Communists, won
reformed Communists, won 73,
73, bet Croat compatriots,
bet as their Croat compatriots, and the the words them
words them-
and the
the remaining
remaining 78 seats
seats went
went toto eight smaller
smaller par-
par selves (in
(in whatever font) were
whatever type font) identical but for
were identical
Because the
ties. Because the electoral
electoral system favored
favored large, well
large, well- minor
minor differences dialect. In symbolic
differences of dialect. symbolic terms,
tenns , how
how-
organized political parties, the
organized the HDZ
HDZ won won almost
almost 60 ever, the
the new law had enormous
new law enonnous significance:
significance: it was was
percent of the
percent Assembly seats
the Assembly seats although
although it had actually
actually regarded not only
only as a huge
huge affront
affront byby Croatia's
Croatia’s ethnic
ethnic
received
received less than half the total votes cast. When
the total When thethe Serbs but also
also as a deliberate
deliberate attempt to erase their their
new cabinet
new cabinet was fonned, Franjo Tudjman
was formed, Tudjman waswas named 500-year
500-year cultural heritage in
cultural heritage in the border regions
the border regions and to
State President
President and another HDZ HDZ member,
member, Lojze
Lojze delegitimize their
delegitimize standing in
their standing the new
in the Croatian
new Croatian
Peterle, became
Peterle, Prime Minister.
became Prime Minister. society
society.6.6
The government of the

new government
The new Croat Republic wasted
the Croat lit
wasted lit- A more
A more serious
serious issue
issue than the
the alphabet was
was the
the
time in taking
tle time taking the
the first legislative steps to
first legislative to pave the
the makeup
makeup of the
the republic's
republic’s new
new police
police force—which
force-which
way for Zagreb's
way secession from
Zagreb’s secession from the
the SFRY and the the bound to
was bound to be a contentious
contentious issue
issue under the best of
under the
formation
fonnation of an independent Croatian
an independent state. But a
Croatian state. circumstances. In a republic
circumstances. republic with no military
military of its
complete lack of sensitivity
complete lack sensitivity to non-Croat
non-Croat concerns
concerns own—the JNA
own-the JNA and toto aa lesser the Territorial
lesser degree the
amplified well-founded
amplified well-founded fears
fears of looming discrimina
looming discrimina- Defense forces
Defense (TO) still functioned
forces (TO) functioned as federal
federal institu
institu-
tion
tion within Croatia's sizeable ethnic
Croatia’s sizeable ethnic Serb minority of
Serb minority tions—the Croatian
tions-the Croatian police
police were the closest thing
the closest thing to a
some 600,000 citizens—roughly 13
600,000 citizens-roughly 13 percent of the
the republic-wide armed force.
republic-wide force. Obviously, control
control of this
this
republic’s population of 4.7 million. These
republic's population legislative
These legislative force by either ethnic
force by ethnic group
group would be crucial
crucial to
to one
moves—discriminatory
moves-discriminatory in their wording, ill-consid
wording, ill-consid- threatening to the
side and threatening the other.
ered in their timing,
timing, and occasionally evocative of the
occasionally evocative
Fascist NDH
Fascist NOH state-were
state—were eventually
eventually to spark a coun-coun crux of the
The crux
The the dispute Croatian efforts
dispute centered on Croatian efforts to
tersecessionist backlash among
tersecessionist backlash among thethe Serbs
Serbs and move
move alter the
the size and character of the republic's police
the republic’s police
both
both sides far
far along
along the war in
the path to civil war in Croatia
Croatia. . force
force byby building additional
additional Croat-majority
Croat-majority police
police sta-
sta
tions and reducing
tions reducing the number of ethnic
the number ethnic Serbs
Serbs in the
the
The first misstep
The first misstep by
by Tudjman
Tudjman’s's new
new government
government was was existing force. By bringing
existing force. bringing additional
additional ethnic
ethnic Croats
Croats
in the
in the wording
wording of thethe republic's Constitution. . In a
republic’s Constitution into
into the regular force,
the regular force, the Croatian Government
the Croatian Government
nation obsessed with
nation with the
the question ethnic national
question of ethnic national- clearly hoped to decrease the
clearly hoped number of Serbs
the number Serbs inin the
the
ity, the
ity, Constitution nowhere
the Constitution nowhere mentioned
mentioned the
the Croatian
Croatian force in
force in both absolute and percentage terms, as
both absolute as well as
Serbs. The document
Serbs . The document produced
produced to move
to Croatian personnel
move Croatian into police
personnel into police stations in in
territory. 7 But the
Serb territory.7 Croats’ heavyhanded
the Croats' efforts to
heavyhanded efforts
defined
defined thethe state of
of Croatia as the
the sovereign
sovereign dominate the
dominate police force
the police poured salt on
force poured on an open
state of the Croatian nation.
of the nation. It made
made no refer
refer- wound and enraged ethnic
wound ethnic Serbs
Serbs everywhere.
everywhere. ThereThere
ence to the
the Serbs.
Serbs. Under Communism
Communism they had had was worse
worse to to come
come:: the
the Croats
Croats adopted
adopted thethe
been a constituent nation of
constituent nation the Republic of
of the of sahovnica—the
sahovnica-the Croatian shield—as the
Croatian shield-as the emblem
emblem of
Croatia. Now they were
Croatia. were dropped
dropped from the Con
the Con- the new, post-Communist
the new, post-Communist police uniform. The
police uniform. The
stitution. . Ethnic exclusivity
stitution exclusivity was
was toto be written
written sahovnica had indeed
sahovnica indeed been (as Croats were
(as Croats were quick to to
law of
into the basic law of the
the state.5
state .5 point
point out) thethe traditional
traditional coat of arms of the Croatian
the Croatian
nation for hundreds
nation hundreds of years. But was also
But it was also the sym-
the sym
Moves by the new government
the new government that seemed merely
merely bol adopted by
bol Pavelic’s Fascist-collaborator
by Ante Pavelic's Fascist-collaborator
forward-looking were taken by
forward-looking were Croatia’s Serbs
by Croatia's Serbs as
as por
por-
bigger and more
tents of bigger serious things
more serious come. On
things to come.
25 July 1990,
25 July instance, the
1990, for instance, Croatian Assembly
the Croatian Assembly
83
83

state.
state, which had systematically
systematically executed thousands
thousands election of Milan
election Milan Babic as president. the council
as president,
upon
upon thousands of Serbs in World War II. Most Serb
War 11. announced that it was scheduling
announced scheduling “a
"a referendum
referendum on
on
policemen
policemen refused outright
outright to wear
wear the new
new uniforms.
uniforms. the historic
the of the Serbs
historic territories
territories Serbs within the borders
borders
of the
the Republic of Croatia which will
Croatia which will take place
place from
from
19 August to 22 September“)
19 in the
September" 9 in the “11
"I I districts
districts of
Serbian Nationalism:
Serbian Nationalism: Serb Reactions Croatia" where
Croatia” where Serbs
Serbs were
were in
in the
the majority.
majority. On
On
3 Croatian Ministry of Justice
August the Croatian
3 August Justice declared
declared the
Ethnic
Ethnic nationalism
nationalism had stirred Serbs in Croatia
Croatia long
long referendum illegal,
referendum 17 August the Croatian
illegal, and on 17 Croatian
before the HDZHDZ took
took power.
power. so so it would not be be Special over Knin,
Special Police attempted to take over Knin. moving
moving on
on
entirely accurate to say that
entirely that Tudjman
Tudjman’s's political moves
moves the town
the town from
from Benkovac
Benkovac and Obrovac.lo Belgrade's
Obrovac. 10 Belgrade’s
were what
what sparked the rise of Serbian nationalism
Serbian nationalism chosen Serb
chosen military leader,
Serb military leader, local
local police
police inspector
inspector
HDZ’s legislation-and.
Nevertheless, the HDZ's
there. Nevertheless. legislation—and, per-
per Milan Martic, deployed
Milan deployed his
his new Special Police unit,
new Special unit.
haps more important.
important, the
the overtly
overtly Croat nationalist
Croat nationalist however. and mobilized
however. the Knin
mobilized the Knin police
police reserves to
to
trappings
trappings it clothed in—served as
clothed itself in-served as a powerful
powerful fell trees
trees across the
the routes into town;
routes into town; he
he appeared
catalyst and propelled
propelled much
much of the Croatian Serb pop
Croatian Serb pop- ready to force. The Croatians
use force.
to use backed down—
Croatians backed down-
ulation
ulation into the
the arms of the
the radical
radical nationalists by fan
nationalists by fan- especially after the Yugoslav
especially Yugoslav Air Force and Air
Air Force Air
ning
ning the
the Serbs'
Serbs’ worst Ustashe
worst fears of a resurgent Ustashe Defense intercepted
Defense intercepted helicopter-borne
helicopter-borne Croatian
Croatian rein
rein-
state.
state. Milosevic personally
personally and the Serbian Republic
the Serbian Republic forcements. 11 Martic’s
forcements." "Log Revolution”
Martie's “Log Revolution" enabled
enabled the
the
Government
Government generally
generally had already
already cultivated support-
cultivated support referendum to
referendum to proceed
proceed as
as scheduled
scheduled on
on 19
19 August,
August.
ers in
in the Serb communities
the Serb communities of the the Krajina region
region and and the results unsurprisineg
the results unsurprisingly and overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly
elsewhere
elsewhere and stood ready to to exploit the Serb
exploit the Serb minor
minor- endorsed an
endorsed an “independent status" for Croatia’s
"independent status” Croatia's
ity's
ity’s opposition Zagreb’s growing
opposition to Zagreb's nationalism.
growing nationalism. Serbs. 1~ Following this
Serbs.l2 victory. Babic moved
this victory, moved rapidly
rapidly
to consolidate his political control
consolidate his control over
over all
all the Serb
Serb-
The
The heart of the Croatian Serbs‘ own
Croatian Serbs· movement for
own movement municipalities of southern
majority municipalities
majority southern Krajina.13
Krajina. 13
autonomy
autonomy lay extremely modest
lay in the extremely mountain town
modest mountain town
Knin, a railway
of Knin. railway junction
junction in the southern arm of the
in the
republic roughly 200 km
republic roughly km south of Zagreb.
Zagreb. With guid-
guid Yearend Croatia Fractures
1990: Croatia
Yearend 1990: Fractures Into
Into Rival
Rival
ance from Belgrade. the Krajina Serb
from Belgrade, Serb political leader
leader- Substates
Substates
ship—led by
ship-led provincial dentist named Milan Babic
by a provincial
and the Serbian Democratic
the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)-marched
Party (SDS)—marched By
By the closing days of 1990,
the closing the Croatian
1990, the Croatian republic
republic
step through aa series of declarations.
step by step through declarations, referen
referen- government in
government Zagreb and the self-proclaimed
in Zagreb self-proclaimed Serb
Serb
dums, and "legislative"
dums. moves to withdraw
“legislative” moves withdraw the bulk of
the bulk in Knin
government in
government Knin were marching in
were marching cadence in
in cadence in
Croatian Serb population
the Croatian from Croatian
population from Croatian Govern
Govern- opposite directions. While Tudjman
opposite directions. Tudjman was arguing self
was arguing self-
control. The Krajina Serbs
ment control. first established
Serbs first established an determination for Croatia
determination Croatia as
as he sought to dislodge
he sought dislodge his
his
association of Serbian
association municipalities in May 1990.8
Serbian municipalities 1990.8 republic from
republic the SFRY.
from the SFRY, be simultaneously main
he simultaneously main-
citizens in and around Knin
When Serb citizens Knin began orga
orga- the indivisibility of his
tained the republic-to-be and the
his republic-to-be
themselves into
nizing themselves into “self-defense militias,” with
"self-defense militias." with inviolability of its borders
borders while refusing
refusing to grant the
the
Serbian Government
Serbian Government weapons
weapons and leadership. the
leadership, the Croatian Serbs political or
Croatian Serbs or cultural autonomy. As
cultural autonomy. As the
evaporation
evaporation of Zagreb's military control
Zagreb’s political and military control SFRY
SFRY was was slowly fracturing
fracturing into
into its constituent
constituent repub
repub-
over the
the region
region began. lics,
lics. the Krajina Serb portion of Croatia
Serb portion Croatia was
was attempt
attempt-
ing to
ing to affirm its political connections
affirm its connections to the
the Federal
Federal
On 25
On 25 July, within hours of the Croatian Assembly’s
the Croatian Assembly's Republic even as
Republic the rest of Croatia
as the spurned theirs.
Croatia spurned theirs. In
In
derecognition Cyrillic alphabet.
derecognition of the Cyrillic representatives
alphabet, representatives December 1990,
December 1990. after some
some preliminary
preliminary half-steps,
half-steps, the
the
from a cluster of Serb-majority
from municipalities met in
Serb-majority municipalities in Krajina Serb
Serb leaders formally established the self
established the self-
the town of Srb,
the town just north of Knin,
Srb, just Knin, and pronounced
pronounced a proclaimed Serbian
proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
Autonomous Region
declaration on the
declaration sovereignty and cultural
the sovereignty cultural autonomy
autonomy
of the Serbian people
the Serbian people in Croatia. This same group
in Croatia. group then
held the
the first session of the self-proclaimed
first session self-proclaimed “Serbian
"Serbian
National Council“ on
National Council" August in
on 1I August in Knin.
Knin. After the
the
84
s4

(Srpska Autonomna Oblast Krajina—SAOK)
(Srpska Autonomna Krajina-SAOK) as a midlevel Knin
midlevel Knin police
police inspector,
inspector, was
was the
the chosen
chosen instru
instru-
political entity within
political the Republic
within the Republic of Croatia
Croatia but ment to command
command the the breakaway
breakaway Serb
Serb police,
police. and the
the
independent
independent of its government.
government. Milan Babic
Babic was SDB appears to have spent some time
SOB time preparing
preparing him
him
elected chairman
chairman of thethe SAOK executive
executive council.
council.]414 to lead the
to lead the uprising
uprising that became known
known as the “Log
as the "Log
The
The new
new SAOK comprised
comprised the
the municipalities of Knin,
municipalities Knin, Revolution” of August
Revolution" 1990. By
August 1990. I 991, Martic
January 1991,
By January
Benkovac, Gracac, Donji Lapac,
Benkovac, Gracac, Obrovac, Korenica,
Lapac, Obrovac, Korenica, and the SDB were operating
the SOB operating a separate Krajina Secre-
Secre
Glina,, Dvor na Uni, Kostajnica,
Vojnic, Glina Kostajnica, and later tariat for Internal
Internal Affairs covering the SAO
covering the SAO Krajina.
Vrginmost.
Vrginmost.
The SDB also created an
The SOB elite combat
an elite combat unitunit to give
give
Moving on a parallel timetable, on 21
parallel timetable, December the
21 December Martic a reliable mobile force
reliable mobile force that
that could
could be moved
moved
Croatian Assembly proclaimed
Croatian Assembly proclaimed its "sovereignty"
“sovereignty” and from sector to sector. This would complement
quickly from complement
unilaterally
unilaterally claimed
claimed authority
authority over its own
own defense the
the existing Serb police
existing Serb police and the
the new
new police
police reserve
forces, diplomatic
forces, relations, and foreign
diplomatic relations, policy. The
foreign policy. The units
units.. The militia, which had also
local militia,
The local also received
received arms
declaration
declaration passed overwhelmingly,
overwhelmingly, since the
since the Serb from SDB, would be rechristened
from the SOB, rechristened the SAO Krajina
the SAO
members (who(who could
could not have outvoted the the measure Territorial Defense
Territorial (TO) and recruit
Defense (TO) the bulk of the
recruit the the
in any case) had earlier
earlier boycotted
boycotted the Assembly.'515 Not
the Assembly. manpower needed for the
manpower protection of the
the protection the new
new auton
auton-
yet independent,
independent, the the nascent Croatian
Croatian state
state already omous region. Similar TO militia forces
omous region. forces were then
comprised
comprised two near-warring entities. As 1991
two near-warring 199 I began, organized for the
organized the SAOs
SAOs of Western
Western Slavonia
Slavonia and EastEast-
few
few in Croatia
Croatia could
could think the portents for the
think the new
the new ern Slavonia-Baranja-Western
Slavonia-Baranja-Westem Srem. Srem. Eastern
Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia
year were anything
anything but ominous.
ominous. also received own elite force—the
received its own force-the later infamous
infamous
Arkan’s Tigers
Arkan's Tigers or Serbian
Serbian Volunteer
Volunteer Guard.
Guard. All of thethe
Chapter 7
Chapter7 TO units
TO units were
were to play
play a major role in
major role in the war that
the war
1991: Politics by Other
Extending Politics
1991: Extending Other Means
Means broke out in
broke in the summer of 1991.
the summer 1991.
Secession Within Secession-Arming

Secession Within Croatian
Secession—Arming the Croatian Organizing and Arming
Organizing the Croatian
Arming the Government
Croatian Government
Serbs’
Serbs• Forces, May
May 1990 August 1991“
to August
1990 to 1991 ••
The Croatian
The Serbs’ political preparations
Croatian Serbs' preparations to withdraw
withdraw The new Croatian
The new Croatian Government
Government under President Tudj
under President Tudj-
from the Croatian Republic
the Croatian Republic would not have been pos pos- inaugurated on 30 May 1990
man inaugurated 1990 was
was also
also faced
faced with
with
sible without
sible without anan armed deterrent to to keep Zagreb from
Zagreb from the need to build up a military
the military force,
force, and without
without the
the
crushing
crushing the
the rebellion
rebellion by force Slobodan Milosevic’s
force. . Slobodan Milosevic's support state or sufficient
support of a patron state weapons of its
sufficient weapons
Serbian Government, which
Serbian Government, which was
was orchestrating the
orchestrating the own. With more
own. more success than it had in Slovenia, the
in Slovenia, the
Croatian
Croatian Serbs' machinations, simulta-
Serbs’ political machinations, simulta JNA on 16-17
JNA 16-17 May moved in
May moved in advance of Tudjman’s
advance ofTudjman's
neously
neously organized
organized a police
police force
force and local
local village
village inauguration
inauguration to seize the
to seize the weapons stocks of the
weapons stocks the entire
guards in order to defend the the new autonomous
new autonomous Republic Territorial
Republic Territorial Defense (TO). 1" The
Defense (TO).'6 Croatians
The Croatians
regions.
regions. Bypassing
Bypassing federal institutions, Milosevic
federal institutions, had to turn
tum to the
the only government institution
only government institution in
used the
the State Security
Security Service (SDB) of his
Service (SOB) his own
own Croatia that still
Croatia arms—the Ministry of Inter
still had any arms-the Inter-
Internal Affairs to
Ministry of Internal implement these
to implement nal Affairs (MUP)-as
(MUP)—as its its first
first step in
in organizing
organizing aa
measures. national army. A
national army. A year spent enlarging
enlarging and training
training the
the
"
·· For the organization of
For a more detailed discussion of the of Croatia's
Croatia"s
The SDB appears to have had a well-thought-out
The SOB well-thought-out plan
armed forces,
armed see Annex
forces. see Organization of
Annex 2 : The Organization of the Croatian Gov
Gov-
to develop these forces.
to develop forces. The first
first step involved creat-
step involved creat ernment Forces,
ernmem May 1990—April
Forc.:es,May 1991; Annex
1990-April 1991: Annex 3:
3: Croatia Creates
ing reliable local
ing a reliable local leadership. Martic, a
leadership. Milan Martic, An Army—The
An Army-The National May-September 1991;
National Guard Corps, May-September 1991: and
Annex 4: The
Annex The Arming 0f the
Arming of the Croatian Government Forces,
Forces. May
May
‘
· For aa more detailed of Serbia
detailed discussion of Serbia’s
' s covert operation to arm 1990-August 1991.
1990—August
the Serbs,, see
the Serbs see Volume
Volume 1111,Annex 1: The Organization and Arming
, Annex I: Arming
of the
of Serbs, 1988-91.
the Croatian Serbs.
85
85

MUP while seeking
seeking foreign
foreign dealers willing to
dealers willing sell itit
to sell were
were more
more impressive
impressive onon paper
paper than inin reality,
reality, lacking
lacking
arms would give
give Croatia
Croatia inin the spring
spring of 1991
1991 a sufficient small arms
sufficient small arms toto equip
equip their
their members
members and
nascent army,
army, the National Guard
the National Guard Corps (ZNG), that
Corps (ZNG), that being even more
being more deficient
deficient in
in heavy weapons. The
heavy weapons.
would eventually
eventually grow
grow into
into a true national
national army,
army, the MUP, following the
MUP, loss of practically
the loss practically all its “mili
all its "mili-
Hn 1atska Vojska
Hrvatska Vojska (HY).
(HV). tary"
tary” units the Ministry of Defense,
units to the Defense, set
set about creat
creat-
ing
ing new
new regional Special Police units
regional Special units that
that may
may have
have
numbered 10,000
numbered I0.000 active
active and reserve
reserve personnel
personnel byby
Expanding the
Expanding the Police August 1991.
August 1991.
Impervious
Impervious to to ethnic reactions, when
ethnic Serb reactions. when the the Croat-
Croat Although it might
might claim
claim to have fielded within the
have fielded
Government first
ian Republic Government first moved
moved to expand the
to expand space of a year a respectable
respectable small
small army,
army, Croatia’s
Croatia's
MUP’s regular
MUP's regular police force, it dismissed
police force, dismissed manymany of the the Ministry of Defense
Ministry Defense was
was going to have to go
going to go to war
war
Serb policemen
policemen while increasing
increasing the number of police
the number police without robust command
without the robust command and control
control structure
structure
stations throughout country as
throughout the country demonstration of
as a demonstration necessary to direct
necessary direct combat operations in
combat operations field. In
in the field.
Croatian sovereignty and to enforce
Croatian sovereignty enforce Croatian
Croatian rule,rule, particular, lack of strong
particular, the lack regional commands
strong regional commands to to
particularly
particularly in Serb-populated
Serb-populated areas. By January January 19911991 control often ill-disciplined and inadequately
Zagreb's often
control Zagreb’s inadequately
the
the original force of 10,000
original force I 0,000 or so police
police had been trained
trained troops, combined with
troops, combined with poor
poor coordination
coordination
expanded to close 20,000 personnel.
close to 20.000 personnel. The The center-
center between
between thethe MUP and thethe ZNG,
ZNG, would dauntingly
dauntingly
MUP’s efforts
piece of the MUP's efforts to develop military force,
develop a military force, hinder Croatia's defense
hinder Croatia’s defense during
during the desperate days days of
however, was the
however, the expansion
expansion of its single antiterrorist
single antiterrorist summer 1991.
summer 1991.
unit into
into a number
number of "special
“special police"
police” battalions
battalions orga-orga
nized
nized along
along military lines. By
military lines. By January
January 19911991 the pro-pro
gram had produced 3,000 regular
produced 3,000 soldiers formed
regular soldiers formed intointo Acquiring Arms
Acquiring Arms
a dozen
dozen battalion-sized units. To
battalion-sized units. To back
back up these
these regular
regular
forces, the
forces, the MUP also began an expansion of its
an expansion Croatia's success in
Croatia’s success in organizing
organizing itsits defense
defense forces
forces was
was
regional
regional reserve elements the the fall of 1990.
1990. By June offset also by
offset also lack of weapons
by aa lack weapons to equip
equip them.
them.
1991 formations numbered
1991 these reserve formations numbered an an estimated
estimated Defense Minister Spegelj’s
Defense urgent efforts
Spegelj's urgent efforts to buy
buy small
small
9,000 to I10,000
0,000 personnel
personnel organized
organized in 16 16 battalion
battalion- arms and antitank systems abroad
antitank systems were only moder
abroad were moder-
units and IO
sized units
sized 10 company-sized
company-sized units. units, although
although successful. His biggest
ately successful. biggest deal
deal was contract for
was aa contract
many
many personnel
personnel probably
probably did weapons.
did not have weapons. 30,000 AK-47 rifles
30,000 AK-47 rifles from
from Hungary,
Hungary, but most most of the
promised Croatia. By
shipment never made itit to Croatia.
promised shipment By
August 1991,
August Zagreb had managed
1991, Zagreb managed to procure fewer
to procure fewer
Creating Guard Corps
National Guard
Creating the National Corps than 30,000
30,000 small
small arms
arms from foreign sources
from foreign sources toto aug
aug-
the 15,000
ment the weapons in
15,000 weapons in its MUP stocks, which
MUP stocks,
In May 1991
1991 the MUP’s Special
the MUP's Special Police and reserve
reserve was clearly insufficient
was clearly equip the growing army.
insufficient to equip army.
transformed into
formations were transformed
formations into the Croatian
Croatian
National Guard
National Guard Corps narodne garde)
(Zbora narodne
Corps (Zhora garde) and Chapter
Chapter 8
subordinated to
subordinated to the burgeoning Ministry of Defense
the burgeoning Defense The JNA
The JNA Fails
Fails To
To Halt
Halt Secession"
Secession•
General Martin Spegelj.
under General Spegelj, a former JNA officer.
former JNA officer.
The Special battalions combined
Special Police battalions combined to form four
to form four Croatia’s
Croatia's efforts to create its own
efforts to armed forces,
own armed forces. along
along
all-professional
all-professional brigades.
brigades, later dubbed “Guards Bri
dubbed "Guards Bri- with its political moves
with moves to separate from
from Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia.
gades," which were to
gades,” which stiffen and spearhead Croatian
to stiffen Croatian were closely watched
were closely by the
watched by JNA,
JNA, which saw
saw itself as
as
military
military operations throughout the coming
operations throughout coming war.war. By the only
only federal institution still able
federal institution able and willing
willing to
1991 these formations
July 1991 formations probably included some
probably included some thwart
thwart Croatia’s
Croatia's secessionist intentions. Led by
secessionist intentions. by Fed
Fed-
soldiers and were the only units
8,000 soldiers in the
units in ZNG that
the ZNG eral Defense Secretary
eral Defense General Veljko
Secretary General Veljko Kadijevic,
Kadijevic, the
could be described
could armed, at least with
described as fully armed. with small
small Army diligently tracked Croatian political and,
tracked Croatian and,
arms. At about the time, the
the same time. MUP reserve
the MUP reserve units
units ‘
· For detailed discussion ofJNA
For a more detailed of JNA efforts to prevent
prevent Yugosla
Yugosla-
had grown
grown toto some 19 19 regional
regional ZNGZNG reserve
reserve brigades
brigades via’s disintegration, see
via's disintegration. sec Annex
Annex 5: Kadijevic Indecisive: The JNA
Kadijevic lndecisive: JNA
and perhaps 14 I4 independent battalions totaling
independent battalions totaling about Fails To Halt
Fails To Halt Secession.
40,000 personnel.
40.000 personnel. Most of these reserve formations
formations
86

especially. military developments
especially, military through its Security
developments through Security indecisiveness—slowed
indecisiveness-slowed for the
planning for
planning the operation.
operation.
Directorate (UB), better known
Directorate (UB). known as the KOS. Kadijevic
the KOS. By
By early December, however,
early December. everything was
however. everything was ready.
ready.
was anan avowed Tito-style federalist
avowed Tito-style federalist whowho made no no All that
All that Kadijevic needed was
was the
the approval the Fed
approval of the Fed-
secret of his opposition to nationalism
his opposition nationalism of any kind kind nor
nor eral Presidency. He never
Presidency. He never attempted to get it and
to get
his determination to
his determination rebellion against
to stamp out any rebellion KOS to postpone
ordered KOS postpone the operation on the
the operation the morn
morn-
Belgrade’s rule. Alarmed
Belgrade 's rule. Alarmed by KOS-derived intelligence
intelligence ing
ing it was
was to sprung. Kadijevic had gotten
to have been sprung.
assessments of the accession of the
the accession the HDZ power in
HDZ to power in cold feet.
cold
spring 1990,
spring 1990, Kadijevic laid laid plans to confiscate
confiscate not
only Croatia's
only republican Territorial
Croatia’s republican Defense weapons
Territorial Defense weapons Meanwhile, the
Meanwhile, the Croatian
Croatian Government
Government knew knew some-
some
but Slovenia's
Slovenia’s and Bosnia’s
Bosnia's as as well. The JNA
well. The JNA thing was
thing was up. up. Kadijevic’s
Kadijevic's adversary, General Spegelj.
adversary. General Spegelj,
believed—rightfully,, as events proved-that
believed-rightfully proved—that these arguing for President
was arguing President Tudjman
Tudjman to order the Croat
the Croat-
weapons could be used by
weapons could the new
by the new governments
governments to ian MUP and the
ian MUP the few MoD volunteer
few MoD volunteer units
units to carry
carry
form their own
form own armies to to oppose the JNA. Kadijevic
the JNA. out a preemptive
preemptive strike strike and blockade
blockade the JNA’s bar-
the JNA's bar
coordinated his plans for the
coordinated seizures with
the seizures with Serbia’s
Serbia's racks throughout Croatia, cutting
throughout Croatia. water, electricity.
cutting off water. electricity,
member
member of the the Federal Presidency. Borisav JJovic.
Federal Presidency, who
ovic. who gas. and food. Spegelj believed
food. Spegelj believed that the predominantly
the predominantly
used his federal position to provide
federal position provide legal
legal cover
cover for the
the conscript JNA
conscript JNA forces disintegrate in
forces would disintegrate in such cir
such cir-
move
move in the face of Croatian
in the Croatian and Slovenian
Slovenian opposi-
opposi cumstances and deliver deliver an JNA military
an entire JNA district
military district
tion. When the
tion. When JNA struck
the JNA struck on 16-17
16-17 May,
May. completely
completely and its equipment
equipment into into Croatian
Croatian hands. Tudjman
Tudjman
disarming
disarming the Croatian TO,
the Croatian TO, it would be Kadijevic’s
Kadijevic 's vetoed Spegelj's plan. He
Spegelj’s plan. He did not believe
believe that Croatia
that Croatia
last decisive
decisive actact in the Army‘s
in the Army's solosolo attempt to to halt the force
had the force necessary
necessary to to take on the JNA, and he
the JNA. he
Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia’s disintegration
disintegration. . feared that
feared that Croatia
Croatia would lose lose what support itit had in in
the West
the West if if it attacked the
the duly
duly constituted government
constituted government
of the federation.
the federation.
To Act-October
Preparing To
Preparing Act—October to
to December
December 1990
1990
Having dealt with with the

the potential military threat of the
potential military the The Presidency
The Presidency Blocks
Blocks the JNA—January 1991
the JNA-January 1991
Croatian TO.
Croatian TO, the JNA turned its attention to the
the JNA politi
the politi-
cal threat, drafting plans to remove
threat. drafting remove the the Croatian
Croatian (and The
The Federal Presidency finally
Federal Presidency finally met to consider
consider
Slovenian)
Slovenian) Governments
Governments by
by late summer
summer or early fall.
fall. Kadijevic’s
Kadijevic 's plan
plan against Croatia
Slovenia on
The J NA leaders intended to
The JNA Croatia and Slove-
to allow Croatia Slove 9 January. detailed presentations
Despite detailed
January. Despite from
presentations from
nia to proceed with
to proceed with their announced steps toward
their announced toward Kadijevic on Croatian Slovenian efforts
Croatian and Slovenian efforts to
to acquire
acquire
independence so that
independence that the J NA’s planned
the JNA's planned military
military weapons and build
weapons “armies,” Borisav Jovic
build "armies." Jovic was
was
actions could be amply
actions could justified. By fall 1990,
amply justified. how
1990. how- unable toto persuade a majority
majority toto back
back the
the operation.
operation.
ever, the JNA appears to
the JNA shifted its focus
to have shifted from
focus from Instead
Instead the Presidency settled for a watered-down
the Presidency watered-down
the political process
the process back to to Croatia's efforts to
Croatia’s efforts to "grace
“grace period" during which
period” during Croatia would hand over
which Croatia
develop
develop its own military forces,
own military forces. especially General
especially General its weapons
weapons to to the JNA. The
the JNA. The Croatians,
Croatians, asserting their
their
Spegelj's
Spegelj’s arms acquisition
acquisition program. described in
program. As described in right to maintain
right maintain separate armed forces.forces, refused to
Yugoslavia: Death of
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation,
Nation. KOS KOS efforts
efforts to crack
crack turn over the
tum the weapons.
weapons. The The Croatian forces and the
Croatian forces the
Croatian security
Croatian received a major
security received major boost whenwhen Spegelj
Spegelj JNA went on heightened
JNA heightened alert while coun
while charge and coun-
asked a junior JNA JNA officer-whom
officer—whom Spegelj Spegelj had raised tercharge reverberated between Belgrade Belgrade and Zagreb
Zagreb
almost as his own
almost son—to act as a Croatian
own son-to Croatian agent and both prepared for war. war. OnOn 25
25 January the Presi
January the Presi-
JNA. The
the JNA.
against the The officer. Captain Vladimir Jager,
officer. Captain Jager. dency met again.
dency again, and again it voted down down Kadijevic’s
Kadijevic's
turned and became a double informing on
double agent, informing proposal. The Yugoslav
proposal. The Yugoslav general refused to act withoutwithout
Spegelj for KOS.
Spegelj KOS. Based Jager’s information
Based on Jager's information and the collective Presidency’s
the collective Presidency's legal
legal blessing.
blessing. Again thethe
other KOS
KOS intelligence reporting, the
intelligence reporting, JNA developed
the JNA developed government had to
Belgrade government
Belgrade to compromise.
compromise.
called Operation
a plan called “Shield” to
Operation "Shield" disarm the
to disarm Croat
the Croat-
ian military organization and put its leaders on trial.
military organization trial. AA
variety of procedural
variety procedural snags-and possibly Kadijevic’s
snags—and possibly Kadijevic's
87
87

What Is Yugoslavia?-The
What JNA and Serbia
Yugoslavia?—The JNA Serbia politicians were
politicians were abdicating
abdicating their
their federal
federal responsibili
responsibili-
Disagree ties while Yugoslavia disintegrated
disintegrated around
around them.
them. The
The
disgusted Army leaders
disgusted leaders bluntly told Milosevic
bluntly told Milosevic and
Serbian
Serbian President
President Milosevic and his key ally, Federal
ally, Federal Jovic
Jovic that they would now
now stage
stage a coup
coup and dissolve
dissolve
a
President Jovic,
President Jovic. had already
already begun to back away
to back away from
from the Presidency
Presidency and any republican
republican government
government that
the goals that Kadijevic and the Army still believed
the goals believed opposed them.
opposed The Army would then give
them. The give all
all sides
sides six
six
in—a Yugoslav
in-a federation firmly embracing
Yugoslav federation embracing Slovenia
Slovenia months to decide
months Yugoslavia's fate while
decide Yugoslavia’s it kept
kept the
the
it
and Croatia. Jovic had no faith
Croatia. Milosevic and Jovic faith that the state together until
state until a political settlement waswas reached.
reached.
a
Army would ever be able to dislodge
dislodge the governments
governments Eager to
Eager oblige, Jovic
to oblige, the other Milosevic
Jovic and the Milosevic-
of the
the breakaway
breakaway republics.
republics, given the popular
given the popular support
support members of the
controlled members
controlled the Presidency
Presidency (from
(from
their policies enjoyed. They were prepared to let the
policies enjoyed. the Vojvodina, Montenegro,
Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo) resignedresigned their
two republics go their own
two republics own way
way but without the Serb
without the Serb the JNA
waited for the
posts and waited JNA to act.
act, reasoning
reasoning that thethe
regions of Croatia,
regions Croatia, which the two believed should
two believed should bebe Army legalists could argue that, without
legalists could without a functioning
functioning
a
allowed
allowed to stay in a rump federation if they
Yugoslav federation
rump Yugoslav presidency, the JNA
presidency, JNA would not not be acting
acting insubordi
insubordi-
so chose. (Milosevic and the SOB SDB of course were prepre nately when
nately when it took
took over
over the
the government.
government.
it
pared to ensure they chose correctly.) crucial dif
correctly.) This crucial dif-
Serbian political leaders and the
ference between the Serbian the Even with
Even this accommodation,
with this however, Kadijevic
accommodation, however,
Army high
high command
command kept them divided
divided even as they and the
the NA could
JNA could not bring themselves to follow
bring themselves follow
J
worked together and shared their separate plans.
worked plans. through. When
through. analyzed the likely domestic
When they had analyzed domestic
When
When war divergent vision would
war did come, their divergent and international
international reactions
reactions to their plans. they con
their plans, con-
bring
bring near catastrophe to the Yugoslav
Yugoslav cause. cluded
cluded that a military putsch would be
military putsch be a disaster
disaster both
both
a
a
internally and diplomatically.
internally diplomatically. Confounded
Confounded that the
Army could
could march into the valley
march into valley of decision
decision and out
J NA Fails
The JNA Fails To
To Strike
Strike the space of a week,
again in the week, Jovic
Jovic and Milosevic
Milosevic
in
turned their
their backs
backs on a
the Army leaders
on the leaders and refused
refused to
Jovic and Milosevic gave Kadijevic one last chance to
Jovic again. The JNA’s
trust them again. JNA's last chance halt Yugo
chance to halt Yugo-
keep Yugoslavia together by by force.
force. Rebounding
Rebounding dog-
dog slavia’s
slavia's disintegration—whether
disintegration-whether it would have suc
suc-
it
gedly from the January
gedly from compromise, the JNA
January compromise, JNA readied ceeded or not—was
not-was gone.
gone.
a proposal
proposal for a state national emergency
state of national emergency in prepa
prepa-
ration for removing
ration removing the Croatian Gov
Slovenian Gov-
Croatian and Slovenian
Milosevic’s sly
ernments. Milosevic's suggestion to Jovic
sly suggestion Jovic that the
the Could Strike Have
Could a Strike Have Succeeded?
Succeeded?
a
military own, without

military act on its own, without trying
trying to get the Fed
Fed-
eral Presidency's
Presidency’s concurrence, however, fell on deaf
concurrence, however, JNA intervention to remove
JNA intervention the Slovenian
remove the Slovenian and Croat
Croat-
JNA would not act without
ears; the JNA without that legal
legal cover.
cover. ian Governments or
ian Governments or disarm
disarm their
their illegal
illegal “paramilitar
"paramilitar-
mid-March, the
In mid-March, JNA again
the JNA again presented its plan to thethe ies" would have been
ies” a difficult operation
operation even if thethe
if
a
Presidency and asked for a declaration

Presidency declaration of emergency.
emergency. Federal Presidency had approved
Federal Presidency approved by March 1991.
it by 1991. A
A
it
Four days of intense debate and negotiations

negotiations produced
produced JNA
JNA operation probably would have
operation then probably have failed
failed less
less
neither approval workable compromise,
approval nor a workable compromise, and the ingloriously than diddid its on Slovenia
its assault on in June
Slovenia in
Presidency
Presidency again rejected the Army’s proposals.
the Army's proposals. 1991, but its success would have been partial
1991, at best.
partial at
The outcome
outcome would have depended heavily on
depended heavily on the
This time
time Kadijevic and the JNA JNA General Staff chief,
General Staff chief, interaction
interaction among
among the elements of time
the elements time and surprise,
surprise,
Adzic, let their anger with
General Adzic,
General with the civilian leader
leader- unit discipline
the unit discipline achieved
achieved by the JNA,
by the JNA, and thethe
ship boil over. As
As they saw Janez Dmovsek degree of military opposition mustered
military opposition mustered by by the
the unpre—
unpre-
it.
ship saw it, Janez Drnovsek and

Stjepan
Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic, the Slovene
(Stipe) Mesic, Slovene and Croatian
Croatian republics. An
pared republics. An even earlier move within the
earlier move
members of thethe Presidency, helping their
Presidency, were helping their gov-
gov December
December 1990—March
1990-March 1991 1991 time frame would have
time frame have
ernments tie the federal government
the hands of the federal government so
could present it with
they could with a fait accompli; the other
fait accompli;
it
88
88

had a host of benefits:
benefits: the Croatians and Slovenes
the Croatians Slovenes Federal
Federal Yugoslavia. claimed that most
Yugoslavia. Vasiljevic also claimed most
would have had even less warningwarning and time
time to to prepare Army officers during the
officers during the Slovene war—junior officers
Slovene war-junior officers
themselves politically, Yugoslav
themselves Yugoslav national
national cohesion
cohesion included—believed
included-believed in a "radical
“radical solution" the
solution” to the
probably
probably would have been somewhat higher and the
somewhat higher the nationalist problems
nationalist problems besetting the
the country,
country. even
soldiers
soldiers’ ' discipline will to fight
discipline and will fight less eroded, and though he
though he acknowledged officers took
that some officers
acknowledged that took the
the
the
the Croatians Slovenes would have had less time
Croatians and Slovenes position
position that “I cannot be against my
that "I my own people ."
own people.”
to field their military forces . In Croatia
military forces. Croatia, , in
in particular,
particular , Certainly by
Certainly by late 1991 a large
late 1991 non-Serb
large percentage of non-Serb
most of the Special Police forces
the Special forces and the
the nascent or Montenegrin officers had deserted the
Montenegrin officers the JNA or no
JNA
MUP reserve units were only
MUP only minimally combat ready ready supported its leaders.
longer supported
longer leaders. If
If Vasiljevic was speak-
speak
in December
December 1990.1990. AA quick
quick decision
decision in Belgrade
Belgrade 1991, however,
ing of 1990 and early 1991,
ing however, his assessment
might have permitted
might permitted the JNA to
the JNA to mount a lightning
lightning may have been correct.
correct.
forces.
strike against these forces.
The officer corps
The officer corps, , however,
however, was not the
the main
main problem.
problem.
Generally
Generally speaking
speaking, , the JNA’s assessments and opera-
the JNA's opera During the Slovene operations
the Slovene operations and the
the war Croatia, ,
war in Croatia
tional planning
tional planning in December
December were probablyprobably more real real- the
the young conscripts and reservists
young conscripts reservists who
who made up the the
istic and effective
istic effective than they proved
proved to be in thethe bulk
bulk of the JNA manpower—and
the JNA manpower-and especially the non
especially the non-
eventual operation
operation against the the Slovenes.
Slovenes. Army leaders clearly unwilling to fight
Serbs—were clearly
Serbs-were fight against their
their
at that
that time appear to to have realized
realized that the removal of
the removal own countrymen or for a cause they did
own countrymen did not believe
believe in.
in.
the governments or the
the governments the disarming
disarming of the paramilitarie s
the paramilitaries Spegelj's from December
Spegelj’s arguments from December 1990 1990 that
that the
the
would require force, and JNA
require force, probably would
JNA units probably JNA
JNA conscripts
conscripts would not fight to prevent Croatia’s
fight to Croatia 's
have been better prepared both mentally mentally and materi
materi- secession probably
secession probably would have proved
proved substantially
substantially
ally.
ally. In addition, KOS
In addition, KOS and military police antiterrorist
military police antiterrorist correct.
correct.
units had done thorough
thorough planning
planning for their parts in the the
operation probably would have been able to
operation and probably to seize
seize Chapter 9
Chapter
*
most government facilities—other than the
government facilities-other the readily
readily The Croatian Pot
The Croatian Pot Boils Over ·
Boils Over
distributed weapons
distributed weapons in in the armories—and many
the armories-and many key
political personalities.
personalities. As the the decisionmaking crisis
decisionmaking crisis The inability of the
The inability senior politicians
the senior to achieve
politicians to achieve a
December, the
stretched on past December, Croatian and Slove-
the Croatian Slove solution to
solution to the crisis and the
the crisis unwillingness of the
the unwillingness the JNA
JNA
nian governments
governments became better able to to anticipate
anticipate and to act ensured that the
to the rising tensions
rising tensions within Croatia
Croatia
JNA move,
resist a JNA move, making well-planned, well
making even a well-planned, well- would lead to fighting between
to fighting Croatian Serbs
between armed Croatian
founded strike
founded strike far more problematic.
problematic. Croatian Government
and Croatian Government forces. The brief clashes
forces. The
that erupted at the town of Pakrac,
the town the resort at
Pakrac, the
Probably
Probably thethe key factor inhibiting the
factor inhibiting the success of any Plitvice Lakes,
Lakes, and the village of Borovo Selo
the village Selo during
during
JNA operation
JNA operation against the secessionist republics
the secessionist republics was
was February, March,
February, March , and May were the first
were the first shots in
in the
the
the
the lack cohesion and will
lack of cohesion will to
to fight JNA per-
among JNA
fight among per war
war that was to consume Croatia for the
consume Croatia the rest of 1991.
1991.
sonnel; these would plague the
sonnel; JNA throughout
the JNA the
throughout the After these actions,
actions, both Serbs and Croatians
both Serbs Croatians realized
realized
1991
1991 fighting
fighting against the the ethnically homogeneous
ethnically homogeneous that all-out
that war was likely,
all-out war emotions reached the
likely, and emotions the
Slovene and Croatian
Slovene Croatian troops
troops, , who
who were primed to
were primed boiling point. fights and threats drew
point. Their fights the JNA’s
drew the JNA's
defend their
defend their homelands
homelands against what 1991 had
what by 1991 garrisons into
Croatian garrisons
Croatian into the role of peacekeepers,
the role peacekeeper s, a rolerole
become in their mindsminds an occupying Army. Colonel
an occupying that did not fully satisfy
that satisfy the Croatian Serbs—who
the Croatian Serbs-who
Vasiljevic, 17 the senior
Vasiljevic,'7the KOS officer responsible
senior KOS responsible for wanted
wanted the JNA to defend them-or
the JNA them—or the Croatians—
the Croatians-
Croatian operations,
Croatian operations, would claim claim in
in 1992
1992 that the
the who
who believed
believed that the JNA
that the JNA waswas explicitly or tacitly
tacitly
multiethnic Army high
multiethnic command—including Slov
high command-including Slov- backing
backing the rebellious Serbs.
the rebellious
enes Croats, , and Muslims—firmly
enes,, Croats Muslims-firmly believed believed in the
the
'
state declaration urged by the
emergency declaration
state of emergency the Army inin · For discussion of
For a more detailed discussion clashess at Pakrac,
of the clashe Pakrac . Plitvice,
Pl it vice.
and Borovo Selo, see
Borovo Seto. Annex 6: Scene Setters for War—Pakrac,
see Annex War-Pakrac.
1990. Vasiljevic’s
1990. Vasiljevic 's judgment
judgment seems plausible,
plausible, and Plitvice Lakes, and Borovo
Plitvicc Lakes. Borovo Selo.
Selo.
indication from
there is every indication Jovic and other sources
from Jovic
the Army leaders were
that the were devoted
devoted to preserving
preserving a
89
89

Pakrac Plitvice: Zagreb Blocks
Pakrac and Plitvice: Blocks Serb
Serb Moves
Moves unplanned, undirected,
unplanned, undirected, and
and incoherent,
incoherent, with
with Serbs
Serbs in
in
one village firing
one village firing at
at the neighboring
neighboring one
one simply
simply
Two incidents
incidents signaled
signaled the start
start of the Croatian
Croatian Serb
Serb because it was
because was Croat
Croat and
and vice versa. This
vice versa. This inchoate
inchoate
leadership's
leadership’s efforts-backed
efforts—backed by the
the Serbian Govern-
Serbian Govern violence would serve
violence serve to mask strategic military
mask strategic
ment-to
ment—to consolidate
consolidate its control
control over
over designated Serb-
designated Serb actions by
actions by the Croatian leadership that, supported
Serb leadership
Croatian Serb supported
populated regions throughout
populated regions throughout Croatia.
Croatia. Croatian
Croatian MUP by Serbia,
Serbia, intended
intended toto expand its control
expand its control over
over Serb
Serb
Special
Special Police thwarted
thwarted the the Serbs'
Serbs’ February
February attempt to to areas in Croatia. The Zagreb
in Croatia. Zagreb government
government was
was forced
forced
take over
over the town
town of Pakrac Western Slavonia,
Pakrac in Western Slavonia, on the
on the strategic defensive, but
strategic defensive, but President
President Tudjman
Tudjman
although
although no one was injured injured in thethe exchange
exchange of gun-gun resisted pressure
resisted pressure from
from hardliners
hardliners who
who wanted
wanted him
him to
to
fire
fire when
when the MUP force force retook
retook the local
local police
police sta-
sta retaliate for Croatian
retaliate Croatian Serb
Serb victories
victories by
by attacking
attacking the
tion.
tion. The Federal
Federal Presidency
Presidency ordered JNA forces
ordered JNA forces to JNA,
JNA, which
which they
they viewed
viewed as
as pro-Serb.
pro-Serb. Tudjman
Tudjman contin
contin-
occupy
occupy the area and halt the the clashes.
clashes. At Plitvice, the ued to look to community for action
international community
to the international action
removal
removal of Croatian
Croatian managers
managers from from a resort byby SAO
SAO to halt fighting. Meanwhile, the JNA,
halt the fighting. JNA, acting
acting in
in the
Krajina Special
Special Police and armed armed civilians sparked
sparked name of Yugoslavia but
name but irresistibly
irresistibly biased
biased toward
toward
another
another Croatian
Croatian counterattack.
counterattack. After some some initial Serb interests,
Serb tried and failed
interests, tried failed to keep the peace.
to keep peace.
miscues, the
miscues, the MUP Special
Special Police succeeded
succeeded in in retak-
retak
ing the park, after which JNA
the park, JNA troops
troops again quickly
moved
moved in to separate the two sides. Both,
two sides. however,
Both, however, Serbian
Serbian and Croatian
Croatian Serb
Serb Planning
Planning
suffered their first
had suffered casualties, each losing
first casualties, losing one dead
and six
six wounded.
wounded. It would get worse. worse. Throughout 1991, Milosevic,
Throughout 1991, Milosevic, Jovic,
Jovic, and
and the Serbian
Serbian
Government proclaimed
Government their vision of aa rump
proclaimed their rump Yugo
Yugo-
slavia that
slavia included the Serb
that included regions of Croatia,
Serb regions Croatia, but
but
Borovo Seto:
Borovo Selo: Wake-Up for Croatia
Call for
Wake-Up Call Croatia without the rest of Croatia
without Croatia or Slovenia.
Slovenia. This clear
clear
vision of Serbian
Serbian national
national objectives
objectives and
and the Croatian
Croatian
The death of at least 12 12 Croatian
Croatian Special Policemen
Special Policemen Serb military
Serb military operations designed to
operations designed to implement
implement part
part
and the wounding
wounding of 21 21 others in a Croatian
Croatian Serb
Serb of them would drivedrive events
events throughout
throughout Croatia
Croatia during
during
ambush
ambush on I1 May at the village
village of Borovo Selo, Selo, in
in summer of 1991.
the summer 1991. The Croatian Serb political and
Croatian Serb
Eastern
Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia near the town town of Vukovar,
Vukovar, had a pro pro- military leadership—backed
military leadership-backed by by Serbia—would
Serbia-would move move
found
found psychological
psychological effect
effect on the Croatian Govem
Croatian Govern- from occasional use of armed
from the occasional armed force,
force, as
as at
at Pakrac
Pakrac
ment and people.
people. The Special
Special Police had been Plitvice, to
and Plitvice. to full-scale military
military operations
operations designed
designed
attacked as they tried to to enter the village to free two
the village two bring Krajina
to bring Krajina and other
other Serb
Serb enclaves into aa politi
enclaves into politi-
comrades
comrades whowho had been wounded
wounded and captured
captured the cal and territorial
cal territorial union.
union. The leaders of the Krajina
The leaders Krajina
previous day while sneaking
previous day sneaking intointo town
town on on a lark
lark to
to Serbian Autonomous
Serbian Region, or
Autonomous Region, or SAO
SAO Krajina,
pull down
down a Yugoslav flag. incident brought
flag. The incident brought planned to
planned to dispatch military units
dispatch military units to
to eject any official
eject any official
secessionist Croatians face
secessionist Croatians face to face withwith the costs of Croatian Government presence
Croatian Government presence from
from the localities
localities
ambitions; their
their ambitions; their outraged
outraged reaction
reaction pushed
pushed they claimed
they as their
claimed as own, and
their own, and Serb
Serb leaders
leaders in
in the
Croatia
Croatia irrevocably toward an all-out
irrevocably toward all-out war
war of indepen-
indepen newly formed
newly formed Eastern Western Slavonia Autono
Eastern and Western Autono-
JNA’s by now
dence. The JNA's now routine
routine intervention
intervention to sepasepa- mous
mous Regions prepared for similar actions
Regions prepared actions to consoli
consoli-
rate local combatants
rate local could not halt the slide
combatants could slide toward
toward date their own holdings.18
their own holdings. 18Personnel
Personnel from
from the Serbian
Serbian
regional war.
regional war. State Security Department and
Security Department and its
its Special
Special Operations
Operations
Unit almost
almost certainly
certainly helped
helped plan many of these
plan many
military operations.19
military operations. 19
Skirmishing—Serb
Skirmishing-Serb Versus Croat, Summer
Versus Croat, 1991
Summer 1991
Selo, internecine
After Borovo Selo, intemecine clashes
clashes spread like a
spread like a
plague.
plague. Many of the outbreaks to be
outbreaks appeared to
90

Croatian Strategy
Croatian conference to
a press conference explain and justify his
to explain decision
his decision
to go to war
not to with the
war with JNA:
the JNA:
Although Slovenia's
Slovenia’s headlong
headlong rush toward
toward indepen
indepen-
dence impelled Croatia to make
impelled Croatia conditional declara-
make a conditional declara Our defense
defense forces
forces . . . because they do not have
tion of independence
independence simultaneously
simultaneously on 25 25 June 1991,
1991, heavy weapons. are inferior
weapons .... . are inferior. . .... to the
the Yiigo-
Yugo
declared political objective
Zagreb's declared
Zagreb’s objective was to achieve a
to achieve slav Army
slav Army ...
. . . this is one of
of the
the reasons
reasons why II
peaceful
peaceful separation of a territorially Croatia
territorially intact Croatia personally
personally . .... declined
declined to wage an open war
to wage
from
from Federal Yugoslavia, and from
Federal Yugoslavia, from June through
through agaimt the
against Yugoslav Army
the Yugoslav and Serbia.
Army and Serbia?2JJ
August President Tudjman
August President Tudjman clung tenaciously to
clung tenaciously to this
Croatian Serbs,
policy. The Croatian
policy. however, had long
Serbs, however, before
long before Unremitting increased Serb violence,
Unremitting and increased however—
violence, however-
decided that they would exit
decided exit Croatia whether it
Croatia whether particularly
particularly in
in Eastern
Eastern Slavonia—and Croatian
Slavonia-and Croatian con-
con
independence or not, and it was
declared its independence was their overt victions the JNA
victions that the siding with
JNA was siding with the Croatian
the Croatian
military action
resort to military action during
during this period
period that
that would Serbs soon forced
Serbs Tudjman to confront
forced Tudjman the issue head-
confront the head
determine thethe nature and timing
timing of Croatia
Croatia’s·s separa-
separa On 22 August
on. On August he he issued an ultimatum
issued an ultimatum to to the Fed
the Fed-
tion. Serb
tion. military “victories,”
Serb military "victories," effectively
effectively consoli-
consoli eral Presidency
Presidency and Defense Secretariat, demanding
Defense Secretariat, demanding
dated by JJNA
NA interventions
interventions to further fighting,
to prevent further fighting, JNA units
that JNA Croatia return to their barracks
units in Croatia barracks by
forced a divisive debate in
forced in Zagreb
Zagreb over the use of
the use 31 August.’ If
31 August.· the JNA
If the did not comply,
JNA did comply, the Croatian
the Croatian
force and would eventually
force President Tudjman
eventually push President Tudjman Government would
Government
into a war
into war that he did not want but had no choice
that he choice but
to
to join. consider that the
consider the Yugoslav Presidency is directly
Yugoslav Presidency directly
responsible for
responsible the aggression
for the aggression against
against the
the
President Tudj
President Tudjman's
man’s initial aim was to intemationalize
internationalize Republic
Republic ofof Croatia and the Yugoslav
Yugoslav Army as
the
the conflict in Croatia,
conflict Croatia, rather than fight fight back withwith mil
milan army
army ofof occupation,
occupation, and
and we will accordingly
will accordingly
itary force,
force, hoping
hoping that the European Community
the European Community and take all necessary for
necessary steps for the
the protection
protection of our
of
the United States would recognize
the United Croatian indepen
recognize Croatian indepen- territorial integrity
integrity and sovereignty ..... . 23
and sovereignty J3
dence and put pressure on Belgrade Belgrade to to halt its "aggres-
“aggres
sion” against Croatia
sion" Croatia. . He
He rejected
rejected the advice of
the advice It was
It mounting losses
was mounting Serbian attacks and deepen-
losses to Serbian deepen
hardliners
hardliners in in his party, thethe HDZ,
HDZ, that Croatia should
that Croatia should ing convictions
ing convictions that JNA was
the JNA
that the was involved
involved in
in these
directly
directly attack the JNA units
the JNA that seemed to
units that be work
to be work- attacks that pushed
pushed Tudjman
Tudjman to thethe brink of adopting
adopting
ing
ing hand-in-glove
hand-in-glove with with the Croatian Serb
the Croatian Serb military
military Spegelj's recommended
Spegelj’s recommended strategy of attacking iso
attacking and iso-
operations. Croatian
operations. Croatian troops
troops would remainremain on the the lating the
lating JNA. Even
the JNA. Even after he had authorized
authorized military
military
defensive, he
defensive, he insisted,
insisted. reacting
reacting only
only to defend Croat- Croat actions and warned
actions warned publicly that he Tud
he would do so, Tud-
ian
ian territory. Croatia descended into
territory. As Croatia into real war
war dur-
dur jman would continue
jman continue to cling to the hope that outside
the hope outside
ing July
ing July and the Croatian Serbs began racking
the Croatian racking up intervention would save Croatia
intervention Croatia from military con
from a military con-
successive victories, the
successive victories, divisions in
the divisions in the Croatian
the Croatian test with the
test with J NA that, in his
the JNA opinion, it could
his opinion, could not win.
win.
leadership grew.
leadership Inspired by ZNG
grew. Inspired Commander Gen-
ZNG Commander Gen
eral Spegelj Defense Minister Djodan,
Spegelj and Defense Djodan, the the hard
hard-
liners decried Tudjman's
liners decried reliance on the
Tudjman’s reliance international
the international The Yugoslav People’s Army:
Yugoslav People's Army: Biased Peacekeepers
Peacekeepers
community and called
community offensive against
called for a strategic offensive
JNA barracks,
the JNA
the barracks. the Spegelj had advocated
the plan that Spegelj much of the
During much fighting in
the summer fighting Croatia, the
in Croatia, the
in late 1990,
I 990. early 1991, and during
early 1991, during the Slovenian
the Slovenian JNA was stuck in the
JNA the middle,
middle, ordered to act as as a buffer
buffer
The debate came to
War.~0 The
Ten-Day War.20 to a head during
during a force at Pakrac,
force (as it had at Plitvice, and Borovo Seto)
Pakrac , Plitvice. Selo)
contentious Croatian
contentious Croatian national
national assembly meeting in
assembly meeting yet distrusted by the Croatians and criticized
the Croatians criticized by the
the
August when
early August when HDZHDZ rightists
rightists demanded more local helping them more. Firmly devoted
local Serbs for not helping devoted
vociferously than ever that Tudjman
vociferously authorize attacks
Tudjman authorize ideal of a Federal
to its ideal Federal Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, the J NA by
the JNA by and
on the JNA.2|1 Tudjman
the JNA.~ Tudjman again stood firm and reorga-
stood firm reorga '
· For
For the
the full of the
text of
full text the ultimatum, see Annex
ultimatum. see Annex 7: Croatian
nized his
nized his government
government to to replace Djodan;
Djodan; Spegelj
Spegelj Ultimatum to the Federal Presidency of
Ultimatum of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
resigned August. Two days later Tudjman
resigned on 3 August. called
Tudjman called
91
91

large did
did try to act act as a neutral peacekeeping force
neutral peacekeeping force Yugoslavia.''
Yugoslavia.”2424 Three
Three days later he he complained
complained that
during
during this period.
period, but thethe fog
fog of warwar and biasesbiases on all all "the
“the military
military ... is intoxicated
. . . is intoxicated with unity of aa
with the unity
three sides led to to repeated misunderstandings
misunderstandings among among Yugoslavia that no no longer exists." 2' Despite
longer exists.”25 Despite the
the Croat-
Croat
the
the contenders.
contenders. The CroatiansCroatians were
were unable
unable to appreci-
appreci ian perception
perception that the the JNA
JNA waswas siding
siding with
with Croatian
Croatian
ate the fine
fine distinctions
distinctions between the J NA’s duty-bound
the JNA's duty-bound Serb forces during
Serb forces July and August,
during July August, thethe evidence
evidence
actions
actions to keep peace within a united united Federal Yugosla-
Federal Yugosla available shows that the JNA
available shows JNA was
was attempting-not
attempting—not
via, the Serbian
Serbian leaders' willingness to
leaders’ willingness to let Croatia
Croatia always successfully—to act
always successfully-to impartially. Typically,
act impartially. Typically. thethe
secede minus
minus its Serbian enclaves, , and the Croatian
Serbian enclaves Croatian JNA would move
JNA move its armor-mechanized
armor-mechanized units units to
to sepa-
sepa
Serbs'
Serbs’ determination
determination to separate themselvesthemselves by force. force. rate
rate Serb
Serb and Croat
Croat units
units and actively
actively try to mediate
mediate a
Feeding
Feeding the Croatians'
Croatians’ suspicions
suspicions of the JNA was
the JNA was the settlement between
between them. Anecdotal
Anecdotal accounts from
accounts from
that, although
fact that. although most JNA JNA commanders
commanders appear to to local
local press reporting
reporting suggest that the JNA intervened
the JNA intervened
rigorously followed orders to act solely
have rigorously solely as peace-
peace in nearly
nearly every
every clash
clash or action
action that occurred from June
occurred from
keepers.
keepers, their sympathies
sympathies tended to to be with
with the Serbs,
the Serbs, until
until mid-September
mid-September (when (when the JNA
JNA would begin act
begin act-
and some unit commanders
commanders very very likely did favor the
did favor the ing
ing consciously
consciously against the the Croatians).
Croatians).
Serbs in their peacekeeping
peacekeeping operations.
operations. Some Some com-com
manders even went so far as as to provide
provide weapons
weapons to While they staunchly guarded the
staunchly guarded JNA’s impartially
the JNA's impartially
Croatian
Croatian Serb forces, although
Serb forces, although the vast majoritymajority of federal
federal mission, whether Kadijevic and Adzic
mission, whether Adzic wanted
wanted
Serb weaponry
weaponry was drawn drawn directly
directly fromfrom Serbian
Serbian TO TO it or not, the Army became
it became increasingly Serbianized
increasingly Serbianized
and MUP stocks stocks. . Finally, even whenwhen the JNA was
the JNA was after the
the eruption
eruption of the
the Slovenian
Slovenian Ten-Day War War asas
clearly
clearly hewing
hewing to to its mandate of restoring
restoring peace and conscripts deserting and the other republics
conscripts began deserting republics
buffer, after Serb forces
acting as a buffer. forces had captured an an refused to send their
refused their biannual
biannual intakes
intakes of conscripts
conscripts toto
from the
area from the Croatians, JNA’s intervention
Croatians, the JNA's intervention to halt halt the JNA.
JNA . The effect JNA morale
effect on JNA was profound.
morale was profound.
fighting usually
the fighting left the Serb forces
usually left forces occupying
occupying Jovic asserted during
Jovic during a a meeting with Kadijevic
meeting with Kadijevic on
their objectives.
objectives. The The cumulative
cumulative effect
effect of such actionsactions July that
5 July
from July to September
from July September was to heighten Croatian per-
heighten Croatian per
ceptions
ceptions of JNA JNA support
support for Serb military actions.
military actions. Army morale
morale has
has hit rock bottom. The
rock bottom. The Serb
Serb
This was exacerbated when, when, after the war war in Slovenia
Slovenia nation
nation is losing
losing faith
faith in in the JNA. The
The opposition
opposition
began, the JNA dispatched
the JNA numbers of troops
dispatched large numbers troops to is seeking
seeking the formation
formation of Serbian army.
of a Serbian army . ... . .
the border with
the border with Eastern Slavonia and elsewhere
Eastern Slavonia elsewhere in The Serbian
The Serbian Renewal
Renewal Movement
Movement is is directly
directly
intimidate Zagreb
Croatia to intimidate
Croatia into backing
Zagreb into backing away away fromfrom encouraging
encouraging reservists
reservists to their callup
ignore their
to ignore cal/up
secession. This essentially
secession. essentially political actionaction by by the JNA JNA orders, to
orders, to desert
desert. .... . The
The mothers
mothers of of soldiers
soldiers are are
leadership.
leadership, though viewed by them as independent
though viewed independent of demonstrating-asking
demonstrating—asking that their
their "children
“children
their impartial
impartial peacekeeping Croatia,
actions within Croatia.
peacekeeping actions return
return from military. "26
from the military. "26
could hardly
could hardly enhance CroatianCroatian confidence
confidence in the the
JNA’s neutrality.
JNA's neutrality. As Silber and Little note, "The“The Slovene
Slovene experience
experience
JNA." 27 Admiral Branko
tore the heart out of the JNA.”27
Whatever the
Whatever the appearances, it is clear from
is clear discussions
from discussions Mamula, General Kadijevic’s predecessor
General Kadijevic's predecessor asas Federal
Federal
between Serbian
between Federal Presidency
Serbian Federal Presidency member Jovic
member Jovic Defense Secretary
Defense Kadijevic’s closest
Secretary and one of Kadijevic's closest
JNA senior
and JNA senior officers
officers during
during the summer of 1991
the summer 1991 informal advisers,
informal told British reporter
advisers, told reporter Misha Glenny
JNA conscientiously
that the JNA conscientiously tried to remain
remain anan unbi
unbi- in 1991 that Kadijevic’s
in 1991 big mistake
Kadijevic 's one big mistake was
was letting
letting
federal force
ased federal Its leaders
Croatia. Its
force in Croatia. leaders consistently
consistently Slovenia go. "After
Slovenia “After that .... . we lost Yugoslavia.”
we had lost Yugoslavia."
refused to accede to demands from
refused Jovic and
from Jovic loss of part of Yugoslavia made it very
The loss very difficult
difficult
Milosevic that the JNA JNA become
become in effect
effect a Serbian
Serbian the multiethnic
for the J NA officer corps
multiethnic JNA corps to undertake
undertake any
army and pull back defend only the
back to defend Serb regions
the Serb regions in in operations in Croatia,
operations especially the combat
Croatia, especially combat opera-
opera
Jovic noted on 24 June
Croatia. Jovic
Croatia. June 1991 General
1991 that General tions that would be
tions ordered against the Croatian
be ordered Croatian
Adzic, J NA General
Adzic, JNA Staff chief,
General Staff “characterized ..
chief, "characterized . . . my
position
position on defending Serbs in
defending Serbs Croatia as
in Croatia unreason
as unreason-
able,. because the JNA
able JNA must defend all all the nations
nations of
92

Government
Government in in the fall of 1991.
1991. The J NA leadership
The JNA leadership by Serbian
by fire, and,
Serbian fire, and, because JNA was
because the JNA was everywhere
everywhere
could
could no longer
longer realistically
realistically justify attacking Croatia
attacking Croatia evidence, Croatian
in evidence,
in accusations of JNA
Croatian accusations JNA complicity
Yugoslavia. The unity
to save Yugoslavia. unity of the officer corps
the officer corps and direct involvement mounted.
direct involvement mounted. JNA units, officially
JNA units, officially
crumble, even though
began to crumble, though the
the senior
senior leadership
leadership neutral but inevitably
neutral inevitably afflicted
afflicted with
with Serb sympathies
Serb sympathies
still assured themselves
themselves that they were fighting for
were fighting resentment of Croatian
and resentment Croatian nationalist sentiments,
nationalist sentiments,
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.2828 faced increasing
faced Croatian hostility and even
increasing Croatian even direct
direct fire
fire
perceptions of JNA-Serbian
as perceptions
as JNA-Serbian collusion hardened.
hardened.
This hostility
hostility would culminate
culminate inin Croatian
Croatian blockades
blockades
Combat Operations,
Combat Operations, June-September
June-September 1991
1991 • JNA barracks
of the JNA barracks inin Osijek, Vinkovci,
Vinkovci, and Vukovar
followed byby direct with JJNA
fighting with
direct fighting NA defenders
defenders in
in late
The primary
primary element
element of Croatian
Croatian Serb military strat
Serb military strat- August. With Tudjman’s
August. Tudjman's ultimatum
ultimatum to Belgrade
Belgrade com-
com
egy in
in the SAC Krajina
the SAO Krajina waswas a summer-long
summer-long campaign
campaign ing in
ing midst of this
in the midst this fighting, stage was
fighting, the stage set for
was set
to
to seize
seize control
control of the the Krajina "borders"
“borders” in the the Banija the all-out
the attack on
all-out attack on J NA barracks
JNA throughout Croatia,
barracks throughout Croatia,
region, south of Zagreb,
region, south Zagreb, by by seizing
seizing all the Croatian
all the Croatian which in September would put the JNA
in September directly and
JNA directly
police
police stations region. In June armed Serbs
stations in the region. tried
Serbs tried openly at
openly at war with the
war with Zagreb government.
the Zagreb government.
and failed
failed to take the initial objective in
initial objective in the campaign,
campaign,
the key
key road junction town
road junction town of Glina and its police police No
No major
major fighting
fighting occurred
occurred in
in neighboring
neighboring Western
Western
station. A second
station. second attack on 26 July, July, spearheaded
spearheaded by by Slavonia until
Slavonia when TO
until mid-August, when TO troops
troops from
from the
the
Martic’s Special
Martie's Special Police from from Knin,
Knin, overcame
overcame strong
strong Serbian Autonomous
Serbian Western Slavonia
Autonomous Region of Western
resistance
resistance fromfrom Croatian
Croatian ZNG ZNG and MUP forces, forces, and attempted to push Croatian
to push Croatian MUP personnel out of
personnel out
two Croatian MUP substations
two Croatian substations southwest
southwest of the the Una their newly
their newly proclaimed Serb region.
proclaimed Serb Croatian ZN
region. Croatian G
ZNG
River town
town of Hrvatska
Hrvatska Kostajnica were were eliminated
eliminated at and MUP
MUP forces,
forces, however,
however, vigorously
vigorously responded
responded and
the same time.
time. Kostajnica was now now isolated
isolated deep contained
contained TO troops
troops around and Pakrac,
around Okucani and Pakrac,
within Serb-held
Serb-held territory,
territory, and Serb forces moved
Serb forces moved to while repelling
repelling efforts town of Daruvar.
seize the town
efforts to seize Daruvar.
control of it.
take control ZNG and MUP
it. Local ZNG MUP troops,
troops, bol-
bol Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the fighting
fighting shut down
down the strategic
the strategic
reinforcements, managed
stered by reinforcements, managed to hold hold out against
against Belgrade-Zagreb highway
Belgrade-Zagreb linked the
highway that linked the Zagreb
Zagreb area
besieging Krajina TO units
besieging units until mid-September,
until mid-September, to Eastern
to Eastern Slavonia.
Slavonia. In the midst
midst of the fighting,
fighting, the
when Serb troops,
when Serb troops, again
again spearheaded
spearheaded by by Special
Special JNA
JNA attempted to intervene and establish
to intervene establish aa buffer
buffer
Police, crushed
crushed Croatian resistance. The JNA
Croatian resistance. JNA failed
failed inin zone,
zone, but with
with the lack of success
the same lack success itit had
had suffered
suffered
efforts to act as a buffer
its efforts force during
buffer force during the fighting,
fighting, elsewhere.
elsewhere.
and the Croatians charged the Army
Croatians charged Army withwith helping
helping the
Serbs, who
Serbs, who in their
their tum
turn upbraided
upbraided the the JJNA
NA for not not Further south,
Further south, in
in contrast regions, the driving
contrast to other regions,
doing
doing enough
enough to help them.
help them. in the Knin-Northem Dalmatia
factor in
factor Dalmatia area during
during
July-September
July-September was JNA. 29 Led by
was the JNA.29 by General
General Spiro
The largest
largest Serb operation in
Serb operation Eastern Slavonia
in Eastern Slavonia- Nikovic
Nikovic and Colonel Ratko Mladic, the JNA
Ratko Mladic, JNA 9th
Baranja
Baranja waswas the successful campaign
the successful campaign to to seize control
control (Knin) Corps,
(Knin) although at first
Corps, although first acting in a
acting in a peacekeep
peacekeep-
of Baranja
Baranja in late August.
August. There were also
There were also clashes
clashes ing role
ing role as directed by
as directed by the JNA high command,
JNA high command, during
during
around Vukovar, Vinkovci,
suburbs of Vukovar,
around the suburbs Vinkovci, and Osijek August became
August more and more
became more prone to initiating
more prone initiating
in which each side
in side attempted
attempted to expand its control.
to expand control. clashes with Croatian
clashes with forces or
Croatian forces defending Serb-held
or defending Serb-held
Much of the fighting
fighting in the region during July
region during July and territory. This culminated
territory. in the capture—in
culminated in capture-in
August, however, consisted
August, however, consisted of intense exchanges of
intense exchanges with SAO
cooperation with
cooperation SAO Krajina troops-of
troops—of the key
key
fire between
fire between Croatian
Croatian and SerbSerb villages without any
villages without Croatian-held village of Kijevo
Croatian-held village on 26 August and,
Kijevo on and, on
either side to
attempts by either to capture
capture territory. There were
territory. There were September, the seizure
11 September,
11 seizure from
from Croatian
Croatian forces
forces of the
the
clashes, random
daily clashes, random mortar
mortar fire
fire against
against towns
towns and bridge linking the Dalmatian
strategic Maslenica bridge
strategic Dalmatian coast
coast
villages, outright battles
villages, and outright produced a flood
battles that produced flood of to northern Croatia. To
northern Croatia. To some
some extent
extent these operations
operations
refugees into Osijek and other
refugees into towns. To the Croatians
other towns. Croatians around Kijevo
around may have
Kijevo may have stemmed from JNA
stemmed from JNA percep
percep-
it seemed as if the whole
as if whole region was being
region was being consumed
consumed tions
tions that it was being attacked,
was being blockaded, or
attacked, blockaded, or threat
threat-
' ened by Croatian troops. ItIt nevertheless
Croatian troops. nevertheless appears
appears that
· For of the summer 1991 fighting,
For a more detailed discussion of fighting. see
see
Annex 8: Fighting
Annex For a descrip-
Fighting Escalates, June-September 1991. For descrip
of the
tion of the military of Croatia.
military geography of Croatia, see
see Annex
Annex 9: Military
Military
Geography and Weather in Croatia.
Croatia.
93
93

the JNA General
the JNA General Staff did
did not authorize most of the
authorize most the intervention. Therefore,
military) intervention. Therefore, when
when the Yugoslav
Knin Corps'
Corps’ actions,
actions, but rather ordered
ordered them halted Presidency-including Mesic and
Federal Presidency—including
Federal and
when
when they occurred.
occurred. Dmovsek—voted
Dmovsek-voted onon 1I September
September to to accept
accept European
European
Community proposals for aa cease-fire,
Community proposals cease-fire, increased
increased inter
inter-
national monitoring,
national monitoring, and a new
new peace conference,
conference,
Evaluation of Forces, June-September
Evaluation June-September 1991
1991 Tudjman was willing
Tudjman was willing to postpone
postpone his
his deadline
deadline and
and
give the
give new conference
the new conference aa chance.30
chance. 30 He
He noted
noted on
on
During the summer
summer fighting,
fighting, thethe Serbs
Serbs appear to have 6 September,
6 September, a day before
before the start of the conference,
the start conference,
performed
performed more effectively
effectively overall
overall than the Croatians,
the Croatians, that even he saw this
he saw this as
as the last chance for aa
last chance
even though
though most regular Croatian ZNG or MUP units
regular Croatian units negotiated settlement.3l
negotiated settlement. 31
were better organized
organized and trained than the average TO TO
unit. The political and militarymilitary leadership
leadership of the three
SAOs, almost
almost certainly
certainly withwith strong
strong support
support fromfrom the EC Peace
The EC Peace Conference and the
the Croatian
Croatian
Serbian
Serbian SOBSDB and its Special Operations Unit, had a
Special Operations Decision for War•
War"
clearer understanding
understanding of their war war aims and the the strat-
strat
egy they intended
intended to use to achieve objectives. In
achieve their objectives. Opening to
Opening to what looked like general
what looked general Balkan approval
approval
addition, the
addition, SDB had thoroughly
the SOB thoroughly armed the the TO
TO on 7 September,
September, the conference
conference almost
almost immediately
immediately
forces
forces of all three autonomous
autonomous regions,regions, ensuring that,
ensuring began drawing ominous signals
drawing ominous signals from
from the Croatians.32
Croatians. 32
in general, Serb forces
forces outmanned
outmanned and outgunned
outgunned Croatian federal
Croatian federal representative Stipe Mesic, serving
representative Stipe serving
their Croatian
Croatian opponents.
opponents. The CroatiansCroatians suffered
suffered par-par his
his tum
turn as President of the Federal
as President Federal Presidency,
Presidency, served
served
ticularly from
ticularly from poor
poor leadership
leadership and command command and con- con up the first of several
the first several warnings
warnings that veryvery dayday with
with the
trol structures at the the regional level and were
regional level were unable
unable to statement that he would soon soon order the JNA
order the JNA to to return
return
coordinate their operations
coordinate operations effectively. Shortages of
effectively. Shortages barracks. At
to its barracks.
to meeting the next
At aa meeting next day, the Croatian
day, the Croatian
trained men in the Serb Serb areas made it very very difficult for Supreme State Council concluded
Supreme State Croatia would
concluded that Croatia
the Croatians
Croatians to hold hold an an area once the Serbs Serbs decided
decided to have to “maintain
"maintain and enhance”
enhance" the combat
combat actions
actions itit
seize it.
it. That
That said, the regular
regular ZNGZNG and MUP units units was engaged in.33
was in.33 The Croatians
Croatians were rushing to
were rushing to the
that made up the bulk of the Croatian Croatian forces
forces engaged conclusion that Belgrade
conclusion Belgrade wanted
wanted to drag the confer
to drag confer-
proved well-trained and highly motivated
proved to be well-trained motivated forma-forma ence out toto allow Serb
Serb forces in Croatia
forces in Croatia to to consolidate
consolidate
tions that, one-on-one,
one-on-one, could could usually
usually defeat any com
any com- gains. On
their gains. On 11 September, Mesic provocatively
11 September, provocatively
parable
parable TO TO unit.
unit. Most of the TO forces
the TO forces had little
little decreed, inin his
his capacity
capacity as President of the Federal
as President Federal
training,
training, and some had none; none: they were little little more
more Presidency, that the JNA
Presidency, JNA must
must return
return toto its
its barracks
barracks
collections of well-armed
than collections well-armed civilians. The The deploy-
deploy within the hours. Although he
the next 48 hours. pretended that
he pretended
SDB-raised Special
ment of the elite SOB-raised Special Police from Knin
from Knin his order
his order was intended
intended toto implement
implement the the ECEC cease-fire
cease-fire
(most likely aided by the SDB's SDB’s Special
Special Operations
Operations proposal which the Presidency
proposal Presidency had adopted
adopted on on
situations was critical
Unit) in key situations critical to bolstering
bolstering the 1 September,34 4 Mesic’s
I September;' Mesic's action
action clearly
clearly was
was designed
designed to to
quantitative
quantitative superiority
superiority of the TO TO forces
forces against regu regu- give
give Zagreb pretext for initiating
Zagreb aa pretext initiating its
its long-planned
long-planned
Croatian troops.
lar Croatian troops. The Serb Serb useuse in
in mid-1991
mid- I 991 of elite strategic offensive
strategic against the JNA
offensive against barracks. 35 The
JNA barracks.35
mobile troops
mobile troops to backback up low-quality territorially
territorially majority of the
majority the Federal Presidency-the JNA
Federal Presidency—the JNA repre
repre-
forces proved
raised forces proved to to be a model
model that the Croatians,
the Croatians, sentative,
sentative, the Serbian
Serbian and Serbian-controlled
Serbian-controlled
and later allall three armies in Bosnia, quickly adopted.
in Bosnia, '
The EC
· The EC conference represented only one phase of
represented only of international
efforts to establish a lasting cease-fire inin Croatia,
Croatia. as well
well as an
Chapter 10
Chapter 10 overall
overal I peace
peace settlement. Most of
settlement. Most of these
these international attempts
attempts had
War: Croatia
War: Croatia Attacks
Attacks the J NA, September 1991
the JNA, 1991 little
little impact on the actual combat operations; cease-fires
cease-fires were reg
ularly violated by one side or both sides almost as soon as they
ularly
reg-
went into effect. The EC’s efforts to construct a peace

The EC's peace settlement
settlement
Despite
Despite Tudjman's
Tudjman’s 31 August deadline
31 August deadline for JNA to
for the JNA to are briefly
briefly covered in
in the section dealing with
with the Vance
Vance Plan
Plan and
barracks, he still the end of of the war.
return to its barracks, still believed
believed that Croatia's
Croatia’s
hopefully
international political (and hopefully
best hopes lay in international
94
Digitized by Go gle OrigilKII from

members of the Federal Presidency,
the Federal Presidency, asas well as
as at
at least territory. The Croatian
territory. Croatian strategy was appropriate for the
was appropriate
one other member-rejected Mesic’s order, claiming
member—rejected Mesic's claiming in which Zagreb
situation in
situation found itself,
Zagreb found itself. and the
the bar
bar-
that the entire Presidency
Presidency had toto vote on the
the decree. racks blockade
racks blockade inin particular was one of the key
particular was key tum
turn-
This rejection
rejection apparently
apparently provided Croatians with
provided the Croatians with ing points
ing points in war.40 Nevertheless,
in the war.40 Nevertheless, Croatian
Croatian military
military
justification they desired.
the justification desired. According to then Croat
Croat- power alone
power was insufficient
alone was insufficient to
to achieve all of
achieve all
Defense Minister Luka Bebic,
ian Defense Bebic, on 1313 September,
September. Zagreb's goals,
Zagreb’s goals, although
although itit did
did succeed in
in containing
containing
federal forces.
the federal forces. President Tudjman continued
President Tudjman continued
The Croatian
Croatia11Ministry
Mi11istryof Defe11seissued an
of Defense a11 throughout the conflict
throughout the conflict to put his faith in
his faith in international
international
order to
order to all ZNG units and to to all Crisis Head
Head- diplomatic, economic,
diplomatic, economic, and even military
military intervention
intervention
quarters according to which,
quarters accordi11g which, on the basisbasis of
of a for the
the fulfillment of Croatia’s
Croatia's war
war aims.
aims.
decree from
from the President
President of of the Republic
Republic and
Command, the
the Supreme Comma11d, implementation of
the implementation of
appropriate
appropriate measures was was i11itiated.
initiated. These The
The Battle
Battle of the
the Barracks*
Barracks*
i11cluded
included tumi11g ofl all mu11icipal
turning off services and
municipal services a11d
the supply ofof fuel
fuel to
to the Yugoslav Army,
the Yugoslav Army, and the On 14
On 14 September, Croatian ZNG
September. Croatian ZNG and MUP forces
forces sur
sur-
passive blocking
blocking of barracks, storage
of barracks, storage depots, rounded and blockaded
rounded blockaded every
every JNA
JNA barracks
barracks or
or depot
depot
and all routes used for
a11d for movements of of the enemy;
enemy: in Croatian-held
in territory and shut off all
Croatian-held territory all utilities
utilities serv
serv-
commanders
commanders in the field field were also
also to undertake
undertake ing them. Croatian
ing also quickly overran
troops also
Croatian troops overran many
many
appropriate
appropriate actions
actions (f if this became necessary.
necessary. of the
the smaller,
smaller, more isolated JNA
more isolated JNA posts,
posts. particularly
particularly
That is the
That basic order
the basic order that was issued and for for- depots and border
border guard positions. By these rapid
guard positions. rapid
warded on 13
warded 13 September..1"
September.36 actions they were
actions were able
able to seize
seize large amounts of heavy
large amounts heavy
weapons. including
weapons, the armament
including the armament of the entire 32nd
32nd
Croatia—convinced that it was already
Thus, Croatia-convinced
Thus, at war
already at war Corps. while recovering
(Varazdin) Corps,
(Varazdin) most of the Croat
recovering most Croat-
with
with the Federal
Federal Army and the
the Croatian Serbs-chose
Croatian Serbs—chose ian TO
ian weapons that the JNA
TO weapons JNA had confiscated
confiscated in
in 1990.
1990.
to offensive and attack the JNA
to go on the offensive JNA.37
..17 Many of the cutoff garrisons responded with
garrisons responded with direct
direct
fire
fire against Croatian attackers or
the Croatian
against the or with artillery and
with artillery
mortar fire,
mortar which the Croatians
fire. which claimed was
Croatians claimed was usually
usually
Croatian Strategy-September
Croatian Strategy—September to December 1991
1991 directed
directed against Surrendering JNA
against civilian targets. Surrendering JNA
units
units often
often sabotaged their equipment or
their equipment called in
or called in air
air-
Croatia’s primary
Croatia's primary warwar aim was to preserve its territo territo- strikes barracks after giving them up to
strikes on the barracks to deny
deny
rial integrity.
rial integrity. ToTo do this, it needed at minimum a
at minimum their Croatians. After an
equipment to the Croatians.
their equipment an initial flurry
flurry
bigger,
bigger, better equipped
equipped armyarmy to oppose the JJNA. NA. The of successful
successful seizures,
seizures, the Croatians
Croatians settled into
into aa pro
pro-
offensive against the
offensive JNA barracks
the JNA barracks had the twin twin aims
aims longed siege of the
longed remaining barracks,
the remaining barracks, interspersed
interspersed
of capturing infantry and heavy
capturing enough infantry weapons to
heavy weapons with occasional assaults on key
with occasional key facilities.
facilities. The
The Croat
Croat-
furnish an
furnish defending the border
army capable of defending
an army border while ians eventually eased the
ians eventually the restrictions
restrictions around most of
around most
reducing
reducing the JNA'sJNA’s striking neutralizing its
power by neutralizing
striking power the barracks,
barracks, and, as part of the internationally
and. as internationally negoti
negoti-
Croatia-based units.
Croatia-based units. Zagreb tailored its military
Zagreb tailored military Vance Plan,
ated Vance December they would
by late December
Plan, by
strategy to Army’s limited
to its Army's limited capabilities
capabilities in a camcam- approve withdrawal agreements for the
approve withdrawal the remaining
remaining
paign divided into
paign that can be divided two phases. During the
into two garrisons.
garrisons.
first, that ran from
first, from September
September through October, the
through October,
Croatians assumed the strategic defensive
Croatians defensive on the the bat
bat- The blockade the JNA
blockade of the JNA facilities
facilities was one of the
was one
tlefield, while going
tlefield, going on the the offensive against the
offensive against decisive actions
decisive actions of the Croatian
Croatian war.
war. Without
Without the
the
JNA’s barracks.""The
JNA's barracks.38 The second phase, in November
second phase, November and and weapons that
weapons ZNG/HV and
that ZNG/HV and MUP
MUP forces were
were able to
to
December, saw the
December, Croatians shifting
the Croatians shifting to more
more attacks seize or negotiate for,
seize Croatian Army
the nascent Croatian
for, the
against the JNA in
the JNA in the field while holding
holding defensively
defensively would never
never have armed enough
enough troops
troops to hold off the
to hold
elsewhere and continuing
elsewhere continuing their barracks
barracks blockades.39
blockades. 39 '
· For discussion of
For a more detailed discussion "'Battle of
of the “Battle of the Barracks,"
Barracks.'"
Maintaining the strategic defensive
Maintaining defensive and launching
launching see Annex
Annex 10: The Battles of
The Battles of the Barracks—Croatian
Barracks-Croatian Offensive
Offensive
only counteroffensives obviously worked
counteroffensives obviously worked toward
toward the Operations-September-October 1991.
Operations—September-October
goal of ensuring
goal Croatia retained all
ensuring that Croatia all of its
95

JNA. The acquisition
JNA. acquisition of JNAJNA heavy
heavy weapons—espe
weapons-espe- working to to create support formations to round
support formations round out and
cially thethe Varazdin
Varazdin Corps equipment-provided
equipment—provided a complete
complete the January 1992,
the Army. By January 1992, Tus
Tus claimed
claimed
quantum leap in
quantum the HV’s
in the HV's capabilities,
capabilities, while the cap-cap the ZN
that the ZNG G numbered
numbered some 200,000200,000 troops,
troops, while
ture of thousands small arms, including the former
thousands of small former the MUP had over over 40,000 personnel (including regu-
40,000 personnel regu
stocks, allowed
TO stocks, allowed the HV to to equip
equip all its existing
all its bri-
existing bri lar
lar police).
police). This expansion-made
expansion—made possible only by
possible by
gades, mobilize and arm enough
gades. personnel to field a
enough personnel success of the
the success the barracks
barracks operations
operations and the organi organi-
large
large number
number of additional brigades, and expand most
additional brigades, most zation of true military staffs-gave
zation Croatia the forces
staffs—gave Croatia forces
if its independent
independent battalions
battalions into brigades.
into brigades. it needed
needed to defend itself. Still, while it had benefited
defend itself. benefited
from the
from the high
high motivation
motivation of a successful
successful defensive
defensive
The
The barracks
barracks siege had a correspondingly
correspondingly disastrous
disastrous war,
war, the Army created and regularized regularized in in the
the heat of
effect JNA. The surprise
effect on the JNA. surprise success of the Croat-
Croat battle was no no more
more than aa loosely
loosely organized
organized, , hastily
hastily
ian offensive already low JNA
offensive sapped already JNA morale
morale and trained light
light infantry
infantry force. supported by limited
force, supported limited numnum-
immobilization, most of the
eliminated, by capture or immobilization,
eliminated, the bers of tanks and artillery,
artillery, and so it remained
remained through-
through
Military District’s
Fifth Military combat forces,
District's combat forces, plus
plus part of the out the 1991
1991 fighting.
fighting.
Military-Maritime District's
Military-Maritime formations. The JNA
District’s formations. JNA
effectively lost
effectively lost the use of eight maneuver
maneuver brigades.
brigades, Chapter 11
Chapter 11
including one armored
armored and two two mechanized brigades,
mechanized brigades, JNA, Serbia, and the
The JNA, Croatian War,
the Croatian War,
as well asas three artillery
artillery regiments.
regiments. Since much of
Since much Fall-Winter 1991
1991
what
what was lostlost to
to the JNA was
the JNA was added toto ZNG/HV,
ZNG/HV, the
doubled. In addition,
effects were doubled.
effects addition, the blockade
blockade forced
forced Croatia’s
Croatia's attack on the
the JJNA
NA barracks
barracks brought
brought to a head
JNA
the JN A to add the barracks' relief to the objectives
the barracks’ objectives of the differences
differences between the Serbian
between the Serbian and JNA
JNA leaders
leaders
an already
already too ambitious offensive that had
ambitious strategic offensive over Belgrade’s
over Belgrade's objectives failed to
objectives but failed to resolve
resolve them.
them.
been planned without provision
planned without provision for that contingency
contingency. . Although the JNA consulted
the JNA consulted closely
closely at this
this critical
moment with Milosevic
moment with Jovic—who
Milosevic and Jovic-who midsum
by midsum-
by
mer 1991 the Army’s
1991 were the facto political overseers
Army's de facto overseers
The Croatian Army Rises: September-December
Croatian Army in
in rump Yugoslavia—the JNA
rump Yugoslavia-the JNA refused
refused toto accept their
their
1991·
1991* definition
definition of Yugoslavia’s
Yugoslavia's war aims.“ The JNA
war aims.'' senior
JNA senior
leadership,
leadership, in particular General Kadijevic, still
particular General still
As
As battles between JNA and Croatian
between the JNA Croatian forces
forces balked at Milosevic’s
balked limited political
pragmatically limited
Milosevic's pragmatically
erupted in the aftermath
erupted aftermath of the
the actions against the bar
against the bar- objective-the
objective—the creation Serbian-controlled Yugo
creation of a Serbian-controlled Yugo-
racks. the ZNG
racks, deficiencies described
ZNG deficiencies earlier became
described earlier the willing,
slavia of the
slavia willing, including the SerbSerb Autonomous
Autonomous
even more
more glaring.
glaring. Zagreb correct these in
Zagreb acted to correct in Regions in
Regions The JJNA
Croatia. . The
in Croatia NA generals
generals still believed
believed
late September.
September, ordering
ordering the formation
formation of a true gengen that the defeat of the
the Croatian
Croatian Government
Government would
eral staff to plan
plan and control
control its combat
combat operations
operations enable the preservation some form
preservation of some confederal
form of confederal
under the
under command of former
the command former Yugoslav Air Air and AirAir Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. Kadijevic wavered
wavered through series of
through a series
Defense Forces commander
Defense Forces commander General
General Anton Tus. Tus. One
One meetings
meetings with
with Milosevic
Milosevic and Jovic
Jovic during July
during July and
Tus’s's first
of Tus first priorities
priorities was creation of the
was the creation the regional
regional August,
August, their frequency
frequency increasing
increasing as JNA hemor
as the JNA hemor-
military headquarters whose lack had been so harmful
whose lack harmful all but its
rhaged all Serbian and Montenegrin
its Serbian Montenegrin personnel.
personnel.
Croatians during
to the Croatians fighting. Equally
summer fighting.
during the summer Every time
time he seemed to have agreed with with Jovic
Jovic and
pressing was
pressing was the general staff’s exertions
general staff's exertions to assimilate
to assimilate Milosevic
Milosevic onon giving up the Federation, Kadijevic
the Federation.
the weapons
weapons and equipment from the
gained from
equipment gained barracks
the barracks would come
come to the next meeting
meeting toto argue for its
so that the ZNG could
the ZNG could be expanded to more
be expanded more than twice
twice "
October, Tus ·· See Annex
Annex 12: National Authority in
National Command Authority Yugoslavia. for
in Yugoslavia, for
size. By the
its size. the end of October. Tus and his staff
staff had
an explanation of the
the formal
formal and informal of command in
informal chain of
formed an
formed additional 25
an additional brigades, another 10
25 brigades, 10 in
in Belgrade during fall
fall 1991.
November, and five to seven in
November. December, while
in December,
'
of the development
· For a more detailed discussion of of the Croatian
development of
Army during the
Army fall, see
the fall. see Annex ll: The Croatian Army
Annex 11: Army Rises—
Rises-
September-December 1991.
September-December
96
96
Digitized by o gle Origir1c1I

from
preservation .41 At mid-September,
preservation." mid-September, the JNA leaders’
the JNA leaders' implement
implement simpler strategy that included
a simpler included an
an
a
position
position remained
remained basically
basically the same,, even as the
the same the state
state immediate withdrawal
immediate withdrawal from
from its exposed positions
exposed positions
disintegrated
disintegrated around them. Jovic’s
around them. Jovic 's comments
comments on 12 I2 throughout the
throughout Croatian Republic to
the Croatian defend only
to defend the
only the
September 1991
September illustrate what Kadijevic and the
1991 illustrate the Serb regions,
Serb regions, rather than launching
launching strategic offen
a strategic offen-
a
senior JNA were
senior JNA thinking just
were thinking just before the start
before the start of the
the sive to achieve
sive achieve a political objective he did
objective he not want
did not want
a
Croatian barracks blockade:
Croatian barracks blockade: and believed
believed infeasible.
infeasible .
II once again
again raised the key question,
raised the question, for
for the
the The
The JNA’s offensive
JNA's consisted of five
plan consisted
offensive plan five corps-level
corps-level
umpteenth time,
time, the
the question
question that constantly pre-
constantly pre campaigns, for which
campaigns, which mobilization
mobilization and preparation
preparation
occupies
occupies me: ls Is our goal toto defend, with the
defend, with mil
the mil- would occur in two
occur in preliminary mobilization
two phases: a preliminary mobilization
a
itary~
itary, the
the new borders
borders ofof the
the nations
nations that want
want to and deployment (which occurred
occurred in July), and a
July).
in
deployment
a
remain
remain in Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, or is it to to overthrow
overthrow the
the follow-on mobilization
mobilization (ordered
(ordered inin September).44
September). 44 The The
Government? . ... . Unfortunately
Croatian Government? Unfortunately there preliminary mobilization
preliminary mobilization waswas meant to to put increased
increased
is not much understanding.
understanding. The military is still pressure on the
pressure Croatians without
the Croatians without actually
actually launching
launching
intoxicated
intoxicated withwith Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, even though
though we any offensive actions. It also permitted
offensive actions. permitted the JNA to
the JNA
It
have discussed
discussed thethe fact no longer
fact that it is no longer realis-
realis pre-position key
key formations
formations in their
their staging
staging areas
areas in
in
in
pre-position
tic a hundred
hundred times. 42
times.42 war actually
case war actually followed. TheThe follow-on mobiliza
mobiliza-
tion was
tion was designed
designed to complete
complete thethe consolidation
consolidation of
Instead of merely
Instead merely defending
defending the Serb regions
the Serb regions of forces identified
forces identified as necessary
necessary toto carry the full
carry out the full plan.
plan.
Croatia, as Milosevic and Jovic
Croatia, Jovic wanted,
wanted, Kadijevic and General Kadijevic states
General states in
in his
his memoirs
memoirs that the JNA
that the JNA
the JNA
the JNA high command were set
high command embark on a full
set to embark full- plan was
plan was designed
designed toto
scale strategic offensive
offensive to defeat Croatia
Croatia militarily
and force
force its capitulation. Kadijevic would persevere
its capitulation. -impose
—impose full air and
a full and sea blockade Croatia;:
blockade on Croatia
a
with
with his objective
objective and the the offensive until, in
offensive until, October, ,
in October
when
when failure
failure of the JNA’s strategic offensive
the JNA's offensive became —link the attack
-link the attack routes of the
routes of main JNA
the main INA forces
forces
indisputable.
indisputable, he he halfheartedly acquiesced in
halfheartedly acquiesced Serbian
in a Serbian- as directly
directly as possible
possible in order to
to liberate the
liberate the
dominated rump
dominated rump Yugoslavia. Even after making
Yugoslavia. Even making this Serb
Serb regions
regions in Croatia and the JNA
and the JNA garrisons
garrisons
decision, however, , Kadijevic would continue
decision, however continue to raise
raise inside Croatian
deep inside territory·. To
Croatian territory. To that end,
end,
the
the question
question of a restorative
restorative military
military offensive
offensive and the
the intersect Croatia along
intersect along the
the lines Gradiska
lines Gradiska-
general mobilization
it,
mobilization required
required toto sustain
sustain it. much
much to the
to the Virovitica, Bihac-Karlovac-Zagreb,
Virovitica, Bihac-Karlovac-Z,agreb , Knin-Zadar,
Knin-Zadar.
dismay
dismay and displeasure
displeasure of Milosevic and Jovic Jovic. . and Mostar-Split.
Mostar-Split . Liberate
liberate Eastern
Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia
of
using the
using the strongest grouping of armored-mecha
strongest grouping armored-mecha-
nized forces, quickly continue
forces, and then quickly continue opera
opera-
JNA War Planning·
JNA Planning* tions westward,
tions westward, hookhook up with forces in
with forces in Western
Western
Slavonia and continue
Slavonia continue on toward Z,agreb and
toward Zagreb and
Kadijevic and the JNA General
the JNA General Staff's
Staff’s strategic offen-
offen Varazdin, that is toward
Varazdin, toward thethe Slovene border. At
Slovene border.
is
plan—probably planned
sive plan-probably planned in
in the
the spring
spring of 1991
1991 and the
the same time, impose a land blockade
time, impose blockade on
a
actually launched in
actually launched in September—called
September-called for slicing up up Dubrovnik with
Dubrovnik with strong
strong forces from the
forces from the Herceg
Herceg
Croatia defeating it militarily to
Croatia and defeating to compel sur
the sur-
compel the Novi-Trebinje region
region and penetrate
penetrate the Neretva
the Neretva
it
render of the Croatian political leadership

the Croatian leadership and thethe valley, thus working
valley, together with
working together with the forces
the forces
confederation.4343 A key the Mostar-Split line; line;
A
renegotiation
renegotiation of a Yugoslav
Yugoslav confederation. key moving along
moving along the
in a
objective
objective added in September
September was to to relieve all the
relieve all the
JNA barracks blockaded by the Croatians. As noted
JNA objectives, secure and
—after achieving specific objectives.
-after
earlier, the
earlier, aims of the
the aims plan exceeded and
the strategic plan hold the border of
the border Serb Krajina
of Serb Croatia, with
Krajina in Croatia, with-
conflicted with
conflicted Milosevic’s war
with Milosevic's war aim of a rump
rump draw thethe remaining of
parts of
remaining parts the
the JNA
JNA Slove
from Slove-
a
Serbian-led Yugoslavia.
Serbian-led Yugoslavia. Milosevic wanted the JNA
wanted the JNA to
to nia, and
nia, and then withdraw
withdraw the JNA from
the ]NA from Croatia.45
Croatia. 45
'
· For
For a detailed breakdown of of the individual
individual campaign plans that
that
a
the strategic
comprised the strategic offen JNA orders of
sive. plus JNA
offensive. of battle, see
battle. see
Annex 13: JNA
Annex JNA Campaign Plans and Organizati
Organization.
on. July-September
I991.
1991.
97
97

-mobilizing.
—m0bilizing, preparing the mobilized addi
mobilized or addi- Mobilization the Political-Military
Mobilization and the Conflict,
Political-Military Conflict,
deploying them would take 10
units, and deploying
tional units, /0 1991 "
September-December 1991
September-December ·•
to 15
15 days,
days, depending
depending on the units· level <l
units’ level of
combat
combat readiness
readiness and their distance
distance from
from the The failure
failure of the the mobilization
mobilization process
process to support
support their
their
deployment
deployment positions.
positions. offensive
offensive plan plan against Croatia impelled the JNA
Croatia impelled JNA
leaders to to demand that the the combined federal/Serbian
combined federal/Serbian
In JNA’s view,
the JNA's
In the view. Croatia
Croatia carved up in this way way political leadership
leadership authorize “general mobiliza
authorize a "general mobiliza-
“would be on the
"would the brink of capitulation ."~hBut
capitulation.”4° But tion,” which
tion," which would have allowed allowed them to to call
call up
Kadijevic provided timetable for the
provided no timetable JNA’s
the JNA's whomever they needed to fill
whomever the empty spaces in
fill the in their
their
achievement
achievement of these objectives
objectives nor any contingency
contingency campaign
campaign plans plans.. The military leaders ' demand for
military leaders”
plans for a less-than-total
less-than-total offensive the event, the
In the
offensive. . In the general mobilization
mobilization became the issue issue on which the
founder on the
plan would founder twin rocks
the twin rocks of civilian continuing differences between Kadijevic and the Ser
continuing differences Ser-
opposition
opposition at the top and, at the bottom, a lack
the bottom, lack of bian leadership
leadership over war aims would be played
over war played out for
enthusiasm for combat among Serbian Serbian conscripts
conscripts and the rest of the war. war. Again and again Milosevic and
reservists.
reservists. Jovic would
Jovic emphatically reject Kadijevic’s
would emphatically Kadijevic's demands
to call up the men needed for the JNA JNA warwar plans,
plans,
refusing
refusing to to give the JNA
give the JNA thethe means to to escalate a war
war
Mobilization and the Failure
Mobilization of the
Failure of the Strategic in pursuit
pursuit of goalsgoals that they did did not believe
believe in or concon-
Offensive’
Offensive• achievable. Only after the JNA
sider achievable. offensive against
JNA offensive
Croatia had failed
Croatia did Kadijevic,
failed did October, for
Kadijevic. on 99 October, for-
Failing to intimidate
intimidate the Croatians with
the Croatians with their prelimi
prelimi- mally bow
mally bow to the demands of Milosevic Milosevic and Jovic,
nary callup
callup in July. the JNA JNA ordered the second phase accepting
accepting as the the JJNA's
NA’s sole
sole strategic objective the
objective the
mobilization for the
of mobilization offensive on 15
the strategic offensive 15 Sep-
Sep defense of the the Serb regions. He
Serb regions. He and the JNA JNA would
tember in response to to the Croatian attacks against its
the Croatian continue
continue to broader mobilization,
to agitate for broader mobilization, plainly
But the wholesale
barracks. But wholesale refusal many reservists
refusal of many reservists showing their
showing continued desire to
their continued Croatia back
to coerce Croatia back
to respond.
respond, thethe desertion
desertion of many distinct
many others, and a distinct into the
into Federation . Milosevic would finally
the Federation. finally quash the
the
lack of enthusiasm among the Serbs who
lack who did
did respond J NA’s agitation
JNA's agitation for the complete
complete defeat of the Croatian
the Croatian
would leave many many of thethe formations earmarked for the
formations earmarked forces after the capture of Vukovar,
forces Vukovar, vetoing JNA’s
vetoing the JNA's
offensive without enough men to field them. The
offensive without JNA
The JNA continue its offensive
plan to continue offensive drive
drive toward Zagreb. ItIt
toward Zagreb.
had carefully
carefully prepared campaign
campaign plans for each of five five was the JNA‘s unwillingness
the JNA's unwillingness to accept Milosevic’s
Milosevic's
operations
operations areas predicated
predicated on a specific number of
specific number design from
design from the the start embroiled the Army in a far
start that embroiled far
arriving. The mobilization
combat brigades arriving. mobilization disaster bitter, fruitless,
more bitter. damaging war
fruitless. and damaging war than would
severely
severely undercut these plans. which would have to
plans, which to be
be otherwise have been the
otherwise the case.
launched without
launched without the the required formations,
number of formations.
required number
and some operations
operations would have to be be abandoned.
vital sector of Eastern
Even in the vital
Even Slavonia, where
Eastern Slavonia, where the the JNA Offensive Against Croatia,
The JNA Croatia, September-
September
JNA had planned
JNA planned its major effort, not nearly
major effort, nearly enough
enough December 1991
1991
infantry arrive, crippling
infantry would arrive, crippling the entire offensive
offensive. .
lack of sufficient
The lack sufficient infantry formations was more
infantry formations When the Croatian Government
the Croatian Government launched
launched its
its Septem
Septem-
than a blow to the JNA's JNA’s offensive
offensive plan;
plan; their absence ber 14-15 offensive against the
14-15 offensive JNA’s barracks
the JNA's barracks inin
represented a shattering of the JNA’s will
the JNA's will to fight,
fight. Croatia, the
Croatia. J NA General
the JNA activated the follow-on
General Staff activated
which cascaded throughout
throughout the Army. The chaos
the Army. mobilization for its strategic offensive
mobilization offensive and began
caused by the country's
country’s breakup, combined with
breakup, combined with the
colossal failure
colossal failure of their well-laid plans, ultimately
ultimately "
For a more detailed discussion of
·· For of the impact of
of the mobilization
mobilization
melted the confidence even of Kadijevic and the
the confidence JNA
the JNA the political-military
failures and the conflict, as well
political-military connict. well as the internal
debate over what its goals should have been.
army debate been. see
see Annex
Annex 15:
high command.
high command.
Mobilization and the JNA-Serbian
Mobilization JNA-Serbian Political-Military Conflict, and
Political-Military Connict.
' Annex Goal?-—JNA vs. JNA:
Annex 16: What is the Goal''-JNA JNA : The Army
Army Debates
Debates
· For of the
For a detailed discussion of the mobilization
mobilization problems and their Role and Future.
its Role
the Army.
impact on the see Annex
Army, see Annex 14: Mobilization
Mobilization and the of
the Failure of
the Strategic Offensive.
the September-December I1991.
Offensive. September-December 991.
98

preparations
preparations for its execution,
execution, with
with the
the five
five main
main The Battle of Vukovar: Croatia Stymies the
Vukovar: Croatia J NA“•
the JNA
campaigns
campaigns kicking off as follows:
Initially, the JNA First Military
the JNA Military District’s
District's objective
objective inin
•' The
The Eastern
Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia operation
operation began on Eastern
Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Slavonia-Baranja was to
was to break
break through
through
20 September,
September, under the the command
command of the the First Croatian
Croatian forces the Osijek-Vinkovci
on the
forces on Osijek-Vinkovci line line and drive
drive
Military District, about a week
week after mobilization.
mobilization. Western Slavonia,
for Western where it would link up
Slavonia, where up to the
the
Simultaneously
Simultaneously withwith the
the start of the
the Croatian
Croatian Corps. In pursuit
5th (Banja Luka) Corps. pursuit of this
this goal,
goal, the
the
offensive, however,
offensive, however, the JNA had initiated
the JNA initiated a small-
small plan
plan appears to called for the
to have called the 12th
12th (Novi
(Novi Sad)
Sad)
scale operation
operation on 14 14 September
September to to relieve
relieve the
the Corps to move between Osijek and Vinkovci,
move between Vinkovci,
Vukovar
Vukovar barracks
barracks. . Unplanned
Unplanned and presumably
presumably unin-
unin probably toward Nasice,
probably toward Nasice, while
while thethe 1st Guards Mecha
1st Guards Mecha-
tended by the JNA, this "small-scale"
the JNA, “small-scale” attack became nized Division
nized pushed south of Vinkovci.
Division pushed Vinkovci . TheThe 17th
17th
its main effort
effort and would consume
consume it it for the
the next (Tuzla)
(Tuzla) Corps
Corps probably
probably was
was to cross
cross the
the Sava
Sava River in
in
two
two months.
months. the
the Croatian
Croatian rear between Bosanski Samac
between Bosanski Samac and
Bosanski/Slavonski Brod,
Bosanski/Slavonski Brod, link
link up the Guards,
up to the Guards, and
and
• The 5th (Banja Corps’ Western
(Banja Luka) Corps' Western Slavonia
Slavonia then push
push west
west along the Belgrade-Zagreb
along the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. highway.
operation
operation appears to
to have begun between
23
23 September October, as reserve formations
September and 5 October, formations The campaign fell apart almost
The campaign immediately as
almost immediately as JNA
JNA
arrived
arrived from
from Bosnia.
Bosnia. forces down in
bogged down
forces bogged in their
their attempt to to reduce
reduce the
the
Croatian-held
Croatian-held town Vukovar. The
town of Vukovar. The JJNA
NA initially
•' The
The Kordun operation
operation toward
toward Karlovac never really
really attacked Vukovar to relieve relieve the barracks there and dis
the barracks dis-
got under way,
way, and operations
operations by the JNA Fifth Mil-
the JNA Mil pose of the the town’s
the threat the defenders would pose
town's defenders pose to
itary District and the
the Croatian
Croatian Serb TOT0 were limited
limited the
the rear of the main JNA
the main JNA operation.
operation. As As Vukovar
essentially local actions
essentially to local actions to consolidate
consolidate their con-
con sucked in
sucked in more
more and moremore JNA JNA forces—including
forces-including all all
trol around Karlovac and the J NA barracks
the JNA barracks there. of the armor-mechanized units
the ill-suited armor-mechanized units previously
previously
This included
included a campaign
campaign in October-November
October-November to earmarked for the
earmarked main operation—the
the main operation-the battle became became
eliminate
eliminate the
the large Croatian-held
Croatian-held pocket
pocket near the
the symbol to both Belgrade
a political symbol Belgrade and ZagrebZagreb of
town JNA forces
addition, JNA
town of Slunj. In addition, forces undertook
undertook determination to achieve
their determination achieve military victory. The
military victory. The
local
local operations
operations in Banija and Lika. JNA’s failure
JNA's failure to seize the the town
town despite its its overwhelm
overwhelm-
ing force
ing force would be be a dispiriting embarrassment to the
dispiriting embarrassment the
JNA 9th (Knin)
• JNA (Knin) Corps
Corps forces earmarked for the
forces earmarked the federal cause, while the
federal the Croatian
Croatian forces’
forces' prolonged
prolonged
Knin-Zadar operation
operation were already mobilized
already fully mobilized resistance became
resistance inspiration and rallying point
became an inspiration point for
when the
move when
and ready to move Croatians attacked the
the Croatians the the
the troops people of Croatia.
troops and people Croatia. When
When the the JNA
JNA
JNA barracks,
JNA barracks, and so
so the JNA operation
the JNA operation here began finally captured Vukovar in
finally in mid-November
mid-November after two two
on 16
16 September.
September. months of intense
months fighting , theirs
intense fighting, was aa Pyrrhic vic
theirs was vic-
tory. The siege had completely
tory. The disrupted the
completely disrupted the timetable
timetable
•' JNA
JNA mobilization
mobilization problems difficulties in
problems and difficulties for the JNA’s strategic
the JNA's offensive and dissipated
strategic offensive dissipated thethe
Bosnia-Herzegovina paralyzed
Bosnia-Herzegovina paralyzed the
the Mostar-Split last the JNA’s
last of the JNA's prewar spirit, which had already
prewar spirit, already
portion
portion of the Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik operation.
the Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik operation,
and it never materialized. The Dubrovnik subopera-
materialized. The subopera
'
October, following the
tion began on I1 October, mobilization
the mobilization · For
For a de1ailed account of
detailed accoum of the Baule of
1he Battle of Vukovar, see Annex
Vukovar. see Annex 17:
17:
Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Easlern Operations—The Road
Slavonia-Baranja Operalions-The Road to
lo Vukovar.
Vukovar. This
This
of Montenegrin-based
Montenegrin-based JNA forces
JNA forces and the
the
annex also discusses
annex discusses 1he JNA‘s use of
the JNA"s of volunteer
volumeer troops.
1roops. including
including
Montenegrin TO.
Montenegrin 1he Volumeer Guard,
the infamous Serbian Volunteer Guard. Arkan's
Arkan·s Tigers.
Tigers.
99

suffered catastrophic damage in in Slovenia
Slovenia and in
in the paralyzed JJNA
sort out the chaos that had paralyzed NA operations
operations
battles for the
the Croatian
Croatian barracks. in the battle, establishing
in establishing new
new headquarters and clari
clari-
fying responsibilities
responsibilities in
in an
an attempt to
to bring
bring order
order and
In Vukovar.
Vukovar, the Croatian ZNG and MUP,
Croatian ZNG MUP. under the
the discipline to the chain
discipline command. With the rein
chain of command. rein-
leadership of Mile Dedakovic and his chief
Mile Dedakovic chief of staff. forcements, the JNA,
forcements, JNA. including
including volunteer
volunteer and local
local
Branko Borkovic,
Branko Borkovic. constructed an
an urban defense maze TO
TO formations, now had more than 36,000
formations, now 36,000 combat
confound the JNA
that was able to confound JNA for over
over two
two Vukovar. This otherwise
troops around Vukovar. otherwise impressive
impressive
arrival of
months. The arrival of these
these two
two commanders in in late force, however,
force. was ill
however, was ill suited for the
the operation
operation at
at
August brought structure to a previously
August previously disorganized
disorganized hand. The JNA’s armor-mechanized units,
JNA's armor-mechanized units, designed
designed
formed a single
force, as they formed brigade from
single brigade the local
from the local for high-speed
high-speed open combat, could barely enter the
could barely
village guard forces.
village forces. Even with reinforcements,
Even with reinforcements. town "s narrow
town’s narrow streets.
streets. and the
the ill-trained
ill-trained and poorly
poorly
Dedakovic and Borkovic (who took command in
Dedakovic in mid
mid- motivated TO troops were
motivated were nono substitute for regular
regular
October)
October) had only 2,000
2.000 to 2,300
2.300 ZNG
ZNG and MUP infantry.
infantry.
with which
troops with which toto hold city. They were able to
hold the city. to
do this against the J NA’s armor-heavy.
the JNA's infantry-poor
armor-heavy, infantry-poor The new
new attack.
attack, directed by
by the
the newly
newly formed
formed Opera
Opera-
force through the creation of an
force an integrated defense tional Group
tional Group South,
South, went in
in on 30 September and
system that featured large-scale
large-scale mining
mining of approach slowly gained ground the Croatian
ground against the Croatian defenders.
routes, roving antitank teams, ubiquitous
routes. roving snipers. and
ubiquitous snipers, A
A Croatian
Croatian counterattack hit hit the overextended JN JNAA
heavily fortified
heavily fortified defensive strongholds. coun
Strong coun-
strongholds. Strong units on 33 October,
units October, driving back almost
driving them back almost toto their
terattacks were usually
terattacks usually able to throw back the JNA’s
throw back JNA"s start line.
start Notwithstanding this reverse, the
line. Notwithstanding the supporting
supporting
often isolated spearheads after the CroatianCroatian defenses attack had all
all but severed the
the Croatians’
Croatians' resupply
resupply
worn them down.
had worn down. Operational Group
route. Operational North's follow-on attack
Group North’s
two weeks
two weeks later against the
the key
key suburb of Borovo
There had already been clashes around the JNA’s
There JNA's Vuk
Vuk- Naselje
Naselje on the northern side of Vukovar
Vukovar also
also pene
pene-
August. but the battle proper
ovar barracks in late August, trated the Croatian
Croatian defenses but bogged
bogged down
down against
began on 14 when the JNA
14 September when JNA sent a small
small stiffening resistance.
stiffening
the town
force into the blockade of the bar
town to raise the blockade bar-
racks. Troops
racks. from the lst
Troops from I st Guards Mechanized Divi
Guards Mechanized Divi- It was during
during this second battle that thethe JJNA
NA intro
intro-
sion quickly through to the barracks,
quickly broke through barracks. but efforts
efforts duced a new
new force
force into the war—volunteer
into the war-volunteer units.
units.
weeks to cut the
over the next two weeks Croatians’ narrow
the Croatians' narrow These recruited to fill
These were recruited the gaps in
fill the the Army‘s
in the Army's
resupply
resupply corridor from Vinkovci and clear the city
corridor from city ranks that should
should have been occupied by trained
occupied by
failed to gain much
failed much ground.
ground. who had failed
reservists who to appear for mobilization.
failed to mobilization.
The men for these
The company- and battalion-sized
these company- battalion-sized
While this fighting
fighting was going
going on. newly mobilized
on, newly mobilized detachments, recruited
detachments. recruited with the assistance of the
with the the
Guards Division began an
troops of the Guards an attack to Serbian MUP,
Serbian MUP. came primarily
primarily from Serbian nationalist
from Serbian nationalist
Vinkovci, clearing
relieve the besieged barracks at Vinkovci. clearing political
political parties and clubs.
clubs. ItIt was an action
was an action that the
the
villages south of Vukovar
many of the villages
many Vukovar in in the process. JNA, imbued as itit was
JNA. imbued was with
with Communist
Communist and federalist
federalist
These units would reinforce JNA
would then be able to reinforce JNA ideals, would have considered
ideals. would unthinkable only weeks
considered unthinkable weeks
troops engaged at Vukovar
Vukovar while providing
providing a secure before. The untrained
before. untrained volunteers
volunteers were
were often motivated
motivated
from which
area from which one part of the main JNA
the main effort to the
JNA effort the xenophobic zeal against the
by xenophobic the Croatians,
Croatians. but the
the
west could launched. The Guards
could be launched. Guards units quickly
units quickly same qualities
qualities that made them savage fighters
fighters turned
Vinkovci, forcing
reached Vinkovci. forcing the Croatians
Croatians to permit
permit the
the them into looters of
undisciplined looters
into undisciplined of captured areas and
evacuation of its barracks on 25 25 September. Other
Other scourge of
the scourge Croatian civilians,
of Croatian civilians. who
who suffered
suffered numer
numer-
eventually seized the
forces eventually the areas south of Vukovar,
Vukovar. ous atrocities their hands. Their
at their
atrocities at use would
Their use would become
with more difficulty.
although with difficulty. an ugly,
ugly. ineradicable
ineradicable stain on thethe JNA’s
JNA"s escutcheon.
additional reinforcements
arrival of additional
The arrival allowed the
reinforcements allowed the In
In addition to taking
addition to the volunteers,
taking on the the JJNA
volunteers. the NA had to
to
JNA forces
JNA Vukovar to prepare aa new
forces around Vukovar new opera
opera- face up toto and deal with
with its own operational and tacti
own operational tacti-
tion to seize the town.
town. They new leader—Lieu
They had a new leader-Lieu- cal failings Vukovar. The campaign
at Vukovar.
failings at to seize Vuko
campaign to Yuko-
tenant Colonel General
tenant Colonel Zivota Panic—who
General Zivota Panic-who had taken var was haphazardly coordinated
was haphazardly coordinated at the operational
at the operational
command of the First Military District.
command Panic tried to
District. Panic to level during the first
level during two phases of
first two of the battle and was
100
100

effectively
effectively orchestrated only only during
during the the last round.
round. For 15 November,
proper. By 15 November. Borkovic’s
Borkovic's brigade
brigade had been
most of thethe campaign,
campaign, federal forces forces were tactically
tactically chopped
chopped into disjointed The remnants of the
bands . The
disjointed bands. the
inept at the
the vicious
vicious street
street fighting typified every
fighting that typified force
force surrendered on 18 November; a very few,
18 November; few,
attempted advance. Their lack lack of urban warfarewarfare train-
train including Borkovic and some other officers
including officers and men,
men.
ing and the reservists ' general lack
the reservists’ lack of any trainingtraining at managed to burrow
burrow out of the
the town
town after it fell.
fell.
all compounded
compounded the difficulties caused by the
the difficulties J NA’s
the JNA's
inappropriate force
inappropriate force mixture
mixture and by by its coordina
poor coordina-
its poor The Croatians’ ' ZNG
The Croatians ZNG 204th Vukovar Brigade,Brigade. together
tion of the
the several arms. The The size of the federal force,
the federal force. the MUP
with the Special Police,
MUP Special Police. lost
lost over 60 percent of
particularly
particularly thethe large number of armored vehicles. vehicles, had their strength in in the
the vicious fighting. . Almost 1,500
vicious fighting 1.500 of
in fact inhibited
inhibited JNAJNA operations
operations against the the town.
town. TheThe the
the 2,000
2.000 toto 2,300 defenders became casualties,
casualties, and
confines
confines of the the city prevented the the Army from from deploy
deploy- some 300 of the the wounded
wounded were executed after the the bat
bat-
ing its combat power effectively, while its
power effectively, its lack
lack of tle by units and individuals
by units individuals from
from the JNA, volunteer,
the JNA. volunteer,
infantry was a basic flaw.
infantry flaw. As fighting continued, the
fighting continued. the and TO forces.
forces. Total deaths,, including
Total deaths civilians. may
including civilians, may
JNA’s tactical doctrine evolved,
JNA's evolved, and it broughtbrought in more more numbered as many as 4,000
have numbered 4,000 to 5,000 persons.
persons .
infantry, including
infantry. units, and gradually
including elite units. gradually shiftedshifted
away from
from an armor-led
armor-led advance to to an infantry-led
infantry-led The
The loss of the the town,
town. and the the apparently
apparently minimal
minimal
All its attacks, however,
one. All employed intense fire
however, employed fire- Croatian political
efforts by Croatian
efforts political and military authorities to
military authorities
power
power that wreaked massive
that wreaked massive destruction
destruction throughout
throughout relieve the siege, raised bitter recriminations
relieve the recriminations between
Vukovar. successful final
Vukovar. For its successful final phase in November,
in November. the
the town's
town’s commanders
commanders and PresidentPresident Tudjman’s
Tudjman's gov gov-
the JNA at last integrated all its arms effectively.
the JNA effectively, ernment. Only two two relief operations had been
relief operations
including the
including the engineer support crucial crucial to an an advance attempted
attempted,, one in mid-October
mid-October and the the other just
just
through a heavily
heavily damaged town littered with mines.
town littered before the town’s fall,
the town's fall. and they appear to have been
The Air Force
The Air Force hardly figured in
hardly figured in the
the fighting,
fighting. lacking
lacking gained little
affairs that gained
halfhearted affairs ground . Neither
little ground. Neither
pilots drilled in
pilots trained and drilled close-support tactics.
in close-support tactics. attack appears to have had much much effect
effect on the JNA
the JNA
Well-trained infantry
Well-trained infantry and engineers. supported rather
engineers, supported forces constricting
forces constricting Vukovar. Dedakovic. Borkovic,
Vukovar. Dedakovic, Borkovic.
than led by armor and backed by strong mortar and the town’s
and the complained publicly
town's civilian leader complained
artillery fire,
artillery finally overcame the
fire. finally the defenders and took took before and after the loss of the
the loss the town,
town . railing
railing at
the
the battered town.
town. Zagreb's failures and refusals
Zagreb’s failures refusals to provide
provide moremore relief.
relief.
The protests brought
The Dedakovic and Borkovic arrest
brought Dedakovic
It
It was General
General Panic
Panic and the First Military District
the First District by the military
by military police
police as Tudjman and his
as Tudjman his government
government
staff who finally devised a plan, using
who finally using the lessons
lessons the moved
moved to to contain
contain the political fallout
the political fallout from
from thethe com
com-
J NA had learned over the
JNA past month,
the past month. that won won the
the manders ' charges. The charges were
manders” perfectly valid
were perfectly valid
elusive victory
elusive Vukovar. In the
victory of Vukovar. the earlier attempts.
attempts, but, in the
but. the larger
larger context of Croatia
Croatia’s·s overall defense, ,
overall defense
attacks had been disjointed.
disjointed. single-sector affairs that
single-sector affairs irrelevant. Vukovar’s
irrelevant. Vukovar's defenders wonderfully
wonderfully disrupted
disrupted
had allowed Dedakovic, (and after mid-October,
allowed Dedakovic, mid-October, the JNA’s main
the JNA's offensive, derailing
main offensive. derailing its strategic plan
Borkovic) to focus Croatian
to focus Croatian resources on each narrow narrow to rapidly seize Eastern
to rapidly Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia and drivedrive toward
toward thethe
advance. This time. the JJNA
time, the NA and the TO conducted
the TO capital Zagreb. Ironically, their own
capital at Zagreb. own success in in
coordinated attacks in
coordinated in several key areas once,. while
areas at once diverting holding back
diverting and holding the JJNA's
back the NA’s mainmain offensive
offensive
severing thethe link between Vukovar town town and thethe ensured that Dedakovic and Borkovic would get
that Dedakovic only
get only
stronghold
stronghold at Borovo Naselje Naselje. . Operational
Operational GroupGroup minimal
minimal reinforcement:
reinforcement: the the town
town was was strategically
strategically
South’s main drive
South's the south side of town,
drive, , on the town . kicked
kicked expendable. and its unexpectedly
unexpectedly stout defense by by its
its
October, grinding
off on 30-31 October, grinding its way
way through
through thethe own people
own people spared GeneralGeneral Tus the necessity of
the necessity
streets. Fighting raged for possession
streets. Fighting possession of a key key hilltop diverting his
diverting regular units
his scarce regular units toto slow
slow down
down the the
until 9 November
until when JNA
November, , when JNA troops finally seizedseized it.
it. J NA.
JNA.
Meanwhile, elite JNA
Meanwhile, JNA troops on 3 NovemberNovember carried
carried
river crossing,
out a surprise river crossing, linking up to “Arkan's
to "Arkan ·s After Vukovar fell,
fell. General
General Panic
Panic moved
moved his his powerful
powerful
Tigers”—the elite Serbian
Tigers"-the Serbian Volunteer Guard—and cut
Volunteer Guard-and cut- forces into
forces position to continue
into position continue the offensive,
the strategic offensive,
ting off Borovo Naselje.
Naselje. Even Operational Group
Even so, Operational Group which Vukovar
which Yukovar had delayed for two months . IJNA
two months. NA 12th
12th
North did not completely
North completely reduce the the suburb until
until Corps troops. spearheaded by Arkan’s
Corps troops. Arkan·s Tigers.
Tigers. began
16 November.
16 November. To the the south, JNA. volunteer
south. JNA, volunteer, . and TOTO effort to
their effort to break through
through the key Osijek-Vinkovci
the key Osijek- Yinkovci
troops systematically
systematically cleared the the center of Vukovar defense line
line defended by the Croatian lst
the Croatian I st Osijek
IOI
101

Operational Zone on 20 November,
Operational Zone November, seizing
seizing several
several The JNA’s
The JNA's failures
failures to achieve campaign objectives
achieve its campaign objectives
key villages
key villages and spreading
spreading dismay in Osijek.
dismay in and the
the Croatian
Croatian defensive successes and offensive
defensive successes offensive
fighting would continue
Although fighting continue along
along the line until
line until victories were a huge boost for Zagreb,
victories were Zagreb, militarily,
January, the
January, the JNA drive soon
JNA drive soon slowed
slowed to a halt.
halt. politically, and strategically.
strategically.49 First, the victories
49 First, victories dem-
dem
Milosevic had come
come to the end of his patience with
his patience with the onstrated
onstrated Zagreb’s
Zagreb's growing military prowess,
growing military prowess, particu-
particu
JNA, and now
JNA, now he forced
forced the high command to
high command call off
to call aftermath of Vukovar;
in the aftermath
larly in
larly Vukovar; strengthened
strengthened
Panic. The
General Panic.
General the JNA
The Yugoslavia of the JNA was
was dead, Tudjman’s hand in
President Tudjman's
President his political battles with
in his with
and the Serbian President was not going
Serbian President to let the
going to hardliners;
hardliners; and helped
helped Croatia internationally in
Croatia internationally in the
army
army escalate the
the war
war for stakes he
he considered
considered ongoing peace talks.
ongoing important, the destruction
talks. Most important, destruction
unwinnable.47
unwinnable.47 of the
the Serb-held salient, which had threatened the
Serb-held salient,
lines of communication
lines communication to Eastern Slavonia,
to Eastern Slavonia, greatly
greatly
improved Croatia’s
improved Croatia's strategic position. Without its
strategic position.
Western Slavonia: Croatia
Croatia Strikes Back*
Strikes Back* removal
removal and withwith federal
federal forces
forces holding some 30 per-
holding some per
cent of the
the country, Eastern Slavonia—one
country, Eastern Slavonia-one of the the
About a weekweek after the initial JNA JNA assault to relieverelieve country's most populous
country’s most important regions—
populous and important regions-
the Vukovar barracks,
barracks, the JNA injected
the JNA injected itself fully would have remained in
have remained in peril.
peril.
into the Serb-Croat
into Serb-Croat fighting
fighting in Western Slavonia,
Western Slavonia,
which
which had been sputtering since early
sputtering since August. The
early August. Looking past 1991,
199 I, Croatia's recapture of most
Croatia’s recapture most of the
JNA
JNA 5th (Banja Luka) Corps's mission was to aban
Corps’s mission aban- Serbian Autonomous Region of Western
Serbian Autonomous Western Slavonia
Slavonia
don its nominal
don nominal peacekeeping
peacekeeping role role and launch drive
launch a drive took much
took the steam out of the Serb
much of the Serb separatist
separatist
north from
north Sava River,
from the Sava through the towns
River, through towns of movement
movement in
in the area, though the Serbs
area, though Serbs retained
retained aa
Daruvar and Pakrac,
Daruvar toward Virovitica on the
Pakrac, toward the toehold between
toehold between Pakrac Sava River.
Pakrac and the Sava River. Western
Western
Croatian-Hungarian border
Croatian-Hungarian border to cut off Eastern
Eastern Slavonia
Slavonia Slavonia was to
Slavonia to prove
prove the weakest portion,
the weakest both polit
portion, both polit-
from the rest of Croatia.“3
from Croatia. 48 The corps
corps would then await await emerging Republic of Serb
ically and militarily, of the emerging Serb
arrival of First Military
the arrival Military District forces forces driving Krajina (RSK).
(RSK). Over the next four years, itit would
west from
west Osijek-Vinkovci.
from Osijek- Vinkovci. After some some modest
modest initial
initial cause Zagreb
Zagreb less embarrassment
embarrassment than the other
other parts
gains
gains in the operation,
operation, Croatian
Croatian ZNG ZNG and MUP units units the RSK.
of the RSK. The region
region would be ripe
ripe for the taking
taking
were able to contain
were contain combined
combined JNA JNA and TO TO forces
forces in in when
when Zagreb moved militarily in 1995
Zagreb moved complete
1995 to complete
the triangle Novska-Pakrac-Nova Gradiska.
triangle Novska-Pakrac-Nova Gradiska. Fighting what JNA in 1991.
what it had started against the JNA 1991.
degenerated into into a succession
succession of inconclusive
inconclusive clashes
clashes
around towns, with
around the three towns, with the struggle
struggle for Pakrac
Pakrac
and the villages around its approaches
villages around approaches becoming
becoming par par- Battles Elsewhere: Consolidating Greater Serbia“
Consolidating Greater Serbia**
ticularly intense. Then, in late October,
intense. Then, October, the Croatians
Croatians
struck back. The 2nd Bjelovar Operational
struck back. Operational Zone Zone Banija, Kordun, and Lika
In the Banija, regions of Croatia,
Lika regions Croatia,
launched an
launched an offensive
offensive against TO positions,
positions, which only importance for the JNA.
only Karlovac had any importance JNA. The
were unsupported
unsupported by by regular JNA troops,
regular JNA troops, near the fighting touched off by
fighting touched the JNA
by the offensive allowed
JN A offensive allowed the
town
town of Podravska Slatina and the Bilogora moun-
Podravska Slatina moun Autonomous Region of Krajina to
Serbian Autonomous
Serbian to consolidate
consolidate
tains, north of Pakrac
tains, well north Pakrac near Virovitica. The attack the gains itit had made in the region
the gains during the spring
region during spring
drove
drove some TO TO troops
troops and a a large number of Serb
large number Serb summer of 1991,
and summer paving the way
1991. paving way for the creation
creation
civilians back toward federal
back toward federal forces
forces around
around Pakrac.
Pakrac. of the Republic of Serb
Serb Krajina. There
There were
were nono major
major
After a period
period of back-and-forth fighting, a final
back-and-forth fighting, battles like Vukovar,
Vukovar, but TO formations backed
TO formations backed by
by a
Croatian offensive
Croatian mid-December completely
offensive in mid-December completely elim- elim few JNA
few units managed
JNA units managed to squeeze the remaining
to squeeze remaining
inated the TO-held salient
inated north of Pakrac
salient north Pakrac and even even Croatian
Croatian forces an arc stretching
forces out of an stretching from
from Petrinja
Petrinja
took some ground
took ground held by the the JNA
JNA near the town. The
the town.
" of the fighting
Croatian forces,
Croatian however, were
forces, however, were tootoo few
few to to try to expel
to expel
•• For
For detailed accounts of fighting in Banija-Lika-Kordun
Banija-Lika-Kordun and
the Zadar-Northern
Zadar—Northern Dalmatia see Annex
Dalmatia regions, see Annex 19: Banija
Banija-
JNA
JNA troops
troops entirely from the region.
entirely from region. Kordun-Lika-Consolidating Greater Serbia and Annex
Kordun-Lika—Consolidating Annex 20:
Zadar—Northern
Zadar-Northern Dalmatia Operations-The Knin
Dalmatia Operations—The Corps Attacks.
Knin Corps Attacks.
'
For a detailed account of
· For of the fighting Slavonia, see
fighting in Western Slavonia, see
Annex
Annex 18: Western Slavonia
Slavonia Operations-Croatia
Operations—Croatia Strikes
Strikes Back.
Back.
102
102

to Gracac. The
to Gracac. significant event in these
The most significant The Siege Dubrovnik: History
Siege of Dubrovnik: History Under Fire’
Under Fire·
operations
operations was thethe capture of the town of Slunj
the town Slunj in
November.
November . This created a link between
between what
what was to to be In the
the West, the JNA’s
West. the Dubrovnik, the
JNA's siege of Dubrovnik, the farthest
the
the northern the RSK
northern half of the RSK centered around
around Petrinja
Petrinja- city in
distant city Croatia, , was
in Croatia was one of the the war’s
war's most visi visi-
Karlovac and the portion near Knin. Despite
the southern portion Despite ble and inexplicable
inexplicable events. Why the JNA undertook
the JNA undertook
success, Croatian
this Serb success. forces from
Croatian forces from the
the 3rd Zagreb
Zagreb the operation in
the operation the first
in the first place difficult to discern
place was difficult discern, ,
Operational Zones
and 4th Karlovac Operational Zones managed to and the destruction of architecture
the destruction architecture and art art of the his
the his-
establish and maintain
establish solid defensive
maintain a solid line, but their
defensive line. toric city
toric city was
was impossible
impossible to to justify. Of Of the
the two
two ques
ques-
counteroffensives from
counteroffensives October through
from October through December
December tions,, why
tions why did the JNA
did the JNA attack and why why was the the
achieved only
achieved only minor
minor successes. The The only JNA cam-
only JNA cam Dubrovnik area subjectedsubjected to looting destruction, .
looting and destruction
paign originally planned
paign planned in thethe area
area (at Karlovac) as the answer to the
the answer the first
first is
is the
the easier. The The JJNA's
NA’s strategic
the Army’s
part of the Army's strategic offensive was stillborn
strategic offensive stillborn plan to carve up Croatia Croatia called
called for one operation
operation to to
when mobilization
when failed to produce
mobilization failed the combat bri
produce the bri- Southern Dalmatia
sever Southern Dalmatia from from thethe rest of Croatia
Croatia and
gades earmarked for the the operation.
operation. blockade
blockade the the port of Dubrovnik at its tip. Objections Objections
that
that the area had no
the area Serb population
no Serb population miss miss thethe point
point
Further south, in
Further Dalmatia, , JNA
Northern Dalmatia
in Northern forces ful
JNA forces ful- that
that the military purpose
the military purpose of the JNA offensive
the JNA offensive was was thethe
filled
filled their role
role in the strategic offensive,
in the while
offensive, while defeat of Croatia;
Croatia; succoring
succoring the Croatian Serbs
the Croatian Serbs was a
expanding
expanding the SAO Krajina and consolidating
the SAO consolidating its secondary
secondary and largely largely political objective. There is
objective . There is no
defenses. . Already in an
defenses offensive mode, the
an offensive JNA 9th
the JNA satisfactory answer
satisfactory answer to the question: Why did
the second question:
(Knin) Corps,
Corps, with General Vladimir Vukovic now
with General now in TO and volunteer
volunteer troopstroops and the JNA itself indulge
the JNA indulge in in
command but Mladic still as
command as his chief of staff,
his chief staff, went
went such gross looting
looting and shelling
shelling on the nonmilitary
the nonmilitary
over to the
the attack immediately
immediately after the start of the
the start the portions
portions of the region? As in
the region? in earlier
earlier agesages of warfare,
warfare ,
Croatian barracks blockade.
Croatian barracks main role in
blockade . Their main in the
the when
when such acts common, blame
were more common.
acts were blame can be put
JNA strategic
JNA offensive was to finish cutting
strategic offensive cutting off Dal
Dal- on the volunteers from
recruiting of volunteers
the recruiting from the the dregs of soci- soci
matia from
from northern Croatia while
northern Croatia while relieving
relieving besieged ety and on the the greed and envy of the conquerors left
the conquerors left
JNA barracks
JNA barracks in Zadar and Sibenik.
in Zadar Sibenik. The Corps’
The 9th Corps' unchecked by
unchecked by proper
proper discipline. Whatever the
discipline. Whatever rea
the rea-
unauthorized capture of the
unauthorized the Maslenica
Maslenica bridge, pre-
bridge, pre sons,, international
sons international reaction
reaction to to the military operation
the military operation
empting
empting the the start of the war, had already
barracks war,
the barracks already and its associated looting destruction degraded the
looting and destruction the
achieved most of the
achieved the corps's primary goal.
corps’s primary The initial
goal. The reputation
reputation of the nation and deepened the
the Serb nation politi
the politi-
operations therefore
corps operations therefore focused
focused on relief of the bar
the bar- isolation of the
cal isolation the Belgrade
Belgrade government.
government.
racks,
racks, the accomplishment of which would also cut
the accomplishment
the Dalmatian
the Dalmatian coastal road. Toward Toward this end. end, in mid-
mid From a purely
purely military viewpoint, it was a fairly
military viewpoint,
September
September JNA JNA troops,
troops , supported by by TO units,.
TO units straightforward
straightforward campaign. General Pavle
campaign. General Pavle Strugar's
Strugar’s
quickly breached Croatian Croatian defenses around Zadar, and
around Zadar, Operational
Operational Group 2, 2, composed
composed almost exclusively of
almost exclusively
October the
by early October
by Croatian authorities
the Croatian authorities inin Zadar
Zadar had troops, had launched
Montenegrin troops,
Montenegrin launched its offensive
offensive on
to
to let the JNA garrison
the JNA garrison leave the the city with all of its
city with October. One
I October.
1 arm,, led by the
One arm the 2nd
2nd (Titograd)
(Titograd) Corps.
Corps,
equipment. All
equipment. An operation
operation to to relieve Sibenik, however,
relieve Sibenik. however , swung through a corner
swung through Bosnia and descended to
corner of Bosnia
was
was halted by a last-ditch Croatian defense just
last-ditch Croatian just short positions
positions north of the city to cut it off from
the city the rest of
from the
of the
the city.
city. After the the opening round of JNA
opening round JNA attacks Croatia. This attack faced
Croatia. resistance from
faced strong resistance from rela
rela-
ended in early-to-middle October, the
early-to-middle October, the fighting sub
fighting sub- tively well-organized
tively well-organized ZNGZNG troops
troops whose
whose strength
into infrequent
sided into infrequent and indecisive
indecisive firefights,
firefights, punctu
punctu- increased the next two
increased over the two months.
months. The axis,
The other axis.
ated by occasional
ated occasional JNA/fOJNA/TO operations
operations to to gain key ‘
local
local positions. Overall, the
positions. Overall, the 9th Corps commanders
Corps commanders · For a detailed account of the Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik operation. see
see Annex
Annex
21: Dubrovnik—Southem
Dubrovnik-Southern Dalmatia Operations
Operations. .
had demonstrated exceptional
exceptional leadership Croat
leadership, , and Croat-
forces had proved
ian forces proved unable
unable to stop the combination
the combination
of well-led unitsunits backed
backed by strong armor and
artillery .50
artillery.50
103
103

commanded
commanded by the Kotorska) Military
the 9th (Boka Kotorska) Military- JNA had to
The JNA acknowledge publicly that the looting
to acknowledge looting
Maritime VPS), advanced directly
Maritime Sector (9th VPS). directly toward
toward and destruction were beyond
destruction were military justification.
beyond military justification.
the
the city from
from bases near Kotor Bay, Bay. some 35 35 kilome
kilome- The 9th VPS
The commander, Admiral Miodrag Jokic,
VPS commander. Jokic,
ters
ters to the south. By 27 October. Dubrovnik was at the
October, Dubrovnik the attributed the excesses to volunteer
volunteer units
units that had been
mercy
mercy of the J NA, whose troops had encircled
the JNA, encircled the illill- hastily organized
hastily inadequately led. This acknowl
organized and inadequately acknowl-
controlled most of the
defended city and controlled the heights com-
com edgment dodges the
the fact the scale and scope of
fact that the
manding
manding it. Local Croatian ZNG and MUP units had
Croatian ZNG the excesses were such that NA regular
JNA regular and reserve
it.
J
neither the numbers nor the firepower
firepower to halt the the troops and some of their senior
senior commanders
commanders had to
JNA’s advance. and JNA
JNA's JNA artillery
artillery could shell the city
could shell city have been involved
involved as well.52
well.' 2
at will: nevertheless the Croatian
Croatian Government
Government rejected
JNA proposal
proposal that it demilitarize So why
why did the looting occur
occur on such a scale?
scale'? Clearly,
Clearly.
in
a JNA demilitarize thethe city
city in the looting
it
a
a
exchange for a guarantee that JNA JNA troops would not the commanders in 9th VPS
operational-level commanders VPS and
in
the operational-level
a
Willy-nilly, round after round of firefights

enter it. Willy-nilly. firefights and likely the
the 2nd Corps
Corps werewere unable
unable oror unwilling to to
it.
artillery barrages ensued as the JNA

artillery JNA methodically
methodically enforce proper discipline
enforce discipline on their subordinates,
on their subordinates.
advanced on the city additional hills,
city and grabbed additional hills. although Admiral Jokic
although Jokic mentioned
mentioned one instance
instance inin
until
until a cease-fire December.
cease-fire was agreed to on 7 December. which JNA attempted to purge a formation
which the JNA formation of
7
a
a
personnel. 51 The high

problem personnel.53
problem high percentage of reservist
reservist
military results,
No matter the military JNA’s campaign
results. the JNA's campaign in
in
and volunteer
volunteer formations
formations undoubtedly
undoubtedly posed a corps corps-
a
Dubrovnik area will
the Dubrovnik will be remembered for the whole
the whole- wide discipline
wide problem. and the peasant Montenegrin
discipline problem, Montenegrin
sale looting
looting perpetrated by JNA reservists and the
by JNA the soldiers could
soldiers hardly avoid
could hardly envying their
avoid envying their wealthier
wealthier
shelling Dubrovnik and its old
shelling of Dubrovnik town by JNA
old town NA artil
artil- neighbors of the
urban neighbors the Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik beaches when when they
J
opinion by encountered them or their property. Faced

their property. Faced with
with unfa
unfa-
in
lery. The outrage evoked in world public public opinion

television coverage.
television coverage, photography. journalist
photography, and journalist miliar wealth, soldiers of any army will
poor soldiers
wealth. poor will be
be
reports reinforced view, already prominent
reinforced the view. prominent after tempted first
first to pilfer, steal. and finally to
to steal,
pilfer, then to to loot
loot
Vukovar, that federal forces,
Vukovar, forces. and later the
the Serbs as a and destroy unless checked
checked by by their immediate
immediate superi
superi-
a
nation, were barbarians aggressively

nation. aggressively bent on subjugat-
subjugat ors. In Dubrovnik,
Dubrovnik. junior officers took part in,
officers took in, encour
encour-
Croatia, destroying
ing Croatia. priceless treasures in the
destroying priceless looting. Finally,
aged, and led the looting. centuries of warfare
Finally. centuries
in in
aged. warfare
process. This certainly major role
certainly played a major the inter
role in the inter- banditry would
and banditry imbued many of the peasant
would have imbued
a
national
national diplomatic economic isolation
diplomatic and economic isolation imposed
imposed soldiers with
soldiers the conviction
with the conviction that they were were entitled
entitled to
on Belgrade.
Belgrade. the possessions of their vanquished
the possessions vanquished enemies.
The looting
looting was exceptionally thorough. The Mon
exceptionally thorough. Mon- The JNA’s shelling of Dubrovnik’s
JNA's shelling clearly civilian
Dubrovnik's clearly
tenegrin reservists of the 9th VPS stripped the Konavli
VPS stripped areas. and in particular its historic
in particular historic buildings,
buildings, along
along
plateau and the resort hotels southeast of Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik with seemingly excessive
with seemingly excessive destruction
destruction visited
visited upon
upon
bare. Misha Glenny writes:
Glenny writes: various nonstrategic
various targets. require somewhat
nonstrategic targets, somewhat moremore
complex explanations. Incidents
complex explanations. Incidents like
like the systematic
the systematic
From the minute we Croatia, the
11·ecrossed into Croatia, destruction of pleasure boats in
destruction in the Dubrovnik marina
the Dubrovnik marina
work <if
work of the Montenegrins visible.
Mo11te11egrinsbecame all too i·isible. wire-guided antitank
by wire-guided
by antitank missiles
missiles were beyond any jus
were beyond jus-
They had plundered and burned el'ery every single tifiable
tifiable level violence. 5-l Fire directed
level of violence.54 directed against build
build-
Each ll'as
house. Each was pack-marked
pock-marked ll'ithwith bullets or ings and facilities
ings being used for military
facilities not being military purposes
purposes
holes from mortars or
with gaping holes.fimn
left irith or grenades falls in the
the same malicious category. for the
malicious category, the same rea
rea-
...
. . . There were 110 left in any <!I'
no contents le.ft of the Blame for the much-condemned
looting. Blame
sons as looting. much-condemned shell shell-
everything had been wke11taken by the ing of Dubrovnik’s
ing Dubrovnik's old old town, however, is not as
town. however. as easy
is
houses, ei·e1:rthi11g
marauding reservists. This
marauding This is what
whm had motimoti-
is
vated the Mo11tenegri11.1·

V(lfed Montenegrins . .. . . Each village
village was a
a
animal instincts <if

shrine to the animal of these
these young
men.“51
men.
104
104

to fix. General
to fix. General Kadijevic has claimed claimed that Croatian
Croatian unable to fulfill
fulfill the
the Croatian objective and unwilling
Croatian objective
units misused the the old
old town
town to shell
shell JNAJNA positions.55
positions. 55 to try. It would
to try. would take three and a half years and another
and Misha Glenny.
Glenny, observing
observing Croatian
Croatian artillery
artillery and war before Croatian Army would make
before aa resurgent Croatian
gun positions Dubrovnik's
positions on Dubrovnik city walls,
's city walls. concluded
concluded good
good Zagreb's claim to a reintegrated Croatia.
claim to Croatia.
that
that the
the Croatians “cunnineg exploiting
Croatians were "cunningly exploiting interna-
interna
tional military purposes?“
tional outrage for military purposes." 5" Kadijevic still still
absurdly
absurdly claims
claims thethe old town
town was not hit. but he he and The EC/Carrington
EC/Carrington Negotiations Fail
Fail
Admiral Miodrag Jokic have also cited some local local
commanders
commanders of artillery
artillery and heavy weapons weapons com-com Throughout the
Throughout the fighting, the EC-sponsored
fighting. the EC-sponsored peace con
con-
manders for exceeding their authority.authority. Kadijevic in in ference at The
ference Hague . which began on 77 September.
The Hague, September.
fact claims
claims that he he had issued an “explicit order"
an "explicit order” continued
continued its efforts compose a general political
efforts to compose
establishing
establishing a stop line line around Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik outside of settlement to end the the fighting peace. · The
fighting and restore peace.‘
mortar and medium-range
medium-range artillery beyond which
artillery beyond J NA
which JNA chairman of the
chairman conference, Lord Carrington,
the conference. Carrington. put
units were not to pass. Kadijevic states he did this
states he together a peace plan plan focusing
focusing on the the six
six republics
republics as as
because, if JNA
because. JNA units closed up toward toward thethe city.
city. they the constituent elements of the
the former Yugoslavia—
the former Yugoslavia-
would either respond to fire
would fire from
from Croatian
Croatian troops in not on the different nationalities,
the different nationalities. as as the
the Serbian
Serbian lead
lead-
Dubrovnik and be
Dubrovnik be blamed,
blamed. or not return fire fire and suffer
suffer ership wanted.
wanted . Carrington·s
Carrington’s plan plan would have allowed
allowed
unnecessary losses Nevertheless, Kadijevic notes
losses.. Nevertheless, republic to choose
each republic choose different levels of cooperation
different levels cooperation
that.
that, "despite
“despite multiple
multiple warnings."
warnings.” some units units crossed in new.
new. confederal institutions.58
confederal institutions. 58 The Serbian leader
The Serbian leader-
the
the line.
line. The
The heavy 6 December shelling of
December shelling formally rejected this
ship formally plan in mid-October,
this plan mid-October. prob prob-
Dubrovnik, apparently in retaliation
Dubrovnik. retaliation for a Croatian
Croatian ably
ably because it did did not allowallow for allall Serbs
Serbs toto live
live inin
incident, illustrates
firing incident. Kadijevic‘s point.
illustrates Kadijevic's point. one state. which Milosevic and Jovic had set
state. which as their
set as their
primary
primary objective
objective.59 In addition,
.5'1 In essentially dis
addition. itit essentially dis-
Chapter 12
Chapter 12 solved
solved the existing Federal
the existing Federal Republic,
Republic. preventing
preventing
War: The Vance 57
Ending
Ending the War: Plan
Vance Plan 57 Serbia Montenegro from
Serbia and Montenegro from claiming
claiming thatthat their feder
feder-
ation was the legitimate successor to the
the legitimate old one.60
the old one."0
The
The end to the the Croatian
Croatian war came in January 1992.
January 1992. Although the
Although the conference
conference sputtered on. the the Serbian
Serbian
The Serbian
The Serbian Government's
Government’s recognition
recognition that it had
that it objections blocked
objections blocked all all paths to to a solution.
solution .
achieved itsits essential war aims. aims, combined
combined with with a real-
real
ization on both sides that
ization that any gains from from continued
continued Balked
Balked by Serbian substantive
by Serbian substantive disagreements with with the
the
fighting would come at an
fighting would an increasing allowed
price. allowed
increasing price, plan. Carrington had the
plan, Carrington the rug pulled out from
rug pulled from under thethe
UN mediator Cyrus
UN Cyrus Vance
Vance to orchestrate an armistice
an armistice conference
conference altogether with the EC’s
with the decision in
EC's decision in
United Nations
backed by a United Nations peacekeeping
peacekeeping forceforce. . It December to recognize
December recognize Croatia Slovenia in
Croatia and Slovenia Janu
in Janu-
was only
only the
the recognition
recognition that the agreement did not
that the ary. What
ary. principally kept Croatia
What had principally Croatia and Slovenia
Slovenia
represent a final political however, that
political settlement, however, that engaged in in the negotiations was
the negotiations was the
the prospect
prospect that
that they
irreconcilable differences
overcame irreconcilable differences and allowed
allowed the the would gain international
international recognition
recognition once a compre
compre-
UN troops to be deployed.
UN deployed. Broad Broad interpretations
interpretations of the the hensive settlement was agreed to. to. The unilateral EC
The unilateral EC
UN mission
UN mission permitted both sides to claim victory.
to claim victory. in in decision to recognize
decision the two
recognize the states removed
two states removed any
the belief that
the belief that the
the terms of the the agreement fulfilled incentive for them to continue
incentive continue serious talks and put
own objectives
their own while prohibiting
objectives while prohibiting those of their the
the final nail in
final nail in The Hague Conference‘s
The Hague Conference's coffin.
enemy claimed that
enemy.. The Serbs claimed that the allowed
the agreement allowed
for local govemments—including their new statelet.
local governments-including ‘
· See Chapter
Chapter IO discussion of
10 for a discussion of the start of
the start of the
the conference.
conference.
the Republic of Serbian
the Republic Krajina—to continue
Serbian Krajina-to continue as they
were until final settlement. This would
until a final would lock
lock in Serb
providing little
gains while providing incentive for the
little incentive the Serbs to
political negotiations.
compromise in political
compromise negotiations. TheThe Croatians
Croatians
believed that
believed that thethe UN would restore Croatian
UN would sover
Croatian sover-
eignty in the
the Serb-held areas, but the
Serb-held areas. the UNUN proved
proved
105
105

To End
Serbia Moves To End the War neither Croatian nor JNA
Croatian nor JNA regular
regular forces
forces entered the
protected areas. In addition,
protected addition, all
all displaced persons
displaced persons
Real
Real progress
progress toward
toward ending
ending the fighting
fighting came onlyonly were to
were to be allowed
allowed to
to return
return to homes.“
their homes.
to their 66
after the Serbian political leaders

the Serbian leaders concluded their
concluded that their
war aims of achieving
achieving military
military control
control over
over Serb areas
in Croatia fulfilled. Uninterested
Croatia had been fulfilled. Uninterested in thethe The Deal Almost
Almost Comes Unstuck
Unstuck
JNA’s aim of a defeated and subdued
JNA's subdued Croatia,
Croatia, they
were more
more willing than the JNA commanders
the JNA commanders to con-
to con Both
Both Zagreb
Zagreb and the Croatian Serbs still had objec
Croatian Serbs objec-
sider moving
moving to a negotiated
negotiated solution
solution once their ownown tions the deal, however,
to the
tions to however, and they nearly nearly caused
caused the
objectives
objectives had been attained. early November,
attained.6| 61 By early November, Vance Plan
Vance Plan to come apart early
to come early inin 1992 before UN
1992 before
Milosevic and Jovic had concluded
concluded the time was ripe ripe troops arrived. The Serbs,
troops arrived. Serbs, led by Krajina Serb Serb Presi
Presi-
to lock in the federal
federal and Serb gains by requesting
Serb gains requesting dent Babic,
Babic, had objected,
objected, as
as soon
soon as
as the potential UN
potential UN
deployment
deployment of UN UN peacekeeping
peacekeeping troops troops toto halt and deployment
deployment plan plan became
became public
public in in December,
December, to the the
prevent further
further fighting
fighting pending
pending the the achievement
achievement of a provision of UN
provision UN peacekeepers
peacekeepers in place of the JNA
in place JNA
general political settlement.
settlement.62 6 " troops in
troops Croatia. From Babic’s
in Croatia. Babic's perspective,
perspective, the
removal of the JNA
removal JNA meant de facto acceptance of
facto acceptance
Croatian sovereignty over
Croatian sovereignty over the
the newly formed Republic
newly formed
Toward a Cease-Fire
The UN Moves Toward Cease-F ire Serbian Krajina (RSK) and was
of Serbian was unacceptable."7
unacceptable. 67
Until
Until the
the Serb
Serb objections
objections were overcome, the UN
were overcome,
UN’s special
The UN's special envoy
envoy for Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, Vance, refused
refused to troops. Milosevic
deploy its troops.
to deploy Milosevic and the Fed Fed-
began shuttling
shuttling the Yugoslav
Yugoslav proposal
proposal between Bel- Bel eral/Serbian
eral/Serbian leadership
leadership used everyevery means
means theythey could
grade and Zagreb
Zagreb during
during November December,
November and December, devise
devise to to pressure their erstwhile clients, the RSK
erstwhile clients,
trying
trying toto gain agreement on an an interim
interim peace plan plan and Government,
Government, into maneuvers culmi
into acceptance. Their maneuvers culmi-
the deployment
deployment of UN
UN troops
troops to
to oversee it.
it."3
63 Vance
Vance nated in an an all-Serb conference
conference in in Belgrade
Belgrade at the end end
made gradual
gradual headway
headway in his negotiations,
negotiations, and by by of January
January at at which the Krajina leadersleaders were
were mademade to
January both sides had accepted what
I1 January what came to to be feel the weight
feel weight of the entire
entire Serb nation, while
Serb nation,
known
known as the the "Vance Plan.”6464 On 2 January,
“Vance Plan." January, Croatian
Croatian Milosevic
Milosevic and Jovic Jovic attempted to isolate
isolate the
the adamant
adamant
Defense Minister Gojko Susak
Defense Susak and the JNA Fifth Mil-
the JNA Mil Babic. 68 After the
Babic.68 the conference,
conference, Belgrade
Belgrade triedtried to follow
follow
itary District deputy commander,
itary District commander, General
General Andrija “victory” with
up its "victory" with votes inin the RSK Assembly to to
Raseta, signed
Raseta, signed a cease-fire
cease-fire in Sarajevo-the
Sarajevo—the I15th
5th so
so ratify
ratify the
the plan
plan and sideline Babic. The parliamentary
sideline Babic. parliamentary
far—to go into effect
far-to effect the next day.
day.6565 Unlike anyany of the
the maneuvers
maneuvers descended into into farce
farce as Milosevic and
as Milosevic
previous
previous 14, 14, this one held.
held. Babic supporters paraded comically from
supporters paraded from oneone building
to another to
to another stage counterassembly
to stage counterassembly meetings
meetings at at which
Vance Plan
The Vance Plan was crafted to stop the the fighting
fighting in one side and then the other proclaimed its
other proclaimed its legitimacy.
legitimacy.
negotiations for a comprehensive
Croatia and allow negotiations
Croatia comprehensive Babic was “officially” replaced on
"officially" replaced on 27 February
February by by
peace agreement without battlefield
without the pressures of battlefield Goran Hadzic,
Hadzic, the Serb leader in
the Serb Eastern Slavonia.
in Eastern Slavonia.
influencing the
events influencing talks. The agreement did
the talks. did not
not Even while the
Even the rumblings continued, Milosevic
rumblings continued, Milosevic some some-
presuppose
presuppose any specific outcome to the negotiations.
specific outcome negotiations. how managed to muzzle
how managed the Babic opposition
muzzle the opposition and
The plan called initially for the deployment
plan called deployment of some guarantee that the RSK RSK would accept
accept the UN UN troops
troops
I10,000 UN peacekeeping
0,000 UN peacekeeping troops,
troops, designated
designated the UN
the UN comply with
and comply with the peace plan.plan.
Protection Force
Protection (UNPROFOR) to establish
Force (UNPROFOR) establish three
(later four) UN Protected
four) UN Protected Areas
Areas (UNPA)
(UNPA) in the major major The Croatian
Croatian Government
Government meanwhile
meanwhile objected
objected to the
providing a buffer
conflict areas, providing buffer zone between the the role RSK Government
role the RSK local officials would
Government and its local
Serb-controlled zones
Serb-controlled zones and Croatian-held
Croatian-held territory,
territory, have under
under the plan. It took
the plan. took the position the UN
position that the UN
while disarming local Serb Territorial
disarming local Territorial Defense
Defense units.
units. Protected Areas
Protected were sovereign
Areas were sovereign Croatian territory in
Croatian territory in
The Serb weapons
weapons would either be be stored under
under joint which leaders of a secessionist
which secessionist movement
movement should
should have
have
control or withdrawn
UN-Serb control with the
withdrawn with JNA. All
the JNA. All JNA
JNA
units were to leave Croatia.
units Croatia. The UN UN was
was toto ensure that
106
106

no authority. The
The Zagreb government rightly worried
rightly worried Croatia’s Future·
Mortgaging Croatia's
Mortgaging Future‘
that the UN zones would
the UN would allow the RSK to consolidate
the RSK
UN deployment
it,
power in
its power Croatia, leaving
in occupied Croatia, leaving little or no Despite the the UN deployment, , and even because of it,
incentive for Belgrade
Belgrade and thethe Krajina Serbs to agree broader peace talks to settle the the issues broached and
to a more comprehensive peace. The Croatians.
Croatians. left unresolved
unresolved by the would become a three-year
the war would
a
although they continued to proclaim
proclaim their rejection
rejection of futility. As the
exercise in futility. Croatians feared, the
the Croatians the UN
UN
local role for Serb leaders,
any local leaders , eventually
eventually, . as a tempo-
tempo effectively secured the
troops effectively the existence of the the RSK—
RSK-
measure,, made a de facto acknowledgment
rary measure acknowledgment of the the just
just as JNA NA peacekeeping troops had allowed allowed Croatian
Croatian
J
RSK Government
RSK Government situation, whilewhile refusing
refusing to negoti-
to negoti separatists in
Serb separatists in the
the summer of 1991 1991 toto consolidate
ate on equal terms with
with any Croatian
Croatian Serb representa-
representa their Serbian Autonomous
Autonomous Regions. Concerned that
Regions. Concerned that
view, the
tives. In their view, the only
only parties to the
the plan were the situation would
the indefinitely, Zagreb in
would continue indefinitely, in
Zagreb.
Zagreb, Belgrade,
Belgrade, and thethe UN. 1993 mounted a number of military
1993 military probes to focus
focus
a
international
international attention and seize important local local objec-
objec
final area
One final area of contention was never settled but tives.. In reaction, the
tives the UNPAs’ demilitarized condition
UNPAs' demilitarized condition
would delay and hinder the
would the implementation
implementation of the the evaporated as SVK SVK troops retrieved their stored weap weap-
plan seemingly in perpetuity.
perpetuity . This was the status of
the status ons and manned the confrontation line.
the old confrontation line . Negotia
Negotia-
frontline areas
several key frontline areas that
that remained outside the the tions in in the
the aftermath of these these clashes partially
partially
defined UNPA lines, and thus would
UNPA lines, would nominally
nominally have restored the Croatia, but no arrange-
the ground seized by Croatia, arrange
fallen
fallen under Croatian Government rule. The Krajina
Croatian Government could be
ment could be found
found that satisfied both sides’
that satisfied sides' require
require-
Serb Army (former
(former TO, now now Srpska vojske krajine—
Srpska vojske krajine- ments for security and sovereignty. Over Over time, Zagreb
SVK) and the the JNA controlled these
JNA controlled areas, later
these areas, lost patience withwith the
the international negotiators and
dubbed “pink zones,” and the
"pink zones," the RSK
RSK refused to remove with the
with the Serbs and resolved to to settle the
the matter
matter by
its forces from them out of concern for their Serb resi-
forces from resi force. As Babic
force. Babic had feared and argued, the the departure
dents
dents.“.69The Croatians, however, refused to modify
Croatians, however, modify the
the of the JNA "peacekeepers"
the JNA “peacekeepers” left the Croatian Serbs
the Croatian
“borders” of any of the
"borders" the sectors. Despite persistent defenseless against a revitalized Croatian Army, and
revitalized Croatian
a
worry the issue would RSK compliance the summer of 1995 the RSK
RSK would
in
worry that the would upset RSK compliance in the 1995 the would pass out of
with
with its demilitarization
demilitarization requirements, in the the event existence.
there was no hindrance to the turnover of RSK
to the RSK
status of the
weaponry. The status the “pink zones” remained
"pink zones" Chapter
Chapter 13
13
however. and would
unresolved, however, would bedevil the UN’s
bedevil the UN's Outcomes and Evaluation
Evaluation of the
the Forces
mission over the
mission the next year.
year .
Results and Implications

Implications
UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR Arrives
Arrives
The Croatian
The finally brought down
Croatian war finally down the
the tottering
the most serious differences papered over and
With the Yugoslav Federal Republic,
Yugoslav Federal finishing the
Republic, finishing the job begun by
the holding , bar a few
the truce holding, skirmishes, , UN
few skirmishes UN troops the microwar in Slovenia.
the microwar Slovenia. The
The military stalemate into
military stalemate
began to arrive in country
country and assume their duties. which the
which Croatian war
the Croatian war congealed was shaped by the the
The UNPROFOR, Indian
The commander of UNPROFOR. Indian General balance between the strengths and weaknesses of the the
Nambiar, arrived to take command on
Satish Nambiar,
8 March.70
March. 70 Over the next two months, UN
Over the UN troops
arrived, deployed, and began assuming control control over '
· The military situation in Croatia from 1993 to 1995 and the
in
the
UNPAs. . Once its forces were in place, the
the UNPAs
the the UN
UN by growth in the of the
the capabilities of the Croatian Army.
Army, including
including its sub -
fits starts began to
fits and starts the Krajina Serb Army
to disarm the sequent defeat
sequent Of the
defeat of the Krajina Army, is discussed in Section
Krajina Serb Army, Section
is
VI, Time, Building

Building lts
(SVK).7|
(SVK) .71 By January 1993, most, if
January 1993, if not all, heavy VI. Croatia 1993-1994: Biding
Biding Its Time, Its Army; parts
Army: parts
of V; and Sections VII
of Section V: VII and III, which cover both Opera-
III, which Opera
weapons and many of the the small arms had been placed tions "Bljesak" “Oluja” (Storm) in 1995 and the HV’s
the HV's
in
“Bljesak” (Flash) and "Oluja"

in the dual-controlled
in the UN/SVK weapon cantonments.
dual-controlled UN/SVK operations in Bosnia
Bosnia in 1992.
in
operations
107
107

two armies.
two armies. A series of critical
critical events-the "Battle of
events—the “Battle mediation and a major
mediation major military
military commitment
commitment of
the Barracks."
Barracks.” the JNA-Serbian political-military
the JNA-Serbian political-military European troops
European to the UN
troops to UN peacekeeping force . Thus
peacekeeping force.
conflict, the Battle
conflict. Vukovar, and the Siege
Battle of Vukovar. Siege of level of Western
began a level Western engagement in
in halting
halting the
Dubrovnik—were
Dubrovnik-were the turning points
the turning points that decided
decided the fighting in the
fighting in former Yugoslavia that would continue
the former continue
outcome
outcome of the war.
the war. to through UN deployments
to deepen through deployments to Bosnia , culmi
to Bosnia, culmi-
nating in the Dayton
nating Dayton peace agreement and the creation
creation
full-scale fighting
Once full-scale
Once fighting broke
broke out between
between the of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.
NATO-led peacekeeping force.
Yugoslav People's Army and Croatian
Yugoslav People’s forces in
Croatian forces in
September
September 1991.199], there was possibility of put
was no real possibility put- Militarily, the Croatian
Militarily. Croatian warwar had ended in in a stalemate
ting Tito’s Yugoslavia back
ting Tito's again.. Without
back together again Without months of its eruption,
within months eruption, which
which was
was a keykey reason
Croatia, . the remaining
Croatia republics would soon
remaining republics soon fall away
away both were willing
both sides were the end of 1991
willing at the 1991 to to accept aa
because none of them were large enough to counter-
were large counter UN-brokered
UN-brokered truce and an an international
international peacekeeping
peacekeeping
Serbia in a rump
balance Serbia rump federation.
federation. This dilemma
dilemma force. At
force. At that point,
point. although gaining in
although gaining in strength, the
was toto have a fatal
fatal impact
impact on Croatia’s
Croatia's neighboring
neighboring Croatian forces
Croatian still lacked
forces still lacked the capability
capability to eject the
republic.
republic, Bosnia Herzegovina, held
Bosnia and Herzegovina, held together in the
the JNA from
JNA from their
their territory. Conversely. the JNA
territory . Conversely, could
JNA could
old federal republic only because of the
federal republic Serbian
the Serbian- not muster
muster the knockout blow against Zagreb
the knockout Zagreb envi
envi-
Croatian balance.
Croatian balance. sioned in
sioned in its initial strategy without
without paying
paying a price
price the
the
leadership was
Belgrade leadership
Belgrade completely unwilling to
was completely
Out the ashes of the war
Out of the war came two new states:
two new states: the withdrawal of the JNA
The withdrawal
accept. The JNA and the the growth
growth and
internationally
internationally recognized Republic of Croatia
recognized Republic Croatia and thethe improvements in
improvements Croatian Army were
in the Croatian were to shift
shift this
this
minute Republic of Serbian
minute Republic Serbian Krajina in the "occupied
“occupied decisively in
balance decisively Zagreb 's favor by
in Zagreb’s by 1995.
1995.
the UN
territory" of the
territory” UN Protected
Protected Areas. Croatia, with
Areas. Croatia. with a
UN peacekeeping
large UN peacekeeping force
force stuck in the middle,
the middle,
remain one of the hotter spots in
would remain former Yugo
in former Yugo- Evaluation
Evaluation of Federal
Federal Forces
slavia the next three and a half years because of
slavia over the
the Croatian Republic’s
the Croatian Republic's demand, sounded over over and JNA’s overall
The JNA's
The overall performance
performance in in the
the Croatian
Croatian war war
over again byby President Tudjman. that it regain
President Tudjman, sover
regain sover- was
was mediocre.
mediocre. The The upheavals
upheavals wracking
wracking the the federation
federation
eignty over the RSK. .
the RSK detracted from motivation JNA
from any motivation conscripts and
JNA conscripts
reservists might
reservists summoned to
might have summoned fight a war
to fight war that
In the war's aftermath, Serbian
war’s aftermath. President Milosevic
Serbian President had
had no obvious stakes for them,
no obvious them. and their
their dispirited
dispirited
became the unchallenged leader in
unchallenged leader in what was
was left
left of responses had a domino effect on the Army’s
domino effect Army's capabili
capabili-
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. The formerly federal government
formerly strong federal government ties. In
In particular,
particular, the refusal of many
the refusal many Serbian
Serbian reserv
reserv-
behind which Milosevic wielded
became a thin facade behind wielded ists to fight
fight inin Croatia
Croatia undercut
undercut thethe JJNA's
NA’s mobilization
mobilization
power. No republics
true power. republics other than tiny Montenegro
tiny Montenegro effort so badly
effort implementation of the
badly that the implementation the Army’s
Army's
remained even to
remained to debate him, JNA, once a
him, and the JNA, strategic offensive affected. Most of the
offensive was critically affected.
as well as a militarily potent force,
politically as force, stood
stood men whowho did respond to the callup
did respond callup received
received little
little
humbled by its disgraceful
humbled performance in the
disgraceful performance war.
the war. training incentive to fight
training and less incentive hard and die for the
fight hard the
Yugoslav/Serbian cause,
Yugoslav/Serbian cause. and this
this further
further dulled
dulled the
As Yugoslavia descended deeper into authoritarian
into authoritarian- JNA’s fighting
JNA's fighting edge. The JNA's JNA’s mobilization
mobilization and
ism,
ism. so too did the standing
standing of the Serbian nation
the Serbian nation motivational
motivational problems impelled itit to
problems impelled rely more
to rely more
decline the world stage. Outrageous
decline on the conduct by
Outrageous conduct by heavily on the poorly
heavily poorly trained, ill-disciplined local Serb
local Serb
Serbian and Serbian-dominated
Serbian J NA troops,
Serbian-dominated JNA amplified
troops. amplified Territorial Defense
Territorial Defense forces
forces and to form hordes of vol
form hordes vol-
Croatian propaganda,
by Croatian propaganda, created a lasting
lasting image
image of unteer units
units too often populated
populated by social misfits,
by social misfits,
Serbia as
Serbia as an nation. Serb
an aggressor nation. atrocities in
Serb atrocities in criminals, and other dregs of society.
criminals. society. The upper levels levels
Bosnia would need no magnification
Bosnia magnification to to darken the of the JNA
the JN A splintered along with
splintered along with the country
country, , leaving
leaving
deep-dyed
deep-dyed image. an officer corps
corps in that, strained
in chaos that. strained by by political
political-
military differences over
military differences over war aims, led
war aims. led to uneven
uneven leadlead-
West, startled by
The West, by the outbreak of military
the outbreak military clashes ership
ership at at all levels of command.
all levels command. With their their country
country
Slovenia, was aghast when
in Slovenia. when a full-scale
full-scale Croatian
Croatian
war, complete
war, complete with
with large-scale atrocities, erupted in
large-scale atrocities. in
Europe. Western horror
Europe. Western horror led the EC’s
led to the EC's attempts at
l08
108

breaking up around them.
breaking them, JNA officers had to conduct
JNA officers conduct facilities
facilities and arms,
arms. including weapons. the
including heavy weapons,
a large and complex offensive with thou
complex strategic offensive thou- Croatians were unable to match their manpower
Croatians manpower with with
ill-trained and poorly
sands of ill-trained poorly motivated conscripts
conscripts enough heavy firepower
firepower to the JNA
to push the JNA out of
while coping
and reservists while coping with an evolving
with an evolving political
political Croatia. The Croatian
Croatia. Croatian soldiers hastily trained,
soldiers were hastily
situation that often bore heavily
heavily on themselves and and,
and. lacking
lacking any significant
significant standing military
military organi
organi-
families. In these
their families. circumstances, it is not surpris-
these circumstances. surpris zations or cadre, it was difficult to weld them quickly
to weld quickly
ing J NA did not perform
ing that the JNA perform as as had been
as well as into cohesive combat units. The individual
into cohesive individual soldier’s
soldier's
expected of the fourth-largest
fourth-largest army in Europe.
Europe. high motivation.
high however. helped make up for this
motivation, however,
Croatian staff work
deficiency. Croatian
deficiency. work also was poor. This
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless. the JNA was able to
the JNA to conduct the multi
multi- shortcoming in
shortcoming particular kept the ZNG
in particular ZNG from
from attempt
attempt-
corps combat operations of its strategic offensiveoffensive plan ing many large-scale offensive
offensive actions that required a
with some measure of success. Sufficient
with Sufficient numbers of high degree of
high of skill inin planning execution. In con
planning and execution. con-
the JNA’s commanders and staff officers
the JNA's officers were present trast with
trast the JNA,
with the JNA, Croatia little in
Croatia had little way of a
in the way
professional skills to orga-
and available to use their professional orga logistic structure to
military logistic
military to start with
with and little
little time
nize and move JNA JNA forces to their areasareas of responsi-
responsi to develop one. Even
to bought. found,
Even after they had bought, found. or
attack, although often only
bility and attack. sluggishly. At
only sluggishly. seized additional ammunition, distributing
additional arms and ammunition, distributing
middle and upper levels,
middle levels, the J NA was able to function
the JNA function the materiel was often haphazard.
the
almost as expected. raggedly. because most of
expected, though raggedly,
the Serbian and Montenegrin
Montenegrin professional officers,
professional officers.
with some loyal
along with officers from
loyal officers from other ethnic Critical Events of the Croatian War
the Croatian
groups, retained enough of the JNA officer
the JNA officer corps'
corps’
ethos and group cohesion. To compensate for its A
A succession of key military military actions and political
political-
weaknesses in training and personnel at the tactical military debates
military decisively shaped the course of the
debates decisively the
level,
level, the JNA made maximum
the JNA maximum use of its abundant war and its final final denouement. The first of these
The first these
firepower, bludgeoning
firepower, way through Croatian
bludgeoning its way Croatian posi-
posi events, the Croatians’ strategic offensive
the Croatians' offensive against the
tions. It
It was able to support these
these resource-intensive
resource-intensive JNA’s
JNA's military facilities, began a new
military facilities, new phase in in the
the
logistic system operating in
tactics thanks to a logistic familiar
in familiar Serbo-Croatian conflict
armed Serbo-Croatian conflict and to a great extent
territory from
territory from nearby armories so so that there was created military balance between the
created a military the forces. ItIt was
ammunition and other supplies coming
always enough ammunition coming not until
until the Croatians
Croatians launched their barracks offen offen-
forward.
forward. sive that the JNA
that the JNA came fully into the conflict conflict against
Croatia, even if
Croatia, if Zagreb believed
believed at the time that the
at the the
JNA
JNA had already sided with with the Croatian
Croatian Serb separat-
separat
Evaluation Croatian Forces
Evaluation of Croatian ists. The offensive’s significance, however,
offensive's key significance, however, laylay inin
the quantum leap in
the in Croatian
Croatian military
military capabilities
capabilities
The
The key factor in the
the Croatian forces’ ability
Croatian forces' ability to hold resulting from barracks' seizure. Before
from the barracks’ Before the offen
offen-
JNA during the
off the JNA the war high morale and
war was their high sive, the ZNG
ZNG lacked
lacked even the small arms necessary to to
clarity
clarity of purpose, believing as they did that they were
believing as equip all organized combat units, let alone any sig
all its organized sig-
defending their homes against the Serbian
Serbian "aggres-
“aggres nificant quantity of heavy weapons. But
nificant the ZNG
But as the ZNG
sor.” In their own minds,
sor." minds, at least, they knew
knew exactly MUP troops seized JNA
and MUP JNA depots and barracks in in
why fighting. This factor, capitalized
why they were fighting. capitalized on by rapid succession, the
rapid the ZNG acquired enough small small
the newly Croatian Main Staff
newly formed Croatian Staff in
in its rapid arms not onlyonly to equip its existing
existing formations
formations but also
mobilization and organization
mobilization organization of combat brigades, form and field
to form field large numbers of new units. Most
Zagreb’s troops
allowed Zagreb"s contain, delay,
troops to contain, and eventu
delay, and eventu- important, it had
important, had obtained
obtained its first stocks of
first sizable stocks of
ally halt many of the JNA’s
ally JNA's individual offensives.
individual offensives. armor, artillery, and mortars. Without
armor. artillery, Without these weapons,
the ZNG
ZNG and MUP would have been helpless to with
MUP would with-
The MUP, however,
The ZNG and MUP, limitations,
however. had many limitations. stand the
the JJNA
NA offensive.
offensive.
and the professional and heavily
the more professional heavily armed JNAJ NA
took advantage Despite their seizure of JNA
advantage of them. Despite JNA
109
109

The federal/Serbian
federal/Serbian effortsefforts toto combat
combat the expanding
expanding Danube River town
Danube town turned
turned into
into aa three-month,
three-month,
Croatian
Croatian forces
forces were complicated
complicated by a longstanding
longstanding life-or-death struggle
life-or-death sucked in
struggle that sucked in nearly all of the
nearly all
difference
difference between key members members of the JNA JNA highhigh combat earmarked for the main
forces earmarked
combat forces main operation,
operation, leav
leav-
command
command and the Serbian Serbian political leadership.
leadership. The The ing offensive beached
ing the offensive gasping. The JNA’s
beached and gasping. JNA's
Serbian leadership—Milosevic and Jovic-believed
Serbian leadership-Milosevic Jovic—believed unseemly inability to
unseemly town quickly from
the town
to take the from aa
in a far simpler
simpler set set of political objectives
objectives or war war aims
aims force of defenders
scratch force
scratch damaged the Army’s
defenders damaged Army's
that would have allowedallowed Croatia
Croatia to secede from Yugo
from Yugo- already sinking morale
already sinking morale andand prestige.
prestige. Then
Then the destruc
destruc-
slavia
slavia without
without its Serb-populated
Serb-populated regions, regions, requiring
requiring tion of the
tion the town
town byby the application of massed
the application massed firefire-
JNA to JNA, how- way the JNA
it,
the JNA to defend only those areas. The The JNA, how power,
power, the only
only way JNA was
was able
able to seize
seize it,
ever, dedicated to preventing
preventing Croatia
Croatia from breaking
from breaking made its belated
belated capture
capture a public
public relations
relations disaster
disaster inin
a
federation, ignored
up the federation, Milosevic’s and Jovic's
ignored Milosevic's Jovic’s the West,
the West, further
further isolating Belgrade and making
isolating Belgrade making it
it
demands to withdraw
withdraw from from most of Croatia Croatia and to more difficult for Milosevic
more Milosevic to achieve
achieve the objectives
objectives
hold territories. The strategy deemed
hold only the Serb territories. about. Finally, the battle came
he cared about. came to symbolize
symbolize
necessary to achieve
achieve this, necessitating
necessitating the total defeat itself, highlighting
war itself,
the war highlighting the Croatians’
Croatians' valiant
valiant
of Croatia's
Croatia’s forces
forces and the the capitulation
capitulation of its govem govern- efforts break away
efforts to break from Yugoslavia and the federa
away from federa-
ment, was far more complex complex than the the essentially
essentially tion's determination
tion’s determination to stop stop them
them byby whatever
whatever means
means
defensive approach Milosevic and Jovic
defensive approach wanted. It
Jovic wanted. necessary. With
necessary. With neither side willing
neither side willing to yield,
yield, the fight
fight-
required
required the JNA JNA to implement
implement a full-blown strategic ing took
ing on a life of its
took on its own.
own.
a
offensive
offensive with multicorps
multicorps combatcombat operations
operations
crisscrossing Croatia to defeat its troops
crisscrossing Croatia troops and threaten The Siege
Siege of Dubrovnik completed destruction of
completed the destruction
its capital.
capital. Despite
Despite the political opposition,
opposition, and in the the Belgrade's public
Belgrade’s public image in the West,
image in ensuring that
West, ensuring
unlooked-for deficiencies
face of unlooked-for deficiencies in the troops troops needed Serbia/Yugoslavia would be demonized
Serbia/Yugoslavia demonized diplomati
diplomati-
flesh out the operation,
to flesh operation, the JNA leaders put this
the JNA this economically for years
cally and economically years to come. While
to come. While con
con-
ponderously difficult offensive
ponderously difficult offensive in motionmotion as soon as
as soon as ducting what
ducting what was
was otherwise
otherwise a legitimate
legitimate military
a
Croatians attacked their barracks.
the Croatians barracks. Although some campaign to
campaign to cut off the Dubrovnik area and and its
its port
port
individual operations succeeded, the offensive
operations succeeded, offensive as a from rest of Croatia,
from the rest troops of the JNA,
Croatia, troops JNA, the
whole
whole was a military,
military, political, and public relations
public relations Montenegrin Territorial Defense,
Montenegrin Defense, and volunteer
volunteer units
units
disaster for the JNA. Their failure
the JNA. failure forced
forced the JNA
the JNA wantonly looted
wantonly looted and burned
burned their
their way
way up the walls
up to the
leaders ultimately
ultimately to Serbian political war
to accept the Serbian war of the ancient city. Then
ancient city. Then the professional artillerists of
professional artillerists
aims even while they dealt with with the
the military conse-
military conse— federal Army
the federal Army shelled it. The television
shelled it. footage and
television footage and
quences of their failed offensive until
failed offensive until the end of the photography of JNA
newspaper photography
newspaper JNA shells hitting historic
shells hitting historic
conflict.
conflict. buildings in
buildings in cosmopolitan Dubrovnik, while JNA
cosmopolitan Dubrovnik, JNA
troops looted
troops the luxury hotels
looted the hotels and
and homes along the
homes along
Battle for Vukovar was the decisive
The Battle decisive factor
factor in the coast, seared the consciousness of Western
the consciousness Western journalists,
journalists,
disruption JNA’s strategic
disruption of the JNA's offensive. The JNA’s
strategic offensive. JNA's diplomats, politicians,
diplomats, their constituencies,
politicians, and their constituencies, burn burn-
called for a massive
plan had called massive armored
armored drive from
drive from ing into
ing their minds
into their image of an ignoble
minds the image ignoble aggressor
aggressor
northern Serbia, past Osijek, and across Slavonia
northern Serbia, Slavonia state. The Serbs
state. Serbs never
never recovered
recovered from this self
from this self-
toward Zagreb
toward Croatia. Instead,
Zagreb and northeastern Croatia. Instead, the
the inflicted
inflicted wound.
wound.
JNA’s undertaking
JNA's undertaking to barracks in
to free its barracks in the small
the small
110
110
Digitized by Go gle OrigifKll from

Endnotes, Section II
II
1' German-occupied Serbia was also placed under a puppet puppet govern - with Tudjman in an October 1991 interview interview although he did not
ment led by another
ment another Quisling
Quisling figure
figure,, Gen. Milan Nedic, a former
Milan Nedic. explicitly July-August chain of events.
explicitly outline the July-August events. Mladen
Mladen Maloca
Maloca
Yugoslav
Yugoslav Army officer who had been
Army officer been dismissed in 1940 for urging and DarkoDarko Pavicic,
Pavicic , "Croatia
“Croatia MustMust Go Go on thethe Offensive,” Danas
Offen sive," Danas
that Yugoslavia
that Yugoslaviajoin the Axis.
join the Axis. Serbia did not, however. however, adopt Hit
adopt Hit- 15 October 1991. 1991, pp. 21-23.
ler’s principles in the
ler's the manner
manner that that Croatia did during its occupa- occupa— "3' Tudjman
Tudjman was forced to rely on the opposition parties partie s in forming
forming
tron.
tion. government to help him hold off the right wing
a new government wing of his own
own
22The
The lower figure
figure of of 200.000
200,000 is from Glenny. Misha, The Fall of
Glenny, Misha, of party. See interviews with Dr. Zdravko Tomac,
Dr. Zdravko Vice President of
Tomac. Vice
Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, p. 81. The higher figure of of 600
600,000
,000 was the “official”
"official " the Democratic Reform Reform Party and the the then
then new deputy PrimePrime Min
Min-
Yugoslav number, cited as
Yugoslav number. as such in Silber and Little,. p. 85. A variety
and Little ister in Marinko
Marinko Culic,Culic, "Why I Joined the Government,”
“Why 1Joined Government," DanasDanas
ofof other
other estim
estimates between..
ates fall in between 6 August 1991, pp. 13-14 and the then new Prime Prime Minister
Minister Dr.Dr.
'3From masomasovni vni pokret, or "“mass movement."
mass movement." Franjo Greguric, Darko
Franjo Greguric, Darko Pavicic, “Success on the Third
Pavicic. "Success Third Try,”
Try,"
•4Laura
Laura Silber and and Allan Little, Yugoslavia:
Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of Nation.
of a Nation. Danas
Danas 6 August 1991 pp. 16~17for 16- I 7 for a discussion of the the contentious
Penguin USA. p. 84. assembly meeting.
55Silber andand Little
Little p. 97. "22NewsNews Conference, President Tudjman, Tudjman. Zagreb Radio Radio 5 August
August
•6Silber and Little
Silber and Little p. 95. 1991.
l
'Belgrade Little, 223 ' President Tudjman interview, Zagreb Radio Radio 22 August
August 1991.
Belgrade Tanjug 14 August 1990; See also Silber and Little.
p. 146, footnote 4. 22“' Borisav Jovic, The Last
Borisav Jovic, Last Days
Days ofof the SFRY:
SFRY: Daily Notes from the
Daily Notesfrom
8 Silber and
"Silber Little,, p. 97.
and Little Period 15
Period May 1989 to 8July
I 5 May 8 July I992. Belgrade : Politika,
/992. Belgrade: Politika, 1995, entry
Belgrade Borba 2 August 1990 p. 8.
99Belgrade for 24 June 1991. I 99 I.
Belgrade Domestic Service 3 August 1990;
l0Belgrade
10 1990',Belgrade Tan jug
Tanjug 22’' Jovic entry for for 27 June 1991.
17 August 1990. 22°• Jovic entry for for 5 July 1991.
I 991.
'1Belgrade Tan
11 Tanjugjug 17 August 1990. Silber Silber and Little,
Little. p. 101.
IOI. 27Silber and Little
27 Little, , p. 167.
l2Although there
"Although there is no question
question that that autonomy enjoyed strong Serb 228 Glenny, The Fall of
Misha Glenny,
' Misha Yugoslavia: The Third
of Yugoslavia: Balkan War,
Third Balkan War,
support
support,, it is worth noting that that the
the referendum
referendum was organized by London: : Penguin Books,
London Books . 1992, p. 97.
the SDS, that
the SDS, that only Serbs were allowed to vote. vote, and that
that there
there was 2"
'° Relativ
Relatively fighting occurred between Croatian and Serb
ely little fighting
no residency requirement
requirement (that (that is, former Krajina
Krajina Serbs residing in forces in the Knin—Northern Dalmatia areas during June
the Knin-Northern June and July
Serbia or Bosnia could vote as as well).
well). 1991; most of it was “border” "border" skirmishes around villages villages north of of
'3By August, Babic controlled at
"By at least
least the municipalities of Knin, Knin, the port city of Sibenik.
Sibenik.
Benkovac, . Gracac
Gracac,, Donji and Korenica, 3°
"' The EC peacepeace conference came about as a result of of an EC
EC deci
Benkovac Donji Lapac
Lapac,. Obrovac, and Korenica. all in deci-
southern Krajina
southern Krajina. . Belgrade Domestic Service 3 August 1990. sion on 27 AugustAugust to send an “ultimatum"—as
"ultimatum"-as Serbian Federal
'4Belgrade Tanjug 13 December 1990; Belgrade Tanjug Presidency member member JovicJovic called it-toit—to Serbia threatening
threatening unspeci
unspeci-
14 1990:
19 December I1990: 990 ; Belgrade Tan jug 5 January 1991.
Tanjug I 99 I. fied action unless it halted JNA
fied JNA and Croatian Serb militarymilitary action
‘5 Croatia’s
'' Croatia Serbs,, with some 12.5 percent
·s ethnic Serbs percent ofof the population, .
the population in Croatia. The EC announcement
announcement stated stated that
that a peace
peace conference
were able to win only five Serbian Democratic Party seats seats of the
the would be held with
would with all those in support of the EC arbitration and
all those
356 in thethe parliament.
parliament. Effectively, Croatia’s
Effectively. Croatia represen
's Serbs had no represen- cease-fire plans. Reuters 27-28 August 1991. The EC
cease-fire EC cease-fire
tation. Rather than
tation. than participate
participate to no end, the five five Serb deputies
deputies propo
proposal stated that,
sal stated that,
boycotted the
boycotted the National Assembly.
Assembly. •0 all paramilitary
paramilitaryforces forces (except policeforces) irregular units
police forces) and irregular
"‘ Belgrade Tanjug 17 May
10 May 1990. shall be disarmed and disbanded;
shall disbanded:
l"Vasiljevic
17 promoted to Major
Yasiljevic was promoted Major General ((one one star)
star) in December •' the reserve
resen ·e structure of of the Croatian
Croatian National Guard shall
National Guard shall be
1990. demobilized, and the JNA
demobiked, JNA shall return to its barracks;
shall return barracks; . . .,
“The Serb leadership
"The leadership in Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Slavonia-Baranja took longer to Jovic entry for 28 August
Jovic Augu st 1991.
199 I.
autonomous region than
form an autonomous than Krajina
Krajina, , although it had estab-estab Because the the Netherlands was head head of of the ECEC Presidency at the
lished aa Serb National Council Council for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja Baranja,, and time, Dutch Foreign
Foreign Minister
Minister Hans van den Broek Broek went to BelBel-
Western Srem by March March 1991. D. Dragicevic, "The
D. Dragicevic. “The Time
Time to Leave present the EC
grade to present
grade EC declaration and proposal to the Serbs, Serbs. the
Croatia Has Come,"Come,” Politika
Politika 19 MarchMarch 1991, p. 9. The council Federal Presidency, government. Despite distaste
Presidency , and government. distaste for
for what they
declared itself the
declared the government
government of of an
an autonomous
autonomous region in July July both viewed as anti-Serb rhetoric, rhetoric . Serbian President Milosevic
Milosevic was
1991. Belgrade Tanjug II July 1991. Pakrac and
11 July and areas
areas in Western able to convince Jovic Jovic that
that it was in the the Serbs“
Serbs ' best interest
interest to
attempted to join the
Slavonia attempted SAO Krajina
the SAO Krajina in February 1991, but accept the
accept the ECEC decision Otherwise, , the Serbs would
decision. . Otherwise would be excluded
the intervention of
the of Croatian Special Police Police partially thwarted
thwarted this from the peacepeace conference and have no influence in0uence and wouldwould most
move until August 1991. 1991, by whichwhich point the the Western Slavonia Serb likely subjected to EC
likely be subjected EC sanctions. After After rancorous debate
debate in the
created its own autonomous
leadership created
leadership autonomous region. Presidency , the EC
Federal Presidency, EC measure accepted. Jovic
measure was accepted. Jovic noted that
that
1"The SDB
SDB,, thethe State
State Security Service (S/uzba he believed that
he that Mesic
Mesic and Drnovsek
Drnovsek probably had hoped that the
19 (Sluzba Drzavne
Dr;:.avneBezbed
Bezbed-
nosti), was redesignated
nosti). redesignated RDB, RDB, Department
Department for State State Security Serbs and their supporters
supporters on the the Federal Presidency would would have
Drzavne Bezbednosti), in 1991.
(Resor Drzavne vote against
against the allowing the Croatians and Slovenes to
the proposal, allowing
20
20 had signed defense agreement attend
attend the conference by themselves themselves and gain an even larger mea mea-
The Croatians had signed aajoint
joint defense agreement with the
Slovenes in AprilApril, , which Zagreb refused refused to honor during the the Ten-
Ten sure of
sure of international support. Jovic Jovic entries
entries for
for 28 August,
August.
War, despite
Day War, despite Spegelj entreaties to Tudjman. See Silber
Spegelj's's entreaties Silber and August, I1 September
29 August, September 1991. I 991.
Little, pp. 149-150, 169. Spegelj alluded to many of
Little, ofhis
his differences “Belgrade
"Belgrade Tanjug 6 September September 1991.
111
111

32
'' Tudjman stated stated on 7 September
September that. that. “We were satisfied
"We were satisfied with the the and MUP did not have
and the forces,
have the training. or firepower
forces. training, firepower to force
force the
the
general atmosphere during the
general atmosphere the conference."
conference ... Belgrade Tanjug 7 JNA
JNA from Croatia militarily,
militarily. as became
became evident the ZNG's
evident during the ZNG's
September 1991.
September I 991. limited offensives.
offensives. This This almost certainly is why President
almost certainly President Tudjman
’3 Belgrade Tanjug 7-8 September
"Belgrade September 1991. 1991. continued
continued to try to internationalize
internationalize the the war,
war. hoping to get get the
the West
West-
3‘ Zagreb Radio 11 September
"Zagreb September 1991. provides a detailed
1991. This pro\'ides detailed ern nations
nations to intervene
intervene againstagainst the the JNAJNA and and force it to withdraw
explanation
explanation of of Mesic's
Mesic‘s public justification
justification for the decision.
the dedsion. from his republic.
35 Jovic dearly
"Jovic clearly saw Mesic's Mesic‘s order order in this light as as well,
well. stating,
stating, 4'
" Jovic
Jovic noted
noted on 8 August 1991 I 991 that,that. “It
"It is amazing
amazing that that Veljko
Veljko
We ref?ard
regard this as an attempt attempt to create create l'l'asonsfiir
reasons for an attack attack (Kadijevic) is one
(Kadijevic) one minute
minute for a general general attackattack to overthrow
overthrow the the
against the
against military in Croatia.
the miliwry Croatia. lfthe /(the military does does nut 'obey.· ’ it
not ‘obey, Croatian authorities,
Croatian authorities. and and the
the next
next minute that." Jovic
against that."
minute against Jovic entry
entry
will he
11·ill be declared
declared outlaw and <111 an occupying
occ111>yingfi,rceforce in Croatia.
Cmatia. The for 8 August 1991. 1991.
purpose is to provide an easier
purpose easier explanation
explanation and justification
j11st(ficationfr1r ‘2 Jovic entry
entry for 12 September
September 1991.
for "Jovic
Croatian aggression against the
aggression ll[.:ain.H miliwr_,·. In
the military. fact, it is preparing
lnfi1ct, ‘3 Army General
'·' Army General Veljko Kadijevic, Moje
Veljko Kadijevic, Moje Vidjenje Raspada,Rasp<1da.
w
to tf,,c/are
declare 11·ar war against
against the
the mililar\'.
military. Belgrade: 1993,
Belgrade: 1993. p. 134.
Jovic entry
Jo\'ic entry for 12 Septcmhcr
September 1991. 1991. ‘4
.w The General Staff was to coordinate coordinate the offensive through through the
3" Darko Pavicic,
"Darko Pavicic. "'Why“Why II Resigned Zagreb Danas
Resigned,”... Zagreh Dan<1.18 October First,
First. Fifth,
Fifth. and Military-Maritime Districts. The First Military
and Military-Maritime Military
199], pp. 14-15.
1991. interview with former Croatian
14-15. An inter\'iew Croatian DefenseDefense Min Min- District,
District. under under the command of Colonel-General Aleksandar
the command
ister Luka
ister Luka Bebic. The order implementing the
order implementing the already
already signedsigned deci
deci- Spiroko\'ski. was to control the
Spirokovski, the Eastern
Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Opera Opera-
went into effect
sion went late on 13 September
effect late September for implementation
implementation on tion; the the Fifth Militarv District,
Fifth Military District. underunder the command of Colonel
the command Colonel-
14 September.
September. General Zivota Avramovic,
General Avra1{10vic.was to control the Western Slavonia
37
17 Despite
Despite the the shift to the offensive against
the offensive against thethe barracks,
barracks, the the ZNG and
and Karlovac Operations: and
Karlovac Operations; and the Military-Maritime District,
the Military-Maritime District.
and MUP remained
and remained on the the strategic defensive along
strategic defcnsi\'e along the the frontline under
under Vice Admiral Mile Kandic,
Vice Admiral Kandic. was to command command the the Knin-Zadar
Knin-Zadar
with the Serb autonomous
the Serb autonomous regions. regions. Croatian forces forces would not and
and Dubrovnik
Duhrornik Operations.
Operations. (For (For a detailed breakdown of the JJNA
detailed breakdown NA
move to conduct
move conduct any offensives on the
any offensives the battlefield
battlefield until late October
late October order of
order of battle,
battle. see
see Appendix C C andand Annex 13.)
and November.
and November. ‘5 Kadijevic, pp. 134-135.
"Kadijevic. 134-135. Kadijevic’s statements in his memoirs
Kadijevic's statements memoirs
38
"As described earlier,
As described earlier. Tudjman made made the the decision
decision to go to war that
that he intended
intended to withdraw from Croatia. or at least least from all of
with thethe JNAJNA in mid-September.
mid-September, launching launching a strategic
strategic offensive to Croatia except except the Krajina. clearly do not track with Borisav
the Krajina,
neutralize and
neutralize and capture
capture the JNA‘s facilities throughout
the JNA's throughout Croatia Jovic‘s understanding of
Jovic's understanding Kadije'l'ic's thinking in 1991.
of Kadijevic‘s 1991. There are are
beginning on 14 September.
beginning September. This simply added dimension to the
added a dimension the two possibilities. Either Kadijevic Kadijevic modified modified his memoirsmemoirs in order
defensive military strategy
defensive strategy Croatia had pursued throughout
had pursued throughout the the to reflect
reflect a more pro-Serbian line rather
more pro-Serbian rather than
than the pro-Yugoslav line
the pro-Yugoslav
fighting with local Serb forces during the
fighting the summer.
summer. Zagreb Zagreb intended
intended in which he believed believed in 1991, 1991. or the the 1991 planning did include
continue on the
to continue the defensive
defensive at at the
the front while attacking
attacking the the JNA
JNA in options to pull out of Croatia but
options hut Kadijevic’s presentation or beliefs
Kadijevic's presentation
rear, although
the rear.
the although the the certain introduction of
certain introduction large-scale JJNA
of large-scale NA forces
forces were
were so muddled muddled at the the time that that it was not clear to Jovic Jovic or anyone
anyone
battle after
into battle after thethe Croatian
Croatian attack attack on the the barracks
barracks would ob\'i- obvi else.
else. Jovic’s description of
Jovic's description of the
the above
above planning based based on a 20 Sep Sep-
increase Croatian
ously increase Croatian military difficulties.difficulties. The barracksbarracks assault
assault tember JNA
tember presentation tracks
JNA presentation exactly with Kadijevic‘s
tracks exactly Kadijevic's descrip
descrip-
was thethe key element
element in the the Croatian
Croatian efforts to expand expand the the National except for Kadijevic’s
tion. except discussion of
Kadije\'ic's discussion of a withdrawal from
Guard Corps and create a real
and create defend its borders,
army to defend
real arn1y borders. which it Croatia. Another possibility is that that thethe plan did not initially
initially call for
would have have been
been unable
unable to do without without the the weapons
weapons stored stored in the the a withdrawal from Croatia but, but. thatthat after
after the agreement to with
the agreement with-
JNA and
JNA Croatian TO
and Croatian TO barracks.
barracks. draw from Slovenia, Slovenia. a withdrawal from Croatia was added added to thethe
39 The newly formed
"'The formed Main Main Staff organized
organized the expansion of
the expansion of the
the plan without modifying any of of the campaigns. Either way,
planned campaigns.
the planned way.
ZNG during
ZNG October with the
during Octoher weapons, while
captured weapons.
the captured orchestrat
whik orchestrat- the JNA
the JNA high command
command clearly appears to have
dearly appears have been
been suffering
the defense
ing the defense against
against the JNA’s campaigns.
the JNA's campaigns. As As ZNGZNG and and MUP
MUP from political-strategic schizophrenia in 1991.
political-strategic schizophrenia 1991. They often were not
forces were
forces were ableable to contain
contain federal troops. field units began
federal troops, began to urgeurge sure
sure what they were
what they were trying to achieve particular time. Jovic
achieve at any particular Jo\'ic
the Main
the Main Staff to authorizeauthorize counteroffensives,
counteroffensives. while the the Croatian
Croatian entry for 20 September
entry September 1991. 1991.
hardline HDZ
particularly hardline
Assembly. particularly HDZ members, continued to press
members. continued press ‘6 Ibid.
"' Ibid.
the government more aggressive.
aggressive. The new offensives. offensives. how *717 The forces available
available to the the First Military
Military District prohahly could
District probably
the government to be more how-
ever, were
ever. were to have have only mixed success. success. Beginning in late late October,
October. have
have broken
broken the the ZNG
ZNG defense
defense line. albeit at considerableconsiderable cost. It It is
is
Croatian forces in Western
Croatian Western Slavonia went went on the the attack:
attack: thethe rela
rela- unlikely. however,
unlikely, however, that the JNA
that the JNA could have dri\'en to Zagreb.
have driven Zagreb.
tively successful
ti\'ely continued until the
operations continued
successful operations end of
the end of the
the conflict
conflict Nevertheless,
Nevertheless. the Government almost
the Croatian Government certainly would
almost certainly
in January. The Croatians Croatians also attempted attempted two unsuccessful
unsuccessful opera opera- have
have been been forced to accept accept worse terms terms than the Vance Plan if
than the if
relieve the
tions to relieve siege of
the siege of Vukovar in October October and and November.
November. Osijek had had been plm:ed at the
been placed the JNA’s
JNA's mercy. For For a more
more detailed
detailed
Attacks in the the Banija area, area. near
near Sisak and and Petrinja. were were only analysis. see
analysis, see Annex
Annex 17.
successful. These
partially successful. These limited attacks attacks were
were the the only Croatian
Croatian ‘8 General Kadijevic
"General Kadijevic stated stated that
that the campaign in Western
the campaign Western Slavonia
“
actions; elsewhere
offensive actions;
offensive elsewhere they remained on the
they remained the defensive,
defcnsi\'e, while designed to,
was designed to ....... . . along the the Gradiska-Pakrac-Virovitica
Gradiska-Pakrac-Virovitica line
maintaining their
maintaining blockades of
their blockades of the
the barracks.
barracks. The barracks barracks remained
remained ..... . cut off
off the
the Croatia forces’ retreat from eastern
forces· retreat eastern and central
central
surrounded until agreements
surrounded agreements were were reached
reached with the the JNA
JNA for the the Slavonia and permit a faster
and permit penetration toward Zagreb
faster penetration Zagreb and VarazVaraz-
withdrawal of of their garrisons in
their garrisons December 1991
in December 1991 as part of
as part of the
the din." Anny
din.” Army General
General Veljko Kadijcvic. Moje
Vcljko Kadijevic, Moje Vidjenje Raspada. Bel
Vidje1\jl' Raspada, Bel-
negotiations that
negotiations that led to the the “Vance
"Vance Plan." grade: 1993,
grade: I 993. p. 138.
‘0 The Croatian
'" Croatian dual-track strategy of
dual-track strategy defending on the
of defending the battlefield
battlefield ‘9 Zagre/, Velebit
''' Zagreb February 1997,
Velehit 7 February 1997, pp. 16-17. 16-17.
hitting the
while hitting barracks was the
the barracks the best available. They did not ini
best available. ini- 5“'" Mladic
Mladic and number of
and a number of his brigade
brigade commanders
commanders were rewarded rewarded
have sufficient
tially have sufficient forces to go on the the offensive directly against against with promotions
promotions for for their efforts.
efforts.
JNA and
JNA and TO TO forces,
forces. but attacking the
hut attacking the barracks
barracks allowed them them to to 5' Glenny. p. 133.
'' 133.
acquire the
acquire means to build
the means huild andand arm arm formations
formations that that could
couh.l eventu
eventu-
challenge the
ally challenge the federal units. Even with the
federal units. acquisition of
the acquisition of weap-
weap
ons from the the barracks
barracks and the creation
and the creation of of many
many new units, units, the ZNG
the ZNG
112
112

52
"An An August
August 1997 Nasa Borba
Borba article
anicle lists charges that senior JNA
charges that JNA "'
61 Milosevic and Jovic
Milosevic Jovic had discussed their willingness
willingness to achieve a
officers and Montenegrin
officers officials had profited
Montenegrin officials profited greatly from the negotiated solution on 6 October.
negotiated October, withwith Jovic stating that, "We
stating that. "We can-
can
plunder around Dubrovnik.
Dubrovnik. Vladimir Jovanovic, , "The
Vladimir Jovanovic “The Most
Most not employ the war option to an extent extent that
that is not necessary
necessary and
Successful Mobilization
Mobilization With
With the Gusle,”
the Gusle Belgrade Nasa Borba
," Bel[?rade Borba perish for something that that we can achieve through negotiation.”
negotiation."
12, 13
I3 August 1997 (Internet version).
version) . Jovic entry for
Jovic for 6 October 1991. See also the earlier section. "Mobi- “Mobi
53Jokic also claimed that
'·' established special commands to col-
that he established col lization and the Political-Military
lization Conflict, September-December
Political-Military Conflict. September-December
lect looted property
propeny for distribution to Serbian refugee refugee groups, 1991" for a discussion of Serbian/federal war aims and political
1991” political-
although he notesnotes that
that the Secretariat for National
the Federal Secretariat National Defense military differences over the
military the course of the the war.
did not set the formal
set up the formal administration to carry this out until 15 15 ‘2
"' Jovic noted that the Serbs controlled most of the territory-
that the territory—
December. By then, much of
By then, of the
the booty from KonavliKonavli probably had except Slavonia—in which
pans of Western Slavonia-in
except parts which they were a "major-
“major
disappeared into the Montenegrin
already disappeared Montenegrin black market or peoples peoples’· ity," while
ity." greater Croatian mobilization
while greater mobilization and armamentarmament was lead lead-
homes.
home Todorovic, . "Miodrag
s. Dragan Todorovic “Miodrag Jokic.Jokic, Retired Vice Vice Admiral,
Admiral, ing to a larger commitment of JNA and increasing JNA
of the JNA JNA calls
On
On Charges That He Was A War
He Was War Profiteer Commander: : I
Profiteer and Poor Commander for full mobilization.
for full mobilization . Jovic indicated that that an intensification
intensification of thethe
Prevented Looting On The Battlefield,”
Prevent ed Looting Battlefield," Belgrade Borba Borba 2 June fighting
fighting was “completely
"completely counterproductive to our policy." policy.” Jovic
1993,
1993. p. 14. entry for 2 November
November 1991.
5“Silber and Little.
"Silber Little, p. 184. ‘3 Vance. US
• ·1 Vance, US Secretary of State State under President Caner, Caner. was
55
'' Army
Army General Veljko Veljko Kadijevic.
Kadijevic, Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Bel
Moje Vidjenje Bel- appointed the the UN Special Representative
Representative of of the
the Secretary
Secretary General
grade:
grade: 1993, p. 140. on 8 October
October.. Reuters 8 October 1991. 199 I .
5"
,. Glenny, p. 136. 6“
"" Belgrade Tanjug 31 December 1991; Reuters 1I January 1992.
57 following account draws heavily on Silber
57 The following Silber and Little
Little’s' s chap-
chap 65Belgrade Tanjug
65 Tanjug 2 January
January 1992. European Community Community Moni Moni-
ter on the peace
peace negotiations “Yugoslavia a la Cane."
negotiations,. "Yugoslavia Carte," and Borisav
Borisav toring Mission
Mission personnel had negotiated
negotiated most of the previous
Jovic’s
Jovic ·s notes
notes on thethe meetings
meetings of of the
the Federal. Serbian,. and Mon
Federal, Serbian Mon- cease-fires, which
cease-fires, which had not been been linked
linked to a peace
peace plan. Most
Most of
tenegrin leadership.
leadership . these truces
these truces broke down almost immediately.
5"
'"Silber Little, , pp. 190-193.
Silber and Little 6" A Belgrade Tanjug report
""A repon from January 1992 has a full
from 2 January full readout
readout
5"
59 Jovic noted thatthat on 18 October the the Serbian leadership had ana- ana of the plan.
“7
Carrington’s's plan and found it unacceptable
lyzed Carrington unacceptable and "must “must be • 1 The RSK had been been formed on 19 December with with Babic Presi
Babic as Presi-
because it broke up Yugoslavia
rejected" because
rejected” Yugoslavia and split Serbs into sev- sev dent through the merger
dent merger of the the three
three Serbian autonomous regions
states. Jovic entry for 23 October 1991.
eral states. I99 I. Slavonia-Baranja-Westem Srem,
in Eastern Slavonia-Baranja-Western Slavonia, and
Srem. Western Slavonia.
6°Serbian opposition to the
"'' the Carrington Plan was nearly upset upset when Krajina.
Krajina.
Montenegro seemed seemed ready to acceptaccept it. Montenegrin
Montenegrin President 6“See Jovic entry for
"' for 2 and 7 February 1992 and Silber Silber and Little.
Little .
Momir Bulatovic
Momir stated openly at the conference that
Bulatovic stated that he supponed
supported pp. 202-204.
the plan. After pressure from the Serbian leader
After extremely strong pressure leader- 6" See Jovic
""See Jovic discussion with Cedric Thomberry, . UNPROFOR
Cedric Thornberry UNPROFOR civil civil
ship to reverse
reverse their position,
position. the Montenegrins joined the the Serbians affairs chief, March 1992. Jovic
chief. in late March Jovic entry for 24 MarchMarch 1992.
in submitting an amendment
amendment to the conference
conference on 30 OctoberOctober,, stat-stat 7°
70 Reuters 8 MarchMarch 1992.
that the
ing that the Federal Republic
Republic would
would continue to exist for those those who 7' Territorial Defense was redesignated
71 The RSK Territorial redesignated the Krajina
Krajina Serb
wished to remain in a single state. state, thus undermining the the Carrington
Carrington Army (SVK) on 19 March
Army March 1992. Reuters 19 March March 1992. UponUpon thethe
Plan. The Montenegrins
Montenegrins appearappear to have initially
initially gone against
against the the withdrawal of the
withdrawal the JNA
JNA from Bosnia
Bosnia and the formation of the
Serbian position becausebecause of anger that,, from their perspective,
anger that perspective , the Bosnian Serb Army.
Bosnian Army, thethe remaining JNA JNA units in UNPAsUNPAs NonhNorth and
Serbian Government was not fully fully prosecuting the the war and that that became part
South also became pan of the SVK.
the SVK.
Montenegro
Montenegro was carrying more of of the
the war burden proportionally
proportionally
than Serbi
than Serbiaa was. The Montenegrins apparently believed that
Montenegrins apparently that the
the
SFRY should either
SFRY either declare
declare full
full mobilization
mobilization and destroy the the
Croatian Government or accept peace deal. See Jovic
accept the peace Jovic entry for for
23. 28, and 30 October 1991 and Silber and Little,
23, 28. Little . pp. 194-196.
Silber and Little
Little also believe that Italian offers of aid money influ
that Italian influ-
enced the
enced the Montenegrin decis decision
ion to support the plan. plan .
113
113

Eastern Slavonia, near Vinkovci,
Eastern Slavonia, Vinkovci, November
November 1991. People’s Army (J
Yugoslav People's
1991. Yugoslav NA) officers,
(JNA) officers,
volunteers possibly
reservists, and volunteers possibly from
from the 3rd Guards Mechanized
the 3rd Mechanized Brigade
Brigade or the 130th
130th
Motorized Brigade.
Motorized Brigade.
JNA
JNA regular officer with
regular officer reservists.
with rese rvists. JNA reservists.
JNA reservists.
Group of JNA
Group of JNA office rs.
officers.
Two JNA volunteer

Two JNA soldiers
volunteer so ldiers from Serbian. Radical
from the Serbian Radi cal Party
Party
(SRS M-83 BOV-1
(SRS).). An M-83 armored vehicle
BOV-1 armored equipp ed with
vehicle equipped AT-3
with AT-3
antitank
anti missiles is in the background.
tank missiles background.
DI
DI Design
Design Center/MPG
Center/MPG 382637ID
382637 10 04-02
04-02
114
114
Digitize by o gle Origi11al from

Wartime damage to Vukovar, as seen in. 1992.
Dubrovnik
Dubro vnik and Dalmatian. coast,
and the Dalmatian coas t, as seen
seen. in
in 1993.
Raznja tovic “A
Zeljko Raznjatovic
Zeljko rkan," command
"Arkan," commanderer of the Serbian
Serb ian
Volunteer Guard,
Volunteer “Tigers,” late
Guard, "Tigers," 1991.
late 1991.
DI
DI Design
Desig n Center/MPG
Center / MPG 382637ID
382637 1D04-02
04-02
115
115
Digitized by o gl Origi11alfrom
UNIVERSITYOf MINNESOTA
Digitized by Gol gle OrigiMI from
III
Section III
Section
Yugoslavia’s Time Bomb

Bosnia 1991-1992: Yugoslavia's
117
117
Digitized by O gle Original from

Digitized by Gol gle OrigiMI from
Chapter 14
Chapter 14 the Austro-Hungarians—with
then under the Austro-Hungarians-with a unique
unique
Yugoslavia’s Time Bomb
Bosnia: Yugoslavia's identity, but not a fully independent
cultural identity,
cultural independent history.
history.
Croat-dominated Herzegovina, by
Croat-dominated Herzegovina, by contrast, has had a
Why should II be a minority
Why should minority in
in your state when
when distinct history
distinct history from most of Bosnia and thus retains
from most retains aa
you can
can be a minority in mine?
minority in mine? different population
different population and attitude.
Macedonian President
Macedonian Kiro Gligorov
President Kiro Gligorov' 1 After the Congress of Berlin in
the Congress in 1878,
1878, administrative
administrative
control over Bosnia was
control over was transferred
transferred to the Austro
the Austro-
Hungarians, although
Hungarians, although thethe province
province technically
technically
Historical and Political
The Historical Political Landscape remained part of the
remained the Ottoman Empire. This awkward
Ottoman Empire. awkward
decision was to prove
decision was problematic for everyone
prove problematic everyone
As fighting
fighting flared
flared first Slovenia, then raged across
first in Slovenia, involved. The
involved. The transfer was pushed
transfer was through over
pushed through over thethe
neighboring Croatia, Yugoslavia's
neighboring Croatia, central republic
Yugoslavia’s central republic of objections of the
objections Ottomans, who
the Ottomans, who had justjust been
Bosnia looked
looked on nervously
nervously and waited
waited for the
the worst.
worst. defeated by the Russians
by the Russians and were were forced
forced to accept a
de facto
facto ceding
ceding of their territory.
territory. TheThe Austro-Hungari
Austro-Hungari-
The civil war that tore Bosnia apart in the
war that spring of
the spring ans
ans not only
only gained
gained control
control overover a strategic territory
territory
1992 cannot be explained
1992 explained without
without an understanding of
an understanding but also over roughly a million new
over roughly new Slavic subjects
Slavic subjects
the
the historical
historical events in the the region
region up to that date. This who were
who were by no means overjoyedoverjoyed about rule rule by thethe
is not to say that the war and the
the war atrocities it spawned
the atrocities spawned Dual
Dual Monarchy.
Monarchy. (When(When the
the Austrians
Austrians occupied
occupied the
the
were the inevitable product
the inevitable product of centuries
centuries of pent-up
pent-up country in 1878,
country 1878, thethe Bosnian population mounted
Bosnian population mounted a
hatreds or that its participants
participants were merely
merely fated to to act
act brief but violent
violent revolt
revolt that
that lasted three months
months and
out roles
roles dictated
dictated to them by by history.
history. Rather,
Rather. it isis to claimed several thousand
claimed several lives.) In particular,
thousand lives.) the eth-
particular, the eth
highlight the
highlight the fact that
that the
the events thatthat followed could
could nic Serbs
nic Serbs of the region were
the region were infuriated
infuriated by by the “loss” of
the "loss"
not have taken place place as
as they did
did (or at least not withwith Bosnian territory to the
Bosnian territory the Austro-Hungarians,
Austro-Hungarians, especially
especially
the rapidity
rapidity they did)
did) without
without the
the historical
historical back-
back after the formal transfer
the formal transfer of the the territory
territory in
in 1909.
1909. This
ground that led up to them. Before
ground Before discussing
discussing thethe fire
fire outrage was rapidly translated into
was rapidly formation of
the formation
into the
it is
is necessary to look at at the flammables and the
the flammables kin
the kin- two underground
two societies dedicated
underground societies dedicated to pan-Serb uni
to pan-Serb uni-
dling:
dling: the Bosnian setting that placed
the Bosnian variety of
placed a variety fication: the
fication: “National Defense”
the "National Defense" (Narodna
(Narodna Odbrana)
nationalities
nationalities within a single border and the
single border the catalog
catalog of and the more famous
the more “Unification or Death,”
famous "Unification Death," better
real or imagined
imagined grievances
grievances each group group had against known
known as "The“The Black Hand” Ujedinjenje iii
Hand" ((Ujedinjenje ili Smrt
Smrt or
the other. Crna Ruka, respectively). . By the
Ruka, respectively) summer of 1914,
the summer 1914,
relations between Austria-Hungary
relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia Serbia had
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the name implies,
as the consists of
implies, consists of grown
grown especially strained, and Serb
especially strained, Serb separatists within
two contiguous
two contiguous regions. “Bosnia” comprises
regions. "Bosnia" roughly
comprises roughly Bosnia had been pinionedpinioned by by a series of harsh legal legal
four-fifths of the
four-fifths the modem nation of Bosnia-Herzegov
modern nation Bosnia-Herzegov- measures.
ina, excluding
excluding roughly
roughly the southernmost 20 percent
the southernmost percent of
the
the country. “Herzegovina” is
country. "Herzegovina" is the remainder.22 Bosnia
the remainder. It was
was at this crucial moment
this crucial moment that Archduke Franz
the Archduke
that the
had a brief period
period of independent nationhood in the
independent nationhood the Ferdinand—heir to the
Ferdinand-heir Habsburg throne
the Habsburg throne and Inspector
Inspector
middle ages, stretching,
middle with some interruptions,
stretching, with interruptions, from General the Armed Forces
General of the the Austro-Hungarian
Forces of the Austro-Hungarian
the reign of Ban
the reign Kulin in 1180
Ban Kulin I 180 up through
through the con
the con- empire-made decision that
empire—~made a decision that would
would change thethe
quest of the
the country
country by the Ottoman Sultan
the Ottoman Mehmet II
Sultan Mehmet II
in 1463.
1463. Bosnia spent most of its modern modem history
history asas an
occupied province—first under
occupied province-first under the Ottoman Empire,
the Ottoman Empire,
119
119

course of history.
history. In a display
display of truly
truly phenomenal
phenomenal bad shifting alliances,
shifting interfactional rivalries,
alliances. interfactional rivalries, and military
military
judgment,
judgment, he he decided to visit the the Bosnian capital of
Bosnian capital campaigns began. On the
campaigns the one side were
were German
German and
Sarajevo
Sarajevo on 28 June June 19l4—the
1914-the anniversary
anniversary of the the Italian military
Italian military forces. supported by
forces. supported by their
their Croatian
Croatian and
Serb defeat at the the epic Battle
Battle of Kosovo Polje in Bosnian
Bosnian auxiliaries. On the
auxiliaries. On the other side
side were the
the two
two
1389-and
1389—and to publish publish the the itinerary
itinerary of his vehicle
vehicle con-con main resistance movements,
movements, the "Chetniks"
“Chetniks” (headed
voy
voy in the
the newspaper the
the day before. No fewer
fewer than by a former
former Yugoslav Colonel, Draza
Yugoslav Army Colonel, Draza
six Serb assassins lurked crowds, but only
lurked in the crowds, only one Mihailovic)
Mihailovic) and the "Partisans"
“Partisans” (headed by the
by the leader
acted, throwing
throwing a bomb that bounced off the the Arch
Arch- of the previously
previously outlawed Yugoslav Communist
outlawed Yugoslav Communist
duke's
duke’s car and wounded wounded passengers in in the vehicle
vehicle Party, Josip Broz Tito).6
Party. Tito).~ Though
Though both resistance
behind. Franz Franz Ferdinand
Ferdinand then diverted from from thethe pub-
pub groups sought a united. independent
independent Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia. they
lished convoy
convoy route in order to to visit
visit the injured offic
the injured offic- had mutually exclusive political
mutually exclusive political objectives.
objectives.
ers in thethe hospital,
hospital, and, with singularly bad luck,
with singularly luck. as as Mihailovic’s
Mihailovic's Chetniks
Chetniks were
were Royalist and favored
favored the
the
direction, it pulled
his car reversed direction. pulled in front
front of yet prewar order, while Tito’s
political order,
prewar political Tito's Partisans
Partisans were
were
another Serb nationalist assassin, Gavrilo Princip.
nationalist assassin. Princip. Soviet-leaning Communists who
Soviet-leaning Communists who wanted
wanted to assume
Princip took aim and fired fired the first shots of World,
the first World- control of an
control new political
entirely new
an entirely political structure after the
the
War I.
War I, killing both the Archduke
Archduke and his wife. wife, the
the Germans were expelled
Germans from Yugoslavia.
expelled from Yugoslavia.
Duchess
Duchess of Hohenberg. Austria-Hungary issued an
Hohenberg. Austria-Hungary an
ultimatum Serbia, and exactly
ultimatum to Serbia. exactly a month later the the two Chetnik
Chetnik and Partisan
Partisan forces
forces at first maintained
at first maintained a loose
loose
states went to war. Within days the rest of Europe
states Europe had alliance the Nazi occupiers,
alliance against the occupiers. but this
this soon
soon
lined
lined up behind the adversaries, and the
the adversaries. First World
the First broke up intointo open warfare
warfare between the two two factions.
factions.
War had begun.
War In their campaigns
campaigns against each other, both both Chetniks
Chetniks
and Partisans Chetniks more frequently)
Partisans (the Chetniks frequently) made
Although the imperial
Although Austro‘Hungarian Army
imperial Austro-Hungarian local
local alliances
alliances oror accommodations
accommodations at different
different times
times
expected a quick quick victory,
victory, the ill-equipped Serbian
ill-equipped Serbian with the
with the Germans Italians. The situation
Germans and Italians. situation was
was fur
fur-
forces put up a heroic heroic resistance-twice
resistance—twice repulsing
repulsing muddied after the Italians
ther muddied capitulated in
Italians capitulated in Septem
Septem-
Austrian
Austrian attacks in 19 1914
I 4 before conducting
conducting a legend
legend- ber 1943. leaving most of their equipment
1943, leaving equipment to to be
ary winter
winter retreat in 1915. Both Both sides suffered
suffered massive captured by Tito’s Partisans.
by Tito's Partisans. The British and
casualties. The eventually joined
The Serbs eventually with the
joined with the Americans—through the
Americans-through the British Special
Special Operations
Operations
advancing
advancing forces forces of thethe Allied armies that moved moved Executive (SOE) and the American
Executive Office of Strategic
American Office Strategic
Salonica, emerging on the
from Salonica,
north from winning side at
the winning Services (OSS)—initially backed
Services (OSS)-initially backed Mihailovic’s
Mihailovic's
the
the war's Bosnia, where the war had started, was
war’s end. Bosnia, Chetniks with
Chetniks with arms and supplies
supplies but later switched
switched
amalgamated into the “Kingdom of the Serbs. Croats,
the "Kingdom Croats, support to the
their support the Partisans
Partisans in mid-1943. Brigadier
in mid-1943. Brigadier
Slovenes,” which
and Slovenes," which was carved out of part of the Maclean, the British SOE
Fitzroy Maclean, SOE representative at at
Austro-Hungarian empire and most of prewar
Austro-Hungarian prewar Serbia
Serbia Tito’s headquarters, explained
Tito's explained Churchill’s
Churchill's decision
decision to
and Montenegro.
Montenegro. (Later (Later the name was simplified
simplified and support Tito’s Partisans despite Tito’s
Tito's Partisans leftist political
Tito's leftist political
shortened to Yugoslavia, “Land of the South Slavs.")
Yugoslavia, '"Land Slavs.”) orientation and the
orientation the likelihood of hishis leading
leading a
But the
But ill-fated country's
the ill-fated independence was
country’s independence was to prove Communist postwar
Communist postwar Yugoslavia:
Yugoslavia:
Hitler’s Wehrmacht
lived. Hitler's
short lived. Wehrmacht invaded April
invaded on 66 April
Italian, Hungarian,
1941, assisted by Italian. Hungarian. and Bulgarian
Bulgarian “Do
"Do you intend,” [Churchill] asked,
intend," he [Churchill] asked, “to
"to
forces approaching
approaching from from all directions.
directions. Resistance
Resistance make Yugoslavia your home
make Yugoslavia after the war?"
home after war?"
crumpled
crumpled as the Yugoslav dissolved, and the
Yugoslav Army dissolved, the
German Army captured the
German country in l11
the entire country 1 days “No, sir," II replied.
"No, sir” replied.
with the
with astonishingly low
the astonishingly list of 151
10w casualty list 151 fatali
fatali-
4
ties.334 55
ties. “Neither
"Neither do I,” he said.
do/," said. “And,
"And, that
thm being so, the
being so.
less
less you and
you and I about the form of
I worry about of govern
govern-
During the Second
During Second World War. Bosnia was to become
War, Bosnia better. That
up, the better
ment they set up, is for
That is them to
for them
the ugliest bloodiest battleground
ugliest and bloodiest battleground of a very
very ugly,
ugly. decide.
decide. What
What interests
illferests me
me is, which of
is, which of them
multisided war within
bloody, and multisided
bloody. within Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. As [Partisans 0r Chetniks] is
or Chetniks] doing most harm
is doing harm to
to
resistance to the German-Italian occupation
the German-Italian occupation degener-
degener Germans"!""77
the Germans?
the
ated into a Yugoslav Civil War.
Yugoslav Civil War, a bewildering
bewildering series of
120
120

Bosnia reflected
The casualties in Bosnia reflected thethe violence
violence of an Although the
the Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb population
population was was inin general
general
internecine
intemecine and most uncivil war. war. An estimated 1.7 1.7 agreement regarding national aims
regarding national aims and objectives,
objectives.
million Yugoslavs
Yugoslavs were killed during during the conflict—
the conflict- they were
were not aa completely
completely uniform population either
uniform population either
about I1 million of thesethese by other Yugoslavs.
Yugoslavs. These
These culturally
culturally or philosophically.
philosophically. Bosnia’s
Bosnia ·s Serb
Serb population
population
deaths represented no less than 11 11 percent of the the pre-
pre did share a common
common Orthodox
Orthodox religion and a historical
historical
war population.
population, giving
giving Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia the the second-highest
second-highest legacy persecution under
legacy of persecution under first the Ottomans
first the Ottomans and
mortality
mortality rate
rate (after Poland)
Poland) of any country
country inin World the Nazi-allied Croatian
then the Ustashe. which in
Croatian Ustashe, in large
large
War 11.
War Although the
8 Although
11.8 Bosnian Muslims suffered.
the Bosnian suffered, by a measure gave thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs aa collective
collective “martyr
"martyr
slight
slight margin
margin, , the
the highest percentage casualties of any complex."
complex.” There was aa cultural
There was divide. however,
cultural divide, however.
Yugoslav
Yugoslav ethnic group in Bosnia (8.1 percent killed),
Bosnia (8.1 killed). between the
the mostly
mostly rural
rural Serbs and theirtheir rarer urban
urban
the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs also suffered
suffered egregiously
egregiously at the the cousins-the
cousins—the latter exemplified
exemplified by the the cosmopolitan
cosmopolitan
hands of the German and Croat
the German Croat occupying
occupying forces
forces Serbs of Sarajevo. The Serbs of west
Sarajevo. The west Bosnia and those
(some 7.3 percent). Many Serb civilians were massa- massa east Bosnia also frequently
of east frequently varied
varied in their political
in their
cred in reprisals
reprisals for operations
operations by the Serbian Chet-
the Serbian Chet views and objectives.
views objectives.” 111
niks and Serb-led
niks Serb—led Partisans (indeed, reprisals
Partisans (indeed, reprisals were
were an an
aim
aim of many of Tito Tito’s·s Partisan
Partisan operations,
operations, in order to The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat population
population was was no
no longer
longer homoge
homoge-
inflame the
inflame the population
population and produce
produce more supporters neous. Most notably,
notably, there was was a difference
difference in in charac
charac-
for the
the revolution).
revolution). These
These wartime
wartime pogroms
pogroms left the the ter
ter and political attitudes between
between the
the Croats
Croats of
Serbs a minority
minority population
population in postwar
postwar Bosnia.
Bosnia. (A western Herzegovina
Herzegovina and those scattered across the the
contributing factor was that
contributing factor that the
the Muslims had the the high-
high rest
rest of Bosnia The Herzgovinian
Bosnia. . The Herzgovinian Croats
Croats were
were histori
histori-
est birthrate of thethe ethnic groups in Bosnia.)
Bosnia.) cally more rural usually more
rural and usually more extreme in in their
their
views. As one Serb
it,
political views. Serb saying
saying put it, “nothing
"nothing
When at last the
When the world war and the ended,
war ended.
the civil war grows Herzegovina except rocks,
grows in western Herzegovina rocks, snakes,
in
Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the

Bosnia-Herzegovina six constituent
the six constituent and UUstashe.”" contrast, , the
stashe ." 11 By contrast Croats of northern
the Croats northern
republics Tito’s new Socialist
republics of Tito's Federal Republic
Socialist Federal Republic of Bosnia—more numerous,
and central Bosnia-more numerous. though
though occupy
occupy-
Yugoslavia (SFRY), with
Yugoslavia (SFRY), with essentially
essentially the borders
the same borders ing less land area than the
ing Herzegovinian Croats—
the Herzegovinian Croats-
it had as a province
province of the Ottoman Empire
the Ottoman Empire. . more politically moderate and multiethni
tended to be more multiethni-
The more
inclined. . The
cally inclined more outspoken Herzegovinian
outspoken Herzegovinian
Bosnia’s checkered history
Bosnia's history produced similarly
produced a similarly Croats, however,
Croats. however. played
played a disproportionately
disproportionately large
large
a
checkered ethnic distribution

checkered distribution across the the republic
republic. . At role in Bosnian
role Bosnian and even Croatian politics. and they
Croatian politics,
the
the outset of the Bosnia was an
the war, Bosnia an ethnic collage
collage usually held
usually the tiller as
held the the Bosnian
as the Bosnian Croat
Croat community
community
within Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia’s larger collage. mixed,
collage. Scattered, mixed, direction it would move
decided which direction move in.in.
it
and intermingled borders were three ethnic

intermingled within its borders
groups-Serbs,
groups—Serbs, Croats, Muslims.. Republic-wide
Croats, and Muslims Republic-wide,, In
In contrast to the other two
to the two ethnic
ethnic groups, the Bosnian
groups. the Bosnian
Muslims were a plurality
plurality but not a majority with
majority, , with Muslims were a “nationality” with no
"nationality" with nation. This was
no nation. was
a
approximately
approximately 43 percent of the the population. Bosnian
population. Bosnian their central, underlying dilemma. The
underlying dilemma. The ethnic Croats
ethnic Croats
Serbs were the second-most-numerous
the second-most-numerous ethnic group,
group, had their “homeland” republic
their "homeland" republic of Croatia. The ethnic
Croatia. The ethnic
with about 32 percent, while the Croats made
the ethnic Croats the literal
Serbs had the republic of Serbia
literal republic Serbia and the con
the con-
up the remainder, with
the remainder, with some 17 17 percent of the
the popula-
popula ceptual homeland “Greater Serbia."
homeland of "Greater Though more
Serbia.” Though more
tion.9 The
tion.9 The Serbs, whowho tended to be rural, occupied
be rural, occupied a numerous, the
numerous, the Muslims of Bosnia lacked lacked a similar
a
somewhat disproportionate
somewhat disproportionate percentage of the the land
land geographic
geographic or cultural gravity. Indeed,
cultural center of gravity. Indeed, the
the
by
Bosnia. . One of the

area of Bosnia groups usually
the three ethnic groups usually Muslims were
were defined more by what
defined more were not—
what they were not-
predominated in any given
predominated given area, but in most places neither Croat Serb, not Catholic or
Croat nor Serb, or Orthodox—
Orthodox-
commingling at some
there was at least some ethnic commingling than by what were. Visually indistinguishable
what they were. indistinguishable
level of dispersion.
level dispersion. Before
Before the
the war there were places from the
from the Serbs and Croats. the Muslims
Croats. the lacked even
Muslims lacked
Bosnia where one could,
in Bosnia could, for instance, findfind a Serb-
Serb
street within a Croat-majority
majority street
majority Croat-majority towntown in a
Muslim-majority opstina
Muslim-majority opstina (county
(county or municipality).
municipality).
121
121

an distinguish themselves. By
an ethnic term to distinguish default,
By default, Akcije—SDA)
Akcije-SDA) came first, 1990. Alija
on 26 May 1990.
first, on
“Muslim” became their cultural
"Muslim" cultural descriptor
descriptor rather than Izetbegovic (a
Izetbegovic (a soft-spoken intellectual who
soft-spoken intellectual who had been
religious one. By the 20th century
a religious century the
the great majority
majority jailed
jailed after a highly publicized trial in
publicized trial 1983 for alleg
in 1983 alleg-
of Bosnian “Muslims” had become secular:
Bosnian "Muslims" most
secular: most edly conspiring
edly to overthrow
conspiring to the Socialist
overthrow the Socialist government
government
drank alcohol
alcohol and had a limited
limited knowledge
knowledge of the the and establish
establish a Muslim state
state in
in Bosnia) became the the
Koran and its principles.
principles. The dilemma
dilemma of Muslim SDA’s
SDA's first leader. The Bosnian
first party leader. Bosnian Serbs
Serbs formed
formed
identity—was it a religious.
identity-was ethnic, or cultural
religious, ethnic. cultural their own
their Serbian Democratic
own Serbian (Srpska
Party (Srpska
Democratic Party
descriptor?-was
descriptor?——was reflected
reflected in the debate over whether whether Demokratska Stranka—SDS)—technically
Demokratska Stranka-SDS)-technically actu-
and actu
the Muslims were an “nation” within the Yugo-
an ethnic "nation" Yugo ally
ally an offshoot of the Krajina Serb
an offshoot Serb SDS party in
SOS party in
slav system. As a result, the “Muslim, in
the term "Muslim, in the Knin—two
Knin-two months
months later on 12 July
on 12 1990. The Croat
July 1990. Croat-
nation,” did not appear on the
sense of a nation." the Yugoslav
Yugoslav ian Democratic
Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajed
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajed-
census form
form until l971—and only after years of
until 1971-and nica—HDZ),
nica-HDZ). a self-professed branch of Franjo
self-professed branch
debate. 12 The 1974 Constitution
debate.'3The finally granted the
Constitution finally the Tudjman's ethnically
Tudjman‘s ethnically based party
party of the
the same name
name in
in
Muslims (the third-largest
third-largest ethnic group group in Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia, Croatia. followed suit shortly
Croatia, shortly thereafter on 18 August
on 18
after the
the Serbs and Croats)
Croats) the the status of a separate 1990.
nationality.
nationality, equivalent
equivalent to to the
the Serbs and Croats.
Croats.
The first
The first free multiparty
multiparty elections
elections in
in Bosnia were held
Bosnia were held
Bosnia the three ethnic groups had coexisted
In Bosnia coexisted for in
in November
November 1990. confirming the
1990, confirming the political
political dimension
dimension
decades, and city
decades. city dwellers
dwellers frequently
frequently intermarried.
intermarried. of the
the ethnic lines dividing the
fault lines
ethnic fault the republic.
republic. Nearly
Nearly
Yet SFRY’s high-minded
Yet even here the SFRY's high-minded and politically 90 percent of the the parliamentary
parliamentary seats went to
seats went to represen
represen-
policies of multiracial
desirable policies
desirable multiracial national
national unity
unity had tatives of the
the three ethnic
ethnic nationalist
nationalist parties,
parties, with
with the
the
failed
failed to eliminate ethnic differences
eliminate ethnic differences or competing
competing distribution of seats
distribution closely mirroring
seats closely mirroring thethe republic’s
republic's
interests among the the three Bosnian
Bosnian groups.
groups. These dif
These dif- ethnic
ethnic percentages. The Muslim-based SDA
The Muslim-based SDA won
won 86 of
however, were hardly
ferences alone, however, hardly deep or sharp the 240 seats
seats in the National
in the National Assembly,
Assembly. the Serb SDS
the Serb SOS
enough to spontaneously
spontaneously ignite war lasting
ignite a civil war sev
lasting sev- party won
party won 71 seats. and the
71 seats, the Bosnian Croat HDZ
Bosnian Croat HDZ wonwon
eral years and costing 200,000 lives.
costing perhaps 200,000 lives. As was seats. In
44 seats. In a smaller version of the
smaller version the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
the
the case in Yugoslavia whole, it took
Yugoslavia as a whole. took a combina-
combina presidency, the
presidency, the newly Bosnian parliament
newly elected Bosnian parliament
tion of ambitious political leaders, extremist
ambitious political extremist ethnic established a coalition
established government with
coalition government with power
power-
chauvinists, carefully constructed
chauvinists, and carefully constructed media camcam sharing arrangements among
sharing among a mixmix of representatives
representatives
paigns aimed at generating popularpopular hysteria
hysteria to finally
to finally from ethnic group."
from each ethnic group. 1-1 Alija lzetbegovic. one of the
Alija Izetbegovic,
set neighbor
neighbor against neighbor. Here again it was the
neighbor. Here the SDA
SDA candidates, President of the
candidates. became President Republic. 15 ‘6
the Republic.'5 16
post-Communist
post-Communist nationalism that rup
rise of ethnic nationalism rup- The Bosnian
The Serb, Momcilo
Bosnian Serb, Momcilo Krajisnik, was was appointed
appointed
tured the relations within Bosnia
the delicate relations Bosnia and set set the Assembly
Assembly Speaker.
Speaker. A A Bosnian Croat, Jure Pelivan,
Bosnian Croat, Pelivan, was
was
stage for war.
stage war. named Prime
Prime Minister.
Minister.
Chapter 15
Chapter 15 At the time, the three parties agreed to
time. the to accept a con
con-
Political Developments
Political Road to War,
Along the Road
Developments Along War, sensus system whereby
whereby all
all must
must agree to aa legislative
legislative
1990-1992
1990-1992 change before
before it could any one of the three eth
could pass; any eth-
nic groups could
nic groups block a proposed
could block item of legislation,
proposed item legislation.
divided against
A house dil·ided against itself cannot stand.
itself cannot with
with the views of each "nation"
the views “nation” counting
counting equally
equally
regardless of its relative population. If
relative population. If or
or when
when this
this
—Abraham Lincoln, I1858
-Abraham 858 '3
1.,
system failed,
failed. not only
only the
the republic’s government but
republic's government
republic itself would break
the republic break down.
down. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately.
If a Bosnia
If Bosnia populated increasingly nationalis
populated by three increasingly nationalis- 1990 and 1991
1991 were
were not years inin which broadminded,
broadminded,
tic ethnic groups was a powder the forma
powder keg, it was the forma- consensus-oriented ethnic leaders thrived,
consensus-oriented ethnic thrived, and the
the
ethnically based political parties that provided
tion of ethnically provided coalition would
coalition would last barely
barely a year.17
year. 17
slow fuse. The
a slow The organization Muslim-based
organization of the Muslim-based
Party Democratic Action (Stranka
Party for Democratic (Stranka Demokratske
Demokratske
122
122

The three main
The main political parties were at this
parties were this point
point Federal
Federal Yugoslavia. The Bosnian
Yugoslavia. The SAO’s presented
Bosnian SAO's
explicitly looking out for the the interests of their own
own their proclamations
their proclamations to
to the
the republic
republic assembly
assembly as estab
as estab-
ethnic
ethnic groups
groups rather than the the interests of Bosnia
Bosnia- lished
lished facts vowed to secede if
facts and vowed if the
the republic
republic
Herzegovina whole. Moreover,
Herzegovina as a whole. Moreover, each groupgroup refused recognize their autonomy.
refused to recognize autonomy.
believed
believed its interests were threatened by—and
interests were by-and directly
directly
with—the other ethnic
at odds with-the ethnic groups.
groups. The Bosnian
The Bosnian In mid-October
mid-October 1991
1991 the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian found the
Serbs found the
Croats—especially those of western
Croats-especially Herzegovina—
western Herzegovina- occasion to pull the
occasion rug out from
the rug from under
under thethe three-party
three-party
had little
little interest in Bosnia per se and instead aspired
aspired coalition, which had held
coalition, held together
together only since the
only since the pre
pre-
to a political and economic merger with
economic merger with Croatia.
Croatia. The
The vious November.
vious November. OnOn 1414 October
October thethe Muslim
Muslim SOA SDA and
Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs likewise wanted
Serbs likewise affiliation with
wanted affiliation with neigh-
neigh the
the Croat HDZ jointly proposed
Croat HOZ proposed a parliamentary
parliamentary reso- reso
boring
boring Serbia
Serbia or at most an autonomous status within
an autonomous lution in
lution in favor
favor of sovereignty
sovereignty for the
the republic. The
republic. The
Bosnia as part of a rump Yugoslavia. Most Bosnian
rump Yugoslavia. Bosnian debate became
became supercharged
supercharged and ran late into into the
the
Serbs
Serbs genuinely
genuinely and rightfully fearedfeared any political SDS leader
night. SOS
night. leader Karadzic reacted with rhetoric that
with rhetoric
change that would leave outvoted by
leave them outvoted by a Muslim
Muslim- may have seemed exaggerated at the the time
time but in in the
the
Croat coalition and subjected
Croat coalition subjected toto a tyranny
tyranny of the
the end proved
proved no more
more than prophetic. Addressing the
prophetic. Addressing the
majority.
majority. assembly,
assembly, he he threatened the
the Muslims in the the starkest
terms yet heard:
heard:
The Bosnian Serbs Move Toward Autonomy

Move Toward Autonomy You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina
You want Bosnia-Herz.egovina down down the the
same highway
highway ofof hell and suffering
hell and suffering that Slovenia
Slovenia
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
While the Bosnia-Herzegovina moved moved travelling. . Do not think
and Croatia are travelling think that you
slowly away from Federal
away from Federal Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, the the ethnic
ethnic will
will not lead
lead Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herz.egovina into into hell,
hell, and
Serbs
Serbs within Bosnia were were moving, perhaps a little
moving, perhaps little do not think you will
think that you will not
not perhaps
perhaps make the the
faster, to leave
leave the
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muslim people
people disappear,
disappear, because
because thethe Muslims
‘9
By
By the
the latter half of 1991
1991 the
the independence-minded
independence-minded cannot defend themselves if
cannot if there is war.
war . .... 19
Bosnian Serbs
Bosnian Serbs were beginning
beginning to playplay out their hand
in the manner as
the same manner Croatian kin.
as their Croatian kin. Radovan
Radovan At
At two o’clock in
two o'clock in the
the morning
morning of 1515 October
October 1991,
1991.
Karadzic’s SOS
Karadzic's SDS leadership
leadership began by by declaring Serb
declaring Serb- Speaker Krajisnik
Assembly Speaker Krajisnik led
led his ethnic Serb
his ethnic mem
Serb mem-
majority chunks of Bosnia as "Serb
majority chunks “Serb Autonomous
Autonomous bers out of the hall.
hall. The the parliament—
remainder of the
The remainder parliament-
Regions" exactly
Regions” exactly analogous
analogous to the SAO’s over the
the SAO's the now
now virtually
virtually all SDA and HDZ
all SOA HOZmembers—was
members-was thus
border
border in Croatia.
Croatia. By late September
September 1991,1991, there werewere able to adopt the
the motion
motion on sovereignty, more as
sovereignty, more as an
an
four of these self-proclaimed regions in
self-proclaimed regions Bosnia: the
in Bosnia: the expression intention than an act of policy.
expression of intention policy. On
“Serbian Autonomous
"Serbian Autonomous RegionRegion East
East and Old Herze
Herze- October the
24 October the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs separately announced
separately announced
govina"
govina” (declared
(declared on 12 12 September);
September); the "Autono-
the “Autono formation within Bosnia of a "Serbian
the formation
the “Serbian Republic of
mous Region [Bosnian]
mous Region Krajina” (declared
[Bosnian] Krajina" (declared on Bosnia-Herzegovina”
Bosnia-Herzegovina" that would have have its own consti
own consti-
16 September);
16 September); the “Serbian Autonomous
the "Serbian Autonomous RegionRegion tution and parliamentary
tution assembly, whose
parliamentary assembly, laws would
whose laws
Romanija”
Romanija" (declared
(declared on 17 17 September);
September); and the the take precedence
precedence over
over those of the Bosnian Republic
the Bosnian Republic. .
Autonomous Region
“Serbian Autonomous
"Serbian Region Northeast Bosnia.”
Northeast Bosnia." Then, , on 9-10
Then 9-10 November,
November, thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs held
held a
(declared
(declared on 19 19 September)
September).'8. 18 referendum of their own,
referendum in which they chose
own, in chose to
remain Federal Yugoslavia?“
remain within Federal Yugoslavia. 1011
These four regions
These regions together included almost one-third
included almost one-third
of Bosnia-Herzegovina's
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s municipalities, with some 20
municipalities, with On January 1992,
On 9 January SDS leader
1992, SOS Radovan Karadzic
leader Radovan
population and about 45 percent of
percent of its total population further and publicly proclaimed
went further
went proclaimed a fully indepen
indepen-
its ethnic Serbs.
its ethnic All of the
Serbs. All “autonomous regions”
the "autonomous regions" “Republic of the
dent "Republic the Serbian in Bosnia
People in
Serbian People Bosnia-
asserted that were constituents
that they were constituents of a Federal
Federal Herzegovina," which quickly became
Herzegovina,” became known
known by
by the
the
Yugoslavia first and members
Yugoslavia first “federalized”
members of a ·•federalized"
Bosnia-Herzegovina only
Bosnia-Herzegovina second—so long
only second-so long as
as the
the
republic remained a nonsovereign
republic remained constituent of
nonsovereign constituent
123
123

Serbia. As
it,
earlier
earlier title of --serbian
“Serbian Republic Bosnia-Herzegov
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegov- Croatia
Croatia and Serbia. As he
he put it, choosing
choosing between
between
ina" (SRBH). The previously
ina” (SRBH). previously proclaimed
proclaimed Serbian
Serbian Tudjman and Milosevic
Tudjman Milosevic was was like
like choosing
choosing between
between
autonomous
autonomous regions in Bosnia were incorporated
regions in into
incorporated into leukemia
leukemia and a brain tumor. 22 In October
brain tumor.22 October 1991,
1991.
a
the new specifically excluded
new entity and specifically excluded from
from the
the Izetbegovic had publicly declared
Izetbegovic declared Bosnia’s
Bosnia's neutrality
neutrality
authority
authority of the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government and President
President regarding the conflict
regarding neighboring Croatia,
conflict in neighboring Croatia, a fence
fence-
in
a
Izetbegovic.
Izetbegovic. The Serbs
Serbs underwrote
underwrote their proclamation
proclamation sitting
sitting statement that
that accomplished nothing
accomplished nothing other
other than
with adoption of a constitution
with the adoption constitution drafted unilaterally
unilaterally antagonizing Serbs within Bosnia.23
radical Serbs
antagonizing the radical Bosnia-23After
and without
without reference to the Republic of Bosnia
the Republic Bosnia- two months of fruitless
two months temporizing, on
fruitless temporizing, on 24
24 December
December
Herzegovina
Herzegovina Constitution.
Constitution. the Bosnian Presidency followed the republic
Bosnian Presidency republic govem
govern-
ments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia
Slovenia, Croatia. Macedonia in in for
for-
one-third of their
With less than one-third their parent republic's pop-
republic’s pop mally requesting
mally requesting diplomatic
diplomatic recognition
recognition from
from the
the
ulation
ulation Bosnia's Serbs nevertheless
Bosnia’s Serbs nevertheless claimed almost
claimed almost European Community.
European Community.242-1 The Badinter Commission
The Badinter Commission
two-thirds
two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, including “historically
Bosnia’s territory. "historically duly concluded that
duly concluded that Bosnia criterion for EC
Bosnia met the criterion EC
Serb" where they were in the minority.
Serb” areas where minority. They
They recognition
recognition provided held a republic-wide
provided it held republic-wide referen
referen-
it
a
also declared
declared that
that all
all taxes and customs
customs revenues col- col dum on
dum on independence
independence to to confirm majority of its
confirm that a majority its
a
lected within their self-proclaimed
self—proclaimed republic
republic would
would be
be people favored secession
people favored secession fromfrom Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
withheld from Bosnia's
withheld from Bosnia’s central
central government. Bosnia—
government. Bosnia-
not yet independent itself—was already
independent itself-was riven by
already riven by The referendum
The process, and the explicit debate on
referendum process, on
secession.
secession. sovereignty it generated, burned
sovereignty away the last fragile
burned away fragile
it
bonds of Bosnia’s
bonds Bosnia's coalition
coalition government
government and touched
touched
off the
the process that would
process that set the republic
would set aflame. In
republic aflame. In
Referendum
Republic-Wide Sovereignty Referendum
The Republic-Wide February 1992
February the Croat-Muslim parliamentary
1992 the parliamentary coali
coali-
tion voted
tion voted for independence
independence withwith a solid
solid majority;
majority: the
a
If
If Bosnia was a figurative
figurative powder
powder keg and ethnically
ethnically Serb assembly
Serb assembly representatives
representatives simply
simply refused
refused to vote
vote
based political representation
representation was the fuse, then it was
the fuse. rather than participate
participate in
in a process
process in which
which they knew
knew
in
the
the European
European Community-sponsored
Community—sponsored referendum on
referendum on they would be be the
the losers.
losers. a
independence
independence thatthat actually
actually litlit the fuse. In October
the fuse. October
1991, at The Hague conference on Yugoslavia,
Hague peace conference Yugoslavia. The republic-wide
The republic-wide referendum
referendum on
on independence
independence
by
the EC representatives
the EC simultaneous but
representatives had made a simultaneous demanded
demanded by the EC Badinter Commission
EC's Badinter Commission followed
’s
conditional
conditional offer of recognition
recognition to to all
all of the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav on
on 29 February-
February—1I March.
March. The
The results
results were
were unambigu
unambigu-
republics. stating that any republic
republics, republic desiring
desiring recogni-
recogni ous, both in
ous, both in what
what was
was recorded
recorded and what
what was
was not.
not.
tion as an
an independent
independent country
country would have to apply apply Bosnia's Muslims and Croats—some
Among Bosnia‘s Croats-some 6464 per
per-
December 1991.
formally by December promptly mod
1991. This was promptly mod- cent of the
the population—an
population-an overwhelming
overwhelming majority
majority
ified in January
ified January 1992
1992 by the Badinter Arbitration
Badinter Arbitration (99. 7 percent)
(99.7 voted for independence.
percent) voted independence. Bosnia’s
Bosnia's
Commission associated with
Commission with the conference,
the peace conference, Serbs. remainder of the
Serbs, the remainder the population, in almost
population, acted in almost
offered recognition
which offered recognition onlyonly ifif each republic
republic had complete unison
complete unison to observe
observe the boycott initiated
the boycott initiated by
by
first ratified
first ratified its independence
independence with with a popular
popular the SDS.
SOS. Virtually
Virtually no Serbs voted,
no Serbs voted, and those who
who did
did
referendum.
referendum. resided mostly in
resided mostly in the
the cities.25
cities. 25
When the the Republics Slovenia and Croatia

Republics of Slovenia Croatia accepted
accepted When the referendum
When the referendum results
results were
were announced
announced on
on
the EC conditions,
the EC conditions, first
first holding popular referendums
holding popular referendums 3 March, the Serb
March, the Serb reaction
reaction was immediate and
was immediate and pre
pre-
3
and then issuing declarations of independence,

issuing declarations independence, they dictable. Radovan Karadzic,
dictable. Radovan Karadzic, still only the Serbian
only the Serbian
crowded Bosnia into
crowded into a trap that was sprung by the
was sprung Democratic Party leader
Democratic Party leader and at
at the time holding no
time holding no
EC’s formal
EC's recognition of Slovenia
formal recognition Slovenia and Croatia
Croatia asas public office,
public office, announced categorically, “We
announced categorically, are not
"We are not
fully independent
independent states. If Bosnia now
states. If remained part
now remained going to accept an
going an independent state of Bosnia
independent state Bosnia-
of the dissolving Yugoslavia, it would become
dissolving Yugoslavia, become even Herzegovina."
Herzegovina.”
overwhelmingly dominated
more overwhelmingly dominated by Serbs; but if
by Serbs: if it
declared its own
declared own independence, would step
independence, it would over a
step over
cliff and into
cliff into almost certain civil war.
almost certain war. Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic was was
trapped both politically and physically between
physically between
124
124

Within a day of the the referendum
referendum announcement,
announcement, the the should be invaded.
should invaded. Belgrade
Belgrade looked
looked again the
again to the
first
first barricades
barricades began to go up in Sarajevo-an
Sarajevo—~an omi omi- mountain republic
mountain republic as
as the
the first redoubt of aa
first and last redoubt
nous precursor
precursor of thethe battle lines that would
battlelines would later snake defensive war, and the JNA
guerrilla war,
defensive guerrilla not only built
JNA not built up
through
through thethe republic's
republic’s capital.
capital. On
On the
the cold night of
cold night an elaborate military
an elaborate infrastructure within Bosnia but
military infrastructure but
3 March, small
small gangs of armed Serbs Serbs began to to travel
travel also moved
also moved key portions of the Yugoslav
key portions Yugoslav arms indus
indus-
about the city.
city, threatening
threatening violence
violence if the
the referendum
referendum try to the republic.n
the republic.27
should
should actually
actually be implemented.
implemented. With preternatural
pretematural
organization
organization they began blockading
blockading streets with with The JNA forces in Bosnia initially played
JNA forces played little role in
little role in
trucks, buses, and cars and barricading
trucks, barricading all routes out
all routes the sovereignty debates that raged
the sovereignty raged between
between the FedFed-
of the city
city center. The
The Muslims responded
responded withwith armed eral Government
Government and Serbia
Serbia on the oneone hand
hand and
groups
groups of their own own that set
set up counterbarricades
counterbarricades from from Croatia
Slovenia on
on the other. The JNA’s
the other. JNA's primary
primary
within the
the city.
city. Occasional
Occasional clashes
clashes between
between the two two concern
concern inin Bosnia,
Bosnia, as in the
as in the other
other two
two republics,
republics, was
was
groups
groups left four dead by morning.
morning. to deter separatist activities from becoming
activities from becoming military
military
insurrections. In May 1990,
insurrections. simultaneously with
1990, simultaneously with the
the
For a brief moment
moment it looked
looked as ifif open
open warfare
warfare was seizure
seizure of the weapons
weapons in Slovenia and Croatia,
in Slovenia Croatia, the
about to begin. however, the pre-
begin. The following day, however, pre JJNA
NA impounded
impounded or or confiscated
confiscated the arms
arms allotted
allotted to the
the
dominantly
dominantly Muslim Sarajevo
Sarajevo police
police force
force began to Bosnian Republic’s
Bosnian Republic's Territorial Defense (TO)
Territorial Defense (TO) forces.
forces.
dismantle
dismantle the barricades, and within a few
the barricades, days order
few days order
had been restored. Why the Serbs Serbs backed from
backed off from What
What shaped and molded
molded the JNA’s view
the JNA's view of Bosnia
their anti-independence
anti-independence ultimatums
ultimatums remains
remains unclear.
unclear. was the war
was Croatia. As
war in Croatia. As clashes
clashes escalated
escalated in
in Croatia
Croatia
lzetbegovic
Izetbegovic had thethe shortest, simplest
simplest explanation. “It
explanation. "It summer of 1991,
during the summer
during 1991, the JNA
JNA became
became more
more
seems,” he
seems," he said later, "that
“that they were
were not quite ready deeply involved
deeply involved in
in “peacekeeping”
"peacekeeping" operations
operations to
to sepa
sepa-
for war."~
war.”266 rate Croats. Most Croatians
Serbs and Croats.
rate Serbs other non
Croatians and other non-
Serbs throughout
Serbs Yugoslavia, however,
throughout Yugoslavia, however, saw
saw these
War come, but after the referendum
War had not come, referendum and the actions by
actions the JNA
by the JNA as more and more
as more more directly
directly backing
backing
Sarajevo
Sarajevo barricades
barricades it became almost
almost unavoidably
unavoidably the Croatian Serb
the Croatian Serb separatists. Muslim and Croat Croat mem
mem-
clear that war would come sooner or later.later. It was in
in bers of the
the Bosnian Government, including President.
Bosnian Government, President.
this environment
environment of fear, dread, and mutual suspicion
mutual suspicion Izetbegovic, feared that the JNA’s
lzetbegovic, JNA's Bosnian conscripts
Bosnian conscripts
that neighbor
neighbor began arming neighbor. Civil
arming against neighbor. Civil would
would bebe used to fire
fire on
on fellow Yugoslavs
Yugoslavs inin pursuit
pursuit
inevitable—a question
war was all but inevitable-a whether
question not of whether of pro-Serb
pro-Serb policies.
policies. These
These objections
objections prompted
prompted many
many
war would
would start,
start, but when how.
when and how. Bosnian Muslims and Croats
Bosnian Croats to ignore
ignore their callup
callup
orders during
orders first phase of the
during the first the JNA’s
JNA's mobilization
mobilization
for its strategic offensive in
strategic offensive in the summer of 1991.
the summer 1991. As
As
JNA’s View
the JNA's
The Shaping of the View of Bosnia-
Bosnia fighting in
the fighting in Croatia grew more
Croatia grew more intense
intense and one
one
Herzegovina sided, in late August the Bosnian
sided, in Bosnian Government
Government
announced its refusal
announced refusal to send any
any new conscripts to
new conscripts
The histories
The Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
histories of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Army.28
Army. 28
Yugoslav
Yugoslav People's
People’s Army (JNA) were inextricably
inextricably
intertwined, from
intertwined, from the JNA’s formation
the JNA's formation in Bosnia dur-dur JNA’s mobilization
The JNA's mobilization to implement
implement itsits strategic
strategic
ing Second World War
ing the Second War until Army’s demise
until the Army's demise in offensive in Croatia
offensive Croatia in
in response
response toto the Croatians’
Croatians'
1991
1991 and 1992, when when Bosnia seceded and Yugoslavia attack on the JJNA
NA barracks
barracks in
in September
September 19911991 was
was the
fell apart. The JNAJNA had been forged
forged in cauldron of
in the cauldron of began the final
key event that began
key split between
final split between the
World War II Bosnia,
War II Bosnia, where
where the JNA‘s lineal
the JNA"s lineal predeces-
predeces Bosnian Government—particularly the
Bosnian Government-particularly the Muslims—
Muslims-
Tito’s Partisans,
sors, Tito's Partisans, fought
fought their most vicious battles
German, Italian,
with German,
with Italian, and Croatian forces. After the
Croatian forces.
war, Yugoslavia reshaped its national
war, national defense doctrine
doctrine
into a formula
into formula for a new new partisan war if the
war if the country
country
125
125

from JNA.’ The strategic
from the JNA.' strategic offensive forced the Bos
offensive forced Bos- against the Serbs or even the JNA.
the Serbs JNA. Meanwhile, Bos
Bos-
nians
nians to choose
choose sides: the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian Serbs sided
sided with
with nian Croats
nian Croats were crossing border to
crossing the border to serve in
in the
Belgrade
Belgrade and the JNA, believing
the JNA, believing that the
the Army waswas nascent Croatian
Croatian armed forces
forces then battling INA,
battling the JNA.
protecting fellow Serbs and would protect them too if
protecting playing
playing a prominent role in
prominent role in many
many elite Croatian
Croatian
necessary, whereas Bosnia’s
necessary, whereas Bosnia's Muslims and Croats
Croats units. 11 (See following chapters for details
units.3| details on the
the
sided
sided with
with Zagreb.
Zagreb. arming
arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats).
the Bosnian Croats).
JNA attack required

The JNA required two two things from Bosnia:
things from Bosnia: the the Muslims and Croats
With the refusing to respond
Croats refusing respond toto
use of its territory operations and the
territory as a base of operations the JNA mobilization
the JNA mobilization order Bosnia, while the Bos
order in Bosnia, Bos-
mobilization of its reservists
mobilization reservists to fill out formations
to fill formations nian Serbs were working hand-in-glove
nian Serbs hand-in-glove withwith the
required
required for key aspects of the attack. Both Both of these Army, disputes
disputes over future of Bosnia and
over the future and its
were anathema to Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic and the the Muslim
Muslim and adherence to
adherence to Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia grew hotter. The Bosnian
grew hotter.
Croat believed in
Croat leaders. They believed what they perceived
in what perceived to to Serbs
Serbs were almost devout
were almost devout in in their allegiance to aa Fed
their allegiance Fed-
be Serb-dominated efforts
be Serb-dominated efforts to forcibly keep republics
republics Yugoslavia that fully and firmly
eral Yugoslavia firmly incorporated
incorporated
in Yugoslavia was was morally objectionable, as well as
morally objectionable, as their own republic.
their own viewed the JNA’s
republic. They viewed defense of
JNA's defense
detrimental
detrimental to to Bosnia’s
Bosnia's own own interest in in loosening
loosening its the Serb population within Croatia
Serb population as a moral
Croatia as moral obliga
obliga-
ties to the federal
federal state.
state. Muslim and Croat Croat leaders tion that also
tion also served their
their own
own interests
interests inin preserving
preserving
therefore
therefore encouraged
encouraged reservists
reservists to refuse to respond
respond to their position
their position within a Federal Yugoslavia.12The Bos
Federal Yugoslavia.32 Bos-
mobilization, and most of these reservists
the mobilization, reservists followed nian Serbs
nian Serbs regarded
regarded Muslim and Croat refusals to sup
Croat refusals sup-
their guidance.
guidance. The leadership formally protested
The leadership protested to to port the
port the offensive against Croatian
offensive against Croatian secession
secession as as
Belgrade
Belgrade the deployment Herzegovina of thousands
deployment to Herzegovina thousands another indicator of their own
another clear indicator own intentions
intentions toto
of Montenegrin reservists, who
Montenegrin reservists, who they thought
thought were
were secede, and the Serb
Serb leaders
leaders stepped up their their prepara
prepara-
being intimidate Muslims and Croats
being used to intimidate Croats and sup-sup tions
tions to leave Bosnia if
to leave if that occurred.
occurred.
Bosnian Serb
port Bosnian Serb separatism.
separatism.29 29 The Montenegrins
Montenegrins
had actually moved to Bosnia to position
actually been moved them
position them- Bosnian
Bosnian opposition
opposition to the JNA’s war
the JNA's in Croatia,
war in Croatia, and
selves for an offensive
offensive into into southern Croatia, but their
southern Croatia, refusal of Muslims and Croats
particularly the refusal
particularly Croats to take
obstreperous behavior frightened
obstreperous behavior frightened many Bosnian Mus
many Bosnian Mus- their
their assigned
assigned places
places in JNA units,
JNA units, caused real
real prob
prob-
lims and Croats.
lims The Bosnian
Croats. The Government had little
Bosnian Government little lems for the
the Army and affected
affected the thinking of most
the thinking most
legal justification and less power
legal justification power to JNA from
to stop the JNA from Serb and Montenegrin
Serb Montenegrin officers
officers in
in negative ways. First,
negative ways. First,
using Bosnian territory
using Bosnian territory for its military
military operations
operations the limited response to mobilization
the limited among Bosnian
mobilization among Bosnian
Croatia, but the
against Croatia, JNA buildup
the JNA Bosnia during
buildup in Bosnia during Muslims and Croats
Croats badly
badly undercut
undercut the strategic
strategic
the fall of 1991,
1991, as units redeployed
redeployed from from Croatia
Croatia or offensive. Two full JNA
offensive. in Tuzla and Sarajevo
corps in
JNA corps Sarajevo
new
new units
units arrived
arrived from Serbia, inspired
from Serbia, inspired new new fears that were unable to take part in
were unable in the offensive
offensive because there
Belgrade
Belgrade would use the JNA to
the JNA to forcibly keep Bosnia
Bosnia were not enough
were reservists to fill
enough reservists fill out their
their formations.
formations.
in the Yugoslav Federation.
in Federation. Concern over
Concern over antiwar sentiment in
antiwar sentiment in the area near
Mostar—especially
Mostar-especially among Croats-prompted the
among Croats—~prompted
Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats
Bosnia's Croats also began to to covertly
covertly retention almost an
retention of almost an entire
entire Serbian JNA corps
Serbian JNA corps in
in the
the
devise ways
ways to to form
form and arm military units that could
military units could Mostar region to guard JNA
region to facilities. When some
JNA facilities. some
defend the
defend the republic federal
republic against Serb separatists or federal formations of the corps
formations in Banja Luka were
corps in were forced
forced to
to
actions to thwart
actions thwart their desires for sovereignty.
sovereignty.30 The
10 The deploy at half strength,1
deploy strength,33 1 the corps commander
the corps commander there
JNA attack on Croatia
JNA Croatia spurred
spurred both groups, usually
groups, usually ordered the mobilization
illegally ordered mobilization of the Banja Luka
acting separately rather than in
acting in harmony,
harmony, to to develop
develop Defense District over
Territorial Defense over Izetbegovic’s
Izetbegovic's express
express
formations that could
formations combine with
could combine existing Min
with the existing Min- disapproval.1
disapproval.344 More ominously,
ominously, the JNA, as it had
the JNA,
istry Internal Affairs (MUP) and Republican
istry of Internal Terri
Republican Terri- elsewhere, was
elsewhere, was recruiting almost exclusively
recruiting almost exclusively Serb
Serb vol
vol-
torial Defense
torial Defense forces
forces to kind of defense
to put up some kind unteer units—often
units-often organized
organized by local SDS
by local SOS party
party
’
For a detailed
• For of the
detailed discussion of Croatia, including
the war in Croatia. including the JNA
the JNA
strategic offensive planning.
strategic mobilization problems. and the use of
planning, mobilization of
volunteer units, see
see the section, ··Croatia
the previous section. “Croatia 1990-1991.”
1990-1991 :·
126
126
Digitized by Gol gle Origir.al from

leaders-to
leaders—to expand manpower. By these actions
expand its manpower. actions it Bosnian conflict as
Bosnian conflict as it began bubble. Not only
began to bubble. only did
armed some of the
the most
most radical
radical elements in the
the the
the Army supply
supply arms to nascent separatist Bosnian Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Bosnian Serb population
population. . Serb police and military
Serb police military structures but it also directly
directly
assumed the rolerole of Serb protector throughout
Serb protector throughout Bosnia.
Bosnia.
Psychologically, the
Psychologically, the Army viewed Croat
viewed Muslim and Croat subtly, on orders from
More subtly, Serbian President
from Serbian President
refusals
refusals to cooperate
cooperate (as creation of
(as well as their creation Milosevic the
Milosevic JNA proceeded
the JNA proceeded to alter the the ethnic
ethnic bal-
bal
“paramilitary” forces
"paramilitary" service by some against
forces and service against the
the ance of its forces in
its forces in Bosnia so that could be con-
that they could con
JNA in Croatia)
JNA Croatia) asas yet another act of betrayal,
betrayal, pushing
pushing verted rapidly into a Bosnian
rapidly into Bosnian Serb army in
Serb army in the
the event
the Serb
Serb and Montenegrin
Montenegrin members
members of the the officer
officer of international
international recognition
recognition of an independent
independent Bos-
Bos
corps closer to the
corps even closer nationalists. At
Serb nationalists.
the Serb At the
the same nian republic—which the
nian republic-which the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs regarded as
Serbs regarded as a
time, the JNA’s multiethnic
the JNA's multiethnic character was diminishing
was diminishing casus result, when
casus belli. As a result, when recognition
recognition actually
actually
non-Serbs deserted or refused
as non-Serbs refused to to mobilize,
mobilize, making
making came in in April
April 1992, the Bosnian
1992, the Serbs and their JNA
Bosnian Serbs JNA
the Army more
the more and more Serbian force.
more a Serbian The adjust-
force . The adjust allies
allies were prepared
prepared to to strike
strike at anyone who stood in
anyone who
ments this forced the JNA
forced on the commanders made them
JNA commanders way of Bosnian
the way
the Serb secession
Bosnian Serb secession from
from the
the prewar
prewar
more susceptible
susceptible to the demands of Milosevic
to the Milosevic and hishis Bosnian Republic. It was
Bosnian position Milosevic
was a position Milosevic had
allies
allies that
that the
the Army givegive up allall efforts preserve its
efforts to preserve toward for at least two
been working toward two years.
vision of a Yugoslav
Yugoslav state. 35
state.35
The failure of the

The failure the JNA’s offensive in Croatia
JNA's strategic offensive Croatia Serbia Assists the
the Bosnian Serbs, 1990-1992
1990-1992
the Army’s
and the Army's final final acceptance of Serbian
Serbian President
President
Milosevic’s
Milosevic's warwar aims
aims inin November
November were the the final
final As
As the Serbian Government
the Serbian Government under
under President
President
steps in the JNA’s diminution
the JNA's diminution to force that would
to a force Milosevic
Milosevic undertook program to assist the
undertook its program Croatian
the Croatian
fight almost exclusively
fight almost exclusively for Serbs multi
Serbs rather than a multi- Serb
Serb leadership
leadership politically and militarily during the
during the
ethnic Yugoslavia. By November-December
ethnic Yugoslavia. November-December 1991,
1991, the
the 1980s and into
late 19805 into 1990,
1990, it conducted
conducted a parallel pro-
parallel pro
Army believed
believed that Croatia and the
that Croatia Bosnian Muslims
the Bosnian gram to to cultivate
cultivate and support Bosnian Serb
support Bosnian Serb political
and Croats were not only
Croats were only opposed
opposed to the J
to the NA but that
JNA that leaders provide them with
leaders and provide with weapons The same
weapons.’.· The
moves toward
moves toward independence
independence in Croatia and Bosnia
in Croatia key political and intelligence
key personalities and institu
intelligence personalities institu-
threatened the Croatian and Bosnian
the Croatian Bosnian Serbs'
Serbs’ political tions
tions that ran thethe Croatian
Croatian Serb
Serb operation,
operation, led by thethe
future and represented a physical
future physical threat to to the
the Serb
Serb Serbian
Serbian State Security
Security Service
Service of the Serbian MUP,
the Serbian MUP,
population's existence.
population’s existence.36 36 Under Milosevic’s's influence,
Under Milosevic influence, served as as the
the overseers conduits for the
overseers and conduits the aid to the
the
the
the Serbianized
Serbianized JNA JNA now viewed itself as the
now viewed the only
only Serbs. It
Bosnian Serbs.
Bosnian It is worth
worth repeating
repeating part of Radmilo
guarantor
guarantor of thethe safety of Serbs
Serbs everywhere.37
everywhere.37 The The statement—mentioned earlier
Bogdanovic's statement-mentioned
Bogdanovic’s earlier in con-
con
results for Bosnia were were toto be dire indeed.
be dire indeed. junction with Croatia—in
junction with Croatia-in which the the former Serbian
former Serbian
Internal Affairs Minister indicates
Internal indicates that SDB pro
the SOB
that the pro-
Chapter 16
Chapter 16 vided
vided assistance to to both the Croatian and the
the Croatian the Bosnian
Bosnian
Serbia, the JNA, and the
the JNA, the Bosnian Serbs: Serbs:
Serbs:
January 1990—April
January 1990-April 1992
We extended help
We help to enable them to
to enable to ...
. . . begin
begin
Simultaneously
Simultaneously with with its program
program to organize
organize and arm nothing. It was
from nothing. was the way when
the same way when people
people
the Croatian Serbs,, the
Croatian Serbs the Serbian Security Service
Serbian State Security Service from the
the present
present day Serbian
Serbian Republic,
Republic, the the then
(Sluzba
(Sluzba Drzavne
Drzavne Bezbednosti-SDB)
Bezbednosti—SDB) also undertook
undertook a Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned We did our
to us . .... We
less ambitious project
less ambitious project of providing assis
providing arms and assis- '
tance to the Serbian Democratic
Democratic Party • For of Serbia’s
For a detailed account of covert operation to suppon
Serbia's coven support the
the Serbian (SDS) in
Party (SOS) in Croatian Serbs, see
see the previous Croatian
Croatian War section, and particu-
Croatian Serbs. War section. particu—
Bosnia.38
Bosnia. 38 By the beginning of 1992
the beginning 1992 the JNA super
the JNA super- larly Annex
larly Annex 1I in Volume
Volume II.
II.
seded the SDB as the
the SOB the primary
primary weapons supplier to the
weapons supplier the
Bosnian happened elsewhere,
Serbs. As had happened
Bosnian Serbs. elsewhere, the JNA
the JNA
was being sucked into
being sucked into the witches’ brew
the witches' brew of the
the
127
127

carry out.follow
utmost to carry out, follow up,up, and ensure secu
secu- from the old
old Yugoslav
Yugoslav Communist
Communist state state to aa new
new
rity for
for ((the
the help)
help) they
they so11ght
sought and forfor that which
which Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. In such aa state,
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. the Army
state, the
Serbia and the Serbian
Serbia and offered . There,
Serbian people offered. believed,
believed, its
its primary
primary mission
mission was defense of
the defense
was the
that is what the Sen •ice did.
Service did.3939 Serbs, not
Serbs, not the
the preservation multiethnicity. As
preservation of multiethnicity. As a
result,
result, from
from January
January through 1992, the JNA
April 1992,
through April JNA inin
Details
Details of the
the Serbian
Serbian assistance are are few,
few, but it it Bosnia had two
Bosnia two priorities.
priorities . The
The first
first was
was toto work with
with
appears to have consisted
consisted of a combination
combination of organiorgani- and support
support a peaceful settlement of the political dif-
peaceful settlement dif
zational
zational support
support (and probably funds) for the
probably funds) the SDS
SDS and ferences among
ferences among thethe three ethnic groups . The second,
ethnic groups. second ,
some weapons
weapons for select SDS supporter Politically,
supporters.s. Politically. and more
more important,
important, was
was to
to see
see that the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs
the
the senior
senior Serbian leadership. including Milosevic,
Serbian leadership, Milosevic. and their
their position
position in
in the
the republic
republic were
were secure.
secure.
were conferring
conferring withwith Karadzic at least as early early as mid-
mid
i1991,
991, and support
support to to or organization
organization of the the SDS prob prob- The Army’s
The Army 's first
first step to ensure that the
step to the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs
ably
ably dates toto 1990
1990 or earlier SDB appears to
.40 The SDB
earlier.40 would bebe protected
protected in in the event of Bosnia’s
Bosnia 's breakup
breakup
have distributed
distributed weapons small, select groups—
weapons to small, groups- came inin late 1991
1991 atat the behest of the
the Serbian
Serbian leader
leader-
almost
almost certainly
certainly SDS supporters-beginning
supporters—beginning in 1990
in 1990 ship. President Milosevic
Serbian President
ship. Serbian Milosevic and Serbian Federal
Serbian Federal
and continuing
continuing intointo possibly
possibly September
September 1991.1991. For member Borisav Jovic
Presidency member
Presidency Jovic concluded
concluded early
early in
in
example.
example, the Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government acquired documen-
acquired documen December 1991
December 1991 that international recognition of Bos
international recognition Bos-
tation showing distribution of M-48
showing the distribution M-48 bolt
bolt action
action nia would follow
nia soon after that of Croatia
follow soon Croatia and Slove
Slove-
World WarWar II-era rifles, as well as
II—era rifles, as other weapons,
weapons, to nia,
nia, placing
placing unbearable
unbearable pressure
pressure on
on Belgrade
Belgrade to
35 Serbs in the Foca
35 Foca area. These weapons
area. These weapons almost cer
almost cer- withdraw
Withdraw thethe JNA
JNA from
from the republic. As
the republic. As Jovic
Jovic notes:
notes:
tainly
tainly were provided
provided by SDB from
by the SDB Serbian MUP
from Serbian MUP
Serbian TO
or Serbian TO stocks
stocks.4| The SDB
.41 The probably distributed
SDB probably distributed When Bosnia
When Bosnia and Herzegovina
Herzegovina are recognized
recognized
no more 3,000
more than 3,000 such weapons weapons in in platoon-sized
platoon-sized internationally, the
internationally, JNA
JNA will
will be declared
declared a for
for-
batches of 30 or so to to groups
groups likely centered on the the eign army and
and its withdrawal
withdrawal will be demanded,
local municipality board
local SDS municipality board in most
most of Bosnia’s
Bosnia's which
which is impossible avoid. In that situation,
to avoid.
impossible to sit11ation,
municipalities. There may
municipalities.424 c There may have been a surge in in these pop11/ace .... . will
the Serb populace. will be left defenseless.
defenseless . . .
SDB deliveries
SDB deliveries late in I1991,99 I, but they would soon be
would soon Sloba feels that we must
Sloba feels 11111st withdraw
withdraw all citizens
citi zens of
of
eclipsed shipments from
eclipsed by shipments from the JNA.JNA. Serbia and
Serbia and Montenegro
Montenegro fromfrom the JNAJNA in Bosnia
Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Herzegovina in in a timely fashion and trans
fashion and trans-
In addition support for the
addition to its support SDS, the
the SDS. SDB
the SDB fer
fer citizens of Bosnia
citizens of Bosnia and
and Herzegovina
Her::.egm•inatoto the
covertly inside Bosnia—as
worked inside
covertly worked Bosnia-as it did
did in
in Croatia-
Croatia—— JNA there in
JNA in order
order to avoid general military
avoid general military
to link Serb members
members of the MUPMUP so that one day theythey chaos upon international recognition . ....That
international recognition That
could rapidly form
could rapidly form a separate Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb police
police will also create the possibility for the Serb
possibility for Serb lead
lead-
force. indications that then SDB
force. Given clear indications SDB Deputy
Deputy ership in
ership in Bosnia Herzegovina to assume
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Stanisic and his
Chief Jovica Stanisic subordinates helped
his subordinates helped cre
cre- command over the Serb part part of the JNA.44
of the JNA. 44
ate
ate the Bosnian Serb MUP
the Bosnian MUP whenwhen it came into being in
into being in
the spring 1992 and the
spring of 1992 the rapidity with which
rapidity with which the Shortly thereafter, Milosevic
Shortly thereafter, Milosevic began
began secretly
secretly engineer
engineer-
changeover
changeover tooktook place. SDB almost
place, the SDB almost certainly
certainly had ing the
ing the transfer Bosnian-born JNA
transfer of Bosnian-born officers, , the
JNA officers
laid plans for such
laid plans such a move
move at least asas early
early as 1991. • 4‘3'
as l99l." majority of whom
majority whom were ethnic Serbs,
were ethnic Serbs, back
back to their
their
home republic.45
home republicY Federal
Federal Defense Secretary General
Defense Secretary General
Kadijevic—who
Kadijevic-who two two months earlier probably
months earlier probably would
would
JNA: Defender of Serbs
The JNA: have
have turned request-accepted Jovic’s
down such a request—accepted
turned down Jovic's
order and reported
order reported on December that itit had been
25 December
on 25
As the Croatian war
the Croatian war dragged
dragged to a finish
to a finish during
during carried out. This was
carried was a naked
naked attempt to to position
position thethe
November and December
November 1991, the
December 1991, JNA had become
the JNA become JNA to
JNA to serve as an
an ethnic
ethnic Serb force within
military force
Serb military
more and more
more committed to shifting
more committed shifting its loyalties
loyalties Bosnia if when independence
if and when independence came.
came . ItIt was
was also
also aa
contradiction of the JNA's
direct contradiction
direct JNA’s policy on the distri
distri-
'
· See Annex of the Bosnian
Annex 22 for a detailed description of Bosnian Serb bution of soldiers
bution soldiers from
from a given republic-one of the
given republic—one the
MUP‘s
MUP's formation.
formation.
128
128

central issues over
over which
which Slovenia
Slovenia had gone
gone to war in
war in Meanwhile,
Meanwhile. by late March, as as the
the situation
situation inin Bosnia
Jovic explains
1991.I. As Jovic
June 199 it:
explains it: continued degenerate. the
continued to degenerate, the JNA
JNA concluded
concluded that it
it
redistribution of its
needed to hasten the redistribution its forces
forces from
from
Milosevic andand II were
were talking
talking about
about it. We
We did not Muslim
Muslim and Croat Croat areas within Bosnia to to “safe,”
"safe," Serb
Serb-
it.
talk to
to anybody
anybody else.
else. We
We instructed
instructed the General controlled territory. On
controlled territory. On 3 April,
April, just
just before
before the
the out
out-
3
Staff
Staff to redeploy
redeploy troops
troops and transfer
transfer all those hostilities, Acting Federal
break of hostilities,
break Federal Defense
Defense Secretary
Secretary
born
born in Bosnia to to Bosnia andand withdraw
withdraw those General Adzic
General Adzic issued
issued anan order
order to General Kukanjac
to General
born
born in Serbia and Montenegro
Serbia and Serbia and
Montenegro to Serbia and the Second Military District (as
Second Military (as well asas presum
presum-
Montenegro .. . . [By the time of recognition]
Montenegro of recognition] out ably Fourth Military
ably Fourth Military District elements
elements in Herzegov
Herzegov-
in
.
of 90,000 troops
of 90,000 troops in Bosnia,
Bosnia, I tthink,
hink, 85 percent
percent r!f
of ina)
ina) toto "hasten withdrawal." Moreover,
“hasten the withdrawal.” Moreover, thethe JNA
JNA
I
them 47
them were from
from Bosnia.
Bosnia.4646 47 was not
was not only
only pulling out out its units was also
units but was also with
with-
drawing all
drawing Bosnian TO weapons,
all Bosnian weapons. military-industrial
military-industrial
By this time, too, the JNA had begun to fully articu
the JNA articu- facilities, and, in some
facilities. and. some ways
ways more
more important,
important, allall
in
dual-track policy for Bosnia of working for
late its dual-track ammunition
ammunition and fuel fuel stocks.50
stocks.' 11
peace between all all three ethnic
ethnic groups
groups but preparing
preparing
for war in support
support of thethe Serbs.
Serbs. A 20 March assess-
assess
A
Bosnian situation
ment of the Bosnian situation from
from Genera Kukanjac,
Genera Kukanjac. Organization of JNA
Organization JNA and Serb Military and Police
the senior JNA commander
senior JNA commander in the the republic.
republic, to NA
the JNA
to the Forces, April 1992*
1992*
J
General
General Staff clearly
clearly outlines
outlines his command's
command’s distaste
for an
an interethnic
interethnic war but notes that “the "the Serb
Serb people
people As a result of the SOB and JNA
the SDB JNA preparations,
preparations, at
at the
the
a
is objectively
objectively in danger, and we are therefore protect-
are therefore protect fighting in
outbreak of fighting
outbreak April 1992,
in April 1992. federal
federal and Serb
Serb
is
ing their interests."

interests.”4848 forces in Bosnia consisted
forces four types
consisted of four armed for
types of armed for-
mations: the
mations: the regular
regular Yugoslav
Yugoslav People’s
People's Army, volun
volun-
JNA had already
The JNA already begun. however, to make thor-
begun, however, thor teer units JNA, municipal
by the JNA.
units raised by municipal Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb
ough
ough preparations
preparations for a war to to "defend"
“defend” the the Serbs.
Serbs. The Territorial
Territorial Defense (TO) detachments,
Defense (TO) detachments, and Bosnian
Bosnian
a
Army took
took a liberal
liberal view
view of thethe formation
formation of Serb Serb vol
vol- Serb Internal Affairs
Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs police
police forces.
forces.
a
unteer units within the JNA and the

the JNA provision of
the provision
weapons Bosnian Serb Territorial
weapons to Bosnian Territorial Defense
Defense and With the conclusion of the Slovenian
the conclusion Slovenian war
war and the
police formations, while working to
police formations, to relocate JNA
relocate JNA withdrawal of all
agreed-upon withdrawal
agreed-upon NA forces
all JNA forces from
from
J
units, depots, and military
units, military industries
industries away from pre
away from pre- Croatia, a tremendous
Croatia. amount of military
tremendous amount equipment
military equipment
a
dominantly
dominantly Muslim and Croat Croat areas. JNA JNA actions
actions to had been withdrawn into Bosnia-Herzegovina
withdrawn into Bosnia-Herzegovina by by the
the
support local and regional
support local Bosnian Serb
regional Bosnian Serb police
police and beginning of 1992.
beginning was. of course.
1992. (This was, course, in addition to
in addition
military
military elements appear to from 30 December
to date from December the disproportionate fraction of Yugoslav
disproportionate fraction Yugoslav military
military
1991 when the
1991 when JNA General
the JNA General Staff
Staff issued
issued an order,
an order. units and defense industries
units industries that were already concen
were already concen-
context, appears to have authorized
which, in context. authorized JNA JNA trated in
in the nation’s central
the nation's republic.) As
central republic.) As a result,
result. the
a
military
military assistance to authorities. Muslim
to such authorities. republic veritable arsenal
republic was a veritable arsenal on
on the eve of war.
the eve war.
a
researcher Dr. Smail Cekic notes that,

Dr. Smail After giving the war
giving up the in Croatia,
war in the JNA
Croatia. the JNA had reor
reor-
ganized its forces
ganized forces in western Croatia and Bosnia.
western Croatia Bosnia.
In conformity
conformity withwith the orders
orders of the General
of the redistributing units
redistributing units and equipment
equipment withdrawn
withdrawn into
into
Staff
Stafl of Armed Forces
of the Armed SFRYI in partic
of the SFRY,
Forces of partic- Bosnia from
from Slovenia
Slovenia and Croatia
Croatia and revamping
revamping its its
ular the order of of 30 December
December 9 91,
199/, and command structure. NA forces
forces in all
in
regional command
regional structure. JNA all of
J
I
instructions of
instructions Secretariat of
of the Federal Secretariat of
Annex 22,
· See Annex Organization of
of Bosnian
'
22. Organization Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav

Yugoslav Peo
Peo-
National Defense especially those of
Defense ((especially of 21 Febru-
Febru
Army Forces,
plc "s Army
ple‘s Forces. April
April 1992,
1992. for a detailed description of
detailed description of the
the
a
ary.. ..
ary JNA supplied
. . ), JNA supplied arms and equipment for
equipment for
),
various Serb and federal armed forces.

Serb armed units rif of the
the Territorial Defense and
Defense and
Police, as well as for
Police, for other Serb "volunteer"
Serb "volunteer"
49
units ...
. . 49
.
129
129

Bosnia—most
Bosnia-most of the the new Second Military District,
Second Military District, With Izetbegovic’s
Izetbegovic's approval,
approval, on 10 June 1991
on 10 1991 the
covered the
which covered bulk of Bosnia and Croatia.
the bulk Croatia, SDA
SDA convened meeting in
convened a meeting Sarajevo of the most
in Sarajevo most
together with
with elements of thethe Montenegrin-based
Montenegrin-based prominent Muslim
prominent leaders, 53 who
Muslim leaders,53 proceeded to estab
who proceeded estab-
Fourth Military District—by
Fourth early April
District-by early April numbered
numbered lish a “Council
"Council for the
the National Defense of the Mus
National Defense Mus-
100,000 to
some 100,000 110,000 troops.
to 110,000 troops.5| These forces
51 These were
forces were lim Nation.”
Nation." Its
Its purpose was to oversee military
purpose was military
equipped
equipped with an estimated 500 tanks,
with an tanks. 400 field
field artil
artil- preparations-to executed through
preparations—40 be executed through the Patriotic
Patriotic
lery pieces over
lery over 100 multiple rocket
100 mm, 48 multiple rocket launch
launch- League—for
League-for armed defense in in the event of
of Bosnian
Bosnian
l20-mm mortars. The
ers, and 350 120-mm The JNAJNA also
also had some independence.54 As
independence.54 Hasan Cengic later explained
As Hasan explained it:it:
120
120 fighter-bombers.
fighter-bombers, some 40 light light attack/observation
attack/observation
helicopters, and 30 transport
helicopters, helicopters based in
transport helicopters in the
the We decided
We decided to
to form
form the [Patriotic League] orga
[Patriotic orga-
republic.
republic. nization through
nization the structure
through the structure of the [SDA]
of [SDAJ
party because
because that waswas the only
only structure
structure we
we
At the same time, the SDS-controlled
the JNA-armed and SDS-controlled could rely
rely on
on ... decided to form aa military
We decided
. . . We
Bosnian Serb
Bosnian Territorial Defense
Serb Territorial Defense units—formed
units-formed from
from organization
organization with very broad basis—the
with a very basis-the patri
patri-
Bosnian Republic TO
Serb-dominated Bosnian
Serb-dominated TO headquarters—
headquarters- otic [basis], for
otic [basis], for the defense
defense of
of the constitutional
constitutional
volunteer units
with volunteer
together with units that were melded into
were melded into order in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if needed,
needed, of
of
TO formations,
TO 60,000 loosely
formations, had almost 60,000 loosely organized
organized democracy, market
democracy, market economy, human rights
economy, human rights and
and
personnel. These
personnel. primarily under
These units operated primarily under the pluralism. The
The main
main idea
idea was simple: we
was simple: we should
should
control of the local
control local municipal officials, although
municipal officials, JNA
although JNA have
have an
an organization
organization ofa of a military nature
nature which
which
regional headquarters exercised
regional command authority
exercised command authority would, in
would, in the
the case
case of serious military attack,
of a serious attack,
when nearby. Finally, the newly
when formed Bosnian
newly formed Bosnian Serb
Serb be the
the spine
spine of total national and
of the total and patriotic
MUP,
MUP, which came into into existence on 1l April,
April, had anan gathering. We
gathering. We did not
not think
think about
about weapons
weapons
15,000 police—active,
estimated 15,000 police-active. reserve, and special.
special. much. At that
much. that moment,
moment, we we concentrated
concentrated on
on
The MUP
MUP police
police usually worked under the
usually worked the authority
authority organizing people.55
organizing people. 55
of the local municipality in
local municipality in conjunction with T0
conjunction with TO and
volunteer
volunteer troops.
troops. The Patriotic League's stated purpose
Patriotic League’s purpose was to defend
was to defend aa
"united" Bosnia-Herzegovina,
“united” although what
Bosnia-Herzegovina, although what this
this
Chapter 17
Chapter 17 meant was
was left
left somewhat unclear. Overwhelmingly
somewhat unclear. Overwhelmingly
The Bosnian
The Bosnian Muslims
Muslims in
in 1992:
1992: Muslim
Muslim in its membership, the Patriotic
membership, the Patriotic League
League
The "Patriotic
The League"-Bosnia's Muslims
“Patriotic League”—Bosnia’s Muslims Begin
Begin included
included some
some Croats
Croats and even a small number of
small number
To Organize
To Organize Serbs.
Serbs.
1991, leaders of the Muslim-based

February 1991,
In early February Muslim-based According toto Maj.
Maj. Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic—the
Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic-the
SDA party met in
SDA the small
in the town of Mehurici outside
small town outside KOS
KOS officer assigned to monitor
officer assigned developments in
monitor developments in $10
Slo-
Travnik to consider
consider alternatives should the
alternatives should the Slovenian
Slovenian venia Croatia, and who later became chief of the
venia and Croatia,
Croatian Republics
and Croatian carry out their
Republics carry their stated plans to JNA Security Directorate—KOS
JNA Security Directorate-KOS had two two agents at at the
declare independence in
declare independence in June. Shortly after this SDA
June. Shortly SDA very top of the SDA
very leadership who were
SDA leadership were able
able to
to
Executive Board
Executive Board meeting, Hasan Cengic (later Bos
meeting, Hasan Bos- inform the federal authorities of any actions
federal authorities actions byby the
Defense Minister) met with
nian Defense with Rusmir Mahmutce-
Mahmutce nascent Muslim
Muslim paramilitary underground. KOS
paramilitary underground. KOS also
also
hajic
hajic (at Deputy Prime Minister in
(at that time Deputy in the stepped up surveillance of all
up its surveillance previously identified
all previously identified
Bosnian Republic Government)
Bosnian Republic Government) to propose the forma
to propose forma- Muslim
Muslim nationalists
nationalists within the JNA
within the JNA officer
officer ranks.“
ranks. 56
tion of a paramilitary
tion organization as
paramilitary organization as an adjunct of the
an adjunct maintained that JNA
Vasiljevic later maintained JNA counterintelli
counterintelli-
SDA political party.
SDA The subject was
party. The broached with
was broached with gence repeatedly warned the JNA
repeatedly warned General Staff and
JNA General
Republic President
then Republic Izetbegovic in
President Izetbegovic early March
in early the Yugoslav Presidency that the SDA
Yugoslav Presidency SDA was
was organizing
organizing
1991, and early preparations proceeded with
early preparations with his
his military arm but that KOS’s
a military warnings were
KOS's warnings were disre
disre-
approval. Thus was
approval. born the
was born the “Patriotic League of
"Patriotic League preoccupied and indecisive
by aa preoccupied
garded by indecisive Belgrade
Belgrade
Peoples," generally known simply
Peoples,” generally simply as “Patriotic
as the "Patriotic
League."
League.”52 52
130
130
Digitized by Gol gle Origir.al from

leadership
leadership that unable to put KOS’s
that was unable KOS's findings
findings to of all three
representatives of
representatives three nations
nations support
support this
this
any good
good use:
use: campaign. lzetbegovic , Karadzic, and Kljuic
campaign. Izetbegovic, Kljuic did
not do
do this, so that the
the whole
whole thing
thing fell
fell through
through
We documents, conversations
We had documents, conversations recorded
recorded by 57
57
tape recorders
recorders and cameras.
cameras. We We got hold of of the
the
entire organizational structure
entire organizational structure ofof the Muslim
armed forces.
forces. We
We used cameras
cameras to record
record illegal Arming the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Muslims
Muslims
military personnel.
meetings by military personnel. We We knew that a
republican
republican command
command had been formed and that
formed and On
On 25 25 September
September 1991 the UN Security
199 I the Security Council had had
it consisted of two parts: the military
consisted of and the
military and Resolution 713,
adopted Resolution 713, which called
called for anan immedi
immedi-
political crisis commands.
commands. There
There are nine
nine ate
ate end to hostilities within the former
to hostilities former Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia,
regional
regional commands
commands in the territory of 8-H
territory of B-H and UN-sponsored
UN-sponsored mediationmediation in the conflict,
in the conflict, and—most
and-most
one each in Kosmet
Kosmet and Sand::,ak
Sandzak [in Serbia] . . . important-a complete
important—a embargo on all
complete embargo all weapons
weapons ship
ship-
former Yugoslavia.
ments to the former Yugoslavia. EvenEven after
after Slovenia.
Slovenia.
"
The “Patriotic l.Rague
The "Patriotic League of Nations [PLN] was
of Nations" was Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia were
Croatia, Macedonia, were recognized
recognized by by
made up of ofmobile units, units
mobile units, with a regional
units with regional the UN as
the independent countries,
as independent countries, thethe UN
UN continued
continued to
structure
structure for
for protecting inhabited places
protecting inhabited places and apply
apply the
the arms embargo them. The
embargo to them. Security Coun
The Security Coun-
and special-purpose
territories, and
territories, special-purpose units-for
units—for spe-
spe cil’s
cil's objective
objective was to minimize the number
was to number of weap
weap-
cial tasks of sovereign-territorial characte,:
of a sovereign-territorial character. ons in circulation in
in circulation the former
in the Yugoslavia and,
former Yugoslavia and, by
by
They known by the public as "Green
They are known “Green extension,
extension, to potential for bloodshed.
reduce the potential
to reduce bloodshed. TheThe
Berets.”
Berets." consequence of UN
practical consequence
practical UN Resolution
Resolution 713713 was
was to
to
lock inin the
the weapons advantage of one
weapons advantage one side—the
side-the
As always, KOS] gathered
always, we [[KOS] detailed informa-
gathered detailed informa Bosnian Serbs-and
Bosnian Serbs—and to close off the other
to close other side’s
side's abil
abil-
tion
tion and sent it to
to the appropriate place
the appropriate place [i.e.
[i.e. the
the ity to
ity to achieve parity. 58
achieve parity.58
Presidency]. . ..
Federal Presidency] . . Thus,
Thus, they
they knew in time
that there existed a secret Muslim military orgaorga With the republic placed under
republic placed under an arms embargo and
arms embargo
nization (the PLN),
nization PLN), which
which comprised
comprised about
about denied the
denied the weapons sources of the
weapons sources Bosnian Serbs—
the Bosnian Serbs-
50, 000 more than well-organized
50,000 well-organi:::edpeople,
people, nearly
nearly the JNA
the JNA and the Serbian MUP—Bosnian
the Serbian MUP-Bosnian Muslims not not
of which
half of which were
were already
already armed
armed even at the already in the Territorial
already Defense looked
Territorial Defense looked toto the Patri
Patri-
very Thus, well organi::,ed
very outset. Thus, organized but poorly otic League
otic League as as their
their only mechanism for
effective mechanism
only effective
armed..... .
armed arming themselves.
arming Unfortunately for them,
themselves. Unfortunately the Patri
them, the Patri-
otic League
otic League failed miserably to acquire
failed miserably acquire andand distribute
distribute
The voluminous
The voluminous and secret information
information that we Shortages of time
weapons. Shortages
weapons. time and money
money were
were com
com-
sent to the
the State Presidency
Presidency on0n the creation
creation andand pounded by
pounded officials who
by some officials misappropriated the
who misappropriated
organization
organization of of Muslim paramilitary
paramilitary forces
forces funds given them to
funds given buy arms and by
to buy by an
an inflationary
inflationary
included a blank
included blank page at the end on which which the spiral that
spiral drove prices
that drove prices up asas all
all sides
sides scrambled
scrambled to
members of of the
the Presidency could write
Presidency could down
write down themselves. The
arm themselves. The Patriotic
Patriotic League
League managed
managed to to
their remarks.
their remarks. They
They did not do either. They
do this either. They covertly some
acquire covertly
acquire weapons from
some weapons the Bosnian
from the Bosnian
simply did not know
simply know what they wanted
what they wanted . ... . MUP procured some others
MUP and procured Croatia. The
through Croatia.
others through The
number of weapons
number weapons it was
was able
able to stockpile before
to stockpile before the
the
Then we worked
Then worked up an exact plan on what
what had toto war, however, fell far
war. however, short of its
far short its requirements.
requirements.
be done. WeWe formed
formed a command
command for
for coordinating
coordinating
mixed units for
this activity and appointed mixed seiz
for sei:.- So,
So, how
how many units did
many armed units did the
the Patriotic
Patriotic League
League
necessary that the Republi
weapons. It was necessary
ing weapons. Republi- actually have
actually at the outset of the war?
have at war? Subsequent
Subsequent tes
tes-
M UP of
can MVP of B-H. the Federal SUP
8-H, the [Secretary
SUP [Secretary timony suggests that the
timony the Patriotic League had
Patriotic League at most
had at most
for
for Internal Affairs],
Affairs] and the Army
, and Army take part in
campaign. In the end, we
disarming campaign.
that disarming
concluded that we would not do anything
concluded anything until
131
131

40,000 armed personnel
40,000 personnel and a fairly evolvedevolved organiza-
organiza Izetbegovic further elaborated on the history
Izetbegovic further history and role
role
tional
tional structure. By the the start the war,
start of the war, it had estab-
estab of the Patriotic
Patriotic League
League inin a speech in 1997.
1997. His long
long
lished
lished nine regional
regional commands
commands (reportedly located in
(reportedly located narration
narration is worth
worth examining both for the
examining both the chronology
chronology
Sarajevo.
Sarajevo, Doboj. Cazin, Prijedor.
Doboj, Cazin. Prijedor, Livno, Mostar,
Mostar, provides and for illustration
he provides illustration of the credit
credit Izetbe
Izetbe-
Visegrad, Tuzla, and the
Visegrad, Tuzla. the Sandzak
Sandzak in Serbia)59 9 further
in Serbia)5 further govic gives to
govic gives to the Patriotic League as the
Patriotic League the organiza-
organiza
subdivided
subdivided into I10303 municipal headquarters.“00 These
municipal headquarters. These tional
tional and philosophical forerunner of the
philosophical forerunner the future
future
formation
formation varied
varied widely in size. size, ranging
ranging from platoons
from platoons Bosnian
Bosnian army:
army:
to small
small brigades .0 1
brigades."l
the SDA Council for
In June 1991 the National
for National
Significantly, the
Significantly. JNA and the
the JNA Bosnian Serbs most
the Bosnian Defense formed. This
Defense was formed. This meeting was attended
likely believed
believed the Patriotic League
the Patriotic League was both larger by about 400 representatives of Bosnians from
of Bosnians from
and better organized
organized than it actually was. The
actually was. JNA’s
The JNA's the entire territory
territory of
of the Yugoslavia, pri
former Yugoslavia,
the former pri-
official journal.
official journal, Narodna Armija, claimed
Narodna Armijo, claimed in March marily·from
nwril_, from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Patriotic League
1992 that the Patriotic League had a membership
membership of
over 50,000 organized
organized into a republic-level
republic-level staff and In July 1991
I 99 I the
the first military experts [/ e.g.
first military ex-
e. g. ex
nine regional political-military headquarters.62
regional political-military headquarters. 02 A A week
week JNA officers]
officers ] joined the Patriotic League
joined the League and and
later, a colonel
later. from the
colonel from JNA’s Second
the JNA's Second Military Dis- Dis prm·ided the first
provided directives for
first directives defense of
for the defense of
trict publicly claimed
claimed that the Muslim paramilitary
paramilitary Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina. .
units ("Patriotic
(“Patriotic League"
League” and "Green
“Green Berets")
Berets”)
60,000 men under arms.
together had 60,000 arms.“ A post-JNA
6 ·1 A post-JNA first truckload
The first of weaponry arrived
truckload of1veaponry arrived in
in
Yugoslav
Yugoslav military journal, Vojska,
military journal. claimed in July
Vojska, claimed July August 1991.
August
1992 that the Patriotic League
the Patriotic League had about 50,000 men
organized
organized into "four “four divisions.
divisions, three regiments,
regiments. 55 55 first military
The first tmining began in
military training in Septembe,:
September:
units of battalion-detachment
battalion-detachment strength, 62 units of
company-platoon
company-platoon strength, and several dozen special special The first units were
The.first formed in October.
were formed October.
units ."t>-1
units.”"4 Such
Such numbers details, whether they had
numbers and details.
any basis in fact, were bandiedbandied about for some time time In
/11Novembera long-range radio transmitter
November a long-range transmitter was
and were widely believedbelieved by at least the Bosnian Serb
the Bosnian acquired to cover all of
acquired of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
citizenry.
citizenry, whowho grew neurotically afraid of an
neurotically afraid under
an under- training of
and the training of communications
communications operators
operators
ground
ground Muslim army with with armed shadow
shadow unitsunits in their
their began..
began
midst. Worries like these readied them for the
Worries like the idea of
ethnic cleansing when the
cleansing when the opportunity
opportunity presented itself. itself. In December organizing of
December the organizing of personnel
personnel and
the arming of reserve police
arming of police units ofof the Bosnia
Bosnia-
lzetbegovic state that the Patriotic
Izetbegovic would later state Patriotic League
League Herzegovina M
Her::,egovina MVPUP (Ministry of Internal
(Ministry of internal Aflairs)
Affairs)
had between 30,000 and 40.000 40,000 armed personnel
personnel at the initiative
began at the initiative and under the leadership
leadership
the outset of the
the war. 65 The Sarajevo
war."5 Sarajevo regional head
regional head- of
of the Patriotic League.
League.
reportedly had Il0,000
quarters alone reportedly 0,000 armed personnel
personnel
out of a total membership 30,000!16000767 As
membership of some 30,000. As In January 1992 the firstfirst unit of the Patriotic
unit of
Izegetbegovic
Izegetbegovic narrated it:
it: League with military
League with training was created, and
military training
distribution of
the distribution T0 arms began at the
of TO initia
the initia-
... . . in the second half of 1991, the League
half of of
League of of
tive of the Patriotic League,
League, an action
action that was
was
Patriots (( 'Patriotska
Patriots ‘Patriotska Liga ·) ') was
\\'OS formed
formed in an carried out through
carried organs of
through the highest organs of
attempt to arm the people and to be,
attempt certain
be, to a certain Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina .
extent, ready for
extent. possible attack. II can say
for any possible
headquarters of
that the main headquarters of the League of
League of
Patriots was formed
Patriots formed immediately before the war.
the war.
Nine regions
Nine municipal headquarters
regions and municipal headquarters were
also formed;
also formed; in some places better,better, in some more
poorly organized
poorly organized . ... . according counts,
according to our coullfs,
League had approximately
the League approximately 30,000 30, 000 to 40,000
40, 000
armed people when we were attacked.M attacked.68
132
132

In February I992
1992 at a a conference
conference in Mehurici, party-affiliated
party—affiliated Croatian Defense Council (HYO).
Croatian Defense (HVO).
orders
orders for stajf of
for the staff the Patriotic League
of the league of
of Both were
Both were offshoots
offshoots of larger,
larger, already
already established par-
established par
Bosnia-Herzegovina were
Bosnia-Herzegovina were defined and issued,
defined and organizations in
ent organizations in Croatia.
Croatia. Despite the similar
Despite the
and directives on the principles
and political directives principles of
of nomenclature and ostensibly
nomenclature ostensibly similar goals,
goals, the two
two
defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina
of Bosnia-Herzegovina were set out. The organizations
organizations were political, military,
military, and philosophi-
philosophi
political goals
goals were:
were: defense of the territory,
defense of territory, competed for influence
rivals, and they initially competed
cal rivals, influence
democracy, multiethnic community,
democracy, a multiethnic and
community, and within the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat ministate. As
Croat ministate. As events
human
human rights.
rights. unfolded, the HOS
unfolded, HOS rapidly
rapidly lost the HVO,
lost out to the HYO, which
had the full
full and explicit backing of Franjo Tudjman’s
explicit backing Tudjman 's
In April
April 1992,
I992, after
after the decision by the Bosnia
the decision Bosnia- HDZ party and the Croatian
HDZ Croatian Army itself.
itself.
HerZegovina Presidency that the
Herzegovina Presidency the Territorial
Defense of
Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-HerZegovina the state
was the
defense
defense structure,
structure, the three high-ranking
high-ranking Terri
Terri- Croatian Defense
The Croatian Defense Force
Force
torial Defense
Defense oflicers who were
officers who appointed then
were appointed
joined the command
joined command of the Patriotic league
of the League ofof In 1991 the extreme rightwing
In late 1991 rightwing Croatian Party of
Croatian Party
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina and began commanding
commanding Rights (Hrvatska
Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava-HSP) within
Stranka Provo—HSP)
the existing of the Patriotic League
structure of
existing structure league ..... . Croatia
Croatia proper
proper began to establish
establish a paramilitary
paramilitary pres-
pres
ence in Croat-majority Bosnia. This armed wing of the
Croat-majority Bosnia.
At the beginning of the war the Patriotic league
beginning of League HSP
HSP political party
party was
was named
named (in
(in both
both Croatia
Croatia and
of Bosnia-Herzegovina had around
of Bosnia-HerZegovina 30,000
around 30,000 Bosnia) Croatian Armed Force
Bosnia) the Croatian Force (Hrvatske
(Hrvatske Oruzane
Oruzane
armed volunteers arranged in units,
volunteers arranged with an
units, with Snage—HOS).
Snage-HOS).
established corps area
established corps area and commander.
and commander.
The leader of the HSP
The leader HSP inin Croatia,
Croatia, anan extreme
extreme Croat
Croat
Prior to the war,
war, the Patriotic League
league hadhad a nationalist named Dobroslav
nationalist named Dobroslav Paraga, appointed Blaz
Paraga, appointed
well-developed logistical system. That
well-developed That system Kraljevic
Kraljevic to to head the HOS paramilitary forces
HOS paramilitary forces in Bos
in Bos-
remained the backbone
remained backbone ofof logistics for the Army
logistics for Army nia. Paraga
Paraga established “main headquarters
established a "main headquarters for
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
of Bosnia-Herzegovina until
until the end ofof the war,
war, Herzegovina" in
Herzegovina” in Ljubuski on on 33 January 1992, but
January 1992,
thanks to SDA state policy and
thanks to solidarity of
and the solidarity of overall direction
overall direction appears to have come from the HSP
come from HSP
friendly
friendly countries in the Islamic world.
countries in world . .... leadership in
leadership Zagreb. 71 72
in Zagreb." 72 Mile
Mile Dedakovic (a.k.a. “Jas
Dedakovic (a.k.a. "Jas-
treb,” or "Hawk")
treb," “Hawk”) was Commander of the
was named Commander the
If for the Patriotic League

If it were not for of Bosnia
league of Bosnia- HOS with his headquarters in
HOS with in Ljubuski. Dedakovic
Dedakovic
Herzegovina, the
Herzegovina, ofBosnia-Herzegov
defense of
the defense Bosnia-Herzegov- had helped
helped lead the the unsuccessful Croatian Army
unsuccessful Croatian
ina would not have been possible.
ina would possible. It was
was the first
first defense of Vukovar
Yukovar and had then been imprisoned
imprisoned
army
army of our defense.
of defense. From Army
From it emerged the Army briefly
briefly in
in Croatia
Croatia early
early in
in 1992.
1992. By
By March 1992 he
1992 he
of
of the
the Republic
Republic of
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina . ..
. 69
. 69 become the leader of the
had become the HSP’s
HS P's military wing.n 7“
military wing.73 74
In
In total the HOS
total the perhaps 5,000
HOS had perhaps active fighters
5,000 active fighters at
at
Chapter 18
Chapter 18 any given
any given time.
time.75
75
The Bosnian
Bosnian Croat Militaries: HOS
Croat Militaries: HOS and HVO
HVO
enough, despite the HOS’s
Oddly enough, HOS's affiliation
affiliation with
with the
the
This Serbs and
This is a war between Serbs Croats that will
and Croats will Croat-nationalist HSP
Croat-nationalist HSP party, it was more willing
was more willing to
be fought
fought down
down to the last Muslim. into its ranks
accept Muslims into ranks than the HVO. The HOS
the HYO. HOS
was
was also more acceptable to Muslims than the HVO,
more acceptable HYO,
—A Bosnian
-A Army commander
Bosnian Anny commander in
in since the
since the latter openly
openly advocated
advocated a territorial
territorial partition
partition
Mostar, August
Mostar, August 1992.70
1992.70 Bosnia, which was squarely
of Bosnia, squarely against
against the
the objectives
objectives
of most
most Muslims.76
Muslims. 76
As
As 1992
1992 opened, the Bosnian
opened, the Croats had two
Bosnian Croats two main
main
political/military organizations,
political/military the HSP
organizations, the HSP party—
party-
affiliated Croatian Armed Force
affiliated Croatian (HOS) and the HDZ
Force (HOS) HDZ
133
133

With the outbreak of the war,
the outbreak the HVO
war, the HYO and the HOS HOS directed by
directed HV
HY General
General Janko Bobetko
Bobetko through
through
would compete
compete for power influence within the
power and influence the former
former HV officers
HY officers reassigned
reassigned to the HVO.78 I-IV
HYO. 78 The HY-
nascent Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat state,
state, and, by the
the close
close of the
the HVO
HYO relationship went well beyond
relationship went beyond the deployment
deployment
first
first year of fighting,
fighting, the HOS as an independent
the HOS independent fight-
fight of allied HV units
allied HY alongside HVO
fighting alongside
units fighting HYO forces
forces in
in
ing
ing force
force would cease to exist and play role of sig-
play no role sig Bosnia. Not only
Bosnia. were HV
only were HVO forces
HY and HYO operating
forces operating
nificance
nificance in the remainder
remainder of the war. war. Although the under a joint command
under command but the the HVO
HYO MainMain Staff was
was
HOS may have started with
HOS with some organizational
organizational an HV
itself an HY forward
forward command post, established
command post, established on
on 1616
advantages, it was not explicitly backed backed by Zagreb
Zagreb in April
April in Grude
Grude atat Tudjman’s
Tudjman's direction."9
direction.n Bobetko
Bobetko per
per-
the way
way the HYOHVO was, and it was was always
always fated toto be sonally selected the first
sonally first HVO
HYO commander,
commander, former
former
the junior force
force among
among the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat militaries.
militaries. Croatian Army Colonel Milivoj
Croatian Army Milivoj Petkovic,
Petkovic, and Petk
Petk-
The HOSHOS Jost
lost out when
when the HVO-HOS rivalry
the HYO-HOS rivalry ovic's established HVO
newly established
ovic’s newly HYO headquarters
headquarters was was
descended into into open confrontation
confrontation in the the late summer
summer simultaneously also an HV
simultaneously HY command
command post both both offi
offi-
1992, and its influence
of 1992, influence plummeted
plummeted thereafter. The cially and in practice. 80 During the entire
in practice.80 entire Bosnian
Bosnian
demise of the HOS HOS became all all but complete
complete after the war—but especially
war-but during the
especially during several months—
first several
the first months-
HVO’s assassination
HYO's assassination of HOS
HOS commander
commander Blaz the HVO’s chain of command,
HYO's chain command, bothboth political and mili
mili-
Kraljevic and eight of his staff staff on 9 August.
August.7777 tary, would
tary, would run all way back
all the way back to Tudjman’s
Tudjman's desk
desk inin
Zagreb.
Zagreb.
Croatian Defense
The Croatian Council
Defense Council When war
When war began the the HVO
HYO probably some 15,000
probably had some 15,000
and perhaps as many
many as as 20,000
20,000 troops
troops under arms.
arms.
The
The Croatian
Croatian Defense
Defense Council (Hrvatska
(Hrvatska Vijece
Vijece These were initially formed
These were formed asas “Croatian
"Croatian Defense
Defense
Odbrane—HVO)—frequently just
Odbrane-HYO)-frequently just called Bosnian
called the Bosnian Councils”
Councils" for each Croat-controlled
Croat-controlled municipality
municipality (for
Croat Anny—was formally established
Croat Army-was early Janu
established in early Janu- example. the “Kiseljak
example. "Kiseljak Croatian
Croatian Defense
Defense Council")
Council”)
ary 1992, although Croat-based HDZ
although the Croat-based HDZ political but would later be organized
organized into
into battalions bri-
battalions and bri
party had begun organizing paramilitary units
organizing paramilitary units in Bos
in Bos- The Bosnian
gades. The Bosnian CroatCroat forces
forces were
were on
on average bet
bet-
nia late in the summer of 1991.
the summer 1991. With Zagreb's exten
Zagreb’s exten- ter organized equipped than their Bosnian Army
organized and equipped Army
sive assistance-and
sive assistance—and with with the
the example
example of the 1991
the 1991 counterparts but still
counterparts still lacked
lacked the professionalism and
the professionalism
Croatian war
Croatian war to motivate
motivate local
local populations
populations to organize
organize expertise their JNA
expertise of their JNA and Bosnian Serb Army oppo
Bosnian Serb oppo-
themselves—the HVO
and arm themselves-the HYO appears to to have made nents and had little armor and artillery.
little armor These limita
artillery. These limita-
considerable
considerable headway
headway toward establishing itself
toward establishing tions
tions were
were to constrain HVO’s performance
constrain the HYO's performance for the
before
before fighting
fighting began. Fully formed HVO units would
formed HYO remainder of the
remainder war, preventing
the war, from ever
preventing it from ever becom
becom-
surface
surface within days of the Bosnian
Bosnian war's beginning,
war’s beginning, ing robust, fully
ing a robust, fully independent fighting force.
independent fighting force.
complete
complete with staffs, organizations,
officers, staffs,
with officers, organizations, and
weapons.
weapons. Chapter
Chapter 19
19
The War Bosnian War
War Begins: The Bosnian War in 1992
1992
HVO leadership
The HYO almost exclusively
leadership was almost Bosnian
exclusively Bosnian
Croat, although
Croat, although the
the ethnic composition of HVO
ethnic composition HYO units
units By March 1992,
By 1992, Bosnia was clearly drifting toward
was clearly toward
varied significantly by region.
varied significantly A few
region. A few Muslims were
were war. Barricades
civil war. Barricades sprang along roads
sprang up along roads and outout-
accepted into HVO formations
into HYO formations in central
central Bosnia
Bosnia and towns as
side towns villagers armed
as villagers armed themselves against the
themselves against
Herzegovina, significant percentage were
Herzegovina, while a significant were inhabitants of the
inhabitants town over—or
the next town over-or elsewhere
elsewhere
into some of the
accepted into “MHVO” brigades
the "MHYO" brigades in north
north- within the town. On
the same town. 18 March 1992,
On 18 1992, inin aa last
last-
Bosnia where
ern Bosnia relations were much
where Croat-Muslim relations much ditch, admittedly
ditch, admittedly stopgap effort war, the EC
effort to avert war, EC
better.
better. persuaded all
persuaded all three ethnic
ethnic leaders
leaders to sign
sign the “Sara
"Sara-
jevo agreement"
agreement” to to divide
divide the republic into
the republic into ethnically
ethnically
Organized and directed
Organized directed from
from Zagreb, the HVO
Zagreb, the HYO in in
all practical
1992 was for all practical purposes subordinate com
purposes a subordinate com-
mand of the Croatian Army ((Hrvatska
the Croatian Hn•atska Vojska),
Vojska),
134
134

based cantons.
cantons. On 25 25 March, however, Bosnian
March. however. Bosnian Presi-
Presi next day Serb TO and volunteer
Serb TO volunteer troops
troops surrounded
surrounded
dent Izetbegovic
lzetbegovic announced
announced one of the the policy rever
rever- and flooded
flooded the town, routing
the town, routing scattered members
members of
sals for which he would
would soon become
become known. known . He
He Bosnian Muslim
the Bosnian
the Patriotic League
Muslim Patriotic League and policepolice and
repudiated
repudiated hishis statement of the previous week—
the previous week- executing Muslim leaders in
executing in the
the streets. They were led
They were led
claiming he had been pressured into signing
pressured into the EC
signing by the EC by the
by the already infamous Arkan’s
already infamous Arkan's Tigers, the Serbian
Tigers, the Serbian
representatives-and called
representatives—and called for all Bosnian citizens
all Bosnian citizens to Volunteer Guard that had fought
Volunteer Guard fought around Vukovar the
around Vukovar the
reject the terms of the
reject the the Sarajevo
Sarajevo agreement on the the summer. Their reign
previous summer.
previous reign of terror continued even
terror continued
grounds that
grounds that it effectively divided the
effectively divided the republic
republic along
along JNA troops
after JNA moved in
troops moved in to "keep the
to “keep the peace”
peace" on
ethnic lines. Instead,
ethnic lines. Instead, lzetbegovic renewed his
Izetbegovic renewed call for
his call 3 April,
April, and by by 4 April
April the Serbs had full
the Serbs full control
control of
a governmental
governmental system founded founded on the the principle
principle of a the town. The
the town. The town‘s
town's Muslim residentsresidents either cowered
cowered
unitary,
unitary, multiethnic Bosnian state
multiethnic Bosnian state. . in
in their
their homes
homes or fledfled for their lives. The operation
lives.8383 The operation
had been a setpiece recreation
recreation of the the summer
summer 1991 1991
Izetbegovic’s call, though
lzetbegovic's call, perhaps well intentioned,
though perhaps intentioned, fighting in
fighting in Croatia
Croatia.84.84K85
5
far too late, and the

was far fragile structure of the
the fragile the inef
inef-
fective central government
republic central
fective republic government was in in no position
position The Bosnian
The Bosnian Serb takeover in
Serb takeover in Bijeljina
Bijeljina setset in
in motion
motion a
to do anything
anything to back it up.
to back The centrifugal
up. The forces
centrifugal forces chain of events that
chain that would
would leaveleave all
all the
the military play-
military play
driving the
the country
country apart were
were far greater than the
the ers—the Bosnian
ers-the Serbs, the
Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian
Bosnian Republic TO, TO,
weak
weak forces
forces binding
binding the
the country
country together which
together and which and the J NA—armed and ready
the JNA-armed ready for war when the
war when the
might have given
might given hope to the idea
to the multiethnic
idea of a multiethnic declared its independence
republic declared
republic independence only only a few few days
Bosnia.
Bosnia. later.
later. Angered
Angered by the the JNA’s
JNA's failure
failure to contain
contain thethe vio
vio-
lence the
lence Serbs had staged in
the Serbs in Bijeljina, the the Bosnian
Bosnian
If
If "April
“April is the
the cruelest month,” then April
cruelest month." April 1992
1992 in Presidency voted
Presidency voted to mobilize the the republican Territo
republican Territo-
Bosnia was
was to prove cruel indeed.
prove cruel the month
indeed. As the month rial Defense,
rial reserve MUP
Defense , reserve MUP forces,
forces, and civil civil defense
began the EC
began,, the EC foreign
foreign ministers in to Luxem
flew in
ministers flew Luxem- elements. On 4 April,
elements. April, lzetbegovic
Izetbegovic issuedissued the order for
the order
“
mobilization to.
it,
bourg whether to extend
bourg to debate whether extend diplomatic recogni-
diplomatic recogni general
general mobilization to, as he put it, " . ... .enable
enable peopeo-
tion Bosnia, while at the
tion to Bosnia, the same time a similar debate defend themselves
ple to defend
ple themselves ... . . . from
from future
future Bijeljinas."
Bijeljinas.”8686
went on in
went Washington. As
in Washington. Europe's ministers
As Europe’s ministers met yet The Serb
The Serb members
members of the the Bosnian
Bosnian Presidency,
Presidency, Kol- Kol
again to discuss future of Bosnia,
the future
discuss the the Bosnian
Bosnia, the Bosnian poppop- jevic and Plavsic,
Plavsic, promptly
promptly declareddeclared the the mobilization
mobilization
ulation was already
ulation taking up arms and settling
already taking mat
settling mat- illegal
illegal and resigned
resigned fromfrom the the Presidency
Presidency that same
ters for themselves
themselves on thethe ground.
ground. day.87
day.87 The JNA meanwhile
The JNA meanwhile refused refused thethe Presidency
Presidency
request for the the return of the TO’s weaponry,
the TO's weaponry, which the the
All
All the
the catalysts that had brought
catalysts that brought war Slovenia and
war to Slovenia Army had confiscated
confiscated in in 1990.88 Bosnia’s Muslims
1990.88 Bosnia's
Croatia-paranoia, ethnic
Croatia-paranoia, ethnic referendums, covert arm-
referendums , covert arm Croats had by
and Croats by this point left
this point left the JNA, and Serb
the JNA, Serb
ing, the formation
ing, the paramilitaries, and “ethnic
formation of paramilitaries, "ethnic members of the
members TO ignored
the TO ignored the the mobilization
mobilization order. order.
cleansing”—finally
cleansing"-finally came together together in thethe first week of
first week of Now there were were two
two legally constituted armies
legally constituted armies in Bos
in Bos-
April
April in the Bosnian
in the town of Bijeljina.
Bosnian town Bijeljina. An ethnically
ethnically nia—the JNA
nia-the JNA and the the Bosnian
Bosnian TO-andTO—and they were were
divided town
divided 36,000 people
town of about 36,000 people inin the
the very north
very north- already at odds.
already odds.
east comer Bosnia, Bijeljina sat
comer of Bosnia, sat less than 15 15 kilo
kilo-
meters from
from the Serbian border
the Serbian border at the junction of two
the junction two The SOS
The SDS and thethe Bosnian Serbs had been making
Bosnian Serbs making
important roads.8l
important roads. The town
81 The town waswas key
key to
to the Serb
the Serb- their
their final preparations for the
final preparations the establishment
establishment of thethe
proclaimed "Semberija
“Semberija and Majevica AutonomousAutonomous Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”
in
proclaimed Serbian Herzegovina" in

Region," and the
Region,” the SDS
SOS had made substantial
substantial efforts
efforts March. The
March. The last step, taken as fighting
fighting flared in Bijel
flared in Bijel-
during 1991 and early
during 1991 1992 to
early 1992 “Serbianize” its
to "Serbianize" its police
police jina, was the creation
was the creation of an
an independent
independent Serb police
police
force
force and ensure Serb Serb political control
control of the town.82
the town.82 force, the MUP,
force, the MUP, on I April. SRBH President
April. SRBH President Karadzic
1
On 31
On 31 March,
March, in an apparent attempt to provoke
in an provoke an an the rest of the
and the the Serb leadership
leadership now were ready for
now were
armed Muslim response that would justify a Serb
response that
takeover of Bijeljina,
takeover Bijeljina. local
local Serbs attacked a Muslim
Serbs attacked Muslim-
coffee shop. The
frequented coffee
frequented The provocation
provocation worked.
worked. The The
135
135

a pretext to declare independence. The Bosnian
declare independence. Bosnian Presi-
Presi Serb Assembly was
Serb was declaring
declaring its secession
secession from
from the
the
dency's
dency’s decision to mobilize the
decision to TO on 4 April
the TO April gave new nation
new nation and claiming most of its
claiming most land area. Politi
its land Politi-
them that pretext. The Serbs immediately rejected
Serbs immediately rejected the
the appointed SRBH
cally appointed SRBH police officers quickly moved
police officers moved
mobilization order and activated
mobilization activated their Municipal establish control
to establish in those Serb-coveted
control in Serb-coveted areas where
where
Crisis Headquarters, police units,
Headquarters, reserve police units, and TO Serb officials
Serb officials had not already
already achieved
achieved quasi-indepen
quasi-indepen-
provocation in
forces.8989 The next provocation
forces. in the
the escalating crisis
escalating crisis status. When supporters
dent status. supporters of the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Republic
soon
soon came as Serb TO
as Serb troops and Serb
TO troops members of
Serb members contested this
contested this power
power grab
grab in
in several key towns,
several key towns, shoot
shoot-
the Bosnian Republic MUP antiterrorist
Bosnian Republic unit seized
antiterrorist unit seized ing erupted,
ing erupted, the
the fighting
fighting spread,
spread, and rival
rival govern
govern-
the Republican
Republican Police Academy
Academy on a key key hill
hill over
over- declared their opponents
ments declared opponents outlaws.
outlaws. The
The
looking central
central Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, apparently preparation for
apparently in preparation international community
international performed the diplo
community had performed diplo-
a Serb
Serb attempt to partition
partition the city force. Armed
city by force. matic equivalent of adopting
matic equivalent adopting aa stillborn
stillborn child.
child.
clashes soon spread to other parts of Sarajevo.'!()
Sarajevo.90
Cease-fire negotiations and the
Cease-fire negotiations the deployment
deployment of smallsmall
JNA "peacekeeping"
JNA “peacekeeping” unitsunits failed
failed to halt
halt the fighting.9|
fighting. 91 Yugoslav
Yugoslav People’s Army Objectives, Strategy, and
People's Army
Operations in April-May 1992*
Operations 1992*
Warfare: April 1992

Open Warfare: As
As war
war erupted
erupted in April, the JNA
in April, continued to follow
JNA continued follow
its schizophrenic,
its two-track policy of attempting
schizophrenic, two-track attempting to
Declared
Declared or not, the the Bosnian
Bosnian civil war war began on defuse
defuse hostilities
hostilities and arrange
arrange negotiations
negotiations among
among the
the
April 1992 in
6 April in reaction
reaction to the Republic’s formal
the Republic's formal dec
dec- groups while continuing
ethnic groups
three ethnic continuing to provide
provide practi
practi-
laration
laration of independence
independence from SFRY?”3
from the SFRY. 9293 This is
is cal support
cal support to
to the
the Bosnian Serbs. As
Bosnian Serbs. As the fighting
fighting esca
esca-
not to say that no blood
blood had been shed in in Bosnia lated, the Army’s
lated, Army's objectives
objectives and
and actions
actions veered
veered
before then. During March 1992,
before 1992, Croat JNA/Serb
Croat and JNA/Serb between the
between two poles,
the two poles, and its exact role
role in
in some
some
forces
forces clashed
clashed in in Bosanski
Bosanski Brod along the Republic’s
along the Republic's remains obscure.
events remains obscure. What
What is
is clear
clear is
is that the JNA,
JNA,
northern Sava River border.
northern Sava border. By I1 April organized vio
April organized vio- already at war
already war with
with the Croatian Army, came to
the Croatian
lence begun with
lence had begun with the fighting in
interethnic fighting
the interethnic Bijel
in Bijel- believe that Croatian
believe Croatian forces
forces had intervened in Bosnia
intervened in
jina. Serb
Serb forces
forces had begun positioning
positioning themselves
themselves on on Bosnian Serbs
to threaten Bosnian Serbs in
in Kupres, Bosanski Brod,
Kupres, Bosanski
Vraca hill south Sarajevo on 4 April,
south of Sarajevo April, and shooting
shooting and southern Herzegovina. The JNA
southern Herzegovina. JNA responded
responded to to this
this
broke out in Sarajevo
broke Sarajevo on 5 April. It
5 April. was on 66 April,
It was April, perceived threat with
perceived with direct military action,
direct military action, joining
however, that fighting
however, fighting ceased to to be local and sporadic
be local sporadic forces
forces with Serb Territorial Defense
Bosnian Serb
with Bosnian Defense troops.
troops.
and flared into a country-wide
flared into conflict. After that day,
country-wide conflict. Elsewhere, however, JNA
Elsewhere, however, commanders appear to have
JNA commanders have
population—Serb, Croat,
the entire population-Serb, Croat, and Muslim;
Muslim; man, to fulfill
tried to
tried fulfill their
their peacekeeping mission of providing
peacekeeping mission providing
woman
woman and child;child; near or far from
from the frontlines—
the frontlines- a buffer
buffer between
between the republican and
the republican Serb TO
and Bosnian Serb TO
found themselves
found themselves in a country undeniably at war.
country undeniably war. forces. In practice,
forces. practice, however,
however, these actions
actions were
were ren
ren-
There was no longer
There longer any avoid choosing
way to avoid
any way choosing sides.
sides. almost completely
dered almost completely ineffective
ineffective by the JNA’s
by the JNA's
overt
overt sympathy toward the Serbs,
sympathy toward Serbs, who
who were
were never
never
That day—as the Bosnian
That same day-as Serbs prepared
Bosnian Serbs to take
prepared to attacked punished. In many
attacked or punished. many incidents—including
incidents-including
throughout their
control throughout
full and overt control new republic—
their new republic- the capture Zvomik-the JNA
capture of Zvomik—the JNA would provide
provide direct
direct
the European Community formally recognized
European Community recognized support in
support in aa Serb attack or
Serb attack occupation of aa town.
or occupation town.
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a fully sovereign,
Bosnia-Herzegovina sovereign, independent
independent
country. United States followed suit the
country. The United the next day.
day. The overriding priority for the JNA,
overriding priority JNA, however.
however,
remained
remained the security of its
the security barracks and depots—
its barracks depots-
earlier stated that, if
Radovan Karadzic had earlier
Radovan if Bosnia ’
For a detailed account ofJNA
· For of JNA objectives and strategy
strategy see Annex
Annex
should ever be recognized
should recognized asas in independent nation,
in independent nation, itit 23: Yugoslav
Yugoslav People’s
People's Army
Army Objectives, Strategy. and Operations,
Objectives, Strategy, Operations,
survive a single
would not survive single day. He
He was
was as
as good as his
good as his April-May
April-May 1992.
word. At virtually the
word. moment the Europeans
the same moment Europeans
and Americans were recognizing
Americans were recognizing Bosnia as as a sover
sover-
nation within its republic
eign nation boundaries, the Bosnian
republic boundaries, Bosnian
136
136

particularly
particularly in light
light of its
its experience Croatia—and
experience in Croatia-and (RDB) special operations
(RDB) special unit, and JNA
operations unit, JNA regular
regular
it reacted fiercely
fiercely any time these werewere threatened. troops, all
troops, all supported by JJNA
supported by NA artillery
artillery fire
fire from
from Serbia.
Serbia.
Bosnian Republic TO
When Bosnian TO troops
troops blockaded
blockaded JNAJ NA The Muslim
Muslim forces
forces inside
inside the town
town apparently
apparently were
were
barracks beginning I1 May and attacked evacuees
barracks beginning evacuees from
from mostly Patriotic
mostly Patriotic League
League defenders
defenders led by an individ
led by individ-
the JNA Second
the JNA Second Military Headquarters in
Military District Headquarters in ual named
named “Captain
"Captain Almir”96 whose real
Almir" 96 whose real name was
was
Sarajevo, the JJNA
Sarajevo, NA gave its full support
support to the Bosnian
Bosnian Samir Nistovic. 97 All
Samir Nistovic.97 All available
available evidence
evidence indicates
indicates that
Serb military and police
Serb military forces. JNA
police forces. JNA units helped
units helped Captain Almir’s
Captain Almir's Muslim
Muslim forces
forces were few in
were few in number
number or
or
organize
organize the siege of Sarajevo assisted in the cap
Sarajevo and assisted cap- poorly organized-and probably
poorly organized—and probably both.
both.
ture of a number
number of Serb
Serb objectives. The JNA’s
objectives. The JNA's days inin
Bosnia, though,
Bosnia, were already
though, were numbered. Bowing to
already numbered. The first fighting broke
first fighting broke out in around Zvomik
in and around Zvornik on
the fact of Bosnian
Bosnian (and Macedonian) independence,
Macedonian) independence, April, and at
8 April, time JNA
at the same time JNA artillery
artillery blatantly
blatantly
April the
on 27 April the SFRY Presidency
Presidency had proclaimed
proclaimed a shelling Zvomik
began shelling Zvornik from
from inside
inside Serbia
Serbia onon the far
far
Federal Republic consisting
new Federal
new Serbia and Mon
consisting of Serbia Mon- side of the river.98 The now-notorious
the river.98 now-notorious “Arkan”
"Arkan" arrived
arrived
tenegro, and had ordered
ordered that all
all federal personnel of
federal personnel on the
the scene that evening
evening and delivered
delivered anan ultimatum,
ultimatum,
these nationalities
nationalities be withdrawn
withdrawn fromfrom Bosnia.
Bosnia. By ordering the Muslims of the
ordering the Zvomik municipality
the Zvornik municipality to to
20 May this had been generally
generally accomplished,
accomplished, and the hand over
over their arms by the following morning
arms by morning or or
JNA’s headquarters
JNA's headquarters staffs
staffs and formations
formations stationed
stationed in “experience the fate of Bijeljina.”""
"experience Serb forces
Bijeljina." 99 Serb forces sur
sur-
drained of Serbians
Bosnia, drained
Bosnia, Serbians and Montenegrins
Montenegrins (as town while the
rounded the town
rounded the Muslims manned
manned hastily
hastily
well as Croats and Muslims), became
as Croats became the nucleus of
the nucleus thrown-together barricades on
thrown-together barricades on the outskirts
outskirts and waited
waited
new Bosnian
the new Serb Army.
Bosnian Serb Army. anxiously
anxiously through night. 1cxiMinutes after the ulti-
through the night.'°° ulti
matum expired
matum morning, the Serb
expired the next morning, forces
Serb forces
Chapter 20
Chapter began their attack. Within hours
hours they had occupied
occupied the
Northeastern Bosnia, April 1992:
1992: The
The Axe Falls‘
Falls* town, and Muslim
town, Muslim resistance
resistance within
within the town effec
the town effec-
tively by nightfall.
tively ceased by nightfall.
Zvomik
Zvornik The
The Yugoslav People's Army actively
Yugoslav People’s actively supported
supported thethe
Serb forces assaulting
Serb forces Zvomik, something
assaulting Zvornik, something itit had not
At the beginning
beginning of April April 1992, Zvomik was
1992, Zvornik was a town
town Bijeljina_w,Indeed,
done in Bijeljina.'°' JNA made no effort
Indeed, the JNA effort to
15,000 people
of about 15,000 people (60 percent of them Muslims) conceal
conceal its involvement
involvement at Zvomik, and an
at Zvornik, an official
official
nestled
nestled on the the west
west bank the Drina River.
bank of the River. AA two
two- JNA statement from
JNA from 1010 April announced that follow
April announced follow-
bridge connected
lane bridge connected it withwith the even
even smaller town of
smaller town ing
ing Croat-Muslim “provocations” the area,
"provocations" in the
Mali Zvomik on the opposite
Mali Zvornik bank of the river
opposite bank river in
in Ser
Ser-
bia. Interethnic
bia. violence came to
lnterethnic violence region on
to the region on the and Territorial
JNA and Defense units
Territorial Defense entered
units ..... . entered
winds of the republic-wide
winds turbulence that followed
republic-wide turbulence Zvornik, pushed
Zvornik, pushed the paramilitary formations
formations out
the independence
independence referendum
referendum results announced
announced on on of town,
of established order,
town, established order, and
and restored
restored commucommu-
2 March; two
2 two weeks Zvomik’s Serbs
weeks later, Zvornik's Serbs proclaimed
proclaimed nications. '02
nications. 102
own independent
their own “Serbian Municipality of
independent "Serbian
Zvornik." 94 At
Zvomik.”94 the end of March,
At the March, thethe Zvomik
Zvornik police
police It was the RDB’s
It was RDB's elite
elite special operations unit
special operations unit that
force split into
force split into two
two rival bands.9595 By
rival bands. By the republic’s
republic's would be
be identified
identified as
as the
the decisive
decisive force in the brief
force in
declaration independence on 6 April,
declaration of independence April, emotions
emotions had battle for Zvomik.
Zvornik. The Serb extremist Vojislav
Serb extremist Vojislav Seselj
Seselj
fever pitch.
reached fever pitch. later
later bragged:
bragged:
The Serb forces

forces that rose
rose to attal:k the Zvornik area
attack the The Bosnian forces took part
Bosnian Serb forces part in it.
it. But the
the
were hodgepodge of professional
were a hodgepodge ultranational
professional and ultranational- special units
special and the best combat
units and combat units
units came
came
ist troops, Zvomik TO,
troops, including elements of the Zvornik TO, this side
from this side [Serbia].
{Serbia]. These were police
These were
possibly
possibly some local police, Arkan’s
local police, Arkan's unit,
unit, Serbian
Serbian units-the so-called Red
units—the Red Berets-special units of
Berets—special units of
ultranationalist
ultranationalist leader Seselj “Serbian Chetnik
Seselj’s's "Serbian Chetnik the Serbian Interior Ministry of
the Serbian Belgrade. The
of Belgrade. The
Movement,” Serbian State Security
Movement," the Serbian Security Department
Department
‘
For a detailed
• For detailed account of the
account of fighting in northeastern
the fighting northeastern Bosnia
Bosnia in
April 1992, see
April see Annex Northeastern Bosnia,
Annex 26: Northeastern Bosnia. April 1992: The
Axe Falls.
Axe Falls.
137
137

army
army engaged
engaged itself
itself to
to a small
small degree-it gaw'
degree—it gave members
members of thethe Patriotic League. At
Patriotic League. At most,
most, there may
may
artillery support where it was
support where The oper
was needed. The oper- armed Muslims in
have been 250 armed in the Visegrad area,
the Visegrad
ation
ation had been prepared
prepared for
for a long
long time . .... not necessarily
necessarily all
all answering
answering to any
any single
single authority.
authority.
Everything
Everything was organized and
was well organi;_ed
implemented. ‘03 Details of the
Details the contest in
in Visegrad
Visegrad are
are very hazy. The
very hazy.
implemented. 1113
heaviest
heaviest fighting
fighting appears to occurred 88 April
to have occurred April
Zvomik typifies
The capture of Zvornik typifies how
how the well
the well- around
around the police station
the police station and
and as
as Serb
Serb forces
forces made
made an
an
organized
organized Serb
Serb forces
forces (created. supplied. and backed
(created, supplied, backed organized clear Muslim
drive to clear
organized drive Muslim forces
forces from
from the left
left
“ Panic
by the
the State Security Department of the
Security Department Serbian Inter
the Serbian Inter- bank of the
bank the Drina during
during the
the day.‘
day. 111 Panic gripped
gripped the
Ministry), the Serbian
nal Affairs Ministry). RDB’s own
Serbian RDB's forces,
own forces, population
population as as rumors circulated of Arkan’s
rumors circulated Arkan's imminent
imminent
J NA could
and the JNA collaborate to rapidly
could collaborate demolish a
rapidly demolish a approach
approach (which were were false);
false); by
by the next
next morning
morning the
the
stunned, ill-equipped.
stunned. ill-equipped, and disorganized
disorganized Muslim entire Muslim population had
Muslim population had fled Visegrad and
fled Visegrad and its
environs. ‘3
resistance. environs.‘ 112
Pockets of armed
Pockets armed Muslim
Muslim resistance
resistance seem to havehave sur
sur-
Visegrad vived for a few
vived few days
days after the fall of Visegrad
after the Visegrad itself.
itself.
As the town being overrun,
town was being overrun, Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb forces
forces
South Zvomik lay the east Bosnian
South of Zvornik Bosnian town
town of VisegViseg- appear to
to have
have wiped detachment of “Green
wiped out aa detachment "Green
rad, once a Turkish stronghold
stronghold in Bosnia.
Bosnia. In
In 1571
1571 the Berets" roadblock near the town
manning aa roadblock
Berets" manning town of Rudo
‘3 Serb forces also
Ottoman Vizier
Ottoman Vizier of Bosnia commissioned
commissioned the the empire's
empire’s on the
the Bosnian-Serbian
Bosnian-Serbian border.‘
border. 113 Serb forces also
greatest architect. Sinan, to design
architect. Sinan, build a 180-
design and build 180 snuffed local Muslim
snuffed out local resistance in
Muslim resistance nearby vil
in the nearby vil-
yard, Ill-arched
yard. bridge over the Drina there. This
I-arched bridge over the next
lages over
lages next few days. 114 “5
few days.“4 115 Minor
Minor skirmishing
skirmishing
architecture was to
jewel of Turkish architecture to provide
provide thethe inspi
inspi- may have continued for as
have continued as much
much as as aa week
week after
after the
ration acclaimed book
ration for the acclaimed The Bridge on the Drina
book The Drina 7 April
April attack,
attack, but the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs had effectively
effectively
author, Ivo ‘6
Yugoslavia’s only Nobel Prize—winning
by Yugoslavia's Prize-winning author, established
established control over the area within 48
control over 48 hours.‘
hours. 116
Andric.“H
Andric. 11 Andric’s bridge
)4 Andric's bridge imagery
imagery notwithstanding,
notwithstanding,
the Visegrad municipality had been fracturing
Visegrad municipality since
fracturing since
January 1992, when
January when its Serbs
Serbs voted to two of the
to join two the Foca
Foca
self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed “Serb Autonomous
"Serb Regions, while
Autonomous Regions,
the town’s Muslims remained
the town's remained loyal
loyal to
to the
the Sarajevo
Sarajevo The ethnically
The ethnically split town of Foca
split town Foca (52 percent Muslim,
(52 percent Muslim,
government.
government.‘05 JO'The same disputes
disputes over municipal
municipal percent Serb),
45 percent Serb). about
about 20
20 km southwest of Gorazde,
km southwest Gorazde,
authority
authority and the composition
composition of the police force that
police force sat along aa north-south
sat along north-south road
road running alongside the
running alongside
had been seen in Zvornik led tension, barricades,
led to tension, barricades, River. As
Drina River. As elsewhere
elsewhere in in the Drina valley,
valley, there
‘07 ‘08 ‘09
and low-level violence
violence in Visegrad
Visegrad asas well.
well.I06
IOh 107 108 io 9 had been trouble
trouble in Foca for weeks
in Foca before April
weeks before April
Il IO
10
1992. 117 "8
1992.“7 118 On 23 March,
On 23 series of inter
March, following aa series inter-
ethnic confrontations,
ethnic local SDS
confrontations, the local SDS Crisis Center
Center
Open warfare erupted on 7 April
Open warfare April when
when Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb "state of readiness”
declared a “state
declared readiness" because of the “threat
"threat-
Defense forces
Territorial Defense forces moved control of
moved to seize control security of the minority
ened security minority Serb population in
Serb population in
town. The local
the town. local Serb TOTO probably numbered some
probably numbered some Gorazde” and stated that,
Gorazde" that, if
if peace were
were not
not restored
restored
1,000 irregular
1,000 irregular troops backed by roughly
troops backed roughly I100
00 to
to 200 that same day, party would call
day, the party call on
on the Serbs of
the Serbs
‘9
municipal police, and these would most likely be
municipal police, Foca to arm themselves.‘
Foca themselves. 119
JNA 37th (Uzice)
soldiers of the JNA
assisted by some soldiers
Corps. Against
Corps. Against this array Visegrad's Bosnian Muslim
Visegrad’s Bosnian Muslim Organized Serb
Organized forces in
Serb forces consisted primarily
in the area consisted
forces clearly overmatched
forces were clearly overmatched in numbers, organi
in numbers, organi- of the Foca Territorial Defense,
Foca Territorial Defense, numbering
numbering probably
probably
zation, and weapons.
zation. weapons. TheThe Muslims probably still had a
probably still about 1,000 Elements of other
troops. Elements
1.000 troops. other Territorial
few of the local
few local police and reserve police forces—
police forces-
perhaps 100 men—and perhaps several
100 or so men-and several dozen
dozen
138
138

Defense
Defense units from
from nearby
nearby towns
towns (at very least,
(at the very least. the further Serb
further Serb advances while holding
advances while holding out
out in
in aa few
few other
other
Cajnice TO)
Cajnice TO) probably assisted,‘20I20 and as many
probably assisted, many as 200200 areas . Serb
areas. Serb units proceeded to mop
units proceeded mop up captured areas,
up captured
local
local MUP forces
forces were probably
probably also involved.
involved. At repeating their
repeating demands for the
their demands surrender of Muslim
the surrender Muslim
least in the
the later stages of the operation.
operation, the Bosnian
Bosnian forces in
forces in the
the remaining villages. 111 '32
remaining villagesi" When Serb
112 When Serb
Serbs
Serbs were
were also reinforced
reinforced by volunteers from Seselj's
volunteers from Seselj’s forces had finally
forces all Muslim
crushed all
finally crushed resistance in
Muslim resistance in the
Serbian Chetnik Movement.
Serbian Chetnik Movement)“ 121 Finally, the JNA’s 37th
the JNA's Foca area itself,
Foca itself, the focus of the
the focus the Muslim
Muslim defense
defense
(Uzice) Corps may have provided
provided limited
limited support.
support. On
On shifted to the defensive
shifted to defensive ring
ring around
around Gorazde.
Gorazde.
the side, the
the Muslim side. the Foca SDA appears to have
Foca SDA have been
exceptionally
exceptionally well organized,
organized, and the several
several hundred
hundred
defenders were probably
probably thethe best armed and best orgaorga The Battle for
for Weapons:
Weapons: Capturing the JJNA
Capturing the NA
nized
nized in eastern Bosnia.
Bosnia. Their comparatively
comparatively high high Barracks
Barracks
level of organization
level armament gave the Foca
organization and armament Foca
Muslims a fighting
fighting chance
chance:: whereas
whereas Muslim forces forces inin Given Sarajevo's desperate need for weapons
Given Sarajevo’s weapons and the
Zvomik, and Visegrad
Bijelina, Zvornik, Visegrad had been all all but virtual impossibility of importing
virtual any from
importing any abroad in
from abroad in
wiped
wiped out within a day or two, two, those in in and around
around the near term,
term, itit was
was imperative
imperative that
that the government
government
Foca resist for almost
Foca were able to resist weeks.
almost three weeks. forces capture
forces capture as
as much
much materiel
materiel as
as possible from JNA
possible from JNA
stores in
in Bosnia at at the
the outset of the war.
war. Surrounded
Surrounded
When Bosnia formally declared declared its independence
independence on JNA
JNA garrisons munitions factories
garrisons and munitions factories became
became prime
prime
April, the Foca
6 April. Foca Serbs took took over
over the the municipal insti-
municipal insti targets.
including the police,
tutions, including
tutions, police, and declared themselves
declared themselves
loyal SRBH and independent
loyal to the SRBH independent of the Sarajevo Sarajevo The Bosnian Army
The Bosnian Army was plagued from
was plagued from the start by by
government.
government.‘22 I22 Sporadic fighting by the
Sporadic fighting the evening
evening of acquisition
acquisition and allocation problems, for even
allocation problems, even the little
little
focused on a contest for control
April focused
8 April control of thethe hydro-
hydro equipment itit possessed or captured
equipment often proved
captured often proved useuse-
electric plant
electric plant near the the town.
town.‘23 In the
I2 .11n estab
the pattern estab- less. For instance,
less. Bosnian Army’s
instance, the Bosnian Army's Sarajevo-based
Sarajevo-based
lished Zvomik, the
lished at Zvornik, Serbs on 9 April
the Serbs April formally First Corps appears to have
First Corps have captured
captured aa relatively
relatively large
large
declared that the local
declared local Muslims could could either surrender
either surrender amount of field
amount field artillery—but
artillery-but the Army Army waswas unable
unable to
retribution. When
their arms or face retribution. When the deadline
deadline find ammunition for these pieces,
find ammunition pieces, and mostmost of these
passed later that day, Serb Serb forces
forces began a mortar mortar bar bar- weapons lay
weapons lay idle
idle during
during thethe war.
war. When
When the Patriotic
Patriotic
rage against the Muslim-majority Donje Polje and League successfully
League stormed the
successfully stormed the Pretis factory in
Pretis factory in Vog
Vog-
Sukovac neighborhoods.
Sukovac neighborhoods.‘24 The next few
124 The few days saw the osca in mid-April 1992,
in mid-April captured some
1992, they captured some 800
800
resistance in the Drina valley
most intense Muslim resistance valley of "Osa" 90-min
“Osa” antitank rockets,
90-mm antitank rockets, but no no rocket
rocket launch
launch-
'26 Most of the town indication of how
April 1992.125
April 1992. 125126 town became a no-man’sno-man's It is
ers. It an indication
is an how desperate the Bosnians
Bosnians
land by day and a looter’s
land looter's paradise
paradise by by night. 127 By
night.‘27 By were
were in in the early days of the war
early days war that they
they directed
directed
April, the Serbs-frustrated
14 April,
14 Serbs—frustrated with with their inability to Sulejman Vranj to fly
then Colonel Sulejman at great risk from
fly at from
dislodge
dislodge the stubborn Muslim
the stubborn defenders from
Muslim defenders from thethe Sarajevo to Visoko
Sarajevo Visoko and backback just
just to
to bring
bring aa single
single
Donje Polje district-battered neighborhood with
district—battered the neighborhood with shoulder-fired rocket
shoulder-fired rocket launcher
launcher intointo the city so the cap
the city cap-
concentrated mortar
concentrated fire and eventually
mortar fire eventually priedpried the
the tured rockets
rockets could
could be utilized.
utilized. The
The precious
precious weapon
weapon
defenders out of a high-rise
Muslim defenders high-rise building that that had was driven from
was driven place to place
from place place and used at at critical
given
given snipers
snipers a dominating overlooking the
position overlooking
dominating position throughout the city
points throughout
points city for weeks
weeks afterward.‘33
afterward. 1.1.1
town. I28 After this, the
town.‘28 overall Muslim
the overall defensive posi
Muslim defensive posi-
tion untenable, and most
tion became untenable, most Muslims had fled fled the An agreement on
An agreement evacuation of JNA
on the evacuation JNA forces
forces was
was
Foca area by 17
Foca 17 April.‘29130
April. I29 110 finally signed on
finally signed 18 May
on 18 May 1992
1992 (in conjunction with
(in conjunction with aa
very short-lived country-wide
very short-lived cease-fire). In general.
country-wide cease-fire). general.
The fall of the
The the town did not end Muslim
town did resistance,
Muslim resistance, the JNA
JNA was
was allowed to withdraw
allowed to withdraw its personnel from
its personnel from
which continued
continued in the area almost
in the until the end of
almost until surrounded
surrounded barracks along with
barracks along all JNA-owned
with all JNA-owned heavy
heavy
April. Muslim
April. forces appear to have
Muslim forces have rallied
rallied in the weapons and soldiers’
weapons soldiers' small
small arms. Bosnian Territorial
arms. Bosnian
JNA arms warehouse)
Ustikolina area (site of a JNA warehouse)
between Foca Gorazde and attempted to block
Foca and Gorazde
139
139

Defense weapons—confiscated
Defense weapons-confiscated from republic in
from the republic restraining influence of the
restraining influence the federal hierarchy, the Bos
federal hierarchy, Bos-
stored in JJNA
1990 and stored NA facilities
facilities since then-were to
since then—were nian believed that Muslims and Croats
Serbs believed
nian Serbs Croats would
be turned over
be turned over to the besieging government forces.“
besieging government forces. 114 dominate such a state
dominate such state to detriment of the Serbs.
to the detriment Serbs.
Later in 1992
Later in 1992 the
the Bosnian Serb Assembly formally
Bosnian Serb
In some cases, the
In evacuation of JNA
the evacuation JNA forces
forces and the the codified aims, explicitly spelling
war aims,
codified its war spelling out the objec
objec-
handover of T0
handover TO weapons
weapons proceeded
proceeded smoothly
smoothly and tives and future
tives borders of the
future borders the of the Serbian
Serbian Republic
without incident. Travnik Barracks
without incident. Barracks had already
already been Bosnia-Herzegovina—soon redesignated
of Bosnia-Herzegovina-soon redesignated the
transferred to
transferred to Muslim-Croat forces on 6 May
forces on May under
under aa “Republika Srpska”:
"Republika Srpska":
locally negotiated Patriotic
arrangement. 115 Muslim Patriotic
negotiated arrangement.I35
League fighters
League seized Visoko’s
fighters seized Visoko's “Ahmet
"'Ahmet Fetahagic"
Fetahagic” -• Separate the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs from Bosnia because
Serbs from because
Barracks
Barracks on 26-27 April, allowing the JNA
26-27 April, JNA troops
troops to “outside Yugoslavia we
"outside we dodo not have
have a future in
future in
with their personal
depart with Zenica's “Josip
only. Zenica’s
personal arms only. "Josip someone
someone else's country."
else’s country.”
Jovanovic” barracks
Jovanovic" complex was
barracks complex was blockaded
blockaded on on
8 May, and at
8 at least the equipment inside
the TO equipment inside had been •' Create
Create aa corridor western Bosnia (the
corridor linking western (the
Bosnian Army by '17
handed over
over to to the
the Bosnian by 18 May. Uh 137
18 May.‘36 Bosanska Krajina) to
Bosanska through the Posavina,
Serbia through
to Serbia Posavina,
Tuzla’s “Husinska Buna”
Tuzla's "Husinska Buna" Barracks
Barracks was turned
turned over
over placing border of the Serb
the border
placing the Serb Republic on
on the Sava
Sava
around
around 16 May.1.1x In
16 May.l38 In western Bosnia. the JNA
western Bosnia, JNA surren
surren- River.
River.
control of two
dered control two barracks
barracks outside
outside Bihac on on
19 May.
19 140141
1_19140
May_139 141 '• “" ... the Drina River is not a border,"
. . . the border,” and the
Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb Republic should
should be allowed
allowed to unite
unite
In other cases, however,
however, the facilities had already
the facilities already been with
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
new Federal
the new Yugoslavia.
taken by storm, the
by storm. evacuations were
the evacuations were delayed,
delayed, or
or the
the
JNA forces
retreating JNA were attacked. HV
forces were HV and HVO HVO '• The border of the
The border with the Muslim
Serb Republic with
the Serb Muslim
Capljina's “Milo
forces had attacked Capljina’s
forces Popara" Bar
"Milo Popara” Bar- and Croat section of Bosnia should
Croat section should run
run along
along the
the
before the war
racks even before began. The JNA
war began. JNA evacuated Neretva Una Rivers,
Neretva and Una Rivers, in
in addition to the Sava.
addition to Sava.
the large
large military
military school
school at Pazaric
Pazaric uneventfully,
uneventfully, but
not until May. It
until 30 May. It was the JNA
was the barracks in
JNA barracks in Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, '• The Serb
Serb Republic should receive part of the
should receive city of
the city
however,
however, that werewere toto prove contentious and
prove the most contentious Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
require the most
require difficult negotiations.
most difficult negotiations. Evacuations
Evacuations of
the JNA installations
major JNA
the major installations in the city—the “Marshal
city-the "Marshal '• The Serb
Serb Republic should
should have access to the sea.'45
sea. 140
Tito”
Tito" Barracks
Barracks along
along sniper alley, and the
sniper alley, “Viktor
the "Viktor
Bubanj,” “Jusuf
Bubanj." Dzonlic,” and "Jajce"
"JusufDzonlic," “Jajce” Barracks
Barracks elseelse- In other words,
words, the
the Bosnian Serbs wanted
Bosnian Serbs wanted to create an
where around
where city—were originally to have
around the city-were have begun
begun independent, territorially
independent, territorially contiguous republic that
contiguous republic
on 1919 May but were delayed repeatedly. The Viktor
delayed repeatedly. Viktor could
could eventually rejoin the Federal
eventually rejoin Federal Republic.
Republic.
Barracks was evacuated
Bubanj Barracks
Bubanj evacuated on on 24 May,
May, although
although (Although they never formally said so,
they never the Serb
so, the Serb lead
lead-
it is unclear
unclear whether
whether any Territorial DefenseDefense weapons
weapons ers were probably still willing
were probably willing to
to accept a single
single state
state
were left behinmehe
left behind. 14" The JNA unilaterally abandoned
JNA unilaterally abandoned organized into
organized into aa loose
loose confederation
confederation divided
divided into
into three
the Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks
the Barracks in Nedzarici on 28 May, May, ethnic “cantons,”
ethnic "cantons," a concept argued for before
concept they had argued before
leaving behind mortars
leaving behind mortars and other equipment
equipment as as the the war erupted.) Unstated
war erupted.) Unstated but essential
essential to the Serbs’
Serbs'
troops
troops escaped overnight
overnight to Serb-held Ilidza.
to Serb-held 143 The
llidza.143 achievement of their
physical achievement
physical their geopolitical
geopolitical goals
goals and
Marshal Tito Barracks-largest
Marshal Barracks—largest of the J NA casernes
the JNA the ending war would be the acquiescence
ending of the war acquiescence of
in Sarajevo—was
in Sarajevo-was not evacuated until June.‘44
until 5 June. 144 the Muslim
the Muslim and Croat leadership in
Croat leadership in these objectives.
objectives.
In the event,
In event, the Serbs would find
the Serbs find creating
creating their repub
repub-
Chapter 21
Chapter 21 lic far
lic far easier than ending the war
ending the war on their terms. A
their terms. A fur
fur-
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb War Aims and Military
War Aims Military Strategy, ther, unstated war aim also
war aim also appears to have been that
1992
1992 population of the
the population the new state, Republika
new state, Republika Srpska,
Srpska,
must
must be be almost
almost purely Serb. Although little
purely Serb. little evidence
evidence
Bosnian Serb
The Bosnian Serb political leadership, Radovan
leadership, led by Radovan exists the most
exists that the senior of the SDS
most senior SDS leaders,
leaders, such
such as
as
Karadzic,
Karadzic, formed
formed their own entity
their own entity and went to war
went to war in
in Karadzic and Krajisnik,
Krajisnik, officially approved such
officially approved such a
April 1992
April 1992 because they did
did not wish to be part of an
wish to an war aim, the systematic
war aim, systematic wayway in which the Bosnian
Bosnian
independent, unitary Bosnian
independent, unitary state. Without the
Bosnian state. the
140
140

Serbs, particularly
Serbs, particularly local SDS organizations,
local SOS organizations. carried
carried most reviled
most reviled armies
armies world. The Vojske
in the world. Vojske Repub
Repub-
in
out their ethnic
ethnic cleansing
cleansing operations makes itit almost
operations makes almost like Srpske
like Srpske (VRS—Army of the Serb
(YRS-Army Serb Republic), was was
certain
certain that they had high-level
high-level direction.
direction. formed melding of two
through the melding
formed through distinct forces,
two distinct forces.
superimposing
superimposing the structure of the
the structure the JNA‘s Second Mili
JNA's Second Mili-
To achieve
achieve the Serbs' primary war
Serbs’ primary aim of a contigu-
war aim contigu tary District over
over the disorganized, SDS-controlled
disorganized, SOS-controlled
ous state
state within its proposed “borders,” Bosnian
proposed "'borders," Bosnian Serb Serb Bosnian Serb
Bosnian Defense. The melding
Serb Territorial Defense. melding waswas
military strategy during
during 19921992 called
called for SerbSerb forces
forces to not an
not an altogether
altogether happy one. Differences
happy one. Differences between
between the
take the strategic
strategic offensive.
offensive. Through
Through a series of large large- VRS’s ex-JNA (and
YRS 's ex-JNA (and ex-Communist)
ex-Communist) seniorsenior command
command-
scale campaigns
campaigns and smallersmaller operations,
operations, the the Bosnian
Bosnian nationalists of the SDS
Serbian nationalists
ers and the Serbian SOS over
over war
war
Serb Army (YRS)
Serb (VRS) hoped
hoped to to seize key key territorial
territorial and aims,
aims, military strategy, and
and the SDS role
the SOS the Army
role in the Army
in
military strategy,
economic
economic objectives.
objectives. The The most important
important of these was was were to lead to political-military conflicts
were conflicts throughout
throughout
the establishment
establishment of a northern northern supply
supply corridor the war. These conflicts
war. These conflicts were exacerbated by
were exacerbated the well
by the well-
stretching
stretching across the Posavina
Posavina regionregion through
through the river
the river founded belief within the
founded the SDS
SOS that the VRS often
the YRS often
town
town of Brcko to link western western Bosnia
Bosnia to eastern Bos Bos- answered
answered more
more directly
directly toto Serbian
Serbian President
President
nia and northern
northern Serbia.
Serbia. Without
Without this this "Posavina
“Posavina corri- corri Milosevic Belgrade than it did to the Bosnian
Milosevic and Belgrade Bosnian
it
dor"
dor” the nascent Serb Serb state
state would have been a Serb Presidency.
Serb Presidency.
bifurcated one. The YRS
bifurcated VRS therefore
therefore launched
launched a large large
operation
operation lasting
lasting over
over sixsix months
months to open open and secure a The VRS
YRS was was initially organized into a Main
organized into Main Staff and
a
corridor from
corridor from Doboj to to Brcko. The second second significant
significant five
five regional
regional corps (later joined by
corps (later by a sixth)
sixth) with
with some
some
a
VRS operation
YRS operation was was the campaign
campaign to capture the the town
town 80 maneuver brigades and regiments,
maneuver brigades plus a full
regiments, plus full com
com-
a
of Jajce and the territory
territory around
around it, including two two plement of support formations, by
support formations, by the end of 1992.
1992.
it.
plement
hydroelectric
hydroelectric plants
plants vital
vital toto the economic viability of
the economic of The force
force initially
initially comprised
comprised over over 250,000
250,000 troops—
troops-
Serb-controlled western Bosnia.
Serb-controlled western Earlier, the
Bosnia. Earlier, VRS had
the YRS 155,000 troops
falling to 155,000 troops by war’s
war's end-equipped
end—equipped
conducted
conducted a series of smaller smaller actions
actions in western
western Bos- Bos with 500 to 550 tanks,
with tanks, about
about 250
250 armored
armored personnel
personnel
in
a
nia to
to secure the against a Muslim-Croat
the area against Muslim-Croat military carriers
carriers or infantry fighting vehicles,
infantry fighting vehicles, some 500 to
some 500 to 600
a
threat that existed

existed only in in Serb propaganda, while
Serb propaganda, field
field artillery pieces, and 400
artillery pieces, 400 toto 500 heavy
heavy mortars.
mortars.
expelling
expelling most of the the Muslim-Croat population.population. The The The VRS’s
YRS's Air Air and
and AirAir Defense
Defense Force
Force had
had some
some 20 20
VRS sustained
YRS sustained and extended
extended the the siege of Sarajevo
Sarajevo to to fighter-bombers, 15
fighter-bombers, 15 light
light attack and observation
observation heliheli-
seize parts of the the city
city for a Bosnian Serb Serb capital
capital and, copters,
copters, and 15 transport helicopters.“
15 transport helicopters." One
One of the
a
more important,
important, maintain
maintain pressure
pressure on the the Bosnian
Bosnian Army’s first
Army's priorities was
first priorities to convert
was to mob of T0
convert the mob TO
Government
Government to meet Serb Serb terms. Smaller operations operations personnel into
personnel into properly organized, well-led light
properly organized,
swept
swept the length
length of the Drina valley against strong
strong brigades, while simultaneously
infantry brigades, simultaneously reining
reining in
in
valley against infantry
Bosnian Government
Bosnian resistance, often
Government resistance, often alternating
alternating autonomous volunteer
many of the virtually autonomous
many volunteer units.
units.
between
between the defensive
defensive and offensive.
offensive. The YRS VRS alsoalso
unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully attempted to secure one
one of the "bor-
the “bor Despite the JNA’s
Despite the recent war
JNA's recent war inin Croatia,
Croatia, relatively few
relatively few
ders” of Republika Srpska
ders" Srpska along
along the the Una River near of the JNA corps or maneuver
JNA corps brigades inherited
maneuver brigades inherited byby
Bihac in western Bosnia. Only in
western Bosnia. in southern
southern Herzegov
Herzegov- VRS had combat
the YRS combat experience, most of the
although most
experience, although
did the YRS
ina did VRS operate in a purely defensive mode,
purely defensive mode, Army’s senior and midlevel
Army's senior midlevel commanders
commanders and and staff
staff
a
defending “borders” against HV/l-IVO

defending the "borders" HY/HYO operations
operations officers had seen service
officers service during fighting in
during the fighting in neigh
neigh-
around Mostar and Trebinje.
around Trebinje. boring
boring republics. brain of the VRS,
republics. The brain YRS, the Main
Main Staff
(Glavni Stab), was formed
Stab), was from the
formed from remnants of the
the remnants the
Second Military District headquarters
Second Military headquarters and infused
infused
Mladic’s Own:
Own: The Bosnian Serb Army new life through
with new introduction of such
the introduction
'
Mladic's ArmyI46
146 • with through the such veteran
veteran
officers as
officers Mladic and
as Mladic the Chief of the Main
and the Main Staff,
Staff,
Created from
Created the ashes of the
from the JNA, the Bosnian
the JNA, Serb
Bosnian Serb Manojlo Milovanovic. The professionalism
Manojlo Milovanovic. professionalism of the
under General
Army under Ratko Mladic
General Ratko become one
Mladic was to become one “
of the most proficient For a description of
" For of the
the role which VRS Air
which the VRS Air and Air
Air Defense
a
of forces in the Balkans

proficient military forces Balkans
Force played in 1992,
1992, see
see Annex
Annex 33: The Role of
The Role of the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
during the 1992
during 1992 to
to 1995 war, as well as one of the
1995 war. Air and Air
Air Defense Force in 1992.
in
Air
'
· For
For a detailed of the
detailed discussion of the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb Army's ethos,
Army's ethos,
a
methods, sec
organization. and methods,
organization, see Annex
Annex 24: '"Mladic's
“Mladic's Own:
Own: The
Army.”
Bosnian Serb Army."
141
141

Main
Main Staff was to be be one of the
the VRS’s
VRS's key
key advantages Chapter
Chapter 22
22
throughout war. The most
throughout the war. most experienced corps com
experienced corps com- Bosnian Government War
Bosnian Government War Aims
Aims
the lst
mand was the
mand (formerly the JNA
I st Krajina Corps (formerly JNA and Military Strategy
5th Banja Luka Corps),
Corps), which formed the Army’s
formed the Army's
during the conflict.
backbone during
backbone conflict. From the
the outset of the war the
the war Bosnian Government
the Bosnian Government
found itself behind
found curve of events, leaving
behind the curve leaving itit with
with
The
The heart and soul VRS was
soul of the YRS Ralko Mladic.
was Ratko Mladic. His fundamental war
one fundamental war aim: survival. After the
simple survival.
aim: simple
charisma, combined
charisma, combined withwith an
an aggressive,
aggressive, no-compro
no-compro- first few
first in Bijelina, Zvomik,
few battles in Zvornik, and Foca,
Foca, it rap
rap-
mise attitude and a frontline
mise frontline leadership
leadership style, made
style, made idly became apparent
apparent that the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs were
Serbs were
him
him a hero among
among Serb soldiers and civilians alike.
Serb soldiers alike. fighting a war
fighting war for ethnic
ethnic purity
purity and territorial gains.
territorial gains.
Mladic
Mladic molded
molded and shaped the the Army into
into aa ruthless
ruthless The Bosnian
Bosnian Government’s
Government's basic objective was
basic objective was there
there-
and efficient
efficient machine
machine that made the the most of hishis own
own fore to retain
fore retain control over as
control over much of Bosnia's
as much terri-
Bosnia’s terri
fiery offensive
fiery offensive style,
style, cool. calculating JNA
cool, calculating staff work,
JNA staff work, tory as
tory as possible. Besides being
possible. Besides vital for military and
being vital
and the army's inherited firepower.
army’s inherited The VRS
firepower. The YRS waswas domestic political reasons,
domestic reasons, it was
was also
also critical
critical that the
Mladic’s army.
Mladic's defiance of Bosnian
army. His defiance Bosnian Serb Presi
Serb Presi- Sarajevo government
Sarajevo government convince
convince the international com-
international com
dent Karadzic on many key issues
many key issues throughout
throughout the war,
war. munity that Bosnia
munity Bosnia was a viable
viable state
state that merited
merited
culminating in
culminating in Karadzic’s
Karadzic's failed
failed attempt to relieve
relieve international
international attention
attention and involvement.
involvement.
him in late 1995,
him in demonstrated that the
1995, demonstrated the Army
Army
answered to one man,
answered man, Ratko
Ratko Mladic; and the the only man
man Bosnian Army
The Bosnian
The Army enjoyed modicum of central
enjoyed aa modicum central
Mladic was willing
Mladic was willing to answer
answer to waswas Slobodan
Slobodan organization from
organization coordination of
the start, and its coordination
from the
Milosevic. forces improved
forces improved somewhat
somewhat over first few
over the first few months.
months.
Bosnian
Bosnian Government objectives and military strategy
Government objectives
VRS’s impressive
Despite the VRS's
Despite impressive military
military capability,
capability, a tended to be locally focused,
focused, however,
however, and not coordi
coordi-
strategic reality
reality afflicted
afflicted it throughout
throughout the the war—the
war-the nated across
across regions. in the Drina valley
Forces in
regions. Forces valley or
lack of sufficient
lack sufficient troop
troop reserves, ensuring
ensuring that thethe Herzegovina, for instance,
Herzegovina, instance, operated almost
almost com
com-
Army would never never have thethe ability to deliver
deliver aa knock
knock- independently of those in,
pletely independently
pletely in, say,
say, the Posavina
Posavina oror
out blow to its enemies
enemies or adequately hold
or adequately hold a frontline
frontline western
western Bosnia. Regional commands
Bosnia. Regional commands did did occasionally
occasionally
of more
more than 1,000
1,000 kilometers.
kilometers. Even during 1992,
Even during 1992, the support each other,
support other, as
as when forces from the Herze
when forces Herze-
VRS
YRS was repeatedly forced
was repeatedly forced to shuttle
shuttle units
units across
across the govina area worked
govina worked to help those in
to help in Sarajevo
Sarajevo by
by oper
oper-
country from
country battle. This shortage
from battle to battle. shortage of reserves
reserves ating on Mt. Igman,
ating Igman, but this
this was
was the exception
exception rather
required
required the VRS
YRS to concentrate
concentrate on holding
on holding down
down than the A
the rule.
rule.
A tenuous
tenuous supply
supply train a trickle
train passed a
casualties and rely
casualties rely heavily concentrated firepower
heavily on concentrated firepower of weapons ammunition up from Croatia
weapons and ammunition Croatia through
through
in its operations.
in operations. Despite
Despite good doctrine, however,
good doctrine, however, Herzegovina and on
Herzegovina on to
to central northern Bosnia,
central and northern Bosnia,
inadequate
inadequate training hampered tactical
training hampered efficiency in
tactical efficiency in but in general the supply
in general system was
supply system also locally
was also
VRS
YRS units
units and kept casualties high. Substantial
casualties high. Substantial assis
assis- based. For the first year of the war,
first year war, both
both the govem
govern-
tance provided
provided by the Yugoslav Army (VJ
the Yugoslav (YJ)-the
)—the ment as
as a whole
whole and each govemment-held
government-held region
region
JNA’s
JNA's successor
successor in in Serbia Montenegro—through
Serbia and Montenegro-through- fought its
essentially fought
essentially own battle for survival.
its own survival.
out the war helped make
war helped shortfalls in officer
make up shortfalls officer and
NCO cadres, logistics,
NCO maintenance, but the VJ
logistics, and maintenance, VJ
never
never deployed combat formations
large combat
deployed large formations into
into Bosnia.
Bosnia. The Bosnian Territorial
The Bosnian Territorial Defense
Defense
The VJ,
VJ, Serbian
Serbian State Security Department (RDB),
Security Department (RDB),
Serbian Ministry of lntemal
and the Serbian Affairs sent only
Internal Affairs While the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian much of the infra
inherited much
Serbs inherited infra-
token combat
token combat units
units into
into the country
country during
during the fight-
the fight structure
structure and equipment the JNA
equipment of the in Bosnia,
JNA in Bosnia, the
probably never
ing and probably
ing never had moremore than 2,000
2,000 men in in Bosnian Muslims and Croats
Bosnian Croats started the war
war in control
in control
Bosnia atat a single time. The usual
single time. figure was
usual figure was almost
almost of virtually no installations and could hope
no Army installations hope to
certainly far lower.
certainly lower.
142
142
Digitized by Go gle Origiflill from

surround
surround only
only a comparative
comparative handful J NA garrisons
handful of JNA garrisons With war war already
already underway,
underway, itit waswas imperative
imperative that
that the
the
(for example,
example, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar,
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, Bihac) in the
the Bosnian Government establish
Bosnian Government establish some form of central-
some form central
hope of collecting
collecting their weapons.
weapons. ized
ized direction
direction over thethe fragmented,
fragmented, competing
competing com com-
mands and the the haphazard
haphazard mix mix of regular
regular and volunteer
volunteer
Bosnia's
Bosnia’s multiethnic
multiethnic character had prevented Sarajevo units
units loyalloyal to it. Fortunately,
Fortunately, the Patriotic League—no
the Patriotic League-no
it.
Sarajevo
from
from consciously
consciously transforming
transforming its Territorial
Territorial longer
longer an underground militia—agreed
an underground militia-agreed to to merge
merge its
its
Defense—much of which
Defense-much which was drawndrawn from
from Serb-
Serb volunteer
volunteer units units with the government-held
with the government-held fractionfraction of
majority
majority areas-into
areas—into an an independent
independent force
force toto counter
counter the
the Territorial Defense. On
Territorial Defense. On 10IO April
April the
the Patriotic
Patriotic
the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs. The The Slovenians
Slovenians had had an an ethni-
ethni League
League announced
announced that it was was effectively
effectively disbanding
disbanding
it
cally homogeneous
homogeneous force force committed
committed to independence,
independence, and "“ ... placing
placing itself atat the
the disposal
disposal of and ... .
.
.
.
.
.
but the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government couldcould not use its republic
republic de facto
facto joining the structure of the
the structure the Territorial Defense
Territorial Defense
TO to establish
establish or train a secret army without
without Bel-Bel .... . ""‘48
148At
At least in theory,
theory, the
the largest
largest paramilitary
paramilitary
in
grade instantly
instantly learning
learning about it. The SDA had
The SDA organization
organization and the the closest thing to a regular
closest thing regular Bosnian
Bosnian
a
attempted thethe next best thing,
thing, using
using the
the organization
organization military
military unit unit had merged
merged at the outset of the
at the the conflict.
conflict.
of the
the political party to conceal
conceal a paramilitary
paramilitary organi-
organi
zation.
zation. The
The Patriotic
Patriotic League
League (less than a year old old and On
On 1515 April 1992, when
April 1992, when the Bosnian Government
the Bosnian Government in in
with
with no formal
formal training
training or heavy
heavy weapons)
weapons) was no Sarajevo
Sarajevo declared
declared the
the establishment
establishment of a military
military force
force
a
however, for the
match, however, VRS, already
the VRS, already a regular,
regular, com-
com based on the
the former
former republic Territorial Defense,
republic Territorial Defense, the
the
bined-arms
bined-arms army. Therefore, when
army. Therefore, when Bosnia fractured
fractured Bosnian consisted of little
Bosnian Army consisted little more
more than thethe text of
three ways
ways in the
the opening
opening days of the war, the
the war, the republi-
republi the announcement. All
the announcement. All across
across the country. Bosnian
the country, Bosnian
Territorial Defense
can Territorial Defense did did so as well. In a country-
country Muslims and Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats were gathering up
were gathering up arms
arms
arms, weapons
wide race for arms.
wide stocks were
weapons stocks were seized by wherever could be
wherever they could found and using
be found using whatever
whatever
whichever
whichever ethnic group could get there first
group could first with the
with the structure happened to
structure happened exist locally—Territorial
to exist locally-Territorial
most people.
people. Defense, Patriotic
Defense, Patriotic League,
League, police forces, criminal
police forces,
gangs, or hodgepodge volunteer units—to
hodgepodge volunteer units-to organize
organize
By the
the eve of the the war JNAJNA headquarters in BelgradeBelgrade themselves for defense. For all
themselves all practical
practical purposes,
purposes, the
the
had gone a long long way toward its goal
way toward goal of reducing
reducing the the Bosnian Government had found
Bosnian Government found itself atat war
war without
without
potential threat of the
potential Bosnian Territorial
the Bosnian Territorial Defense
Defense to an
an army.
army. The price for this
The price this unreadiness
unreadiness wouldwould prove
prove
the JNA. As of 1992
the JNA. 1992 the Bosnian TO
the Bosnian TO had been shrunk
shrunk steep indeed,
indeed, and the
the Bosnian
Bosnian nation would pay it in
nation in
it
steep
from its all-time
from all-time high 300,000 troops
high of over 300,000 troops in the the blood.
blood.
mid- down to a theoretical
I 980s down
mid-19805 mobilized strength of
theoretical mobilized
only
only 86,000 troops.
troops. Almost all all of the TO’s weaponry
the TO's weaponry By late April the Bosnian
April the Government had reorga
Bosnian Government reorga-
had long
long since been moved JNA-controlled storage
moved to JNA-controlled nized the
nized the republic's Territorial Defense—omitting
republic’s Territorial Defense-omitting the the
sites. On paper the Bosnian TO may have had nine
the Bosnian nine Serb-held areas of Bosnia from
Serb-held from its organization
organization and
regional subcommands and tens of thousands
regional subcommands thousands of incorporating
incorporating the the Patriotic League's volunteers—into
Patriotic League’s volunteers-into
troops and weapons,
weapons, but the the reality
reality was that the terri
the terri- seven regional districts and 75
regional districts 75 municipal
municipal headquar
headquar-
tory,
tory. the
the manpower,
manpower, and the TO inventories
the TO inventories would all ters.I49 In total,
ters.149 the Bosnian
total, the Bosnian Government
Government probably
probably
divided (quite
be divided (quite unequally)
unequally) among Bosnia Bosnia’s's Serbs.
Serbs. started the war with
the war more than 100,000
with more I00,000 men
men but prob
prob-
Muslims, and Croats.
Muslims, Croats. The JNA passed the
The JNA lion’s share
the lion's ably
ably only 40,000 to 50,000
only 40,000 small arms and virtually
50,000 small
of the
the TO weaponry
weaponry to the Serbs, with
Bosnian Serbs,
the Bosnian with the
the no heavy
heavy weapons. Later it would surround
weapons. Later NA
few JNA
surround a few
it
Croat-dominated HVO
Croat-dominated HVO and HOS HOS obtaining
obtaining most of garrisons and confiscate
garrisons confiscate their
their weapons,
weapons, adding
adding proba
proba-
could be
what could be seized in Croat-majority
Croat-majority areas. The
areas. The bly several
bly several thousand
thousand moremore small arms, limited
small arms. limited
forces directed by the
forces Sarajevo government-by
the Sarajevo government—by this amounts of ammunition
amounts ammunition and explosives,
explosives, and atat most
most a
a
time a shaky de facto alliance alliance of armed ethnicethnic Mus

Mus- few dozen
few dozen tanks and artillery pieces. The
artillery pieces. The Bosnian
Bosnian
lims and ethnic Croat
lims militias—inherited what
Croat militias-inherited what little
little Croat militias,
Croat militias, the HOS and HVO,
the HOS HVO, had a combined
combined
a
‘47
remained. . 147
remained
143
143

strength of as many 25,000 adequately
many as 25.000 adequately armed offensive
offensive operations expand Croat
hold and expand
operations to hold Croat terri
terri-
troops with
with a handful
handful of heavy
heavy weapons-and.
weapons—and, of tory
tory while cutting
cutting the Bosnian Serbs' most
Bosnian Serbs’ most strategic
strategic
course, Croatian
course. Croatian Army suppon.
support. Their Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb supply in nonhern
line in
supply line Bosnia.
northern Bosnia.
adversaries
adversaries could. however, if fully mobilized,
could, however. field
mobilized. field
200,000 troops
more than 200,000 troops already
already established
established in doz-
doz Croatia
Croatia’s·s later effons
efforts to retake the southern Dalmatian
southern Dalmatian
ens of well-organized brigades
well-organized brigades and support
support forma-
forma coast and relieve
relieve the siege of Dubrovnik were pan of
were part
tions, with
tions. hundreds of tanks and APCs
with hundreds APCs and hundreds
hundreds its war
its war of independence,
independence. but they were were also
also directly
directly
more field
field anillery
artillery pieces
pieces.. The
The war
war began as a very
very related to occurring in
military events occurring
to military in southern
southern Herze-
Herze
uneven contest weighted
weighted heavily
heavily in the Serbs'
Serbs’ favor.
favor. govina Croatians would deploy
govina. . The Croatians troops into
deploy troops into
Herzegovina both to exploit
Herzegovina exploit terrain advantages and—
terrain advantages and-
Chapter 23
Chapter together with
with the Zagreb-controlled HVO—broaden
the Zagreb-controlled HYO-broaden
Croatian Political
Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy the front
front faced
faced byby Bosnian Serb Army and JNA
Bosnian Serb JNA forces
forces
in Bosnia, 1991-1992'
1991-1992’ so that the
the Serbs’
Serbs' resources
resources might
might be stretched to the
breaking point."
breaking point."
As it prepared for its own own independence.
independence, ZagrebZagreb’s's pri-
pri
mary
mary political objective
objective in Bosnia was to to secure the Chapter 24
Chapter
position Bosnian Croat
position of the Bosnian Croat population,
population, developing
developing Ethnic Cleansing as a Military Operation:
Ethnic Operation:
at least a measure of political autonomyautonomy in in the
the near Prijedor, Sanski Most,
Prijedor, Most, and Kljuc,
term, and working toward
term. toward either a panition
partition of Bosnia May-July 1992 150 W
May-July 1992‘50 •••
with the
with confederal state
the Serbs or a confederal with full Bosnian
state with Bosnian
Croat autonomy. The first
Croat autonomy. overt steps toward
first oven toward Bosnian
Bosnian Houses and whole
Houses and whole villages
villages reduced
reduced to ashes,
Croat
Croat political autonomy
autonomy came in November November 1991 1991 unarmed
unarmed andand innocent populations massacred
innocent populations massacred
with formation of the "Croatian
with the formation Community of
“Croatian Community en masse, incredible
incredible acts of violence, pillage
of violence,
Herceg-Bosna” (Hrvatska
Herceg-Bosna" (Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg-Bosna—
Zajednica Herceg-Busna- and
and brutality
brutality ofof every kind—such
kind-such werewere the
HZHB),). and soon after the
HZHB “Croatian Community
the "Croatian Community of means which
which were employed by the Serbo-Mon
were employed Serbo-Mon-
Bosanska
Bosanska Posavina
Posavina.”." President
President Tudjman efforts to
Tudjman’s's effons tenegrin soldiery, with
tenegrin soldiery, with a view
l'iew to the entire
entire trans-
trans
promote
promote an agreement with with Milosevic
Milosevic and the Bos- Bos formation of
fommtion 0f the ethnic character of
ethnic character regions. ‘5‘
of regions. 151
nian Serb leadership

nian leadership on the the possible
possible panition
partition of the
however, and on the International
Report on Commission
l11tematio11alCommission
country
country had begun early early that year.
year, however.
Causes and Conduct
to Inquire Into the Causes
Zagreb officials met several
Zagreb officials several times with with Bosnian
Bosnian Wars, Carnegie
Carnegie Endow
Endow-
of the Balkan Wars,
of
Croats in early
Croats early 1992
1992 toto try to harmonize
harmonize their objec-objec ment for lntemational
ment International Peace,
Peace . 1914
1914
tives. Western
tives. Western outrage over these doubledealings
doubledealings
The
The Chetniks started picking up civilians, and
Chetniks started
forced Zagreb
forced backtrack and promote
Zagreb to backtrack promote instead pub- pub
lic suppon
support for an Bosnian Republic while tac-
an intact Bosnian tac
asked about
about refugees from Rogatica.
refugees from Rogatica. They
They had
had
caught them and killed them all.
caught all. II did not
not see
itly approving Bosnian Croat
approving Bosnian moves toward
Croat moves toward
autonomy. military strategy that Zagreb
autonomy. The military Zagreb pursued
pursued
torture the civilians, but
them torture boasted in
bw they boasted in my
in suppon
support of these goals consisted of a two-track
goals consisted two-track plan plan
presence how
presence how many many Muslims each
each hadhad killed and
to
to organize indigenous Bosnian
organize and arm indigenous Croat mili
Bosnian Croat mili- II saw with my own
saw with own eyes bridge covered
eyes the bridge in
covered in
blood, and in
blood. in the water
water under
under the bridge,
bridge,
tary units-begun
units—begun in 1991 Croatian Army "volun-
1991 by Croatian “volun
teers” under Zagreb's
teers" control—while deploying corpses ..... . II do not know
corpses how many
know how many people
people were
were
Zagreb’s control-while deploying
MUP troops to Foca, but II heard
killed in Foca, heard Captain Sergije
Sergije
regular Croatian Army (HY)
regular Croatian (HV) and MUP to the
the
republic
republic in 1992 whenwhen Croat
Croat communities
communities came under under " detailed account of
For a detailed
·· For of these operations. see
these operations, see Chapter 30 and
primary theaters in which HY
direct threat. The primary HV forces
forces Annex 32,
Annex 32. The Battles for
for Herzegovina
Herzegovina and thethe Relief of
Relief of
Herzegovina and Posavina
operated were Herzegovina Posavina. . HV forces
HY forces Dubrovnik, 1992.
Dubrovnik.
‘”
··· For see Annex
For a detailed description see Annex 27: Ethnic
Ethnic Cleansing as a
in these regions.
regions, in conjunction
conjunction with with the Bosnian
Bosnian
Military Operation:
Military Operation : Prijedor—Sanski Most-Kljuc . May-July 1992.
Prijedor-Sanski Most—Kljuc,
Croat Army (HYO)
Croat (HVO), . carried
carried out both defensive
defensive and
'
detailed discussion see
· For a more detailed see Annex
Annex 25: Croatian Political
Political
Objectives and Military Strategy in Bosnia. 1991-1992.
Military Strategy 1991- 1992.
144
144

Mihailovic saying,
saying, 'We of tlu:
‘We have got rid of the to
to physically
physically eliminate
eliminate those who refused to relin-
who had refused relin—
enemy
enemy. . We killed 5,000
We have killed Muslims in
5,000 Muslims quish their arms.
quish arms . The
The YRSVRS meanwhile
meanwhile joined
joined other
Gorazde and
Gorazde Foca. ‘52
and Foca. 151 Serb authorities
Serb authorities to accelerate the the removal
removal of the the entire
Muslim and Croat populations. In reaction
Croat populations. reaction a small
small
Dragutin Ocko, a Serb
Dragutin Ocko, Serb prisoner
prisoner of war
war band of Muslims and Croats Croats launched suicidal coun
launched a suicidal coun-
interrogatedby
interrogated Ustashe on
by Ustashe on 29
29 January
January
terattack on 30 May, seizing part of Prijedor city
May, seizing city
1942
1942
before
before Serb troops
troops overwhelmed
overwhelmed them. them . Throughout
Throughout
The war crimes
The committed against Muslims and
crimes committed June these
June Serb forces
these Serb forces unobtrusively
unobtrusively swept the the area of
Croats in
Croats in the
the Prijedor—Sanski Most-Kljuc areas of
Prijedor-Sanski Most—Kljuc non-Serb
non-Serb citizens
citizens while redeploying some units for
while redeploying
western Bosnia during
western Bosnia during the
the late spring
spring and summer
summer of operations elsewhere. The
operations elsewhere. final VRS
The final YRS operation
operation in the the
1992were some of the
1992 worst atrocities
the worst atrocities to occur
occur during
during area began inin late July,
July, apparently
apparently aimed at a forested
forested
the Bosnian war.
the Bosnian The scope, scale, and programming
war. The programming mountain area where
mountain where poorly equipped Muslim
poorly equipped Muslim mili mili-
with which these actions
with actions were carried out would
were carried would have tary bands were stillstill holding out, to
holding out, mop up the
to mop the last of
been impossible as mili the Muslim hamlets

the hamlets and neighborhoods
neighborhoods. . This opera opera-
impossible had they not been conductedconducted as mili-
tary operations
operations by by units
units of the Bosnian Serb Army’s
the Bosnian Army's tion appears to
tion satisfied the
to have satisfied the VRS
YRS that
that it had
Ilst
st Krajina Corps.
Corps. Although
Although the Serbian Democratic
the Serbian Democratic eliminated the
eliminated the primary “threat,” and it continued
primary "threat," continued to
Party
Party and the Bosnian Serb
the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal
Internal transfer its combat
combat units units to more active sectors.
sectors .
Affairs also played
played key roles
roles in the violence,
in the violence. the VRS
the YRS
was
was the primary actor in
the primary in the
the assaults and occupation
occupation Chapter 25
Chapter 25
of Muslim and CroatCroat villages

villages throughout
throughout thethe region.
region. Corridor:
The Battle for the Corridor:
Operations in the
the Posavinam'
Posavina 153'
The main
The main objective
objective of YRS VRS operations
operations in in this
this area was
was
to eliminate the
to eliminate the so-called
so-called threat posed
posed by by Muslim and During 1992
1992 some of the the largest battles of the the Bosnian
Bosnian
Croat residents
Croat residents to Serb control
control over a key section
section of war-engaging
war—engaging more than 50,000 troops on both both
western Bosnia. Some
western Bosnia. Some elements of the the Muslim and sides—occurred in
sides-occurred the most
in the most strategic area of the coun
the coun-
Croat population were
Croat population were armed and put up resistanceresistance to try, the Posavina
try, the region of northern
Posavina region northern Bosnia.
Bosnia. One One of the
the
the
the Serb takeover of the the area, but never on a scale that first clashes of the
first conflict enveloped
the conflict enveloped the the Sava
Sava River
threatened the the Bosnian Serbs’ control
Bosnian Serbs' control inin the
the region
region. . In town of Bosanski
town Bosanski Brod in early March,, when
early March when mixedmixed
addition, the VRS’s
addition, the eliminating this
YRS's methods of eliminating this Croat and Muslim HYO
Croat HVO forces
forces used weapons
weapons pro- pro
“threat” involved
"threat" involved the wanton killing
the wanton civilians, the
killing of civilians, the vided
vided by the Croatian Army to stop a Serb
the Croatian Serb takeover
takeover of
complete
complete removal
removal of the
the civilian population from
population from their the municipality. 15J During April
the municipality.‘5“ April and May,
May. as as HV
HY
homes, barbaric
barbaric treatment in in detention camps,
camps , and troops reinforced
troops reinforced the the HVO,
HYO, their combined formations
their combined formations
finally
finally their ejection from Serb territory.
ejection from territory. Concurrently,
Concurrently, pushed JNAJNA and Serb Serb TOTO troops completely out of
troops completely
the "cleansing"
the “cleansing” of the the region achieve a key
region helped achieve Bosanski Brod, , overran
Bosanski Brod overran the towns of Modrica and
the towns
Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb warwar aim-the
aim—the creation
creation of an an ethnically
ethnically Derventa,
Derventa , and temporarily
temporarily severed the the east-west route
pure Serb
Serb state.
state. running between
running between the the Serb-controlled Bosanska Kra
Serb-controlled Bosanska Kra-
jina region
region (and the the Republic Serbian Krajina) and
Republic of Serbian
Military actions in
Military actions in the
the Prijedor-Sanski Most-Kljuc
Prijedor—Sanski Most—Kljuc the rest
the rest of the
the Serb Republic, as well as
Serb Republic, as the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
region in April,
region began in April, when JNA formations
when JNA formations sup-
sup Federal Republic . No supplies
Federal Republic. supplies could
could reach these areas,
SDS actions
ported SOS actions to take over the adminis
the political adminis- the nascent Serb Republic
and the Republic was cleftcleft in two. Miti
in two. Miti-
tration,
tration, seizing
seizing government offices, police
government offices. police facilities,
facilities, gating the effects of this dramatic
gating the dramatic penetration,
penetration,
utilities,
utilities, and other key
key infrastructure. The formation
infrastructure . The formation Bosnian
Bosnian Serb and JNA JNA units
units managed to take and hold hold
of the Bosnian Serb Army prompted
the Bosnian prompted the VRS to order
the YRS key towns
key flanks at Doboj,
towns on its flanks Doboj. Bosanski
Bosanski
Croats living in
all Muslims and Croats
all in the
the area to turn over ‘
For a dclailed
• For account,, see
detailed account see Annex
Annex 28:
28: The Battle for
for the Corridor:
Corridor:
their
their weapons
weapons toto the
the Serb police The Army enforced
police. . The enforced Operations in the
Operations the Posavina March
March 1992 to January 1993.
this
this order and, beginning
order and. beginning 23 invaded several vil
May. invaded
23 May. vil-
lages and towns
towns near Prijedor. Kljuc
Sanski Most. and Kljuc
Prijedor, Sanski
145
145

Samac-Pelagicevo,
Samac-Pelagicevo, and Brcko. Holding these posi—
posi- by Croatian
secret agreement by President Tudjman
Croatian President Tudjman to
tions
tions allowed
allowed the newly VRS to move
newly created YRS move rein
rein- enclave for the JNA-held
trade the enclave JNA-held Prevlaka
Prevlaka peninsula
peninsula
forcements from its I1st
forcements from st Krajina Corps East
Corps and East in
in southern
southern Croatia.
Croatia. There
There is
is no
no direct
direct evidence
evidence to
Bosnian Corps
Bosnian Corps to these areas and prepare for a major
major support this
support theory but, whatever
this theory whatever the truth, the HV/
HY/
counteroffensive.
counteroffensive. HVO
HYO defenses crackedcracked during
during the
the final
final offensive
offensive only
the VRS
after the YRS unexpectedly
unexpectedly shifted direction of its
shifted the direction its
In
In early June the YRSVRS lst1st Krajina Corps,
Corps, under
under Gen-
Gen attack toto avoid the stiff resistance
avoid the resistance itit had met during
during
eral Momir Talic, began a series of preliminary
preliminary opera
opera- initial push.
the initial push. Given
Given the
the sudden execution of the
sudden execution
tions to open up some breathing
breathing space between Doboj maneuver, the Croats’
Serb maneuver,
Serb Croats' success
success in in withdrawing
withdrawing
and Derventa
Derventa and move forces into
move forces position to reopen
into position reopen their men and equipment
their equipment in in good
good order
order looks
looks suspi
suspi-
the vital
vital supply
supply corridor.
corridor. By 20 June the the fall of Kotor
Kotor- ciously like planned withdrawal,
like a prepared or planned withdrawal, either
Johovac, north
sko and Johovac, north of Doboj, leftleft the
the path clear.
clear. Zagreb had already
because Zagreb already concluded
concluded the enclave
enclave
On 24 June thethe lst
I st Krajina Corps launched
launched the first
the first was untenable
was untenable or as as part of a deal.
deal. It seems unlikely
phase of Operation “Corridor 92,”
Operation "Corridor 92," attempting to to break
break Bosanski Brod would have fallen
that Bosanski fallen as
as soon
soon oror as
as
through
through toto East Bosnian
Bosnian Corps troopstroops northeast of neatly as
neatly as it did
did without
without these coincidental
coincidental actions.
actions.
Gradacac.
Gradacac. Two days of heavy fighting enabled the
fighting enabled the
units to link up and cut the the connection
connection between The VRS
YRS waswas now
now able to turn its attention to to the east
east-
enemy-held
enemy-held Modrica and Gradacac.Gradacac. Modrica itself fell ern end of the
the corridor, where HV/I-IVO
corridor, where HY /HYO forces
forces in
in their
their
on 28 June. Although this main
June. Although main effort was successful,
effort was successful. remaining enclave
remaining enclave at Orasje and joint Bosnian
at Orasje Bosnian Army—
Army-
supporting attacks on the flanks
supporting flanks and near Derventa-
Derventa HVO units near Brcko town
HYO units remained in
town remained in position
position to
Bosanski Brod achieved
Bosanski little gain against strong HV/
achieved little HY/ the RS supply
threaten the route. In mid-September,
supply route. mid-September. while
HVO resistance.
HYO the VRS
the YRS waswas still
still focused west, HVO
focused to the west, HYO and Bos Bos-
nian troops had even cut the link south of
nian Army troops
The lst1st Krajina Corps
Corps prepared its next major major strike
strike Orasje. VRS
Orasje. troops were
YRS troops were able
able to reopen the
the route
route but
for early July to seize Odzak and Derventa-Bosanski
Derventa-Bosanski lost again for aa time
lost it again time in mid-October. 155 While
in mid-October.155 While the lstI st
Brod. On 4 July
Brod. July a three-pronged kicked off
three-pronged attack kicked Krajina Corps preparing another major
Corps was preparing major offensive
offensive
toward Derventa, Bosanski
toward Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Odzak,
Odzak. and the the Sava for November
November to to clear
clear the Orasje pocket and secure
Orasje pocket secure
River. Over
River. Over the next 10 IO days. VRS troops
days, YRS troops drove HV/
drove HY/ the route permanently,
permanently, HVO
HYO units again cut the road
units again road
HVO forces
HYO forces out of strong positions Odzak, seiz
positions near Odzak. seiz- in early November.
in early promising start, the VRS
November. After a promising YRS
ing town on 12
ing the town 12 July,
July, and reached the Sava Sava on November
November offensive failed, and HV/HVO
offensive failed, HY/HYO forces
forces
Other units pushed to
14 July. Other
14 to within 10 kilometers of
JO kilometers drove
drove the Serb attack units
the Serb units back
back in
in heavy fighting and
heavy fighting
Bosanski Brod after an
Bosanski an advance of 10 IO to 15 kilome
15 kilome- terrible weather. It would be May of 1995
terrible weather. 1995 before
before the
the
Meanwhile, formations
ters. Meanwhile, formations further
further to the west
to the retook
west retook VRS
YRS would attempt anotheranother assault onon Orasje.
Orasje.
Derventa on 4-5
Derventa 4-5 July. The VRS driven HV/I-IVO
YRS had driven HY/HYO Instead, VRS
Instead, planners turned
YRS planners turned their to the threat
their gaze to
forces out of all
forces all the Bosanski Brod
territory between Bosanski
the territory on the
the south side of the corridor.
south side corridor. In
In middle
middle and late
Samac, while forcing
Bosanski Samac.
and Bosanski forcing their troops intointo a December. lst
December, I st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps units
East Bosnian units
now constricted
now constricted bridgehead
bridgehead around Bosanski Brod
around Bosanski Bosnian Army 2nd
attacked Bosnian 2nd Corps and HVO HYO troops
troops
itself.
itself. west of Brcko,
west back about 22 to 33 kilome
driving them back
Brcko. driving kilome-
ters, giving the Serbs
giving the Serbs a bit
bit more room. Still,
more room. the corri
Still, the corri-
Bosanski Brod during
around Bosanski
After a series of attacks around during dor remained
dor remained a bare 33 kilometers
kilometers wide at its narrowest
wide at narrowest
August and September
August achieved only
September achieved limited success,
only limited point, southwest of Brcko town.
point. southwest town. Widening thisthis portion
portion
the lst
!st Krajina Corps prepared to launch a decisive
to launch decisive of the vital route would have to wait
the vital wait until
until 1993.
1993.
assault on the Croat
Croat bridgehead.
bridgehead. OnOn 27 September,
September,
VRS troops began their attack, again making
YRS making only
only Despite these lingering
Despite problems, in
lingering problems, 1992 the VRS
in 1992 YRS
small initial gains. On
small October, however.
On 4 October, however, after shift
shift- achieved one of its
had achieved its most victories of the
strategic victories
most strategic the
ing sector, VRS
ing the attack sector. YRS troops broke through HV/
broke through HY/
HVO lines
HYO lines and captured
captured the town on 6 October.
the town October. Many
have argued that the Serbs owed victory to a
owed their victory
146
146

war, creating what many Bosnian
war, Bosnian Serb military arti-
military arti I 00 mm,
100 while again demonstrating a distinct
distinct superi
superi-
a
“corridor of life.”
cles call the "corridor life." The victory unified
The victory unified the ority in command organization. . Bal
control and organization
command and control Bal-
in
the ority
Republika Srpska politically,
Republika politically, and it physically
physically linked
linked anced against thethe VRS
YRS strengths were
were some very
very
its western wing and thethe Krajina with
with the
the rest of the difficult
difficult terrain and strong fortifications
fortifications defended by by
Serb republic
republic and the rump Yugoslav federation . The
Yugoslav federation. The over 5,500 highly motivated HVO
highly motivated HYO and Bosnian
Bosnian Terri
Terri-
VRS was able to achieve this victory
YRS victory over experienced torial
torial Defense troops . The lack
Defense (TO) troops. lack of a unified
unified Croat
Croat
a
and numerically Croatian, Bosnian
numerically superior Croatian, Croat,
Bosnian Croat, command structure and squabbles among
and Muslim command
Bosnian Army forces
and Bosnian forces thanks to its typical
typical mixture
mixture the two
the the shape of their alliance
two groups over the alliance would
of professional leadership, organization.
professional leadership, organization, and fire fire- weaken
weaken these strong defenses.
power,
power, enhanced in these operations by the commit
the commit-
ment of most of the YRSVRS’s's battle-tested former
former JNA The VRS
The YRS campaign
campaign plan may have called called for thrusts
units..
units supply artery between Travnik and Jajce
to cut the supply
prior
prior to reducing
reducing the pocket. Preliminary
the pocket. operations in
Preliminary operations in
In coming
coming years, importance of the corri
years. the strategic importance corri- July, however,
July. however, failed
failed to
to gain significant ground and
significant ground
would loom
dor would loom large in in the background of battles in
the background in the VRS switched instead to a straightforward
YRS switched straightforward attack
a
the rest of the
the country None of the subsequent clashes
country. . None toward Jajce itself.'5°
toward itself. 156 The plan, in
The plan, with VRS
keeping with
in keeping YRS
in would be on the scale of the 1992
in the area would cam
1992 cam- doctrine, called for careful,
doctrine, careful, step-by-step advances
Bosnian Army and
paign, but the perpetual threat that Bosnian along three separate thoroughly with
separate axes to deal thoroughly with the
Bosnian
Bosnian Croat Army forces might retake the corridor
the corridor defenses and minimize
minimize losses.
and the implications Republika Srpska if
implications for Republika if it were
VRS to
cut forced the YRS portion of the
sizable portion
to station a sizable slow campaign began in
This slow in earnest in in mid-August
mid-August
from its best corps to safeguard it.
troop reserves from when
when thethe VRS
YRS launched
launched its first major attack,
first major attack , biting
biting
it.
Occasionally the VRS

Occasionally YRS was able to draw on small small chunk of territory
off a chunk along the western approaches
territory along
a
these reserves for other operations,

increments of these operations. but advancing to within 2 kilometers
and advancing kilometers of the town.town . The
The
2
for the most part they had to remain untouched.
untouched . Only second step early/mid-September when
in
step came in early/mid-September when thethe
combined HV/HVO
when a combined Bosnian Army offen-
HY /HYO and Bosnian offen VRS
YRS seized another piece of ground ground to the southwest,
a
1995 threatened
sive in 1995 Republika
threatened to overrun western Republika pushing to within
pushing kilometer of Jajce from
within a kilometer from that direc
direc-
a
would the YRSVRS be forced

forced to down these tion. simultaneous joint HVO-TO
tion. A simultaneous HYO-TO attack north north of
A
Srpska would to draw down these

reserves because the the loss of the portion of the
the western portion the Bugojno
Bugojno and Novi Travnik to to divert
divert this Serb
Serb drive
drive
state would have rendered the
state would corridor they were
the corridor failed
failed toto gain ground or affect the
gain any ground the VRS
YRS assault.
defending meaningless. Perhaps it was this failure
Perhaps that induced
failure that induced the Bosnian
Bosnian
it
Croats
Croats to sign separate cease-fire
sign a separate with the Serbs on
cease-fire with
a
Chapter 26
Chapter October in
9 October in exchange for a pledge to provide provide electric
electric-
9
VRS Assault on
The VRS Jajce, July-November
on Jajce, July-November 1992‘
1992" ity from
ity from the power plants. The
the power The Muslims,
Muslims , however,
however ,
took
took no part in the discussions,
in the discussions, and their relations
relations with
with
While operations in the the Posavina continued, , the VRS
Posavina continued YRS the Croats were frayed
the frayed by a number
number of contentious
contentious
a
began preparations during June June and JulyJuly to eliminate

to eliminate issues. OnOn 21 21 October Croat and Muslim units
October, , Croat units hold
hold-
Croat-Muslim salient at Jajce,
the large Croat-Muslim Jajce, northwest of ing the main
ing supply route to Jajce opened fire
main supply fire on each
Travnik. The
Travnik. The troops in the salient threatened
threatened Bosnian
Bosnian The VRS
other. The YRS tooktook advantage of the the discord
discord and
lines of communications
Serb lines communications in the area and con-
the area con launched a final
launched final push to to seize the enclave on 25 25 Octo
Octo-
a
trolled hydroelectric dams vital

trolled two hydroelectric vital to Serb-controlled
to Serb-controlled ber. attacking hard along
ber, along all
all three axes. Despite their
axes . Despite their
Bosnia. The YRS
western Bosnia. VRS was able to deploydeploy some differences, the HVO
differences, HYO and TO troops fought well,
troops fought well,
7,000 to 8,000 of its troops from from the
the 30th Infantry
Infantry yielding
yielding onlyonly after four fighting. VRS
four days of heavy fighting. VRS
Division of the st Krajina Corps
the I1st VRS forces
Corps. . YRS forces had a troops entered the the center ofof town October while
town on 29 October while
a
clear advantage in heavy weaponry, fielding 20 to 30

weaponry, fielding a bedraggled columncolumn of of disheartened soldiers
soldiers and
a
tanks and 30 to 50 fieldfield artillery

artillery tubes larger than
‘
account,, see
• For a detailed account see Annex
Annex 29: Operation '‘Vrbas
Vrbas 92’:
92': The
The
a
VRS
YRS Assault Jajce,. July-November
Assault on Jajce 1992.
July-November 1992.
147
147

some 40,000
some panicked civilians made their
40,000 panicked way out of
their way Kladusa. A
Kladusa. A lesser
lesser road ran
ran west
west from
from Cazin through
through
enclave to Travnik. The Serbs
the enclave Serbs had again
again won their
won their the small town of Coralici and on
small town on to the Croatian
Croatian bor
bor-
victory through superior
victory through superior organization, firepower, and
organization, firepower, der. Another
der. Another major
major road from Bihac along
east from
road ran east along the
the
planning.
planning. Although the disagreements between
the disagreements between the
the side of the Una
south side Una River to Bosanska Krupa and
to Bosanska
Croats
Croats and Muslims certainly contributed to their
certainly contributed Bosanski Novi.
Bosanski The region’s
Novi. The region's most means of
important means
most important
defeat, there is no evidence Jajce’s fall
evidence to suggest that Jajce's transport was
transport was not highway, however,
not aa highway, however, but rather
rather a
between the
involved a deal between
involved Croat and Serb
the Croat Serb leaders.
leaders. segment of the railway
railway line
line that stretched all the way
stretched all way
The defenders
defenders were
were simply
simply beaten in a straight fight.
fight. from Belgrade
from north Bosnia to Bihac and ulti
through north
Belgrade through ulti-
mately to
mately Serb-held Knin,
to Serb-held Knin, the self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed capital
capital
Chapter
Chapter 27 of the Serbs. All
the Krajina Serbs. Serb communities—
All three Serb communities-
The Bihac Pocket, 1992
1992 Serbian,
Serbian, Bosnian Serb, and Krajina Serb—thus
Bosnian Serb, Serb-thus had aa
stake in
in the recapture of Bihac city
the recapture city and the southern
southern
The Bihac regionregion in the
the northwestern corner of Bosnia
northwestern corner half of the Muslim-held pocket.pocket.
was ethnically
was homogeneous area, with
ethnically a fairly homogeneous with a sub-
sub
stantial Muslim majority
stantial majority in all region's four
all of the region’s Partly because of the region’s
Partly significant Muslim
region's significant Muslim
opstinas.
opstinas.157157 Nearly 90 percent of the region'sregion‘s approxi-
approxi Bosnian forces
majority, Bosnian
majority, in the Bihac region
forces in region were
were able
250,000 residents
mately 250,000
mately were Muslims,
residents were Muslims, with 25,000
with 25,000 organize much
to organize more quickly and effectively
much more effectively than
or so Serbs
Serbs living mostly
mostly on the southern edge of the
the southern the elsewhere in
elsewhere in the
the country.
country.”0160 The foundation
foundation of the
pocket example, in Bihac and Bosanska
pocket (for example, Bosanska Krupa) Bihac region’s
region's defense structure
structure was was the existing
existing Ter
Ter-
small Croat
and a small community of about 6,000
Croat community 6,000 living in in ritorial Defense
Defense headquarters.
headquarters. (As (As early
early as 16 April,
as 16 April,
the Bihac suburbs.
the suburbs.158 large Muslim
158 The large Muslim presence
presence in Bihac had been established
established as as one of the seven territo
territo-
the
the area-a demographic oddity—was
area—a demographic oddity-was the result of a
the result rial districts—okrug—subordinate
rial districts-okrug-subordinate to the Bosnian
to Bosnian
conscious Ottoman
conscious effort dating
Ottoman effort back several
dating back several centu
centu- Republic’s
Republic's reorganized
reorganized Territorial Defense
Defense Staff.)““
Staff.) 161
ries to encourage Bosnian Muslims to
encourage Bosnian to settle in the
the The Bihac
Bihac area Territorial Defense provided
Territorial Defense provided the
westernmost
westernmost comer corner of the Ottoman
Ottoman Empire,
Empire, the the per-
per region's Muslims with
region’s with both
both aa preestablished
preestablished organiza-
organiza
manent tidemark
tidemark between
between it and the Austro-Hungarian
the Austro-Hungarian tion nucleus of a command
tion and the nucleus command staff.staff. This military
military
empire. 159 The resettled Muslims of the
empire.159 Bihac region
the Bihac region structure was at first
structure was called the
first called the "Una-Sanska
“Una-Sanska Opera Opera-
became the counterweights to the Serbs
the counterweights Serbs of thethe Croat
Croat- tional Group,"
tional Group,” but in thethe fall it was
was renamed
renamed the
ian Krajina, who
ian who had been resettled on the the opposite
opposite ARBiH
ARBiH 5th Corps—destined
Corps-destined to become one of the
to become
side of the
side border by the
the border the Habsburgs
Habsburgs to form a buffer
to form buffer most
most distinguished fighting formations
distinguished fighting formations in in the Bosnian
Bosnian
against the Ottomans. Centuries later,
Ottomans. Centuries later. the
the descendants military.
military.
of these resettled Serbs Serbs and Muslims would do battle
along cultural fault
along a cultural fault line whose original purpose
line whose purpose had As elsewhere in
As elsewhere in Bosnia,
Bosnia, frictions
frictions had heated thethe atmo-
atmo
vanished
vanished into into history.
history. the Bihac area for months
sphere of the months before the out
before the out-
break
break of actual
actual conflict. Roadblocks mushroomed
conflict. Roadblocks mushroomed
“
What become known
would later become
What would known as the
the .. Bihac after the proclamation of the ethnic
the proclamation referendum, and
ethnic referendum,
pocket"
pocket” had as 2,000 square kilo
core area about 2,000
as its core kilo- someone fired shots at
someone fired at a JNA
JNA facility near Bihac twice
twice
meters of territory (roughly 4 percent
territory (roughly Bosnia’s land
percent of Bosnia's land in
in March. 16" “’3
March.162 most of the rest of Bosnia went
16·' While most went
bounded by the
area) bounded the Una River and the the Bosnian
Bosnian- up in
up in flames days of the Republic’s
flames within days Republic's indepen
indepen-
border. Most of the
Croatian border.
Croatian region’s terrain
the region's terrain isis hilly declaration, violence
dence declaration, violence does not to have
not appear to have
but not truly mountainous. (The
truly mountainous. (The most
most significant ter
significant ter- come the Bihac area for almost
come to the almost two weeks.""‘
two weeks. 164
rain
rain feature, the high
high hills of the Grabez
Grabez plateau over
plateau over-
looking Bihac proper,
proper, are immediately south
are immediately south and east
east When itit did
did come,
come, it was Bosanska Krupa,
was Bosanska Krupa, aa medium
medium-
of Bihac city.)
city.) The fewfew primary
primary roads traversing
traversing thethe sized town of 15.000
sized town 15,000 residents
residents on south side of the
on the south
area tended toto channel
channel major
major military
military operations
operations along
along Una River.
River, that suffered first. The town
suffered first. town had started to
few axes. One
a few main highway
One main highway ran north-south
north-south
through the
through the entire pocket,
pocket, from through Cazin
from Bihac through
and on to the northwestern Bosnia at
northwestern tip of Bosnia at Velika
Velika
148
148

July 1991
split in July 1991 when
when Serb Serb leaders established
established their Fighting approached
Fighting approached the the Bihac area itself in
Bihac area in June after
own
own assembly
assembly in the the town
town and began passing passing their broke out southeast of the
clashes broke the city the end of
city at the
own
own resolutions. Then, with
resolutions. Then, with only
only 2727 percent of the the May;““
May; 181the city and some of its suburbs
the city suburbs were
were first
first hit
hit
population
population but with with better organization
organization and more arms with
with small
small arms and mortar
mortar fire
fire on 12 June. 182There-
12 June‘szThere
than their Muslim neighbors,
neighbors, the Bosnian Serbs pro-
the Bosnian pro after, Bihac would huddle under periodic
huddle under periodic mortar and
posed a map whereby
whereby they would take over 60 percent artillery fire for the
artillery fire rest of the
the rest the war, VRS forces
war, YRS from
forces from
of the town; they also made it clear they would
the town; the
the 2nd Krajina Corps former JNA
Corps (the former 10th Bihac
JNA 10th
enforce
enforce their demands with violence.“51M Their threats
with violence. Corps) having established themselves
having established themselves on the the Grabez
Grabez
were realized
realized late in the the day on 21 21 April when Bos
April when Bos- plateau near the town of Tihotina,
the town Tihotina, some
some 10 IO km
km south-
south
Territorials from
nian Serb Territorials from the the Grmec
Grmec area crossed the the east of Bihac.
east Bihac. From positions
positions here their
their artillery
artillery and
Una River and clashed with with Bosnian Republic TO
Bosnian Republic TO mortars could
could firefire into
into the
the city
city with
with virtual
virtual impu
impu-
forces within Bosanska
Bosanska Krupa.Krupa.166 166(The JNA’s I10th
(The JNA's 0th nity.183 For years Serb
nity.183 Serb and Muslim forces would
Muslim forces
Bihac Corps
Bihac Corps denied any involvement
involvement in the
the fighting,
fighting, much of their
expend much their resources
resources and energy vying for
energy vying
although
although at least a battalion
battalion of the the 6th Partisan Bri
Partisan Bri- control of this
control strategic plateau. As Bihac
this strategic Bihac waswas coming
coming
gade of the JNA’s 5th Banja
the JNA's Banja Luka Corps Corps was almost
almost under attack, fighting
fighting also west of Cazin—a
also began west Cazin-a
certainly
certainly engaged.) The The following morning,morning, Serb Serb town the center of the
town in the the developing pocket. 184
developing pocket.‘84 Clashes
Clashes
forces surrounded Bosanska Krupa, and most of the
surrounded Bosanska the also spread north to Buzim, northeast of Bihac, Bihac, where
where
citizens evacuated the
Muslim citizens the town
town under
under a rain of fighting was
fighting reported in
was reported in mid-July. 185
mid-July.185
167By 23 April,
rounds.‘67
mortar rounds. Tenitorials and
April, Serb Territorials
the JNA battalion
the JNA battalion had occupied
occupied most of BosanskaBosanska Trying to clear Muslim forces
to clear forces from
from thethe Grabez
Grabez plateau
plateau
Krupa,
Krupa, although
although some Muslims continued continued to to resist in Bihac, the
south of Bihac, the Bosnian Serbs pressed a wider
Bosnian Serbs
the
the western half of the town for several more
the town more days.
days.168168 offensive, directing
offensive, directing increased shelling, scattered
increased shelling,
'69'7017'
169170 171The now occupied
The Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs now occupied the the entire infantry probes and even some air
infantry probes air attacks against
against the
the
city
city on thethe eastern bank
bank of the the Una and most of the the defenders. YRS
defenders. VRS 2nd Krajina Corps Corps forces
forces first
first
town's smaller half on the
town’s smaller the western bank; bank; Muslim attempted to break through Muslim
break through Muslim defenses at at the
the
forces retained control
forces control of the the hills overlooking Bosan
overlooking Bosan- town of Golubic on the
town the Una River on on 13 September. 186
13 September.186
'87 After three
187
ska Krupa and some suburbs as close close as 1l km fromfrom thethe days of unsuccessful
unsuccessful attacks there, they
town.
edge of town. tried attacking along a broader front
attacking along south of Bihac
front south
and at Bosanska Krupa and Buzim.188
at Bosanska Buzim. 188Bosnian
Bosnian Army
An uneasy lull settled over the Bihac region
the Bihac region after the
the forces from Cazin responded
forces from responded by advancing south
by advancing south of
fall of Bosanska
fall Bosanska Krupa, duringduring which the evacuation
the evacuation the Una,
the capturing two
Una, capturing two towns
towns at the foot of the
the foot the
federal armed forces
of federal forces began in earnest, and Air Air Grmusa mountains. 189The
Gnnusa mountains.‘89 The VRSYRS tried to press the the
Force and Army personnel
Force personnel began flying flying back
back to Ser
to Ser- defenders along
Muslim defenders along thethe entire front
front through
through thethe
"3
May.1722 173 On 16
bia around 8 May.17 16 May I 1992, the last of
992, the rest of September
September and into into the
the middle November. 190
middle of November.”0
the
the withdrawing
withdrawing JNA JNA forces
forces demolished Bihac’s
demolished Bihac's '9' 192
191 '92The Bosnian Army counterattacked
The Bosnian counterattacked where where it
Zeljava airfield—one of the
Zeljava airfield-one modern military
the most modern military could in
could early and mid-October,
in early mid-October, gaining
gaining some stratestrate-
facilities in the
facilities Yugoslavia—by detonating
former Yugoslavia-by
the former detonating gic ground northeast of Bihac,
gic ground Bihac,‘93193east Buzim, 194and
east of Buzim.194
explosives
explosives under the runways and in
the runways in the kilometers
the 5 kilometers the Velika
in the Kladusa area in
Yelika Kladusa in the northwest of
the extreme northwest
of underground
underground tunnels. 174175
tunnels.I74 175JNA
JNA units
units surrendered the Bihac enclave.
the Bihac 195
enclave.195
control of the
control two main barracks
the two barracks near Bihac on
19
19 May but do not appear to have left any significant significant The VRS
The occasionally bombed
YRS occasionally bombed thethe Bihac
Bihac area in in the
the
'77 178
'78
military equipment
military behind.”°
equipment behind. 176 177 fall of 1992,
1992, but with
with few aircraft and to
few aircraft to little
little effect.
effect.
Two aircraft hit Cazin on 28 August,
aircraft hit both Bihac
I% and both
August,"’"
'98
Shooting
Shooting started again on 12 12 May, this time in Bosan
in Bosan- and Cazin were bombed
bombed on 9 and 14 September.197197
14 September. 198
Novi, a town
ski Novi, town along '99
199Bosnian
ski the Una
along the Una River on the Bosnian
the Bosnian Bosnian Government
Government forces
forces claim
claim to have downed
downed
side of the Bosnian-Croatian border.
the Bosnian-Croatian border. Rifle fire and
Rifle fire three VRS
YRS aircraft
aircraft on September. 200201
on 22 September.200201
mortar shelling
shelling began suddenly
suddenly after the JNA claimed
the JNA claimed
that Muslims had attacked a military police patrol.
military police 179
patrol.'7°
forces responded
Serb forces responded by taking control of
taking control the town
of the town
within 24 hours. 180
hours.180
149
149

On
On 20 October 1992, the
October 1992, Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army formally courage imagination, they lacked
courage and imagination, lacked weapons
weapons andand
established
established itsits 5th Corps
Corps under command of
under the command strategic depth. Completely
strategic surrounded and cut off
Completely surrounded
Ramiz Drekovic, a former JNA officer
former JNA officer from
from thethe from the distant
from the resources of Govemment-held
distant resources Government-held Bos Bos-
Muslim-majority Sandzak region of Serbia.
Sandzak region 202 The
Serbia.202 nia, Corps would be entirely
nia, the 5th Corps entirely dependent
dependent on on the
corps
corps was
was formed
formed by by simply
simply reflagging
reflagging the the TO-based anchor of Zagreb
nearer anchor
nearer Zagreb for the supply
supply lifeline that
“Una-Sanska Operational
"Una-Sanska Operational Group,"
Group,” which
which had been would keep it it in
in the war. Meanwhile, the Bosnian
the war. Bosnian and
directing
directing the area's
area’s defense
defense upup toto that
that point. and under
point, and under Krajina Serb
Serb forces problems of their
forces had problems their own.
own.
its new
new designation
designation the corpscorps would direct ARBiI-I
would direct ARBiH Although Serb forces completely
Serb forces encircled Bihac’s
completely encircled Bihac's
operations
operations in the the pocket
pocket for thethe remainder
remainder of the war. war. Bosnian defenders,
Bosnian defenders, mostmost of their
their frontage
frontage opposite
opposite the
The new command had nominal
new command nominal responsibility
responsibility as as well Bihac enclave
enclave waswas held
held by the 2nd Krajina
the 2nd Krajina Corps,
Corps, the
for Bosanski Novi, Prijedor.
Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most,
Prijedor, Sanski Most. Kljuc,
Kljuc, and weakest overstretched of the Serb
weakest and most overstretched corps. The
Serb corps.
Mrkonjic Grad,
Mrkonjic Grad, but 5th Corps troops would see
Corps troops see none
none Krajina Serb
Serb units also had to deal
units also deal with enemies in
with enemies in
cities for over
of those other cities years and would
over three years both front
both front and rear.
rear. Forced
Forced to maintain
maintain aa defense
defense
never set
set foot
foot inin most of them.203
them. 20, against Croatian Army—their
the Croatian
against the Army-their most most dangerous
dangerous
foe—before them
foe-before them and the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army 5th Corps
Corps
The VRS 2nd
The VRS 2nd Krajina Corps-possibly
Corps—possibly supported
supported by by behind them, the
behind them. the Krajina
Krajina Serb
Serb military
military commanders
commanders
the Krajina Serb Serb Army's 15th Lika
Army’s 15th Corps—mounted
Lika Corps-mounted could
could spare onlyonly limited
limited reserves
reserves for offensive
offensive actions
actions
operation of the
its last operation
its the year inin November.
November. This more more against the Muslims,
against the Muslims. lest an an overambitious
overambitious campaign
campaign
ambitious operation—“Una 92”—sought
ambitious operation-"Una 92"-sought to clear the
to clear the leave them vulnerable
leave them vulnerable to to Croatian
Croatian attack.
Grabez plateau and seize the
Grabez plateau the entire
entire southern
southern bank
bank of
the Una River. 204 The
River.204 The operation
operation began on 14 Novem-
14 Novem This improbable combination of opposing
improbable combination opposing forces,
forces,
ber,
ber,205 but a week
205 week of fighting failed to
fighting failed dislodge the
to dislodge the 5th capabilities,
capabilities, and geography
geography created a a dynamic
dynamic imbal
imbal-
Corps positions. 20o After a short
from its positions.206
Corps from short pause thethe ance in which
which each side
side could
could at times
times gain
gain a local
local
attack resumed
resumed about 12 December,
about 12 December, onlyonly to sputter
sputter out advantage
advantage but neither could wholly defeat
neither could defeat the other.
other.
less than a weekweek later with
with few gains. The VRS would
few gains. The Serbs
Serbs started with
with the upper hand,
the upper hand, since they had
since they
become
become quite with such
quite familiar with such results
results on the Grabez
the Grabez superior
superior organization,
organization, equipment.
equipment, and geographic
geographic
plateau in the the years to come.
come. position.
position. From the outset,
From the outset. the Bosnian
Bosnian 5th Corps’
Corps'
bottom-line goal
bottom-line goal was
was simply to stay in
simply to in the fight.
fight. ItIt is aa
At the
the end of the Bihac enclave
the year the Bihac enclave sawsaw perhaps
perhaps testament toto the Bosnian Muslims’
the Bosnian Muslims' organization,
organization, dedidedi-
7,000 to 10,000
7,000 10,000 defenders
defenders organized
organized into six Muslim
into six Muslim cation, and resourcefulness
cation, resourcefulness that
that they
they were
were able
able to dodo
brigades
brigades and one battalion-sized Croat unit,
Bosnian Croat
battalion-sized Bosnian unit. so.
holding
holding their own in
their own in a small
small triangular
triangular pocket com
pocket com-
pletely
pletely surrounded
surrounded by by Serb forces. 2°7 Opposing
Serb forces.207 Opposing VRS Chapter
Chapter 28
forces
forces comprised
comprised 6,000
6,000 to 7,500
7,500 troops
troops of Colonel Battles 0n the Drina,
on the Round One:
Drina, Round One:
(later
(later Major General) Grujo Boric’s
Major General) Boric's 2nd Krajina
Krajina April to December 1992‘
April 1992*
Corps—five light
Corps-five light infantry brigades-reinforced in the
infantry brigades—reinforced
northeast
northeast by a lightlight infantry from Ilst
brigade from
infantry brigade st Krajina Some of the
Some most brutal
the most brutal fighting atrocities of the
fighting and atrocities
Corps
Corps numbering possibly another
numbering possibly another 2,000 3,000
2,000 to 3,000 Bosnian occurred in
Bosnian conflict occurred in the Drina valley.
valley. During
troops. 20
troops.208 s A
A battalion
battalion of armor,
armor. plus
plus one
one or
or two
two field
field 1992,
1992. Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb efforts
efforts to control
control the strategic
strategic
artillery battalions, backed
artillery battalions, backed up the Serb Serb infantry.
infantry. mountain valley
mountain valley bordering Serbia were
bordering Serbia were repeatedly
repeatedly
thwarted
thwarted by stalwart Muslim
by stalwart Muslim resistance
resistance based on on the
By the end of 1992
1992 the enclave fighting
the Bihac enclave fighting had numerous Muslim
numerous Muslim towns
towns and farms dotting the valley.
farms dotting valley.
assumed the
assumed general outlines—both
the general outlines-both figurative
figurative and A
A seesaw series of vicious little
little battles—usually
battles-usually
literal—that would remain
literal-that remain almost
almost until
until the very end of
the very involving nono more
more than a brigade
brigade on either side—
on either side-
the war
war in
in October 1995. The resilient
October 1995. resilient Bosnian
Bosnian Army raged up
raged down the
up and down the valley during 1992.
valley during 1992. Overcom
Overcom-
had already built a tough
already built tough and resourceful
resourceful fighting
fighting ing great and persistent
ing difficulties, the VRS
persistent difficulties, VRS managed
managed
force—the 5th Corps-that
force-the Corps—that was capable of holding
was capable holding its
its to open
open a tenuous road corridor from
tenuous road from the key
key border
border
own against
own against the forces of both Bosnian
the forces Bosnian Serbs
Serbs (to the
the '
· For a detailed account see
detailed account the Drina,
see Annex 30: Battles on the Drina, Round
south and east) and Krajina Serbs
south Serbs (to the north
(to the north and April to December
One: April December 1992.
west).
west). While the
the Bosnian
Bosnian defenders
defenders of Bihac had
150
150

town of Zvornik to Serb-controlled
town Serb-controlled areas around Sara
areas around Sara- terrorize VRS
terrorize YRS troops—and
troops-and the local Serb
the local Serb popula
popula-
jevo. Bosnian
jevo. TO/Army
Bosnian TO/ troops, however,
Army troops, however, were
were also
also tion—for the
tion-for the rest of the year, launching
the year, launching repeated raids
raids
able to keep control over great swathes
control over swathes of territory
territory on Serb
Serb villages
villages and steadily
steadily widening
widening government
government
around
around Srebrenica-Zepa
Srebrenica-Zepa and Visegrad-Gorazde-Foca,
Yisegrad-Gorazde-Foca, control in
control the area.
in the 209 The
area.209 The successful December
successful late December
even opening
opening a thread-like supply link to central
thread-like supply Bos-
central Bos offensive Oric carried
that Orie
offensive that out toward
carried out toward Bratunac
Bratunac and
nia through
through the
the town Tmovo, some 30 kilometers
town of Trnovo, kilometers Skelani, combined
Skelani. combined with his foolhardy
with his shelling of Ser-
foolhardy shelling Ser
south of Sarajevo.
south Sarajevo. From their bases, Bosnian
valley bases.
their valley Bosnian bia proper, finally forced
proper, finally forced the YRS Main
the VRS Staff—and
Main Staff-and
Army troops
troops were
were able to
to regularly
regularly threaten or cut the
the Belgrade—to deal with
Belgrade-to with the
the Drina valley.
valley.
slender route from
slender route from Zvornik to to Pale.
Pale. A successful Bos
successful Bos-
nian
nian Army yearend
yearend offensive from Srebrenica
offensive from Srebrenica against As
As in
in the Zvomik-Srebrenica area, operations
the Zvornik-Srebrenica operations inin the
the
Serb-held Bratunac and Skelani
Serb-held Bratunac Skelani was the straw for
the last straw southern region were
southern region were seesaw affairs
affairs in the Bos
in which the Bos-
the VRS, which decided
the YRS, decided toto make
make the
the capture of the
the nian
nian Serbs
Serbs initially attempted to seize control over
seize control the
over the
Drina valley
valley its strategic focus for 1993:
strategic focus 1993.‘ Gorazde
Gorazde region.
region. Bosnian TO/Army
Bosnian TO/ ripostes to open
Army ripostes open a
supply
supply route into
into the
the enclave soon followed, while the
enclave soon the
The
The Drina valley
valley theater can be divideddivided intointo two
two Muslims pushed
pushed to expand
expand the territory under
the territory under govern-
govem
major
major sectors
sectors:: a northern
northern one around Zvomik
around Zvornik- ment control.
ment control. The fighting
fighting around Gorazde-Foca
around Gorazde-Foca-
Srebrenica
Srebrenica and a southernsouthern one around
around Foca-Gorazde-
Foca-Gorazde Visegrad
Visegrad sorted into into three sectors: clashes between
sectors: clashes between
Visegrad.”•• In the
Yisegrad. Zvomik-Srebrenica area,
the Zvornik-Srebrenica area, thethe fight-
fight Cajnice and Gorazde
Gorazde towntown in the southeast,
in the southeast, the the fight-
fight
ing was further
ing was further subdivided
subdivided intointo VRS
YRS efforts
efforts to to create a ing for the
ing the Gorazde
Gorazde supplysupply corridor betweenbetween Foca Foca-
road corridor from from Zvornik to Sekovici
Sekovici and on to Pale. Pale, Tmovo, and battles
Trnovo, battles in the northeast between
the northeast between Rogatica,
Rogatica,
and Bosnian TO/Army moves
Bosnian TO/Army moves to expand
expand government
government Yisegrad. and Gorazde
Visegrad, Gorazde. . The Serbs’ initial efforts
The Serbs' to
efforts to
control
control around
around Srebrenica.
Srebrenica. After the the capture
capture of capture thethe town
town in May,May, primarily from from thethe direction
direction
Zvornik on 9-10 9-10 April,
April, Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb TO troops-with
troops—with of Cajnice in in the southeast,, came to naught,
the southeast naught , although
although
some support
support from JNA—moved to expand
the JNA-moved
from the expand thethe battles for hilltops and passes in
battles in this
this area sputtered
sputtered on
Serb-held bridgehead around
Serb-held bridgehead Zvornik,, pushing
around Zvornik pushing gov-gov until July.
until the west,
July. To the west, after the the Serbs
Serbs captured
captured Foca Foca
ernment forces
forces backback toward Kalesija. . By
toward Kalesija By mid-May, in April
April and mopped
mopped up the the rest of the municipality,
the municipality,
Serb
Serb forces
forces had openedopened thethe road
road to Serb-held
Serb-held fighting
fighting shifted
shifted to thethe southern
southern edge of the the Jahorina
Sekovici, but they spent the the rest of the
the year
year blocking Mountains
Mountains between
between the town of Tmovo
the town Trnovo and the the
Muslim attempts to sever this route.
repeated Muslim route, which enclave's western frontline.
enclave’s western frontline . It waswas from
from this rugged
rugged
succeeded
succeeded at least three or four times times.. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, area that
that the TO/Army would successfully
Bosnian TO/Army
the Bosnian successfully
VRS troops
YRS troops had to stop the Bosnian Army
the same Bosnian Army supply its forces
supply forces in in the enclave. After some
the enclave. some early
early spar-
spar
troops-those
troops——those holding
holding the Cerska-Kamenica enclave
the Cerska-Kamenica enclave ring, the government
ring, the government troopstroops launched
launched a majormajor offen
offen-
about 4 kilometers
kilometers southsouth of Zvomik—in
Zvornik-in their their efforts
efforts sive July, seizing
sive in late July, seizing the passage to Gorazde Gorazde and
to link up to to Bosnian
Bosnian Army forces forces southeast of Tuzla.Tuzla. pushing
pushing YRS VRS troops Tmovo. It then held
troops out of Trnovo. the
held the
This Muslim-held enclave enclave near Zvornik also lacked lacked a route open against VRS
open against YRS efforts
efforts toto cut it in in mid
mid-
territorial link to that around
territorial around Srebrenica.
Srebrenica. Serb TO
Serb TO November, which achieved
November, achieved only only rare and temporary
temporary
troops
troops had initially seized
seized Srebrenica,
Srebrenica, but on successes. Bosnian Army
successes. Bosnian Army forces
forces alsoalso won
won substantial
substantial
8-10 May
8-10 local Muslim
May local Muslim forces,
forces, led byby the
the charismatic
charismatic victories in
victories in the northeast. Although Serb
the northeast. forces won
Serb forces won
Naser Oric, drove
Naser Orie, drove out the the Serbs Oric’s forces
Serbs.. Oric's were to
forces were the first round
the first round of fighting, seizing most
fighting, seizing most of Rogatica
Rogatica
'
municipality positions southeast of Visegrad,
municipality and positions Yisegrad , a
• The Bosnian Army offensive in late December 1992-January
Bosnian Army 1992—January
1993 and the counteroffensive, which
the VRS counteroffensive. which began
began in February
Bosnian Army
series of Bosnian Army attacks from August to
from late August
1993, will
1993. dealt with in Chapter 36, "“Battles
will be dealt Battles on the Drina,
the Drina. November retook
November retook key territory around
key territory Yisegrad. This
around Visegrad.
December 1992
Round Two: December
"
1992 to
to August 1993."
1993." offensive placed ARBiH
offensive placed ARBiH troopstroops less kilometers
less than 33 kilometers
the Drina
.. The terrain in the Drina River typically Bosnian,
River valley is typically Bosnian. with
forested mountains and hills
heavily forested hills (a few 2,000
few rising to almost 2.000
from a key
from hydroelectric dam on the
key hydroelectric the Drina River and
meters in height) interspersed
meters interspersed with small rivers and streams.
streams. In the
the within the distance of the
the same distance the town
town itself.
itself.
combat theater
main combat theater between the towns of
between the of Zvornik
Zvornik in the
the north
nonh and
the geography varies so little that
Foca in the south the that there
there is little
benefit from a detailed
benefit of the
detailed discussion of the terrain in each
each sector.
sector.
Instead, will be discussed
Instead, terrain will discussed as appropriate each section
appropriate in each section..
151
151

The Bosnian
Bosnian Army had scoredscored a number
number of notable
notable cease-fire
cease-fire was was agreed
agreed to late in day. 214 2'5
in the day.2M 216 217 The
215 216217The
victories
victories against the
the VRS in thethe valley
valley during 1992-
during 1992— following day (the
following sixth of April,
(the sixth anniversary of
April, the anniversary
victories
victories that were
were to make the Drina the primary stra-
the primary stra the city’s
city's liberation
liberation from the Nazi
from the Nazi occupation
occupation in in 1945)
1945)
tegic VRS in 1993.
tegic target for the VRS 1993. Outgunned
Outgunned by its any illusion of normalcy
normalcy in in Sarajevo
Sarajevo broke
broke down
down com com-
opponents,
opponents, the Bosnian
Bosnian Army made better use of the the pletely. Bosnian Serb
pletely. Bosnian Serb gunmen
gunmen firedfired indiscriminately
indiscriminately
highly motivated
motivated natives
natives of the
the region.
region. Though
Though they from upper floors
from upper floors of the
the Holiday Inn Inn into
into the court
court-
lacked
lacked formal
formal training,
training, these born
born mountain fighters
mountain fighters yard of the Bosnian
yard Parliament building across
Bosnian Parliament across thethe
were natural
natural light
light infantrymen whose small,
infantrymen whose small, nimble
nimble street, killing several
street, killing several people
people who
who werewere demonstrating
demonstrating
units
units exploited
exploited their
their familiarity with the terrain
with the terrain to for peace and injuring numerous Bosnian Gov
others. Bosnian
numerous others. Gov-
defeat the better armed VRS. VRS forces
VRS. VRS forces in the valley
valley ernment Special Police eventually
emment Special eventually stormed
stormed the hotel
the hotel
were also more
more vulnerable
vulnerable to these methods
methods than SerbSerb and captured
captured sixsix Serb snipers. 218 2'9
Serb snipers.218 219
units
units in other theaters, who
who generally commanded
generally commanded
more
more firepower
firepower and benefited
benefited from
from a higher
higher propor-
propor second of May
The second May 1992
1992 was
was to be one of the most
be one most
tion
tion of former JNA units
former JNA units and personnel.
personnel. The VRS
The VRS crucial days in
crucial days in the three-year siege of the
three-year siege the city.
city. Partly
Partly
would
would rectify
rectify this situation 1993, bringing
situation in 1993, bringing inin better by accident, series of interrelated
accident, aa series interrelated events
events irrevocably
irrevocably
units
units and more firepower
firepower to conduct
conduct its next strategic
strategic changed the JNA’s
changed the JNA's involvement
involvement in in the siege
siege and
and dra
dra-
offensive.
offensive. matically escalated the
matically escalated level of violence.
the level violence. ItIt began
began after
after
President Izetbegovic's plane
President Izetbegovic’s returned from
plane returned from three daysdays
Chapter 29
Chapter unproductive international
of unproductive negotiations in
international negotiations in Lisbon
Sarajevo, 1992:
1992: The Siege
Siege Begins•
Begins” and landed at JNA-controlled
landed at INA-controlled Sarajevo airport. 220 The
Sarajevo airport.220
UNPROFOR commander
UNPROFOR commander in in Bosnia, Canadian Brig.
Bosnia, Canadian Brig.
From the very
very outset of the Bosnian
Bosnian warwar the primary
primary Gen. Lewis MacKenzie,
Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, had had sent
sent aa Swedish
Swedish armored
armored
focus
focus of the
the world's
world’s attention
attention was Sarajevo: politi
Sarajevo: the politi- personnel
personnel carrier escort Izetbegovic
carrier to escort Izetbegovic back back toto the
cal and emotional
emotional heart of the nation. Well
the nation. Well before the
before the Bosnian under UN
Presidency under
Bosnian Presidency UN auspices,
auspices, butbut the APC
APC
war
war began, the 1984 1984 Olympics had made Sarajevo Sarajevo the left when the
left when the Swedes
Swedes learned that the flight
learned that flight was
was
outside world’s most familiar image
outside world's image of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. delayed.“ So
delayed.•· So instead
instead it was
was 30 30 JNA
JNA soldiers
soldiers whowho met
When that
that image
image was shattered by artillery fire and
artillery fire Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic and escorted
escorted himhim to the JNAJNA barracks
barracks at at
replaced
replaced with glimpses of street fighting
with glimpses fighting in the former
former Lukavica. JNA
JNA General
General Djurdjevac (commander of
Djurdjevac (commander
Olympic village,
village, the Kosevo
Kosevo and Zetra stadiums
stadiums inin Sarajevo Corps) told
the 4th Sarajevo told Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic he was was being
being
ruins, and rows
ruins. rows of newnew graves
graves dug alongside
alongside thethe soc-
soc detained “for
detained "for his
his own
own safety,”
safety," butbut the
the inescapable
inescapable fact fact
field, the plight
cer field, plight of besieged
besieged Sarajevo
Sarajevo permitted
permitted was that the Bosnian
was that Bosnian President
President was now aa prisoner?“
was now prisoner. 221
most Western
Western viewers
viewers to relate the carnage to some some-
thing
thing familiar and commanded
commanded mediamedia attention
attention in a At the same time the Army
time the Army was taking the Bosnian
was taking
way
way that often inaccessible
that the often inaccessible and unfamiliar hinterhinter- President hostage, the JNA
President hostage, JNA itself waswas becoming
becoming aa cap
cap-
land could
could not. tive in
tive in most (Indeed, the JNA’s
Sarajevo. (Indeed,
most of Sarajevo. capture of
JNA's capture
Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic maymay have
have been aa direct
direct response
response toto the
the
was ironic and tragic
It was tragic that
that the
the cosmopolitan,
cosmopolitan, peace-peace blockade of its
developing blockade
developing forces.) Government
its forces.) Government police
police
ably multiethnic residents
ably multiethnic residents of Sarajevo
Sarajevo were
were the last
last and Muslim
Muslim volunteer
volunteer forces ostentatiously sur
forces ostentatiously sur-
Bosnians to
Bosnians to accept that war would indeed
that war indeed comecome toto the rounded several JNA
rounded several barracks in
JNA barracks in the city—apparently
city-apparently
republic.
republic. The shooting
shooting in in Sarajevo
Sarajevo began on 5 April, April, orders from
on orders from someone other than Izetbegovic—and
someone other Izetbegovic-and
before Bosnia's
the day before Bosnia’s formal
formal declaration
declaration of indepen-
indepen surrender of the troops
demanded the surrender
demanded inside. When
troops inside. When thethe
dence and the onset of fighting elsewhere in
fighting elsewhere in the coun
coun- INA troops
JNA troops refused, the Bosnian
refused, the Bosnian Government
Government forces
forces
try. On that day.
try. On day, well-equipped
well-equipped Serb Serb police, TO, and
police, TO. tightened their
tightened their cordons and laid siege
cordons and siege to
to the buildings.
buildings.
volunteer units surrounded
volunteer units surrounded and then attacked the the Bos
Bos- The Army responded with
Army responded bombardment of
with aa bombardment
nian MUP’s large
nian MUP's large police academy complex
police academy complex atop Vrace Vrace "
2'32” For an account of
•• For of the UN‘s military role in
UN's military Bosnia during 1992,
in Bosnia 1992,
hill on the south side of the
the south the city. 210 211 rn
city.2l02H build
2 1.1The build-
see Annex 34: The
see Annex The Charge ofthe Light Blue
of the Light Brigade: UNPROFOR
Blue Brigade: UNPROFOR
ing
ing was contested for several hours, with
several hours, with about a Deploys Fall-Winter
First Deploys Fall-Winter 1992.
dozen defenders
dozen wounded, before
defenders wounded, before anan EC-brokered
'
Annex 31: Sarajevo 1992: The Siege Begins
· See Annex Begins for a more
detailed account.
detailed
152
152

Sarajevo's
Sarajevo’s medieval field artillery
medieval center by field from
artillery from single force—the
into aa single
into force-the Sarajevo-Romanija
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Corps.
positions
positions outside
outside the city,
city, a shocking escalation of the
shocking escalation the This formation,
formation, using
using the structure of the
the structure the 4th
4th Corps,
Corps,
familiar mortar
mortar fire
fire that the Serb TO had sporadically
Serb TO sporadically former JNA
controlled three former
controlled brigades (including
JNA brigades
used to pepper the
the city. 222
city.222 enough equipment for five
enough equipment five armor-mechanized
armor-mechanized battal battal-
ions), six new
ions), six new light infantry brigades
light infantry brigades (raised
(raised from
from the
An even more dramatic
dramatic escalation
escalation was JNA’s next
was the JNA's next TO),
TO), aa mixed
mixed artillery
artillery regiment, antitank regiment,
regiment, an antitank regiment,
action-although
action—although the
the sequence
sequence of events is far from from and an air
air defense regiment. 227 All
defense regiment.227 All told,
told, the force
force com
com-
clear-against
clear—against the Bosnian capital. From garrisons
Bosnian capital. garrisons prised about 15,000
prised about 15,000 men,
men, as as many
many as 80 tanks,
as 80 tanks. some
some
outside
outside the city, JNA sent two
city, the JNA two armored
armored columns
columns 72 field
72 field artillery
artillery pieces,
pieces, and
and 1212 multiple
multiple rocket
rocket
into
into the streets of Sarajevo
Sarajevo in a maneuver
maneuver that probaproba- launchers, plus several
launchers, plus several hundred
hundred 60-mrn,
60-mm, 82-mm,
82-mm, and and
bly
bly was aimed
aimed at relieving
relieving the
the besieged
besieged barracks
barracks and l20-mm mortars.
120-mm mortars. Initially,
Initially, Major
Major General
General Tomislav
Tomislav
could
could have cut the the government's
govemment’s defense
defense of the city in
the city in Sipcic commanded
commanded the corps, corps. but Colonel (later
(later Major
Major
half.
half. One
One armored
armored column
column advanced
advanced fromfrom the
the west General) Stanislav Galic replaced
General) Stanislav replaced Sipcic at at the end of
the end
near the
the airport
airport but was stopped
stopped by by makeshift govern-
makeshift govem the summer.
the summer.
ment defenses
defenses in the the far-western
far-westem neighborhood
neighborhood of
Stup.
Stup. Another
Another JNA JNA column
column advanced
advanced north
north from
from thethe Sarajevo’s defenders—initially
Sarajevo's defenders-initially numbering
numbering perhaps
perhaps
Lukavica barracks
barracks south of the the city
city center into
into the
the 10,000
I 0,000 to 15,000
15,000 armed personnel of all
armed personnel types, with
all types, with
government-held
govemment-held heart of the city. Muslim Patriotic
city. Muslim Patriotic only a few
few heavy
heavy weapons
weapons and and very
very limited
limited ammuni
ammuni-
League
League volunteers
volunteers and Territorial Defense Defense troops
troops tion—were
tion-were a motley lot. 228 They included
motley lot.228 much of the
included much
stopped the second
second Serb
Serb armored advance ((within
armored advance within a former Sarajevo Territorial Defense
former Sarajevo Defense headquarters
headquarters and and
hundred
hundred meters of the Bosnian Bosnian Presidency
Presidency building) units from
units from the Muslim-majority municipalities;
municipalities; somesome
with rifle grenades, and a home
cocktails, rifle
with Molotov cocktails. home- Muslim
Muslim deserters from the JNA
deserters from JNA barracks
barracks in in the city;
city;
made artillery
artillery piece
piece fashioned
fashioned from
from a drainpipe.
drainpipe. probably several
probably thousand Patriotic
several thousand Patriotic League
League members
members
Caught
Caught at a disadvantage
disadvantage in the close-in fighting, four
close-in fighting, (at least organized, if
least organized, not fully
if not fully armed);
armed); andand aa few
few con
con-
Serb
Serb tanks were destroyed
destroyed and the rest withdrew
withdrew southsouth spicuous, outright criminal
spicuous, outright gangs. These
criminal gangs. These gangster
gangster
with
with no ground
ground gained.
gained. Disaster
Disaster for the government
government bands-led
bands—led by by flamboyant
flamboyant outlaw chieftains like Juka
outlaw chieftains Juka
had been narrowly
narrowly averted, and Sarajevo's
Sarajevo’s belea-
belea Prazina, Musan “Caco”
Prazina, Musan "Caco" Topalovic,
Topalovic. and and Ramiz “Celo”
"Celo"
guered defenders
defenders scoredscored a major
major psychological
psychological Delalic—provided
Delalic-provided some some of the city’s armed and
city's best armed and
victory. 224 bravest defenders,
defenders, but they also also brazenly
brazenly extorted
extorted the
victoryzza223 224
citizens they
citizens they were defending and
were defending and for aa time
time became
became aa
By the
the evening
evening of 2 May,
May, the President’s capture had
the President's law unto
law unto themselves.
themselves.
become public
become public knowledge, Bosnian Govem
knowledge, and the Bosnian Govern-
JNA, and the EC
ment, the JNA, EC began aa marathon
marathon negotia-
negotia After a series
series of inconclusive
inconclusive skirmishes, the Bosnian
skirmishes, the
tion of terms for a cease-fire
tion cease-fire and thethe President's
President’s Government attempted
Government attempted its
its first
first major
major offensive
offensive opera
opera-
release. 225 By an agreement reached the next morning,
release.225 morning, tion from within the city
tion from city on
on 88 June. Bosnian Army
June. Bosnian Army
President would be exchanged
the President exchanged for JNA JNA General
General forces mounted several
forces mounted simultaneous attacks
several simultaneous attacks aiming
aiming
Kukanjac and his staff officers, who
staff officers, who by then had been capture four critical
to capture critical hilltop positions
positions overlooking
overlooking
surrounded in the city's
surrounded city’s Second Military District head
Second Military head- the city center: Mojmilo
city center: ridge to the southwest,
Mojmilo ridge southwest, Vrace
Vrace
Bosnian Government
quarters. The Bosnian Government promised
promised a safe hill and Vidikovac
Vidikovac to the southeast,
southeast, and
and the imposing
imposing
conduct for the JNA
conduct JNA convoy
convoy leaving barracks,
leaving the barracks, Mt. Zuc
Mt. northwest. With
Zuc to the northwest. With little
little more
more than
than sur
sur-
but~to Izetbegovic's
but-to fury—Muslim units
Izetbegovic’s fury-Muslim units opened fire
opened fire prise determination, Sarajevo’s
prise and determination, Sarajevo's defenders
defenders rolled
rolled
on the
the withdrawing
withdrawing JNA JNA vehicles,
vehicles, killing
killing at least six
six back
back the besieging Serbs,
the besieging their ill-equipped troops
Serbs, but their troops
federal troops
federal troops and capturing third of the
capturing the rear third the were unable to
were unable to hold much of their
hold on to much gains in
their gains in the
the
convoy.
convoy.226226 face of Serb
Serb counterattacks
counterattacks and
and artillery fire.229 2302“
artillery fire.229 230 231
In the end,
In Bosnian Army
end, the Bosnian Army was able to
was able to retain
retain
JNA completed
As the JNA completed its withdrawal
withdrawal from city in
from the city in
VRS absorbed
new YRS
late May, the new JNA 4th Corps
absorbed the JNA
and Serb TO forces
Serb TO forces around
around the city molded them
city and molded
153
153

control of only Mojmilo
control Mojmilo ridge,
ridge, which at least removed
removed As
As 1992 drew to a close,
1992 drew close, Sarajevo’s
Sarajevo's citizens
citizens could
could
the
the sniper
sniper threat to southwestern
southwestern parts of the
the city.
city. measure of pride
some measure
take some pride and of hope
hope from
from their
their
handful of military victories:
handful victories: the halting of the JNA’s
the halting JNA's
Desultory
Desultory shooting
shooting and shelling continued for several
shelling continued several surprise armored
surprise armored thrusts on capture of
on 22 May. the capture
months
months while armed bands wrestled wrestled for control
control of Mojmilo ridge
Mojmilo ridge in
in June,
June, and the successful
successful occupation
occupation
individual Sarajevo
individual Sarajevo neighborhoods. affecting the
neighborhoods, affecting the con-
con of vital
vital Mt.
Mt. Zuc December. The defense
Zuc in December. defense of Sarajevo
Sarajevo
frontation
frontation lines
lines hardly
hardly at all.
all. The next round
round of serious
serious at this
this time,
time, however,
however, was more aa saga of disasters
was more disasters
fighting
fighting opened in DecemberDecember with offensive push
with an offensive averted than of gains achieved. In a military situation
gains achieved. situation
by the VRS directed
the YRS directed against the the Otes and StupStup suburbs
suburbs where neither
where neither side
side could force aa quick win,
could force win, the stage
of western
western Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, which were jointly held HVO
held by HYO was set
was set for a protracted contest of wills.
protracted and bloody contest wills.
and Bosnian forces.232 1” By 6 December,
Bosnian Army forces.mm December, the the
hard-pressed
hard-pressed defenders had begun back. 234 The
begun to fall back.234 Chapter
Chapter 30
30
next day thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government countered
countered withwith The Battles for
The for Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, 1992
1992
another operation
operation against the the Serb-held peaks over
Serb-held peaks over-
looking the city,city, attacking
attacking ZucZuc hill inin the northwest
the northwest The JNA’s
JNA's attacks in in Herzegovina
Herzegovina and its its campaigns
campaigns
and the
the edge of Mt. Trebevic
Trebevic in the the southeast for sev-sev along Croatia’s
along Croatia's southern
southern Dalmatian
Dalmatian coast
coast directly
directly
eral days. The Bosnians
Bosnians again pushed back back their intertwined Bosnian and Croatian
intertwined the Bosnian wars for the first
Croatian wars first
besiegers, taking
taking most of Zuc Zuc hill and seizing
seizing the keykey time, as they would
time. as would againagain more dramatically in
more dramatically in 1994
1994-
Vidikovac peak on Mt.
Yidikovac Trebevic.235 5 Yidikovac
Mt. Trebevic.1-1 Vidikovac was The JNA
1995. The
1995. JNA began
began offensive operations in
offensive operations in April
April
counterattack, but by IO
lost to a Serb counterattack. December the
10 December the 1992 against
1992 against Croatian
Croatian and Bosnian
Bosnian Croat forces in
Croat forces in
Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government triumphantly claimed control
triumphantly claimed control of western Herzegovina, near Kupres,
western Herzegovina, Kupres, and in in southeast
southeast-
summit of Mt.
the summit Zuc—a crucial
Mt. Zuc-a crucial victory
victory that largely
largely Herzegovina near Stolac
ern Herzegovina Stolac inin order
order to achieve
achieve rela
rela-
northern part of urban Sarajevo
secured the northern from Serb
Sarajevo from Serb tively limited
tively limited objectives inside Bosnia.
objectives inside Forces from
Bosnia. Forces from
attacks. 236 The city's
attacks.236 city’s Bosnian
Bosnian defenders
defenders had paid paid a General Kukanjac's JNA
General Kukanjac’s Military District—
Second Military
JNA Second District-
high
high price
price in blood effort, but they managed
blood and effort, managed to to drawn from the 5th (Banja Luka) and 9th (Knin)
drawn from (Knin)
close out 1992 with an
close an important
important victory.
victory. Corps-recaptured
Corps—recaptured Kupres from
Kupres combined HV/
from aa combined HY/
HVO force
HYO force onon 77 April
April and threatened Croat-held
Croat-held
Perhaps
Perhaps more than anywhere Bosnia, the
anywhere else in Bosnia, the siege Tomislavgrad and Livno
Tomislavgrad Livno to to the southwest. The 13th
the southwest. 13th
of Sarajevo
Sarajevo highlighted
highlighted the contrasts between a a Bos
Bos- Corps and 2nd
(Bileca) Corps (Podgorica) Corps from
2nd (Podgorica) from GenGen-
determined but ill-
numerous determined
nian Army with numerous ill eral Strugar's JNA
eral Strugar’s JNA Fourth Military District drove
Fourth Military drove local
local
equipped
equipped infantry forces and a Bosnian
infantry forces Bosnian SerbSerb military Bosnian Croat
Bosnian Croat troops
troops outout of Stolac
Stolac inin mid-April
mid-April and
machine with far more heavy
machine equipment but inade
heavy equipment inade- nearly all
captured nearly Herzegovina south
all of Herzegovina south of Mostar up up
quate infantry
infantry reserves that had to carefully hus
to be carefully hus- to
to the Neretva. In May,
the Neretva. May, after
after cease-fire
cease-fire talks
talks collapsed,
collapsed,
banded. Most important,
important, Sarajevo's defenders had no
Sarajevo’s defenders the JNA took control
JNA took control over much of Mostar,
over much Mostar, including
comparable weapons to counter
comparable weapons counter the SerbSerb artillery
artillery part of the city
city onon the western bank of the Neretva
western bank Neretva
pieces that shelled city with
shelled the city with impunity
impunity from from miles
miles River.
River. These operations were
These operations designed to defend
were designed defend
away. Unable to engage the guns
away. Unable guns directly.
directly. the Bosnian
the Bosnian “Serb”
"Serb" territory what the JJNA
pre-empt what
territory and pre-empt NA perceived
perceived
infantry
infantry had to assault directly well-defended hills
directly the well-defended the threat of Croatian
to be the "aggression." Croatian
Croatian “aggression.” Croatian
Bosnian Serbs used as
the Bosnian firing and spotting
as firing loca
spotting loca- military officials,
political and military officials, however,
however, saw saw inin these
tions. Conversely,
tions. hundred artillery
Conversely, the several hundred artillery pieces,
pieces, first phase of aa JNA
attacks the first strategic offensive
JNA strategic offensive to to
mortars with
tanks, and mortars with which the SerbsSerbs ringed
ringed the the threaten and invade
invade southern Croatia. They expected
southern Croatia. expected
city
city could inflict civilian and military casualties,
could inflict casualties, the JNA
JNA to drive through western
drive through Herzegovina while
western Herzegovina while
spread material destruction, and sometimes
material destruction, sometimes put politi- politi also attacking from
also attacking from Stolac
Stolac across Neretva toward
across the Neretva toward
Bosnian Presidency,
cal pressure on the Bosnian Presidency, but they could could the Croatian port of Ploce,
Croatian port permanently severing
Ploce, permanently severing
not seize ground,
ground, and in the artillery bombard
the end artillery bombard- southern Dalmatia
southern Dalmatia (and (and Dubrovnik) and and possibly
possibly
ment would prove unable to force
prove unable force the surrender of
the surrender
either the people
people or their leaders.
154
154

threatening Split.
threatening Split. This misperception
misperception initially drove
drove completed,
completed, a garrison of bridge
a garrison protectors, or
bridge protectors, “mos
or "mos-
Croatian
Croatian strategic thinking,
thinking, and, toto meet the antici-
the antici tari”
ta ri" was assigned
assigned to guard the bridge at
the bridge at all times.
all times.
pated threat, the Croatian Army
the Croatian Army deployed
deployed additional
additional eventually passed to include
Their name eventually all of the
include all the
combat
combat troops into Bosnia and set
troops into set out to reorganize
reorganize city's residents.
city’s residents.
command the
and command the nascent Bosnian Croat military
Bosnian Croat military
organizations
organizations and the Croatian Defense
the Croatian Defense Council Mostar had been a trouble trouble spot before
before the the war
war began,
(HYO)
(HVO). . With these forces
forces the Croatian Government
the Croatian Government relations between
and relations between the the JNA
JNA and the the local
local citizenry
citizenry
hoped to halt
hoped the expected JNA
halt the offensive, after which
JNA offensive, were
were probably
probably the worst of any place
the worst place in Bosnia. After
in Bosnia.
the HV
the HY would launch counterstrike.
launch a counterstrike. JNA’s participation
the JNA's
the participation in the the war Croatia, JNA
war in Croatia, JNA
units were
units were widely regarded by the the Croat population of
Croat population
Corps
Corps General Bobetko, a long-retired
General Janko Bobetko, long-retired Croatian
Croatian Mostar as an an occupation
occupation force force and a provocation.
provocation.
JNA general,
JNA general, led led and organized
organized thethe HVHY and HYO HVO Even when the
Even when JNA attempted to be
the JNA impartial and
be impartial
forces
forces of thethe newly
newly activated
activated "Southern Front:•m
“Southern Front.”237 unobtrusive,
unobtrusive, it was was still universally
universally perceived
perceived as as a
Bobetko launched his first
Bobetko launched first offensive
offensive (or counteroffen
(or counteroffen- force friendly to the
force Serbs and hostile
the Serbs hostile to the the Muslims
sive) in
sive) in late May, attacking with units
attacking with units from
from inside
inside Croats, and JNA
and Croats, JNA soldiers
soldiers and reservists
reservists werewere
Bosnia and from from positions Ston in
positions near Ston Croatia to
in Croatia clearly unwelcome in
clearly unwelcome most of western
in most western Herzegovina
Herzegovina. .
JNA and Bosnian
push JNA Bosnian Serb
Serb Army forcesforces from
from their On 1I February
February a JNA JNA officer
officer waswas severely wounded in
severely wounded
positions northwest
positions northwest of Dubrovnik. Bobetko'sBobetko’s attacks a battle between
between an Army patrol patrol and Croat police
Croat police
conveniently coincided with
conveniently coincided the JJNA
with the NA withdrawal
withdrawal fromfrom 23"Three days later,
reservists.238138 239 Three
reservists. later, hundreds
hundreds of mostly mostly
Bosnia and the pullback of the
the pullback JNA/V RS units
the JNANRS units in
in the
the Croat citizens blockaded
Croat citizens blockaded the the roads from Mostar to Cit-
roads from Cit
area to positions inside Bosnia or near the
positions inside the Dubrovnik luk and Siroki Brijeg in protest over over the behavior of
the behavior
airport. This withdrawal
airport. withdrawal greatly facilitated the
greatly facilitated Croat
the Croat- JNA
JNA reservists
reservists in the area. Two days later,
the area. later, the local
the local
ian advance, and HV
ian advance, HY troops
troops in previously
previously surrounded
surrounded Serbs responded
Serbs responded by blockading
blockading the the Mostar-Sarajevo
Mostar-Sarajevo
Dubrovnik linkedlinked up to Bobetko’s
Bobetko's forces
forces by thethe road. 240 Mostar citizens
road.240 citizens traded gunshots
gunshots with with the
the
beginning of June.
beginning June. garrison
garrison of the JNA’s Mostar Bataljon
the JNA's Bataljon barracks
barracks on
14 March,w
14 March?" and barricades
barricades went went up once again the the
Meanwhile, in in Herzegovina
Herzegovina to to the north, Bobetko’s
the north, Bobetko's following day day as Mostar citizens demanded the
citizens demanded the with
with-
HV/I-IVO
HY/HYO forces
forces were
were preparing operations to eject
preparing operations drawal of JJNA
drawal NA reservists
reservists from from the
the city. Blockades
242 Blockades
city.242
the VRS
the from Mostar and the
YRS from the Stolac area . This offen-
Stolac area. offen partitioned the
partitioned the city into its ethnic
city into ethnic neighborhoods
neighborhoods for
sive
sive would guard the HV flank
the HY flank for further
further attacks toto the next three days, and interethnic
the gunfire was
interethnic gunfire was
the Dubrovnik hinterland
clear the hinterland while
while simultaneously
simultaneously exchanged in some outlying
exchanged outlying neighborhoods.
neighborhoods.243 243 2‘“ Even
244 Even
"liberating" large areas of Herzegovina

“liberating” large Herzegovina populated
populated by more serious
more serious fighting
fighting occurred
occurred on 1 April,, with
I April skir
with skir-
Croats and Muslims.
many Croats
many mishes between JNA
mishes between JNA soldiers
soldiers and Croat Croat paramilitaries
paramilitaries
in several villages
in several villages and mortar fire in
mortar fire in the southern sub-
the southern sub
urb
urb of Jasenica.245
Jasenica .245 Finally, on 33 April April 1992—only
1992-only days
Mostar: The Runup
Mostar: Runup to Operation
Operation “Cagalj”
"Cagal.i'' before
before the country-wide hostilities—a
outbreak of country-wide
the outbreak hostilities-a
remote-controlled
remote-controlled bomb bomb was used to detonate an an oil
The city of Mostar was historically
The city historically the
the capital
capital of truck outside
truck outside the JNA’s Mostarski Barracks,
the JNA's Barracks, killing
Herzegovina, and the
Herzegovina, the heart of the
the region
region. . The
The city's
city’s one and injuring 40.24 4O.246 6 Mostar had practically become
practically become
derives from
name derives from the
the Serbo-Croatian
Serbo-Croatian wordword “most,”
"most," war zone,
a war zone, even before before thethe start of the the actual
actual war.
war.
“bridge,” and Mostar has for centuries
meaning "bridge,"
meaning centuries been
most famous for the
most famous the Stari Most
Most ("old bridge") , a
(“old bridge”), After the war did
the war did begin on 6 April,
begin on April, clashes between
between
single-span local white
bridge of local
single-span bridge white limestone
limestone spanning
spanning JNA and primarily Croat
the JNA
the Croat forces
forces began at several
the Neretva
the river. The
Neretva river. The bridge constructed at the
bridge was constructed the locations
locations in Herzegovina. The town
Herzegovina. The town of Siroki
direction of the
direction Ottoman Sultan
the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman
Suleyman the the Mag
Mag- Brijeg, 247 west of Mostar,
Brijeg,247 Mostar, was
was hit
hit by JNA air attacks
by JNA
nificent and was
nificent completed in
was completed 1566. When
in 1566. When it waswas first
first
155
155

April. 248 2‘9
on 7 and 8 April.248 JNA anillery
249 JNA artillery began shelling
shelling Operation “Jackal”:
Operation Liberation of Mostar,
"Jackal": The Liberation Mostar,
some Mostar suburbs
suburbs and shelled
shelled the city periodically
city periodically 1992
June 1992
thereafter 25‘ Croat forces
.250 251
thereafter.250 Croat forces unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully tried to
gain
gain control
control of Mostar's JNA-held military
Mostar’s JNA-held airfield on
military airfield Almost from the outset of the war,
from the the HV/HVO
war, the HV/HYO com com-
9 April.2 52 Serb
April.252 territorials seized
Serb territorials seized control
control of twotwo mand been making
mand preparations for the complete
making preparations complete capcap-
hydroelectric
hydroelectric power stations on the
power stations Neretva two
the Neretva two days ture of Mostar itself,
itself, requiring
requiring the
the occupation
occupation of both
later.m JNA forces
later.253 JNA forces ejected the the Croats
Croats from
from Stolac
Stolac on west and east
the west banks of the
east banks the Neretva river, followed
Neretva river,
11 April, capturing
11 April, capturing the town with little
town with little or no resis
resis- the capture of Blagaj
by the Blagaj and
and Stolac
Stolac to
to the
the south.
south. While
tance?“
tance. 254 Capljina, aa Neretva
Neretva river
river crossing
crossing some 25 25 the relief of Mostar was objective, HV
was itself a critical objective, HV
km Mostar, was attacked repeatedly
km south of Mostar. repeatedly by JNA
by JNA General Bobetko was
General Bobetko was also
also focused
focused on thethe longer
longer term
term
aircraft
aircraft and anillery
artillery from early April
from early April onward.
onward. goal
goal of relieving
relieving Serb pressure on Dubrovnik. To
Serb pressure
these ends, the combined HV-HVO
the combined HV-HVO commandcommand devised
devised
In early
early May,
May, Bosnian
Bosnian Croat leader Mate
Croat leader Mate Boban
Boban met plan for aa campaign
a plan campaign to
to first
first retake much
much of eastern
with
with Bosnian
Bosnian Serb Radovan Karadzic in
Serb leader Radovan Graz,
in Graz, Herzegovina and then to
Herzegovina relieve Mostar from
to relieve from outside
outside
Austria to discuss
discuss cease-fire
cease-fire terms and a possible
possible city, rather than breaking
the city. breaking out from from within. This
political arrangement.
arrangement. They issued
issued a formal
formal statement plan was
plan was codenamed
codenamed Operation ( Cagalj) “Jackal”
Operation (Cagalj) "Jackal" and
on 7 May, agreeing cease-fire but indicating
agreeing to a cease-fire indicating that was set for early
was set early summer
summer of 1992.258
I 992. 258
disagreement on the division of Mostar and its envi-
disagreement envi
rons had prevented “delineation
prevented agreement on a draft "delineation Bobetko’s preparations were
Bobetko's preparations extensive. He
were extensive. He first
first
map."
map.” The Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs maintained that the Neretva
Serbs maintained Neretva weak HVO
shored up weak
shored antitank capabilities
HYO antitank capabilities by
by bringing
bringing
River was
was the dividing line
line between Serb and Croat
between Serb Croat in an HV
in an HV unit
unit from
from Sisak.
Sisak. He
He then worked
worked to establish
establish
claims portion of Mostar on the
claims and that the ponion the eastern several small
several small (platoon-sized) reconnaissance and sab
(platoon-sized) reconnaissance sab-
river
river bank should
should be Serb. Bosnian Croats
Serb. The Bosnian Croats main
main- otage units,
units, each intended
intended to locate
locate and attack a spe-
spe
all of Mostar and the surrounding
tained that all surrounding areas cific objective
cific disrupt Serb
objective and disrupt Serb forces at the very
forces at very
should belong to the Croats
should belong Croats. . The Bosnian Muslims—
The Bosnian Muslims- outset of the HV/HVO offensive. The main
HV/HYO offensive. main effon
effort
Mostar’s population—were
the largest percentage of Mostar's population-were would be assisted by Croatian Army
by Croatian anillery fire,
Army artillery fire,
neither consulted
neither mentioned in
consulted nor even mentioned official
in the official which
which was intended to
was intended to knock
knock out the Serb
Serb command
command
statement.
statement.255
255 post in
post Aladinovici and to
in Aladinovici to pin down Serb
pin down forces while
Serb forces
the Croats executed a flanking maneuver
Croats executed maneuver through
through
cease-fire was
The cease-fire was to prove
prove short lived. the follow
lived. for the follow- Klepci .259
Klepci.259
ing day JNA
ing JNA and Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb forces mounted a con-
forces mounted con
Croat-held
certed attack against the Croat -held ponion
portion of the At the end of May,
At the the Bosnian
May, the Bosnian Croats
Croats began a series
river bank.256
eastern river bank. 256 At this point, Mostar’s
this point, Mostar's defenders
defenders of attacks aimed progressively improving
aimed at progressively improving their
their tac
tac-
were serious trouble.
were in serious trouble. The Bosnian Croats hung
Bosnian Croats onto
hung onto tical
tical position around Mostar and relieving
position around Serb pres
relieving Serb pres-
narrow band on the
a narrow bank and the Bijelo
the eastern bank Bijelo Polje sure on
on the city.
city. These with the capture of Mt.
These began with Mt.
neighborhood
neighborhood to the northeast. JNA J NA and Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb Hum to the south on 23 May. 260 The next Croat
23 May.260 Croat
forces occupied
forces positions on three sides of the
occupied positions the city:
city: advances
advances were 11 June,
were on 11 June, when
when HVO
HYO forces
forces pushed
pushed
high hills overlooking
the high overlooking the city city from east, Mt.
from the east, Mt. significantly
significantly further, taking Mt.
funher , taking Mt. Orlovac
Orlovac and the towns
towns
Hum and some of the suburbssuburbs to the the south, and some of Varda, Cule, and Krusevo
Varda, Cute, southwest and Jas
Krusevo to the southwest Jas-
of the high ground to the nonh.
high ground north. TheThe highway
highway west enica
enica and Slipcici to the south. 261 262
the south?“ 262 By 12 June,
By 12 June, the
the
toward Siroki Brijeg (some
toward (some 15
15 km
km away)
away) was
was still free
free
but subject JNA shelling.
subject to JNA shelling.2572s7
156
156

Bosnian Croats
Bosnian Croats had cleared
cleared the Serbs from
the Serbs from the
the west
west- The
The completion Operation “Cagalf’
completion of Operation "Cagalf' was was a major
major
ern bank
bank of the
the Neretva.263
Neretva. 263 As an admission of defeat,
an admission success for the combined HV
the combined HY and HVO HYO forces.
forces.
the Serbs
the Serbs destroyed Mostar’s's other
two of Mostar
destroyed two other bridges
bridges on (Croat-Muslim relations
relations were
were already
already strained
strained in in
13 June, leaving
13 leaving only the largely
only the largely undamaged
undamaged StariStari Mostar by this time,
by this Bosnian Army
time, and the Bosnian Army was was not
not
Most connecting
connecting the
the two
two river banks. 2<w
river banks.264 included
included in in any of thethe planning
planning for Operation
Operation
27327“ ARBiH troops
“Cagalj.” 273
"Cagalj." 274 ARBiH troops appear to have played
to have played
At
At the time HVO
the same time HYO troops were clearing
troops were Serb units
clearing Serb units at most a secondary
secondary role in the
role in eastward out of
the attacks eastward
from western Mostar and pushing
from western pushing them across the
the Mostar itself.)
itself.) Although the the Serb-held lines still ran
Serb-held lines
Neretva around
Neretva around the the city, the main
city, the Croat attack,
main Croat attack, Opera-
Opera dangerously
dangerously close Mostar, enough
close to Mostar, enough of the the eastern
tion Cagalj, was
tion was launched
launched on 7 June June. . HV
HY and HVO HYO bank
bank of the Neretva (most
the Neretva (most important,
important, thethe high ground
high ground
troops struck
troops struck eastwards
eastwards from from Capljina, 25 25 km
km south of directly
directly overlooking
overlooking the the city)
city) had been cleared
cleared of Serb
Serb
Mostar on the the west
west side of the Neretva river,
the Neretva toward
river. toward forces.
forces. Strategically,
Strategically, the the operation
operation had also also accom-
accom
the objectives of Mostar to the
twin objectives
the twin north and Stolac
the north Stolac plished Zagreb's intermediate
plished Zagreb’s intermediate objective:
objective: establish-
establish
to the
the east.
east. TheThe first
first important
important step step was
was the
the capture
capture of ment of a position from which Croatian
position from Croatian forces could
forces could
Tasovici,
Tasovici, easteast of Capljina on opposite side of the
opposite side the mount
mount a subsequent operation to relieve
subsequent operation relieve thethe siege
siege of
Neretva,
Neretva, on on 8 8 June .265 The
June.265 Serbs' thin
The Serbs’ thin Herzegovina
Herzegovina Dubrovnik.
Corps
Corps lines
lines collapsed,
collapsed, and rapidrapid advances north and
advances north
east followed. On On 13 June, Capljina HYO
13 June, HVO forces
forces cap-
cap
tured the
tured junction at Recice
road junction
the road Recice and the towns of Biv
the towns Biv- Operation "Tiger":
Operation Croatian Relief of
“Tiger”: The Croatian
olje Brdo and Lovke, then made a lightning
olje lightning advance
advance Dubrovnik and the Prevlaka
Dubrovnik Prevlaka Peninsula Agreement
east up to the outskirts of Stolac
the outskirts The advance
.266 The
Stolac.266 advance north
north
along
along the east bank
the east bank of the Neretva made similar
the Neretva similar At Dubrovnik, in early June,, Bobetko
early June Bobetko had conducted
conducted a
progress , moving
progress, moving from Bivolje Brdo through
from Bivolje through Pijesci hastily
hastily organized
organized attack to clear the VRS
clear the YRS from
from keykey
and Gubavica
Gubavica to reach the the Mostar suburb
suburb of Buna
Buna by by heights
heights commanding
commanding the city from
the city from inside
inside Bosnia.
Bosnia. TheThe
14
14 June.
June.267267 By 15 15 June thethe Capljina HVO HYO was consoli
was consoli- attack failed.
failed. Bobetko
Bobetko took some time
took some to develop
time to develop a
dating its hold
dating Stolac and captured
hold on Stolac captured the Serb
nearby Serb
the nearby more thorough attack plan
more thorough plan while building up his his
stronghold
stronghold of Hodovo.268
Hodovo. 268 forces
forces around
around the
the city.
city. The new new attack, Operation
Operation
"Tiger,"
“Tiger,” began on 4 July,July, and HV HY Southern Front
Southern Front
The final
The element of the
final element the operation
operation was was an advance
an advance troops
troops were
were able to seize many of the
seize many important hill
the important hill
northwest
northwest toward
toward Mostar itself.
itself. One
One of Bobetko’s
Bobetko's col- col positions from
positions the VRS
from the YRS by 10 July. After this,
IO July. how
this, how-
umns struck
umns north through
struck north through Buna
Buna and Blagaj,
Blagaj, reaching
reaching ever, Colonel Radovan
Radovan Grubac's
Grubac’s Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps Corps
Mostar airport from the
airport from south.. At
the south At the
the same time, time. troops
troops stiffened their defenses
stiffened their defenses southwest
southwest of the the Serb-
Serb
another column
another column consisting troops from
consisting of troops from the the 4th held town of Trebinje.
held town Repeated HY
Trebinje. Repeated HV efforts
efforts to gain
gain
Guards Brigade
Guards Brigade and the the Mostar HVO forces pushed
HYO forces pushed additional ground
additional ground from July through
from July September made
through September
through Jasenica.
south through Jasenica. TheThe two Croat columns
two Croat columns were were only minor gains,
only minor gains, despite
despite thethe Croatians'
Croatians’ superiority
superiority in
effect a linkup at the
able to effect the Mostar-Soko airfield airfield on manpower, thanks
manpower, difficult terrain
thanks to the difficult terrain and a tena-
tena
17 June.
17 June.269269 With
With this major
major objective
objective accomplished
accomplished, , cious Serb
cious Serb defense backed
backed by by strong
strong artillery
artillery support
support. .
the Bosnian Croats
the Bosnian their attention
Croats turned their attention to mopping
mopping
up the
up Bijelo Polje neighborhood
the Bijelo neighborhood in the the northeast
northeast and At
At the July, HV,
the end of July, YRS, and JNA
HY, VRS, commanders
JNA commanders
advancing into
advancing the foothills
into the foothills of Mt.Mt. Velez
Velez to the the east.
east.270
270 began talks
talks mediated
mediated byby UN and EU EU military
military officers
officers
By 21 June, follow-up
21 June, follow-up attacks in in Mostar and from from the withdrawal of JNA
the withdrawal
on the JNA forces
forces from
from their
their positions
positions
units advancing
units advancing along the Neretva
along the Neretva fromfrom thethe south had around Dubrovnik airport
around airport and the Konavli Plateau.275
the Konavli Plateau .275
pushed the YRS
pushed VRS completely
completely out of Mostar,Mostar, leaving
leaving the
the Belgrade—and in
Belgrade-and in particular
particular the JNA General
the JNA General Staff—
Staff-
more or less
city more
city from Serb
less secure from Serb attack .271 Although
attack.27l insisted on maintaining
had insisted control over
maintaining control over the
the area after
continued on and around
battles continued around Mt. Velez,Velez, between
between its formal
formal withdrawal from Bosnia because
withdrawal from because of the stra
the stra-
Mostar and Serb-held
Serb-held Nevesinje,
Nevesinje, through
through the the rest of tegic
tegic importance the Prevlaka
importance of the peninsula, which lies
Prevlaka peninsula, lies
the summer and again
the summer again inin early November, neither
early November, neither side
was able to make
was significant additional
make significant additional advances
advances.272 .272
157
157

at the southern end of Konavli. If If Croatian
Croatian forces con-
forces con Chapter
Chapter 3131
trolled
trolled the peninsula,
peninsula, they could
could look directly into
directly into Dress Rehearsal for
for aa New War:
War:
Kotor Bay. Yugoslav Navy was
Bay, where the entire Yugoslav was sta-
sta The 1992 Croat-Muslim
The 1992 Croat-Muslim Clashes
tioned following the loss of all all its other naval
naval bases
along
along the Croatian
Croatian coast. The
The military
military officers
officers deputed As Bosnia’s
Bosnia's government
government fought fought for its political and
however, had no authority
to the talks, however, authority to decide what military
military survival
survival against its
its Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb opponents,
opponents,
essentially was a political matter. Instead,
essentially Owen
Instead, Lord Owen it soon
soon became apparent that the the Muslim-Croat Bos Bos-
Vance, the EU and UN heads of the
and Cyrus Vance, the Interna-
Intema nian entity
entity was aa ship
ship with
with twotwo rudders—and,
rudders-and, more more
tional
tional Conference
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia—the
the Former Yugoslavia-the ominously,
ominously, two two captains.
captains. On On the one hand, Alija
international
international negotiation forum—brought President
negotiation forum-brought President Izetbegovic nominal head of state
Izetbegovic was the nominal state of aa newly
newly
Tudjman
Tudjman and Federal
Federal Yugoslav
Yugoslav President Dobrica
President Dobrica independent country, most of whose
independent country, whose land
land area waswas inin
Cosic together to to work out a deal on Prevlaka.
Prevlaka. In late rebellion, who
rebellion, who was still working frantically
frantically to orgaorga-
September agreement was reached for the the JNA
JNA to nize even the
nize the citizenry
citizenry that remained
remained loyal him. On
loyal to him.
withdraw
withdraw from
from the October in exchange for
the area by 20 October the other hand, Bosnian Croat political leader
Mate
UN-monitored demilitarization
a UN-monitored demilitarization of the peninsula.
peninsula. Bohan
Boban (a (a former
former supermarket
supermarket managermanager from the
Herzegovinian town
Herzegovinian town of Grude)
Grude) had rapidly
rapidly risen
risen
the date neared, both the
As the HV and the YRS
the HY VRS began through
through the workings of
the workings ofTudjman's visible hand
Tudjman’s visible hand to
planning
planning to fill the
to fill vacuum that
the vacuum that would be be left
left by the
the achieve political dominance
achieve dominance over over the self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed
JNA withdrawal.
JNA withdrawal. The VRS realized
The YRS the JNA
realized that the JNA pull-
pull Community of Herceg-Bosna”—an
"Croatian Community
“Croatian Herceg-Bosna"-an all all-
would uncover
out would flank of its Trebinje
uncover the flank Trebinje defenses, Croat, HDZ-dominated,
Croat, HDZ-dominated, one-party with its own
state with
one-party state own
which the JNA positions
the JNA positions in Konavli had guarded. The The armed forces,
forces, schools,
schools, local governments, and cur
local governments, cur-
HV obviously
HY obviously wanted to forestall VRS move
forestall any YRS move into
into Izetbegovic was
rency. Izetbegovic
rency. was profoundly opposed to this
profoundly opposed this de
de
Konavli while "liberating" Croatian territory.
“liberating” Croatian On
territory. On facto sovereign statelet within what
facto sovereign what was left of Bos
was left Bos-
20 October
October the HY HV enveloped
enveloped the port of CavtatCavtat with
with nia, but—engaged in a life-and-death
nia, but-engaged struggle with
life-and-death struggle with the
the
well-executed landing
a well-executed from the
landing from sea and advanced to
the sea Bosnian Serbs and dependent on
Bosnian Serbs Croatia for aa precari
on Croatia precari-
the hills along the border. Over the next six days, days. HV
HY ous and vital supply line—he
vital supply line-he was was in
in no
no position
position toto do
do
troops, in conjunction
conjunction with with units already
already inin position anything about it.
it.
position anything
Dubrovnik, pushed back
north of Dubrovnik, the VRS
back the troops that
YRS troops
had attempted to occupy positions. Key terrain
occupy the hill positions. terrain The capture of the the JNA barracks and the divvying up
JNA barracks
that the HV had been unable to take earlier
the HY earlier now
now fell as of their weapons
weapons was the first
was the occasion for open
first occasion open con
con-
VRS defenses came unhinged.
the YRS unhinged. The door door to flict
flict between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.
between Bosnia’s Croats. The firstfirst
Trebinje lay wide
Trebinje until President
wide open until President Tudjman
Tudjman confrontations occurred in
confrontations occurred in May 19921992 as several JNA
as several JNA
bowed to international
bowed international pressure to stop the the fighting
fighting barracks
barracks and munitions production facilities
munitions production facilities surren
surren-
operation halted.
and ordered the operation November, rel-
halted. By 1l November, rel dered in joint Muslim-Croat held
in
held territory.
territory. Disputes
Disputes
calm descended on the Dubrovnik front.
ative calm front. over
over control facilities and the division of the
control of the facilities
spoils within
spoils immediately. Muslims and
within began immediately. and Croats
Croats
The Croatians' combination of military
Croatians’ skilled combination military opera-
opera first
first clashed
clashed over over the Kaonik Barracks
control over
over control Barracks at at
tions and negotiations
negotiations brought
brought them strategic success. Busovaca, 276 then at
Busovaca,276 at the Novi
Novi Travnik “Bratstvo”
"Bratstvo" arms
arms
Zagreb had regained control over all
regained control all of southern Dal
Dal- factory,277 over the contents of the Ljuta Territorial
factory, 277 and over Territorial
lifted the siege of Dubrovnik while joint
matia and lifted Defense depot. 278 In July
Defense depot.278 July the disputes
disputes escalated andand
HV/HVO
HY forces had been able to defend and recap-
/HYO forces recap confrontations Yares279 and Vitez,
confrontations spread to Vares279 Vitez, where
where
ture key portions including Mostar,
Herzegovina, including
portions of Herzegovina, Mostar, control of the
control the evacuated explosives factory was
explosives factory was con
con-
the Serbs. Militarily,
from the
from Militarily, the HYHV had gained valuable
gained valuable tested,280and
tested,280 HVO
HYO forces seized JNA
forces seized JNA facilities
facilities from
from
experience conducting large-scale
experience in conducting offensive opera
large-scale offensive opera- Muslims in
in KiseljakPB'
Kiseljak. 281
tions. The Dubrovnik campaign
campaign was the first first in long
in a long
series of steps leading eventually to the Croatian
leading eventually Croatian vic-
vic
Events had also shown
tories of 1995. Events shown that dug-in Serb
dug-in Serb
ex-JNA artillery
troops backed by ex-JNA artillery could
could still take the
the
forces and frustrate Croatia's
Croatian forces
measure of Croatian Croatia’s
larger designs.
158
158

In mid-August the
In mid-August divisions that
the Muslim-Croat divisions that were
were town of Prozor quickly and briefly
town briefly became a tiny Stal
tiny Stal-
to
to plague
plague the
the defense of Sarajevo
Sarajevo throughout
throughout thethe war
war ingrad as both
ingrad both armies behalf of their
intervened on behalf
armies intervened their
came to to the
the surface
surface asas Serb forces hard on the
forces pressed hard the ethnic populations and street battles raged. HVO
ethnic populations HYO
western
western Sarajevo
Sarajevo suburb
suburb of Otes withwith artillery
artillery fire
fire and forces brought up from
forces brought from Tomislavgrad
Tomislavgrad shelled the
shelled the
infantry advances. A notorious
infantry advances. notorious gang of Muslim fight fight- Muslim
Muslim sections
sections of the
the town
town with artillery fire
with artillery fire over-
over
Prazina, , one of Sarajevo’s
ers led by Juka Prazina Sarajevo's flamboyant
flamboyant night. the following morning,
night. By the morning, Prozor's roughly
Prozor’s roughly
local warlords, showed
local warlords, showed up to to defend the town
defend the town but 5,000
5,000 Muslims had fled southward and much
fled southward much of the
the
immediately antagonized the
immediately antagonized the local HVO. . (The Sara-
local HYO Sara town was
town was reduced
reduced to a burnt-out wasteland. 291
bumt-out wasteland?“
HVO also objected
jevo HYO objected to Muslim
Muslim forces launching
forces launching
uncoordinated
uncoordinated attacks from from Croat-held
Croat-held areas that
that pro
pro- Tensions came close
Tensions close to the
the breaking
breaking point in many
point in many of
voked retaliatory Serb
voked retaliatory Serb artillery
artillery fire
fire into
into Croat neigh-
Croat neigh the nearby
the nearby towns
towns of mixed ethnicity—Konjic, Jablan
mixed ethnicity-Konjic, Jablan-
borhoods.
borhoods.)282)282 The
The unpleasantness
unpleasantness was was eventually
eventually Gomji Vakuf—but
ica, Bugojno, and Gornji
ica, Vakuf-but did
did not erupt
smoothed over,
smoothed Bosnian Army-HVO
over, but Bosnian relations in
Army-HYO relations in into
into open violence in Novi
violence as they had in Novi Travnik, Vitez,
Vitez,
Sarajevo remained strained.
Sarajevo remained strained. Prozor. Mostar perhaps
and Prozor. perhaps came closest
closest to igniting,
igniting,
as
as Croat
Croat commanders
commanders occupied government buildings,
occupied government buildings,
The
The level
level of Croat-Muslim violence signifi
violence escalated signifi- raided the
raided local SDA
the local SDA party headquarters, disarmed
headquarters, disarmed
cantly
cantly in late October
October 1992.
1992. Outright fighting between
Outright fighting between Muslim soldiers, and pressured
Muslim soldiers, pressured Muslim
Muslim citizens
citizens to
the nominal
nominal allies
allies appears to have begun first in Novi
first in Novi leave the
leave city. 292 293
the city?92 Had the
293 Had the Bosnian
Bosnian leadership
leadership
Travnik on 19 19 October
October and then in in Vitez the
the following decided
decided to to retaliate against
against the HVO after the
the HYO the events
day. A truce was was arranged in October, , but
in Vitez on 22 October in Prozor,
in the Croat-Muslim civil war
Prozor, the could easily
war could easily
Croat
Croat forces
forces continued shell Novi Travnik from
continued to shell from the have begun in
have in 1992
1992 rather than 1993. (Bosnian Army
1993. (Bosnian Army
hills outside
outside the town, causing
the town, serious damage. Mean
causing serious Mean- commander
commander Sefer Halilovic reportedly
Sefer Halilovic reportedly argued for a
while, the
the Serb troops outside
Serb troops outside the
the city watched in
city watched in forceful
forceful military
military response
response against the the Bosnian Croats
Bosnian Croats
delight
delight as their opponents
opponents battled each other. but was
was overruled
overruled by by Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic and the senior Bos
the senior Bos-
UNPROFOR finally cease-fire around
finally arranged a cease-fire around nian Government
nian Government leaders
leaders after a closely
closely contested
Novi Travnik on 23
Novi October, and the
23 October, the brushfire crisis
brushfire crisis vote.) 294 Instead,
vote.)294 Instead, Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic opted to send a pleadingpleading
appeared to have been stamped out. It would flare flare letter to Bosnian Croat leader
Mate Boban
Boban begging
begging
again.
again)” 2RJ 284285286
2R4 285 286 287
2R1 him
him toto end the
the "systematic
“systematic destruction"
destruction” of the republic
the republic
and met with
with Croatian President Tudjman
Croatian President Tudjman on
on
Just as UNPROFOR was was dousing
dousing the the last of the
the I November
1 November to discuss improvements in Croat-
discuss improvements Croat
embers in Novi Novi Travnik, a conflagration
conflagration was was about to Muslim cooperation. 295 29"297
Muslim cooperation.295 296 297
begin in Prozor,
begin Prozor, some 40 km km directly
directly to to the Pro
the south. Pro-
zor was an unassuming town
an unassuming town of about 15,000 15,000 Croats
Croats The
The confrontations
confrontations of October
October 1992 1992 were
were clearly
clearly a
and Muslims, far from from the frontlines and noteworthy
the frontlines noteworthy precursor
precursor to the Croat-Muslim civil war
to the war that would
only because it had the
only fortune or misfortune
the fortune misfortune to to sit the following spring
erupt the spring. . Even
Even the the short, nasty con
con-
astride thethe main
main north-south highway in Bosnia,
north-south highway Bosnia, run run- flict
flict of October
October 1992 was costly
1992 was costly enough:
enough: at least doz-
doz
ning
ning from
from thethe sea Ploce to
sea at Ploce J ablanica,
to Mostar and Jablanica, ens
ens and possibly
possibly as many as
as many as 300
300 people were killed
people were
through Prozor to Gornji
through Gomji Vakuf,
Vakuf, and on to Jajce and (most of them Muslims) over four or five
(most five days, and
western Bosnia.
western Bosnia. One version of the
One version the story is that the the many more were
many more were wounded
wounded.298 .298 29"
299 In 1992
1992 both sides
sides
violence began in
violence in Prozor on 23 OctoberOctober as as a gangland
gangland backed away from
backed away the brink and restored
from the restored the
the uneasy
uneasy
dispute
dispute over which mafia organization would receive
mafia organization receive Croat-Muslim working relationship common to most
relationship common most
delivery of black-market
a delivery black-market gasolinegasoline.288.288 Another
Another ver- ver Bosnia. In 1993,
of Bosnia. however, the
1993, however, the two sides would not
two sides
sion is
sion is that the Bosnian
that the Bosnian Army objected objected whenwhen thethe HVO
HYO tum back, and another war
turn back, war within Bosnia’s
Bosnia's existing
existing
refused to
refused to allow passage for a military military supply
supply con-con war would be the
war bloody result.
the bloody result.
voy. Yet another version
289 Yet
voy.289 version is that Bosnian
Bosnian Army
troops in Prozor refused
troops refused to allow HYO HVO special
special forces
forces
reinforce the
to reinforce the Bosnian Croats fighting
Bosnian Croats fighting thethe Muslims
in Travnik.290
in Novi Travnik .290 Whatever
Whatever the the reason, the little
the little
159
159

Chapter 32 The Muslims’ preparedness for the
lack of military preparedness
Muslims' lack
Conclusions consequences of the Bosnian
consequences Bosnian Govemment’s
Government's drivedrive for
independence had catastrophic
independence consequences for
catastrophic consequences
The war in Bosnia was not an an inevitable
inevitable result
result of war
war- thousands of Muslim
thousands citizens. Many paid
Muslim citizens. paid for their
their
like
like peoples'
peoples’ desire to fight,
fight, but instead came about leaders' lack
leaders’ lack of foresight
foresight with
with their livelihoods and
through
through the conflict of vital
the conflict vital political interests
interests among
among their lives
lives as the Serbs
Serbs burned
burned their villages and killed
their villages
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.
Serbs, Croats. Ethnic chauvinism
chauvinism and or drove
drove off the inhabitants. Even so, with
inhabitants. Even little mili
with little mili-
historical
historical grievances,
grievances, combined
combined withwith the brutalities
brutalities experience to
tary experience go on,
to go on, through
through the
the Republican
Republican TerTer-
inherent war, ensured that the
inherent in a civil war, the Bosnian
Bosnian con-
con ritorial Defense
Defense and paramilitary Patriotic League
paramilitary Patriotic League the
flict would be a bloody
flict bloody affair.
affair. As 1992 ended, the Muslims werewere able
able to build
build a framework
framework fromfrom which
which
unfinished business of the year would provide
unfinished business the
provide the to defend their new
to defend country. With even these primitive
new country. primitive
main
main battlegrounds
battlegrounds for 1993. During the new new year, thethe formations,
formations, when animated by the Muslim
when animated Muslim soldier’s
soldier's
Serbs would move Muslims’ military
move to end the Muslims' con-
military con typical
typical motivation desperation, the central
born of desperation,
motivation born central
trol
trol over key parts of thethe Drina valley
valley and thereby government
government was able able to hold most of Sarajevo
hold most Sarajevo and
achieve
achieve one of the primary
primary Serb war aims. Mean
war aims. Mean- key regions
key in central
regions in northern Bosnia while
central and northern
Croats and Muslims would resort to war
while, the Croats war to strongly challenging the
strongly challenging Serbs elsewhere.
the Serbs elsewhere.
settle their
their differences
differences over the political shape of
Bosnia, while the Serbs
Bosnia, Serbs stood on the the sidelines
sidelines and The Bosnian Croats
The Bosnian patrons in
their patrons
Croats and their in Zagreb
Zagreb werewere
laughed.
laughed. the wild card
card in 1992 and would remain
in 1992 remain so throughout
throughout
Bosnian War.
the Bosnian War. There
There were
were times when they joined
when they
The side that started the war-thewar—the Serbs-was
Serbs—was able to to with the Muslims to raise
with raise a stout military
military opposition
opposition
achieve
achieve most of its war aims during 1992, including
during 1992. to
to the Serbs, particularly
Bosnian Serbs,
the Bosnian particularly through
through thethe deploy
deploy-
the creation
creation of a territorially
territorially contiguous Bosnian Serb
contiguous Bosnian ment of thousands Croatian Army forces
thousands of Croatian forces into
into the
state.
state. They were able to do this primarily because of country. Indeed,
country. introduction of HV
Indeed, the introduction HY troops
troops to prepre-
their extensive
extensive prewar preparations for secession
prewar preparations from
secession from occupy
occupy the VRS was
the YRS was one of thethe key obstacles to
key obstacles to an
an
Bosnia, including the
Bosnia, the development
development of armed units. units. early.
early, total Serb victory. Zagreb
Serb victory. Zagreb and thethe Bosnian
The backing
backing given
given the Serbs
Serbs by thethe Yugoslav
Yugoslav People's
People’s Croats had a different
Croats vision of an
different vision independent Bos
an independent Bos-
Army in early 1992, together with
early 1992, with the transformation
transformation nia,
nia, however,
however, than did did the Muslims,
Muslims. oneone inin which the
JNA units into
of JNA into a Bosnian however, was
Bosnian Serb Army, however, Croats did
Croats did not answer government in
answer to a government in Sarajevo.
Sarajevo.
by far the
the most important factor in the Serbs'
important factor Serbs’ ability
ability to Muslim-Croat conflicts erupted briefly
conflicts erupted at different
briefly at different
fight
fight and win.win. This new new army,
army, the VRS, was able to
the YRS, places and over different local
over different local circumstances
circumstances through
through-
win key victories, such as those in the
key victories. Posavina corri-
the Posavina corri the year, but all
out the essentially were
all essentially were rooted
rooted in in the
the
dor, through
through its application
application of professional
professional military
military divergences
divergences over what the nature of Bosnia would be.
over what be.
expertise
expertise and firepower.
firepower. The Serbs owed owed their failure
failure
to completely
completely defeat their enemies enemies to cumulative
to the cumulative As
As 1992
1992 drew close, the Bosnian
drew to a close, stage had been
Bosnian stage
effects of the
effects ambitious war aims of the Serb
the ambitious Serb political set and the
set the actors
actors introduced. It remained
introduced. It remained to be seen
leadership
leadership and the rapid rapid expansion-at
expansion—at the cost of how events would play
how play out over
over the coming years.
the coming years.
necessary training discipline—of major
training and discipline-of portions
major portions
VRS. As a result,
of the YRS. result, when took on a highly moti-
when it took moti
vated enemy, as it did in the the Drina valley, Serb
valley, the Serb
army suffered a bloody
army suffered bloody nose.
160
160

Endnotes, Section III
III
'' Woodward,
Woodward, Susan L. L. Balkan
Balkan Tragedy:
Tragedy: ChaosChaos and Dissolution
Dissolution "'6 For
For reasons
reasons which
which have never become entirely clear. clear, Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic
After
After the Cold Cold War.
War. Washington.
Washington, DC: DC: The Brookings
Brookings Institution, got the office of president
the office political rival,
even though his political
president even rival, Fikret
Fikret
1995. Quoted before the the introduction. Also Also mentioned as a popular Abdic,
Abdic , had won roughly percent more votes. In a mysterious
roughly 15 percent
saying in Reiff, Reiff, David,
David, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia Bosnia and the Failure
Failure of of deal, Abdic
deal. traded his position as President of the
Abdic traded the Presidency in
the West. New
the York: Touchstone (Simon
New York: (Simon & Schuster) 1995. p. 65. 65, exchange for
exchange for the selection of Alija Delimustafic
Delimustafic as InteriorInterior Minis
Minis-
attributed
but not attributed to Gligorov.
Gligorov. Abdic would
ter. Abdic would later not only break with with the Bosnian
Bosnian Government
2 For the
'For document, "Bosnia"
the remainder of this document, “Bosnia” will
will generally be but declare
declare his own autonomous province north nonh of BihacBihac and raise
used for the
used the sake
sake of brevity to refer to either the the republic or the the his own military Krajina Serb support) to defend it against
military (with Krajina against
independent nation of“
independent of" Bosnia Herzegovina,” unless specifi-
Bosnia and Herzegovina," specifi Bosnian Army Anny forces.
'7
cally stated “Herzegovina” will continue to
stated otherwise. The term "Herzegovina" 17 Silber and Little,
Little , pp. 210-211.
refer to the the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Herzegovina described above. "'8 Gow,
Gow, James, Triumph
Triumph of of the Lack
lack of of Will:
Will: International
International Diplo Diplo-
33Total casualties,, including
German casualties
Total Gennan including wounded and missing missing,, macv
macy and the Yugoslav War, New
Yugoslav War. New York:
York: Columbia
Columbia University
University
amounted to 558. Yugoslav
amounted civil and military
Yugoslav civil casualties, by con-
military casualties. con Press, 1997,1997. p. 34.
trast, may have amounted
trast, amounted to as as many as as 100,000.
100.000. Roughly 345,000
Roughly 345.000 '9 Silber and Little,
19 Little. p. 215.
Yugoslav
Yugoslav Anny surrendered at the
Army troops surrendered the campaign
campaign’s 's end. 20 Reuters. “" Dubrovnik
"' Reuters, Dubrovnik Bombardment Causes ''Irreparable Irreparable Dam Dam-
44 The degreedegree of collapse within within the Yugoslav
Yugoslav military evidenced
military is evidenced age"'
age’” By Richard Meares,
By Richard Meares. 12 November 1991. I 991.
by the the fact that
that the
the entire
entire city of Belgrade surrendered
surrendered to l11 1 men 2‘ Belgrade Radio,
"Belgrade November 1991. FBIS
Radio, 11 November FBIS Vienna
Vienna
from the the SS "Das
“Das Reich"
Reich” Motorized
Motorized Infantry Division on 12 April.
Infantry Division AU1111152691,111526Z
AUi 111152691. 1115262 November November 1991.
The unit had been been blocked by a blown blown bridge, but the the Ill-man
I -man 22
" Malcom,
Malcom , Noel,
Noel, p. 228
detachment simply convinced Belgrade's
detachment Belgrade’s Mayor that a much larger
Mayor that *3
"Predictably
Predictably,, thethe SDA and HDZ eventually declared declared their support
suppon
force was following
following immediately behind them. them. It was several
several hours for
for the Croatian cause cause,, whereas
whereas the declared its support of the
SDS declared
the SDS
before any additional reinforcements arrived, but Klingenberg's
reinforcements arrived. Klingenberg’s breakaway KrajinaKrajina rebels.
rebels .
bluff worked and he
bluff he received the the Knight
Knight’s's Cross for his daring act. act. 2"
'' Reuters, "Four
“Four Yugoslav
Yugoslav Republics
Republics ApplyApply ForFor EC EC Recognition."
Recognition,"
5Antal, Maj
'Antal. John F.
Maj. . John F. "Operation
“Operation 25: Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia Disintegrates."
Disintegrates,” 24 December 1991 1991..
Army, May
Army. May 1993. pp. 28-35. 2835. 25 Technically, one could argue
"Technically, argue that
that the
the Bosnian
Bosnian referendum
referendum did not
66His His original name name was Josip Brozovich. .
Josip Brozovich meet the criterion laid out by the
meet the Badinter Committee, since the
7 Maclean, Fitzroy,
7 Maclean, Fitzroy, Eastern
Eastern Approaches.
Approaches. Bosnian Serbs refused to participate
panicipate and the vote was thus not rep rep-
'8 Yugoslavia, Country Swdy.
Yugoslavia. A Coulltry Study, p. 42 42.. Belarus,
Belarus. with comparable resentative
resentative of the population as a whole. The specific specific language
language
casualty
casualty rates,rates, could compete
compete for this dubious distinction but was stated that
stated that a "referendum
“referendum vote in which which all of the the citizens of Bosnia
Bosnia
not an independent
independent country at the time time.. and Herzegovina
Herzegovina wouldwould panicipate" "possibly" establish
participate" could “possibly” establish the
99 The remaining 8 percent percent consists mostly of of mixed-ethnicity indi- indi will of the
will Bosnia-Herzegovina populations to constitute
the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute Bosnia
Bosnia
viduals who declared declared themselves “Yugoslavs” in the prewar cen-
themselves as "Yugoslavs" cen and Herzegovina
Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent independent state. state. [European
Zametica, John.
sus. Zametica. John, The Yugoslav Conflict. . International Institute
Yugoslai· Conflict Community Arbitration
Community Arbitration Committee Opinion Opinion No. No. 4—The
4-The Recogni
Recogni-
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Adelphi Paper #270, #270. p. 36. Bosnia-Herzegovina, reprinted in Yugoslav
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sun-ey. No.
Yugoslm· Survey, No. l,I,
'0 Both the
"' the urban-rural and western-eastern divides—as exempli-
western-eastern divides-as 1992. p. 125.]
exempli
fied by the
fied the rivalry between Banja Luka
rivalry between Luka and Pale for for primacy withinwithin 2" Silber and Little,
'" Silber Little. p. 206.
Republika
Republika Srpska-were
Srpska—were to assume assume greater
greater imponance
importance later on. on, 27
" The postwar Federal Yugoslav Yugoslav Government also imported imponed or cre cre-
but internal divisions within within the
the Bosnian Serb community always ated many of the
ated the arms factories in BosniaBosnia in order to help industri industri-
remained secondary whenever the
remained the Serbs believed they were threat- threat alize the previously backward republic republic. .
ened by an
ened an outside actor example,, NATO,
actor:: for example NATO. the Croats, or the
the Croats. 2"
" On 25 August 1991, during an address address in Foca
Foca marking the one
Muslims.
Bosnian Muslims. year anniversary of the formation of the SDA SDA,, Izetbegovic
lzetbegovic stated
stated
''1' Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslal'ia:
Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of Nation.
of a Nation. that “they” (presumably the JNA
that "they" JNA and Serbia) were trying to draw
Penguin USA, USA, p. 212. Bosnia into the
Bosnia Croatia, stated
the war in Croatia. stated "This
"This is not our conflict."
conflict. "
'1 Malcom, , Noel,
"Malcom Bosnia: A Short History.
Noel. Bosnia: Histon·, 2nd Edition.
Edition. Papermac
Papermac,. Izetbegovic went on to claim that
lzetbegovic Muslim JNA
that more Muslim JNA generals
generals
1996, p. 199. should be given command in Bosnia Bosnia and stated
stated thatthat “Our
"Our boys will
will
'3 Referencing Mark
,., Mark 3:25. “If a house be divided against
3:25, "If against itself, that
itself. that killed and will
not be getting killed will not be cannon fodder. fodder . TheyThey will
will not
house cannot stand:·
house stand.“ commanded by others
be commanded ." (Sarajevo Radio,
others.” Radio , 25 August
August 1991.)
'4 The Bosnian Presidency system
14 system had a total of seven seven seats.
seats. with On 27 August.
August, a large group of of parents
parents ofof Bosnian
Bosnian conscripts serv serv-
two each each reserved Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, and one seat
reserved for Muslims. seat for
for ing in the JNA invaded the Bosnian
the JNA Assembly. demanding that
Bosnian Assembly, that the
“Yugoslav.”." The two Muslim
a "Yugoslav seats in the 1990 elections went to
Muslim seats JNA reassign their children to JNA
JNA reassign JNA units stationed
stationed in BosniaBosnia and
Alija lzetbegovic
Alija Izetbegovic and and Fikret Abdic.
Abdic. Biljana Plavsic—later to
Biljana Plavsic-later that in the
that the future no recruits be allowed to serve outside the repub‘ repub-
become President of of Republika
Republika Srpska-and
Srpska—and Nikola Nikola Koljevic
Koljevic took lic. (Sarajevo Radio,
lic. Radio, 27 August
August 1991.) The same same day.day, Bosnian
Bosnian
the two Serb seats.
the Kljuic and Franjo
seats. Stjepan Kljuic Franjo Boras won the Croat Defense Minister Jerko Doko
Minister Jerko announced that
Doko announced that the republican gov gov-
seats. Ejup
seats. Ganic (a Muslim)
Ejup Ganie Muslim) won the "Yugoslav seat.
“Yugoslav”" seat. ernment would
ernment postpone the dispatch of
would postpone of the September conscripts
the September
‘5 Of the
"Of the six republic presidents
presidents who took office after the first
office after first mul
mul- the JNA
to the JNA and refuse to tum turn over conscription records to the Army Anny
tiparty popular elections in Yugoslavia,
tipany Yugoslavia, Izetbegovic was the the only
one who was not a former Communist.
161
161

so that Bosnia could call up the
that Bosnia the draftees
draftees by itself. Belgrade Tanjug Tanjug Radmilo Bogdanovic quoted in Paul
Radmilo Bogdanovic Paul Williams
Williams and NormanNorman Cigar,Cigar.
(27 August 1991.) (In the the SFRY, the the republican ministries of A Prima Facie Case
Prima Facie for the Indictment
Case for Indictment of S/obodan Milosevic,
of Slobodan Milosevic,
defense and local subordinate
defense subordinate defense defense secretariats
secretariats were responsible London: Alliance
London: Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1996,
Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996. p. 35.
for maintaining conscription and reservist records and conducting w
40 On June 1991, before a meeting between
On 11 June between Milosevic,
Milosevic, Tudjman,
Tudjman,
actual
actual callups for the JNA, as
the JNA, as well
well as the republican territorial lzetbegovic, Milosevic,
and Izetbegovic, Borisav Jovic (the Serbian member on
Milosevic, Borisav
defense.)
defense.) the Federal Presidency), Dobrica Dobrica Cosic
Cosic (a famous Serbian national national-
,.2"Belgrade TanjugTanjug 20. 20, 24, 26. 26, 27 September
September 1991. 1991, Belgrade RadioRadio ist thinker and future post-Croatian war Yugoslav president). and
Yugoslav president),
27 September
September 1991. The JNA JNA and the Bosnian Ministry Ministry of Internal
Intemal Karadzic met to discuss Serbian strategy
Karadzic strategy for
for the meeting. Jovic Jovic
Affairs did reach
Affairs reach an agreement
agreement for JNA JNA reserve
reserve formations entry for for 11 June
June 1991.
deployed in the the area
area to be garrisoned in existing JNA JNA facilities
facilities “
41 The
The information is drawn from from Dr. Smail Cekic,
Dr. Smail Cekic, TheThe Aggression
Aggression
rather than
rather than quartered
quartered in local towns and villages. Belgrade Tanjug Tanjug on Bosnia
m1 Bosnia and Genocide Against Bosniacs,
Genocide Against Bosniacs. 1991-1993 translated
translated
26 September
September 1991. In at least one incident,
at least incident. JNAJNA forces clashed Haris Mesinovic,
by Haris Mesinovic. Kadira Kadira Hadzic,
Hadzic. and Ferica Ducic. Ducic. Sarajevo:
civilians (probably Croats) near
with civilians near the
the town of Stolac. Institute for for the Research of Crimes Crimes Against Humanity and lntema
Against Humanity Interna-
3°Many
1-0 Many Herzegovinian
Herzegovinian Croats were in fact more radical than their tional Law,Law, 1995, pp. 66, 66. 385. which
which includes summaries and cita cita-
brothers in Croatia. Herzegovina had been
ethnic brothers been one of the breedbreed- tions for collectio.n of JNA
for a large collection JNA and SDS SOS documents
documents that the
ing grounds for the the Croatian World World War II II Fascists,
Fascists. the Ustashe. Bosnian
Bosnian Government captured captured during the war. The The document cited
3'
31 For example.
example, the Croatian military newspaper, Zagreb Velebit
military newspaper, Velebit in
in this case
case did not say who issued the weapons, and the author
noted that
noted that the
the HV's elite 4th Guards Brigade Brigade included many Herze Herze- assumes the JNA
assumes JNA rather
rather than the Serbian SDB SOB (later
(later RDB)
RDB) pro pro-
govinian volunteers upon its formation in spring 1991. See Zeljko Zeljko them. However,
vided them. However. it seems seems clear thatthat the JNA
JNA did not begin
Stipanovic, "Unit “Unit That Won Won All All Its Battles,''
Battles." Zagreb Velebit 2 May May issuing weapons to Serbs (at least least on an official,
official, large-scale level)level)
1997, pp. 16-17. until
until the JNA JNA became
became fullyfully involved
involved in in the Croatian war during the
In addition, many prominent Croatian leaders leaders were born in Herze- Herze fall of 1991. When
fall When the JNA JNA began
began issuing these these weapons to per per-
govina, in particular many of the the Croatian emigres
emigres who returned
returned sonnel officially registered as “volunteers,”
officially registered "volunteers," it appears
appears that
that it usu
usu-
home in 1989/1990 when the
home the HDZ was formed. These included documentation and receipts for
ally provided them documentation for the weapons
Croatian Defense Minister Minister Gojko Gojko Susak and many of the ex-French that identified them as JNA,
that identified JNA. in contrast absence of a record
contrast to the absence
Foreign LegionLegion personnel,
personnel, such as Colonel Colonel Ante Roso (later HYO HVO for the 1990 document. In In addition, the type of weapons distributed
commander), who played prominent roles inside the
commander), the Croatian and the way they appear appear to have been issued are consistent consistent withwith
Army.
Army. what is knownknown about about the SDB’s provision of weapons to the Croat
SDB's provision Croat-
33See
-" See interview with SOS SDS member
member Momcilo
Momcilo Krajisnik, then Presi
Krajisnik. then Presi- ian Serbs.
dent of
dent of the Assembly in Degan Jovic,
the Bosnian Assembly Jovic. "Yugoslavia
“Yugoslavia or ‘2
42 Additional
Additional supply shipments shipments found by the Bosnian Bosnian MUP MUP include
include
War!" Zagreb Danas
War'" Bonus 6 August 1991. 1991, pp. 29-31. stopped on 24 May
one stopped May 1991. The The truck, traveling betweenbetween Niksic,
Niksic.
33See
·" See Z. Ecim,
Ecim, "We“We Know Know Our Goal," Goal,” Kozarski Vje.rnik 20 May
Kozarski Vjesnik May Montenegro and Bileca, Bileca, was carrying 80 Russian Russian submachineguns
submachineguns
1994 and "The “The Brigade of of a Long
Long and Honorable Warpath," Kazar Kozar- and 16,000 rounds of of ammunition. Cekic. Cekic. p. 45. The The description of of
ski Vjesnik 29 July 1994, issue 984 for discussion of mobilization mobilization the
the weapons as “Russian submachineguns" sounds like
"Russian submachineguns” like the Soviet
Soviet
problems in one JNA JNA and one Bosnian TO brigade. brigade, both of of which
which World
World War War II PPSh submachinegun, which
II PPSh which given its age almost
mobilized in the
were mobilized the Prijedor area.
Prijedor area. certainly came came from from Serbian TO stocks rather rather than the JNA. JNA. See
·3“ Radio, 29 September
14 Zagreb Radio, September 1991: 1991; Sarajevo Radio.Radio, 29 Septem-
Septem Cekic, pp. 76-79,
also Cekic. 76- 79, for additional descriptions of of weapons distridistri-
ber 1991: Belgrade Tan
ber Tanjug, September 1991.
jug. 30 September bution to SDS SOS locallocal boards. Again,
Again. these appear to have been SDB
these appear SOB-
35Nevertheless. many Muslim
"Nevertheless. Muslim JNA JNA officers
officers continued to serve serve in weapons. vice JNA.
provided weapons, JNA. TheThe list of submachineguns
submachineguns and
the Army
the Army throughout
throughout the the Croatian war, much to the the chagrin of their machine pistols given to the senior SDS SOS leadership during June June
“allies” in the
future Croat ··allies" the Bosnian conflict.
conflict. These include such 1991,
1991. and described in Cekic, Cekic. pp. 86-87, also probablyprobably came from from
prominent figures figures as as Rasim Delic, Delic. who was to become become the the Bosnian
Bosnian the SOB. although Cekic
the SDB. asserts it was the JNA.
Cekic asserts JNA. Cekic,
Cekic, however,
commander, and Enver Hadzhihasanovic,
Army commander,
Army Hadzhihasanovic, who was a brigade does not say whether the documentation explicitly states
documentation explicitly states that
that the
commander in Sarajevo.
commander Sarajevo, later later commanded
commanded the the Bosnian Army Army 3rd SDS
SOS received the the weapons from from thethe JNA.
JNA.
Corps, and
Corps. and became
became the the Chief
Chief of of the
the Bosnian
Bosnian General Staff. ‘3
'' Stanisic and key subordinatesubordinate “Frenki” Simatovic both attended
"Frenki" Simatovic attended
neither of
although neither of them
them took part part in combat. the four-year anniversary of the Bosnian Bosnian Serb MUP’s MUP's Special
Special
3" Although there
' 0 Although substantiate Serb claims that
there is no evidence to substantiate that Police Brigade in April 1996. A
Police Nasa Borba
A Nasa reporter who
Borba reporter who attended
attended
either the
either the Muslims
Muslims or the the Croats intended
intended to to launch military opera
military opera- the
the gathering stated stated that “it was explained to us that
that "it that the Serbian DB DB
tions to expel the the Serbs or at at least
least eliminate their political
political leader
leader- Security] was actively involved
!State Security)
[State involved in the creation and training
ship, many Serbs believed that
ship. that they were threatened
threatened by such of
of this brigade,
brigade. and that that is the reason
reason forfor the visit
visit by high-ranking
high-ranking
actions. Serbian MUP MUP officials.“
officials." D. P, “Who
D. P. "Who Are Agents of
Are Special Agents of Repub
Repub-
37 Although the
37 Although JNA clearly saw its role as the
the JNA the defender
defender of of the lika
lika Srpska: ‘Second Echelon' of
·second Echelon' of Karadzic‘s
Karadzic's Security,"
Security," Belgrade
Serbs by the the end of of the
the Croatian war in 1991. 1991, that
that does not mean
mean Nasa
Nasa BorbaBorba 13 August 1997 Version). The
I997 (Internet Version). The first
first Bosnian
Bosnian
that the
that JNA desired to start
the JNA start a new war in Bosnia. During During late 1991 Serb Intemal
Internal Affairs Minister was Mico
Affairs Minister Mico Stanisic,
Stanisic. whowho apparently
and early 1992.1992, the JNA appears
the JNA appears to havehave still been working for a
been working relative-possibly a cousin—of
is a close relative—possibly Jovica Stanisic.
cousin---0f Jovica Stanisic.
peaceful solution to the the republic's crisis, although ready and will-
republic’s crisis. will ‘4 Jovic entry for
.w Jovic for 5 December 1991.
ing to use defend the Serbs in the
use force to defend the event
event it came to war. ‘5
4 ·1 This
This was concurrent with independent of
with but entirely independent of the callup
call up
3“The SOB SDB was later later redesignated
redesignated the the RDBRDB (Rezor Drzavne of
of Serb reservists
reservists in Serb-majority
Serb-majority Bosnia.
38 (Rezor Dr~avne Bosnia.
Bezbednosti—Department for State
Bezbednosti-Department State Security). 4" Silber and Little,
46 Silber Little. p. 218.
39 Bogdanovic also stated
19 Bogdanovic stated thatthat "I Bosnian Serb SDS SOS leader
"[Bosnian
Karadzic]
Karadzic] was working patriotically, and sought out our help in
working patriotically.
organizing the Serbs, and we looked favorably
the Serbs. favorably on that. that. He was
often in my office."office.” "The“The Logistics
Logistics of of Service for the the People‘s
People's
Will,” Belgrade Duga
Will," Duga 7-20 January 1995, 1995. p. 21.
162
162

‘7 By early the
"By the following
following year. 85 to percent of the JNA
1090 percent INA forces in 53
' ' Cengic refers to
10 probably the same meeting al
the same at the “Dom
"Dom
Bosnia were Bosnian citizens. See Jovic
Bosnia Jovic entry for 25 December Milicije" in Sarajevo.
Sarajevo, although he states the meeting was not until
states the until
1991. According to Cengic, this was when the name “Patriotic
July 1991. According "Patriotic
4“A full
'"A full translation
translation of of this assessment
assessment was included in Cekic. Cekic, asas League" was adopted, the “Council
adopted, the "Council for National
National Safety" of Mus
Mus-
Supplement XII, 304-321..
XII, pp. 304-321 lims was established,
lims established. and preparations began for
preparations began for an organized mil
mil-
4‘9 ° Cekic.
Cekic, p. 92. A number number of examples.
examples, basedbased on captured docu
captured docu- November 1996,
itary underground. Sarajevo Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996.
ments, are
ments. are provided on pp. 92-94 92-94,, 97. For example.
example, on 18 February Interview with
Interview with Hasan Cengic.
Cengic, “The
"The Crisis
Crisis of the Dayton Agree Agree-
1992, the the "“illegal”
illegal'' (from the Muslim-Croat
Muslim-Croat s1andpoint)
standpoint) Serb ment Will Not Not be Solved Removal." FBIS Vienna
Solved by My Removal," Vienna
Regional
Regional TO headquarters
headquarters for for Bihac
Bihac requested
requested fromfrom thethe JJNA
NA 4051b
405th AU
AU181] 194496, 1819442
I 811194496, I 8 I944Z November
November 1996.
Rear Base—a unit—2,000 infantry weapons.
Base-a logistic unil-2,000 uniforms, and
weapons, uniforms. 5‘ Luck
'" Luckin,in, S, "Com mined to
“Committed 10 Democracy and the Idea of Freedom,"
other
other supplies from the JNA in order 10
the JNA to form a "Serb
“Serb uni!."
unit." In for
for- Oslobodjenje 13-20 July 1995, FBIS Vienna
Sarajevo Oslobodjenje Vienna AU AU
warding the the request
request 10 to its higher headquarters
headquarters.. the 405th noted that that AU 1807090095, 1809002
AUl807090095. 180900ZJuly July 1995.
this request
request should be considered in light of the the 30 December Gen Gen- "55Sarajevo Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996, Interview Interview with
with Hasan
eral Staff directive. Note that that some of the examples
examples given on pp. Cengic.
Cengic, 'The “The Crisis the Dayton Agreement Will
Crisis of the Not be Solved
Will Not
involve Krajina
94-97 involve formations—6th Lika
Krajina Serb TO formations-6th Division—as
Lika Division-as by My Removal,"
Removal," FBIS Vienna AU181 I 194496,
Vienna AU1811 194496 , 1819442
181944Z Novem
Novem-
well as a regular JNA
well JNA formation ((10th I 0th Partisan Division).
Division). and thus ber 1996.
for thethe JNA’s
JNA's purposes the nascent
nascent Bosnian 5" Vasiljevic
Vasiljevic also claimed that 1ha1KOS established
established contact with Alija
contact with
purposes did not come under the '"
Serb TO and police. Delimustafic
Delimustafic (then (then Bosnian
Bosnian Republic
Republic Interior Minister)
Minister) and per per-
In addition to the 30 December General Staff directive
10 the directive,. the SSNO
SSNO suaded him to block
suaded block efforts to establish
establish a state emergency in the
slate of emergency
appears to
appears 10 have issued a similar order on 21 February. See Cekic. Cekic, republic. Belgrade Nin, Nin. 12 June 1992. pp. 30-33. FBIS
June 1992, FBIS Reston VA VA
104, for a description of
p. 104. JNA I10th
ofaa JNA 0th Corps request
request to provide 92BA1 147A,
92BAI 0914562 July 1992.
147A, 091456Z
weapons and supplies 10 T0 units in Bosanska Krupa
to TO Krupa during late 5] Belgrade Nin,
"Belgrade Nin. 12 JuneJune 1992, 30-33 . FBIS Reston VA
1992. pp. 30-33. VA
April that that uses
uses thethe 21 February SSNO order as justification.
asjustification. 928A] 147A, 0914562 July 1992.
92BAll47A.091456ZJuly
5°On 25 March,
"' March, the the chief of thethe First (Operations) Directorate/JNA
Directorate/JNA 5‘
"TheThe arms embargo
embargo applied most significantly
significantly to heavy weapons,
weapons.
General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Colonel General Dragoljub
Dragoljub Simonovic.
Simonovic. the Bosnian
the Bosnian Muslims’
Muslims' critical deficiency. Although all sides would
deficiency. Although would
informed Adzic: Adzic: undoubtedly have welcomed more small arms during the the conflict,
conflict.
about the
about the situation and capabilities of JNA JNA units on the terri terri- there were in
there substantial number of handguns,
in fact a very substantial handguns. semiau
semiau-
tory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Herzegovina, the the problem of deployment tomatic rifles,
rifles . and automatic
automatic weapons in Bosnia Bosnia even before the
withdrawal of war material reserves
and withdrawal reserves from depots depots and of TO stocks were distributed and coven covert arms imports began.began. Basi
Basi-
endangered JNA
endangered JNA communication.
communication, command.command, control, and cally, prewar Bosnia
cally. Bosnia was a well-armed
well-armed society: according to police
logistics facilities on the the territory of 8111.BiH. reports fromfrom June 1991, 92 92,500 Muslim citizens owned 110,400
,500 Muslim
As a result of
As of this briefing,
briefing, Adzic
Adzic issued an order on 3 April April 10to the
the registered firearms,
registered firearms. 131,900 Serbs owned 157.200 registered fire
157,200 registered fire-
Second Military District (and, as
Military District noted,, although Cekic
as noted Cekic did not cite arms, and 43,000 Croatian citizens owned 51,800 registered
arms. registered fire
fire-
a similar order.order, presumably also to the the Fourth Military District for
Military District arms.. Belgrade Politika.
arms Politika, 21 June
June 1993 p. 7.
its units in Herzegovina)
Herzegovina) calling on the JNA INA to: 5"
•• Mijalkovski,
Mijalkovski. Milan. Milan. "Terrorist
“Terrorist Conspiracy Against the State,”
Conspiracy Against Stale."
Hasten the the withdrawal
withdrawal of war material reserves, reserves, especially Belgrade Vojska,Vojska. 28 October 1993, 1993. pp. 12-14, FBIS Vienna Vienna AUAU
of modern and
of and valuable combat equipment equipment ..... . Unit reserves
Unit reserves AU1311
AU 1311 192493, 1319242 13 I 924Z November
November 93.
to be handled within within the
the removal and relocation of units. 6°Lazanski,
"" Lazanski , Miroslav, "One Plane and 80,000 Men,”
Miroslav , “One Men ," Belgrade
The Second Military District also was to
Military District 10 prepare
prepare,, Politika 21 June
Politika June 1993 p. 7. 7, FBIS Vienna
Vienna AU0107093893
AU0107093893 0109382 01()(H8Z
. . . a map analysis of
... of the area which will clearly show:
area which July 93.
situated in secure
what is situated areas; what can be successfully
secure areas; 6' Halilovic.
"' Halilovic, Sefer,
Sefer. Lukava Strategija ("Clever Strategy"), Chapter
(“Clever Strategy”),
defended, with adequate
defended, reinforcements, until the condi-
adequate reinforcements. condi 17.
evacuation are
tions for evacuation are created
created (exactly specify quantitiesquantities 62
"' Belgrade Narodna Armija, Commentary by Ivan
Narodna Armija. Ma1ovic. “The
Ivan Matovic. "The
to be defended
10 defended and and to be evacuated);
evacuated): what can be evacuated evacuated Leopard's Skin
Leopard’s Tighter." FBIS
Skin is Getting Tighter.” Vienna. 1913292
FBIS Vienna. 191329Z March
March
threats and force by creating
through threats creating the corridors for with with- 1992.
drawal (on maps of of I1:25.000 detailed plans are
:25,000 scale de1ailed are to
10 be 63 officer also claimed at
• -1 The officer at the
the same
same time that there were 30,000
that there 30.000
made) , with the
made), the alternative
alternative of demolition/des1ruc1ion
demolition/destruction (plan troops in the the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb “White Eagles" and 15.000 in the
"White Eagles" the Bos
Bos-
in detail what can be extractedextracted by surprise of most impor- impor nian Croat HOS HOS and ZNG combined combined. . Belgrade Tanjug, 20 March March
tant technical assets
tant assets and what can be distributed to the the pop-
pop 1992. FBIS London London 2014162
201416Z March
March 1992.
ulation for safekeeping.) 6“Mijalkovski, Milan.
"'Mijalkovski. Milan, “The Guilty Are
"The Guihy Are Still
Still Going Unpunished."
Going Unpunished."
safekeeping.)
Adzic gave
Adzic the Second Military
gave the District a deadline of 10 April
Military District April for Belgrade Vojska,Vojska, 23 July 1992. p. 42. FBIS Reston VA VA
the completion of
the of these Cekic, , pp. 115-1
these plans. Cekic 115-116. 16, which
which give thethe 92BA1274G, 1113302
92BAl274G, 111330ZAugustAugust 1992.
1992.
specific citation of
specific of Adzic's
Adzic’s order-Federal
order—Federal Secretarial
Secretariat for for National
National •(’5
, Sarajevo Radio, Izetbegovic 13 February 1993 Speech,
Radio. Izetbegovic Speech. FBISFBIS
Defense, General Staff of of the
the Armed
Armed Forces of of the SFRY, First
the SFRY. London,
London . 1410272
141027Z February 1993.
Department, Top Secret No.
Department. 585-2, 03 April
No. 585-2. April 1992—Au.
1992-Att. Com- Com “This appears
""This appears consistent with a press report stating
consistent with stating that
that there
there were
mander or Chief
mander Chief of of Staff ofof HQ Second Military District.
Military Distric1. 5.000 Patriotic
Patriotic League members members registered
registered in Sarajevo’s
Sarajevo's Novi
Novi
Sec Cekic, pp. 115-123 for a description of
See Cckic, of the JNA withdrawal
the JNA withdrawal Grad district alone. which which were to become the nucleus of of four Bos
Bos-
"5‘ This
This number
number is an estimate
estimate based
based on totals
totals after
after the
the early April
April nian Army
Army Brigades
Brigades (lhe(the Ilst Motorized, 2nd Motorized,
st Motorized. Motorized . 102nd
I02nd
I NA mobilization
JNA mobilization in key areas areas ofof Bosnia.
Bosnia. See Annex Annex 22 and the the Mountain,
Mountain . and 5th Dobrinja Brigades .) Mehicevic,
Dobrinja Brigades.) Alisa, “I Will
Mehicevic , Alisa,"[ Will
section for more details.
next section Not Evict a Single Person Despite All
Not Evict All the Pressures,”
Pressures," Sarajevo
’2 Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996. Interview
Sarajevo Lji/jan
"Sarajevo Interview with Hasan Lji/jan January 1997 pp. 30-31. FBIS
Ljiljan 8 January FBIS Reston VA VA 97E97El7030,
17030.
Cengic, "The
Cengic. “The Crisis
Crisis of of the
the Dayton Agreement Will Not be Solved
Will Nol 1102422
I l0242Z February 1997.
by My Removal,“" FBIS
My Removal, Vienna AU181
FBIS Vienna 1 194496, 181944Z
AU1811194496. 1819442
November 1996.
163
163

“7
,- Sefko Hodzic, ...“Foundations
Sdko Hodzic Foundations of the the Bosnian Miracle,”
Miracle:· Sarajevo “6 Radio. 4 April 1992.
'" Sarajevo Radio,
1996, FBIS Reston 0900142 April *1 gesture was largely irrelevant,
Oslohodjenje 3 January 1996.
Osloboa'jenje Res ton 090014Z April 1996 Koljevic’s and Plavsic’s
"Koljevic"s Plavsic's gesture irrelevant. since the
“8
6 ' Sarajevo Radio, Izethegovic 13 February 1993 interview,
Radio. Izetbegovic interview. FBIS entire SDS
entire already walked out of the parliament.
contingent had already
SDS contingent parliament.
London LD1402125793,
London LDl402125793. 141257Z 1412572 February 1993. 8“
" General Kukanjac ordered the
Kukanjac ordered JNA Second Military
the JNA Military District sub
District sub-
6"
" Izetbegovic speech to the
lzctbcgovic speech the Second Congress of the the Party of Dem Dem- ordinates
ordinates not to hand over any weapons to the the TO without written
ocratic Action, reprinted in
Action. reprinted Dnel'lli Avaz,
in Sarajevo Dnevni A,•a~. 9 September
September permission from the the District commander. See Cekic,
District commander. Cekic. p. 91.
8" Radio. 4 April 1992.
1997. 89 Sarajevo Radio,
7° Tom, Sart!jel"O 9° Radio. 4-6 April 1992;
' 0 Sarajevo Radio, Radio. 4-6 April 1992,
Gjelten. Tom.
711 Gjelten, Daily: A City and Its Newspaper
Sarajevo Daily: Nell"spaper Under 1992: Belgrade Radio, 1992.
Siege. New
Siege. New York, HarperCollins. 1995. p. 34.
York. HarperCollins, Tanjug. 4-6 April 1992; Silber
Belgrade Tanjug, Silber and Little,
Little. pp. 226-227.
7' Vego. Dr.
71 Vego, Dr. Milan, “The Croatian Forces in Bosnia
Milan. "The Bosnia and Herzegov
Herzegov- 9‘
91 On thethe night of
of 5 April the JNA seized control of
the JNA of Sarajevo air
air-
ina,” Review, March
Jane 's Intelligence Rel'iell".
ina." Jane's March 1993,
1993. pp. 99-103. port.
72
7: Sarajevo Radio
Radio 2000 GMT. GMT, 19 Jul 1992, 1992. FBIS London London 1922142
I 92214Z 92
9 ' The date
date 6 April was by coincidence a historically charged charged one.
July 1992.
I992. On 6 April 1941, Hitler‘s Wehrmacht began
1941. Hitler's began its lightning invasion
73
"Z.Z. Zanko Report: "Croatian“Croatian Party Of Rights Will Not Not Leave Yugoslavia. and Luftwaffe
of Yugoslavia, Luftwaffe bombers
bombers devastated
devastated Belgrade.
Stan:evic House" Zagreb Vecernji
Starcevic Vecemji List, May 1992,
List. 12 May 1992. p. 9. Appropriately. it was on 6 April 1945 that
Appropriately, that Sarajevo was liberated
liberated
1“
" Dedakovic
Dedakovic returned
returned to Croatia in October 1992. 1992, whereafter
whereafter he from the the German occupation.
was accused
accused of stealing 300,()()0 DM intended
stealing some 300,000 intended for for Vukovar’s
Vukovar·s 93
9 .1 Also by coincidence,
coincidence. the UN Security CouncilCouncil formally
formally voted
defenders and imprisoned. He
defenders He faced a military court but was even even- that same day to recommend
that same recommend full deployment of
full deployment of UNPROFOR
tually a<:quitted.
acquitted. peacekeepers in Croatia.
peacekeepers
75
" Malcom,
Malcom. p. 228 9“ Tanjug. 15 March
94 Belgrade Tanjug, 1992. FBIS
March 1992, London LD1503154992,
FBIS London LDl503154992.
7" Vego, Dr.
'"Vego. Dr. Milan,
Milan. “The
·The Croatian Forces in Bosnia Bosnia and Herzegov
Herzegov- 1515492 March 1992.
I 5 I 549Z March
ina," Jane ’s Intelligence Review,
ina:· Jane's March 1993,
Review. March 1993. pp. 99-103. 95Belgrade Radio,
95 Radio, 28 March 1992. FBIS Vienna
March 1992, AU2803162092,
Vienna AU2803 I 62092,
77
77 Zagreb Radio,
Radio. 9 August 1992, 1992. FBIS
fBIS London
London LDO908190692.
LD0908l90692. 2816202
28 I 620Z March
March 1992.
7“
"Sec Bobctko pp. 212-216,
See particularly Bobetko 220-221, 224,
212-216. 220-221. 224. 229 for 9" Radio, IO
"' Sarajevo Radio. 10 April 1992. FBIS Vienna AU1004180392,
AU I004180392.
photographs of Bobetko orders to HV
photographs officers organizing HVO
HY officers HYO 1018032
101803Z April 1992.
defenses in key areas
defenses areas of Herzegovina. 97
9 ' Travnik Bosnjak. Interview
Travnik Bosnjak, Interview WithWith Senahid Hadzic,
Hadzic, Commander
79 photographic copy of Tudjman’s
79 A photographic Tudjman ·s order authorizing Bobetko Bobetko to of thethe 9th Muslim
Muslim Liberation "Crucial Test,”
Liberation Brigade, “Crucial Test." 21 Novem
Novem-
assume command of all Croatian forces from Split
assume command Split to Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik is ber 1995. FBIS
FBIS Reston VA. VA, 96BA0040A.
96BA0040A.
reproduced in Janko Janko Bobetko,
Bobetko. S,·eSve Moje
Moje Bitke (A Mr Battles),
(AllII My Battles). 98 Sarajevo Radio,
"Sarajevo Radio. 8 April 1992. FBIS Vienna AU0804181592,
April 1992, AU0804181592.
reproduced
Vlastita Naklada,
Zagreb: Vlastita Naklada. 1996. p. 202. 08181 SZ April 1992.
0818152
8° See Bobetko pp. 206-208 for photographs
"' Sec photographs of of the orders establish
the orders establish- 99 Sarajevo Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna
99 Sarajcrn Radio. Vienna AU0804224092,
AU0804224092.
ing this forward command post with Petkovic
forward command Pctkovic as its chief when 0822402 April
082240Z April 1992.
Bobetko was not present. present. '00 Gjelten, Tom, Sarajel'o
""Gjelten.Torn, Daily: A City and its Newspaper
Sarajevo Daily: Newspaper Under
Under
8‘
" Bijeljina municipality had about
Bijcljina municipality about 96,000
96.(JO0people in 1991, 1991. compris-
compris Siege. New
Siege. York: HarperCollins,
New York: HarpcrCollins. 1995. pp. 89-91.
percent Serbs and 31 percent smattering of
Muslims. with a smattering "’1
1111JNA
JNA elements
elements within Bosnia itself included part part of the 336th
ing 59 percent percent Muslims. the 336th
Croats. Although
Although an ethnic breakdown for the town itself is not
for the Motorized
Motorized Brigade. while while JNA
JNA artillery from the First Military
Military
available,
available. it probably was more heavily Muslim. while many of the
Muslim, while the District
District was deployed on the the Serbian side of the the Drina River. Bel-
Drina River. Bel
surrounding villages were predominantly Serb. Population data data grade Tanjug Domestic Service,
grade March 1992, FBIS London
Service. 2 March London
taken
taken from The Miroslav Lexicographical Institute,
Krleza Lexicographical
Miroslav Krleza Institute. A Con
A Con- LD0203222792,
LD0203222792. refers members of a JNA
refers to members JNA mechanized-armored
mechanized-armored
cise
ci.H'Atlas
Atlas ofof the Rep11hlic of
the Republic of C roalia & of
Cmatia of the
rhe Republic
Rep11blic of of Bosnia unit from Jastrebarsko
Jastrebarsko deploying to the Zvornik area
the Zvornik area in late Febru
Febru-
and Hercegovina,
Hcrcegm·ina. Zagreb: 1993. ary-early March.
ary—early March. This
This was the the former 4th Armored
Armored Brigade, for for-
82
" See
Sec Abdulah
Abdulah Sahinpasic,
Sahinpasic ...“Every Beginning is Hard,"
E,cry Beginning Hard:' Sarajevo headquartered at Jastrebarsko and redesignated
merly headquartered redesignated the
the 336th
336th
Slobodna Bosna,
Slohodna Bo.ma. 5 April 1996. 1996, pp. 12-15. Although
Although a Muslim Muslim Motorized.
Motorized.
account,
account. it appears accurate details of ‘02 Tanjug. 10 April 1992, FBIS London LD1004224892,
appears to provide the the most accurate the
of the 10' Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS London LDI004224892.
events
events surrounding the capture of
the capture Bijcljina. including
of Bijeljina, including preliminary 1022482
102248Z April 1992.
political and bureaucratic
Serb political bureaucratic moves preceding
preceding the actual seizure.
the actual m Silber and Little,
" 1' Silber Little. p. 224.
83
" Abdulah
Ahdulah Sahinpasic,
Sahinpasic ...“Every Beginning is Hard,"
Every Beginning Hard:· Sarajevo Slo S/o- m"
"~ Andric
Andric won the Nobel Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961. His His book
Bo.rnll. 5 April 1996,
bodnll Bosna,
bodna 1996. pp. 12-15;
12-15: Sarajevo RadioRadio 4 April details the life of
the life of the town—and of the
the town-and Orthodox, Muslim.
the Orthodox. Muslim, Catho-
Catho
1992;
1992: Belgrade Radio Radio 4 April 1992. lic, Jewish communities that
lic. and Jewish it—through four cen-
that comprised it-through cen
8“ Radio 3 April 1992. JNA
84 Sarajevo Radio JNA troops in Bijeljina
Bijeljina did not turies after
turies after the
the bridge’s construction. Andric
bridge's construction. Andric (a Croat who wrote in
intervene during the
intervene the fighting, either to halt the Serb attacks
fighting. either attacks or to the
the Serb dialect) also refersrefers directly to the
the interethnic
interethnic tensions
tensions in
them. JNA
support them.
directly support JNA troops. however,
however. did shelter
shelter both Serb then- Yugoslavia and the
then-Yugoslavia beneath the
the potential for violence beneath the commu
commu-
and Muslim refugees in the
Muslim refugees the JNA’s Bijeljina area
JNA"s Bijeljina area barracks.
barracks. See Sejo nity's surface.
nity’s surface.
Omeragic Tracking Down
Omeragic, ...“Tracking Down Crime: The Bloody Bloody Bijeljina Bayram,”
Bijcljina Bayram:' '05
"" Belgrade TanjugTanjug Domestic Service, 13 January 1992, 1992. FBIS LonLon-
Sarajevo S/ohodna Bo.ma. 5 April 1996.
Slobodna Bosna, 1996, pp. 12-15. don LD1301140392,
LD 130 I 140392. 1314032
I 3 I403Z January 1992.
"85In
In one ofof the
the Bosnian Presidency’s
Presidency's last official
official acts
acts before the '°"
'°° March 1992, FBIS
Tanjug. 4 March
Belgrade Tanjug, London LDO403233392,
FBIS London LD0403233392.
government
government collapsed,
collapsed. Izetbegovic sent sent a joint delegation
delegation (includ-
(includ 0423332
042333Z March March 1992.
ing Fikret Abdic, a Muslim;
Fikret Abdic. Jerko Doko,
Muslim; Jerko Croat; and Biljana
Doko. a Croat: Biljana "’7 Os/obodjenje. Interview
"" Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, Morncilo Mandic,
Interview with Momcilo Mandie, Assis
Assis-
Plavsic, investigate what had happened
Plavsic. a Serb) to investigate Bijeljina. Pre
happened in Bijeljina. Pre- tant Minister of
tant Minister of Internal Affairs
Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, "They “They
dictably. the
dictably, the inquiry went nowhere. The most memorable memorable aspectaspect ofof Want the Officer to Be Replaced!”
the Personnel Officer March 1992,
Replaced!" 6 March 1992. p. 2.
the “investigation”
the occurred when the
..investigation .. occurred the future president
president of of the
the
Republika Biljana Plavsic. first
Srpska. Biljana
Republika Srpska, first encountered
encountered Arkan Arkan after
after
the Bijeljina
the greeted him with a kiss.
takeover. She greeted
Bijcljina takeover.
164
164

"’8
111 ' Belgrade Tan March 92. FBIS London
jug. 23 March
Tanjug, LD2303 I 14292,
London LD23031 I 4292. is indicative of both the destruction
destruction and the chaos chaos of the very first first
2311422
23 I 142Z March 1992. days of the the Bosnian
Bosnian war, before the the various sides had regularized
‘09
11" Belgrade RTV. RTV, 24 March Vienna AU2403194292,
March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2403 I94292. their forces and imposed greater discipline on the troops:
greater discipline
2419422
24 March I1992.
I 942Z March 992. Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foca, Foca. turning the once quiet
“0 Belgrade Tanjug. 24 March March 1992. FBIS LondonLondon Bosnian
Bosnian town into a nightmare landscape of shattered
nightmare landscape shattered
1111 Tanjug,
LD2403234392, 242343Z
LD2403234392. 2423432 March 1992. streets
streets and burning houses. assonment of fierce
houses. The motley assortment fierce-
"‘ Sarajevo Radio,
111 Radio. 8 April 1992.1992, FBIS Vienna AU80415
AU804151492. I492. looking bearded
looking Kalashnikovs and bandoliers or
bearded men carry Kalashnikovs
08 I 5 I4Z August 1992.
0815142 have handguns tucked into their belts. Some are
handguns tucked members of
are members
"2 Radio, 9 April 1992.
112 Zagreb Radio. 1992, FBIS London
London LD0904120792.
LDO904120792. paramilitary groups from Serbia. others others are wild-eyed local
are wild-eyed
0912072
09 I 207Z April 1992. strangers and happy to have driven out
men. hostile toward strangers
"3
11' Belgrade Tan jug Domestic Service, 9 April 1992,
Tanjug I992, FBIS London
London their Moslem neighbours. No
Moslem neighbours. No one seems
seems to be in command
LDO904215792,
LD09042 0921572
I 5792. 092 I57Z April 1992. ill-disciplined and bad
and ill-disciplined had tempered gunmen stop and
tempered gunmen
“4
11 Radio, 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1004203092,
' Sarajevo Radio. AU 1004203092. detain people at
detain at will.
will.
1020302 April 1992.
I02030Z Moslems. who made
The Moslcms. made up half the town's population of
the town’s
“5' Belgrade RTB Television
11 Television Network, 1992, FBIS Vienna
Network. 9 April 1992. Vienna 10,000
I0.000 people, have fled
people. have fled or are
are in jail. Many of their houses
jail. Many houses
AU0904191892, 091918Z
AU0904191892. 0919182 April 1992. 1992. have been destroyed or are in flames.
been destroyed flames. Entire streets
streets have
‘1“As the
110 the fighting around Visegrad drew to a close. there
fighting around there was a been destroyed,
been destroyed, restaurants reduced to cinders and twisted
restaurants reduced
bizarre epilogue involving Muslim, Murad
involving a Bosnian Muslim. Sabanovic,
Murad Sabanovic. metal, apartment
metal. charred. the
apartment blocks charred. the hospital hit by mortar monar
who took control of of the
the hydroelectric damdam above
above the
the city and fire. The Serbs say that
fire. despite the damage.
that despite damage. only seven seven or
threatened to blow it up with explosives.
threatened explosives, which
which would
would havehave eight of their own men and about about twenty Mos Moslemsle ms were
flooded Visegrad and
flooded and much of the the surrounding area.
area. After
After negotia-
negotia killed in the
killed the fighting.
fighting.
tions by radio failed, the JNA stormed
the JNA stormed the
the position and
and discovered Glenny, Misha,
Glenny. Misha, The Fall of of Yugoslavia. Penguin. 1992. p. 166.
Yugoslal'ia. Penguin,
that Sabanovic had
that had no explosives. The small amount amount of of water
water '3'
1 ' 1 Sarajevo Radio, April 1992,
Radio. 28 April Vienna AU2804192492,
1992. FBIS Vienna AU2804 I 92492.
released did little damage.
released damage. Glenny. Misha.Misha. The Fall of of Yugoslavia.
Yugos/m•ia. 2819242
28 I 924Z April April 1992.
Penguin, 1992. 1992. pp. 165-166. ‘32
ilO Belgrade Radio, Radio, 30 April 1992. FBIS Vienna Vienna AU3004161292,
AU3004 I6 I 292.
“7 Belgrade Radio I1 March 1992.
111 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0 AU0103210892,
I 03210892. 3016122 April
301612Z April 1992.
0121082 March 1992.
012108ZMarch '33
il., Interview with General Sulejman Vranj Vranj by Fahira Fejzic,Fejzic. “They
"They
“8
11< Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 2 March March 1992,
1992. FBIS Lon-Lon Didn’t Believe
Didn't Believe That II Would
Would Get to to Sarajevo Alive,
Alive, So TheyThey Only
Only
LD0203160192, 021601Z
don LD0203160192. 0216012 MarchMarch 1992. Entrusted One Launcher to Me,"
Entrusted Me,” Sarajevo Ljiljan.
Ljiljan, 15 MayMay 1996
"9' Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 1992. FBIS
March 1992,
Service. 23 March FBIS Lon
11 Lon- pp. 20-21.
LD2303132592,
don LD2303 I 32592. 23 2313252
I 325Z March
March 1992. '34
1 " Sarajevo Radio,Radio, 18 May May 1992, FBIS Vienna Vienna AU1805141792.
AU I 805141792.
‘20 Stanic, Commander of
1211Miro Stanic. of the
the Foca War Headquarters,
Headquarters. left on “5
1'' Sarajevo Radio Radio 6 May 1992. FBIS Vienna
May 1992, Vienna AU0605161392,
AU0605 I 61392.
30 April 1992 1992 to meet
meet in Cajnice with the the "Army
“Army Minister
Minister of thethe 0616132 May
061613Z May 1992.
Serbian Autonomous Region of of Hercegovina" in order to coordi-
coordi '36 Radio, 12 May
1 ' 0 Sarajevo Radio. May 1992. FBIS FBIS Vienna
Vienna AU1305122492.
AU I 305122492.
nate further operations
nate operations in the Belgrade Radio 30 April 1992,
area. ((Belgrade
the area. 1992. ‘37
1" Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 18 May 1992. FBIS
May 1992, FBIS Vienna
AU1805141792.
FBIS Vienna AU3004161292, 301612Z
Vienna AU3004161292. 3016122 April
April 1992) Cajnice was '33
1" Bosnian MUP MUP and Territorial
Territorial Defense forces had already already seized
also the the closest
closest sizable town with its own TO headquarters.
headquarters. the arrns.
the arms. ammunition. equipment of
ammunition, and equipment of the
the former Regional
Regional
'2‘ Belgrade Tan
121 jug Domestic Service,
Tanjug Service. 15 May
May 1992. FBIS London
1992, FBIS Headquarters of
Headquaners of the Tuzla Territorial
the Tuzla Territorial Defense stored stored at Tuzla,
Tuzla. SreSre-
LD I 505135392. I1513532
LD1505135392. 5 I 353Z MayMay 1992. brenik, and Lukavac
brenik. Lukavac at at the outset of the
the very outset the fighting
fighting (15( I 5 April).
April).
'22
1" Belgrade Radio 8 April FBIS Vienna
April 1992. FBIS Vienna AU08041
AU0804114792.14792, (From the
(From the chronology in a 1993 Bosnian Bosnian Army soldier's hand
Army soldier’s hand-
081 1472 April 1992.
081147ZApril book.)
'23Zagreb Radio 9 April
121 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904 I01 192,
London LDO904101 192. ‘39
iw These were the "27 July" and “Grmec”
the “27 "Grmec" Barracks. “Grabez”
"Grabez" BarBar-
0910112
09101 April 1992.
IZ April racks,
racks. somewhat
somewhat further away,
away. remained
remained in the hands of
the hands of Serb Terri
Terri-
'24
1°' Sarajevo Radio.
Radio, 9 April FBIS Vienna
92, FBIS
April 92. Vienna AU0904190792.
AU0904 I 90792. torials.
0919072
09 April 1992.
I 907Z April "0
1' 11Sarajevo Radio,
Radio, 19 May 1992, FBIS
AU I905092892.
"-5
1 " Sarajevo Radio. 11 April FBIS Vienna
1992, FBIS
April 1992. Vienna AU1104213792,
AUi 104213792. 1"'Sarajevo May 1992,
' 1Sarajevo Radio. 19 May FBIS Vienna AU1905174892.
1992. FBIS AUl905174892.
1121372
112 April 1992.
I 37Z April 1'42
" Sarajevo Radio,
Radio, 24 MayMay 1992, FBIS
FBIS Vienna
AU2405163792.
'16Zagreb
120 Radio, 13 April
Zagreb Radio. April 1992. FBIS London
1992, FBIS London LD LD1304080792,
I 304080792. ‘43
1'·' Sarajevo Radio,
May 1992. FBIS Vienna
AU2805 I 25792.
I1308072 1992.
April 1992.
30807Z April '“
144 Sarajevo Radio, 5 June 1992, FBIS Vienna
1992. FBIS Vienna AU506111792.
AU5061 I I 792.
'27Belgrade Radio, Radio, 13 April FBIS Vienna AU
1992, FBIS AU1304173292, "5 based on a speech
127 April 1992. I 304173292. 1" These war aims are are based speech and an interview that that Bos
Bos-
1317322 April 1992.
I 3 I 732Z April nian Serb President Radovan Karadzic gave in 1995. See Banja
Karadzic gave Banja
'28
1" Belgrade Radio, 14 April 1992. FBIS FBIS Vienna AUl404161692.
AU1404161692, Luka Srpska Televizija
Luka Televizija 12 September
September 1995 for a long interview
1416162 April
141616Z April 1992. with Karadzic
Karadzic in which
which he outlines the military and diplomatic sit
the military sit-
1”
12' Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 17 April April 1992, FBIS Lon
1992. FBIS Lon- uations in 1995 and relates
uations them to war aims that
relates them the Bosnian Serb
that the
don LD1704152792.
LDl704152792. 171527Z 1715272 April
April 1992. approved in 1992. Karadzic‘s
Assembly approved speech to officials
Karadzic's speech officials in East
East-
13°Following the
llll Following the Serb capture
capture ofof Foca in mid-April.
mid-April, a panicularly
particularly ern Herzegovina on 25 August 1995 on Banja Luka Luka Srpska
bad example
had example of of "ethnic
“ethnic cleansing" ensued.
ensued. Muslim-owned
Muslim-owned houses houses Televizija is a more propagandistic,
Televizija propagandistic. less straightforward discussion
were torched, mosques
were looted or torched. down, and the
burned down.
mosques were burned the small of the
of same aims,
the same aims. again in the context of
the context of the political-military situ
the political-military situ-
Muslim population that
Muslim that remained
remained behind was terrorized.
terrorized. A A Reuters ation in 1995.
correspondent managed
correspondent managed to get after the
get into Foca shortly after the town was
captured by Serb forces and
captured and described
described the
the scene
scene he saw. The reportreport
165
165

"6
1'° This
This section is derived largely from author’s experience
from this author·s 15"
1' 6 It is also likely that the VRS
likely that YRS chose to leave a route out of the
analyzing the the Bosnian Serb Army Army on a daily basis for more than pocket open to encourage the population population to evacuate
evacuate the enclave
five
five years. when it fell,fell, thus removing the need for for VRS
YRS personnel to eject the
“7 Drawn
147 Drawn from the testimony of defense
from the defense expert witness Brigadier
Brigadier Croats and Muslims
Muslims themselves.
Muhamed
Muhamed Zejzagic Zejzagic during the ICTY ICTY WarWar Crimes
Crimes Tribunal
Tribunal '57
157 Bihac,
Bihac. Bosanska
Bosanska Krupa, Krupa, Cazin,
Cazin, and Velika
Velika Kladusa.
Kladusa.
"Celebici·'
"Celebici" trial of Zejnil Delalic, et.
Zejnil Delalic, et. al. ‘53
1" Figures are approximate and are taken from from the 1991 Yugoslav
Yugoslav
1‘“
1" Radio, 10 April 1992, FBIS
Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna 102132Z Apr 92,
Vienna 1021322 census data.data.
AU1004213292.
AU I 004213292. '59 Unlike the rest of Bosnia—most
" 9 Unlike Bosnia-most of which which was conquered in in
1" Lazanski, Miroslav.
1" Lazanski, Miroslav, "One Plane and 80,000 men.” men." Belgrade 1463—the
1463-the Bihac Bihac region remained in Croat-Hungarian hands
in Croat-Hungarian
Politika 21 June
Politika June 1993 p. 7. FBIS ViennaVienna AU0I07093893
AU0107093893 0109382 through most of the 16th century. Indeed, the Habsburg Habsburg fortress in in
July 1993. the city was not captured by the Turks Turks until
until 1592.
'50
15 " This
This section will will look
look almost exclusively
exclusively at the ethnic cleansing '6“
1"°TheThe Muslims
Muslims were also somewhat better better armed at the Outset,
outset,
in western Bosnia Bosnia through the actions of the Bosnian Bosnian Serb Army.
Army. It since the Patriotic
Patriotic League had managed to intercept a significant significant
will not examine the detention camp system and is not intended to
will Territorial Defense weapons that the JNA
fraction of the former Territorial JNA
be a fullfull examination of the war crimes issue. It also will will not focus had intended to distribute to the area’s area's Serbs. Halilovic,
Halilovic, Sefer,
on the often exaggerated
exaggerated actions of so-called "paramilitary"
“paramilitary” units Lukava
Lukava Strategija (“Clever Strategy"), chapter 17.
("Clever Strategy”),
(more accurately designated volunteers); these
designated volunteers): these cutthroats
cutthroats served as 16‘
161 Sarajevo Radio,Radio, 16 April 1992, FBIS FBIS Vienna
AU I 704094892.
auxiliaries to YRS
auxiliaries VRS regular formations. Much Much of the reporting, "’3 Belgrade Tanjug,
162 Belgrade March 1992, FBIS
Tanjug, 1I March FBIS London
LD0I03 l 20292.
unless otherwise cited, is drawn from a series of debriefings ref
debriefings of ref- “’3 Tanjug, 31 March
Belgrade Tanjug,
16 ·' Belgrade March 1992, FBIS FBIS London
London
ugees
ugees expelled by the the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs during their operations. This This LD3103090492.
LD3 l 03090492.
reporting has has been
been judged to be highly accurate in most cases.
highly accurate cases. 1‘“
164 AsAs late as the second week of May, May, JNA
JNA 10th
I 0th Bihac Corps com'
Bihac Corps com-
Crosschecks between between reports, together with other sources that
together with that cor-
cor mander Lt. Lt. Col.
Col. General Spiro Spiro Ninkovic
Ninkovic cited the BihacBihac area as an
roborate these these debriefings, allowed us to develop a detailed
debriefings, have allowed area of relative stability
area stability and an example for for the rest of Bosnia.
Bosnia. AsAs
picture of the VRS operations.
the YRS Ninkovic put it—with
Ninkovic it-with the exception of the town town of Bosanska
Bosanska
'5‘ As cited in Reiff,
" 1 As Reiff, David,
David, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Fall
Slaughterhouse: Bosnia Fail- Krupa, which
Krupa, which had already been taken over by Serb forCes—Bihac forces-Bihac
ure of the West. New
ofthe York: Touchstone, 1994. pp. 76-77.
New York: was an area area where “sanity prevails and interparty antagonisms are
"sanity prevails
'52
1'° Vulliamy,
Vulliamy, Ed, Seasons in Hell: Hell: Understanding
Understanding Bosnia's War. War. not as they are in the broader areas areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Bosnia-Herzegovina ... (Bel (Bel-
New York:
New York: St. Martin's
Martin's Press, 1994. p. 66. Tanjug, 8 May
grade Tanjug, May 1992, FBIS FBIS London LD080512 l 592J Given
London LD0805121592) Given
'5’
15 ·1 The following
following narrative and analysis has a Serbo-centric focus the bizarre and tragic free-for-all
free-for-all which
which was to ensue—with
ensue-with Mus Mus-
because of the
because the strategic
strategic importance of the Posavina corridorcorridor to the lims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian
lims, Bosnian Bosnian Croats, Krajina
Krajina Serbs, and separatist
separatist
creation and survival of Republika Republika Srpska. In addition, the Bosnian
Bosnian Abdic
Abdic forces all fighting fighting inin the area—Ninkovic's
area-Ninkovic's words words appear in in
Serb Army Army has has published a substantial amount of information
information on retrospect ironically far off the mark.
retrospect to be ironically
its operations in the the corridor, making it far easier to tell the Serb “’5
165 O’Shea,
O'Shea, Brendan, Crisis Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia's's Bloody
Bihac: Bosnia Bloody Battlefield,
Battlefield.,
side of the military
military story than thatthat of
of the Croatians, who, for obvi obvi- UK:
UK: Sutton Publishing,
Publishing, 1998. p. 3.
reasons (they lost), have provided far less public
ous reasons information
public information "’6
1"" Sarajevo Radio,Radio, 21 April 1992, FBIS FBIS Vienna
AU2 l 04182292.
on their version of of events.
events. Thus, for example.
example, thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Serb '67 Radio. 22 April 1992, FBIS
167 Sarajevo Radio, FBIS London
LD2204124792.
military
military journals, K rajiski Vojnik and Srpska Vojska
rajiski Vojnik Vojska have many “’8 Radio, 22 April 1992, FBIS
168 Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna
AU2204210992.
detailed articles on the corridor,corridor, describing unit dispositions,
dispositions, the '6" Radio, 30 April 1992, FBIS
169 Zagreb Radio. FBIS London
LD3004083 l 92.
battles, and commanders. The comparable Croatian military
battles. military publi
publi- ‘70 Tanjug, 24 April
Belgrade Tanjug,
170 Belgrade April 1992, FBIS
FBIS London
LD2504002192.
Hrvatski Vojnik
Vojnik and Velebit, usually
and Ve/ebit, mention in passing
usually mention passing '7'
17 ' Nikola Zoric, “1
Nikola Zoric. "I 1th
Ith Krupa
Krupa Light
Light Infantry Brigade: Order
Infantry Brigade: Order on
cations. Hn·cll.<ki
cations.
that a unit fought in the "Sava
that “Sava Basin"
Basin“ in 1992, or more rarely, will will Chests.” Srpska Vojska
Krajina Chests,"
Krajina Vojska 15 July 1993, pp. 8-9, 8-9, describes the
admit to having been been in "Bosanska Posavina"; beyond general
“Bosanska Posavina"; fighting around Krupa
fighting Krupa from the perspective of the Serb Krupa Krupa
statements, however, no narrative detail is provided
locational statements, provided on TO—later
TO-later the YRS VRS 11th Krupa Krupa Light
Light Infantry
Infantry Brigade.
Brigade.
combat operations. In addition, unlike unlike the Croatian Army com
Army com- '73 Belgrade Tanjug,
172 Belgrade Tanjug, 8 May May 1992, FBISFBIS London
LD0805220392.
mander Herzegovina and the Dalmatian coast, General Bobetko,
mander in Herzegovina Bobetko, ‘73 Tanjug, 9 May
Belgrade Tanjug,
"'Belgrade May 1992, FBISFBIS London
LD0905224792.
General Stipetic-the
Stipetic—the last HY HV commander in Posavina-is
Posavina—is still
still an ‘74
1" There may have been a shortage of of pilots anyhow. Zagreb Radio
pilots anyhow. Radio
officer and has not published his memoirs.
active-duty officer claimed that that 32 AirAir Force pilots from
Force pilots from the Bihac
Bihac garrison had
'54
1 events from March
This section will discuss events
j4 This March 1992 to January
January declared their allegiance to the Bosnian Republic Government
Bosnian Republic Government
there was no clear separation
because there
1993 in a single narrative because separation shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Zagreb Radio,
of hostilities. Radio, 10IO April
dividing operations in March
dividing March from those in June. One set set came 1992, FBISFBIS London
LDI004095792.
right after the other and need need to be discussed in context. ‘75 Sarajevo Radio,
"'Sarajevo Radio, 16 May May 1992, FBISFBIS Vienna
Vienna AU605143592.
AU605143592.
‘55 As Bosnian
Bosnian Army Hasim Sadie
Sadic was to ‘76
176 These were the “27 "27 July"
July" and “Grmec”
"Grmec .. Barracks.
Barracks. The
The “Grabez”
1" As Army 2nd Corps Commander Hasim "Grabez"
say two years later: Barracks,
Barracks. somewhat further away, remained in in the hands of
of Serb
know that
You know
You that we fought a battle
battle for the corridor
corridor once Territorials.
Territorials.
before, in cooperation with
before. with the 4th Operational HYOHVO Zone "7 Radio, 19 May
177 Sarajevo Radio. 1992. FBIS
Vienna AU190592892.
AU I90592892.
of Orasje. The HYO
ofOrasje. HVO progressed Vucilovac, and we then
till Vucilovac,
progressed till '78 Radio, 19 May
Sarajevo Radio.
"'Sarajevo 1992. FBIS
Vienna AUl905174892.
AUl905 l 74892.
of Gorica-Krepsic and got as close as 1.5
the position ofGorica-Krepsic
took the '79
179 Belgrad Radio, 12 May
Belgrad Radio, May 1992, FBISFBIS Vienna
AUl205140592.
km, but we did not manage
manage to hold out. While
While the HVO bri-
the HYO bri 13°
180 Zagreb Radio,
May 1992, FBIS London
LO I 205153192.
gades remained at
gades at the positions, we had to withdraw
withdraw more "“ Belgrade Radio,
181 Belgrade Radio, 31 May 1992, FBIS
AU3 l 05165292.
the south.
to the "‘2
1"' Sarajevo Radio,
Radio, 12 June 1992, FBIS
June 1992, FBIS Vienna
AU1206074192.
Zeljko Garmaz and Sasa Buric,
Zeljko “The Offensive
Buric, "The Offensive Aimed
Aimed at Cutting
Cutting
Corridor and Lifting
the Corridor Blockade of
Lifting the Blockade of Sarajevo Has Started
Started!”1..
Globus, 12 August 1994. FBIS

Zagreb G/ohus. FBIS Vienna AU, 171056Z
Vienna AU, 1710562
August 1994.
August
166
166

"‘3
"' Zagreb Radio, September 1992, FBIS
Radio, 27 September FBIS London
London subsequently added to
were subsequently to the 5th Corps order
5th Corps order ofof battle, but these
these
LD2709151292.
LD2709151292. were the original
original units.
units.
“‘4 Sarajevo Radio,
1"' Sarajevo Radio. 13 I 3 June I 992. FBIS
June 1992, FBIS Vienna
AUI306163192 . 208 The 2nd
208 The Krajina Corps
2nd Krajina brigades-\ 1th
Corps brigades—l Krupa, lst
\ th Krupa, I st Drvar,
Drvar, 3rd3rd
'85
1'' Belgrade Radio, 14 July
Belgrade Radio, 1992, FBIS
July 1992, FBIS Vienna
AUI407163292. Petrovac,
Petrovac, 17th Kljuc, Kljuc, and 15th15th Bihac—were
Bihac-were deployed deployed between
between
'56
1" Zagreb Radio Radio 13 13 September 1992, 1992. FBIS
FBIS London
London Bosanska
Bosanska Krupa Krupa and Bihac
Bihac city, including the
city, including the Grabez
Grabez area.area . The
The 1st
Isl
LD1309141792
LD 1309141792 The The 15th Bihac Light Infantry
Bihac Light Brigade carried out
Infantry Brigade Novigrad
Novigrad Light Light Infantry Brigade from
Infantry Brigade from lst I st Krajina Corps defended
Krajina Corps defended
the attack on Golubic.
Golubic . the area northeast of Krupa up to the Croatian
of Krupa Croatian border.
border.
“‘7 Radio , 16 September 1992, FBIS
187 Zagreb Radio, FBIS London
London 2°“
'll'!This
This does not mean that the the Muslims
Muslims were the only only ones
ones comcom -
LD1609113492.
LD 1609 I I 3492. mitting atrocities in
mitting in the Drina
Drina valley fighting . On
valley fighting. On the contrary,
contrary , the
‘33
'" Sarajevo Radio, 18 September 1992, FBIS
Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna
Vienna Serbs ethnically
ethnically cleansed the Muslim population from
Muslim population from allall the
the areas
areas
AU I 809134092.
AU1809134092. that they captured. The The atrocities committed by by Oric‘s
Oric's menmen have
“39
180 TheThe Bosnian Army's lst
Bosnian Army’s I st Cazin
Cazin (later
(later 503rd) Brigade took
503rd) Brigade took the
1he been highlighted
highlighted in in part because they they appear to have been an
towns of Novakovci
towns Novakovci and Trnjak. Sarajevo Radio,
Tmjak. Sarajevo Radio, 16 September exception to the conduct of of Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government troops toward toward
1992, FBIS FBIS London
LDl609215792. civilians. Elsewhere,
Serb civilians. Elsewhere . other than in isolated incidents,
in isolated incidents. Bosnian
Bosnian
1""
,~, Zagreb Radio,
Radio . 23 September 1992, 1992, FBIS
FBIS London
London Army units appear
Artny appear to have treated the Serb
generally treated
have generally Serb population
population
LD2309 l 00992.
LD2309100992. appropriately, on the express orders of of the Bosnian
Bosnian Government.
Government.
‘9‘ Sarajevo Radio,
191 Sarajevo September , FBIS
Radio , 25 September, FBIS Vienna
AU2509 l 24392. 21" The head of the MUP
2 10 The school reportedly stated
MUP school stated there were were 840
‘92
19' Zagreb Radio, November 1992, FBIS
Radio, 7 November FBIS London
London student s and teachers
students teachers inin the school compound at the time.
school compound Most of
time . Most of
LD07 l l 235692.
LD0711235692. these teenagers. Zagreb Radio,
these were teenagers. Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS FBIS London
London
‘93
1••
Zagreb Radio,
Radio , 10 IO October 1992, I992, FBIS
FBIS London
LD IOIOI 21192. LD0504160392.
LD0504 I 60392 .
‘94
19 ' The
The Bosnian Army's 105th (later 505th) Buzim
Bosnian Army’s Buzim Brigade
Brigade 3"
111 By By an unfortunate coincidence,
coincidence, the gun battles battle s around the sur sur-
advanced several kilometerskilometers east Bosanski Novi,
east toward Bosanski Novi, capturing rounded police police academy were taking place at the same exact
Banjani and Basta but was unable to completely
Banjani completely forceforce the Serbs out moment as a march by a large multiethnic multi ethnic crowdcrowd of of thousands of of
of the area area north of Otoka.
Otoka. Zagreb Radio, October 1992, FBIS
Radio, 13 October FBIS unaffiliated
unaffiliated Sarajevans calling for peaceful coexistence among all
calling for all
London
LDl310163492. the factions.
factions. The crowd had first
The crowd gathered near the national assem
first gathered assem-
‘95
191 Bosnian
Bosnian ArmyArmy forces captured the Bosanska Bojna area
Bosanska Bojna area 16 bly
bly building fighting and the breakup of
building to protest the fighting of the country.
October 1992. Zagreb Radio,
October Radio, 16 October 1992, FBIS FBIS London
London Unaware of the attack,
Unaware attack , the crowd
crowd then crossed the Miljacka Miljacka RiverRiver
LD1610115792.
LD\6JOI 15792. southward over the Vrbanja Vrbanja bridge in in the city’s
city's Grbavica
Grbavica neighbor
neighbor-
19°
196 Zagreb Radio, August 1992, FBIS
Radio, 28 August London LD2808100192.
FBIS London LD2808100192. hood. Unwittingly, they began to march straight toward
hood . Unwittingly, toward the police
police
‘97Zagreb Radio,
197 Radio, 9 September 1992, FBIS FBIS London
London academy grounds, where Serb forces forces were then attacking Vraca Vraca
LDO909195792.
LD0909195792. hill.
hill. TheThe Serbs opened fire fire on the group, causing causing the crowd crowd to
'98 Radio, 14 September 1992, FBIS
London panic and disperse. One One man was injured,injured, and then a 21-year-old
21-year-old
LD1409121492.
LDl409121492. Muslim
Muslim medicalmedical student,
student, Suada Dilberovic—a
Dilberovic-a refugee from from
'°° Radio, 14 September 1992, FBIS
i w Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna
Vienna Dubrovnik, Croatia-was shot through the chest. She died within
Dubrovnik, Croatia—was within
AU1409123392.
AUl409123392. minutes, and the Sarajevo marchers’ marchers' dream of of a united Bosnia
Bosnia died
20°
200 Zagreb Radio, September I1992,
Radio , 22 September 992, FBIS
FBIS London
London with her. She is sometimes counted as the first first casualty of of the Bos
Bos-
LD2209113392.
LD2209 I I 3392. civil war, although that
nian civil that dubious distinction
distinction couldcould perhaps bet bet-
2‘“ Radio, 22 September, FBIS
20 1 Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna
AU2209I80192. ter be awarded to the Muslim victims of
Muslim victims Arkan 's occupation of
of Arkan’s of
202
"" Ramiz Drekovic was the 5th Corps
Ramiz Drekovic first commander.
Corps’' first commander . Bijelina four
Bijelina four days earlier on 1I April.
April. See SilberSilber and Little,
Little. p. 227.
227.
2‘“
w Radio,, 20 October 1992, FBIS
3 Zagreb Radio London LD2010132392.
FBIS London LD2010132392. 2‘2
212 Silber Little, pp. 226-227.
Silber and Little,
'°'
20‘The 2nd Krajina initial objective were a series of
Corps’s's initial
Krajina Corps of much
much- 22“1.1 In end,, the several hundred surrounded police
In the end cadets were
police cadets
disputed hills hills running from just south of Bihac
fromjust Bihac north across the pla pla- exchanged for for the six Serb gunmen who had fired fired into the crowdcrowd
teau to the Una. See Brendan O'Shea
teau O’Shea, , Crisis Bihac: Bosnia's
Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia ’s from the HolidayHoliday Inn on 6 April 1992. Gjelten, Tom, Tom, Sarajevo
Sarajevo
Bloody Battlefield, Gloucestershire, Sutton Publishing
Bloody Battlefield, Publishing Limited,
Limited. Daily: A
Daily: A City Newspaper Under
City and its Newspaper Under Siege. New New York:York: Harper
Harper-
1998, pp. 8-9. Nikola Zoric, "I
Nikola Zoric, “11th
I th Krupa
Krupa Light Infantry Brigade:
Light Infantry Brigade: Collins, 1995. pp. 41-42.
Collins,
Order on Krajina Chests,” Srpska Vojska Vojska 15 July 1993, pp. 8-9. For 2" Radio, 5 April I1992, 992, FBIS Vienna AU0S04200892.
AU0504200892.
Krajina Chests," rn Sarajevo Radio, FBIS Vienna
day-to-day reporting on the fighting see Paris AFP
AFP 1I December 2'5
' 1' Less fighting occurred elsewhere in the city city on 5 April.
April.
fighting, , see Less intense fighting
1992, Zagreb Radio Radio I1 December 1992, 15 December 1992: 1992; BelBel- Muslim forces seized control of
Muslim of the
the Novo
Novo Sarajevo police police station
grade
grade Radio Radio S 5 December 1992; Sarajevo Radio Radio 6 December 1992, (Sarajevo Radio,Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS FBIS Vienna
Vienna AU0504134292),
AU0504 I 34292) , and
Sarajevo Radio Radio 11 December 1992, 14 December 1992. shooting and grenadegrenade firefire were reported in the Dobrinja and Bas
the Dobrinja Bas-
205The 2nd Krajina
201 Krajina Corps
Corps employed the bulk of of the
the lst Drvar, I15th
I st Drvar, 5th carsija neighborhoods. (Sarajevo Radio, April I1992,
Radio, 5 April FBIS
992, FBIS
Bihac, and 17th Kljuc Light
Bihac, Infantry brigades, plus the
Light Infantry Battal
the 3rd Battal- Vienna AU0S04224292.)
Vienna AU0504224292.)
ion/1 I1th
ion/I th Krupa
Krupa Light
Light Infantry
Infantry Brigade and an engineer (pioneer) 2“•
Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS London LD0504230692.
LD0504230692.
battalion, used used as as infantry. Malic, "Pioneer
“Pioneer Battalion
Battalion of 2‘7Zagreb Radio,
Radio, 5 April FBIS London
April 1992, FBIS LD0604000892. .
London LD0604000892
infantry. Predrag Malic, 217
Laniste—Future Overflow
Laniste-Future Overflow Chamber of the the Klenovac-Laniste
Klenovac-Laniste Pipe- Pipe 2'“
21 Few Sarajevans had any doubts that
' Few that Radovan Karadzic
Karadzic had
lnzinjerac February I1993,
line,” Mladi lnzinjerac
line," 993, p. 4. ordered the shootings—the rooms from which
the shootings-the which the shots were
the shots were fired
fired
1‘“The 5th Corps appears
206 appears to have employed the Ilst and 2nd Bihac
st and Bihac been rented
had been rented to the Serbian Democratic
Democratic Party, and one ofof the
the six
Brigades, the the I1st Cazin Brigade, and
st Cazin and possibly elements of
possibly elements ofthethe I111th
11th arrested Serbs turned out to be
arrested be aa Karadzic bodyguard—but his role
Karadzic bodyguard-but
Bosanska Krupa Krupa Brigade. was never actually proved.
207 These were the the 1st
lst Bihac
Bihac (later 501st) Bihac (later 3‘9 Gjelten, pp. 2-3, 22-24.
207 SOlst) Brigade, 2nd Bihac 21 • Gjelten.
502nd) Brigade, 1st lst Cazin
Cazin (later 503rd) Brigade, 105th Buzim Buzim
(later 505th) Brigade, Ilst Velika Kladusa
st Velika Kladusa (later 521 521st) Brigade,
st) Brigade,
I111th
I I th Bosanska KrupaKrupa (later 51 I1th) th) Brigade, and and the
the JO101st HVO
I st HYO
Brigade (later JO IOlst
I st Home Defense Regiment). Other brigades
167
167
Digitize-d by o gle Origir1al from

22°Silber
"" Silber and Little,Little. p. 231. 23" Radio. 1I February 1992. FBIS
2 " Zagreb Radio, FBIS London
London LD0102|72192.
LOOI 02172192.
22'
" 1 Silber and A Little,
Silber 232, 235.
Little. p. 232. 24" Tanjug. 6 February 1992. FBIS
040 Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS London
London
m Gjelten, pp. 98-99.
"'Gjelten.pp. LD060294 l 92.
LD060294192.
223 1“ March 1992. FBIS
Tanjug. 14 March FBJS London
London
'" Ibid.
Ibid. 241 Belgrade Tanjug,
21‘
'" Silber and Little, Little. p. 233. LD1403202192.
LDl403202192.
225Sarajevo Radio,
'" Radio. 2 MayMay 1992, Vienna AU0205191992.
1992. FBIS Vienna AU0205191992. 2‘2 Tanjug. 15 March
'" Belgrade Tanjug, I 992. FBIS
March 1992. FBIS London
London
22"Gjelten.
"'' Gjelten, p. 99. LD1503214192.
LD I 503214192.
217
'" The order of battle Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in 1992 was
the Sarajevo-Romanija
battle of the 2‘3 Tanjug. 17 March
' 4 ' Belgrade Tanjug, 1992. FBIS
March 1992, FBIS Vienna
AU I 703161492.
as follows:
as follows: '+1
2“ Belgrade Tanjug, March 1992, FBIS
Tanjug. 18 March Vienna AU
FBIS Vienna AU 1803161992.
Headquarters. Sarajevo-Romanija Corps-Lukavica
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps—Lukavica “5
"' Belgrade Radio.Radio. 1I April 1992. FBIS FBIS Vienna
AU0104155992.
Headquarters,
I st Sarajevo Mechanized
lst Mechanized Brigade*—Grbavica/Stari
Brigade*-Grbavica/Stari Grad 2“ Tanjug. 3 April 1992, FBIS
' 46 Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS London
London LD0304221
LD030422 I 192.l 92.
2nd Sarajevo Light Light Infantry Brigade*—Dobrinja/Vitkovici
Brigadc*-Dobrinja/Vitkovici 2‘7
' 47 Also known
known as Listica.
Listica.
lst
I st Romanija “8 Tanjug. 7 April 1992, FBIS FBIS London
Romanija Infantry Brigade*—I-Iresa
Brigade*-Hrcsa ' 4 ' Belgrade Tanjug, LD0704 I 84 l 92.
Vogosca Light Infantry Brigade—Vogosca
Brigade-Vogosca 24" Tanjug, 8 April 1992, FBIS
244 Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS Vienna
AU0804 I 95992.
Vogosca Light
Kosevo Light
Kosevo Light Infantry Brigade—Kosevo
Brigade-Kosevo 25°
"" Zagreb Radio, 1992. FBIS London
Radio, 8 April 1992, London LD0804133993.
LD0804 I 33993.
Rajlovac
Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade-Rajlovac
Light Infantry Brigade—Rajlovac 25‘ Radio. 22 April 1992,
251 Sarajevo Radio, 1992. FBIS
FBIS Vienna
AU2204201592.
Ilidza Light
Jlidza Infantry Brigade-llidza/Nedzarici/ Airport 252 Tanjug. 9 April 1992. FBIS
'" Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS London
London LD0904201
LD0904201192. 192.
Light Infantry Brigade—Ilidza/Nedzarici/Airport
lgman Light Infantry Brigade—Hadzici/Kiseljak
Brigade-Hadzici/Kiseljak 253 Tanjug. 11 April 1992,
''' Belgrade Tanjug, 1992. FBIS London LDl
FBIS London 104133292.
LD 1104133292.
Igman Light Infantry
llijas Light
Ilijas Light Infantry Brigade—llijas/Visoko
Brigade-llijas/Visoko 25‘ Tanjug. l111 April 1992, FBIS
254 Belgrade Tanjug, FBIS London
LDl204151392.
4th “White
"'White Wolves" Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment
Wolves" Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachmc111 155
'" Zagreb Radio, I 992. FBIS
May 1992,
Radio. 7 May FBIS London
LD0705 I 63 I 92.
4th Mixed
Mixed Artillery
Artillery Regiment 25“
256 Zagreb Radio, May 1992, FBIS
Radio. 8 May FBIS London
London LD08051
LD0805 I 10692.
I0692.
4th Mixed Antitank Artillery
Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment 257
"' Sarajevo Radio, 1992. FBIS
May 1992,
Radio. 10 May FBIS Vienna
AUJ005213292.
Light Air Defense Artillery
4th Light Artillery Regiment 15" Janko Bobetko,
'" Janko Bobetko. Sve Moje Bitke
S1·eMoje Bitke (All My Battles),
(All My Battles), Zagreb:
Zagreh:
*Ex-JNA brigade
*Ex-JNA hrigade Vlastita Naklada,
Vlastita Naklada, 1996. pp. 200-270.
Four infantry battalions of the corps-the
Four Tmovo. Pale,
corps—the Tmovo, Praca, and
Pale. Praca. 25"
"" Ibid.
Ibid.
J ahorina Battalions-appear
Jahorina Battalions—appear to have been assigned to the 2nd Sara
been assigned Sara- 'l,(l
26°Sarajevo Radio. May 1992. FBIS Vienna
Radio. 23 May Vienna AU2305213192.
AU2305213192.
jevo Light (Tmovo) and lst
Infantry (Tmovo) 1st Sarajevo Mechanized
Mechanized Brigade
Brigade 2‘“
261 Zagreb Radio, June 1992, FBIS
Radio. 11 June London LDI
FBIS London LOI 1061 13292.
106113292.
Light Infantry
((the
the other three). battalions, however.
however, were not stationed 262 June 1992, FBIS
Radio. 11 June Vienna AUl
FBIS Vienna 106201092.
three). These battalions. stationed ' 6 ' Sarajevo Radio. AU 110620 I092.
Sarajevo, but deployed 20 to 25 kilometers southeast
around Sarajevo. southeast of the
the 1"“ Radio, 12 June
26 ' Zagreb Radio. 1992. FBIS
June 1992, FBIS London
LDl206183292.
city as part of VRS YRS operations to contain Bosnian Army forces
Bosnian Army 1“
2,._, Zagreb Radio,
Radio. 13 June 1992. FBIS
LD I 306221192.
around Gorazde in the Drina Drina valley. In In addition, the 2nd Romanija
addition. the Romanija 1“
'" Zagreb Radio,
Radio. 8 June 1992. FBIS
LD0806141692.
Motorized
Motorized Brigade, Brigade. while corps. was never
assigned to the corps,
while assigned 3“
'"" Zagreb Radio, 1992. FBIS
June 1992,
Radio. 13 June FBIS London
LD I 306215492.
deployed around Sarajevo and fought in the Olovo-Kladanj. 1‘”
267 Zagreb Radio,
Radio, 14 June 1992. FBIS
LDl406115392.
Olovo-Kladanj,
2"“
'"' Zagreb Radio, 1992. FBIS
June 1992,
Rogatica-Gorazde, and Han Pijesak-Zepa
Rogatica-Gorazdc. Pijesak-Zepa areas.
areas. These operations Radio. 15 June FBIS London
London LD15061
LD 15061 14892.
also probably drew off some of the the corps‘ artillery and armor
corps' artillery 26"
269 Zagreb Radio,
Radio, 17 June 1992. FBIS London
June 1992, London LD1706204792.
LDl706204792.
the siege of the city. 27”
27 " Zagreb Radio, June 1992. FBIS
Radio, 18 June FBIS London
strength from the
strength LD I 806200592.
1"
"' A senior Bosnian Army Army official
official told a Reuters correspondent
correspondent 27‘
271 Zagreb Radio,
Radio, 21 June 1992. FBIS
LD2106163892.
that Sarajevo's
that defenders had begun the with about 4,000
the war with 272
'" Zagreb Radio, November 1992,
Radio. 8 November 1992. FBIS
FBIS London
Sarajevo’s defenders London
police weapons and about about 3,000 weapons of all other types. (Reu (Reu- LD0811145492.
LD081 I 145492.
ters, “Bosnia‘s Moslem Anny Long Conflict,“
Connict." by Gilles 27’
27 ·' Sarajevo Radio, September 1992, FBIS FBIS London
ters, "Bosnia's Moslem Army Predicts Long Gilles Radio. 19 September London
Trequesser, 1I December 1992) Other figures based on Patriotic
figures based Patriotic LD1909195892.
LD I909195892.
League membership suggest that the actual number of
suggest that of weapons 27‘
274 A A high-level, joint Croat-Muslim
high-level, joint Croat-Muslim commission
commission met in in Mostar
Mostar on
was probably somewhat. somewhat, though not much, much. higher. 26 October 1992 in in wake of the Novi Novi Travnik,
Travnik. Vitez,
Vitez. and Prozor
Prozor
22"
"" Sarajevo Radio, June I1992,
Radio. 8 June 992. FBIS Vienna
AU0806 I 8 I 392. fighting. but there
fighting, there was little
little perceptible improvement in in relations
23°
"" Sarajevo Radio, June 1992, FBIS Vienna
Radio. 9 June Vienna AU0906074492.
AU0906074492. thereafter. Zagreb Radio,
thereafter. Radio. 26 October 1992, 1992. FBIS
FBIS London
London
23‘
'" Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 8 June 1992, FBIS London
June 1992. London LD0906015192.
LD0906015192. LD2610233792.
LD2610233792.
2“
''' Sarajevo Radio, Radio. I1 December 1992. FBIS London
1992, FBIS London 175 successor to the JNA
'" The successor JNA was the Yugoslav ( v,,;ske Jugo
Army (Vojske
Yugoslav Army Jugo-
LD0212000992.
LD0212000992. slavijc-V J).
slavije—VJ).
2”
''' Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 2 December 1992, FBIS Vienna
1992, FBIS Vienna 2“ Tanjug. 10
"" Belgrade Tanjug, IO May 1992, FBIS
May 1992, FBIS London
LD I 005222292.
AU0212122092.
AU02 l 2 I 22092. 177 Novi Sad TV
' 77 Novi TV 24 May 1992. FBIS
May 1992, Vienna AU2405200392,
FBIS Vienna AU2405200392.
23“
'" Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 6 December 1992, FBIS London
1992. FBIS London 242003Z May May 1992.
LD0612172092.
LD06 l 2 I 72092. 27“
' 78 Belgrade
Belgrade Tanjug, September 1992. FBIS
Tanjug, 16 September FBIS London
London
2’5
'" Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 7 December 1992, 1992. FBIS
FBIS Vienna
Vienna LD1609172592,
LD1609172592. 1617252 September 1995.
161725Z September
AU0712161592.
AU0712161592. 27"
"" Sarajevo Radio 1992. FBIS
Radio 5 July 1992, Vienna AU0607122792,
FBIS Vienna AU0607 I 22792.
23"
" 6 Sarajevo Radio, Radio, 10 December 1992, I 992. FBIS
FBIS Vienna
Vienna 061227Z July 1992.
0612272
AU1012121192. 28" July 1992. FBIS
Radio. 13 July
"" Sarajevo Radio, Vienna AU1307203192,
FBIS Vienna AU I 307203192.
AUI0l2121192.
237
'" Bobetko was a partisan veteran of
partisan veteran of World
World War II and had served
War II served 1320312
132031ZJuly July 1992.
in thethe postwar JNA, JNA, reaching general officer rank and serving on
general officer 28‘ Radio 6 July
281 Sarajevo Radio 1992. FBIS
July 1992, London LD0607210692,
FBIS London LD06072 I 0692,
the staff of the Fifth
of the Military District.
Fifth Military District. Bobetko
Bohetko was drummed out 0621062
062106ZJuly July 1992.
of the
of Army in 1971 for
the Army sympathies during Tito’s
pro-Croatian sympathies
for pro-Croatian Tito's
crackdown on the "Croatian “Croatian Spring" same time as Franjo
Spring” at the same Franjo
Tudjman and future HV Main Staff chief Zvonimir
HY Main Zvonimir Cervenko.
Cervenko.
23‘Belgrade Tanjug, I1 February
''' Fehruary 1992. FBIS London
1992, FBIS London
LD0102223992.
LD0I02223992.
168
168

m Sarajevo Radio. 13 September
"' 1992, FBIS London
September 1992. London 2”
'"' Reuters, Could Join Clashes With
“Serbs say Planes Could
Reuters. "Serbs With Croats,"
Croats:· by
hy
LDl309191392.
LD1309191392. Kurt Schork, 25 October 1992.
Kurt Schork.
“
''2“' Reuters
Reuters,... Croat-Muslim
Croat-Muslim Clash Stops U.N. Convoys,” 19 Octo-
U.N. Convoys." Octo 2‘” Vulliamy, pp. 229-234.
2"' Vulliamy,
ber 1992.
ber 1‘“ Reuters, “Serbs
'"' "Serbs Advance Jajce as Moslem-Croat
Advance on Jajce Moslem-Croat Alliance
Allian,c
228“" Reuters, "“U.N.
U .N. Staff Evacuated from Bosnian Town." Town," by Kurt Kurt Breaks,” by Kurt
Breaks." Schork, 27 October 1992.
Kurt Schork.
Schork, 2
Schork. 21I October 1992. 2” Reuters, "Moslem
2" ·' Reuters. “Moslem Leader Urges Croats Not Not to Destroy Bosnia,”
Bosnia ,..
2“ Reuters, “
"' Reuters, •· EC Tells Serbia to Halt Raids. Ethnic Ethnic Cleansing."
Cleansing," by Schork,. 29 October 1992.
Kurt Schork
by Kurt
Kurt Schork, 21 October 1992
Kurt Schork. 296At time, Mate
same time.
'"" At this same Mate Boban angrily denied claims by West West-
28" Reuters, "Bosnian
""' Reuters. “Bosnian President Calls Calls for Talks
Talks to End Clashes,” by
End Clashes." ern correspondents
correspondents thatthat they had seen destroyed houses in Prozor
seen destroyed Prozor
Kurt
Kurt Schork, 22 October 1992. and
and thousands
thousands of Muslims
Muslims fleeing
fleeing toward Gomji
Gomji Vakuf.
Vakuf. Boban
Bohan
22‘" Reuters, "Military
" Reuters, “Military Talks in Sarajevo are are Small Step for Peace,”·
for Peace: that the Croats had documents
insisted that proving the attacks
documents proving attacks had
by Kurt Kurt Schork, 23 October 1992 been instigated
been instigated by Muslim
Muslim ex-JNA officers
officers who
who had committed
28"Silber and Little, Yugoslal'ia:
"' and Little. Yugoslavia: Death of of a Nation,
Nation. p. 294. Croatia, that
war crimes in Croatia. destroyed in Prozor,
that no houses had been destroyed Prozor.
2” The latter
"" latter version of of the
the story appears corroborated by and thatthat no residents fled the town. Reuters,
residents had fled Reuters. “Bosnian
"Bosnian Croat
appears to be corroborated
local news media at at the
the time
time.. According radio, the
According to Croatian radio. the Chief Accuses
Chief Accuses Moslems
Moslems of Assaults."
Assaults." 29 October 1992.
Muslim Territorial
Muslim Territorial Defense commander
commander in nearby Jablanica
Jablanica threat-
threat 2‘"
2" 7 Reuters,
Reuters. “Moslem, leaders Vow
"Moslem. Croat leaders Vow to Stop Fighting,“
Fighting."
ened to surround all Croat inhabitants
ened of the
inhabitants of the town unless the HYO HVO 1
I November 1992.
stopped blocking aa live-truck
stopped five-truck convoy. (Zagreb Radio. Radio, 23 October 2""
'"'Belgrade
Belgrade Tanjug. 1992. FBIS
Tanjug, 24 October 1992, FBIS London
London
1992, FBIS London
1992. London LD2310164492)
LD2310164492) Of course course,. both versions LD2410133692.
LD2410133692.
true—the heavily armed
could be true-the armed local mafias
mafias most likely
likely had 22‘”
''" Reuters,
Reuters. “Rival
"Rival Bosnian
Bosnian Gunmen Fight Fight on as Commanders
competing claims on the the contents of the
contents of the supply convoy whether it Meet,"
Meet," by Kurt Schork, 26 October 1992.
Kurt Schork.
was military or not.
29°Reuters. "Croats
'"" “Croats Drive
Drive Muslims
Muslims from Bosnian Prozor,”
Town of Prozor:·
Bosnian Town
by Andrej
Andrej Gustinic, 27 October 1992.
22‘" Ed, Semons
Vulliamy, Ed.
" 1 Vulliamy. Seasons in Hell:
Hell: Understanding
Understanding Bosnia
Bornia 's ’s War.
War.
New York:York: St. Martin's
Martin’s Press, 1994. pp. 221-227.
169
169

"’i-‘5‘]
, 1"“ ~
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mountain road
road near
near
K iseljak, , central
Kiseljak cenlral Bosnia.
Bosnia,
as
as seen
seen in
in early
early I1993.
993.
.
l Mountains
Mountain s in
in north
nor1h-
l".
- I\ ‘
ce111ralBosnia,
central Bosnia, as
as seen
seen
in early 1993.
in early 1993.
The
The town
lawn of Gorazde,
of Gorazde, as
as
seen in
in. 1992.
/ 992.
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Mountains east of Sarajevo, on the road toward the Drina Valley, as seen in 1996.
Bosnian Gove
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rnment soldiers from the Gorazde Territorial
the Gorazde Defense, as
Territorial Defense, see n in
as seen in 1992.
1992.
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soldier, May
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(ARBiH)
1993.
1993.
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Bosn ian Croat
Croat
A
Defense Council (H
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in Mostar,
1993.
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Council (HVO) soldiers
(
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outside their
rest outside their
trench, June
trench, June 1993.
1993.
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(ARBiH) soldiers Saraj evo direct
in Sarajevo direct
Bosnian Serb
Bosnian Serb A rmy (VRS)
Army soldiers through
( VRS) soldiers minefield to
through a minefield
recoverr VRS
recove dead, June 1993.
VRS dead,
A Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Se rb Army
A rmy
( VRS) soldier near
(VRS) near
Brcko
Brcko fi 82-min
res an 82-
fires mm
Augusr I1993
mortar, August
mortar. 993..
A Bosn
A Bosnian Serb An
ian Serb Army soldier, probably
( VRS) soldier,
ny (VRS) f rom the 1st
probably from 1st Sarajevo Mechan ized Brigade
Saraj evo Mechanized or I1st
Brigade or st Rornanija
Romanija Infantry Brigade, looks
lnfanrry Brigade. looks
down on Saraj
down Sarajevo
evo ffrom
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Mount Trebevic, south of
of the city, August I 993.
August 1993.
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I st Guards Moto rized Brigad e 2nd Armo red Brigade 16th Krajina Motorized Bri gade
43rd Prij edor Motorized Brigade I st Ozren Light Infan try Brigad e 1st Krnjin Light infantry Brigade
I st Bijeljina
1st Bij eljina Light Infantry
Infan try Brigade
Brigad e 2nd Romanija
Romanija Motorized Brigade
Brigade I1st
st Bratunac Infantry Brigade
Bratuna c Light Infantry Brigade
(Se rbian Guard-Panth
(Serbian ers)
Guard-Panthers)
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"Black Swans Artillery-Rocket
Ar tillery -Rocke t Battalion
Ba11alio n ( later 155th)
(later 155th)
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BOSNE 1 HERCECOVINE
v
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st Motori zed Brigade
Brigade 2nd Corps
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(later 101st
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44 1st) 502nd Mountain
502nd Mountain Brigade
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DI Design
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l.
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"Ludv Sp ecial Purpose
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I st Guards Brigade ( 1994-95) 2nd Guards Brigade (1994 -95) Unit (60th
Unit Guards Airborne
(60 th Guards A irborne
Battalion,
Battalion, 1994-95)
1994-95)
Military
M Police Light
ilitary Police I st M ilitary Police Ba/talion ( 1994-95) 50th
50th Home
Home Defense
Defense Regiment
Regimen t
"
Assault
Assau lt Brigade
Brigad e (I
( 1993)
993) “Kne:
"Knez Domagoj
Domagoj" (1994-95)
( 1994-95)
"
80th Home
80th Home Defense
Defense 51h
5th Brigade
Brigade "Kne~ Branimir"" ((1992-93)
“Kile: Branimir 1992 -93) 5th Brigade
Brigade “Posusje
"Posusje" (1992-93)
(/992 -93)
Regimen t ( I1994-95)
Regiment 994- 95)‘
01Design
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176
Digitize- by o gle Origi11alfrom

IV
Section IV
Section
Bosnia 1993:
1993:
Versus Neighbor Versus
Neighbor Versus Versus Neighbor
177
177

Digitized by Go gte Origi11al from
Chapter 33
Chapter33 Bosnian Serb Military Strategy,
War in 1993:
The Bosnian War 1993: January-October 1993
January-October 1993
Neighbor Versus Neighbor Versus Neighbor
The Bosnian Serbs'
The Bosnian military strategy during
Serbs’ military during thethe first
first
The
The second
second year of thethe Bosnian
Bosnian War expanded
expanded the the IO months
10 months of 1993
1993 focused
focused on on achieving those war
achieving those war
Muslim-Serb war, war, while the conflict between
the conflict between Serbs
Serbs aims
aims that had eluded
eluded them
them in in 1992,
1992, making
making the the Drina
and Croats
Croats wound
wound down.
down. As the year opened,
opened, the
the valley their
valley their principal Bosnian Army
theater.• Bosnian
principal theater.’ Army gains
gains in
in
Bosnian
Bosnian Army continued
continued its attacks on the Bosnian
the Bosnian the Drina region
the during 1992
region during 1992 and early 1993 threat
early 1993 threat-
Serbs in the
the Drina valley,
valley, prompting
prompting thethe Serbs
Serbs to ened to undermine
undermine SerbSerb tenitorial
territorial claims
claims inin the area
respond
respond with
with a major
major counteroffensive.
counteroffensive. The The Serbs'
Serbs’ and thwart the larger
thwart the larger war
war aim
aim of extending
extending the the Serb
Serb
VRS forces
forces nearly
nearly conquered Srebrenica, threatened
conquered Srebrenica, lands to the
lands the Drina and the the Serbian border. After
Serbian border.
Zepa,
Zepa, contracted
contracted the
the Gorazde
Gorazde enclave
enclave and eliminated
eliminated absorbing
absorbing the last ARBiH
the last ARBiH offensive toward Bratunac
offensive toward Bratunac
its supply
supply lines
lines to central Bosnia, and then cut
central Bosnia, and Skelani on the
Skelani on Serbian border
the Serbian border inin early
early January,
January, the
Sarajevo's
Sarajevo’s last lifeline at Mount Igman Igman. . NATO
NATO threats VRS embarked
VRS embarked on a strategic
strategic offensive clear most
offensive to clear most
forced
forced the
the Serbs
Serbs to withdraw
withdraw fromfrom Igman,
Igman, but the the rest of the
the Drina valley.
valley. This offensive,
offensive, comprising
comprising a a series
series
of their strategic
strategic gains in the
the Drina
Drina remained
remained intact.
intact. of individual operations
operations to reduce the Muslim
reduce the Muslim
enclaves Srebrenica, , Zepa,
enclaves of Srebrenica Gorazde, would last
Zepa, and Gorazde, last
The Muslim-Serb war, war, however,
however, was was toto be overshad-
overshad until
until August.
August.
owed
owed by the the start
start of a new conflict—Muslims versus
new conflict-Muslims versus
Croats.
Croats. In 1992
1992 the two sides had come to blows
the two when
blows when Elsewhere,
Elsewhere, most of the
the actions conducted by
actions conducted by the VRS
the
the frictions of local issues ignited
local issues ignited a larger
larger contest until November
until 1993 (see footnote)
November 1993 footnote) were
were local
local opera
opera-
over the
the underlying
underlying nature of the the Bosnian state. In
Bosnian state. tions to seize key
tions terrain, towns,
key terrain, towns, or roads. An
or roads. An excep
excep-
1993
1993 the
the dispute
dispute boiled
boiled over into war, devastat-
into all-out war, devastat tion was
tion the July
was the July 1993
1993 operation undertaken to widen
operation undertaken widen
ing
ing much
much of central
central Bosnia and setting in motion motion newnew the vital
the vital Posavina
Posavina corridor at
at Brcko
Brcko and free
free up
up an
waves
waves of refugees.
refugees. The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats threw
threw thethe first
first important power
important power line route to
line route Bosanska Krajina. The
to Bosanska
punch mid-April, with
punch in mid-April, with their
their brutal Lasva Valley
brutal Lasva Valley VRS
VRS also
also continued its siege of Sarajevo
continued its Sarajevo in the belief
in the
offensive. The
offensive. The Bosnian
Bosnian Army rallied rallied and scored
scored some that this pressure might force
pressure might force the Bosnian Govem
the Bosnian Govern-
important victories against
important victories against the Croats, seizing
the Croats, control
seizing control ment
ment to capitulate.
capitulate.
of most of central
central Bosnia and leavingleaving thethe Croats
Croats withwith
few isolated
a few isolated enclaves.
enclaves. By the the fall, though,
though, thethe fight-
fight With the
With the onset of the
the Croat-Muslim warwar in
in late
late spring
spring
ing
ing had settled downdown intointo vicious
vicious trench
trench warfare.
warfare. of 1993,
1993, however, Serb military strategy
however, Serb strategy took
took onon an
an
dimension. Clearly it
added dimension. it was
was in interest of the
the interest
in the the
Throughout
Throughout the the year, the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian Serbs played their
played their Serb republic
Serb republic that its two enemies,
its two the Croats
enemies, the Croats and
and the
the
rivals off against each other, seeking
rivals debilitate both
seeking to debilitate Muslims, continue to fight
Muslims, continue fight each other
other as
as long
long as
as possi
possi-
by a prolonged
prolonged conflict. All-out war
conflict. All-out war between
between its two
two ble. The Bosnian
ble. The Serbs therefore
Bosnian Serbs therefore consciously set out
consciously set out
opponents
opponents was the the best possible circumstance the
possible circumstance the '
• Bosnian Serb strategy
strategy during the
the period November 1993—March
1993-March
already
already tiring Bosnian Serb
tiring Bosnian Serb Army could could have hoped
hoped
covered in Section V
1994 is covered V of
of this study. Serb war aims and milimili-
for. Content
for. Content to remain
remain on the sidelines for most
the sidelines most of strategy were in
tary strategy in flux
flux during this period, as the Serb political
political
1993, the
1993, VRS watched
the VRS watched the Croats and Muslims kill
the Croats kill and military leadership
and leadership sought means to end the war on their terms.
sought means terms.
VRS offensive operations
YRS responded to these
operations responded these political-military
political-military
concentrated on retaining
each other and concentrated retaining the battle
the battle-
considerations.
considerations.
field gains that Serb forces
field forces had already won.
already won.
179
179

to provide military
to provide military support
support to both sides, depending
to both depending lack manpower. ItIt did
lack for manpower. lack virtually everything
did lack everything
upon balance in
upon the military balance given sector,
in a given sector, while else, however, required of an
however, required an army:
army: training,
training,
increasing the flow
increasing flow of propaganda
propaganda designed
designed to inflame
inflame command expertise,
command expertise, adequate firepower,
firepower, and true
the Croats
Croats and Muslims against
against one another. VRS mil
another. YRS mil- offensive capability.3
offensive capability.'
itary
itary assistance usually
usually took form of artillery
took the form or
artillery or
occasionally
occasionally armored support for an
armored support individual HVO
an individual HYO Halilovic was
Halilovic ignorant of the
was not ignorant his Army
problems his
the problems
or ARBiH operation, most often
ARBiH operation, often to
to the side that was in
the side in faced. Indeed, he correctly
faced. Indeed, correctly identified
identified most
most of the
the weaker military position,
weaker military position, thus prolonging
prolonging the ARBiH’s
ARBiH's critical
critical needs and had taken
taken the first
first halting
halting
fighting increasing the costs to both
fighting and increasing both sides. In In at toward correcting
steps toward them before
correcting them before he was
was replaced
replaced
least two
two areas-Zepce Konjic—VRS and HYO
areas—Zepce and Konjic-YRS HVO as commander. In late August
operational commander.
as operational August 1993
1993
units fought
units fought side Bosnian Army
against Bosnian
side by side against (shortly
(shortly after his replacement) Halilovic
his replacement) Halilovic pointed
pointed the
troops.
troops. direction Bosnian Army
direction the Bosnian Army must move:
move:
. ... . in
in frontal
frontal clashes—whether
clashes-whether in attack or
in attack
The Bosnian
Bosnian Army in 1993
1993 defense-we
defense—we cannot cannot achieve
achieve more significant
more significant
success.
success. This This leads
leads to
to the
the conclusion
conclusion that we
There on the part
There is a new testiness on of the
of quickly.find
must quickly find new
new forms of
forms of combat
combat action
action
Bosnians
Bosnians ..... . They are not
They are not being
being pansies.
pansies. ... creating a large
. . . by rapidly creating number of
large number of mobile
mobile
a11d reconnaissance-sabotage units
and reconnaissance-sabotage and con
units and con-
—Lt.
-Lt. Col. Bill Aikman, UNPROFOR
Bill Aikman, UNPROFOR ducting massive
ducti11g massive reconnaissance-sabotage
reco11naissance-sabotage
spokesman Sarajevo, December
spokesman in Sarajevo, December 1993‘
19931 actions
actions in in the enemy’s rear.. .... For
enemy's rear For a start,
start. each
each
corps must form one
corps one such brigade, which should
brigade, which should
In 1993
1993 the Bosnian
Bosnian Army was to be forged fire. In
forged in fire. given a new
be given 11ewname:
name: for example, “Bosnian”
"Bosnian"
for example,
a desperate, make-or-break situation, the ARBiH
make-or-break situation, ARBiH manman- or “Liberation.”
"Liberation." In that way. way . .... we
we shall use
defend the nation
aged not only to defend nation but even to take the
the our strong weapo11:The
stro11gweapon: numerical superiority
The 11umerical superiority
offensive in
offensive appointment of Rasim
in some areas. The appointment Rasim and
a11dquality
quality ofof our troops.
troops.
Delic as commander on 8 June 1993
as Army commander 1993 was
was a cru
cru-
cial
cial event; under ARBiH made its initial
under Delic, the ARBiH The question
question of military discipline
discipline is
is the ques-
The of ques
transformation from a band of armed
transformation from armed civilians into
into a tion of our survival
survival . .. Of course,
course, is urge11tly
tion of . . Of it is urgently
true army.
army. necessary
necessary to organize
organize courses
courses in
in the brigades
brigades
for squad commanders,
for commanders, courses at the the corps
During the first
first year war, Delic’s
year of the war, Delic's predecessor,
predecessor, level forArmy
for Army and a11dcompany commanders, and
level company commanders, and a
Sefer Halilovic, had assembled
Sefer assembled a Bosnian
Bosnian military
military officers' school
military oflicers’ school at the main staff level
main stafir level
with basic organizational
with a basic structure and a very
organizational structure large
very large schooling junior officers
for schooling officers and officer cadres,
and officer cadres,
for
number personnel. As
number of personnel. As early
early as August 1992
as August 1992 the
the and all this
and this for
for the purpose
purpose of of strengthening
strengthening
ARBiH was able to to field 170,000 fighting
field some 170,000 fighting men military discipline, and therefore
therefore combat
combat
discipline, and
organized into 28 brigades,
organized into brigades, 1616 independent battalions,
independent battalions, discipline.
discipline.4 4
I138
38 miscellaneous detachments, two
miscellaneous detachments, two artillery
artillery regi
regi-
ments, and one armored
armored battalion.
battalion.22 By early 1993 the
early 1993 Rasim Delic’s
Rasim Delic's first
first critical
critical move
move as new Army
the new
as the
ARBiH had reached
ARBiH 261,500
reached its peak strength of 261,500 commander would be
commander be to begin the disciplining and
begin the
troops. The great majority
troops. The served in
majority of these served in local
local professionalization of the force.
professionalization force. A
A crackdown
crackdown in
in Octo
Octo-
units, but some were organized
defense units, organized into
into special-
special ber against the mafiosi leaders of the 9th and I10th
mafiosi leaders 0th
ized maneuver, reconnaissance,
ized maneuver, reconnaissance, and sabotage forces. forces. Mountain Brigades Sarajevo was
was intended as aa visi
Brigades in Sarajevo intended as visi-
(These
(These manpower figures would slowly decline
manpower figures decline inin ble
ble message to everyone inside
to everyone inside (and
(and outside) Bosnia:
outside) Bosnia:
1994 1995 due to combat
1994 and 1995 losses, work defer-
combat losses, defer the ARBiH going to be an
henceforth
henceforth the ARBiH was
was going army that
an army
ments, and other causes.) With over over a quarter of a mil mil- would respond
respond to orders at all
orders at echelons, even at the
all echelons,
lion men in the field-over
field—over 90 percent
percent of them
volunteers—it was clear that Sarajevo's
volunteers-it army did
Sarajevo’s army did not
180
180

jailing some of its own
expense of jailing people.55 The shoot-
own people. shoot and western Herzegovina—far
Herzegovina-far from from the confrontation
confrontation
itself
ing or arrest of two gang leaders did not by itself lines with
with the
the Serbs-contributed
Serbs—contributed forces for camcam-
transform the Bosnian
Bosnian Army into
into a trained and disci-
disci paigns elsewhere in in Bosnia
Bosnia but had little
little to
to do in
in their
plined
plined fighting
fighting force, but it did signal
signal to all that the hometowns
hometowns other than keep a watchful
watchful eye on the
transformation had begun.
transformation Muslims who lived there. The Bosnian
who also lived Bosnian Croats
Croats
had been expelled from
from most of their formerly
formerly
Equally critical was Delic’s
Equally critical decision to take the offen-
Delic's decision offen Posavina corridor—
holdings north of the Posavina
extensive holdings corridor-
sive. At the
the time, this may have seemed a questionable Derventa, Modrica, Odzak,
Derventa, Modrica. Bosanski Samac—
Odzak, and Bosanski Samac-
unwise decision
or even unwise decision: : Bosnian
Bosnian Army forces were and were now
now confined
confined to to the defensive inin the small
the small
virtually surrounded, cut off from
virtually from supplies, and out out- pocket remaining
remaining around Orasje.
Orasje.
gunned
gunned. . AA sound argument could could have been made that
the smart thing to do was to adopt the defen
the strategic defen- In April and May 1993, however,
In however, thethe HVO
HYO tooktook thethe
sive, forcing
forcing its enemies to to expend resources against war in anan entirely
entirely different direction, opening
different direction, opening a new new
ARBiH’s prepared defenses while the Bosnian
the ARBiH's Bosnian conflict against the
conflict Bosnian Muslims. In doing
the Bosnian doing so,so, the
built up its own
Army built own forces.
forces. ButBut Delic’s calculations
Delic's calculations HVO took
HYO took on a new type of opponent, less capable
went beyond the the typical
typical military “school solution":
military "school solution”: he than the Bosnian Serbs but much more numerous.
the Bosnian numerous .
recognized vital human dimension
recognized the vital dimension and concluded
concluded Moreover, the scale of the conflict
Moreover, conflict escalated dramati-
dramati
that his Army needed to win win in itself.
in order to sustain itself. cally for the HVO
HYO once it took
took on the Bosnian Army.
the Bosnian
Without morale-boosting
Without victories to convince
morale-boosting victories convince thethe Previously, the HVO
Previously, HYO had maintained relatively short
maintained a relatively
Army and its supporting
supporting population
population that Sarajevo's
Sarajevo’s frontage against the VRS YRS (especially considering that
(especially considering
cause was not lost, Delic knew knew he would have no mil-
he would mil HV had taken over the southernmost area near
the HV
itary to fight
fight with
with and the
the war would
would be
be over. Dubrovnik) comparatively small
Dubrovnik) and required a comparatively small comcom-
mitment to man static positions with generally
positions with generally little
little
Delic’s
De decision to come out of the
lie 's decision fighting had
the corner fighting activity.
activity. Once Croat-Muslim war
Once the Croat-Muslim war began, though,
though.
visible dividends
paid visible dividends by the end of 1993. Bosnian
Bosnian HVO units found
HYO found themselves fighting literally in their
fighting literally
Army forces had captured-and
captured—and, , more important, own backyards as
own as entire towns went to war, some
war. some-
held—at least six major towns during
held-at during the
the year's
year’s fight-
fight areas far from
times in areas from the confrontation lines.
the confrontation Over
lines. Over-
Travnik, Bugojno.
ing: Travnik, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Fojnica,
Gomji Vakuf. Fojnica, Kakanj,
Kakanj, Croats’ requirements for military
Bosnian Croats'
night the Bosnian military
and Vares. The Bosnian
Vares. The Bosnian Army had been forced into manpower soared. For the smallest
manpower smallest of the three comcom
the
the smaller, eastern half of Mostar.
eastern half Mostar, but retaining even batant forces, this represented a serious problemproblem
that much of the city and mounting occasional coun-
mounting occasional coun indeed.
terattacks against the
terattacks HVO represented a significant
the HYO significant
accomplishment.
accomplishment. The The Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj
Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj area HVO’s shortage of fighting
The HVO's fighting troops. combined
troops, combined
had become a minitheater of its own. own, with Bosnian
with the Bosnian with the strategic vulnerability
with vulnerability of the central Bosnian
Bosnian
Army pressing the Bosnian Croats (the latter subse-
the Bosnian subse enclaves and the sheer desperation of the Bosnian
Bosnian
quently assisted by the the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs) while the tena- tena Muslims, had put the
Muslims. HVO in real trouble by late sum-
the HYO sum
town of Maglaj held out as a Muslim island
cious town island mer. The Bosnian
mer. The Bosnian Croats
Croats had suffered mili
suffered a series of mili-
within the
within Bosnian Croat enclave.
the besieged Bosnian tary reverses in June and early July, and morale
morale was
unlikely that the Muslims
falling fast. While it was unlikely
could or would
could would push on into
into the exclusively Croat
exclusively Croat
The Bosnian Croat Army in 1993
Croat Army 1993 heartland of eastern
eastern Herzegovina,
Herzegovina, there was a veryvery
remaining enclaves of Vitez and
real danger that the remaining
The Bosnian
The Bosnian Croat Army began 1993 largely as a de
1993 largely Kiseljak might
might fall and the Croats would
the Croats be forced
would be forced out
of the
adjunct of
facto adjunct the Croatian Army had fought suc-
Army. . It had suc— of border areas like
of like Prozor.
Prozor.
HV the
cessfully alongside the HV
cessfully previous year
the previous year,, espe -
during the July 1992 Operation
cially during “Jackal”
Operation "Jackal"
Herzegovina, but the HV
campaign in Herzegovina, HV was the primary
the primary
HVO forces raised in central Bosnia
driver of events. HYO Bosnia
181
181

At this point HVO looked
point the HYO looked in two
two directions
directions for more percent of the 65
more than 20 percent 65 to 70 percent of Bosnia
70 percent
allies.
allies. One
One choice
choice was
was obvious:
obvious: appeal directly
directly to that the Serbs then controlled,
the Serbs controlled, leaving them only 43
leaving them 43
Zagreb
Zagreb for military assistance.
assistance. After some delibera-
delibera country. Moreover,
percent of the country. Moreover, the plan plan would have
have
tion,
tion, Tudjman
Tudjman diddid direct HV to step into
direct the HV into Bosnia,
Bosnia, broken up
broken up their
their single,
single, contiguous
contiguous state—a
state-a key
key Serb
Serb
providing both military and moral
providing moral support
support to the aim. The Bosnian
war aim.
war Bosnian Muslim
Muslim leaders
leaders also
also rejected
rejected
embattled HVO. The other choice
embattled HYO. choice seemed incongru
incongru- the plan because of their
plan because their emotional
emotional attachment
attachment to the
Kafltaesque world of the
ous but made sense in the Kafkaesque the concept of a strong
concept strong unitary
unitary state
state and
and because
because it ratified
ratified
it
a
Bosnian conflict.
Bosnian HVO in some of the enclaves
conflict. The HYO enclaves Serb ethnic
Serb ethnic cleansing.
cleansing. President
Izetbegovic waswas
turned to their
their Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb opponents
opponents for assistance
assistance finally
finally pressured
pressured into signing in March by
into signing by interna
interna-
in
Muslims—and got it. Surrounded
against the Muslims-and Surrounded on three
it. tional opinion and the Croats
tional opinion and in
Croats and the belief that the
in the the
Muslim adversaries,
sides by Muslim HVO garrisons
adversaries, the HYO garrisons in in Serbs would
Serbs would notnot sign
sign anyhow.
anyhow.
Konjic, Kiseljak, and Zepce
Konjic, Zepce would secure help help from
from
VRS. Necessity
the YRS. Necessity having
having made for strange bedfel
bedfel- Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs were still holding out.
Serbs were out.
lows, HVO was
lows, the HYO was at least able to stabilize its mili
stabilize its mili- Lord
Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance,
Vance, squeezing
squeezing Serbian
Serbian Pres
Pres-
tary position
position and even take some modest
modest initiatives
initiatives ident Milosevic
ident Milosevic with
with continued
continued international
international strictures
strictures
toward
toward the end of the year. and new
and financial sanctions,
new financial sanctions, persuaded
persuaded him him to back
back
the plan
plan and pressure
pressure Bosnian
Bosnian SerbSerb President
President
Chapter 34
Chapter34 Karadzic and his his deputies
deputies to to accept it. Milosevic
accept it. Milosevic waswas
for Peace:
Searching for Peace: willing to swallow the unpalatable
willing details of the plan
unpalatable details plan
Vance-Owen and "Invincible"
The Vance-Owen “Invincible” Plans, 1993 as a way
way to cease-fire that would lock in recogni
to get a cease-fire recogni-
in
199366 as
a
a
tion of Serb
tion Serb autonomy
autonomy and and a de facto
facto Serb
Serb state.
state. Even
Even
a
In January 1993, the chief negotiators
January 1993, negotiators for the joint though the administrative
though administrative boundaries out in
spelled out
boundaries spelled in
International Conference
UN- EU International Conference on the Former
Former “Vance-Owen”
"Vance-Owen" differed
differed from
from hishis own
own concepts,
concepts, he diddid
forth a comprehensive
Yugoslavia put forth settle
comprehensive peace settle- not think
not they would ever
think they ever be implemented
implemented on on the
a
ment-the
ment—the Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen Plan.Plan. The plan took its
plan took its name ground. The Bosnian
ground. Bosnian Serbs
Serbs thought
thought otherwise.
otherwise.
from the two
from two diplomats, US Secretary
former US
diplomats, former Secretary of State Karadzic rebuffed
rebuffed Milosevic’s personal overtures,
Milosevic's personal overtures, and
and
Cyrus Vance former British Foreign Secretary
Vance and former Secretary the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb Assembly rejected
rejected a letter
letter signed
signed byby
a
Owen. The two
Lord David Owen. two had worked
worked for more
more than Federal President Cosic, Milosevic,
Federal President Milosevic, and Montenegrin
Montenegrin
months to craft
four months craft a proposal
proposal they thought all three
thought all President Bulatovic in
President April. In a scheme
in late April. scheme to bully
a
a
could accept and that would keep Bosnia in
sides could Karadzic and his deputies, Vice
his deputies, President Koljevic
Vice President Koljevic
in
existence
existence as a single state. As Silber and Little write,
single state. write, and President Krajisnik,
and Assembly President Krajisnik, into accepting the
into accepting
a
plan, a conference
plan, conference sponsored
sponsored by by Greek Prime Minister
Greek Prime
a
recognized Bosnia within

It recognized within its existing
existing frontiers
frontiers Mitsotakis convened
convened at at the beginning of
the beginning May. There
of May. There
It
but granted
hut granted substantially
substantially devolved powers to
devolved powers to Milosevic subjected Karadzic to nonstop
Milosevic subjected nonstop haranguing
haranguing
each ofof the ten
ten provinces which were
provinces which were defined,
defined, behind
behind closed doors. Karadzic finally
closed doors. signed the plan
finally signed plan
ethnic grounds:
primarily on ethnic grounds: three ofof the prov-
prov for himself but insisted
insisted on
on ratification
ratification by by the Bosnian
Bosnian
inces would have a Serb
inces Serb majority, two a Croat
majority, two Serb
Serb Assembly.
Assembly.
a
majority, three a Muslim, and one mixed Croat

majority, Croat-
a
Muslim. The
Muslim. province—Sarajevo—would
The tenth province-Sarajevo-would Assembly, which everyone
The Assembly, everyone knew
knew was opposed to
was opposed to
retain power-sharing between all three ethnic
retain power-sharing ethnic terms of Vance-Owen,
the terms Vance-Owen, met on on 5 May
May inin the pres
pres-
5
groups.
groups. TheThe republics
republics would retain central
retain a central ence of the
the entire senior Federal
entire senior Federal Yugoslav
Yugoslav leadership
leadership
government, hut
government, powers would
but its powers would hebe minimal.
minimal.77 Prime Minister Mitsotakis. Milosevic
and Prime and Cosic’s
Milosevic and Cosic's
opening arguments were
opening arguments rejected, but they
were rejected, they persisted,
persisted,
Croats immediately
The Bosnian Croats immediately accepted the the plan
plan and
and the debate raged
raged on
on into night. The decisive
into the night. decisive
territorial compact-
autonomy, territorial
because it gave them autonomy, compact speaker was VRS
speaker was YRS commander General Mladic,
commander General Mladic, who
it
direct access to the Croatian

ness, and direct border.88 The
Croatian border.
leaders of the Bosnian Serbs rejected
Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan
plan because
it would have required
required the Serbs withdraw from
Serbs to withdraw from
it
182
182

was no friend
friend of Karadzic and usually
usually deferred
deferred to The VRS fought
The YRS fought back
back with
with twotwo attacks to widen
widen the
Milosevic.
Milosevic. The The military
military man knew
knew the
the plan
plan would be a corridor,
corridor, succeeding
succeeding onon the second
second try.
try. The
The seesaw
seesaw
strategic disaster for the Bosnian Serbs, and his pun-
Bosnian Serbs, pun fighting around
fighting around Brcko persisted
persisted into
into early in 1993,
early in 1993,
gent rhetoric
rhetoric and anan array of dramatic
dramatic maps showing
showing achieving
achieving nothing
nothing but casualties. January, HVO
casualties. On 2 January, HYO
the territory
territory the Serbs
Serbs would lose
lose swayed
swayed much
much of his
his ARBiH troops
and ARBiH again attacked and cut the corridor
troops again
audience.
audience. Eventually,
Eventually, they voted
voted 51
51 to 2, not in oppo-
oppo northwest Brcko . VRS
northwest of Brcko. YRS 1stI st Krajina
Krajina Corps and East East
sition
sition to
to the
the plan
plan but in
in favor
favor of a popular
popular referendum
referendum Bosnian
Bosnian Corps
Corps forces
forces fought
fought backback against local HVO
against local HYO
they knew it—and promptly
knew would reject it-and promptly did.
did. ARBiH 2nd Corps troops
and ARBiH troops for over
over 10IO days
days along
along
this line before the VRS
line before YRS completely restored its
completely restored
The next international effort, dubbed
international effort, “Invincible”
dubbed the "Invincible" positions.
positions.
plan
plan after the British aircraft
aircraft carrier where the talks
carrier where talks
were held, began during
were held, during thethe summer
summer of 1993 1993 after the The
The battle lines
lines congealed
congealed intointo a profitless
profitless exchange
exchange
Croat-Muslim war war had erupted in in full force. Implicitly
force. Implicitly of vicious shelling and small-arms
vicious shelling small-arms firefire that made
recognizing failure of the Vance-Owen
recognizing the failure Vance-Owen Plan Plan and Brcko one of the most
most dangerous
dangerous sectors in in Bosnia,
Bosnia.
the dissolution
dissolution of the alliance, the
the Croat-Muslim alliance, even when
when it was most stagnant. The arrival
was the most arrival of
Invincible proposition
proposition offered
offered a thinly veiled
veiled partition
partition spring
spring in mid-May
mid—May brought
brought another
another attack by the VRS
by the YRS
of the country
country into
into three ethnic minirepublics with
ethnic minirepublics with a East Bosnian Corps directed
East Bosnian directed atat widening
widening the corridor
nominal
nominal central
central government.
government. All three sides, sides, even the just southwest
southwest of Brcko. Again the Serbs Serbs managed
managed to
Muslims, seemed ready to negotiate-the
negotiate—the latter onlyonly penetrate Muslim-Croat defenses, but over
Muslim-Croat defenses. over the next
next
because they saw themselves
themselves abandoned
abandoned by the week ARBiH and HVO
week ARBiH HYO units
units clawed
clawed back
back what
what they
they
United
United States, isolated
isolated in middle of Bosnia,
in the middle Bosnia. and at had lost.
lost. Repeated Serb attempts to pierce
Repeated Serb pierce the
the
with the
war with the Croats
Croats. . As Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic stated, positions all
Muslim-Croat positions failed.
all failed.
will give Muslims a Bosnian

This division will
This Bosnian state.
state. VRS determination
YRS determination to widen widen the corridor produced
produced
For the
For the moment the idea
idea of
of a multiethnic
multiethnic Bosnia preparations
preparations in July for Operation
in July "Sadejstvo" (Joint
Operation “Sadejstvo”
is dead. Future
Future generations
generations can hope for for such a Action) 93.93.‘3n The
The Serbs needed the space not
Serbs needed not just to
state.
state. But only
only after
after they
they have sobered
sobered up from
from safeguard traffic in
safeguard traffic in the
the corridor but to lay lay and protect
protect
their state of
of drunkenness.
drunkenness? 9 an electrical
an line to
electrical line provide needed power
to provide power to the Kra
to the Kra-
jina region. General Novica Simic's
Major General
region. Major Simic’s East
East Bos-
Bos
lzetbegovic was famous
Izetbegovic was famous for hishis about-faces.
about-faces. In
In Sep
Sep- nian Corps, reinforced
nian Corps, reinforced by by two Isl Krajina
two 1st Krajina Corps
Corps
tember, under pressure from virtually
pressure from his entire con-
virtually his con brigades
brigades and an armored battalion,
an armored battalion, began the opera-
opera
stituency
stituency to reject an unenthusiastic
an agreement he was unenthusiastic tion July. Serb
tion on 20 July. Serb troops
troops broke through ARBiH
broke through ARBiH
about in any case, he back on the plan.
he turned his back plan. The southwest of Brcko town
defenses southwest town on 2323 July,
July, pushing
pushing
brokers went
peace brokers went back
back to the drawing board again
drawing board again as
as Muslim forces
Muslim back into
forces back into their
their reserve positions. By
reserve positions. By
all the deals for territorial
all territorial boundaries
boundaries and access the end of 24 July, village of Brod had fallen,
July, the village fallen,
routes came unraveled.
unraveled.10 w unhinging Muslim
unhinging defenses to the west
Muslim defenses west and opening
opening
the way
way for YRSVRS units
units to continue advance. By
continue the advance. By
Chapter 35
Chapter35 July they had seized
26 July seized somesome additional
additional territory,
territory,
Widening Corridor:
Widening the Serb Corridor: village of Donja Brka, but Muslim
including the village Muslim
Brcko, January-July 1993"
Brcko, January-July 1993‘“
11 elsewhere stiffened
defenses elsewhere stiffened and blunted the attack.
blunted the attack.
Nevertheless, the VRS
Nevertheless, YRS had finallyfinally achieved
achieved its mainmain
Toward 1992, the
Toward the end of 1992, the focus
focus of the fighting in
fighting in objective, widening the corridor by
objective, widening by 55 kilometers
kilometers and
Posavina corridor had shifted
the Posavina shifted to its
its narrowest sec
narrowest sec- securing the route of the powerline.
securing powerline.
Brcko.12
tor at Brcko. ARBiH and HVO
12 ARBiH forces, including
HYO forces,
units from
units from Orasje,
Orasje, had launched
launched several
several attacks that
temporarily northwest of Brcko.
temporarily severed the corridor northwest
'
Annex 35: Widening
· See Annex the Corridor:
Widening the Corridor: Brcko
Brcko Operntions.
Operations,
January-July of the fighting
January-July 1993, for a more detailed account of fighting..
183
183

The VRS success demonstrated
The YRS demonstrated Serb capabilities to
Serb capabilities Zvomik. Oric’s
Oric's troops
troops thrust along the Drina River to
thrust along to
attack and capture some of the strongest ARBiHARBiH posiposi- where
where itit touches Serbia to
touches Serbia to the northeast
northeast and
and almost
almost
tions
tions through
through the professional
professional application
application of thorough
thorough captured thethe Serbian
Serbian border village of Skelani,
border village Skelani, some
some
organization preparation and expert use of supe-
organization and preparation supe 25 kilometers to the southeast of Srebrenica.
25 kilometers Srebrenica. For good
good
rior firepower.
firepower. But
But the Muslim and Croat forces
Croat forces measure, Oric’s men
measure, Oric's men fired
fired mortar
mortar rounds
rounds into
into Serbia
Serbia
showed
showed that the elemental
elemental tactics of strong
strong trench and itself.
itself.
bunker
bunker defenses could
could slow
slow and eventually
eventually halt
halt a
strong Serb attack. As the war progressed,
progressed, the Serbs'
Serbs’ This push toward
toward the Serbian
Serbian border
border and the mortar
mortar
ability seize, and hold
ability to penetrate, seize, hold such positions
positions incidents sparked
incidents response from
sparked a response from the Yugoslav Army
the Yugoslav Army
would decline.
decline. (VJ),
(VJ). which quickly dispatched
dispatched more
more units
units to reinforce
reinforce
the border,
border, along
along with
with artillery, some of its
artillery, and sent some its
Chapter 36
Chapter own
own troops across into
troops across reinforce the VRS.
Skelani to reinforce
into Skelani YRS.
Battles on Drina, Round
on the Drina, Two,
Round Two, The VRS
YRS Main
Main Staff also got down
also got down to business
business and
December 1992 August 1993*
1992 to August 1993* sent reinforcements
reinforcements to the Bratunac area—via
the Bratunac area-via SerSer-
bia—to
bia-to hold
hold the town
town and initiate
initiate some local
local counter
counter-
The 1992 war in the Drina valley valley spilled
spilled over into Jan
over into Jan- attacks while it planned
planned aa major
major operation.
operation, Operation
Operation
uary 1993
1993 when Bosnian Army’s
when the Bosnian Army's offensive
offensive around
around “Cerska 93,”
"Cerska 93," to reduce
reduce and eliminate
eliminate the
the Srebrenica
Srebrenica-
Srebrenica
Srebrenica began in late December.
December. Coming on top of Cerska enclave.
Cerska enclave.
extensive
extensive victories
victories throughout
throughout the the valley 1992, the
valley in 1992, the
offensive
offensive impelled
impelled the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs toto plan for 1993
1993 VRS launched
The YRS launched the the first
first move
move in
in its
its counterstrike
counterstrike
offensive to secure the Drina valley
a strategic offensive valley up to in mid-February,
in mid-February, lopping
lopping off half of the enclave’s
enclave's
the border
border with Serbia. If
with Serbia. successful, the campaign
If successful, campaign Cerska-Kamenica section. Two
Cerska-Kamenica section. Two weeks later VRS
weeks later YRS
fulfill the
would fulfill the Serb
Serb republic's
republic’s warwar aim of ofjoining
joining its troops the rest of the Cerska
stormed the
troops stormed Cerska area, overrun
overrun-
border with that of Serbia
border with Serbia proper.
proper. The strategic offen-offen ning it even as
ning as US
US airair transports dropped food
transports dropped food to
to the
the
laid out a series of individual operations
sive plan laid operations beleaguered residents. After aa pause while UN
beleaguered residents. UN repre
repre-
against the three main enclaves, culminating
main enclaves, culminating in an an sentatives tried
sentatives tried to negotiate
negotiate aa halt
halt to
to the Serb
Serb offen
offen-
operation
operation to cut the the supply
supply line
line to Gorazde and link
to Gorazde sive and rescue
sive refugees from
rescue refugees Cerska, the VRS
from Cerska, YRS
Serb-held
Serb-held Herzegovina directly to the rest of the Serb
Herzegovina directly Serb advance
advance resumed
resumed in in mid-March. With the backing backing of aa
republic."14 The campaign
republic. campaign expanded
expanded intointo an effort to
an effort to Yugoslav Army
regular Yugoslav
regular battalion, the VRS
armored battalion,
Army armored YRS
sever the Muslims’ only
the Muslims' only supply
supply route intointo Sarajevo
Sarajevo broke through
broke through Bosnian defenses east of Cerska
Bosnian Army defenses Cerska
across Mount lgman.
Igman. This last attack provedproved too much
too much at Konjevic
at Konjevic Polje and reopened the road
and reopened road toto Bratunac.
Bratunac.
for the international
international community,
community, and the the threat of
NATO airstrikes
NATO airstrikes forced Bosnian Serb
forced the Bosnian Serb political The VRS
YRS Main
Main Staff then shifted focus of its
the focus
shifted the its oper
oper-
leadership General Mladic to remove
leadership to order General remove hishis ation to the southeast,
ation to southeast, near Skelani,
Skelani, where
where itit sent
forces from the mountain.
forces from mountain. crack
crack units
units reinforced
reinforced with
with VJ paratroopers and
VJ paratroopers and
Serbian RDB
Serbian ROB special
special operations troops. General
operations troops. General
Oric—commander of Bosnian
Naser Orie-commander
For Naser Bosnian Army forces
forces Mladic
Mladic himself led the Serb
led the forces that in
Serb forces in three days
days
in the
the Srebrenica enclave—his December
Srebrenica enclave-his December 1992 offen
1992 offen- of intense
intense fighting
fighting punched through ARBiH
punched through ARBiH lines
lines
sive was the climax successful year of operations
climax of a successful operations almost
almost 1515 kilometers
kilometers to the industrial zone of Zeleni
industrial zone Zeleni
that had played havoc with
played havoc with the Bosnian Serb Drina
Bosnian Serb Jadar at the gates of Srebrenica
at the town. Oric’s
Srebrenica town. Oric's men
men
Corps and the Serb-populated
Corps Serb-populated villages throughout the
villages throughout the launched aa desperate counterattack,
launched blunting the thin
counterattack, blunting thin
Srebrenica area.
Srebrenica successful attack cut the ten
area. His last successful ten- Serb spearhead and forcing it
Serb it back almost 55 kilome
back almost kilome-
uous road connection between Serb-held
connection between Bratunac and
Serb-held Bratunac Both sides
ters. Both sides then yielded
yielded to
to aa UN-negotiated
UN-negotiated aa
the Zvomik area while linking his own forces to the
own forces cease-fire.
cease-fire.
Muslim—held Cerska-Kamenica
Muslim-held pocket south of
Cerska-Kamenica pocket of
'
See Annex
• Sec Drina, Round
Annex 36: Battles on the Drina. Round Two:
Two: December 1992
1993, for
to August 1993. of the fighting.
for a more detailed account of fighting.
184
184

The VRS, however,
The YRS, however, wanted nothing nothing less than a Serbia
Serbia late in the month,
in the Yugoslav Army
month, but Yugoslav Army troops
troops
Muslim surrender, and when when this was refused refused it closed
closed in and eliminated
eliminated it. The VRS
it. The YRS defenses held,held,
quickly restarted its attack, opening opening what what would however,
however, and the Serbs mounted strong
Serbs mounted counter-
strong counter
become the the final
final phase of the the operation
operation on 3-4 April.
3-4 April. attacks. In April local VRS
April local YRS units
units pressed
pressed a stronger
stronger
Over thethe next 12 12 days, YRS VRS troops
troops bludgeoned
bludgeoned their attack to
to eliminate
eliminate thethe Muslim
Muslim salient pointed at
salient pointed at
way
way toward
toward thethe town from the
town from the northeast and southeast, Yisegrad
Visegrad and thethe hydroelectric
hydroelectric dam there but were were
seizing
seizing key hilltops villages. ARBiH troops
hilltops and villages. troops on repulsed. The VRS
repulsed. The YRS Drina Corps
Corps attacked
attacked again
again late in in
7 February
February managed to push YRS VRS units out of Zeleni Zeleni crushed Muslim
May and crushed Muslim forces
forces in
in the salient, driving
the salient,
Jadar, source of Srebrenica's
Jadar, Srebrenica’s water supply, supply, three days them back
back some 15 15 kilometers
kilometers to the Praca River and
the Praca
after the
the Serbs had seized it. By 15-16 April, however,
15-16 April, however, eliminating
eliminating the Yisegrad. Follow-on
the threat to Visegrad. Follow-on attacks
the VRS had fought
the YRS fought back into into thethe village
village while
while other from
from Cajnice in thethe southeast toward Gorazde itself,
toward Gorazde itself,
units closed
closed in on the the rest of the the town from the
town from the north-
north however, gained
however, gained little
little ground.
ground.
east.
east. Serb troops
troops now
now stood only only 2 2 or 3 kilometers
kilometers
from
from Srebrenica
Srebrenica and controlled
controlled nearly nearly all thethe key posi-
key posi Throughout June the
Throughout the VRS Herzegovina Corps and
YRS Herzegovina
overlooking the
tions overlooking the town.
town. As the the media and relief ARBiH 6th Corps Corps clashed
clashed along
along thethe Muslim
Muslim supply
supply
workers
workers publicized
publicized the the desperate plight plight of the the encir-
encir corridor running
corridor between Tmovo
running between Trnovo and Gorazde.
Gorazde. Small
Small
cled refugee population,
population, on 16 April the
16 April the UNUN Security
Security units
units of Muslim troops scored a few
troops scored few temporary
temporary suc suc-
Council vainly
vainly tried to to protect Srebrenica
Srebrenica by declaring
declaring cesses in attacks to to widen portions of the
widen portions corridor, but
the corridor,
“UN safe area
it a "UN area.” Oric had realized
." Orie realized two earlier,
two days earlier, the VRS Main Staff was
the YRS was planning
planning something
something bigger.
bigger.
however, that
however, that his troops were finished, finished, and he had On 4 July, reinforced
reinforced by by an elite brigade,
an elite brigade, thethe Herze
Herze-
smuggled
smuggled out an UN-supervised halt to
an appeal for a UN-supervised govina
govina Corps
Corps attacked 6th Corps south of
positions south
Corps positions
the
the fighting.
fighting. On 17 April the
17 April the twotwo sides agreed to a Tmovo. A
Trnovo. A week
week of fighting
fighting broke through Muslim
broke through Muslim
cease-fire
cease-fire in place. The The Serbs were to halt their offen- offen defenses, and the
defenses. the VRS
YRS seized
seized thethe town,
town, finally
finally linking
sive while the Muslim forces forces in the the enclave
enclave turned Herzegovina
Herzegovina to the the rest of the
the Serb
Serb republic
republic and seversever-
over their arms to Canadian UN
to Canadian UN soldiers,
soldiers, the collec
the collec- ing
ing the Bosnian logistics
the Bosnian logistics line
line to Gorazde at its
to Gorazde its base.
tion to bebe supervised
supervised by Serb officers. The
Serb officers. The Canadian
Canadian Serb troops then rolled up to
Serb troops to the foot the Muslim
foot of the Muslim
UN troops quickly arrived,
UN arrived, but Orie Oric and his men strongholds of Mounts Igman
strongholds Igman and Bjelasnica,
Bjelasnica, across
across
somehow kept their small
somehow small arms while a trickle trickle of their
their which ran the
which only Muslim
the only supply route
Muslim supply route into
into Sara
Sara-
most badly wounded found
badly wounded found safe passage out on UN UN jevo—through a tunnel
jevo-through tunnel under
under the airport. After incon
the airport. incon-
helicopters Protected only
helicopters. . Protected declaration, the
only by a paper declaration, the clusive clashes
clusive clashes near thethe mountains
mountains and aa diversionary
diversionary
Srebrenica safe area also proved
Srebrenica proved illusory: two two years Sarajevo, Mladic
attack near Sarajevo, Mladic led surprise attack on
led a surprise on
later Serb troops would overrun overrun it and slaughter
slaughter its Bjelasnica that may
Igman and Bjelasnica
Igman may have included
included a heliheli-
male population.•
population.’ copter assault and captured the the 2,000-meter
2,000-meter summit
summit of
Bjelasnica August. Over the
Bjelasnica on 1I August. the next three days, the the
Less than a month
Less month after its Srebrenica
Srebrenica operation
operation neu
neu- surprise offensive also seized
surprise offensive seized and held held key
key positions
positions
tralized the
tralized the armed Muslim enclave VRS troops
enclave there, YRS troops on Mount Igman.
lgman.
attacked the enclave. Three
the nearby Muslim-held Zepa enclave. Three
days of fighting the Bosnian
fighting penetrated the Bosnian Army Mladic’s successful
Mladic's successful operation Igman violently
operation against Igman
without gaining
defenses without much useful
gaining much useful ground,
ground, and the shifted the
shifted focus away
the focus away from the Drina valley,
from the valley, the
the pri
pri-
VRS halted its offensive
YRS offensive on 8 May to allow peace
peace- mary focus of the
mary focus the 1993 offensive, and onto
strategic offensive,
1993 strategic onto
keeping
keeping troops and UN UN observers
observers to be
be stationed in Sarajevo. For the
Sarajevo. the rest of the
the war, Western world
the Western
war, the
Gorazde and Zepa. The
Gorazde The Serbs appear to have decided
decided media would devote most
ubiquitous media
and its ubiquitous most of their
their
that
that taking worth the
taking Zepa was not worth effort—yet.
the effort-yet. attention to the Serb siege of
the Serb of the former Olympic city.
the former city.
Fears that
Fears the VRS
that the advances would collapse
YRS advances collapse the
the city’s
city's
Bosnian Army forces
Bosnian forces in the Gorazde enclave
the Gorazde enclave had defenses or at least starve its its population
population energized
energized thethe
followed up their 1992 with new
1992 successes with new attacks UN, and more
UN, important NATO,
more important NATO, to apply
apply sustained
sustained
toward Yisegrad
toward Visegrad and Rudo during
during January. One
January. One
wormed its way
Muslim sabotage unit even wormed into
way into
'
See Annex
· Sec UN Peacekeeping Operations in 1993 for details.
Annex 37: UN
185
185

pressure on Bosnian Serb President Karadzic—then
Serb President Karadzic-then business areas of the city,
business city, exacting toll of
steady toll
exacting a steady
attending fruitless peace talks
attending fruitless in Geneva—to
talks in Geneva-to orderorder civilian casualties
casualties that kept Sarajevo
Sarajevo inin the world
Serb mountains. With hints
forces off the mountains.
Serb forces airstrikes
hints of airstrikes headlines day. The biggest
headlines day after day. event of
biggest military event
looming,
looming, the Serbs agreed on
Serbs agreed on 55 August to pull
pull out the siege, noted earlier,
siege, noted occurred in August to the
earlier, occurred
their troops forces would take over
troops if UN forces over their
their posi-
posi south of the city
south city when the VRS
when the captured Mount
YRS had captured
tions
tions and prevent Bosnian Army units
prevent Bosnian from occupying
units from occupying Igman and cut
Igman cut the city’s
city's last
last supply line. The prospect
supply line. prospect
the vacated terrain.
terrain. To keep
keep the Serbs honest, NATO
Serbs honest, NATO modern European
of aa modern European city starving under
city starving under aa medieval
medieval
on 9 August agreed on on a program
program of phased airstrikes
airstrikes siege generated international
international pressure
pressure that eventually
eventually
guard the UN "safe
to guard “safe areas"
areas” and forceforce the Serbs to
the Serbs to forced the Serbs
forced Serbs to vacate
vacate the mountaintop.
mountaintop.
withdraw
withdraw from Igman if
from Igman if they should
should cheat on the the
agreement.
agreement. By 19 19 August,
August, virtually all the VRS
virtually all YRS troops
troops There
There were other important
were other clashes in
important clashes in 1993,
1993, including
including
had pulled
pulled back
back to their 30-31
to their 30-31 July positions. A
July positions. A few
few battles for the suburbs of Azici
the suburbs Azici and StupStup inin February
February
remained mountain, probably
remained on the mountain, probably for observation
observation and March, which which continued successful operation
continued the successful operation
and reconnaissance.
reconnaissance. the VRS
YRS had launched in
had launched in December against Otes
December against Otes to
further isolate
further Sarajevo. Had
isolate Sarajevo. Had the Serbs
Serbs seized
seized these
Bosnian Serbs
The Bosnian Serbs had nevertheless achieved most of
nevertheless achieved suburbs, particularly if
suburbs, and particularly if they
they then captured
captured
their 1993
their 1993 objectives valley. The Mus
objectives in the Drina valley. Mus- Dobrinja, they they would have have left
left Bosnian
Bosnian Army troopstroops
lims'
lims’ 1992 territorial gains
1992 territorial gains had been drastically
drastically farther from
even farther from the UN-controlled airport airport and the
thinned,
thinned, Serb
Serb towns secured, Herzegovina
towns secured, Herzegovina directly
directly ARBiH
ARBiH troopstroops in in Hrasnica-Butmir-Mount Igman Igman and and
linked to the rest of the republic, Muslim sup-
republic, and the Muslim sup made useless
made useless the new supply
the new tunnel the ARBiH
supply tunnel ARBiH was was
ply route to Gorazde eliminated. The VRS
Gorazde eliminated. was able to
YRS was under the airport
digging under
digging Hrasnica. The Bosnian
airport to Hrasnica. Bosnian
achieve victories despite
achieve these victories despite strong Muslim resis-
strong Muslim resis Army’s
Army's victory
victory at Stup,Stup, even
even after it had lost lost Azici,
Azici,
tance because
because of the MainMain Staff’s
Staff's effective planning
effective planning thwarted this
thwarted this plan.
plan. Other
Other minor
minor battles
battles during
during the year
and coordination
coordination of the strategic
strategic offensive
offensive followed failed VRS
included failed
included YRS attempts in in July
July and December
December to
by professional
by professional execution
execution at the operational
operational and tacti-
tacti prominent Zuc
recapture the prominent
recapture Zuc Hill,
Hill, which
which the Serbs
Serbs hadhad
cal levels. The YRS's
cal levels. VRS’s superiority
superiority in in firepower and—
firepower and- lost in December
lost December 1992. 1992. ARBiH
ARBiH units and VRS
units and YRS forces
forces
Srebrenica—its employment
especially at Srebrenica-its
especially employment of elite elite spe-
spe also
also regularly clashed in
regularly clashed Grbavica district—the
in the Grbavica district-the
cial operations from the
troops from
operations troops Yugoslav Army
the Yugoslav Army and only Serb-held section of central
Serb-held section central Sarajevo—particu
Sarajevo-particu-
the Serbian
Serbian State Security Department, as
Security Department, as well asas larly around
larly around the the Vrbanja bridge and the Jewish
Yrbanja bridge Jewish ceme-
ceme
several imported
several imported armored artillery units,
armored and artillery units, made
made a tery. The year
tery. year ended
ended withwith aa spate of bloody
bloody shelling
shelling
critical difference
critical difference in equalizing
equalizing the traditional advan-
the traditional advan incidents in
incidents in the city center that killed a number
city center number of
tages of a strong defense. This time
strong defense. time Muslim
Muslim bravery
bravery civilians.‘5
civilians. 15
alone
alone was not enough
was not enough to prevail against the stronger,
prevail against stronger,
better organized
organized and better led Serb Serb troops.
troops. The Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Army took
took on
on aa battle
battle inside
inside Sarajevo
Sarajevo
itself when,
when, in
in late October 1993, it cracked
October 1993, cracked down
down onon
Chapter 37
Chapter two
two of its own units that had
own units out of hand.
gotten out
had gotten hand. These
These
Siege Continues, Sarajevo
The Siege Sarajevo 1993'
1993' “Celo” Delalic's
were "Celo"
were Delalic’s 9th and
and “Caco” Topalovic’s
"Caco" Topalovic's
10th Brigades, which had
10th Mountain Brigades, begun the war
had begun war as
as
By 1993 Bosnian Army and the
1993 the Bosnian the Bosnian Serb
Bosnian Serb armed criminal gangs who
armed who proved ready and
proved ready and able
able to
to
Army forces around
Army forces Sarajevo had settled deep into
around Sarajevo into the
the defend city with
defend the city their own
with their own illegal
illegal guns. These
guns. These
grim routine of trench
grim routine trench warfare.
warfare. Intermittent
Intermittent but persis
persis- patriotic criminals soon
patriotic soon became a problem them
a problem them-
tent shelling
shelling and exchanges
exchanges of small-arms fire, punc-
small-arms fire, punc selves,
selves, extorting money and
extorting money coercing labor
and coercing labor from
from the
occasional battle for a
tuated by the occasional a key suburb,
key suburb, neighborhoods they
neighborhoods were supposed
they were defend. In mid
supposed to defend. mid-
feature, or
terrain feature,
terrain defensive position,
or defensive position, became
became the daily October, Topalovic’s 10th
October, Topalovic's 10th Brigade overstepped the
Brigade overstepped
routine for the soldiers
routine soldiers of both sides.
sides. The better armed
armed line when it publicly embarrassed
line when embarrassed the government
government by
by
VRS used its artillery
YRS artillery to harass residential
residential and
‘
Continues, for a more
Annex 38: Sarajevo 1993: The Siege Continues,
• See Annex
detailed account.
186
186

stealing two
stealing two UN
UN armored
armored personnel
personnel carriers.
carriers. The
The aside to
aside to allow
allow Izetbegovic—the
Izetbegovic-the SDA’s
SDA's second-biggest
second-biggest
authorities responded
authorities responded by
by mounting
mounting Operation
Operation votegetter-to
votegetter—to assume
assume the office. Abdic’s
the office. Abdic's political
“Trebevic-l”
"Trebevic-1" onon 26 October, aa joint Army/police
26 October, Army/police self-sacrifice has never
self-sacrifice has never been
been adequately
adequately explained.l9
explained. 19
action to
action to round
round up
up and Caco , Celo, and
and arrest Caco, and their
their
most notorious
most notorious associates.
associates. The
The operation
operation turned
turned nasty
nasty As
As Izetbegovic’s grasp of power
Izetbegovic's grasp appeared to
power appeared wane in
to wane in
when Caco took
when took several
several MUP
MUP special
special policemen
policemen hos
hos- 1993, Fikret Abdic
1993, Abdic reemerged
reemerged as as aa major
major challenger.
challenger.
tage, torturing
tage, torturing them
them to
to death before
before government
government forces
forces The first
The signs of division within the
first public signs the Muslim
Muslim
could capture
could him. Celo had
capture him. had meanwhile
meanwhile kidnapped
kidnapped camp appeared on
camp appeared 21 June in
on 21 in the runup to
the runup to another
another
25 civilian hostages
25 hostages but
but eventually
eventually released
released them
them and
and round of EC-sponsored peace
round peace talks in Geneva,
talks in Geneva, when
when
gave up. About 20
gave himself up. 20 people, six civil
people, including six civil- Izetbegovic indicated
Izetbegovic he would not
indicated he not attend the meet
attend the meet-
ians,
ians, were
were killed in
in shootouts
shootouts during
during the
the operation.
operation. Of ing. He
ing. termed the
He termed the new
new peace plan
plan “genocidal,”
"genocidal,"
more than local
more local importance, the “Trebevic-l”
importance, the "Trebevic-1" opera
opera- charging that itit codified
charging codified the gains of Serb
the gains Serb ethnic
ethnic
tion was the
tion was the first
first and
and most
most dramatic
dramatic step in
in Bosnian
Bosnian and amounted
cleansing and
cleansing amounted to to the
the de
de facto partition of the
facto partition the
commander Delic’s
Army commander Delic's campaign
campaign to regularize and
to regularize and into Serb-,
country into
country Serb-, Croat-, and Muslim-controlled
Croat-, and
professionalize the Bosnian
professionalize the Bosnian Army.l6
Army. 16 areas. 20
areas.20 Abdic publicly criticized Izetbegovic’s
Abdic Izetbegovic's refusal
refusal
to attend, prompting turmoil within Bosnia’s
prompting turmoil Bosnia's nine
nine-
Chapter 38
Chapter member
member collective Presidency. 21 One
collective Presidency.“ day later,
One day later, the
the
“The Man Who
"The Would Be King”:
Who Would Fikret Abdic
King": Fikret Abdic announced that itit had
Presidency announced
Presidency had met
met without
without Izetbe
lzetbe-
the Autonomous
and the Province of Western
Autonomous Province Western Bosnia‘
Bosnia* and voted
govic and
govic voted to participate
participate in
in the talks with
peace talks
the peace with
or without the
or without President. 22 Many
the President.22 Many sawsaw in
in this
this aa signal
signal
complex civil
Within a strange and complex civil war,
war, the rise and
the rise that Abdic
Abdic was seeking to displace
was seeking displace Izetbegovic,
Izetbegovic,
fall of Fikret Abdic and his
his self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed “Autono
"Autono- although he denied
although denied the
the claims.23 Nevertheless, Abdic
claims. 23 Nevertheless, Abdic
mous
mous Province
Province of Western Bosnia” (APWB) was
Western Bosnia" was one
one appeared to be aa serious
appeared contender for the
serious contender the future
future lead
lead-
of the strangest and most complex
the strangest interludes.
complex interludes. ership of Bosnia.
ership Bosnia.
Fikret Abdic had gained

gained attention one of Yugosla
as one
attention as Yugosla- Only days later, however, the
later, however, the story took another
story took another turn.
tum .
via's
via’s most charismatic
charismatic and controversial
controversial figures
figures even Bosnian Interior Ministry
The Bosnian announced on
Ministry announced 26 June
on 26
before
before the breakup
breakup of the country. In the
the country. the twilight days that Abdic
Abdic was
was wanted the Austrian
wanted by the Austrian Government
Government
of socialist massive state-owned
Yugoslavia's massive
socialist Yugoslavia’s state-owned indus-
indus charges of defrauding
on charges defrauding Bosnians
Bosnians resident in Austria
resident in
tries, Abdic was the the director
director of thethe "Agrokomerc"
“Agrokomerc” who had contributed
who refugee relief money
contributed refugee money funneled
funneled
food-processing
food-processing consortium-the
consortium—the Bihac area's
area’s through the Agrokomerc company’s
through the company's Vienna-based
Vienna-based
single-largest
single-largest employer.
employer. In 1987 1987 it emerged
emerged that subsidiary.
subsidiary.24 Despite the
24 Despite charges, Abdic
the charges, Abdic remained
remained thethe
Abdic’s company
Abdic's company had essentially
essentially been printing
printing its Bosnian Presidency's Muslim
Bosnian Presidency’s Muslim representative
representative atat the
the
own
own money
money by issuing
issuing roughly
roughly half a billion dollars
dollars in Owen-Stoltenberg
Owen-Stoltenberg peace negotiations
negotiations inin Geneva.
Geneva.
unbacked
unbacked promissory
promissory notes. The The ensuing scandal
ensuing scandal
rocked the
rocked the entire Yugoslav Government and its bank-
Yugoslav Government bank mid-September, Abdic was
By mid-September, was openly
openly defying
defying not
ing system. Abdic was found found guilty fraud and
guilty of fraud only
only Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic but the itself, calling a
Presidency itself,
the Presidency a
'8
briefly imprisoned.
briefly imprisoned.l717 18 parliamentary assembly to meet in his
parliamentary assembly home city
his home city of
Velika Kladusa to vote on the the creation
creation of anan “autono
"autono-
Surviving the
the scandal conviction, Abdic by 1990
scandal and conviction, 1990 mous province"
mous Bosnia-Herzegovina.
province” within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Abdic
Abdic
become one of the
had become the most prominent Muslim politi-
prominent Muslim politi stopped
stopped short of declaring
declaring that this would mean the the
cal leaders in
in Bosnia and, campaigning
campaigning for the SDA in
the SDA secession of the Bihac
secession of all or part of Bihac region, dis
region, but the dis-
the first multiparty
the first elections, won
multiparty elections, won the
the most votes of tinction seemed purely
tinction academic. Even
purely academic. Even before
before the
candidate. Although this entitled
any Muslim candidate. entitled him
him to assembly vote on 27 September
assembly September proclaimed
proclaimed himhim the
the
become the
become first president
the first Bosnia, Abdic stepped
president of Bosnia, head of the "Autonomous Western
“Autonomous Province of Western
' account, see

• For aa more detailed account,
more detailed see Annex
Annex 39: The Man
Man Who
Who Would
Would
Be King:
Be Abdic and
King: Fikret Abdic and the
the Autonomou
Autonomouss Province of Western
Province of
Bosnia in 1993.
187
187
Digitized by o gle Origirlill from

Bosnia,” Abdic had already established
Bosnia," established a privately
privately Bosnian Army forces
Bosnian forces initially confined the Abdic
confined the Abdic sup
sup-
raised military
military force
force and used his money
money and influ
influ- porters to the extreme northern around Velika
northern area around
mini-nation in
ence to create a mini-nation in the northwestern
northwestern corner
comer Kladusa, but Drekovic’s
Kladusa, overtaxed 5th Corps lacked
Drekovic's overtaxed lacked
country.2525 Sarajevo
of the country. Sarajevo responded
responded by ejecting Abdic
by ejecting troop reserves to guard
the troop guard against both the Bosnian
against both Bosnian
from the Bosnian
Bosnian collective
collective Presidency
Presidency on 22 October.
October. and Krajina Serb armies while simultaneously
Serb armies simultaneously putting
putting
down the Abdic rebellion.
down the rebellion. On
On 15 October, Abdic’s
15 October, Abdic's
With now
now two rival claimants
two rival claimants for control
control of thethe forces made a comeback
forces comeback and regained
regained control
control over
over
besieged Bihac enclave—Fikret
enclave-Fikret Abdic and his his APWB Cazin without
without aa firing shot, but the following day
firing a shot,
"army," Bosnian Army’s
“army,” versus the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps then Bosnian Army troops
Bosnian troops pulled
pulled from
from the
the surrounding
surrounding
Drekovic—it remained
under Ramiz Drekovic-it remained to be be seen where
where drove them back
area drove out. 29 3"
back out.” 30 (Government sources
(Government sources
loyalties
loyalties lay and who who would control which territory.
control which territory. claimed—credibly—that
claimed-credibly-that the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs assisted
Abdic urged 5th Corps brigades brigades to defect to to his new
new the Abdic rebels
rebels byby mounting
mounting simultaneous
simultaneous attacks inin
flag,
flag, while Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic calledcalled for the Army to remain remain several areas to
to tie down
down ARBiH forcesforces during
during the
the
loyal
loyal and stamp out this this new insurrection. Abdic rap
new insurrection. rap- APWB
APWB capture of Cazin.) The BosnianBosnian Army
idly established
established his authority
authority in in Velika Kladusa,
Kladusa, a mounted aa counterattack
mounted counterattack onon 1818 October,
October, shelling
shelling
municipality that had long
municipality long been his powerpower base. Abdic Velika Kladusa,
Kladusa, but was
was unable
unable toto eliminate
eliminate the
loyalists
loyalists initially declared their control control in the
the Bihac APWB
APWB as as a military
military threat.3|
threat. 31
enclave's
enclave’s central towntown of Cazin, but a flying flying column
column
of 500 Bosnian
of Bosnian Army troops from Bihac (ironically,
troops from (ironically. With the
the Bihac
Bihac situation
situation still hanging in
still hanging in the balance,
balance,
“Agrokomerc” vehicles)
driving in "Agrokomerc" arrived in
vehicles) arrived in Cazin the Belgrade
Belgrade media announced that Abdic had met
media announced
eventually secured it
on 20 September and eventually it for the with
with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and Serbian
Bosnian Serb Serbian Presi
Presi-
ARBiH 5th Corps.
Corps?“2726 "7 Abdic’s
Abdic's support was weakest
support was dent Milosevic
Milosevic on October.32 32 Ever the
on 22 October. the consummate
consummate
itself, which generally
in Bihac itself, generally sided with with the opportunist, Abdic
opportunist, Abdic had thrown
thrown in in his
his lot
lot with
with his
his
Izetbegovic
Izetbegovic government.
government. former
former Serb
Serb opponents
opponents toto gain backers for his
gain backers his break
break-
away empire. A
away empire. A public
public statement followed to the
When the decision
When was forced,
decision was two Bosnian
forced, two Bosnian Army effect the Abdic forces
effect that the forces and the Serbs
Serbs had signed
signed aa
brigades—the 521st and 527th,
brigades-the 527th, both from the Velika
both from peace agreement, while Karadzic’s
Karadzic's Republika
Republika Srpska
Srpska
Kladusa area---defected
Kladusa area—defected virtually wholesale to the
virtually wholesale the unrecognized) announced
(itself unrecognized)
(itself announced itit was
was recognizing
recognizing
Abdic camp. (These
(These were to be redesignated as the
be redesignated the Autonomous Province of Western
Autonomous Province Western Bosnia as
as a
APWB’s
APWB 's lst Brigades.) Much of the
1st and 2nd Brigades.) the 504th entityY
separate entity.33
and part of the 503rd Brigade in Cazin
Cazin also changed
sides. The 517th Brigade from the small
Brigade from small town
town Abdic’s
Abdic's forces
forces regained initiative when
the initiative
regained the when fighting
fighting
remained loyal
of Pjanici remained loyal to
to the
the government
government but lost resumed November, after Krajina Serb
in November,
resumed in Serb forces
forces
many of its personnel
personnel to defections. These
to defections. These units
units were allowed
allowed his troops to travel
his troops through Serb-held
travel through Serb-held terri
terri-
to provide the equivalent
to provide equivalent manpower
manpower of three to four
to four tory in
tory in Croatia mount a flanking
Croatia to mount flanking attack from
from the
the
brigades
brigades to forces.
to the rebel forces. western the Bihac pocket.
western side of the pocket. Advancing
Advancing from
from this
this
unexpected direction, a
unexpected direction, a tidy force of APWB
tidy force APWB troops
troops
violence between the rival
Open violence
Open rival forces
forces began inin the (perhaps 1,000
(perhaps 1,000 to 1,500)
1,500) gained
gained significant ground in
significant ground in
early October, as for the first
early days of October, first time
time Muslims the western Bihac enclave,
western Bihac enclave, occupying strip of terri
occupying aa strip terri-
fought not only
fought Croats but other Muslims.
only Serbs and Croats tory several
tory several kilometers along the Croatian
kilometers deep along Croatian border
border
UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR attempted to negotiate a truce between between and advancing
advancing asas close
close as IO km
as 10 outside Cazin itself.
km outside itself.
the two Muslim factions
the two factions before
before the violence
violence escalated At the time, Abdic
the same time, Abdic forces
forces in
in the north
north succeeded
succeeded
control, but the
out of control, the Abdic representatives refused
refused to in capturing Johovica and Skokovi,
in capturing Skokovi, two hotly con
two hotly con-
Meanwhile, the
talks.2828 Meanwhile,
attend the talks. Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian wel
Serbs wel- tested towns
towns several
several kilometers south of
kilometers south of Velika
Velika
comed the opportunity
opportunity to stand downdown and let their
their Kladusa.
Kladusa. UN
UN observers confirmed that, in
observers confirmed addition to
in addition to
Muslim opponents
opponents beat each other up.
188
188
Digitized by Go gle 0rigiMI from

allowing the
the rebel forces to
rebel forces to transit their territory,
transit their territory, the
the ideal. This group
ideal. group was
was still represented
represented by Alija
Serbs
Serbs supported
supported the the APWB attack with
with artillery
artillery and Izetbegovic, but it was
Izetbegovic, beginning to dwindle in
was beginning in the
tank til-6.34
fire_J435353637
36 37 face of ethnic
face ethnic cleansing
cleansing and the seeming impossibility
the seeming
of multiethnic
multiethnic coexistence.
coexistence. This group
group also advocated
also advocated
As
As 1993
1993 drew close, Abdic’s
drew to a close, APWB empire
Abdic 's APWB empire a continuation
continuation of the war until
the war all ((or
until all more) of
or at least more)
remained a very
remained very tiny one—roughly the northwestern
tiny one-roughly northwestern Bosnia had been brought
brought under the control
under the control of the cen-
cen
third of the
third the surrounded
surrounded Bihac
Bihac enclave-but
enclave—but still too tral government.
tral government. On the the other hand were were those
those who
who
powerful for the
powerful the Bosnian Corps to eliminate
Bosnian Army 5th Corps eliminate favored the
favored the de facto
facto or de jure partition
de jure partition of thethe country
country
built himself a small
reduce. Abdic had built
or even reduce.
or small army
army into Serb, Croat,
into Serb, Muslim regions,
Croat, and Muslim delimited by
regions, delimited by
of six brigades—perhaps 5,000
six brigades-perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 fighters—
10,000 fighters- boundaries and giving one ethnic
map boundaries ethnic group clear
group clear
out of his ownown supporters
supporters and major
major elements
elements of thethe authority
authority over
over a particular
particular section
section of the the country.
country. This
two defecting
two defecting Bosnian
Bosnian Army brigades.
brigades. The
The Bosnian
Bosnian group generally
group generally advocated
advocated a rapid
rapid conclusion
conclusion to the
the
Milosevic back
Serbs, and Milosevic
Serbs, back in Belgrade,
Belgrade, welcomed
welcomed thethe war
war so that the
the calculated
calculated division of the the country
country
Muslim
Muslim renegades
renegades as a proxy force for diverting
proxy force diverting 5th could proceed. In early
could proceed. early 1993
1993 this group, perhaps best
group, perhaps
Corps fighters, they made sure that Abdic’s
fighters, and they Abdic's forces
forces exemplified
exemplified by by Bosnian
Bosnian Croat Mate Boban,
leader Mate
Croat leader Boban, had
were adequately
were outfitted with
adequately outfitted small arms
with small arms and mortars
mortars the dominant hand.
the dominant hand.
but prevented
prevented from
from obtaining artillery or
heavy artillery
obtaining heavy or
armor.
armor.3838 When
When actively supported
actively supported by the
the Krajina or Perhaps the
Perhaps the greatest tragedy
tragedy of the civil
the Croat-Muslim civil
Bosnian Serbs-as
Bosnian they were
Serbs—as they in November
were in November and war is that itit was
war is was in
in large measure sparked
large measure sparked by an inter-
an inter
December-the APWB
December—the APWB army could advance
army could advance and take national peace proposal
national proposal that was
was intended
intended to
to end the
the
territory but lacked
territory lacked an independent offensive
an independent offensive poten-
poten interethnic bloodshed—the
interethnic bloodshed-the Vance-Owen-Stoltenberg
Vance-Owen-Stoltenberg
tial. At
tial. At least for the time, Abdic’s
the time, Abdic's rebel
rebel forces
forces and the
the plan. When
plan. When the
the outlines
outlines of the
the proposed ethnically
proposed ethnically
Bosnian Army had reached
Bosnian reached a standoff
standoff. . based cantons
cantons were published, itit was
were published, was obvious
obvious to all
all
which ethnic faction would be accorded
ethnic faction accorded majority
majority rule
rule
Chapter 39
Chapter over
over each section
section of the country. This was
the country. was not seri
not a seri-
Neighbor Fighting
Neighbor Neighbor:
Fighting Neighbor: ous problem
problem where
where the
the map awarded control to the
awarded control the
The Croat-Muslim Descent Into
Croat-Muslim Descent War
Into War was already
faction that was
faction already inin control
control of a given
given area,
such as the Muslim-majority Bihac enclave
as the enclave or the
the eth-
eth
A variety of factors
A variety contributed to the
factors contributed the strains fric
strains and fric- cleansed Serb-majority
nically cleansed areas of western
Serb-majority areas western
tions in
tions in the relationship that had
the Croat-Muslim relationship had now
now Bosnia. It was
Bosnia. was bound
bound to provoke trouble, however,
provoke trouble, however, in
flared warfare, all
into open warfare,
flared into all stemming
stemming inin some way
way areas that were
were to be turned over to
turned over different
to a different
competing interests
from competing interests and mutually exclusive con-
mutually exclusive con faction—or in
faction-or in areas where
where there waswas no single domi
single domi-
cepts of the future the Bosnian
future of the state. Who
Bosnian state. exercised
Who exercised nant ethnic group. It was
ethnic group. was in this crucial detail
this crucial detail that the
the
control
control on the
the ground canton and municipality
ground in each canton municipality tragedy
tragedy of the mixed Croat-Muslim
the mixed Croat-Muslim areasareas would be
was the
was the proximate
proximate source
source of hostility,
hostility, but the
the larger
larger played
played out.
underlying issue
underlying was the
issue was the philosophical
philosophical one of what
what
sort of state
state postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina would be.
postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina much of ethnically
In much ethnically mixed
mixed northern
northern Herzegovina
Herzegovina
From these differences
differences followed different conclusions
different conclusions central Bosnia,
and central Croats or Muslims
Bosnia, either Croats Muslims might
might
about Croat-Muslim war war aims what sort of peace
aims and what predominate in
predominate in a given city or
given city region, but the
or region, the majority
majority
should be agreed to how
should how quickly.
quickly. On the one hand,
On the hand, the
the was
was rarely
rarely overwhelming,
overwhelming, and power power was
was usually
usually
advocates of a unitary
advocates unitary Bosnian
Bosnian state
state (mostly,
(mostly, but not shared (or, more accurately,
(or, more accurately, competed over) by
competed over) by the
exclusively,
exclusively, Muslims) were were trying
trying to keep alive the
keep alive two ethnic
two ethnic groups. Both factions
groups. Both military forces
factions had military forces
single undivided
idea of a single undivided nation with all three ethnic
nation with ethnic collocated in
collocated in many
many of the major urban
the major areas—Mostar
urban areas-Mostar
groups living together
groups together in multiethnic, pluralistic
in a multiethnic, pluralistic most famous among
most famous them-tenuously allied,
among them—tenuously allied, but
society. This was
society. was the concept behind
the original concept the free
behind the free responding
responding to to different chains of command
different chains command and only only
multiparty held in
elections held
multi party elections in the Bosnian Republic in
the Bosnian
1990,
1990, but even then the rise of the
the rise the ethnically
ethnically based
political parties
parties had all
all but
but fatally undermined this
fatally undermined this
189
189

sometimes supporting
sometimes supporting each other in combat.
combat. When the ethnic balance
ethnic balance in a given
given area. The patterns and pas-
pas
Vance-Owen map was published,
Vance-Owen published, it appeared to the sions of interethnic
sions conflict began to gather like thun-
interethnic conflict thun
ethnic factions
ethnic factions to clearly delineate which ethnic
clearly delineate ethnic group
group derclouds over central
derclouds central Bosnia at the beginning
beginning of
control in each town
would be in control town on each side of each 1993.
1993.
cantonal border.
cantonal border. The intricately
intricately crafted nuances of the
proposed
proposed power-sharing
power-sharing arrangements
arrangements and multiethnic
multiethnic The new
new year opened inauspiciously for the strained
opened inauspiciously strained
cantonal administrations
cantonal administrations were lost to the competing
competing Croat-Muslim alliance.
alliance. After a week
week of rising
rising inter-
inter
political and military leaders on the ground ground in Bosnia.
Bosnia. ethnic
ethnic tensions
tensions across
across the entire central
central Bosnian area,
In particular, emboldened local
particular, the map emboldened local Bosnian two ostensible
the two ostensible allies
allies clashed
clashed openly
openly on 12 12 January
January
Croat leaders
Croat leaders who
who wished
wished to assert their
their undisputed
undisputed Vakuf—a predominantly
1993 in Gomji Vakuf-a
1993 Muslim town
predominantly Muslim town
authority over areas of central
authority over central Bosnia and Herzegov-
Herzegov what had been designated
in what Croat-majority canton.
designated a Croat-majority canton.
ina that had been designated
ina Croat-majority can-
designated as Croat-majority can HVO forces
HYO firing from
forces firing from commanding
commanding positions
positions in in the
effect, the peace plan
tons. In effect, offered the semblance
plan offered semblance of hills to the southeast began a drive
drive to force
force the
an international
international imprimatur
imprimatur to naked
naked power
power grabs. A Muslim defenders
Muslim defenders out of most of the town.town.” 40‘“
39 40 41
tenuous alliance
tenuous alliance based on a common
common enemy had
into a direct
turned into direct competition title to
competition for title to the same On 15I 5 January,
January, three days after
after the opening shots were
opening shots were
land.
land. Vakuf, the HVO
fired in Gomji Vakuf,
fired HYO publicly and formally
demanded the
demanded the submission
submission to HYOHVO authority
authority of the
the
It would be grossly unfair to imply that the Vance-
grossly unfair Vance Muslim units
Muslim units in the three cantons
cantons designated
designated as as Croat-
Croat
plan caused the Croat-Muslim war
Owen peace plan war of majority under
majority under the proposed plan; Bosnian
proposed peace plan;
1993-94. While
1993-94. While the plan
plan set
set the parameters
parameters for discus-
discus Army
Army units
units that did
did not accept the HVO’s
not accept HVO's conditions
conditions
sion, underlying issue of ethnic
sion, the underlying control of territory
ethnic control territory were
were to be disarmed
disarmed or or disbanded.
disbanded.42 lzetbegovic
42 Izetbegovic
predated and would outlast

outlast the peace negotiations.
negotiations. rejected Croat demands,
rejected the Croat demands, objecting
objecting partially
partially to the
Nevertheless, the Vance-Owen
Nevertheless, Vance-Owen Plan Plan and its associated
associated resubordination
resubordination of Bosnian Army units units but more
more funfun-
brought the issues
maps brought issues of ethnic
ethnic territorial
territorial control
control to damentally
damentally to
to the concept
concept of ethnic
ethnic partition
partition of the
fore and in
the fore large measure served
in large as the catalysts
served as catalysts country that the Croat
country Croat demand implied. Bosnian Army
demand implied. Army
for the war
war to come.
come. commander Halilovic also
commander Halilovic rejected the HVO’s
also rejected HVO's orders,
orders,
instructing the Army
instructing Army units
units in
in the disputed
disputed cantons
cantons to
Given supercharged interethnic
Given the supercharged atmosphere of
interethnic atmosphere respond only
respond only toto the ARBiH command. His
ARBiH command. His orders
orders
central Bosnia in
central in 1993, sudden influx
1993, a sudden influx of tens
tens of were countermanded,
were countermanded, however,
however, when
when Bosnian
thousands of refugees
thousands refugees into was just about
into the area was about the Defense Minister Bozo Rajic
Defense Rajic (a Croat)
Croat) acceded
acceded to to the
worst thing that could
worst thing could possibly
possibly happen—and
happen-and happenhappen itit HVO’s
HVO's demands
demands on on 17
17 January.43
January. 43
did. From the very
did. beginnings of the war,
very beginnings war, the conflict
conflict
had created—indeed,
had created-indeed, in in many
many ways
ways had
had been intended
intended Fighting nevertheless
nevertheless continued
continued unabated in Gomji
unabated in Gomji
to create—massive
to create-massive waves displaced civilians, the
waves of displaced Vakuf, despite the country-wide
Vakuf, despite country-wide military agreement,
agreement, aa
detritus of their
detritus their ethnically
ethnically cleansed
cleansed hometowns
hometowns and and 20 January truce
20 truce brokered
brokered byby the
the Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen teamteam
regions. communities of Muslims,
regions. Entire communities Muslims, Croats,
Croats, and
and just in advance of the peace
in advance peace talks in Geneva,
talks in Geneva, and
and aa
Serbs-though mostly
Serbs—though mostly Muslims—had
Muslims-had been been driven
driven out
out series of local
series local cease-fires
cease-fires arranged
arranged byby the UN British
British
of different
different areas by by the advancing
advancing armies.
armies. Forced
Forced battalion. The Bosnian Croats
battalion. Croats demanded
demanded the uncondi
uncondi-
from
from their
their homes
homes at gunpoint, Muslim
at gunpoint, Muslim and
and Croat
Croat refu
refu- surrender of all
tional surrender
tional all Muslim
Muslim forces
forces in
in the town
town and
and
gees streamed
streamed into central Bosnia from places
into central places like
like the began using
began using their
their heavy
heavy weapons
weapons advantage
advantage to
to sys
sys-
Krajina and the Drina valley.
Krajina valley. Central
Central Bosnia’s
Bosnia's small
small tematically demolish
tematically surrounding Muslim-majority
demolish surrounding Muslim-majority
Serb population was
Serb population was in
in turn pushed out,
tum pushed out, but
but the hous
hous- towns like Bistrica.
towns Bistrica. In Gomji Vakuf
In Gomji Vakuf itself,
itself, HVO
HYOtanks
tanks
they vacated
ing they
ing vacated waswas not
not nearly enough for the hordes
nearly enough hordes advanced up the road
advanced up road from the south,
from the south, destroying
destroying
of displaced
displaced citizens.
citizens. Relations
Relations between
between Croats
Croats andand houses
houses one at aa time.
one at Gomji Vakuf’s
time. Gomji Vakuf's Muslim
Muslim
Muslims
Muslims worsened
worsened in each municipality as
in each as both
both
groups competed for limited
groups competed limited resources—a
resources-a competi
competi-
tion sharpened when
tion sharpened refugee influx
when the refugee influx altered
altered the
190
190
Digitized by Go gle Origiflal from

defenders had no
defenders no heavy
heavy weapons
weapons and onlyonly a few mor-
few mor manifold.
manifold. In the
the end, it was
was the lethal combination
the lethal combination of
tars but nonetheless managed to
nonetheless managed to hang on in in the
the town.
town. the
the Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen peace plan, refugee-fueled ethnic
plan, refugee-fueled ethnic
HVO forces
forces pressed their attacks repeatedly
repeatedly untiluntil an
an tensions,
tensions, and disputes
disputes on the
the ground
ground over who
who had
order from
from Bosnian
Bosnian Croat President Mate
Croat President Mate Boban
Boban military suzerainty
military suzerainty that was to produce
produce yet another
another
finally
finally brought the offensive
brought the halt. 444545
offensive to a halt.44 civil war
war and some of the most vicious
the most vicious battles of the
the
Bosnian conflict.
entire Bosnian conflict.
No sooner
sooner had the situation calmed
the situation in Gomji Vakuf,
calmed in Vakuf,
than violence
violence flared in Busovaca,
flared in Busovaca, alongalong the
the road
road In the
In unstable environment
the unstable central Bosnia,
environment of central Bosnia, a bad
southeast of Vitez. Bosnian Army
Vitez. Bosnian Army forces
forces ambushed
ambushed situation
situation was made worse
worse byby the
the Muslim defeat at
two HVO soldiers
and killed two soldiers outside the town
outside the town on Srebrenica
Srebrenica in early April.
in early April. With thethe Muslim
Muslim defenders
defenders
24 January,
January, and thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats responded
responded on on the
the verge of being
being overrun
overrun and forced
forced out of thethe
January by blocking all
27 January all traffic
traffic along the roads
along the roads into into enclave, the
besieged enclave,
besieged the rumor
rumor spread that the the tens of
central Bosnia,
central Bosnia, cutting
cutting off thethe flow
flow of weapons
weapons to to thethe thousands of Muslim
thousands Muslim refugees
refugees thronging Srebrenica
thronging Srebrenica
Muslims.46
Muslims. 46 Intense
Intense fighting
fighting began in and around around would be evacuated and resettled in in mixed-ethnic
mixed-ethnic
Busovaca
Busovaca immediately
immediately after the Croat blockade
the Croat blockade was was regions central Bosnia.
regions of central Behind the
Bosnia. Behind clouds of rumor
the clouds rumor
announced
announced. . Yet
Yet another truce
truce waswas signed
signed on the UN actually
the actually arranged a face-saving
face-saving halt to to the
the
January in which both sides agreed to separate
30 January Serb
Serb assault and declared
declared the town a "safe
the town “safe area."
area.”
their combatant
their combatant forces
forces and reopen the roads .47 ‘8
the roads.47 4 K 4"
4' 1 Hardly any Srebrenica
Srebrenica refugees
refugees actually left for cen-
actually left cen
tral Bosnia or anywhere else,, but by
anywhere else by that point
point fact had
Sporadic Croat-Muslim fighting
Sporadic fighting spluttered into
spluttered on into lost out to fear. With central Bosnia already
already on edge,
mid-February ,50 and another crisis
mid-February,50 crisis had to be defused
defused tensions had gone up yet another notch.
tensions notch.
when the
when the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats again closed
Croats again the supply
closed the supply
routes into central Bosnia on 28 February.5|
into central February. 51 After this,
this, thin ties of the
The thin
The the Croat-Muslim alliance finally
alliance finally
relative calm
relative calm descended in March. It was to
in March. prove the
to prove the snapped under
under the
the force
force of the
the Croats'
Croats’ 15 15 April
April ulti
ulti-
last calm
calm before
before the storm.
the storm. matum to the
matum the Bosnian Army. Reiterating its earlier
Army. Reiterating earlier
demand, the
demand, the HVO
HVO insisted
insisted that Bosnian Army
all Bosnian
that all Army
In what
what would soon
soon prove
prove to be one of the
to be more
the more troops in
troops Croat-majority areas must
in Croat-majority must either
either give
give up
ironic twists
twists of the war’s history,
the war's history, Bosnian
Bosnian President
President their leave for a Muslim-majority canton.
their arms or leave Pre-
canton. Pre
Izetbegovic and Croatian
Izetbegovic President Tudjman
Croatian President Tudjman dictably, the Muslims again refused,
dictably, the refused, and manymany on
announced on 28 March their agreement to the
announced the estab-
estab both sides began girding themselves for a fight
girding themselves fight as the
the
lishment of a joint Croat-Muslim military
lishment in Bosnia.
military in Bosnia. deadline
deadline setset the
the stage
stage for ethnic
ethnic violence.
violence. TheThe day
After months
months of wrangling
wrangling and debate, the the Bosnian
Bosnian the HVO’s
after the HVO's ultimatum
ultimatum expired,
expired, thethe Croat-Muslim
Army and the HVO finally
the HVO finally were
were to be placed
placed under
under a war
war began.
began.
command, , although
single joint command
single although thethe exact terms of the
arrangement were left
arrangement were left unstated .52 It hardly
unstated.52 hardly mattered. In
In north-central Bosnia, problems
north-central Bosnia, first spiraled
problems first spiraled out of
Within three weeks
weeks the newly allied
the newly armies of the
allied armies the control in
control in the Zenica area. Whether
the Zenica Whether in in response
response toto the
the
Croat-Muslim joint command
command would be at each HVO’s ultimatum
HVO's ultimatum to disarm or simply
to disarm coincidence, ,
simply by coincidence
others' throats in a full-scale,
others’ no-holds-barred war.
full-scale, no-holds-barred war. an unknown but very
an unknown very expert group
group of kidnappers
kidnappers
abducted Zivko Totic-the senior HVO commander
Totic—the senior commander
Chapter 40
Chapter 40 Zenica—on 15
in Muslim-majority Zenica-on April. The
15 April. The abduc-
abduc
Central Bosnia
Central Bosnia Afire:
Afire: ambushed Totic's
tors ambushed Totic’s car in broad daylight and shot
broad daylight
The HVO’s Lasva
The HVO's Lasva Valley Offensive, April
ValleyOffensive, April 1993
1993 bodyguards dead. The
three of his bodyguards The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats
immediately and logically accused the
immediately the Bosnian
Bosnian
Having twice
twice come
come to
to the brink of war—after
the brink war-after Prozor Muslims of the the outrage. The Bosnian Army
The Bosnian denied all
Army denied all
in
in October 1992 and Gomji Vakuf in
October 1992 January 1993—
in January 1993- responsibility but was
responsibility unable to produce
was unable Totic
produce either Totic
the Croats and Muslims finally
the Croats finally plunged
plunged over the
the edge
in mid-April. The Croat-Muslim showdown
in mid-April. showdown had been
a long
long time coming, the reasons behind
coming, and the it were
behind it were
191
191

or a credible
credible suspect."
suspect.53 By thethe next morning inflamed
morning inflamed private driveways,
private driveways, and livestock
livestock lay
lay dead in
in the streets
tempers crossed over into violence,
violence , and shooting
shooting and gardens. An entire family of seven was found found
broke
broke out between Zenica
Zenica’s's Croats
Croats and Muslims. Seri-Seri dead in one house,
house , including
including at at least two
two young chil
young chil-
ously outnumbered, the
ously outnumbered, HVO’s understrength
the HVO's “Jure
understrength "Jure dren who
who had almost certainly burned to death. The
almost certainly
Francetic"
Francetic” Brigade was forced
Brigade was forced out of the
the city
city almost
almost images from
from this small Bosnian town—the
central Bosnian
small central town-the
immediately.
immediately. The HVO made a fighting
The HYO fighting retreat a few
few Guemica of the
Guernica conflict—would shock
Bosnian conflict-would
the Bosnian shock and
kilometers 5657
.55 56 57
kilometers west to thethe village Cajdras, , but most of
village of Cajdras outrage the world.55
the world
the
the brigade
brigade surrendered later in the day. 54
day.54
Investigations
Investigations by the UN and others indicate
the UN indicate that the
HVO had long
The HYO long ago planned offensive to secure
planned an offensive village was taken by surprise
village early in
surprise early in the morning,
morning ,
control
control of the Lasva Valley, and, as Croat-Muslim
Lasva Valley, shortly after 0500
shortly hours, by
0500 hours, simultaneous attacks from
by simultaneous from
fighting flared across most of Bosnia
fighting flared Bosnia on 16 April, it
16 April. north and south. Mortar rounds
the north sniper fire
rounds and sniper fire cut
drive in motion
put the drive motion. . The Lasva
Lasva is a very small
very small down anyone who
down who tried
tried to
to escape across the the open
river
river running
running west to to east
east from through Vitez
from Travnik through ground.
ground. Within the the town,
town, squads of soldiers
soldiers moved
moved
until
until it feeds into the the larger Bosna river
larger Bosna river northeast of methodically from
methodically from house to house , killing
to house, killing the occu
occu-
Busovaca.
Busovaca. The river river is paralleled
paralleled by a primary road—
primary road- with close-range
pants with gunfire. When
close-range gunfire. everyone in
When everyone in the
the
important in Bosnia—connecting
one of the most important Bosnia-connecting town
town was
was dead, many of the bodiesbodies were
were dragged into into
Travnik with
with Vitez, Busovaca, , Kiseljak and ultimately
Vitez, Busovaca ultimately their former
former homes, and the buildings
buildings were
were set aflame
set aflame
Sarajevo.
Sarajevo. In planning
planning its campaign,
campaign, the HVO counted
the HYO with gasoline—probably in
with gasoline-probably in an effort
effort to conceal
conceal or
on ejecting
ejecting the non-Croat population
the non-Croat from the
population from valley
the valley destroy as much evidence as possible
much evidence possible.58.585960
5960All told, at
All told,
and assumed that this cleansing would be a relatively
cleansing would relatively 03 people
least I103 (including 33
people (including 33 women
women and children)
children)
simple
simple task.
task. IfIf successful, campaign would not
successful, the campaign were killed at Ahmici,
were according to the UN,
Ahmici , according UN, and the
only
only improve
improve the HVO's HVO’s military
military position
position by securing
securing number could
actual number could be considerably higher . In all,
considerably higher. all,
control Bosnia’s main
control of Bosnia's highway but also
main east-west highway some 176176 buildings including two
buildings including mosques were
two mosques were
would create an corridor across cen-
Croat corridor cen destroyed 626364656667
.61626364656667
an exclusively
exclusively Croat destroyed_6l
tral Bosnia
Bosnia. . Because
Because its military force was small
military force small rela-
rela
tive to the
the sizable
sizable Muslim population
population in thethe area, the
the All the
All evidence suggests that the Ahmici operation
the evidence operation
HVO’s objective
HVO's terrorize the Muslim civilians
objective was to terrorize was preplanned
preplanned and executed by by a picked
picked assault
into
into evacuating
evacuating the Lasva Valley
the Lasva Valley of their own volition
their own group. (There have been persistent
group. (There persistent but unsubstantiated
unsubstantiated
and thereby possibly
possibly even avoid avoid having
having toto fight all
fight at all rumors group of senior
rumors that a group senior Bosnian Croat leaders
Bosnian Croat leaders
for the cities and towns.
the cities towns. met on 15 April, the night
15 April. before the attack,
night before attack , to make
make
the final decision
the final decision on the operation,
operation, allegedly dubbing
allegedly dubbing
it "48
“48 hour
hourss of blood ashes." 6x) The Ahmici
blood and ashes.”°8) Ahmici attack
Ahmici Massacre•
The Ahmici Massacre’ was not a military offensive,
military offensive, but rather a deliberate
deliberate
massacre of unarmed,
unarmed, unwarned
unwamed civilians: the Bosnian Bosnian
horrific centerpiece of the
The horrific HVO’s ethnic cleans-
the HVO's cleans Croats systematically
Croats systematically setset out to find
find and execute the the
ing strategy for the Lasva
ing Lasva Valley
Valley was the “Ahmici
the "Ahmici entire population.
population, positioning the HVO
positioning the HYO troops
troops so they
massacre” of 16
massacre" April 1993.
16 April 1993. When
When British UN UN peace
peace- could catch anyone who
could who tried
tried to flee
flee the town
town in in preset
arrived in
keepers arrived in the village
village on I199 April
April to investi
to investi- fields of fire.
fields Once they had killed everybody
fire. Once everybody, , they
gate Bosnian massacre,. they found
Bosnian charges of a massacre found that
that immediately
immediately set set about disguising
disguising what
what they had done
the entire village
village had been systematically
systematically destroyed. in a coverup operation that a purely
coverup operation purely military
military operation
operation
main mosque had been burned and its minaret
The main minaret would hardly
hardly have required.
required.
felled by explosives
felled explosives detonated at the the base. The major
major-
ity of the houses had also been put to the torch,
the houses torch, their Ahmici remains the most famous
remains the victim of the HVO’s
famous victim HVO's
roofs collapsed
roofs collapsed by the flames. Only Croat-owned
the flames. Croat-owned infamous Lasva
infamous Valley offensive,
Lasva Valley was only one
offensive, but it was
buildings Bumed-out cars blackened
remained intact. Burned-out
buildings remained blackened of the towns
towns attacked in coordinated HVO
in a coordinated strike
HYO strike
'
detailed account.
· For a more detailed see Annex
account. see Annex 40
40:: The Ahmici
Ahmici Massacre
Massacre
of 16 April 1993: A
of A Military Analysis.
Military Analysis.
192
192

against the
the valley's Muslims. While Ahmici
valley’s resident Muslims. destroying
destroying parts of Svinjarevo Gomionica, and Rotin
Svinjarevo, , Gomionica, Rotilj
burned, troops of the
the HVO's Central Bosnia
HVO’s Central Bosnia forcing their residents to
after forcing to tlee.
flee.7373Muslim civilians
civilians
Operational Zone
Operational Zone were also attacking thethe numerous in Kiseljak proper were rounded
in rounded up and either
Muslim-majority villages
Muslim-majority villages surrounding
surrounding the
the detained or forced
forced to leave the town. 74Battles
the town.74 contin
Battles contin-
Croat-majority towns of Vitez and Kiseljak
Croat-majority Kiseljak.. ued for anan arc of villages
villages several kilometers
kilometers west of
Kiseljak until
until the HVO gained effective
the HYO effective control
control over
Svinjarevo,
Svinjarevo, Jehovac, Gromiljak, Visnjica,
Jehovac, Gromiljak. Visnjica , and Rotilj
The Vitez Region’
Region· by the April. 75 77677
the end of April.75 677
During the
During HVO’s Lasva
the HVO's Lasva Valley offensive, the
Valley offensive, the Vitez Heavy fighting
Heavy fighting resumed north and west of Kiseljak at
area was to see
area see some of the bloodiest and most violent
the bloodiest violent the
the very end of May around the villages of Lisovo and
the villages
Croat-Muslim clashes of the
Croat-Muslim the war. The harbinger of
war. The Kazagici. 78On 1I June,
Kazagici.78 June, according
according to to UN observers, the
UN observers. the
violence in
violence in the
the area was the
the detonation of a huge truck HVO
HYO launched preemptive attack against a Muslim
launched a preemptive Muslim-
bomb
bomb outside a mosque in in Stari Vitez on 1616 April (the held ridge
ridge overlooking
overlooking thethe road running
running northwest
northwest
same day as the the Ahmici massacre). The The bomb killed from Kiseljak. 79The
from Kiseljak.79 The fighting
fighting sputtered out the follow
the follow-
or injured
injured dozens of people and completely devastated
completely devastated ing week
week when Bosnian
Bosnian Army commander Delic and
most of the
the old town's center.“69
town’s Muslim center. HVO
HYO commander PetkovicPetkovic met in in Kiseljak and agreed
to a country-wide
to country-wide truce on 10 10 June.80
June. 80
The HVO’s
The HVO's lightning
lightning offensive
offensive in the Lasva Valley
the Lasva Valley
allowed the
allowed Bosnian Croats
the Bosnian Croats to capture or destroy
many of the villages
villages in the the immediate
immediate area area around Bugojno to
The Bugojno to Jablanica
Jablanica Road
Vitez in a couple of days days.. After these initial gains.
gains,
limited resources kept the
though, limited the HVO Bos
Central Bos-
HYO Central Although
Although the Lasva Valley
the Lasva corridor was the
Valley corridor the HVO’s
HVO ' s
nian Operation
Operation Zone from from pressing its attack strongly
strongly most significant offensive objective
significant offensive in central Bosnia,
objective in Bosnia ,
after the first several days of fighting.
the first The command
fighting. The the Bosnian
the Bosnian Croats simultaneous attacks in
Croats launched simultaneous in
appears to have tried to link the the Vitez enclave to the the other mixed Croat-Muslim areas. In several areas
mixed Croat-Muslim
HVO-held Kiseljak area
HYO-held area some 10 IO km
km toto the
the east with
east with the Lasva
south of the Valley-including Gornji Vakuf,
Lasva Valley—including Vakuf,
an attack along the highway on 25
the main highway 25 April, but it Prozor, and Jablanica~HVO
Prozor, Jablanica-HVO forcesforces attempted to rap
rap-
was blocked
blocked by significantly superior Bosnian
significantly superior Bosnian Army idly stake out exclusively Croat areas and then consol-
exclusively Croat consol
forces, leaving
forces. leaving the the two Croat-held
Croat-held areas still sepa-sepa There was heavy fighting
gains. 81 There
idate their gains.“ fighting outside
rate.70The advantage of a surprise attack against neg-
rate.70 neg Busovaca as HVO
Busovaca forces expelled Muslims from
HYO forces from sev
sev-
ligible or disorganized opposition had enabled the
disorganized opposition the A few
villages .82 A
eral nearby villages.82 few kilometers away, Muslim
kilometers away,
Bosnian Croats to seize territory
Bosnian territory easily, but when they forces
forces advanced against the the HVO east of Prozor.83
HYO east Prozor. 83
came up against determined Muslim opposition opposition they
were stymied Croat-Muslim cease-fire
stymied. . After a Croat-Muslim cease-fire was
signed in April, and observed with
in late April. with only occa
only occa- Aftermath: The
Aftermath: End of April
The End
sional breaches, the
sional HVO assumed a largely
the HYO largely defensive
while the
posture while the ARBiH
ARBiH 3rd Corps Corps took the the opportu-
opportu The mid-April round
The Croat-Muslim fighting
round of Croat-Muslim fighting burned
nity to build counterstroke.7|7172
build its forces for a counterstroke. 71 itself leaving hundreds of sol-
week or so, leaving
itself out over a week sol
civilians dead on each side.
diers and civilians HVO alone
The HYO
side . The
counted 145 civilians killed in
soldiers and 270 civilians
145 soldiers in
Kiseljak Area··
The Kiseljak Area” combat by 24 April,“
24 April, 84 and Muslim casualties werewere
probably at least as
probably as high.
high.
Full-scale the Kiseljak area when the
Full-scale war came to the the
HVO
HYO struck first
first northwest
northwest of the town on 18
the town 18 April, Bosnian Army Commander
Bosnian Halilovic and HVO
Commander l-Ialilovic Com
HYO Com-
shelling the
shelling Muslim-majority town of Bilalovac
the Muslim-majority Bilalovac and mander Petkovic
Petkovic attempted interethnic
to patch up interethnic
attempted to
'
military relations
military the end of April, signing
relations at the signing a
Annex 41: The Croa1-Held
• See Annex Croat-Held Vitez
Vitez Enclave
Enclave:: Vitez.
Vitez. Busovaca.
Busovaca .
and Novi Travnik, June-December 1993. for a more detailed
Novi Travnik. detailed
account.
" Annex 42: The Kiseljak
•· See Annex Kiseljak Enclave in 1993: The Battle
Baille for
for
Kiseljak . Kresevo. and Fojnica,
Kiseljak. Fojnica . for a more de1ailed
detailed account.
account.
193
193

cease-fire
cease-fire agreement (at
(at a time when
when the
the international
international be released, and free mobility of civilians would be
be
community
community was strongly
strongly pressuring
pressuring the
the Bosnian Serbs
Bosnian Serbs guaranteed. 92
guaranteed.92 The cease-fire little visible effect
cease-fire had little effect on
on
to accept the Vance-Owen
Vance-Owen peace settlement) and the ground, in the city
ground, and battles in city continued.93 Then
continued. 93 Then
ARBiH-HVO Joint
promising to activate the ARBiH-HVO
promising the Mostar HVO—reinforced
HYO-reinforced by
by units
units brought
brought in
in from
from
Command
Command to enforce
enforce the truce. 85 A week
truce.85 week of relative
relative Ljubuski, Citluk, and Capljina-on
Capljina—on 16
16 May made a
peace ensued, but the agreement was not to last. determined
determined and successful
successful attack to seize
seize the small
small
strip of territory
territory still
still held by the Muslims on
held by on the right
right
Chapter 41
Chapter 41 bank of the
bank Neretva. 94 Calm of aa sort finally
the Neretva."4 finally came on
on
Alliance Shattered:
The Alliance 21 May, though
21 May, though both sides
sides remained
remained deployed
deployed along
along
Mostar and Herzegovina Battles, May
The Mostar May 1993
1993 the confrontation
confrontation line sawed Mostar city
that had sawed
line that city in
in
half. 96
half."595 96
After the
the Lasva
Lasva Valley
Valley fighting
fighting subsided April,
subsided in late April,
the conflict shifted
the nexus of conflict shifted for a time
time to the Mostar
to the Mostar Chapter
Chapter 42
42
area, where a delicate balance had been maintained
maintained in in The
The Bosnian Army Fights Back:
Army Fights Back:
the ethnically
ethnically mixed region. The Croat-Muslim vio
mixed region. vio- The
The Lasva Valley Counteroffensive,
Lasva Valley Counteroffensive,
lence touched off by the HYO HVO in mid-April produced
produced June-July
June-July 1993
1993
several deaths from
from sniper
sniper fire Mostar, but the city
fire in Mostar, city
was spared the widespread
widespread violence
violence that left hundreds
hundreds For they
For they have sown
sown the wind, and they
the wind, thev shall
Bosnia. On 24 April
dead in central Bosnia. April a shaky was
shaky truce was reap the whirlwind.
reap the
arranged for the Mostar area, and the
the Mostar the two
two forces
forces
uneasily to their former
returned uneasily alliance.“
former alliance. 86 The agree
agree- -Hosea
——Hosea 8:7
817
ment seems not to have dissuaded the HVO from
the HYO from
repeating its demand that Bosnian Army troops
that Bosnian troops in the
the early June 1993,
In early 1993, the Bosnian literally had no
Bosnian Army literally no
city hand over their weapons
weapons in exchange
exchange for safety place to go.
go. With their former HVO
their former allies now
HYO allies now adver
adver-
guarantees. Again the great majority
majority of Muslims saries, the
the government
government forces
forces were surrounded, cut off
were surrounded, off
weapons. A
refused to give up their weapons. A collision waswas from all
from all military supplies, and fighting
military supplies, fighting the Bosnian
Bosnian
inevitable and imminent.
inevitable imminent. Serbs and the
Serbs the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats simultaneously. At
Croats simultaneously. At this
this
point in
point time—from Sarajevo’s
in time-from Sarajevo's standpoint,
standpoint, probably
probably
On
On 8 May, Muslim-held military concen
military and civilian concen- the darkest hour of the
darkest hour Bosnian conflict—the
the Bosnian conflict-the Army
trations throughout Mostar came under what
throughout Mostar received a new
received new commander,
commander, General Rasim Delic,
General Rasim
UNPROFOR commander
UNPROFOR commander Lt. Lt. Gen.
Gen. Wahlgren
Wahlgren con-con who set
who immediately to make
set out immediately changes in
make changes in the com
com-
firmed
firmed was "a “a major Croat attack.”
major Croat Bosnian Croat
attack." Bosnian Croat position and the
position the strategy of his forces. First and fore
his forces. fore-
forces set fire
forces fire to Bosnian Army headquarters and a
to the Bosnian most, the
most, Bosnian Army began to hit
the Bosnian hit back.
back.
cluster of important
important buildings
buildings at the very outset of the
the very the
which HYO
attack, after which HVO troops roundedrounded up Muslim salvo of the
opening salvo
The opening Bosnian Army’s
the Bosnian Army's counter
counter-
civilians en masse and evicted
civilians evicted over 1,300 1,300 of them offensive was
offensive to come
was to at Travnik,
come at Travnik, almost exactly in
almost exactly in
from two
from two formerly
formerly Muslim-majority sections sections of thethe the geographic demographic center of Bosnia
geographic and demographic Bosnia-
city.
city. The defending Bosnian Army forces
defending Bosnian forces of the city's
the city’s Herzegovina. With a
Herzegovina. a prewar population of over
prewar population over
“Mostar” Brigade
41st '"Mostar" responded by attacking
Brigade responded attacking the
the 70,000 (45 percent Muslim,
70,000 Muslim, 37 percent Croat, Croat, 11
11 per
per-
HVO-held Tihomir Misic
HYO-held Misic army
army barracks
barracks on thethe east Serb) it was (after Zenica)
cent Serb) Zenica) the second-largest
second-largest
side of the
the river. Fierce house-to-house
river. Fierce house-to-house street battles Bosnia. ItIt was
town in central Bosnia.
town was also location of the
also the location
*88990
throughout the city
raged throughout the next few
city for the few days.
days.8787 88 8990 Pucarevo
Pucarevo “Bratsvo”
"Bratsvo" Weapons Plant, which had manu
Weapons Plant, manu-
time,
At the same time, HYO HVO forces
forces launched
launched attacks in the factured, assembled,
factured, assembled, and repaired
repaired artillery pieces for
artillery pieces
Jablanica and Dreznica
Jablanica Dreznica areas.
areas.9|91 the Yugoslav Army. 97 A
Yugoslav Army.97 A fewfew kilometers south of
kilometers south
the smaller
Travnik was the smaller town Novi Travnik,
town of Novi Travnik, with
with
As they had in the Lasva Valley
the Lasva Valley the
the month before,
month before, some 30,000 residents and aa slightly higher
30,000 residents higher percent
percent-
ARBiH and HYO
ARBiH l-IVO commanders
commanders Halilovic
Halilovic and age of Croats
age Croats than Muslims.
Petkovic signed a cease-fire
Petkovic cease-fire agreement covering
covering
Mostar on 13
Mostar 13 May stipulating soldiers of
stipulating that soldiers of both
barracks, prisoners
sides would return to their barracks, prisoners would
194
194

home of central
The home
The central Bosnia’s largest Muslim
Bosnia's largest Muslim popula
popula- Enver Hadzhihasanovic and
Enver Hadzhihasanovic Mehmed Alagic,
and Mehmed Alagic, respec
respec-
tion, the Travnik-Zenica urban
tion, the urban area was
was also
also becom
becom- tively. The
tively. core would be
The core be the 17th Krajina
the 17th Krajina Brigade,
Brigade,
ing center of aa new.
ing the center new, more
more assertive
assertive Bosnian
Bosnian commanded
commanded by by Fikret Cuskic and headquartered in
and headquartered in
Muslim identity. More
Muslim identity. More radical and much
radical and much more
more reli
reli- itself. 100 In
Travnik itself.loo In addition
addition to
to the 17th Krajina, the
the 17th the
gious than the
gious Bosnian Muslim
the Bosnian Muslim population
population asas aa whole,
whole, ARBiH
ARBiH could
could call
call upon
upon the 306th Mountain
the 306th Mountain Bri
Bri-
"new" Travnik Muslims
the “new” Muslims were
were starting
starting to
to attract aa headquartered in
gade, 101 headquartered
gade,‘°' in the nearby Travnik suburb
the nearby suburb of
dedicated following.
dedicated following. TheThe new, hardline attitude
new, hardline attitude was
was Han Bila,
Han and if
Bila, and if necessary
necessary the 7th Muslimski,
the 7th Muslimski, 303rd,
303rd,
most visible
most visible in
in the
the large
large refugee
refugee population
population that hadhad and
and 314th Brigades from
3 I4th Brigades Zeni ca. When
from Zenica. the Bosnian
When the Bosnian
been expelled
been from Jajce, Donji
expelled from Donji Vakuf,
Vakuf, and
and large
large Muslims
Muslims launched their attack,
launched their attack, they probably had
they probably had the
the
swaths of western
swaths Bosnia. Their radicalization
western Bosnia. radicalization hadhad equivalent of at
equivalent least four full
at least brigades to
full brigades to commit
commit to
to
begun with
begun with the
the atrocities
atrocities they
they suffered
suffered at
at Serb
Serb hands
hands the fight.102
the fight. 102
during the
during the ethnic cleansing of 1992,
ethnic cleansing 1992, and
and attitudes
attitudes
became all
became the more
all the extreme after
more extreme Bosnia's Muslims
after Bosnia’s HVO forces in
HVO forces in the comprised most
the area comprised most of the
the Central
Central
were attacked by
were the Croats
by the in April-May
Croats in April-May 1993.
1993. Bosnian
Bosnian Operation Zone's First Operational
Operation Zone’s Operational Group.
Group .
Two HVO
Two brigades were
HVO brigades from Travnik,
were from Travnik, the
the
From aa military
military standpoint,
standpoint, there were
were twotwo visible “Travnika” Brigade and
"Travnika" Brigade and the
the “Frankopan”
"Frankopan" Brigade.103
Brigade. 103
products of the
products the hardening
hardening Bosnian attitude in
Bosnian attitude in the
the Another,
Another, the "Stjepan Tomasevic”
the “Stjepan Brigade, had
Tomasevic" Brigade, had aa bat
bat-
Travnik area:
area: the 7th Muslimski
the 7th Muslimski and 17th 17th Krajina talion in
talion nearby Novi
in nearby Novi Travnik. Although the the First
Brigades. Destined
Brigades. Destined to become
become twotwo of the most feared,
the most feared, Operational Group’s
Operational (OG's) other
Group's (OG’s) other assets—the
assets-the
famous,
famous, and accomplished units in
accomplished units Bosnian Army,
the Bosnian
in the “Vitez”
"Vitez" Brigade,
Brigade, thethe other battalion of the
other battalion the “Stjepan
"Stjepan
the 7th Muslimski Brigade from
Muslimski Brigade from Zenica
Zenica and 17th17th Brigade, and the
Tomasevic” Brigade,
Tomasevic" remnants of the
the remnants the defeated
Krajina Brigade from Travnik were
Brigade from were zealous
zealous shock
shock “Jure
"Jure Francetic” Brigade, all
Francetic" Brigade, in Vitez—could
located in
all located Vitez-could
troops of Bosnia’s
troops Bosnia's displaced
displaced Muslims. Composed
Composed in theory have
in theory have reinforced
reinforced thethe Travnik HVO,
HVO, as as events
largely of Muslims "cleansed"
largely other parts of
“cleansed” out of other unfolded
unfolded the the HVO’s
HVO's other
other resources proved too
resources proved too far
far
Bosnia—young
Bosnia-young men with with no place to go—the
no place go-the soldiers
soldiers away and too
away preoccupied with
too preoccupied with events inin the Vitez
of these brigades made up in
these brigades fierceness and enthusi
in fierceness enthusi- area to bebe of any assistance. The
any assistance. The HVO,
HVO, therefore,
therefore, had
asm what
what they lacked
lacked in training
training and discipline. The
discipline. The roughly two
roughly two brigades available for the
brigades available defense of
the defense
Bosnian Army
Bosnian Army did quite know
did not quite know how
how it felt
felt about
about Travnik.
them oror the
the increasing
increasing number foreign Islamic vol-
number of foreign vol
unteers who
who came to join their ranks. On the
ranks. On one hand,
the one hand, The Croat-Muslim frontline
frontline with
with the Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian Serbs
they could
could be unruly
unruly and problematic, harassing local
problematic, harassing local ran 22 or 3 kilometers
kilometers to the northwest of Travnik. The
the northwest
Bosnian
Bosnian Croats insufficiently religious
Croats and even insufficiently religious Serbs were in an excellent
Serbs were excellent geographical position, hav
geographical position, hav-
Bosnian Muslims.
Bosnian Muslims.9898 On
On the
the other hand, there waswas no ing occupied
ing occupied the massive Mt.
the massive Mt. Vlasic feature
feature situated
question
question that these troops were highly motivated
troops were motivated and just north of Travnik and overlooking
just north overlooking the entire town
the entire town
effective
effective fighters.
fighters. Sorely willing and able
Sorely in need of willing and its environs. During the
its environs. the Croat-Muslim conflict
conflict in
assault troops,
troops, the Bosnian Army began in June 1993
the Bosnian 1993 this however, the
this area, however, Serbs were content to
the Serbs watch
to watch
units as spearheads for its attacks.
to use these units attacks.9999 their
their opponents
opponents fight involve them-
fight it out and did not involve them
selves beyond occasional shelling
beyond occasional shelling. .
At the outset, both the Bosnian Government
the Bosnian Government and the the
Bosnian
Bosnian Croats substantial forces
Croats had substantial forces available
available for The Bosnian
The Bosnian Muslims kicked kicked off their attack on
combat in the
the Travnik-Novi Travnik area. area. Although with fierce
4 June with fierce infantry inside Travnik
infantry clashes inside
the Croats may have had a slight
the Croats slight edge in terms of town. Street battles were accompanied
town. accompanied by mortar and
by mortar
organization
organization and equipment,
equipment, the two forces
the two forces were on artillery fire, while leveled
artillery fire, leveled antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns were used
the
the whole
whole comparably
comparably armed. Other Other factors
factors being
being to clear out houses.
houses.104 104 By 5 June the HVO had largely
the HVO largely
about equal, the Army’s local
Bosnian Army's
the Bosnian local advantage in vacated Travnik itself but continued shell the
continued to shell the area
manpower
manpower was to prove decisive.
prove decisive. from Croat-held
from Croat-held villages
villages in the suburbs overlooking
the suburbs overlooking
the town center.
the town center.105 cease-fire agreements were
105 Two cease-fire
All of the
All Bosnian Government's
the Bosnian Govemment’s forces
forces in the
the area announced on 5
announced June, but fighting
5 and 6 June, continued
fighting continued
‘07
belonged
belonged to the ARBiH 3rd Corps
the ARBiH Bosanska
Corps and its Bosanska unabated.“
unabated. 106 107
Krajina Operational Group under the

Operational Group command of
the command
195
195
Digitize-d by o gle Origir1al from

By the
the end of the day on 6 June.June, the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats Bjelavici and Obrovici, 33 kilometers
kilometers to the southsouth-
were unquestionably
unquestionably on the the run. Bosnian
Bosnian Serb military
Serb military east.120
east.120 The
The following day day fighting
fighting had advanced
advanced to
spokesmen stated on 7
spokesmen 7 June that
that about 5,000 Bosnian
about 5,000 Bosnian Catici, 2 kilometers
kilometers south south of the town. After several
the town. several
Croats—including over 1,000 HYO
Croats-including HVO troops-had
troops—had sur-sur more days of fighting
more days fighting inin the surrounding
surrounding villages,
villages,
rendered to Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb forces
forces west of Travnik to to Bosnian Croat residents
Bosnian Croat began to
residents began flee Kakanj on
to flee on
escape thethe Croat-Muslim fighting
fighting of thethe previous few
previous few 13 June,
13 June, and soon thousands of them were
soon thousands were headed east
east
108w'09 away. 121HVO
days.
days")8 9 The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats initially dismissed
dismissed the toward Vares,
toward Vares, some
some 20 km km away.'3' HYO forces
forces
claim
claim as propaganda
propaganda but later admitted
admitted that the HVO
the HYO apparently established a blocking position
apparently established position at
at
troops
troops had indeed
indeed disobeyed
disobeyed orders to fight fight their way
way Kraljevska Sutjeska
Sutjeska along
along the
the road
road to Vares
Vares onon
through
through to other Croat-held positions and had instead
Croat-held positions instead 14 June,
14 June, probably
probably tryingtrying to
to keep
keep the
the escape route
route
given
given themselves
themselves up to the Serbs.
Serbs.“"110Thousands
Thousands moremore open”:
open. 122The besieged villages of Catici and
besieged villages
Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat civilians fled
fled up the slopes of Serb-held
the slopes Serb-held Kraljevska Sutjeska
Sutjeska surrendered
surrendered the following day, day,
Mt. Vlasic (in
Mt. (in dreadful
dreadful weather)
weather) to surrender
surrender toto the along major elements of the HVO’s
with major
along with HVO's defending
defending
Serbs
Serbs over the next few few days, after Muslim forcesforces cut "Kotromanic" Brigade, 123leaving
“Kotromanic” Brigade,‘23 leaving the way clear for the
way clear
off all
all other escape routes.
routes.HI111“2 m “4
112“3 114 Bosnian Army’s occupation of Kakanj itself on
Army's occupation on the
16th 124125
16th'2“ 125—a triumph quickly marred
-a triumph marred by by rampant
rampant
A barely
A barer perceptible occurred 8 June when
perceptible lull occurred when thethe looting_ 126‘27
looting.‘26 i 21
Bosnian Army’s new

Bosnian Army's new commander
commander in chief, chief, Gen.
Gen.
Rasim
Rasim Delic, called
called for a halt in in the fighting
fighting and With the
the consecutive
consecutive defeats at at Travnik andand Kakanj,
accepted a Croat-Muslim cease-fire
cease-fire agreement effec- effec Bosnian
Bosnian Croat losses in
Croat losses in men
men and territory
territory were
were
tive for the
the whole
whole country.
country.“5 115Having gained
gained thethe initia
initia- becoming acute, and the Herceg-Bosna
becoming Herceg-Bosna leadership’s
leadership's
however, the
tive, however, Bosnian Army pressed its
the Bosnian concerns
concerns deepened as as June wore
wore on.
on. The
The military
military tide
tide
advantage as far as it could in in all
all directions
directions and on 8 already turned
had already turned far
far enough
enough as as early
early asas 99 June for
and 9 June continued
continued its offensive
offensive to the southeast, Bosnian Croat
Bosnian Croat leader
leader Mate
Mate Boban
Boban to appeal
appeal publicly
attacking
attacking the nearby village
village of Senkovci
Senkovci and pushingpushing to
to Croatian President Tudj
Croatian President Tudjman help. '28
man for help. 128On 18 18 June,
June.
the remaining
remaining HYOHVO forces
forces south and east east toward
toward Boban's deputy, Dario Kordic,
Boban’s deputy, Kordic, admitted
admitted that
that the
‘6
Croat-held Novi Travnik and Vitez.
Croat-held Vitez.l116 Government
Government Bosnian Croats
Bosnian Croats had lost
lost more 2,000 killed and
more than 2,000
forces also made important
forces important gains west, seizing
gains to the west. seizing wounded in
wounded Bosnian Army
in the Bosnian Army offensive
offensive andand that aa
'7 Lastly, the
the key road junction Turbe.l 117
junction at Turbe. Lastly, the ARBiH
ARBiH further 60,000 had been driven
further 60,000 driven from
from their
their homes
homes durdur-
offensive axis to the east,
opened a new offensive east, successfully
successfully ing the fighting.
ing (UN authorities
fighting. (UN authorities could
could not
not confirm
confirm
clearing
clearing a government-controlled
govemment-controlled corridor all the
corridor all the way
way Kordic’s figures
Kordic's figures but agreed that they appeared credi
they appeared credi-
from Travnik to
from Zenica, some 20 km
to Zenica, km away.
away.“8118 ble.)129 outnumbered HVO
ble.)129By 30 June the outnumbered HYO was was clearly
clearly
hard pressed, especially in
pressed, especially central Bosnia,
in central Bosnia, prompting
prompting
successful linkage
The capture of Travnik and its successful linkage toto Jadranko Prlic,
its political head, Jadranko Prlic, to issue
issue an an “appeal
"appeal
Zenica was a military
nearby Zenica military victory
victory of major signifi
major signifi- order" for all
and order” all Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats between
between 18 18 and
and
Travnik’s wider and more lasting
cance. Travnik's importance
lasting importance 60 to report for military
military service
service under
under aa general
general
was psychological tactical or strategic,
psychological rather than tactical strategic, mobilization.
mobilization.
however. At
however. At a desperate moment
moment in in the fighting
fighting thethe
Bosnian Army had not only held
Bosnian held its own
own but had Chapter
Chapter 43
43
achieved a clear victory.
achieved victory. The significance morale
significance for morale The Three-Sided
The Three-Sided War:
War:
incalculable.
was incalculable. Zepce, Zavidovici,
Zepce, Maglaj, June-July
Zavidovici, and Maglaj, June-July 1993
1993
ARBiH lost no time in following up its success in

The ARBiH in For months, Zepce had
months, Zepce had been an island of Croat
an island Croat-
Travnik and on 16 16 June won
won the second major
the second victory
major victory Muslim coexistence,
Muslim town of about
coexistence, aa town about 20,000
20,000 residents
residents
two-week-old offensive
of its two-week-old offensive by
by capturing
capturing the large
the large almost equally
almost equally divided
divided between Croats and Muslims.
between Croats
Muslim-majority towntown of Kakanj east
east of Vitez and
Kiseljakl 119
north of Kiseljak begun several
The battle had begun
19The several days
earlier on 9 June with
earlier with an the towns
an attack on the towns of
196
196

An unnatural maintained in
unnatural peace had been maintained in Zepce
Zepce by by Bosnian Croats
Bosnian Croats had secured almost
almost complete
complete control
control
an form of ethnic
an eerie form ethnic apartheid:
apartheid: two
two parallel
parallel govern-
govern Zepce, blocking any
of Zepce, any possible Bosnian Army rein
possible Bosnian rein-
ments-one
ments—one Croat,Croat, one Muslim—operated
Muslim-operated simultasimulta- forcements from
forcements Zenica. Not only was Maglaj itself
from Zenica.
neously in
neously in the
the same town. children would attend
Croat children
town. Croat surrounded, but the entire “Maglaj
surrounded, "Maglaj finger”
finger" to the
the
the central
central school morning; Muslim
school in the morning; children
Muslim children north-the Muslim-held area around
north—the around Tesanj,
Tesanj, south
south of
would have classes
classes in the same building in the
in the the after
after- Doboj and west
west of the Serb-held Ozren mountains—
Serb-held Ozren mountains-
noon.
noon. The local Bosnian Army and HYO
local Bosnian HVO headquar-
headquar was also cut off from
was also resupply. Bosnian
from resupply. Bosnian forces
forces had
ters, a
a kilometer directed brigades
kilometer apart, directed brigades fighting
fighting the the secure control over only Zavidovici at this
control over point. 138 '39
this point.138 1.19
Bosnian Serbs along
Bosnian Serbs along adjacent frontages. It
adjacent frontages. was a deli
It was deli-
cate balance,
balance, but it kept the peace for a time.
time.‘30130 By the end of the summer, the Zepce-Maglaj-Tesanj
the summer, Zepce-Maglaj-Tesanj
area had turned into
into a crazy
crazy quilt
quilt world of sieges
a
This fragile arrangement broke
fragile arrangement broke down
down on 24 June. The
June. The within sieges and alliesallies joining with
with enemies
enemies to fight
fight
Croats claim
Croats the Bosnian
claim the first attacked several
Bosnian Army first several allies. In the
allies. the Zepce-Zavidovici
Zepce-Zavidovici area, the VRS
area, the YRS had
Croat-majority
Croat-majority villages outside Zepce
villages outside touched off
Zepce and touched stepped in the HVO
in to assist the HYO against the the Muslims. To
street fighting
fighting in the ethnically
ethnically mixed town itself.‘3'
mixed town itself.1.11 north, Muslim-held Maglaj was
the north, was surrounded
surrounded by by
Bosnian Army
Bosnian commander Delic maintained
Army commander maintained that that it Croats on three sides
Croats sides and Serbs
Serbs on north of
on one. Just north
was the Croats
was Croats and Serbs
Serbs who
who began the fighting
fighting with with the Muslim-held Tesanj
that, the Tesanj area had become
become an an
a joint attack on Zavidovici in violation
violation of the
the most
most island with
island with its through Maglaj cut off.
its link through off. Within that
recent cease-fire)“ follow the HVO’s
it,
cease-fire. 132 Whoever

Whoever started it, by by the
the follow- Tesanj area, Bosnian
Tesanj Bosnian CroatCroat soldiers
soldiers of the HYO's
ing day
ing day the Croat-Muslim fighting engulfed not
fighting had engulfed I 10th Brigade were
10th Brigade fighting side
were fighting by side
side by with the
side with
1
only Zepce
Zepce but also adjacent Zavidovici and the
also adjacent larger
the larger Bosnian
Bosnian Muslims against the the Bosnian Serbs—no
Bosnian Serbs-no
town of Maglaj to
town to the north.
north.133 outnumbered HVO
133 The outnumbered HYO more
more than 20 km km from other HVO
from other troops of the I I I1th
HYO troops th
1
1
forces
forces chose to withdraw
withdraw most of the BosnianBosnian CroatCroat Brigade who
Brigade who were accompanied by VRS
were accompanied YRS armor
armor in
in
civilians from
from the three towns
towns on 25 25 June and began a assaults against the the ARBiH. In this three-comered
three-cornered
a
very
very heavy bombardment of the urban
heavy bombardment urban centers the fol fol- war,
war, it seemed, all all things
things were possible.
were possible.
it
lowing day,
day, causing
causing numerous casualties and exten-
numerous casualties exten
sive material
sive damage.I34134 Muslim forces
material damage. claimed some
forces claimed Chapter 44
Chapter44
gains by 27
gains June, capturing Zavidovici and holding
capturing holding a Zagreb Intervenes To
Zagreb To Stem
Stem the Tide, July
the Tide, 1993
July 1993
a
small foothold
small foothold in southern end of Zepce
in the southern Zepce despite
heavy HVO
the heavy HYO shelling.
shelling.I35
135 By mid-July
mid-July 1993,
1993, the
the leadership
leadership in Zagreb
in
Zagreb was
was
deeply concerned,
deeply concerned, not only over the HVO’s
only over HYO's battlefield
battlefield
The Zepce-Zavidovici
Zepce-Zavidovici area saw saw anan undisguised Croat-
undisguised Croat reverses but also
reverses also about thethe military prospects for
military prospects
Bosnian Muslims. UN
alliance against the Bosnian
Serb alliance
Serb UN offioffi- Herceg-Bosna as
Herceg-Bosna as a whole. Tudjman and his
whole. Tudjman his advisers,
advisers,
a
cials confirmed in
cials confirmed that Bosnian
in late June that Bosnian Serb Serb tanks however,
however, had a delicate play. Convinced
delicate game to play. Convinced that
that
a
were
were actively assisting HVO
actively assisting HYO forces
forces during
during the fight
fight- they had to intervene directly to shore
intervene directly shore up their
their
Serb Army assistance
ing. 136 Bosnian Serb
ing.'3°Bosnian from Colonel
assistance from Bosnian Croat allies
Bosnian Croat prevent the further
allies and prevent further loss
loss of
Slavko Lisica’s "Doboj"
Slavko Lisica's “Doboj” Operational
Operational Group was was toto territory to the Muslims, they also had to somehow
territory somehow
frequently prove decisive,
frequently prove decisive, as
as at the
the fiercely
fiercely contested mask the visibility of the HV’sHY's involvement
involvement to mini
mini-
suburb of Novi
Maglaj suburb Seher. Bosnian
Novi Seher. Bosnian Serb armor
Serb armor mize
mize international criticism and the
international criticism the risk of sanctions.
sanctions.
finally
finally overran town after HVO
overran the town HYO artillery
artillery and infan
infan-
try efforts failed to dislodge
efforts had failed dislodge thethe Muslim
Muslim defend
defend- In May, Tudjman—under
Tudjman-under a near-ultimatum from the
near-ultimatum from
a
ers_
ers.I37
1i1 EC to
EC rein in
to rein in the Bosnian Croats or
Bosnian Croats or face
face possible sanc
possible sanc-
tions—had public plea to the Bosnian
tions-had made a public Bosnian Croats
a
as a result
Largely as the Bosnian
result of the Serb assistance, the
Bosnian Serb to break their offensive,
break off their offensive, which
which could
could only help
help
a
HVO began to
HYO to get the upper
upper hand
hand in
in the fighting
fighting by their common
their Serbs. The Croat
enemy, the Serbs.
common enemy, Croat leaders
leaders in
in
July. UN
early July.
early UN military officials confirmed
military officials confirmed that Mag-
that Mag—
laj
laj had been completely surrounded by

completely surrounded July, and its
by 2 July, its
2
defenders were clearly

defenders were clearly in trouble. Even
in trouble. worse, the
Even worse.
197
197

Bosnia were just as
were just as public
public in their rejection of Tudj-
their rejection Tudj ARBiH Captures
The ARBiH Captures Bugojno, 18-25 July"
Bugojno, 18-25 July*
man
man’s's argument,
argument, claiming that they they had to defend their
defend their
right
right to
to live
live in Bosnia against
against Muslims who who "want
“want to Bugojno's strategic
Bugojno’s strategic location
location and its its damaged
damaged but but still
still-
expel
expel all
all other peoples
peoples and create an an Islamic, 10010O- functioning “Slavko
functioning "Slavko Rodic”
Rodie" munitions
munitions factory
factory made
made itit
percent Moslem state." 140Herceg-Bosna
state.”‘*‘0 Herceg-Bosna leader Mate
leader Mate one of the most
most heavily
heavily contested
contested towns
towns during
during the
Boban's
Boban’s will will prevailed,
prevailed, and the war
war had continued
continued summer
summer 1993 1993 fighting
fighting between
between Croat
Croat andand Muslim
Muslim
through July—only to
through July-only HVO on
to put the HYO on the losing
losing end forces in
forces central Bosnia.
in central Before the
Bosnia. Before war, Bugojno was
the war, was
conflict.
of the conflict. a large
a town of about
large town about 46,000
46,000 residents with aa Muslim
residents with Muslim
plurality (42
plurality (42 percent)
percent) and substantial minorities of
substantial minorities
The competing
competing factors
factors of international
international pressure
pressure and Croats (34 percent)
Croats (34 percent) and SerbsSerbs (about
(about 20 percent). The
20 percent).
Croat
Croat national
national interests hung
hung in balance for a time,
in the balance time, ethnic
ethnic balance
balance in in the town
town quickly changed
changed after
after the
but eventually Tudjman
eventually Tudjman ordered
ordered his
his own
own army
army into
into war
war began, however. Most of Bugojno’s
began, however. Bugojno's Serbs
Serbs left
left
July, UN spokesman
Bosnia. On 22 July,
Bosnia. spokesman Barry Frewer
Barry Frewer immediately for Serb-controlled
almost immediately
almost Serb-controlled areas, while
reported
reported that UN military observers
observers had observed
observed Bosnian
Bosnian Croat and Muslim
Croat and Muslim refugees
refugees streamed
streamed in in from
from
"heavy movements” of HV soldiers
“heavy movements" soldiers inin Bosnia near J ajce and
Jajce and other
other areas lost
lost to
to the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb Serb Army.
Army.
Ljubuski and Mostar. 141With the
Mostar.‘4‘ the commitment
commitment of Although the the town’s
town's total
total population
population remained
remained
weapons
weapons and special
special units
units to
to the Croat-Muslim con con- roughly the same,
roughly refugee influx
same, the refugee influx had
had probably
probably
flict, the HY
flict, HV essentially
essentially assumed responsibility for the
assumed responsibility increased proportion of Bosnian Muslims
increased the proportion Muslims by by mid
mid-
entire southern
southern Herzegovina
Herzegovina confrontation line with
confrontation line with i 993. Until
1993. Until then,
then, the town
town waswas jointly defended
defended from from
the Serbs, freeing
the Bosnian Serbs, freeing the Bosnian HVO
the Bosnian HYO to con
con- Bosnian Serbs
the Bosnian Serbs byby the HVO’s "Eugen Kvaternik”
HVO's “Eugen Kvaternik"
centrate its full attention conflict with
attention on the conflict with the Mus
Mus- Bosnian Army’s
Brigade and the Bosnian
Brigade 307th “Bugojno”
Army's 307th "Bugojno"
lims.142
lims.‘42 Direct and indirect
indirect assistance
assistance was prove
was to prove Mountain Brigade.
Brigade. Interethnic
Interethnic relations
relations remained
remained rel rel-
crucial
crucial to the survival Bosnian Croats'
survival of the Bosnian Croats’ hard-
hard atively good until
atively good first Croat-Muslim
until the first Croat-Muslim fightingfighting in in
Herceg-Bosna statelet in the latter half of
pressed Herceg-Bosna Gornji Vakuf
Gomji Vakuf in January 1993,
in January after which they
1993, after they
1993.
1993. became
became extremely
extremely tense.
Chapter 45
Chapter In theory,
theory, the HVO’s Eugen Kvatemik
HVO's Eugen Kvaternik Brigade
Brigade had
had aa
The Contest for the
The Road:
the Southern Road: strength of perhaps
strength perhaps 1,000 to 1,200
1,000 to 1,200 troops,
troops, in
in three bat
bat-
Bugojno, Vakuf, and Prozor,
Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, talions, aa military
talions, police company,
military police company, and and aa small
small mixed
mixed
July-December 1993
July-December 1993 artillery battery. The force
artillery battery. force was
was not
not as
as strong as it
strong as
looked, however. A
looked, however. A substantial number of mostly
substantial number mostly
Just as
as the Croatian
Croatian Army was was intervening
intervening toto stiffen
stiffen Muslim soldiers
Muslim soldiers deserted
deserted before
before or during the July
or during July
HVO’s defense,
the HVO's defense, the Bosnian ArmyArmy began
began its sec sec- most of the brigade’s
fighting, and most
fighting, brigade's troops
troops were
were on
on
ond major
major offensive.
offensive. Having reduced-though
reduced—though not
not leave
leave oror deployed outside the town
deployed outside when the ARBiH
town when ARBiH
eliminated-the
eliminated—the HVO
HYO presence in the Lasva
presence in Lasva Valley
Valley attacked. The Croat
attacked. brigade's effective
Croat brigade’s effective fighting
fighting
through its capture of Travnik and Kakanj in
through in June, the strength
strength was probably only 200
was probably 200 toto 400 at the time
400 at time and
and
ARBiH turned its attention
ARBiH attention along the road to the
along the the place Bosnian Army
place of the Bosnian Army attack.
attack.
south. This highway-one Bosnia’s major
highway—one of Bosnia's major arter
arter-
ies—ran from
ies-ran from Serb-held Donji Vakuf
Serb-held Jajce and Donji Vakuf The ARBiH’s
ARBiH's own from Bugojno—the
brigade from
own brigade Bugojno-the 307th
307th
through disputed Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf
through disputed Vakuf to Croat
to Croat- Brigade of the 3rd
Brigade 3rd Corps’
Corps' “Operational
"Operational Group
held Prozor, reached Muslim-held Jablanica,
Prozor, reached Jablanica, and con- con West”—spearheaded the government
West"-spearheaded attack. ‘43
government attack. 143‘44Like
144
Like
tinued Mostar. Control of this
tinued south to Mostar. road, which
this road, most Bosnian Army
most Bosnian brigades, the 307th
Army brigades, 307th had
had many
many
define the
would also define border between
the border between Croat-held
Croat-held troops but
troops relatively few
but relatively few weapons:
weapons: atat the time,
time, the
Herzegovina
Herzegovina and Muslim-controlled central Bosnia,
central Bosnia, '
For a more detailed account, see Annex
• For Annex 43: The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Army
drew the
drew primary attention
the primary attention of the Muslims and Croats Croats Bugojno, July 1993.
Capture of Bugojno,
remainder of their
for the remainder war in
their war in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
198
198
Digitized by Go gle Origil'Kll from

307th Brigade could probably
Brigade could field 3,000
probably field 3,500
3,000 to 3,500 the area late in
the area July before
in July before launching
launching the offensive on
the offensive
troops
troops when mobilized, with
when fully mobilized, with as many as
as many as three to August. When
I August.
1 When the the ARBiH’s
the time came, the ARBiH's local
local
four dozen mortars but no field
dozen mortars field artillery or armor.
artillery or armor. “Gomji Vakuf”
317th "Gornji Vakuf' Mountain Brigade,
Brigade, commanded
commanded
by Fahrudin “Pajo” Agic
Fahrudin "Pajo" Agic (probably
(probably supported
supported by by a
The
The Bosnian forces began their assault on
Bosnian Army forces on battalion of the
battalion the elite 7th Muslimski
Muslimski Brigade) launched
Brigade) launched
Bugojno early
early in the morning on 18
the morning July 1993,
18 July 1993, and attacks on the town from
the town from the northwest, north,
the northwest, north, and
continued in
street battles continued around the
in and around town for the
the town the east. 148The
east.I48 HVO’s defending
The HVO's defending "Dr. Ante Starcevic"
“Dr. Ante Starcevic”
several days as the
next several the numerically superior Muslims
numerically superior Brigade
Brigade waswas inin for a hard fight.
fight.
progressively
progressively forced
forced the
the Croats back. After particu-
Croats back. particu
larly
larly heavy fighting in the
heavy fighting the town
town center on 2 21I July,
July, the
the Battling
Battling throughout
throughout the the night,
night, government
government forces forces had
Bosnian
Bosnian Army took control of most
took control most of the key facili
the key facili- won control over
won control most of the
over most the town
town by by the
the following
ties—including
ties-including the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade’s
the Eugen Brigade's bar bar- day. UNUN peacekeepers and Western Western press correspon-
correspon
racks—the
racks-the following day.145day. 145The
The last large
large pocket
pocket of dents confirmed
confirmed that that the Bosnian Muslims had
the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Bosnian Croat resistance—~the surrounded military
resistance-the surrounded secured control
control over
over "95 percent” of Gornji Vakuf,
“95 percent"
police company-surrendered
police company—surrendered on 25
25 July. 146
July.‘46 The
T he last with a small
with small number
number of disorganized
disorganized Croats maintain
Croats maintain-
fighting in
fighting in the
the area, Croat and Muslim
in which Croat Muslim forces
forces ing toehold in
ing a toehold in the Croat-majority neighborhood
the Croat-majority neighborhood in
several Muslim
contested several Muslim villages the road
villages on the road toto the
the the
the southwest.
southwest. (The (The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats changed the the name
over by
southeast, was over by about 29 July. The intense
intense section of the
of their section Turkish-named Gornji Vakuf to
the Turkish-named to
fighting produced
fighting produced high casualties on both sides. Each
high casualties Each Uskoplje.) The The HVOHVO troops
troops there were were badly
badly shaken
brigade lost
brigade killed, and probably
dozens killed.
lost at least dozens probably about by the
the assault, but did did not collapse entirely. 149'50
collapse entirely.I49 150With
350 Bosnian Croat soldiers
Bosnian Croat soldiers were captured.‘47147
were captured. most of the town in hand, the
the town Bosnian Army proved
the Bosnian proved
unable or unwilling to consolidate
unable consolidate it it fully by wiping
The battle for Bugojno was
The the few
was one of the few in thethe Bos
Bos- out the remaining Croat
the remaining Croat pockets.
pockets. (Apparently,
(Apparently, the the
nian war
nian war in which
which the advantages lay
the advantages lay with the Bosnian
with the Bosnian ARBiH was unable
ARBiH unable to send substantial
substantial reinforcements
reinforcements
Army. The
The 307th Brigade probably had at least three
Brigade probably to
to the
the area this time,
area at this time, and the the 317th
317th Brigade,
Brigade, onlyonly
times as
as many troops as its HVO
many troops HVO opponent
opponent and was slightly augmented, was
slightly forced to slug
was forced slug it out one-on-
one-on
comparably
comparably or better equipped. The HVO’s
equipped. The HVO's Eugen
Eugen with its HVO
one with opponent.) A
HVO opponent.) small Croat
A small Croat enclave
enclave
Brigade had no apparent advantage in
Kvaternik Brigade lead
in lead- remained to the
remained the north
north in in the little area of Trnovaca.
the little Tmovaca.
ership, and its officers
ership, officers were
were consistently described as
consistently described More important,
important, the HVO retained
the HVO retained the Podovi Ridge
inexperienced and disorganized.
inexperienced The Bosnian
disorganized. The Army’s
Bosnian Army's just southwest of the
just southwest the town,
town, fromfrom which they could could
advantages were further magnified
were further magnified by the factor of
the factor direct
direct artillery
artillery and machinegun
machinegun fire into the
fire into the town
town cen-
cen
the HVO
surprise: the
surprise: troops were
HVO troops were caught stunned, under under- ter.151
ter.151 After pulling themselves together, the
themselves together, Bosnian
the Bosnian
manned, and ill-positioned.
manned, ill-positioned. With its forces
forces separated, counterattack from
Croats attempted to counterattack
Croats from these positions
positions
the HVO in Bugojno effectively
the HVO fought three separate
effectively fought August with
on 5 August with mortar
mortar rounds small-arms
rounds and small-arms
battalion-sized battles rather than one brigade-sized
battalion-sized brigade-sized fire.
fire.152 The HVO was
152The was similarly unable unable to dislodge
dislodge its
one. Outnumbered surrounded, the
Outnumbered and surrounded. the battalions
battalions opponents
opponents from from the town, and it failed
the town, failed to advance.
advance.
detail. Although battling
were defeated in detail. battling against an
opponent
opponent that may have been unimpressive,
that may unimpressive, the the HVO reinforcements—including tanks and heavy
HVO reinforcements-including heavy
Bosnian Army was
Bosnian was at least beginning
beginning to to display
display some artillery—were brought
artillery-were brought inin to support
support another attack
professional
professional proficiency.
proficiency. Gomji Vakuf on 15-16
on Gornji 15-16 September,
September, but this attack
was likewise unsuccessful.
was likewise unsuccessful. The The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats
shelled the
shelled the town intensely at intervals—on
town intensely intervals-on 21 October
21 October
The Contest for Gomji Vakuf:
for Gornji Vakuf: 1 August and 1515 November
November in particular-but, although the
particular—but. although the
shelling
shelling caused extensive destruction, , it won
extensive destruction won no
no
While it executed its successful
successful attack on Bugojno, the ground. A
ground. A stalemate had been reached in in Gomji
Gornji
Bosnian Army was
Bosnian was contemplating
contemplating anan assault on with the confrontation
Vakuf, with confrontation line
line running
running through
through the
the
town '54 ‘55
itself.15.1154 155
Gomji Vakuf (some
Gornji (some 20 kmkm to the
the southeast) as the
the town itself.153
offensive campaign,
next step in its offensive forces in
massing forces
campaign, massing
199
199

By
By late September, the frontlines
September, the pretty well been
frontlines had pretty On 30 June,
June, the Bosnian
Bosnian Army achieved sweeping,
achieved a sweeping,
established north of Herzegovina
established north Herzegovina and would remainremain crucial victory,
crucial capturing the Croat-held
victory, capturing Croat-held Tihomir
essentially unchanged for the
essentially unchanged war. At
the rest of the war. At the Misic Barracks on
Misic Barracks the east bank
on the Neretva, one of
bank of the Neretva,
same time the lines around Prozor were
lines around being drawn,
were being drawn, the hydroelectric dams on
the hydroelectric on the river,
river, and the main
main
however, similar battles were deciding
however. deciding Croat-Muslim northern approaches
northern approaches to the city.city. Muslim
Muslim forces
forces also
also
areas of control
control within Herzegovina itself.
within Herzegovina itself. captured the
captured Vrapcici neighborhood
the Yrapcici neighborhood in northeastern
northeastern
Mostar and were were contesting adjacent Bijelo
contesting the adjacent Bijelo Polje
Chapter 46
Chapter 160 The capture of the HVO
district."’°The
district. military base
HVO military
Croat-Muslim War in Herzegovina,
The Croat-Muslim essentially secured
essentially the entire eastern half of the city
secured the city
June-July 1993
June-July 1993 for the government.
government.‘6| 161 Further gains north
Further gains north of the city
the city
on the next day
the next day raised
raised serious
serious HVO concerns
concerns that the
Wizar we are
What are witnessing Mostar right
witnessing in Mosrar now is
right now Bosnian Army would eventually
Bosnian eventually link up to Muslim
only the
only rhe semi-final.
semi-final. We
We are
are still awaiting
awaiting rhe
the forces from Jablanica,
forces from Jablanica, 30 km north. 162 163
km to the north.162163
winner.
winner.
—A senior
-A Bosnian Serb
senior Bosnian Serb Army
Army com-
com Government forces
Government forces mounted
mounted another majormajor drive
drive toto
mander. the HVO-ARBiH
mander, on the HYO-ARBiHduel duel for
for the south
the beginning on
south beginning on 1313 July—possibly aiming to
July-possibly aiming
Mostar
Mostar156
156
cut the Croat-held
Croat-held road from from Capljina to to Stolac—and
Stolac-and
captured towns of Buna
captured the towns Buna and Blagaj
Blagaj about 10 10 km
km
By
By the late summer 1993, Mostar had become
summer of 1993, become the
the
south of the
the city. I64 "‘5
city.'64 165 The offensive
offensive widened
widened on
most divided
most city in
divided city in divided
divided Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnia-Herzegovina. front for con
15 July, and fighting
15 July, fighting raged across a long long front con-
Before the war
Before war the
the greater Mostar metropolitan area’s
metropolitan area's trol of the
trol the city's
city’s northern
northern and southern approaches.
southern approaches.
population of some
population 120,000 citizens
some 120,000 citizens showed
showed a very
very Shooting extended as
Shooting as far
far south
south as Capljina—20 km
as Capljina-20 km
marginal Muslim
marginal Muslim plurality:
plurality: 35 percent Muslims, 34
35 percent
Mostar—as well as
south of Mostar-as as across the city itself,
the city itself.
percent Croats,
Croats, and 19 Serbs. Within urban
19 percent Serbs. urban according
according to to UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR spokesmen.“6
spokesmen. 166
Mostar itself,
itself, there was fraction of Mus
higher fraction
was a higher Mus-
lims—52 percent.
lims-52 percent. When the ethnic ethnic violence
violence cut It was at this the UN
It was stage that the
this stage UN started reporting
reporting signs
signs
through city center, Mostar's
through the city Mostar’s roughly 55,000 Mus
roughly 55,000 Mus- Croatian Army had
that the Croatian brought in
had been brought in to back-
to back
lim townspeople
townspeople found themselves squeezed into
found themselves into the stop thethe faltering 167 At
HVO.I67 time, UNPRO
At the same time,
stop faltering HVO. UNPRO-
smaller and besieged
smaller besieged East East Mostar section, forced off
section, forced FOR confirmed that HVO
FOR confirmed HVO counterattacks
counterattacks against
against
western bank of the
the western the river with only a medieval
river and with medieval Buna
Buna and Blagaj
Blagaj had been supported
supported by Bosnian Serb
by Bosnian Serb
footbridge. famed Stari Most, still
footbridge, the famed still linking the two
the two
artillery.168 The HVO
artillery. 168 The HVO recaptured
recaptured Buna after a fierce
Buna after fierce
halves
ha! ves of the
the city. 157
city.157 counterattack, although
counterattack, Bosnian Army retained
although the Bosnian retained its
hold
hold on on nearby Blagaj. The ARBiH’s
nearby Blagaj. ARBiH's advance south of
advance south
East Mostar was
East was by
by now
now the headquarters
headquarters of the the
blunted. 169 ‘70
Mostar had been blunted.I69 170 '7‘
171
ARBiH’s 4th Corps,
ARBiH's direction of Arif
Corps, under the direction Arif
Pasalic, a
Pasalic. former JNA
a former JNA colonel
colonel charged
charged withwith the
By
By late 1993
1993 the only link left
the only left between
between the Croat
Croat-
defense of what remained of Muslim-held Herzegov
what remained Herzegov- controlled western part of Mostar and the Muslim
controlled western Muslim-
ina. Although Pasalic
ina. could direct
Pasalic could direct units
units as far
far north
north as
as
held eastern section
held section was
was the city’s
city's namesake:
namesake: the
Konjic and as
Konjic as far south as the forces
Blagaj, the
as Blagaj, forces he could
could centuries-old Stari Most.
centuries-old Srari Most. All
All of the modem bridges
modern bridges
actually
actually reach personally were limited
personally were limited to the city’s
to the city's connecting
connecting the city's
city’s two
two halves
halves had been destroyed,
destroyed,
defending hometown
defending unit, the 41
hometown unit, 4lst “Mostar” Brigade
st "Mostar" Brigade largely to
largely to isolate
isolate the tiny, Muslim-held foothold
the tiny, foothold that
and another
another brigade nearby in
brigade nearby Blagaj. 158 All
in Blagaj.‘58 All other
other still clung
still clung tenaciously alongside the
tenaciously alongside the river
river in
in
forces directed by radio
forces had to be directed radio from
from thethe surrounded
surrounded Croat-majority western
Croat-majority western Mostar. Snipers, mortars,
Mostar. Snipers, mortars, and
Muslim corps headquarters!”
Muslim corps headquarters. 159 These limitations not
These limitations not- artillery all
all targeted the bridge the Ottomans had built,
the Ottomans built,
artillery the bridge
withstanding, Pasalic
withstanding, undertook a series of operations
Pasalic undertook operations
Croats in
that would leave the Croats peril of losing
in peril losing their
their
entire strategic position in
strategic position in the
the area.
area.
200
200
Digitized by o gle Origilial from

but those brave
brave and cautious
cautious enough could dash across
enough could across Miljacka River.172
Miljacka River. 171 At thethe end of September,
September, the Bos
the Bos-
from
from one side of the the city
city to the
the other to get water.
to get water. nian Army
nian Anny ordered
ordered the the brigade
brigade to tum turn over its weap-
weap
food, ammunition. Holes had been blasted
food, or ammunition. blasted inin the
the ons,, return to barracks,
ons barracks , and subordinate
subordinate itself to the the
sides,, a ramshackle
sides ramshackle wooden
wooden roof covered
covered most
most of thethe ARBiH lst
ARBiH 1st Corps
Corps. . When
When the the brigade's commander,
brigade’s commander,
bridge automobile tires and sandbags had been
bridge, , and automobile Salko Zelic, refused, President lzetbegovic
refused, President Izetbegovic intervened
intervened
piled along
piled alongside effort to shield
side in a forlorn effort shield the struc
the struc- and rescinded
rescinded the the order. mA
order.173 A month however, the
month later, however, the
ture from
from shelling
shelling. . Underneath all, the
Underneath it all, the single
single stone Anny followed up its crackdown
Bosnian Army
Bosnian crackdown on renegade
still as graceful
arch was still ever, and the
graceful as ever. the battered ARBiH units
ARBiH units in Sarajevo
Sarajevo (Operation "Trebevic-1 ")
(Operation “Trebevic-l”)
walkway remained
remained both a physical
physical and a symbolic
symbolic with a less extensive
with extensive operation
operation to to bring
bring the King
the King
link holding
link together the
holding together the war-shattered
war-shattered halves
halves of thethe Tvrtko Brigade under its authority
Brigade under authority (Operation
(Operation
city and its population.
city population. "Trebevic-2").
“Trebevic-Z”). The The HVOHYO military leaders in Sarajevo
military leaders Sarajevo
were rounded
were detained, and their brigade
rounded up and detained, brigade was
was
It
It was not to to last. four and a quarter centuries
last. As four centuries had disbanded
disbanded and reconstituted
reconstituted underunder a new commander,
new commander,
come and gone, the Start Most had borne
the Stari borne the
the feet of Nedeljko Veraja.
Yeraja. On November, the
On 6 November, the Bosnian Anny
Bosnian Army
Ottomans and Austrians,
Ottomans Austrians. Serbs and Croats Albanians,
Croats, , Albanians. command
command announced
announced that the King Tvrtko Brigade
the King Brigade
Montenegrins , Jews, Bogomils
Montenegrins, Bogomils,, and Muslims.
Muslims . The
The would retain
retain its name but would henceforthhenceforth serve
bridge
bridge had seen empires rise
seen empires fall, and it had sur
rise and fall. sur- under the ARBiH lst
the ARBiH I st Corps.
Corps. The “Croatian King
The "Croatian King
vived earthquakes,
vived floods, and two
earthquakes, floods, wars. In
two world wars. In the
the Tvrtko Brigade”
Brigade" remained
remained a Bosnian
Bosnian Anny unit for
Army unit
end, Mostar’s own citizenry
Mostar 's own citizenry destroyed
destroyed what invaders
what invaders the remainder of the
the remainder the war with less
174 but with
warI74 less than half its
the forces
and the forces of nature had spared. The The Bosnian
Bosnian original personnel.
personnel. 175'75
Croat leaders in
Croat leaders in West
West Mostar,
Mostar. self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed capital
capital
of the
the self-proclaimed
self-proclaimed statestate of Herceg-Bosna wanted
Herceg-Bosna, , wanted In the Bihac area, the
the Bihac tiny Bosnian
the tiny Croat community
Bosnian Croat community
to ensure that their portion
portion of Herzegovina
Herzegovina was set set officially had its own
officially “Bihac Regional
own separate "Bihac Com
Regional Com-
completely
completely apart from from that
that of Mostar’s Muslims—and
Mostar's Muslims-and mand"
mand” consisting
consisting of the IOIst HVO
the 101st HYO Brigade.
Brigade . In prac
prac-
also to destroy many viewed
what many
destroy what viewed as a visible
visible tice,
tice, this semiautonomous,s, battalion
consisted of a semiautonomou
this consisted battalion-
reminder
reminder of the the city's Ottoman past.
city’s Ottoman On the
past. On the morning
morning sized unit
sized unit functioning the ARBiH
functioning as part of the ARBiH 5th Corps.
Corps.
November 1993,
of 9 November 1993, HVO
HYO T-55T-55 tanks
tanks blasted
blasted thethe With a fewfew hundred
hundred Bosnian Croats dependent on the
Bosnian Croats the
ancient stone bridge
ancient bridge with
with high-explosive shells, and
high-explosive shells, Bosnian
Bosnian 5th Corps the entire Bihac enclave
Corps and the look
enclave look-
the Stari Most crumbled
the crumbled intointo the Neretva river.
the Neretva river. ing
ing to Croatia for its survival,
to Croatia mutual self-interest—if
survival, mutual self-interest-if
nothing else—kept Croat-Muslim relations
nothing else-kept relations in
in the
the
Chapter 47
Chapter47 Bihac
Bihac area reasonably
reasonably good
good throughout
throughout thethe war.
war.
The That Wasn't:
Conflict That
The Conflict Wasn’t: The Croat-Muslim
Croat-Muslim
Alliance Holds
Alliance Parts of Bosnia
Holds in Parts Bosnia Three HVO
Three brigades in
HYO brigades the southern
in the southern Posavina corri
Posavina corri-
107th “Gradacac,”
dor (the 107th "Gradacac," 108th “Brcko” and 115th
108th "Brcko" 115th
A notable feature
A notable feature of the conflict in Bos
the Croat-Muslim conflict Bos- “Zrinski” Brigades)
"Zrinski" functioned for all
Brigades) functioned all practical pur-
practical pur
nia is that it was widespread universal. While
widespread but not universal. poses as Bosnian Army
as Bosnian Anny units throughout 1992
units throughout 1992 and
most
most of Bosnia was seared with emotional and actual
with emotional 1993. They
1993. They were nominally assigned
were nominally assigned to the the HVO’s
HYO's 4th
flames,
flames, there were
were some
some areas in which Croat-Muslim
areas in (Orasje) Operational Zone
(Orasje) Operational Zone but had no physical and lit
no physical lit-
relations taut but never broke
relations stretched taut broke into violence, ,
into violence administrative connection
tle administrative connection to the rest of Croat-held
to the Croat-held
few where
and even a few where Croat-Muslim relations
relations Bosnia. All three brigades
Bosnia . All brigades were
were raised from the
raised from the multi
multi-
remained
remained good
good and the two factions
the two continued to fight
factions continued fight ethnic, cosmopolitan
ethnic, cosmopolitan Tuzla metropolitan
metropolitan area-area—
side by
by side against the Serbs.
the Serbs. as distinct from
as distinct from the hardline Croat
the hardline Croat strongholds
strongholds of
Herzegovina and central
Herzegovina Bosnia—and generally
central Bosnia-and generally
In Sarajevo, the HVO’s
Sarajevo, the HYO's “King Tvtrko”" Brigade
"King Tvtrko chron
Brigade chron- maintained good relations
maintained good relations with
with the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Anny
‘77
icled a long
icled long and rocky relationship with
rocky relationship with the Bosnian
the Bosnian throughout the
throughout the Croat-Muslim conflict. Like the
conflict.176176 177 Like the
Army.
Anny. The HVO contributed
The HYO contributed about 1,500 troops to the
1.500 troops the three HVO brigades in
HYO brigades in the
the nearby southern
nearby southern
defense of Sarajevo, manning a 2-kilometer
Sarajevo, manning 2-kilometer strip
strip of
the confrontation
the line along
confrontation line the north
along the bank of the
north bank the
201
201

Posavina—but unlike
Posavina-but the 111th
unlike the HVO brigade
I I I th HYO brigade in
in The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Army Strikes: 14 September 1993*
Strikes: 14 1993*
Zepce
Zepce just south—the I110th
just to the south-the “Usora” HVO
10th "Usora" HYO Bri
Bri-
gade in the Tesanj
Tesanj area remained
remained loyal
loyal to
to the
the Bosnian
Bosnian After the Bosnian Army’s
the Bosnian capture of most
Army's capture most of Gomji
Gomji
Government
Government and effectively functioned as
effectively functioned as part of the
the Vakuf in August 1993,
in August the ARBiH
1993, the ARBiH again
again took
took aa break
break
ARBiH 2nd Corps’ Operational Group “7-South,”
Corps' Operational "7-South," to consolidate
to consolidate its gains
gains and plan
plan its next
next effort.
effort. The
which later became the
the 37th Division.I78
Division. 178 obvious objective
next obvious objective waswas Prozor—not
Prozor-not just for the
town itself,
town itself, but in
in order
order to gain control of the
gain control the road
road
Chapter
Chapter 48 linking newly captured Gomji Vakuf
newly captured Vakuf toto Muslim
Muslim-
Seesaw
Seesaw and Stasis: Jablanica. After most
majority Jablanica.
majority most of the Muslim
Muslim popula
popula-
War, August-December
Croat-Muslim War,
The Croat-Muslim August-December 1993
1993 fled Prozor itself,
tion fled
tion itself, local
local Croat and Muslim
Croat and Muslim forces
forces
had spent the May-July
May-July months
months battling
battling over
over villages
villages
As the
the Bosnian Army’s second
Bosnian Army's second offensive
offensive began to few kilometers
a few west of the town,
kilometers west town, destroying
destroying aa numnum-
wind down around Bugojno and Gomji
down around Gomji Vakuf,
Vakuf, the
the ber of these villages
villages inin the
the process.182183I84
process. 182 18-1184
Croat-Muslim war war settled into
into a largely
largely static
confrontation
confrontation in which little ground changed
little ground hands.
changed hands. Beginning in August,
Beginning emphasis of fighting
August, the emphasis fighting shifted
shifted
Sometimes intense battles would be fought
Sometimes fought for small
small the north,
to the where Muslim
north, where Muslim and Croat
Croat forces vied for
forces vied
towns
towns or key facilities around
key facilities various enclaves,
around the various enclaves. control of the
control the commanding heights of Crni
commanding heights Vrh. A
Cmi Vrh.
but, as summer
summer stretched into autumn, there would
into autumn. would bebe rocky over 1,300
rocky mass over 1,300 meters high
high at points, Crni
at points, Cmi Vrh
Vrh
few
few noteworthy victories.
noteworthy victories. was just
was north of the equally
just north high Makljen
equally high Makljen Ridge,
Ridge,
which in in turn
tum looked
looked straight
straight down over Prozor town
down over town
In the Kiseljak area, HVO held
area, the HYO held three sizable
sizable just
just 2 kilometers south. Both
kilometers south. Both sides
sides occupied
occupied portions
portions
towns:
towns: Kiseljak itself and the smaller towns of Fojnica
smaller towns of the Cmi Vrh
the Crni Vrh heights,
heights, but neither had firm
neither had firm control,
control,
and Kresevo
Kresevo to the west south. After unsuccess
west and south. unsuccess- August and September
so August September were punctuated with bat
were punctuated bat-
fully pressing
pressing the southern
southern edge of the Kiseljak along the hills and
tles along and ridges.
ridges.
enclave during the latter half of June, the Bosnian
enclave during Bosnian
Army shifted emphasis to the west, attacking
shifted its emphasis attacking On 14
14 September 1993, the Bosnian Government
September 1993, Government
Fojnica—a quiet lumber
Fojnica-a town of some 15,000
lumber town 15,000 resi
resi- took up the offensive,
again took
again offensive, mounting
mounting Operation
Operation
mountains west of Kiseljak-at
dents in the mountains Kiseljak—at the “Neretva 93," one of the
"Neretva 93,” the largest
largest military campaigns of
military campaigns
beginning of July.
beginning Bosnian Army heavy
179 Bosnian
July.179 heavy weapons
weapons year. 185 In
the year.185
the In its
its most
most complex effort to date, the
complex effort
units, apparently
units. apparently brought
brought up fromfrom the
the south after the ARBiH
ARBiH launched
launched coordinated
coordinated attacks against the
attacks against
failed Kresevo, supported
failed attacks on Kresevo. supported thethe infantry with
infantry with Croat-held enclaves of the Lasva
Croat-held enclaves Lasva Valley, as well as
Valley, as as the
a rare barrage of artillery fire for two
mortar fire
artillery and mortar two days.
days. entire confrontation
entire confrontation line running south
line running from Gomji
south from Gomji
through the streets of Fojnica, the
In a series of battles through around Prozor to Jablanica,
Vakuf around through Vrdi
Jablanica, through Vrdi and
and
Bosnian Army took
Bosnian took control
control of thethe town
town on July.
on 33 July, Mostar and asas far
far south as Buna.
south as Buna. Even by the later
Even by later
removing
removing one pointpoint of the
the Fojnica-Kiseljak-Kresevo standards of the
standards war, the ARBiH’s
the war, ARBiH's September
September 1993
1993
triangle
triangle that had previously defined the Croat-held
previously defined Croat-held effort
effort was
was aa sizable
sizable operation.
operation.
enclave.
enclave.180
180
Government attacks on
Government attacks on several
several towns around Vitez
towns around
Around Vitez,Vitez, the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Army forces forces had pressed were centerpiece of the broader
were a centerpiece broader offensive.
offensive. Bosnian
Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
the Bosnian into an
Croats into irregular area extending
an irregular extending Army forces attacked the Vitez
forces attacked Vitez area simultaneously
simultaneously
just east of Novi
from just
from Novi Travnik to just west of Buso
just west Buso- from north and south,
from the north enclave near
pinching the enclave
south, pinching near its
its
vaca, allall along
along the main highway
the main highway adjacent the Lasva
adjacent to the Lasva narrowest point east of Vitez.
narrowest point Vitez. Bosnian Army troops
troops
river. But at the
river. the same time thethe Muslims were were sur
sur- broke through HVO
broke through HYO lines at one point
lines at point and
and reached
reached up
up
rounding enclave, the
rounding the Vitez enclave, Croats were
the Croats were laying
laying '
For more details,
• For see Annex
details. see Annex 44: Northern
Northern Herzegovina:
Herzegovina: Konjic,
Konjic.
siege to the neighborhood
neighborhood of Stari
Stari Vitez within the
Vitez the Jablanica,
Jablanica, and Vrdi
Vrdi in
in 1993.
city itself, where
city itself, 1,300 Muslims defended
where about 1,300 defended a tiny
tiny
enclave of perhaps a kilometer
enclave kilometer on on each side.“l
side. 181
202

to the edge of Vitez itself but were
to the were ultimately
ultimately forced
forced unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully on the morning of 19
the morning 19 September,
September, while
back
back with
with no net gains. The
net gains. Bosnian Army
The Bosnian Army also also trying
also nearby Medvjed hill
trying to seize nearby hill and Mt.
Mt. Cab-
Cab
attacked from
from the
the southwest
southwest in the
the direction
direction of the
the ulja
ulja to
to the
the west. 19·1 Shortly
west.‘93 Shortly after the
the failed attack,, UN
failed attack
Croat-held explosives
Croat-held factory, whereupon
explosives factory, the Croats
whereupon the Croats observers
observers reported
reported seeing government
government reinforcements
reinforcements
to blow up the
threatened to factory rather than let the
the factory the being brought in from
being brought from the north. 194 A
the north.”4 second Bosnian
A second Bosnian
Muslims capture it. The "doomsday
it. The “doomsday bomb”
bomb" threat Army attempt on 4 October
October was was more
more successful:
successful: the
apparently had the
apparently the desired effect, for the
desired effect, the Muslims ARBiH entered the
ARBiH town the
the town the following day, although
although
‘87
never took
took the factory. 186 187
the factory.I86 Vrdi
Vrdi was
was to remain
remain on the line for the
confrontation line
the confrontation the
remainder
remainder of the war. 195 ‘96
the war.'95 196
At the time Vitez was

the same time was being
being pressed in in central
central
Bosnia, fighting
Bosnia, fighting was
was raging
raging at points
points all all along
along a nearly
nearly The
The situation between Vrdi
situation between Vrdi and Mostar was was violently
200-km-long front
200-km-long front that tore diagonally
diagonally from from Gomji
Gornji but chaotically contested. . For a time there simply
chaotically contested simply was was
Vakuf all
all the way to south of Mostar.
the way Mostar. Just outside
outside fixed frontline,
no fixed frontline, as unitsunits from both both sides roamed
roamed up up
Gomji Vakuf,
Gornji ARBiH and HVO forces
Vakuf, ARBiH forces battled for down the
and down the hills and battles erupted wherever wherever thethe
control strategic Karaulica Hill
control of strategic . 188
Hill.188 two armies
two armies met.met.197197 Still further
further to the south,, the
the south the Bos
Bos-
nian
nian Army tried again to break
tried break the
the siege of easteast
Mostar beginning
beginning on 17 September. ARBiH
17 September. ARBiH and HVO
The Uzdol
Uzdol Massacre grappled in Mostar city
troops grappled
troops city and its Bijelo
Bijelo Polje and
Rastani suburbs,
Rastani ARBiH forces
198 199 while ARBiH
suburbs,198199 forces attacking
attacking
After months
months of bloody
bloody but inconclusive
inconclusive fighting,
fighting, the
the outward from
outward from the city in
the city directions made some
in three directions
Bosnian mounted a sizable
Bosnian Army mounted sizable offensive east of
offensive east limited gains.
limited The HVO
200 The
gains.200 HVO responded
responded by by blocking aid
Prozor on 14 September. It
14 September. It was during this
was during effort that
this effort convoys
convoys into into east Mostar and leveling
leveling an intense artil artil-
“Uzdol massacre"
the "Uzdol massacre” occurred
occurred in in the
the Croat-held vil
Croat-held vil- lery barrage against the
lery the city
city on 2323 September,
September, fol- fol
lage of Uzdol,
lage Uzdol , 7 kilometers
kilometers east east of Prozor.
Prozor. The out-
The out lowed by an
lowed ineffective infantry
an ineffective infantry counterattack
counterattack the the next
rage appears to have evolved from a successful
have evolved successful day. 201 202
day.2°' 202 Artillery
Artillery duels furtherfurther smashed the the already
already
military operation in which a company-sized
operation, , in company-sized unit unit of city, but neither
battered city. neither sideside was
was able to make signif
make signif-
70 to 100 ARBiH
to 100 ARBiH military police infiltrated
military police Croat
infiltrated past Croat icant
icant headway
headway on the the ground. (However, government
ground. (However, government
defense lines
lines and wiped
wiped out anan HVO command
command post in in "recon-diversionary"
“recon-diversionary” forces
forces appear to have caused
the
the village. The Bosnian
village. The Bosnian troops went on a killing
troops then went considerable confusion
considerable confusion south of the the city,
city, operating
operating
spree, murdering
murdering the the civilians of Uzdol
Uzdol and adjacent behind HVO
behind HVO lines
lines and conducting
conducting ambushes
ambushes and sab- sab
Kriz with
with firearms, knives, and axes and burning
firearms , knives, burning otage operations.
operations.2°3) 203 ) After several
several days of negotia-
negotia
down some
down some of the houses. UNPROFOR
the houses. UNPROFOR observers
observers and tions, fighting
tions, fighting woundwound down down and yet another Mostar
Western
Western reporters corroborated Croat
reporters corroborated Croat claims
claims that the cease-fire took
cease-fire effect on 3 October
took effect October.204.204
Muslims had killed 34 civilians during during a three-hour
three-hour
rampage_ 190
rampage_189 189 190 When
When the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian offensive petered out with
Army offensive with
the Vrdi, ARBiH
into Vrdi,
the last push into commanders could
ARBiH commanders could
Between Prozor and Jablanica,
Between the ARBiH
Jablanica, the ARBiH 44th still be justly satisfied
still satisfied with
with a moderately successful
moderately successful
“Neretva” Brigade
"Neretva" Brigade pushed the confrontation line
the confrontation line execution of a very
execution very ambitious
ambitious plan. The strategic con-
plan. The con
slightly
slightly to the west and, after several
the west several days of fighting,
fighting, cept had been veryvery sound: the ARBiH’s
sound: utilize the ARBiH's manman-
advanced south from
had advanced J ablanica and Dresnica
from Jablanica Dresnica power advantage to mount
power mount simultaneous
simultaneous attacks, in
toward Mostar, capturing
toward Mostar, capturing a band of territory
territory along
along a the
the hopes of overtaxing the HVO
overtaxing the HVO and gaining
gaining control
control
‘92
20-km
20-km segment of the highway)”
the highway. 191 192 over the
over the entire road Gomji Vakuf
between Gornji
road segment between
Mostar. In the
and Mostar. the Army was
the event, the was not
not yet up to
A focus
A focus of the government attack was
the government Vrdi, a small
was Vrdi, small such a task, and the HVO—backstopped by key
the HYO-backstopped key
town
town on the Neretva River halfway
the Neretva halfway between Jablanica
between Jablanica Croatian Army reinforcements—was
Croatian reinforcements-was able to retainretain
the south. After an
and Mostar to the an artillery
artillery
bombardment,
bombardment, Bosnian
Bosnian infantry
infantry attacked the town
the town
203
203

control
control over
over the area around
around Prozor. ARBiH did
Prozor. The ARBiH did itself. 208 The Bosnian
Vares itself.208
Vares Bosnian Croats,
Croats, with
with more
more people
people
secure a large
large swath
swath of ground between Jablanica and
ground between than housing,
housing, responded
responded by by forcing the Muslim
Muslim
Vrdi, however,
Vrdi, however, and managed
managed to take tenuous
tenuous control
control residents out of three villages
residents out outside Kakanj
villages outside Kakanj on
on
over the highway
highway from
from Grabovica
Grabovica through
through Potoci and
Potoci and 23 June.209
23 June. 209 The Croats
Croats also
also demanded
demanded that the
Vrapcici into
into northeast Mostar.
Mostar. Muslims in nearby villages—including
several nearby
in several villages-including Stupni
Stupni
Do—tum over
Do-tum over their arms to the HVO,
their arms HYO, although
although this
this
ultimatum appears to
ultimatum appears to have
have been ignored.”0
ignored. 210
D0 Massacre:
Stupni Do
The Vares Enclave and the Stupni Massacre:
October-November 1993*
October-November 1993’ residents of Vares
While the residents Vares were
were coping
coping with
with aa refu
refu-
gee influx
gee influx that
that substantially
substantially altered
altered their
their ethnic
ethnic bal
bal-
The
The Nordic battalion
battalion found
found that all 52 houses
houses in in ance, the Muslim
Muslim and the Croat Croat military
military commanders
commanders
the village
village had been burned
burned to ground. At
to the ground. were trying to
were trying sort out
to sort out overall
overall military
military control
control inin the
last report, UNPROF OR soldiers
report, UNPROFOR soldiers had searched
searched region.
region. The Bosnian
Bosnian Croats exerted military authority
Croats exerted authority
half
half the houses andfound
and found the bodies
bodies of
of 15 per
15 per- over
over the Vares area itself,
the Vares with the locally raised
itself, with raised
sons who
who had either
either been shot or burned
burned to to "Bobovac" Brigade
“Bobovac” Brigade occupying
occupying the towntown and
and guarding
guarding
death. against Bosnian
against Bosnian Serb Serb forces east. The Bosnian
forces to the east. Bosnian
-—UNPROFOR public
-UNPROFOR public statement,
statement, Army’s 2nd
Army's Corps, however,
2nd (Tuzla) Corps, however, began
began pressuring
pressuring
27
27 October
October 1993
1993 the Vares Croats to resubordinate
Vares Croats resubordinate themselves
themselves fromfrom the
HVO's Central Bosnia Operational
HVO’s Central Operational Zone
Zone to the
It seems there was
was a massacre
massacre committed
committed in in ARBiH 2nd
ARBiH 2nd Corps
Corps (as, instance, the HVO’s
(as, for instance, HVO's 108th
108th
Stupni Do, but not
Stupni Do, not of
of the size it was
was reported
reported and 1 110th Brigades had already
10th Brigades done further
already done north). In
further north). In
earlier.
earlier. effect, the Bosnian Muslims
effect, the Muslims werewere asking
asking the
the local
local
—HVO spokesman
-HYO spokesman Veso Veso Vegar, 27
Vegar, 27 HVO’s,
HVO's, regardless
regardless of their
their ethnic
ethnic composition,
composition, to
October 1993, after repeated
October 1993, Bosnian
repeated Bosnian
acknowledge Sarajevo's political and
and military author
author-
acknowledge Sarajevo’s
Croat denials that
Croat denials that there
there had
had been
been aa
ity over
ity over the region.
region. The
The Vares
Vares Croats
Croats tried
tried hard
hard to
to
massacre in
massacre in the
the village
village205205
balance their
balance relations with
their relations Bosnian Muslims
with the Bosnian Muslims who who
Vares is a small
Vares small mining
mining town
town that at the outset
outset of the
the
surrounded them
surrounded them with demands of the Bosnian
with the demands
war
war registered
registered a slight
slight Croat
Croat majority
majority among
among its popu-
popu
Croat ministate of which they
Croat ministate they were
were also
also part,
part, but
but the
lation 12,000 residents.
lation of about 12,000 residents. ItIt lies
lies roughly
odds
odds were against them,
were against them, and their
their efforts
efforts proved
proved
roughly 50 km
northwest futile?“
futile. 211
northwest of Sarajevo
Sarajevo at thethe end of a primary
primary road
road
running
running north
north from
from the
the capital
capital through Breza, and
through Breza,
Tuzla?“ At
At this
this delicate
delicate juncture in mid-October
juncture in mid-October 1993,
1993, the
the sit
sit-
connected
connected thereafter
thereafter by secondary
secondary roads to Tuzla. 206
uation
uation in the Vares
in the Vares enclave
enclave changed dramatically with
changed dramatically with
Vares area had been more
The Vares more oror less free of intereth
intereth-
nic tensions summer of 1993,1993, despite
arrival of Ivica RajicZ‘Z—commander
the arrival Rajic 212-commander of the HVO
HYO
nic tensions even through
through the summer despite
violence that
the Croat-Muslim violence that had ripped
ripped through
through
Central Bosnian
Central Bosnian Operational
Operational Zone’s
Zone's Second
Second Opera
Opera-
central Bosnia only 20 or 30 km
central km away. leaders of
away. The leaders
tional Group, hailing
tional hailing from
from the hardline
hardline Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat
Muslim communities
Croat and Muslim
the Croat communities preserved much of
preserved much
Kiseljak
Kiseljak enclave south. 213 In what
enclave to the south?‘3 what could
could best be
be
their prewar moderation and their
prewar moderation their people
people continued
continued to described as a local
described as coup, Rajic
local coup, group of armed
Rajic and aa group armed
collapsed around
coexist while the rest of Bosnia collapsed
coexist around Croat extremists took
Croat extremists control of the Vares
took political control Vares
them.
them.207
207 enclave on 23 October,
enclave on October, ousting and jailing the mayor
ousting and mayor
police chief and replacing
and police replacing them
them with
with supporters
supporters
first began to surface
Problems first
Problems surface in
in Vares
Vares after
after the Bos
the Bos-
from
from outside. Rajic put Kresimir Bozic,
outside. Rajic one of his
Bozic, one his
Army’s mid-June counteroffensive
nian Army's forced the
counteroffensive forced
allies from Kiseljak,
allies from Kiseljak, in charge of the HVO’s
in charge HVO's local
local
Bosnian Croat
Bosnian population out of the
Croat population the Kakanj area about
about
Bobovac
Bobovac Brigade. Spared until
Brigade. Spared until now
now the fate of
the fate
20 km to the west. Some
the west. 12,000 to 15,000
Some 12,000 Croat
15,000 Croat minorities elsewhere,
minorities the Vares
elsewhere, the Vares enclave’s
enclave's substantial
substantial
into Vares
Vares from
from Kakanj and its
Muslim
Muslim population was harassed,
population was harassed, robbed,
robbed, and
and system
system-
refugees
refugees streamed into its sur
sur-
dispossessed. Within
atically dispossessed.
atically Within days most of the
days most
rounding
rounding villages, roughly doubling
villages, roughly population of
doubling the population
'
Annex 45:
· See Annex 45'. The Vares Enclave
Enclave and the
the Stupni
Stupni Do
Do Massacre:
Massacre:
October-November I1993,
October-November 993, for a more detailed account.
204
204

enclave's
enclave’s Muslims had fled fled to the
the village
village of Dabrav-
Dabrav When
When UN peacekeepers
peacekeepers approached
approached StupniStupni Do to
ina well to the south.214 2‘5
the south.wrn investigate
investigate thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Government's
Govemment’s claims claims of Croat
Croat
atrocities
atrocities there, the
the Croat
Croat commanders
commanders barred barred them
them
At roughly
roughly the
the same time that lvica Rajic arrived
that Ivica arrived to
to from
from entering the village.
entering the village . Swedish
Swedish peacekeepers
peacekeepers
impose
impose his hardline
hardline Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat government
government on finally gained
finally gained access to the the destroyed
destroyed village late on on
Vares, the
Vares, the Bosnian
Bosnian Army was massingmassing its forces
forces to
to 26 October,
October, three days after the attack. While itit was
the attack. was
attack the
the enclave. precipitated which—
enclave. Which event precipitated which- clear that
that the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats had used the the intervening
intervening
indeed, if
or, indeed, if the
the two are linked—remains
are even linked-remains time to
to clean up thethe town
town and remove
remove or or destroy
destroy evi
evi-
uncertain.
uncertain. Whether Rajic’s arrival
Whether or not Rajic's arrival spurred
spurred the
the dence, enough remained to verify
enough remained verify the essentials of the
the essentials the
action, by late October,
ARBiH into action, October, thethe Bosnian
Bosnian attack, if not its details magnitude. An
details and magnitude. An investiga
investiga-
Government
Government had transferred
transferred all or part of at least three tion conducted by UNPROFOR
tion conducted UNPROFORmilitary military police
police found
found
brigades
brigades into the the area and was poised
poised to attack. that an absolute minimum of 23
absolute minimum 23 residents
residents were
were con-
con
firmed
firmed killed, withwith another 13 unaccounted for,
13 unaccounted for, but the
the
Although the Bosnian Croats
the Bosnian Croats may have instigated
instigated the the figure is
actual figure is probably higher. 220ItIt was
probably higher.220 clear that
was clear
violence that shattered the
violence the peace of VaresVares when
when they dozens had been killed, but most
dozens most of the
the bodies
bodies were
were
drove the Muslims from
the Muslims homes, it was the
from their homes, Bos
the Bos- found, and an exact count
never found, count of thethe dead may
may never
never
nian Army that that began military
military operations
operations in the
the area. possible . All
be possible. All 52 houses in in the village had been
the village
'7')",
The
The earliest ARBiH attack appears to have struck struck thethe burnt to the ground?“
the ground. 221~-
222
town
town of Ratanj
Ratanj, , halfway
halfway between Kakanj and Vares, Vares,
on 1919 October
October. . Government
Government forcesforces went
went on capture The UNPROFOR Chief of Staff,
The Staff, Brig. Angus Ram Ram-
the Croat-majority village
the Croat-majority Kopjari—IO km
village of Kopjari-10 km south-
south say, took
say. took thethe unusual
unusual stepstep of publicly assigning
assigning blameblame
Vares—on 21
west of Vares-on October, killing three HVO
21 October, HYO sol-sol for the
the massacre to unit and individual,
particular unit
to a particular individual,
diers and forcing town’s population
forcing the town's population to flee. flee. This stating on 27 October
October that 'This“This was
was done
done by by the
the
apparently infuriated
latter attack apparently infuriated Rajic and evidently
evidently Bobovac Brigade,
Bobovac Brigade, whose commander is
whose commander is Kresimir
incited him
incited him toto look for a Muslim village village toto hit in Bozic ... . .. But
But his soldiers
soldiers are notnot soldiers,
soldiers, theythey are
response. Possibly Rajic and the Vares Croats
the Vares Croats had scum, if
scum, if they do this thing ." 223ItIt is
this sort of thing.”223 is not
not that
that cer
cer-
concluded that
already concluded that the Croat enclave
the Croat enclave was indefen-
indefen tain, however,
tain. however. that the Vares-based
that the Vares-based Bobovac
Bobovac Brigade
Brigade
sible and were planning
planning to evacuate their people people to was in
was in fact thethe main
main unit responsible or,
unit responsible indeed, if
or, indeed, if itit
Serb-held territory
Serb-held territory to the
the east. If so,
east. If HVO may
the HYO
so, the participated in
even participated in the massacre. 22~ There
the massacre.224 There is is circum
circum-
concluded that it had to
have concluded to clear the
the tiny town of
tiny town stantial but persuasive
stantial evidence that
persuasive evidence the attack was
that the was at at
Stupni
Stupni Do to secure the the escape since it lay along
escape,, since along the
the least spearheaded and perhaps perhaps executed
executed entirely by
entirely by
road to the whatever reason, Rajic visited
the south. For whatever visited the “Maturice,”," an entirely
the "Maturice entirely different
different unit brought in
unit brought in byby
his anger on the 260-odd Muslim villagers
the 260-odd villagers clinging to to lvica Rajic from
Ivica from outside
outside the Vares pocket
the Vares pocket shortly
shortly
mountain about 4 km
one side of a mountain km south of Vares Vares before the
before the attack. 225226227
attack.225 226227
itselr.216211
itself.216217
Starting in
Starting in the week of October,
the last week October, anarchy
anarchy bred
bred pan
pan-
HVO infantry
HYO infantry attacked Stupni
Stupni Do early in thethe morning
morning demonium in
demonium Vares—now cleansed
in Vares-now cleansed of all
all Muslims
of 23 October, probably
23 October, probably supported with mortars
supported with mortars and except for 110
110 terrified clustered for safety
terrified civilians clustered safety
some artillery.mUnlike Ahmici, Stupni
artillery.218 Unlike Ahmici, Stupni Do had some around the
around Swedish UN
the Swedish contingent’s vehicles
UN contingent's vehicles while
while
defenders: 39 Bosnian
defenders: Bosnian Army soldiers
soldiers quartered in the the former Croat
former Croat neighbors
neighbors looted abandoned Muslim
the abandoned
looted the Muslim
town with
town with their small
small arms. Their resistance was virtuvirtu homes and businesses.
homes Suddenly word
businesses. Suddenly word came thatthat the
the
nil; in all likelihood the
ally nil;
ally few armed Muslim resi-
the few resi Bosnian Army was on
Bosnian way. In
on its way. the dark
In the early hours
dark early hours
Stupni Do were asleep
dents of Stupni asleep,, scattered, and taken of 3 November,
November, the the town’s remaining Croat
town ·s remaining Croat residents
residents
before they could
surprise before
by surprise organize. . In a
could organize a few
few hours
hours gathered their ownown possessions
possessions and their
their loot
loot and fled
fled
the attacking HYO
the attacking HVO soldiers
soldiers had completely
completely destroyed
destroyed the
the town. 228 22"
town.228 Then, at dawn
229 Then, dawn, , coming
coming from
from two
two direc
direc-
the town, leveling
the town, leveling every single
single building with direct
building with direct tions, ARBiH units
tions, ARBiH units entered Vares without firing
Vares without firing aa shot
shot
fire or dynamite
fire resident unable
dynamite and killing every resident unable to
flee in time.
flee time.219219
205

to find
find it an eerily silent ghost town.
an eerily The 3rd Corps’
town. The Corps' counterattack of late 1993. 1993. HVO
HVO forces
forces from
from the
7th Muslimski Brigade
Brigade occupied Vares from
occupied Vares from the
the west, enclave punched outward in the Citonje-Bakovici
punched outward Citonje-Bakovici area
23'
Corps forces
while 2nd Corps forces entered from
from the north?30
north. 230231 kilometers due west of Kiseljak. The HVO
several kilometers
(Elements of the ARBiH
(Elements Corps were
ARBiH 6th Corps were apparently
apparently drive—visibly backed
drive-visibly backed by Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb armor
armor and
involved.)232 12 For several days thereafter, drunk
also involved.)2 drunk artillery support—pushed Bosnian
artillery support-pushed Bosnian Government forces
Government forces
and disorderly soldiers roamed the
disorderly Muslim soldiers the streets of back about 5 km on 12 12 and 13
13 November?34235HVO
November. 234235 HVO
Vares, carrying
Vares, carrying off whatever
whatever the Bosnian Croats had
Bosnian Croats troops reached rightright up to the edge of Fojnica,
Fojnica, but
left behind. Eventually, order was restored, and Vares'
behind. Eventually, Vares’ failed
failed to Government forces
it.236 Government
occupy it.236
to occupy forces appeared
ejected Muslims returned to to their violated
violated homes?33
homes. 23 ~ ready toto yield Fojnica-which would have returned
yield Fojnica—which
the Croat-held enclave to its original
Croat-held enclave original borders—but
borders-but
Most of the Bosnian Croats
the thousands of Bosnian Croats who
who had managed to to reoccupy
reoccupy their commanding positions in
commanding positions in
once coexisted
coexisted in Vares fled for Kiseljak, leaving
Vares fled leaving a the town when
the town the HVO
when the HVO offensive stalled. m 238
offensive stalled.237 238
minuscule Croat-controlled
minuscule island—barely 2 square
Croat-controlled island-barely
km—around the
km-around little town
the little Dastansko 4 km
town of Dastansko south
km south- On 15 15 November
November the HVO expanded its
the HVO its offensive,
offensive,
Vares. Within a few
east of Vares. weeks, Vares
few weeks, itself had
Vares itself assaulting positions in
government positions
assaulting government Gornji Vakuf with
in Gomji with
gone from
from a thriving,
thriving, ethnically mixed town
ethnically mixed town to anan artillery and rocket
artillery rocket fire from the Makljen ridge to
fire from the
to the
exclusively
exclusively Croat majority Muslim
Croat one and then to a majority south, supported by probably platoon of armor.
probably a platoon armor. The The
one. When
When Ivica expelling Muslims from
lvica Rajic began expelling from HVO seemed unwilling or unable
HVO unable to commit
commit any
October, his intention
their homes in late October, intention was
was to force
force infantry
infantry forces
forces to the town. With the
the assault on the town. the
the Muslims out and claim claim the entire Vares
Vares region
region for HVO unable
HVO unable to take any ground
ground with firepower alone
with firepower alone
Bosnian Croats.
the Bosnian Croats. Less month later, his
Less than a month initia
his initia- Bosnian Army spent after its massive
the Bosnian
and the massive
tive had produced
produced exactly
exactly the opposite result.
the opposite result. September-October offensive,
September-October offensive, the two sides were
the two were set set
for an
an impasse as winter
winter began toto set in. 2-19 240241242
set in.239 240 241 2-12
The HVO
The Counterstrike, 12
HVO Counterstrike, 12 November
November 1993
1993
Stalemate: December 1993
1993
Rasim Delic in June
As the advent of Rasim June had marked a
milestone
milestone in the ARBiH’s development,
the ARBiH's development, so was the the Although the Muslim-Croat confrontation
Although confrontation lines
lines had
performance of the HVO
performance HVO to be be improved
improved by by the
the arrival
arrival essentially stabilized
essentially September, serious
by late September,
stabilized by serious fight-
fight
of a new commander,
commander, AnteAnte Roso,
Roso, on 9 November
November continued in the
ing continued
ing Prozor-Gornji Vakuf area through
the Prozor-Gomji through
1993—the same day that HVO
1993-the HVO tank firefire knocked
knocked the the end of November, highlighted by a series of con
November, highlighted con-
Stari Most into the Neretva.
Neretva. Zagreb,
Zagreb, it seems, had tests
tests for secondary
secondary locations
locations along the road, including
along the including
unhappy with
been unhappy lackluster performance
with the lackluster performance of the Pidris in the direction of Gomji
the direction Gornji Vakuf and Slatina
Slatina
previous two
previous two HVO commanders: the HVO’s
HVO commanders: HVO's firstfirst toward
toward Jablanica. 243 The Bosnian
Jablanica.243 Bosnian Army couldcould shell
shell
head. Brigadier Milivoj
head, Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic,
Petkovic, was superseded on Prozor from
from the heights the north,
heights to the HVO
north, but the HVO
24 July
July after the ARBiH’s successful
the ARBiH's June offensive
successful June offensive control of the
retained control the town itself. The Muslims held
town itself. held
(although he remained as chief
(although chief of staff);
staft); and its sec
sec- the highway north of Gornji
highway north Gomji Vakuf,
Vakuf. anchored to to the
commander, Maj. Gen.
ond commander, Slobodan Praljak,
Gen. Slobodan Praljak, was northwest by Muslim-held
northwest Bugojno. The Bosnian
Muslim-held Bugojno. Bosnian
replaced after less than four monthsmonths in command.
command. Croats controlled the road south of Gomji
Croats controlled Gornji Vakuf,
Vakuf,
Roso, HVO’s third commander
Roso, the HVO's commander in chief, was
in chief. was through Prozor and southwest
through southwest toto HVO-held
HYO-held Doljani,
Zagreb's next attempt to
Zagreb’s to find
find someone who who could
could turn slightly northwest of Muslim-held
slightly northwest Jablanica. Each
Muslim-held Jablanica. Each
the military ideally, allow the
situation around and, ideally,
military situation faction
faction could
could travel relatively
relatively safely along its respec
safely along respec-
Croatian
Croatian HV HV units
units sent in toto backstop the HVO HVO to be be tive section of the
tive the road,
road, as the Bosnian
as the Bosnian Government
Government
withdrawn.
withdrawn. Within a week, week, Roso set set out to regain
regain the
the held territory south of its section
held territory section of the highway and
the highway
initiative for the Croatians
initiative Croatians in in central Bosnia.
Bosnia. the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats strip several kilome
controlled a strip
Croats controlled kilome-
ters to the
ters the north.
north.
Roso’s opening shot came on 12
Roso 's opening November, as
12 November, as the
the
Bosnian effort against nearby Vitez was
Bosnian Army effort
grinding to a halt, with
grinding HVO‘s most substantial
with the HVO's substantial
206

Having
Having stabilized the situation
stabilized the around Fojnica after
situation around By
By contrast, in in 1993
1993 the
the Bosnian
Bosnian CroatCroat Army had
the
the HVO’s
HVO's November counterstrike, the
November counterstrike, Bosnian
the Bosnian clearly
clearly taken on more than it could handle. The
could handle. The HVOHYO
Army went on to mass more more forces
forces there in prepara
prepara- launched its military
launched military and ethnic-cleansing campaign
ethnic-cleansing campaign
tion for one last winter counterattack. The
winter counterattack. The elite 7th in the spring without
the spring without anticipating
anticipating the the fierce
fierce resistance
Muslimski Brigade—having
Brigade-having just just helped to capture the Bosnian Muslims would put up.
the Bosnian up. Having
Having begun the the
Vares—was brought into
Vares-was brought the Fojnica area as a rein
into the rein- conflict, the
conflict. the HVO
HYO rapidly found itself
rapidly found itself on the defensive
the defensive
forcement, , supported
forcement supported byby at least two
two other brigades
brigades. . on almost
almost every front and would have been in even
every front
Western military
Western military observers estimated that the Bosnian
the Bosnian worse shape had it not been for the
worse the direct and indirect
indirect
Army had brought
brought inin 3,000
3,000 to 4,000 additional
to 4,000 additional troops assistance of the Croatian Army. A
the Croatian A measure of how how
by the
by beginning of December
the beginning December and speculated that the
that the bad things
things were for the Croats was
the Croats was thethe open letter
might be the
Kiseljak enclave might the next target after Mate Boban
Mate Boban sent to the UN
to the UN after the the failure
failure of his
Vares?44 When the
Vares.144 When blow came,
the blow though, , it would fall
came , though offensive, in
offensive, in which
which he protested the the Muslim "aggres-
“aggres
elsewhere.
elsewhere. sion.” By
sion.'' By Boban’s
Boban's own own account
account thethe HYOHVO had lost in in
the seven weeks
the since the
weeks since the beginning
beginning of June June the
the towns
towns
just ahead of a Christmas-New
Moving just Christmas—New Year
Year truce Konjic,, Jablanica,
of Konjic Jablanica, Fojnica,
Fojnica. Travnik, Kakanj, Zen- Zen
between
between the Croats and Muslims,
the Croats Muslims. the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian ica, and Bugojno, as well as over 150
ica, smaller villages.
150 smaller villages.
launched well-coordinated
launched a well-coordinated offensive against the
offensive the The total loss
The loss was
was stated atat about 3.7003,700 square kmkm—
Lasva Valley
Lasva Valley on 22 December
December. . Government
Government forcesforces about 7 percent of Bosnia’sBosnia's land area and over a quar quar-
the Croat-held
attacked the valley from
Croat-held valley from six directions,
six directions, the Bosnian
ter of the Croats’ territorial
Bosnian Croats· territorial holdings
holdings at the the
capturing the
capturing village of Krizancevo
the village outside Vitez.
Krizancevo outside Vitez . start of the summer .146 By the
the summer?46 the end of 1993,1993, the HVO—
the HYO-
Forces attacking
Forces attacking east of Travnik advanced some 300 with significant
with significant direct assistance from from Zagreb
Zagreb and
meters and tooktook important
important high
high ground
ground overlooking
overlooking under the leadership of a new
the leadership commander—had
new commander-had at
at
the road running
the running west out of thethe city. 145 As 1993
city.245 1993 stabilized its military
least stabilized position. and managed to
military position.
turned to 1994,
1994, a Croat-Muslim peace still seemed regain some ground ground during
during thethe mid-November
mid-November coun- coun
distant.
distant. terattacks. averted,, but the
Disaster had been averted
terattacks . Disaster the HVO
HYO
was still worse
worse off than it had been at the the beginning
beginning of
Chapter 49
Chapter the
the year.
year.
Conclusion: The End
Conclusion: End of 1993
1993
The VRS
The YRS had achieved
achieved most of the the objectives
objectives it had
The Bosnian
The Bosnian Army at the the close
close of 1993
1993 had not yet set for itself
set itself during
during 1993, securing most of the
1993, securing the Drina
become
become a mature fighting force, but it had achieved
fighting force, achieved a valley
valley and eliminating
eliminating the military threat to
the Muslim military
renewed sense of confidence
renewed confidence despite a situation
situation that
that the Serb position
the position along
along the Bosnian-Serbian
the Bosnian-Serbian border..
border
could fairly be
could called desperate. The
be called force still
The force still showed
showed The Serb political and military
The military leaders in in Bosnia
Bosnia were
were
serious deficiencies
serious equipment and skills,
deficiencies in equipment skills, lacking
lacking further encouraged
further encouraged by the the Muslim-Croat war war and diddid
armor and artillery
both armor artillery and, in in some units,
units, even basic whatever they could
whatever could to exacerbate it. TheyThey failed.
failed.
infantry weapons and ammunition.
infantry weapons ammunition . It It had improved
improved its however, . to
however to fully exploit the situation
exploit the situation with direct
with a direct
fighting skills—both individually and as
fighting skills-both as an
an organiza-
organiza attempt to destroy the the Bosnian
Bosnian Army. The VRS
Army. The YRS
tion—but
tion-but it was still learning
was still work, tactics,
learning staff work. tactics, and ignored
ignored opportunities
opportunities to the Tuzla and Zenica
to crush the Zenica
logistics through
logistics through thethe painful
painful and expensive school of
expensive school areas—the heart of Muslim-held Bosnia—with
areas-the Bosnia-with the the
trial and error. Nonetheless,
trial Nonetheless , most Bosnian
Bosnian Army sol- sol major
major operations
operations needed, and the the operations
operations the VRS
the YRS
diers felt
felt that the darkest days had passed. Already
that the launched late in
launched in the the 1994
the year (see the 1994 section) failed
section) failed
battling the VRS,
battling the YRS, the ARBiH had taken on a second
the ARBiH achieve their objectives.
to achieve The Serbs in
objectives. The 1993 had had
in 1993
opponent,
opponent, the HVO, , and more
the HYO more often than not emerged a last chance
chance to win win the
the war Bosnia outright.
war for Bosnia outright, and
victorious.
victorious . Bosnian civilians could
soldiers and civilians
it.
Bosnian soldiers could seesee they failed

failed to take advantage of it.
that their path to ultimate
ultimate victory
victory would unquestion-
unquestion
ably long and arduous,
ably be long arduous, but at least they were confi- confi
dent that it was leading
leading in in that direction.
that direction.
207

Endnotes, Section IV
IV
''Reutets, “Purges Renew

Reuters. ··Purges Morale in Bosnian Army”
Renew Morale Anny " by MaggieMaggie Ll "Sadejstvo" is also translated
l3“Sadejstvo” translated as "Cooperation."
“Cooperation.”
Fox, 12 December 1993.
Fox. "' Mladic has
" Mladic has stated
stated that.
that.
2Halilovic, Sefer
iHalilovic, Sefer,. Lakam
Lukava Srrategija
Strategija ("Clever
(“Clever Strategy").
Strategy”), chapter
chapter . . . we were forced to carry out a complex operation. operation, so that
that
17. we could protect
protect thethe people in Podrinje
Podrinje ..... . we planned a
'3Halilovic,
Halilovic. chapter
chapter 17. series of operations
series operations in Podrinje
Podrinje ..... . II would
would mention the the bat-
bat
‘1Halilovic
Halilovic, . reprinted document from an addressaddress by Halilovic
Halilovic to a tles around Srebrenica and for Srebrenica, as well
4
reprinted document for Srebrenica. the bat
well as the bat-
military conference in Zenica. 21-22 August 1993.
military conference Gorazde, . the battles
tle around Gorazde battles for Tmovo
Tmovo .... . and for for many
5 Delic’s predecessor
• Delic's Halilovic later claimed that that he had wanted to
predecessor Halilovic other places.
discipline renegade
discipline commanders but lacked the
renegade commanders the legal basis to do Jovan
Jovan Janjic, General Ratko Mladic,
Janjic, Srpski General Mladic.
so, as as the
the Bosnian Government had not yet passed passed a law law on Novi Sad: Matica
Novi Matica Srpska Press, 1996, 1996. chapter
chapter
defense Halilovic, Sefer.
defense.. Halilovic. Sefer, chapter
chapter 18. 10.
66This
This account is drawn almost exclusively from Silber and Little. Little, Each operation had a different cover name, name. although only two of
chapters 21-23
chapters 21-23.. For a personal accountaccount and analysis of the the negotia-
negotia the names
the names Mladic
Mladic lists below
below have been positively identified
been positively identified with
with
tions, see
tions. see David Owen, Balkan
David Owen. Balkan Odrssev.
Odyssey. NewNew York:
York: Harcourt attack in a given area:
an attack area:
Brace & Jovanovich.
Jovanovich. 1995. · · Cerska 93 was the the beginning of all operations.
operations, of whichwhich
7 Little, p. 276. ForFor a more comprehensive several, in continuity,
there were several, continuity. such as Mac Mac 1 I [Sword
' Silber and Little. comprehensive listing listing of thethe there [Sword 1],I].
plan’s main points
plan·s see David
points,. see Owen, Balkan Odvssev.
David Owen. Odyssey, pp. 89-90. 89-90 . Mac 2.
Mac 2, Podrinje,
Podrinje , and so on. LukavacLukavac 93 was the finale finale of all
8BBosnian enthusiasm for the
Bosnian Croat enthusiasm the plan contributed
contributed to the the growing operations.. . . . All
operations All these
these operations were the the fruit of a very
between the
temper between
bad temper the Croats andand the
the Muslims
Muslims and helped spark thorough analysis by the Main Main Staff and its first first level of
the Croat-Muslim
the Croat-Muslim war, when the the Croats demanded
demanded that the Bosnian
that the Bosnian leadership and command ..... .
Army turn over its weapons or withdraw
Anny withdraw from the the Travnik
Travnik area area in Jovan Janjic.
Jovan chapter 11.
Janjic, chapter
April 1993. Oddly. Travnik was not in one of the the Croat-dominated '5 Reuters, 2 January 1994.
Oddly, Travnik "Reuters.
Vance-Owen provinces
Vance-Owen provinces,. but in what would would have been been thethe mixed l6Musan
1 “Caco” Topalovic
• Musan "Caco" Topalovic was killed killed (under highly
highly suspicious cir- cir
Croat-Muslim one.
Croat-Muslim cumstances)
cumstances) while while allegedly trying to escape. escape. Ramiz “Celo” Dela
Ramiz "Celo" Dela-
9 Little, . p. 304.
and Little Iic was arrested sentenced but subsequently
9 Silber and lie arrested and sentenced subsequently freed with a
'0See David Owen.
10 Owen, Balkan OdysseyOdyssey,. pp. 219-222,
219-222 . for a discussion reduced sentence.
reduced sentence. He He eventually became became a restaurant
restaurant owner in
of the
of the circumstances
circumstances surrounding Izetbegovic Izetbegovic’s's rejection of the the Sarajevo, with
Sarajevo. with rumored ties to organized crime crime..
agreement.
agreement. ‘7Vulliamy
17 Vulliamy, . Ed, Seasons in Hell:
Ed. Seasons Hell: Understanding Bosnia Bosnia's's War,
War.
''‘1In
In addition to their operations around Brcko,
operations around Brcko. the the VRS carried out New York,
New York. St. Martin’s Press, 1994. pp. 301-302.
Martin's Press.
an operation southwest
an southwest of of Doboj
Doboj in an effort to seize the the Doboj- ‘8Malcom.
Malcom. Noel, Noel. Bosnia:
Bosnia: A Short History Edition/. Mac
Doboj 18 Histon- (2nd Edition). Mac-
Tesanj-Teslic road during March
Tesanj-Teslic March 1993. The "Doboj"“Doboj” Operational millan (Papcnnac).
millan (Papermac), 1996. p. 209. ·
Group. under the the command of of Colonel
Colonel Slavko
Slavko Lisica. began the
Lisica. began the 19Laura
'" Laura Silber Allan Little,
Silber and Allan Yugoslal'ia: Death of
Little. Yugoslavia: of a Nation.
attack on 19
attack 19 March 1993. 1993, led
led by clemems
elements of of the
the 2nd
2nd Annored Bri- Bri Penguin USA. 210-211.
USA. pp. 210-21 I.
2° “
gade, together
gade. together with major elementselements of of the
the OG's
OG’s many infantry/light
infantry/light io Reuters, Izetbegovic Says Not
Reuters." Izetbegovic Not Going
Going to Geneva Talks" Talks" by
brigades.. The VRS.
infantry brigades VRS, however.
however, was only able to to penetrate
penetrate Pagani, 22 June
Steve Pagani. June 1993.
about I1 kilometer against resistance from the the 203rd Motorized 2‘ Reuters. "Bosnian
i, “Bosnian Presidency Meets Without Without Izetbegovic"
lzetbegovic" by
about against stiff resistance Motorized
Brigade/Operational Group 7 "South." “South.” During
During four days of of fight-
fight Pagani. 21 June
Steve Pagani, June 1993.
ing, the
ing. 203rd, reinforced with additional units from OG-
the 203rd. OG-77 and the 22Reuters,
i, “Bosnians To
Reuters. "Bosnians To Attend Peace Talks Talks Without
Without Izetbegovic”
Izetbegovic"
HVO 110th Brigade
HVO Brigade,. drove VRS VRS forces back to their start start line
line.. For
For Giles Ellwood,
by Giles Ellwood . 22 June 1993.
detailed account
a detailed account of of the
the battle ARBiH perspective.
battle from the ARBiH see 33Reuters, "Bosnian
“Bosnian Moslem
Moslem Leader Denies Presidency Ambi
perspective, see "Reuters. Ambi-
“Battle in the
"Battle Karuse,” Pn
the Karuse." Prva·a Linija.
Linija, March/April
March/April 1998, pp. 43-45. tions," 22 June June 1993
12The Belgrade magazine
"The magazine Nin Nin described
described thethe corridor in a 22 Janu- Janu 2“
04 Reuters, “Bosnia‘s·s Abdic
Reuters. "Bosnia Abdic Wanted in Austria Austria on Fraud Charges,”
Charges ...
ary 1993 article. 26 June 1993. I993.
Muslim lines are
The Muslim are 1.5 km from the the center
center (of Brcko], 25 Reuters "Moslems
“Moslems Declare AutonomousAutonomous ProvinceProvince in Maverick
[of Brcko]. "Reuters Maverick
away from the Sava, in the
the Sava. the suburb known
known as Suljagica
Suljagica Enclave,“ September 1993.
Enclave." 27 September
Thus, the
the corridor linking Kra~ 2“
' 6 Reuters, “Bosnian Troops
Sokak. Thus. linking Serbia and Bosanska Kra- Reuters . "Bosnian Troops SwoopSwoop on Rebel
Rebel Moslem Town" by
Moslem Town"
the largest
jina.. the
jina largest territory of of the
the Serbian Republic
Republic in B-H. B-H, is Paul Holmes,
Paul Holmes. 30 September
September 1993.
than 2 km km wide in the center ofof Brcko.
Brcko. ’7 Bosnian Government security forces sprayed
less than the very center "Bosnian sprayed the ground in front
. . . This
... This strip of of territory. about 200 km
territory, about km long and often very of aa crowd of
of Adbic supporters
of Adbic Cazin with
supporters in Cazin gunfire but do not
with gunfire
narrow, which on the
narrow. the map is so twisted that that it reminds one appear to have killed
appear killed or injured anyone while while dispersing the crowdcrowd..
of an umbilical
of umbilical cord.cord, looks still stranger
stranger in the field.
the field. Reuters, “Bosnian
Reuters. "Bosnian Enclave’s
Enclave's '‘Father’
Father' Tries To To Do
Do ItIt Alone"
Alone" by
Lengthy detoursdetours connect
connect country roads to the the highways.
highways, Paul Holmes, I1 October 1993.
Paul Holmes.
the forest lead 25Reuters, “UN Fails
muddy and broad paths paths cut recently through the "Reuters. "UN Fails to Stop Intra-Muslim
Intra-Muslim BattlesBattle s in Bosnia"
Bosnia" by
straight to pontoon bridges. However.
straight However, this does does not stop the the Paul Holmes, 5 October 1993.
Paul Holmes.
numerous trucks in both directions from continuing on their
numerous
way . . .
Cicic, "Do
Dragan Cicic. “Do Not Lean Out the the Window,”
Window."
Belgrade Nin Nin 22 January 1993. p. 15.
208
208

29
''' Reuters, “Rebel Moslems
Reuters . "Rebel Moslems Seize Bosnian Town” by Giles
Bosnian Town" Giles Elgood,
Elgood . 52White Warrior,
''' Warrior, pp. 57-60.
15 October 1993. 63According
•• According to the International Criminal Criminal Tribunal
Tribunal for the FormerFormer
30Reuters,
' 0 Reuters ...“Bosnian Army Takes Back
Bosnian Army Back Town
Town From
From Rebel Mos
Mos- Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Yugoslavia ([CTY) indictment. Ahmici had a population of 356
indictment, Ahmici
lems,”
lems:· 16 October 1993. Muslims
Muslims out ofa ofa total population of 0f466.
466 . The town’s
town's population on
3'
' ' Reuters "Moslem
“Moslem Rebels Say Bosnian Troops Launch Attack,”
Launch Ana,k:· the morning of of the allack
attack may have been heen as high as 800. however.
18 October 1993. because
because of of an influx
innux of of refugees
refugees from Jajce. Foca,
from Jajce, Foca. and Visegrad.
Visegrad.
32 Reuters, ''Bosnian
'' Reuters. “Bosnian Moslem Dissident Meets Karadzic,
Moslem Dissident Karadzic. (The figures of 800 residentsresidents during the the anack
attack and 500 before the the
Milosevic,"
Milosevic ... 22 October 1993. war are taken from UNHCR estimates.) Of those
UNHCR estimates.) those whowho survived,
survived.
’3 Reuters,...“Rebel
' ' Reuters Rebel Moslems Deal With
Moslems Sign Peace Deal With Bosnian Serbs,”
Bosnian Serbs:· perhaps escaped into the hills
perhaps half escaped hills and eventually made made their way
22 October 1993. to Muslim-held
Muslim-held territory. The remainderremainder were taken taken prisoner by the the
3‘Reuters, Bosnia Pocket,”
Rebel Forces Say They Advance in Bosnia
' " Reuters ...“Rebel Pocket : · HVO harmed—possibly as a result of UN
HYO but were not otherwise harmed-possibly
11 November 1993. intervention and international allention attention after the
the massacre’s
massacre's discov
discov-
35
' ·1 Reuters,
Reuters ...“Rebel
Rebel Moslems
Moslems Gain Ground Against
Against Bosnian Army"
Army .. ery. British
British peacekeepers, seeing HVO
peacekeepers , seeing HYO soldiers escorting least 150
by Maggie
Maggie Fox.Fox. 6 December 1993. Muslim
Muslim prisoners away from Ahmici Ahmici after the assault, demanded
the assault, demanded to
3"
•• Reuters, ..“Rebel Moslems Get Serb Help
Rebel Moslems Help for Assault
Assault on Bosnian
Bosnian know what was going on, whereupon the
know the HVO captors changed
HYO captors changed
Army”" by Maggie
Army Maggie Fox,
Fox. 6 December 1993. direction and eventually released released thethe prisoners to the the UNHCR. The
37
17 Reuters,
Reuters. --serbs To Support Rebel Moslems,"
“Serbs Shell Bosnians To Moslems:· prisoners, at least, lirmly believe they were ahout
least. firmly about to be executed
executed
15 December 1993. that UNPROFOR’s
and that UNPROFOR's intervention saved saved their lives. Stewart,,
lives. Stewart
3" Reuters, "Bosnian
"Reuters. “Bosnian Army
Army at Standoff With With Rebel Moslem
Moslem pp. 278-299.
Enclave"
Enclave .. by Maggie Fox, 8 November 1993.
Maggie Fox. 6‘ Reuters, "UN
04 “UN Tribunal
Trihunal Turns
Tums Attention
Allcntion to Croat War Crimes Crimes”.. byhy
3" Vakuf, with
Gomji Vakuf.
·'" Gomji with a population of about 20,000 20.000 to 25,000.
25.000. had Andrew Kelley.
Andrew Kelley. 9 MayMay 1995
about percent Muslims,
about 50 percent percent Croats. and a small number
Muslims. 45 percent h'
65White Warrior,
Warrior, pp
6‘ Reuters,. "Croatian
pp.. 57-60.
others.
of Serbs and others. ""Reuters “Croatian Was Crime Suspects Surrender to UN"
Was Crime UN .. hyby
40Reuters,
""Reuters, ..“Moslem, Allies Fight
Moslem, Croat Allies Fight in Central Bosnia"
Bosnia" by Andrew Kelley,
Andrew Kelley, 6 October 1997.
Mark Heinrich, 12 January 1993.
Mark Heinrich. 67
• The figure
1 destroyed buildings of
figure of 176 destroyed types is from
of all types from the
""'Stewart
Stewart,. Col.
Col. Robert, Broken Lives: A Personal View Viell' of the
of the ICTY’s “Kupreskic
ICTY's "Kupreskic et al." a1.”indictment. apparently
apparently derived from from the
Bosnian Conflict. London:
Bos11ia11Co11flict. Collins, 1994. pp. 200-211.
London: Harper Collins. 200-21 1. authorities‘ preliminary
Bosnian authorities· preliminary investigation by hy a Zenica court.
42At
"' At the same time,
the same the HVO
time. the HYO mademade a corresponding statement
statement 68 Split Feral
., Split Feral Tribune, interview with with Ivan Santic,. Former
Ivan Santic Former President
about Bosnian Croat units in
about in the three proposed Muslim-majority
the three Muslim-majority of Vitez
of Vitez Opcina, “There are 200 Who
Opcina. "There Who AreAre Worse!“
Worse' .. 20 November
cantons. Reuters....“Bosnian
cantons. Reuters Bosnian Croats Demand Control Moslem
Control of Moslem 1995.
Units,”
Units:· 15 January 1993. 69Reuters, --uN
°"Reuters. “UN Tries
Tries To To End Moslem-Croat
Moslem-Croat Clashes in Bosnia" Bosnia" hy by
‘3 Reuters "Bosnian
"'Reuters “Bosnian Minister
Minister Orders ArmyArmy Units
Units Under
Under Croat Pagani, 20 April
Steve Pagani. April 1993.
Control”.. by Kurt
Control Kurt Schork. 17 January
January 1993. 70Zagreb
'" Radio. 25 April
Zagreb Radio. April 1993. FBISFBIS London LD2504122693.
London LD2504 I 22693.
4“ Reuters, --croats
"" Reuters. “Croats Report Taking
Taking Key Town From
Key Town From Moslem Allies” ..
Moslem Allies 2512262 April 1993.
251226ZApril
Mark Heinrich,
by Mark Heinrich. 19 January 1993. 7' AFP, 28 April
" Paris AFP, April 1993. FBIS Vienna AU28041 10393.
‘5 Stewart, pp. 200-21
"' Stewart. 200-2111 2811032 April 1993.
••Reuters. “Croats Seal Bosnian Roads After
4“Reuters. --croats After Fighting With Mos
Fighting With Mos- "Zagreb HTV,
72Zagreb HTV. 12 May May 1993. FBIS London London LDl205180493.
LD1205180493.
lems”.. by Mark
lems Mark Heinrich.
Heinrich , 27 January 1993. 1218042 May May 1993.
‘7 73
"'Zagreb HTV, 1
Zagreb HTV. I February 1993. FBIS LondonLondon LD0102202393,
LD0I02202393. 7 ·' Sarajevo Radio.
Radio, 19 April April 1993. FBIS ViennaVienna AU1904124493.
AU I 904124493.
0120232 February 1993.
0120232 1912442 AprilApril 1993.
4“
"'TheThe Bosnian Croats claimed that that Muslim
Muslim forces attacked
attacked Travnik
Travnik 7‘ Sarajevo Radio,
'"Sarajevo Radio. 21 April 1993. I 993 . FBIS Vienna AU2104161893,
FBIS Vienna AU2 I04 l 61893 .
on 30 January. but UN peacekeepers in the
UN peacekeepers the town called the the story a 2116182 April April 1993.
complete fabrication. 7’ Zagreb Radio,
''Zagreb Radio. 24 AprilApril 1993. FBIS London London LD2404161993,
LD2404161993.
‘9
"'' Reuters, "Moslems
“Moslems and Croats Sign Cease-Fire Accord in Cen-
Cease-Fire Accord Cen 2416192
241619ZApril April 1993.
Bosnia.” 30 January
tral Bosnia." January 1993. 76
7• UNPROFOR spokesmen reported on 30 April that
spokesmen reported that the
the villages of of
5° Reuters, "Bosnian
"'Reuters. “Bosnian Rivals
Rivals Fight on Despite Peace Talks" Talks” by MarkMark Hercazi, Ulsnjica.
Hercazi, Ulsnjica, and Gomionica
Gomionica had been been damaged
damaged or (in the
Heinrich,
Heinrich. 6 February I1993. 993 . case of Gomionica)
case destroyed outright but did not specify which
Gomionica) destroyed which
5' Reuters, --Moslems
' ' Reuters. “Moslems Denounce Border Blockade by Croats
Border Blockade Croats”.. by side had beenbeen responsible for the destruction. Paris AFP,
the destruction. AFP. 20 April
Mark Heinrich, 28 February 1993.
Mark Heinrich. 1993. FBIS Vienna AU3004114393. 3011432 April
Vienna AU3004114393. April 1993.
52
'' Reuters,
Reuters ...“Bosnia,
Bosnia. Croatia Agree Plan Plan for Joint Bosnian
for Joint Bosnian Army"
Army .. 7"
77 The Bosnian
Bosnian Government charged charged the HVO HYO on 25 May May 1993
Pagani . 28 March
by Steve Pagani. March 1993. with violence against
against the civilian populations of
the civilian of a number of of vil
vil-
53
'' Stewart, Broken Lives, pp. 278-299.
Broken Lives. lages during the April-May fighting
the April-May lighting in thethe Kiseljak area, including
Kiseljak area. including
5‘
"The The few
few remaining members
members of of the
the Jure Francetic Brigade even even- the burning down of
the of between
between 450 and 500 houses. Specifically. the
houses. Specifically, the
retreated to Vitez,
tually retreated
wally Vitez. where they later formed the 44th --Jure “Jure War Presidency of
War of the Kiseljak
Kiseljak Municipality accused the
Municipality accused the Bosnian
Francetic“ Independent Home
Francetic .. Independent Home Guard Battalion.
Ballalion. Croats of war crimes and/or property in Rotilj Rotilj. . Visnjica. Svin
Visnjica. Svin-
’5 Stewart, pp. 278-299.
' 1 Stewart. jarevo. Komionica, Gromiljak. Mihovac,
Komionica, Gromiljak, Mahala, Rudnik
Mehrici Mahala.
Mihovac, Mehrici Rudnik, .
56
•• White Warrior: The Cheshir,,s
Whit<' Warrior: Chesllires in Bosnia
Bosnia. . lst
I st Battalion the 22nd
Ballalion the and Kazagici.
aod Kazagici. Sarajevo Radio. Radio. 25 May May 1993. FBIS London
FBIS London
(Cheshire) Regiment, Regimental HQ, Chester, 1994. pp. 57-60.
HQ, Chester. 57-60 . LD2505211093, 2521102
LD2505211093. 2521 I0Z May May 1993.
57
57 Bell, Martin, , In Harm ·s’s Wav: 78Zagreb HTV, FBIS London LD3005221693, .
Bell. Martin Way: Reflections
Reflections of of a War-Zo11e
War-Zone Thug. "Zagreb HTV. 30 May May 1993. FBIS London LD3005221693
London: Penguin Books,
London: Books. 1996. pp. 152-155. 3022162 May May 1993.
58 Stewart. pp. 278-299.
"Stewart. 7” Reuters, "Bosnia's
'"Reuters, “Bosnia’s Black Black Market Town Braces for War"
Market Town War" by John
hy John
59
' 9 White Warrior.
Warrior. pp. 57-60. Fullerton. 3 June 1993.
Fullerton.
°°Bell, pp. 152-155.
"'Bell.
6' Stewart, pp. 278-299.
• 1 Stewart.
209
209

‘09Here. as elsewhere
80Sarajevo Radio. 10 June 1993. FBIS Vienna
"'Sarajevo Vienna AU
AU 1006120793.
1006120793. '""Here.as elsewhere in Bosnia
Bosnia during this period. the the HVO
HYO
1012072June
1012072 June 1993. appears
appears to have actively supportedsupported the the forced emigration of its own own
8‘ Sarajevo Radio. 18 April 1993. FBIS London
"Sarajevo London LD1804122493
LD1804122493 Bosnian Croat population out of a government-captured
government-captured area. area. The
1812242 April 1993. Bosnian authorities in Travnik
Bosnian authorities Travnik pleaded
pleaded with
with Croats and Serbs not
‘2
"Reuters “Gunfire British Troops Hunt” vacate their homes and indicated they would cooperate withwith the
Reuters.. ..Gunfire Traps British Troops on Bosnia Atrocity
Atrocity Hunt" to vacate would cooperate the
by Douglas Hamilton.Hamilton, 28 April
April 1993. UN in order to guarantee
guarantee their safety and property. The HYO. HVO, how how-
''83Reuters.
Reuters, "British
“British UN Troops CollectCollect Massacre Victims”
Victims" by ever, was spreading
ever. spreading the word that that anyone who remained
remained behind
Douglas Hamilton,
Hamilton, 27 April 1993. would be in danger
would encouraged a mass
danger and strongly encouraged mass exodus. VirtuVirtu-
5“ Reuters,. "Croat
"Reuters “Croat Commander Promises Inquiry Inquiry Into Family's
Family’s ally the entire Bosnian Croat population voted with with its feet. elect
elect-
Death” by Corinne DufKa.
Death" Duflta. 24 April 1993. ing to surrender
surrender to thethe Serbs rather
rather than
than remain in their homes
''85Reuters
Reuters,...“Croats
Croats andand Moslems
Moslems Activate Joint Joint Command To To Keep
Keep Muslim-majority rule. Sarajevo Radio,
under Muslim-majority Radio . 7 June
June 1993. FBIS
Peace
Peace”.. by Mark Heinrich, 30 April 1993.
Mark Heinrich, LD0706215193,
London LD07062
London 0721512
I 5 I 93. 072 I 51Z June 1993.
86Reuters '“°As HVO soldier put it. "We
it,
•• Reuters,...“Shaken
Shaken Croat-Moslem Alliance Restored in Mostar
Croat-Moslem Alliance Mostar".. 10 As one HYO “We could have tried a breakthrough
breakthrough
a
Hamilton, 24 April 1993.
by Douglas Hamilton. Vitez but the terrain was difficult
to Vitez difficult and we were outnumbered.
outnumbered. We We
87Reuters,...“Bosnia‘s
"Reuters Bosnia ·s Croats and Muslims Battle in Mostar”
and Muslims Mos tar .. by didn’t have a choice (but
didn't surrender].” Reuters,
[but to surrender(." “Bosnian Croat
Reuters. "Bosnian
a
Mark Heinrich, 9 May
Mark Heinrich. May 1993. Refugees From From Moslem Offensive Reach Croatia" by Davor
Moslem Offensive Davor Huic,
Huie ,
8“ Reuters....“Croats
"Reuters Moslems Battle as
Croats and Moslems as New
New Bosnia
Bosnia Truce JOJune 1993.
10
Declared".. by Kurt
Declared Schork, 9 May
Kurt Schork. May 1993. “‘ Reuters, "Bosnian
111 Reuters. “Bosnian Serbs Claim Claim 1,000 Surrender,”
1.000 Croat Soldiers Surrender."'
89Reuters.
'" Reuters, "Croat
“Croat Troops Detain 1,300 Moslem Moslem Civilians
Civilians in Camp"
Camp“ 7 June 1993.
7
by Mark Heinrich, 12 May
Mark Heinrich. May 1993. “2 Reuters, "Fighting
'" Reuters. Travnik Prompts Croat Refugee Exodus"
“Fighting in Travnik Exodus"
°°Sarajevo
"'' Linija "Bridges
Sarajevo Prva Linija “Bridges of Defense and Friendship"
Friendship" by John Fullerton,
by John Fullerton. 8 JuneJune 1993.
8
Edin Logo.
Edin Logo, June 1997 pp. 37-38. “3 Reuters, 'Thousands
113 “Thousands of Croats Stuck on Rain-Lashed Rain-Lashed Serb
9‘ Reuters. "UN
91 “UN Council
Council Tells
Tells Moslems
Moslems and Croats To To Stop Fight
Fight- Mountain" by Adian
Mountain" Hartley. 8 June 1993.
Adian Hartley.
8
ing" by Evelyn Leopold, 10 May
Evelyn Leopold. May 1993. "“‘The
114 The Bosnian Croat refugeerefugee exodus appears
appears to have continued
"' “Mostar Fighting
Reuters. "Mostar
nReuters. Fighting Rages On. On, French Helicopter
Helicopter Hit"Hit" by beyond 7 June. On 16 June the the Serbs claimed that another 2,000
that another
Kurt Schork, 13 May
Kurt Schork. May 1993. Bosnian 7 civilians and some 400 more HVO
Bosnian Croat civilians HYO soldiers had
93
9 ' Reuters, .. “Moslems
Moslems and Croats Fight Fight On Despite MostarMostar Truce" crossed over to surrender
crossed surrender to the Serbs west of Novi Novi Travnik
Travnik. .
by Kurt Kurt Schork, 13 May May 1993. Another HYO HVO unit was reportedly remaining behind to screen screen the
94Reuters,
94 “Croats Keep Attacking.
Reuters. "Croats Attacking, Displacing
Displacing Moslem Civil
Moslem Civil- mass exodus. Reuters,
mass Reuters ...“Serbs Claim New
Serbs Claim New Croat Refugee Influx."lnnux:·
ians—UN”
ians- Pitter,. 16 May
UN .. by Laura Piner May 1993. 16 June 1993.
l6June
•95 Reuters, "Snipers
1 Reuters. Active in Mostar Despite Cease-Fire Pact” “5 Reuters, “Moslems,
"Moslems, Croats Ready for Another Another Battle”
Battle .. by John
John
“Snipers Active Pact" by 115
Pitter, 20 May
Laura Pitter. May 1993. Fullerton, 10 June
Fullerton. June 1993.
96 Reuters, "Croat-Moslem
% Reuters. “Croat-Moslem Panel Breaks Up Mostar" by Laura
Up in Mostar" Laura “6
11•Reuters, “Moslem-Croat Fighting Grows in Central Bosnia”
Reuters. "Moslem-Croat Fighting Grows Bosnia .. by
Pitter,, 24 May
Piner May 1993. John Fullerton,
John Fullerton , 9 June 1993.
9
97The plant had been

"'The been damaged
damaged by Serb shelling but was mostly 117 Paris AFP,
“7Paris AFP. 9 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AUO906134793, . 0913472
Vienna AU0906l34793
9
operational at at the
the time of the
the Muslim
Muslim counteroffensive in June June 1993.
1993. Subsequent
Subsequent Bosnian Serb air attacks attacks in late August 1993 and ““Paris AFP, 9 June 1993. FBIS
'" Paris AFP, AU0906134793,
Vienna AU0906
FBIS Vienna I 34 793. 0913472
09 I 3472
9
late February 1994 severely

late severely damaged
damaged portions of of the factory, but it June
June 1993.
nevertheless able
was nevertheless able to remain at at least
least partially operational for the the “9 According to the 1991 census.
119 According census, Kakanj
Kakanj had a population of about
duration of the the war. 59,000, slightly
59,000. slightly over half of which a
which were Muslims.
Muslims . About
About a quarter
quarter
a
98 Reuters,. "Music
'" Reuters “Music School a Place of Fear for Zenica Croats" Croats” by were Bosnian Croats, and about 10
Bosnian Croats. percent were Bosnian
IO percent Bosnian Serbs.
John Fullerton,
John May 1993.
Fullerton . 31 May Radio, . 10 June 1993. FBIS
‘ZOSarajevo Radio
""Sarajevo London LD1006085593,
FBIS London LDI006085593.
“London Al-hayah,
""London “Central Bosnia’s
Al-hayah, "Central Muslim Military
Bosnia's Muslim Com
Military Com- l008552 June 1993.
1008552
manders Reject Partition Option That Is Imposed on Them" by
manders ‘2‘
"' Zagreb HTV Television, 13 June 1993. FBIS
HTY Television. London
FBIS London
As’ad
As ' ad Taha. 28 August 1993. LD1306220593,
LD l306220593, 1322052 June June 1993.
‘°°
11 Reuters, "Croats.
XlReuters. “Croats, Muslims
Muslims Eyeball
Eyeball to Eyeball Travnik” by
Eyeball in Travnik" '" Zagreb HTV
‘ZZZagreb Television, 14 June 1993. FBIS London
HTV Television. London
John Fullerton, 30 May
John May 1993. LD1406183493, 1418342
LDl406l83493, l4l8342June June 1993.
‘°‘ Later redesignated
101 redesignated the the 706th
706th Mountain
Mountain Brigade.
Brigade. ‘23
11 ' Paris
Paris AFP. June 1993. FBIS
AFP, 16 June Vienna AU1606162393,
‘02
10 Radio. 24 April
' Zagreb Radio. FBIS London
April 1993. FBIS London LD24004222093.
LD24004222093. 1616232 June 1993.
2422202 April 1993. ‘2‘ Radio, 15 June 1993. FBIS
'" Sarajevo Radio. Vienna AU1506153993,
‘03 brigades were later
10 ·' The two brigades later combined to form the 9lst
the 91 st Home 1515392 June 1993.
Defense Regiment. ‘25 Radio , 15 June 1993. FBIS
" 5 Zagreb Radio, London LD1506180593,
FBIS London LD 1506 I 80593 .
‘0‘
'°'Reuters.
Reuters, "Bosnian Croats, Moslems
“Bosnian Croats. Moslems Call Travnik” by
Call Truce in Travnik" 1518052
l5l8052June June 1993.
John Fullerton, 5 June 1993.
John ‘26 Radio, 10
"• Sarajevo Radio. June 1993. FBIS
IO June Vienna AU1006120793,
FBIS Vienna AU I006120793.
‘05Sarajevo Radio
'"'Sarajevo Radio.. 5 June 1993. FBIS FBIS London LD0506211993,
London LD0506211993. 1012072
IO12072 June 1993.
0521 192 June 1993.
0521192 ‘27Reuters,
117 “Moslems Said To
Reuters, "Moslems To Capture Key Town".. by
Key Central Town hy
'06Reuters.
""' Reuters, "Bosnian Croats, Moslems
“Bosnian Croats. Moslems Call Call Truce in Travnik"
Travnik" by Mark Heinrich, , 16 June
Mark Heinrich June 1993.
I 993.
John Fullerton, 5 June 1993.
John Fullerton, ‘23Reuters, “Bosnian
'" "Bosnian Croats Ask Ask Croatia forfor Protection Against
Against
‘07Zagreb Radio.
107 Radio, 6 June 1993. FBIS FBIS London
London LD0606194093,
LD0606 I 94093, Muslims“ by Mark
Muslims" Mark Heinrich,
Heinrich. 9 June 1993.
9
0619402 June 1993.

0619402
"’8
"" Belgrade Tanjug. 7 June 1993. FBIS FBIS London
LD0706l7 I 893.
0717182 June 1993.
071718ZJunc
210
210

‘29Reuters. "Croats
" 9 Reuters, “Croats Say 2,000 Dead, Wounded Wounded in Moslem Offen
Moslem Offen- ‘59 Husum . Soren B0,
"" Husum, Bo, At
Ar War Without Weapons: Peace-Ke epa in
Weapons : A Peace-Keeper i11
sive” by Mark
sive" Heinrich, 18 June 1993.
Mark Heinrich. I 993 . the
the Bosnian
Bo.rnian Conflict. UK: Airlife Publishing,
Conflict . UK: Publishing. 1998,
1998. p. 39.
m
'-'" Reuters, “Moslems, Croats Govern
Reuters . "Moslems. Govern Separately in Bosnian
Bosnian "’0 Reuters, "Bosnian
161' Reuters. “Bosnian Moslem Mostar,"
Moslem Seize Croat Barracks in Mostar."
Town" by John
Town" Fullerton, 3 June 1993.
John Fullenon. 30
30JuneJune 1993.
'3' Reuters,
'-" “Bosnian Croats and Moslems
Reuters. "Bosnian Moslems FightFight for
for New Town” by
New Town" “‘1 Reuters, "Fierce
1• 1 Reuters. “Fierce Fighting Erupts in Mostar”
Fighting Erupts Giles Ellgood.
Mostar" by Giles Ellgood,
Giles Ellgood
Giles Ellgood, , 24 June
June 1993. 20 June
June 1993.
‘31Reuters, "Moslem
u: “Moslem Commander Warns Warns Over Central BosniaBosnia '62
102 Reuters, “Fierce Fighting
Reuters. "Fierce Mostar, Aid in Jeopardy“
Fighting in Mostar. Jeopardy" by Giles
Giles
Fighting.” 27 June
Fighting." June 1993. Ellgood . 30 June 1993.
Ellgood,
'33
' '·' Reuters, “Croats, Moslems
Reuters. "Croats. Moslems Fight
Fight on NewNew Bosnian Battlefront”"
Bosnian Battlefront '63
16·1 Reuters, “Bosnian Moslems
Reuters. "Bosnian Advance on Croats Around
Moslems Advance Around
Gilles Trequcsser.
by Gilles Trequesser, 25 JuneJune 1993. Mostar,”
Mostar." 1I July 1993.
"4
'-" Reuters, “Fierce Fighting
Reuters. "Fierce Fighting in Northern
Northern Tip Bosnia,” ""Reuters, “Bosnian Croats Report Big Moslem Offensive,"."
Tip of Central Bosnia," 164 Reuters , "Bosnian Repon Big Moslem Offensive
26 June 1993. 13 July 1993.
'35Reuters, "Serbs, Croats, Close Close in on Moslem Town” by Gilles
Moslem Town" Gilles "’5
1" 5 Reuters, "Bosnian
“Bosnian Serbs Said To Towards Bosnian
Moving Towards
To Be Moving Bosnian
115 “Serbs.
Trequesser,. 27 June 1993.
Trequesser Capita” by Mark
Capita" Heinrich, , 26 July 1993.
Mark Heinrich
'36
11 • Reuters, “Croats Mobilize
Reuters. "Croats Mobilize as Central BosniaBosnia Fighting
Fighting Rages"
Rages” by '"°
“5"Reuter
Reuters, “Moslems Reported To
s, "Moslems Launch All-Out Attack
To Launch Attack on
Giless Ellgood
Gile Ellgood. . 30 June
June 1993. Mostar." 15 July 1993.
Mostar.”
137Ibid.
'-" Ibid. "’7
1" 7 Ibid.
Ibid.
‘35Reuters,
'-" Reuters , "Fighting
“Fighting Rages in Central Bosnia,"Bosnia,” 2 July 1993. "’8 Reuters,. "Bosnian
10' Reuters “Bosnian Serbs Said To To Be
Be Moving Towards Bosnian
Moving Towards Bosnian
'39
'- 19 Reuters, "Serb
“Serb and Croat Forces Slice Slice Moslem Salient”" by
Moslem Salient Capital"" by Mark
Capital Heinrich, 26 July 1993.
Mark Heinrich,
Gilles Trequesser.
Gilles Trequesser, 2 July 1993. '°"
'69Paris AFP,
AFP, 15 July I1993. Vienna AU1507094093,
993 . FBIS Vienna AU I 507094093 ,
14°Reuters,
'"' “Bosnian Moslems
Reuters . "Bosnian Moslems and Croats Continue After
Fighting After
Continue Fighting 1509402 July 93.
Truce" by Mark
Truce" Heinrich. 10
Mark Heinrich, IO May
May 1993. '70Reuters,
170 Reuters. "Fighting Mostar, Still
“Fighting in Mostar, Still No
No Aid for Mos
for Trapped Mos-
"1 Reuters,
141 “UN Says Croatian Troops
Reuters . "UN Pouring Into
Troops Pouring Into Bosnia"
Bosnia" lems” Giles Ellgood,
lems" by Giles August 1993.
Ellgood , 20 August
22 July 1993. '7' Zagreb Radio
'" Radio,, 25 October 1993. FBIS London LD2510173393,
FBIS London LD2510173393 .
"“2 2 Reuters, "Bosnian
“Bosnian Croat Commander Prefers Fighting Talks”
Fighting to Talks" 2517332 October 1993. I993.
Kojovic, 18 November
by Pedja Kojovic, November 1993. ‘72
m Split Dalmacija , Interview
Split Slobodna Dalmacija, Interview with Zelic, Com-
Slavko Zelic.
with Slavko Com
1“
'" LikeLike other Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Army Operational Groups, Groups. OGOG West was a mander of the 'King Tvrtko’ brigade of the Croatian Defense
‘King Tvrtko'
~ semipennanent. division-level Garmaz, “Croats
semiperrnanent, division-level headquartersheadquaners established to coordi-coordi Council
Council from Sarajevo, by Zeljko
Zeljko Garmaz. Sacrificed
"Croats Sacrificed
nate the
nate the operations of several brigades. Because of of Zuc," 93BA0928D, 0423462 May
Zuc." FBIS Reston 93BA0928D. May 1993.
14“Theunit
,..., The unit may have been been reinforced for for the attack by elements
elements of "3
171 Paris
Paris AFP, September 1993. FBIS
AFP, 25 September AU2509130293,
Vienna AU2509
FBIS Vienna I 30293.
the 17th Krajina Brigade from Travnik
Krajina Brigade Travnik or the 7th Muslimski Bri
Muslimski Bri- 2513022 September 1993.
gade from "4 the ARBiH
Zenica.. but there
from Zenica there is no substantial confrmration
confinnation of this. redesignated the 124th
Eventually redesignated
174 Eventually I 24th Brigade
Brigade of the ARBiH 1st I st
"5
" 5 Sarajevo Radio,Radio . 21 July 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2107191193.
FBIS Vienna AU2I07191193 . Corps’' 12th Division
Corps Division. .
“6
'"' Sarajevo Radio,Radio, 25 July 1993. FBIS London LD250715
FBIS London LD2507151293.I 293. "5 Paris AFP,
175Paris November 1993. FBIS
AFP. 6 November FBIS Vienna AU0652493,
Vienna AU0652493.
‘47 Kvaternik Brigade
147 The Eugen Kvaternik Brigade was effectively destroyed in this
effectively destroyed 0615242 November
November 1993.
operation. Its remnants
remnants were regrouped into a single battalion and "6 Zagreb Radio,
""Zagreb January 1993. FBIS
Radio, 18 January London LD1801150593,
FBIS London LDI 801150593.
eventually combined with two other destroyed shattered shattered and exiled 1815052 January
January 1993.
'77 “
HVO units—the
HYO Kupres" and "Jajce"
units-the former "“Kupres” “Jajce” brigades-to
brigades—to fonn form "Gradacac" and 108th ·· Brcko"
'" The 107th “Gradacac” Brigades fell
Brcko" Brigades fell under
the 55th Home Home Defense Regiment.
Regiment. the operational control of the ARBiHARBiH 2nd Corps' Ilst st Operational
Operational
"8 The previous day, 30 July 1993.
'''The 1993, another
another UNPROFOR-brokered
UNPROFOR-brokered Division) . The HVO’s
Group (later the 21st Division).
Group HVO's 115th “Zrinski” Bri-
I 15th "Zrinski" Bri
country-wide cease-fire had been
country-wide cease-fire Bosnian Army
been signed by Bosnian Army com
com- Tuzla’s Bosnian
gade . raised from Tuzla's
gade, community, functioned
Bosnian Croat community. functioned
mander Delic Delic and HVO HYO commander Petkovic.Petkovic. Obviously
Obviously, . the smoothly as part of the ARBiH
ARBiH 2nd Corps Operational Group
Corps’ ' 5th Operational Group
agreement failed to hold.
agreement hold. Reuters, “Text of Latest Bosnia
Reuters. "Text Bosnia General Division) through all of 1992 and 1993. In
(later the 25th Division) In early
Cease-Fire Accords," 30 July 1993.
Cease-Fire Accords,” January 1994,
January 1994. however, local Tuzla
however. the local Tuzla Bosnian
Bosnian Croat leadership
"9
''" Reuters,
Reuters, “Moslems
"Moslems Said To To Have Won Won Strategic Bosnian Town”
Bosnian Town" ordered the 115th disband—over the objections of most
I 15th Brigade to disband-over
by Kurt Kurt Schork,
Schork. 2 August
August 1993. of soldiers—rather than continue serving under Muslim
unit’s soldiers-rather
of the unit's Muslim
'50Reuters,
150 “British Commander Confinns
Reuters. "British Confirms Moslems
Moslems HaveHave Gornji
Gomji command. SplitSplit Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 14 April
Nedjelj11a Dalmacija. April 1993. FBIS Vienna
FBIS Vienna
Vakuf,” 2 August
Vakuf," August 1993. AU2404094095, 2409402 April 1995.
AU2404094095,
'5' Reuters,
151 Reuters. “Croats Counter-Attack in
"Croats Counter-Attack Bosnia" by Kurt
in Central Bosnia" Kurt '7'
"' The 110th Usora
Usora Brigade
Brigade functioned as part of of the 2nd Corps·
Corps‘
Schork, . 5 August
Schork August 1993. Operational
Operational Group “Seven South"
Group "Seven South" (later the 3rd Corps 37th Divi- Divi
'52
152 Ibid.
lbid. sion) for the war's
war’s duration
duration..
'51
15 ·' Reuters, "Fighting
“Fighting Erupts in Central Bosnia”Bosnia" by Kurt Schork,
Kurt Schork. "9
179 Fojnica
Fojnica was one of of the last places where Croat-Muslim
Croat-Muslim violence
violence
16 September 1993. would Indeed , UNPROFOR
would erupt. Indeed, UNPROFOR Bosnia Bosnia Commander
Commander Morrillon
Morrillon
‘5‘ Reuters,
154 Reuters. "UN“UN Repons
Reports Bosnian
Bosnian Croat Attack
Attack on Moslems”
Moslems ·· by had cited the ethnically “island of peace”
ethnically mixed town as an "island peace" only
only
Kun Schork, 21 October 1993.
Kurt Schork. days before it was to become yet another another central Bosnian
Bosnian battle
battle-
‘55Reuters, "Croats
155 “Croats Pound Central Bosnian Bosnian Town"
Town” by JohnJohn Fuller
Fuller- ground.
ground .
ton, 15 November
1on. November 1993. ‘8" Reuters, "Bosnian
""Reuters. “Bosnian Town’s
Town's Dream of of Peace Blown
Blown to Pieces" by hy
15"Husum, Soren Bo,
" 0 I-Iusum, At War Without Weapons: A
Bo, Ar A Peace-Keeper in Gilles Trequesser, 3 July 1993.
Gilles
“‘1
the Bosnian
the Conflict. . UK:
Bvs11ia11Conflict Airlife Publishing
UK: Airlife Publishing, . 1998. p. 44 "' Reuters. Within a Siege Strands Bosnian
“Siege Within
Reuters . "Siege Bosnian Moslems”
Moslcms"" by
'57Reuters,
157 Reuters . “Croats Keep Attacking,
"Croats Keep Attacking. Displacing Moslem Civil
Displacing Moslem Civil- Kurt Schork, 16 July 1993.
Kurt Schork.
ians—UN” by Laura
ians-UN" Pitter, 16 May
Laura Pitter. May 1993.
15"
' 5' At
At least until the formation of of the Konjic-based ARBiH 6th
Konjic-based ARBiH
Corps temporarily removed some of the more northern
Corps nonhern forces fromfrom
Fourth Corps command in June June 1993.
211
211

"‘2 “NATO in Ambush'"
.Iavnost, "'NATO Ambush” by Dragoljub Jeknic, 1" The Second Operational Group (OG)
"' Sarajevo J,mwst. Dragoljub Jeknic "'The (OG) was a more or less perma perma-
22 May May 1993. FBIS Vienna Vienna AU2605100493.
AU2605100493. nent subcommand
nent subcommand under the the Central Bosnia
Bosnia Operational Zone
"‘3Zagreb Radio. Radio, 20 June 1993. FBIS London London LD2006191593
LD2006191593 (OZ) OG was established
established in 1992 and remained in
"' (02).. The Second OG
2019152
20 I9 I 52 June 1993.
I993. existence through the
existence the end of the the war in 1995. It was one of three three
"‘4Zagreb Radio.
'"Zagreb Radio, 3 July 1993. FBIS London London LDO307142493,
LD0307142493. (initially four) groupings of brigades under the Central Bosnia
(initially Bosnia 02.OZ.
0314242 July 1993.
031424ZJuly The Second OG 06.. headquartered
headquartered in Kiseljak,
Kiseljak, had responsibility
responsibility for
'85Zagreb Radio
"' Radio,. 14 September 993. FBIS
September I1993. FBIS London
London the HVO’s
the defense of the
HVO"s defense the Kiseljak-Kakanj-Busovaca-Vares
Kiseljak-Kakanj-Busovaca-Vares area.
area.
LD1409141793 1414172 September 1993.
LD1409141793 141417ZSeptember Under
Under its command fell the “Nikola
fell the "Nikola Subic Zrinski”
Zrinski" Brigade
Brigade (later
19" Reuters,. "No-Surrender
"" Reuters “No-Surrender Croats Say Moslems Moslems Plan New New Attack"
Attack” the 93rd "Nikola
“Nikola Subic ZrinksiZrinksi"" Home
Home Defense Regiment. trans trans-
by Kun Schork, 20 September
Kurt Schork. September 1993. ferred to thethe First headquartered in Busovaca;
First OG) headquanered Busovaca : the “Ban" Ban Josip
Josip
“‘1Reuters
'" Reuters,. "Croats
“Croats Left
Left With
With No Bosnia”·· by
No Escape in Central Bosnia Jelacic Brigade"
Jelacic ( later split into the
Brigade" (later “Ban Josip
the 94th "Ban Josip Jelacic”
Jelacic " and
Kurt Schork, 21 September
Kurt Schork. September 199 1993.
3. “Marinko Bosnjak"
95th "Marinko Bosnjak" Home Home Defense Regiments) headquarteredheadquartered
'“Zagreb Radio,
'"Zagreb September 1993. FBIS London
Radio. 18 September London in Kiseljak; previously mentioned “Bobovac”
Kiseljak: the previously "Bobovac" Brigade,
Brigade. (later
LD1809152293,
LD 1809 I 52293. I1815222 September 1993.
815222 September I993. the 96th “Bobovac”
the "Bobovac" Home Defense Regiment) headquanered headquartered in
"" Reuters. "Croats
189Reuters. Civilians Massacred in Central Bosnia"
“Croats Say Civilians Bosnia" by Vares;
Vares: and the the “Kotromanic”
"Kotromanic" Brigade Brigade headquartered
headquanered in Kakanj.
Kakanj.
Schork, 15 September
Kurt Schork.
Kun September 1993. "Kotromanic" Brigade
(The "Kotromanic" Brigade was disbanded
disbanded and incorporated into
‘90 Reuters, "UN
'"" Reuters. “UN Urges Punishment After Village Massacred,”
After Village Massacred.' ' “Ban Josip
the "Ban Josip Jelacic Brigade" after the
Jelacic Brigade" fall of Kakanj
the fall Kakanj in JuneJune
16 September
September 1993. 1993.) In addition, the Second 00
In addition. OG may have had nominal authority
1‘“Sarajevo Radio.
'"' Radio, 18 September
September 1993. FBIS London London over the HVO’s
HVO's “Kran Tvrtko" Brigade
"Kralj Tvrtko" Brigade in Sarajevo. but by the fall fall
LD1909023793,
LD I 909023793. 1902372
I902372 September
September 1993. of 1993 the Bosnian Croat
of Croatss in this unit had been disarrned or resub
been disarmed resub-
‘91Sarajevo Radio
'"' Radio, . 20 September
September 1993. FBIS FBIS Vienna
Vienna ordinated to the ARBiH
ordinated ARBiH Ilst st Corps. Ivica
lvica Rajic appears to have
Rajic appears
AU2009161893, 2016182 September
AU2009161893. September 1993. been the
been the Second OG's OG's commander
commander from its creation through all of
'93Zagreb Radio.
'"'Zagreb September 1993. FBIS London
Radio. 19 September London the events
the events of the Vares and Stupni D0 Do fighting.
righting.
LD1909123793, 1912372 September
LD1909123793. 11"Sarajevo Radio . 26 October 1993. FBIS Vienna
September 1993. "' Radio. Vienna AU2610095593
AU2610095593
‘9‘
'"' Paris AFP. September 1993. FBIS
AFP, 21 September AU2109105993,
FBIS Vienna 2609552 October 1993.
2111022 SeptemberSeptember 1993. 2‘5 Silber and Little,
" 5 Silher Little. pp. 300-302.
“’5Sarajevo Radio.
'"' Radio, 4 October 1993. FBIS London London LD0410225493,
LD0410225493, 2"’There is.
""There is, however.
however, another
another road to the the north and easteast of Stupni
0422542 October 1993.
0422542 Do that
Do the Vares Croats could probably have used
that the used instead,
instead. under
under-
19"Reuters
'"" Reuters.. "Overnight Fighting Reported in Bosnia,”
“Overnight Fighting Bosnia:· 5 October mining this theory
theory..
1993. 2‘7 Reuters, "New
' 17 Reuters. “New Showdown
Showdown Looms Looms Between Croats and and Muslims
Muslims
1"’7 AFP, 21 September
" 1 Paris AFP. September 1993. FBIS Vienna Vienna AU2AU2109105993,
I 09105993 . Bosnia” bv
in Bosnia" Schork, 30 October 1993.
Kurt Schork.
by Kun
21 10592 September
September 1993. 2"‘UN
'" UN peacekeepers reported hearing mortars and artillery fired
peacekeepers reported fired inin
"’8
'"' Zagreb Radio,Radio . 17 September I 993. FBIS
September 1993. FBIS London
London area into the night of 23 October but saw little evidence of shell
the area
LD1709134693, 1713462 September
LDl709134693. September 1993. impacts or mortar fragmentsfragments when they gained entry into the town
'"'' Zagreb Radio.
'“Zagreb September 1993. FBIS London
Radio, 20 September London on 26 October. It seems seems likely
likely that the HVO
that the HYO removed any evidence
LD2009073593, 2007352 September
LD2009073593. September 1993. shelling-as it did with
of shelling—as with spent cartridges—but it is
spent small-arms cartridges-but
2°”Reuters
'"' Reuters,. "Mostar
“Mostar Moslems
Moslems Launch Three-Pronged Attack Attack on difficult to prove this.
difficult this, especially after the the town‘s
town ·s structures
structures were
Croats,"
Croat s: · 20 September
September 1993. subsequently burned. Reuters,
subsequently Reuters. "Charred Bodies, Bodies. Smouldering
20'Reuters.
"" Reuters, "Croats Moslem City
“Croats Shell Moslem Mostar” 23 September
City of Mostar" September Ruins in Bosnian
Ruins Hamlet” by Kurt
Bosnian Hamlet" Schork, 26 October 1993.
Kurt Schork.
1993. "2‘9
" Reuters, “Evidence Mounts
Reuters . "Evidence Mounts of Massacre in Central Bosnia" Bosnia"' by
202Reuters,
'"' Moslem Fighters Battle in Mostar”
“Croat and Moslem
Reuters . "Croat Mostar" by Giles Kurt Schork,
Kun Schurk. 25 October 1993.
Ellgood
Ellgood, . 24 September
September 1993. 220TheBosnians
""The Bosnians claimed at at the time that the HVO
that the HYO had killedkilled 60 of of
2°3
'"'Paris September 1993. FBIS Vienna
AFP, 21 September
Paris AFP. Vienna AU2109105993,
AU2109105993. the village's
the village‘s 260 residents.
residents. Reuters “UN Aid Convoys
Reuters,. "UN Convoys Caught in in
21 10592 September
2110592 September 1993. Bosnian Crossfire”" by Mark
Bosnian Crossfire Mark Heinrich,
Heinrich. 24 October 1993.
20‘Reuters.
,,~ Reuters, "“UN Confirms Cease-Fire in South Bosnian
UN Confirms Town,”
Bosnian Town:· 22'
"' Reuters, “Charred Bodies,
Reuters. "Charred Bodies. Smouldering Ruins Ruins in Bosnian
Bosnian Ham Ham-
3 October 1993. let" Kun Schork,
let” by Kurt Schork. 27 October 1993.
'205 At one point.
'"Atone HVO issued an official
the HYO
point, the official communique claiming in Reuters,
"' Reuters. "UN“UN Identifies
Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects” Suspects"
that the
that massacre victims were in fact Serbs from the
the massacre the town that
that the
the by Anthony Goodman, . 14 February 1994.
Anthony Goodman
Muslims had used
Muslims used asas human shields during a Bosnian attack on the
Bosnian attack the m
"' Reuters,
Reuters. “Croat
"Croat Attack
Attack in Bosnia
Bosnia a War Crime—UN Official”
War Crime-UN Official" by
HVO defense
HYO defense lines. Paris AFP, AFP. 31 October 1993. FBIS Vienna
FBIS Vienna Maguire . 27 October 1993.
Sean Maguire,
AU3110153193, 3
AU3I10153193. 3115312
I 153 IZ October 1993. 22“
'" It is true
true that
that Bobovac
Bobovac Brigade elements in Vares
Brigade clements Vares consistently
20‘Reuters.
''"' Reuters, "“Huge
Huge NewNew Refugee Problem in Central Bosnia Bosnia"" by obstructed UNPROFOR
obstructed UNPROFOR effons efforts inin the
the area
area before and after the the
Gilles Trequesscr.
Gilles Trequesser, 23 June June 1993. Stupni Do attack (for example
Do attack example,. troops from the brigade were
2“"
'"' Silber and Little, pp. 300-302.
and Little. almost certainly responsible for Swedish APC
tiring on a Swedish
for firing APC attempt—
attempt-
2'“Reuters.
:tlK Reuters, "Moslems
“Moslems Said To To Capture Key Town" by
Key Central Town" ing to check on MuslimMuslim prisoners at a schoolhouse in Vares Vares on
Heinrich, I16
Mark Heinrich.
Mark 6 June 1993. 26 October). There is no conclusive evidence, evidence. however,
however. that the
that the
20"Reuters,
'"' “New Wave of
Reuters. ··New of Ethnic
Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia"
Bosnia“ by Giles Bobovac Brigade was necessarily involved,
Bobovac Brigade involved . the strongest evidence
the strongest
Ellgood. 23 June 1993.
Ellgood, being the numerous
numerous reports of of heavy weapons use during the the day
m Paris AFP.
'"'Paris AFP, 18 June 1993. FBIS FBIS Vienna
Vienna AU1806082693
AU 1806082693 on 23 October.
October . IfIf mortars and especially artillery were used. they
1808262 June 1993. likely came from the Bobovac
most likely Bobovac Brigade,
Brigade. thethe only mortar or
1" Sarajevo Radio.
"' Sarajern September 1993. FBIS
Radio, I1 September Vienna
FBIS Vienna artillery-equipped unit within within the Croat-held enclave.
AUO|09202093 0120202
AU0109202093 0120202 September
September 1993.
2"Also
'" Also known
known as as Viktor Andric.
Viktor Andric.
212
212

2” Ivica Rajic
"' Ivica reportedly founded the Maturice
Rajic reponedly Maturice special forces unit 23"The chiefly concerned about the safety of
'-' 0 The UN at this time was chiefly
the Kiseljak
with troops from the Kiseljak area
area in early 1993. The unit reput
reput- some 570 patients
patients at two hospitals in Fojnica
Fojnica and Bakovici.
Bakovici.
edly was composed of of extreme
extreme Croatian nationalists and may have UNPROFOR
UNPROFOR troops eventually posted guards around the facilities
posted guards facilities
substantial percentage
included a substantial of Bosnian Croat refugees
percentage of refugees.. The and looked
looked after the patients fled. Reuters,
patients when the hospital staffs fled. Reuters.
Maturice
Maturice reputedly used for '"special
reputedly were used missions,"... including
“special missions including the “UN Troops Guard Front-Line
"UN Troops Hospitals in Central Bosnia"
Front-Line Hospitals Bosnia " by
secret
secret executions of Muslims
executions of the Kiseljak
Muslims in the area . (The Maturice
Kiseljak area. Maturice Kurt Schork, 14 November
Kurt Schork. November 1993.
also most likely
likely indulged in war profiteering-Kiseljak
profiteering—Kiseljak being the 7-‘7
'-'' Reuters, “Croats, Moslems
Reuters , "Croats, Moslems Step Up Talks” by
Up Peace Talks" hy Mark
Mark
gateway
gateway to besieged and the
besieged Sarajevo and of the
the capital of the black-market Heinrich,
Heinrich, 12 November
November 1993.
trade .) 23“
' " Reuters,
Reuters . “Moslems
"Moslem s and Croats Fight,
Fight. Leaders Call
Call for
for Truce"
Truce" by hy
trade.)
71‘
" 0 Rijeka
Rijeka No, List, '"Officer
Novi·i List. “Officer Ivie
Ivicaa Rajic
Rajic Arrested for Massacre of Mark Heinrich. 12 November
Mark Heinrich. November 1993.
Muslims," 12 July 1995.
Muslims," 23"
' -'9 Reuters, Launch Attack
“Croats Launch
Reuters. '"Croats Attack inin Central Bosnia”
Bosnia" by Kurt
Kun
"227 Ljiljan, "The
7 Sarajevo Ljiljan, “The Croatian ListList of Bosnian
Bosnian Officers
Officers To
To Be Schork,
Schork. 15 November
November 1993.
Killed”
Killed" by Aziz Handzic March 1996. FBIS Vienna
Handzic, , 6-13 March Vienna 2‘0
2'"' Reuters, “Croats Launch
Reuters. "Croats Tank Attack,
Launch Tank Attack, Moslems
Moslems Back
Back inin
AU1203091296.
AU I 203091296 . Fojnica" by Kun
Fojnica” Kurt Schork,
Schork, 15 November 1993.
22"
'" Silber and Little,
Little . pp. 300-302.
300-302 . 2‘“
' "' Reuters,
Reuters. “Croats
"Croats Pound
Pound Central
Centr al Bosnian
Bosnian Town"
Town'' by John
John Fuller
Fuller-
“9 “Moslems Tell
2' 9 Reuters, "Moslems of Rape,
Tell of Murder in Central Bosnia”
Rape. Murder Bosnia" by ton, 15 November
November 1993.
Kurt Schork, 2 November 1993.
Kun 2‘?
240 Paris AFP, November 1993. FBIS
AFP, 15 November FBIS Vienna
AU I 511113893.
230 “Izetbegovic Says Bosnian Forces Entering Croat Bas
2J0 Reuters. "Izetbegovic Bas- 1511382
151138Z November
November 1993
tion,”
tion ," 4 November 1993. 243 Zagreb Radio,
'" 'Zagreb September 1993. FBIS London
Radio , 19 September London LD19091593
LDl9091593
23'Reuters
"' Reuters,, "Looting Moslem-Captures Bosnian
“Looting Continues in Moslem-Captures 1909152 September 1993.
190915Z September
Town" by Kun
Town" Kurt Schork, 5 November 1993. 14"
2"" Paris AFP,
AFP, 3 December 1993. FBIS FBIS Vienna
AU0312134493 .
23?Reuters, "Looting
231 “Looting Continues in Moslem-Captured Bosnian
Moslem-Captured Bosnian 0313442
03 I 344Z December 1993.
Town“ by Kurt
Town" Kun Schork, 5 November 1993. 2‘5
m Reuters,
Reuters , “Moslems Attack Croats in Central Bosnia,"
"Moslems Attack Bosnia,"
23’Formerly
m thousands of Mus
residences were occupied by thousands
Formerly Croat residences Mus- 22 December 1993.
cleansed out of
lims cleansed of other
other areas
areas of Bosnia during the Croat-Muslim
the Croat-Muslim 2“
246 Zagreb Radio,
Radio, Text of a Letter from
from Croatian Community of
Croatian Community of
“Looting Continues in Moslem-Captures
war. Reuters, '"Looting Moslem-Captures Bosnian Herzeg-Bosna President Mate
Herzeg-Bosna Bohan to the UN
Mate Boban UN Security Council.
Council.
Town” by Kurt
Town" Kun Schork, 5 November 1993. 26 July 1993 FBIS London London LD2607131093.
LD2607 I 3 J 093 .
23‘Reuters, "Moslems
234 “Moslems Attack UN Headquarters Town in Bosnia”
Headquaner s Town Bosnia' '
Heinrich, 12 November 1993.
Mark Heinrich,
by Mark
1'" “Bosnian Leaders Press for
m Reuters, "Bosnian On”
for Truce but Troops Fight On··
Heinrich, 13 November 1993.
Mark Heinrich,
by Mark
213
213

-~~~~: /
., ~',
°'
"'
lllt'I’S
A Canadian UN Protection
A Canadian Protec tion Force ( UNPROF
Force (UN PROFOROR)) M-113
M- 113 Bosnian
Bosnian Serb
Serb Army
A rmy ( VRS)
VRS) troops
troop s from I st Bijeljina
from the 1st Bije/jina
armored p
armored carrier in
ersonnel carrier
personnel Srebrertica,
in Sreb renica, early I 993..
early 1993 Light Infantr y Brigade—“Panthers
Lighr Infantry Brigade- "Panthers "-w "—withdraw fro m Mount
ithdra w from Mount
Igman, Augus t 1993.
lgman , August
,
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troops and Mostar, A
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Bosnian Croat Defense Council
Croat Defense (HVO) soldier with
Council (HVO) with make
mak e-
sp ring I1993.
spring 993. shift lZO-mm
shift 120-mm rocket
rocket launcher in the Vitez enclave,
laun cher in encla ve, central
central
Bosnia, Sep tember 1993.
Bosnia, September
"~4 -
British
Briti sh UN
UN Protection
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Force ((UN PROFOR OR ) troops
troops with
with A Bosnian A n ny (ARBiH ) so ldier in the Sarajevo suburb s,
a Scimitar-armored
Scimit ar-armored reconaissance
reconaissa nce vehicle north-central
vehicle in north-central Jun e I1993.
June 993.
Bosnia,
Bosnia , sprin
springg 1993.
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in
in central Sarajevo, as
central Sarajevo, as seen
seen in 996.
in 1996.
Mostarr and the Old

Mosta Old Bridge, 993.
spring 1993.
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A Bosnian Serb Army
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probabl y fr om the 2nd A
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rmored Brigade, near Doboj,
Doboj ,
Junee I1993.
Jun 993.
1i
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‘
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Briti sh UN Protection
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(UN PRO FOR ) so recoverr Muslim bodies
ldiers recove bod ies from
from a destroyed house,
destroyed house,
April I1993.
993.
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2 16
Digitizedby gt Originalfrom
V
Section V
Section
Bosnia 1994:
1994: The Turning Point
217
217
Digitized by O gle Origir1al from

Chapter 50 capitulation of the
capitulation the Bosnian
Bosnian Government.
Government. The The
War in 1994:
The Bosnian War Point
Turning Point
1994: The Turning ARBiH’s
ARBiH 's staunch defense stopped stopped this
this offensive
offensive in
in its
its
tracks,
tracks , and then its new-found
new-found brazenness
brazenness pushed
pushed the
the
The Bosnian Serb Army’s
The Bosnian Army's failurefailure toto exploit
exploit thethe Serbs onto the the defensive
defensive to such an an extent that they
Muslim-Croat war war and knockknock out the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian would
would never regain
regain the
the strategic initiative. The politi
initiative. The politi-
in 1993
1993 would haunt the the Serbs for the remainder of the
the remainder the cal and military
military leaders
leaders of the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs were
were
war.
war. As 1994 dawned, the
1994 dawned, the Croat-Muslim war slowed, slowed, never able to reach agreement on how how to to end the
the war
war
and US negotiators
negotiators tacked together a framework framework successfully,
successfully, and the the growing
growing Muslim military
military capa
capa-
peace accord
accord between the the twotwo sides-the
sides—the Washington
Washington bility widened
widened thethe splits
splits between thethe two groups .
two groups.
Agreement,
Agreement, which would be be the
the basis for diplomatic
diplomatic These splits would in
These splits in time cause aa more
more profound
profound disdis-
efforts
efforts to
to patch up the division of Bosnia-Herzegov
the division Bosnia-Herzegov- agreement between
between Serbian President Milosevic and
Serbian President
ina. The
The strategic implication
implication of a newly newly improved
improved President Karadzic over acceptance of
Bosnian Serb President
Bosnian
Bosnian
Bosnian Army able to focus focus its undivided
undivided attention on the
the Western
Western "Contact Group” peace plan,
“Contact Group" plan, culminating
culminating
the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs was to make 1994 1994 the the turning point
turning point in
in the imposition of political and economic
the imposition economic sanctions
sanctions
in the
the three-and-a-half-year
three-and-a-half-year war, however.
war. however. The The the Republika
on the Republika Srpska
Srpska byby Federal
Federal Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia.
ARBiH’s victories
ARBiH's victories during
during the the Croat-Muslim conflict conflict
had given
given the force a new sense of confidence.
the force confidence, bol- bol While these
these political divisions widened, , the
divisions widened the military
military
stered by thethe experience
experience many officers officers and men had capability the VRS
capability of the YRS began to wane. Its
to wane. Its bold
bold strategic
gained in conducting small-scale offensive
conducting small-scale offensive operations
operations. . offensive in January-March
offensive in January-March 1994 1994 failed
failed to
to secure anyany
The Muslims had also developed developed more sophisticated
sophisticated permanent gains, for two
permanent gains, two years of warwar had begun to
infantry
infantry tactics, and the the Muslim-Croat rapprochement
rapprochement the VRS,
wear on the Delic’s offensives
YRS. and Delic's offensives would
allowed
allowed the reopening of the
the reopening the arms pipeline through
pipeline through degrade it further.
further. Of the
the offensives launched by
offensives launched by the
the
Croatia to the
Croatia ARBiH. Bosnian
the ARBiH. Bosnian Army commander commander VRS in 1994,
YRS 1994, only
only the Gorazde met with
the attack on Gorazde with
Delic exploited
exploited these
these improvements
improvements to to devise a new new more than temporary
temporary success.
success . Attacking
Attacking Bosnian
Bosnian
strategy that would carry the the warwar to the Serbs. Delic
the Serbs. Army trenches and bunkers
bunkers would
would atat last prove
prove too
placed his hopes on a war attrition across the
war of attrition coun
the coun- costly for the
costly manpower-poor VRS.
the manpower-poor YRS.
try that would employ
employ smallsmall to medium-sized
medium-sized attacks
in an
an effort
effort toto wear down
down the the Serbs and gain back back key
key Nevertheless, for most
Nevertheless, most of the the VRS
the year the YRS retained its
bits of territory.
territory. HeHe believed
believed his biggerbigger army could could strike successfully
ability to strike isolated ARBiH
successfully against isolated ARBiH
absorb more easilyeasily than the the VRS
YRS the the manpower
manpower losses enclaves, such as Gorazde.
enclaves, Gorazde, or against overextended
overextended
require . When
this strategy would require. When he put it into into effect, ARBiH units conducting
ARBiH operations. In its
offensive operations.
conducting offensive
the fighting reached new
the tempo of fighting levels, surpassing
new levels, surpassing defensive operations
defensive operations at Ozren, , Treskavica
at Ozren Treskavica, , and Bihac,
Bihac,
those of 1992,
1992, as battle after battle raged day after day the VRS was still
the YRS still able
able to orchestrate professionally
professionally a
for obscure villages. mountains, and roads throughout
villages, mountains, throughout large-scale operation, , move
large-scale operation move hundreds
hundreds or or thousands of
Bosnia.
Bosnia . troops into
troops into position, counterattack, skillfully
position, and then counterattack, skillfully
employing
employing its its superior weaponry and elite units
superior weaponry units to
Delic’s hold-and-hit
Delic's hold-and-hit strategy appears to have surprised
surprised positions. By the
regain lost positions. the end of the
the year, however,
however.
the
the Serbs. The VRS began the
The YRS the year with
with a strategic when the
when VRS was
the YRS relying on defensive
was relying defensive successes to to
offensive plan designed to
offensive to knock
knock out thethe Bosnian
Bosnian punish the Muslims in
punish the in hopes of ending the conflict,
ending the conflict ,
through a series of operations
Army through operations toto seize
seize key por-
por simply could
they simply could not afford
afford the
the heavy manpower
manpower
tions of territory
tions territory that consolidate the
that would consolidate “borders”"
the "borders
of the Republika Srpska,
the Republika the Tuzla region
Srpska, sever the from
region from
central Bosnia,
Bosnia. and perhaps even forceforce the
the
219
219

losses that
that the ARBiH operations were causing, even newly Federation and one of which
newly created Federation which would
would go
if each attack was defeated.
if defeated. It
It was clear by then that
that to the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact
the Bosnian Contact Group
Group plan
the Serbs were beginning
beginning to lose the
the war. the cantonally
replaced the Vance-Owen Plan,
cantonally based Vance-Owen Plan, a
effectively dead for months.
concept that had been effectively A
A
The year ended with
The with even more ominous
ominous harbingers central concept of the Contact Group’s
Group's proposal
proposal was
for the Serbs. In the midst of their successful counter
counter- the allocation 51 percent of Bosnia’s
allocation of 51 Bosnia's land area to
offensive Bihac in December 1994, they found
offensive at Bihac found the Federation
Federation and the
the remaining
remaining 49 percent to the
themselves once again facing Croatian
Croatian Army troops as Republika Srpska.
Republika The hard part, of course, was
Srpska. The was get
get-
the Zagreb government ordered its forces into the the the parties to agree not only
ting the plan itself
to the plan
only to itself but
Livno Valley (Livanjsko Polje), ostensibly
Valley (Livanjsko ostensibly to help thethe also to the map. Exactly which 51
Exactly which 51 percent or 49 per
per-
ARBiH at Bihac,
ARBiH Bihac, but more directly
directly to outflank the
to outflank the hugely contentious issue, as
cent each side got was a hugely as
Krajina Serb Army's
Krajina defenses around Knin in Croatia.
Army’s defenses Croatia. some of Bosnia’s
Bosnia's land area was far more valuable
valuable than
VRS, however, that
It was the YRS, that had toto come up with
with others. The bargaining sessions over the postwar
The bargaining postwar map
most of the troops to hold this vulnerable cross-border were conducted by diplomats in Geneva,
diplomats in Geneva, but all
all sides
sector. which the strained YRS
sector, troops which VRS had difficulty
difficulty knew that the end the map would
that in the be decided on the
would be
finding. The deployment of Zagreb's
finding. The Zagreb’s elite Guards battlefield force of arms.
battlefield by force
Brigades victories they began to rack up fore-
Brigades and the victories fore
shadowed the decisive tum of events that would would come Chapter
Chapter 5151
in 1995. Bosnian
Bosnian Serb War Aims, Military Strategy, and
War Aims,
Political-Military
Political-Military Relations,
Relations, 1994
1994
Political Landscape in 1994

The Bosnian Political 1994 The Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs were remarkablyremarkably steadfast
steadfast through
through
1993 and into 1994
1993 in their pursuit of the
1994 in the war
war aims laid
laid
By the beginning
beginning of 1994.1994, what had been the the single down
down in late 1992 and early
late 1992 early 1993. They had achieved
1993. They
state Yugoslavia was now
state of Yugoslavia now fragmented into a bewilbewil- virtually all of their territorial
virtually all territorial objectives
objectives atat acceptable
jigsaw of states,
dering jigsaw substates, and self-proclaimed
states, substates, self-proclaimed costs. This very success posed a problem problem within
within the
the
ministates. With the signingsigning of the Washington
Washington Agree-
Agree leadership, however, for the political leaders generally
the political generally
March, there
ment in March, there were no fewer
fewer than 12 12 “presi
"presi- spoke and acted as as if war was over, and they seemed
the war
if the
dents” of one kind
dents" kind or another on the the territory of the reluctant toto deal with
with their generals’
generals' conviction
conviction that
that the
the
Yugoslavia—five of these
former Yugoslavia-five within Bosnia
these within Bosnia conflict had to
conflict to be
be brought to to a decisive
decisive close with
with a sig
sig-
alone.1 1 It
alone. It seemed
seemed at times as if if Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia was suffer-
suffer nal military victory over the
military victory the Muslims.
Muslims. Undeterred,
Undeterred,
ing from a multiple-personality
multiple-personality disorder, with each of General Mladic and the the VRS
YRS moved forward with mili
forward with mili-
its successor states characteris
states representing different characteris- tary planning
planning to to achieve such a victory,
victory, ignoring
ignoring the
the
attitudes.
tics and attitudes. apparent reluctance of KaradzicKaradzic and the the SDS,
SOS, who
who con
con-
tinued—with
tinued-with Milosevic’s backing-to look for Serb
Milosevic's backing—to Serb
Two years into thethe war, with all of the combatants
war. and with advantages in
advantages in the
the Owen-Stoltenberg
Owen-Stoltenberg process that that
battered and weary, everyone hoped that
battered that peace was sought a negotiated settlement.
settlement.
just comer—but nobody
just around the comer-but could seem to
nobody could
find the comer. Peace hopes at this time centered on
find The VRS
The offensive—initially codenamed
YRS strategic offensive-initially
the diplomatic five-nation "Contact
diplomatic efforts of the five-nation “Contact “Drina 93"-was
"Drina 93”—was conceived
conceived as as a series of separate
separate but
Group” formed in April 1994 by the
Group" the United States,
United States. coordinated from Bihac to Olovo.
running from
coordinated operations running
Britain, France. Germany,
Great Britain, Russia.
Germany, and Russia. The biggest operation of
The of this series occurred
occurred during
during
November 1993-January 1994 around Olovo
November 1993—January Olovo where
The signing of the Washington
signing of Washington Agreement and the the VRS troops attempted
YRS attempted to lines of
to sever the lines of communi
communi-
Croat-Muslim Federation made possi
creation of the Croat-Muslim possi- cation between Tuzla and Zenica.
Zenica. Follow-on
which was
Group’s new proposal, which
ble the Contact Group's
division of Bosnia-Herzegov-
territorial division
essentially a territorial Bosnia-Herzegov
which would
ina into two halves, one of which would go to the
the
220
220

operations
operations would then destroy ARBiH 2nd Corps Corps Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, and against the
the Mostar-Sarajevo
Mostar-Sarajevo highway
highway
forces
forces around Tuzla.
Tuzla. TheThe Main Staff Staff apparently
apparently concurrently with the
concurrently with second Nisici
the second Nisici attack in
in October
October. .
believed
believed that
that the
the destruction
destruction of a major major ARBiH forfor The biggest VRS
The biggest YRS effort
effort during period, however,
this period,
during this however,
mation
mation and the the loss
loss of such a key key region
region would forceforce was Operation 94,” a joint offensive
"Breza 94,"
Operation “Breza offensive with
with the
the
Sarajevo
Sarajevo to surrender.
surrender. Most of the the other operations
operations Serb Army (SVK)
Krajina Serb (SYK) against thethe Bihac
Bihac enclave
enclave
were designed to seize key territory territory and nailnail down
down the to
to punish
punish and pin
pin down
down the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army 5th
5th Corps.
Corps.
"borders"
“borders” of the Republika Serpska
the Republika Serpska. . This included
included an an All of these attacks made some headway,
headway, but each
operation
operation in November-December
1993 at Teocak
Teocak to time the
the Bosnians
Bosnians held
held their
their ground
ground and drove
drove the
the
sever the
the Sapna salient and seize a key hydroelectric
key hydroelectric Serbs back the ARBiH’s
back while the ARBiH's own own operations
operations contin
contin-
dam,, and at Maglaj to
dam to capture important lines of com-
important lines com ued unabated.
unabated.
munication.
munication. The The YRSVRS launched
launched additional
additional attacks durdur
February-March 1994 at Bihac
ing February-March Bihac and Maglaj-Tesanj Even when the
Even when the Main
Main Staff was was not
not conducting
conducting its own own
to secure key terrain and road/rail
road/rail networks.
networks. (NATO's
(NATO’s offensive
offensive operations,
operations, it sought
sought to the Muslims’
to use the Muslims'
ultimatum to the
ultimatum the Serbs at Sarajevo
Sarajevo in February
February, , after attacks to to the
the Serbs'
Serbs’ advantage. The The VRSYRS became
became
the
the "marketplace massacre,” that
“marketplace massacre," forced them to
that forced adept as the the year went
went onon in
in "punishing"
“punishing” the the Bosnian
Bosnian
remove YRS
remove VRS heavy
heavy weapons
weapons from from around
around thethe city,
city, inflicting maximum
Army for its attacks, inflicting maximum casualties,
casualties ,
appears toto have had little
little impact
impact on YRS VRS strategy anyany turning
turning initial victories into defeats, and feeding
victories into feeding thethe
where
where else .) These
else.) These attacks were successful,
were initially successful, Serbs
Serbs’ ' superiority complex. Their spectacular
superiority complex. spectacular defeat
defeat
but—ominously—the YRS
but-ominously-the VRS failed
failed to hold
hold any of its of the near-victorious Muslims in
the near-victorious in the
the Ozren
Ozren waswas aa big
big
battlefield gains against the
battlefield Bosnian Army.
the Bosnian Army. boost to VRS
boost YRS pride,
pride, but their
their biggest
biggest and most
most surpris
surpris-
ing counteroffensive victory
ing counteroffensive victory in in 1994
1994 came
came at at Bihac inin
In March, after the the Washington
Washington Agreement
Agreement ended the the November-December. . For a time
November-December time the advance of
rapid advance
the rapid
Croat-Muslim war, war, the Bosnian Army began its new
the Bosnian new the ARBiH 5th Corps
the ARBiH Corps and the the collapse
collapse of thethe VRS
YRS 2nd2nd
attrition
attrition strategy against the Serbs, launching
the Serbs, launching attacks Krajina Corps forces shocked
Corps forces shocked even the the Serbs drew
Serbs and drew
all across thethe country.
country. Fearing
Fearing they would lose the the predictions
predictions from from the
the international community of the
international community the
initiative, the
strategic initiative, the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb Supreme
Supreme Com- Com VRS’s imminent
YRS's imminent demise.
demise. TheThe Main
Main Staff snapped
snapped
mand and the the VRS
YRS launched
launched their ownown offensive
offensive back, however,
back, however, and engineered
engineered the recapture of all
the recapture all the
the
against the isolated Gorazde
the isolated Gorazde enclave
enclave in April 1994.
in April 1994. By lost territory,
lost territory, handing
handing thethe 5th Corps
Corps aa near—total
near-total
this move
move they hoped to to pressure Sarajevo
Sarajevo intointo sign-
sign defeat. ItIt was tonic for the
valuable tonic
was a valuable Serbs in
the Serbs in a year
nationwide cease-fire
ing a nationwide cease-fire thatthat would lock in Serb beset with strategic downers.
with strategic downers.
territorial gains in exchange
territorial exchange for halting
halting the Gorazde
the Gorazde
offensive. If
offensive. If this failed,
failed, the VRS could
the YRS could proceed
proceed to to Karadzic’s order
Karadzic's order to halt
halt the
the operation against Bihac,
operation against Bihac,
destroy the enclave, almost
the enclave, almost completely finishing the
completely finishing the when, rightly
when, rightly or wrongly, the VRS
wrongly, the believed itit was
YRS believed was on
on
work it had started in the the Drina valley
valley in 1993. In the
in 1993. the the verge of eliminating
the the 5th Corps.
eliminating the Corps, had
had exacer
exacer-
when the
event, when Bosnian Government
the Bosnian Government refused
refused to take bated the the political-military triangle
fraying of the
the fraying triangle concon-
the Gorazde bait, the
the Gorazde VRS bore down
the YRS down on the enclave
the enclave necting Karadzic, Mladic,
necting Mladic, and Milosevic. The pulling
Milosevic. The
with considerable
with considerable success before before punitive
punitive NATONATO airair between political and military leaders
hauling between
and hauling leaders
strikes and strong pressure from from Milosevic forced forced spun out a long skein of problems
long skein dating back
problems dating back to thethe
call off the
them to call offensive.
the offensive. end of 1993.
1993.
finessed the
Having finessed Serbs’ Gorazde
the Serbs' Gorazde operation
operation, , the
the Karadzic appears to to have been the bold of the
the least bold the
Bosnian continued its strategic offensive
Bosnian Army continued offensive across three, supporting negotiations throughout
supporting negotiations the war
throughout the war and
the
the country with repeated small
country with small and medium-sized
medium-sized always willing
always willing to sacrifice what Mladic
sacrifice what Mladic would per
per-
attacks that kept the VRS everywhere
the YRS everywhere on the the defen - ceive as military
ceive in order
necessities in
military necessities to score a politi
order to politi-
struggling to
sive. Still struggling the initiative
to regain the initiative and extend point in
cal point the West.
in the West. He the SDS
He and the SDS also
also opposed
opposed
the boundaries of their republic,
the boundaries republic, the VRS Main
the YRS Main Staff
ordered attacks against the Nisici Plateau
the Nisici Plateau in in May and
October to secure a key
October northwest of
key road route northwest
221
221

the
the idea of a "war-winning offensive,” believing
“war-winning offensive," believing that stop him from continuing
him from continuing to to argue for offensive
offensive action
action
the Serbs
Serbs had already
already achieved
achieved their war
war aims. Never-
aims. Never against the Bosnian Army: when
the Bosnian when Karadzic ordered
ordered the
theless, Karadzic regularly
regularly held
held fast on
on key
key negotiat-
negotiat VRS to
YRS to halt
halt its offensive against Bihac and then
offensive against
ing points,
ing making it impossible
points, making impossible compose
compose aa settlement
settlement accepted a cease-fire
cease-fire in 1994, Mladic
in late 1994, Mladic blamed
blamed
a
palatable
palatable to the Muslims. Karadzic, and their
their disagreement became permanent,
disagreement became permanent.
ready to
ready wide open
to burst wide open in spring of 1995.
in the spring 1995.
When Karadzic and the SOS SDS rejected
rejected the Contact
Contact
Group peace plan plan in August, following Milosevic’s
August, following Milosevic's
acceptance of it, Milosevic
Milosevic coldly applied The Bosnian Serb Army in
Bosnian Serb 1994—The Weary
it,
grudging
grudging acceptance applied The in 1994-The Weary
political and economic
economic sanctions against the
sanctions against the leaders Giant"
Giant•
and territories
territories of the Republika Srpska. Milosevic
Republika Srpska. Milosevic was was
more pragmatic
more decisive than Karadzic and, seek
pragmatic and decisive seek- Bosnian Serb
The Bosnian Serb Army during during 1994 went from the
1994 went
ing relief from
ing sanctions imposed
from the sanctions imposed on Federal
Federal victorious force
victorious force that had achieved
achieved major victories in
major victories in
Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, he he was willing compromise over
willing to compromise over the
the the previous year to a skilled but tired army
the previous army that was
a
borders of whatever
nature and borders whatever SerbSerb entity
entity was
was to
to still able to hold
still most of the Serbs’
hold on to most Serbs' territorial
territorial
exist in Bosnia as as long Serb interests remained
long as key Serb remained claims. These
claims. defensive successes,
These defensive successes, however,
however, camecame at a
a
exempting the VRS
intact. By exempting from any of the sanc price manpower and resources
price in manpower resources that the VRS YRS was was
in
intact. YRS from the sanc-
tions applied
tions republic, Milosevic made plain
applied to the republic, plain his
his sustain. As
less and less able to sustain. As the Serbs’
Serbs' ownown failed
failed
support
support for and reliance
reliance on the
the future
future of the
the Bosnian
Bosnian offensive operations
offensive operations and the the Bosnian Army’s
Army's attacks
attacks
Serb Republic. took their toll,
took their toll, the wear and tear on
the wear on the VRS began to
YRS began
show. Ammunition and fuel
show. fuel expenditures
expenditures beganbegan to
The most
The enigmatic of this
most enigmatic triumvirate was General
this triumvirate General drain the
drain VRS depots;
the YRS depots; the
the always critical manpower
always critical manpower
Mladic, whose
Mladic, whose mixed
mixed motivations
motivations made him him anan unpre-
unpre situation
situation worsened
worsened with increasing casualties
with increasing casualties and
dictable card. Mladic
dictable wild card. Mladic had tirelessly insisted dur
tirelessly insisted dur- desertions,
desertions, forcing the the VRS
YRS to rely rely even more
more on on
ing 1993
ing 1993 and 19941994 that he be allowed
he be “win the
allowed to "win war”
the war" reservists and undertrained
overage reservists
overage undertrained conscripts. Offic
conscripts. Offic-
by decisively
decisively defeating
defeating the Bosnian Army, complain-
the Bosnian complain ers and NCOsNCOs from Yugoslav Army, and VJ
from the Yugoslav Y J logis
logis-
politicians were
ing that the politicians
ing were hindering
hindering military opera-
military opera tic and maintenance support (which continued
maintenance support continued despite
tions with
tions with what
what hehe called “Stop-Go” strategy.
called their "Stop-Go" the inter-Serb sanctions imposed
inter-Serb sanctions imposed in August),
August), helped
helped
(Whether
(Whether the YRS VRS could actually have won
could actually won such
such a stiffen and sustain
stiffen sustain the faltering VRS,
the faltering YRS, while VJ Y J and
a
decisive
decisive victory
victory is anan open question.)
question.) Mladic also also Serbian RDB
Serbian ROB special operations unitsjoined
special operations units joined with
with
is
stubbornly
stubbornly opposed territory to the Muslims
returning territory
opposed returning VRS
YRS combat
combat forces during fighting
forces during fighting atat Bihac late in the the
Croats, particularly
or Croats, particularly areas he thought were strategi-
thought were strategi year. These
year. These troops
troops probably
probably numbered
numbered no more more than
the RS. This would seem to have put him
vital to the
cally vital him 500 to 1,000
500 1,000 men and could could hardly substitute for VRS
hardly substitute YRS
at odds with Milosevic, who
with Milosevic. who was willing to
was more than willing formations
formations stretched along along the 1,000-kilometer
1,000-kilometer front front-
compromise on the map, and more in line
compromise with
line with Allied Krajina Serb
line.1 Allied
line.3 Serb Army formations
formations and FikretFikret
in
Karadzic and hardline

hardline elements of the SDS. The
the SOS. The Abdic’s Serb-armed Muslim
Abdic's Serb-armed Muslim separatist troops troops were
were
general was ideologically to Milosevic, additions to VRS operations, but only in
in
general close to
ideologically close Milosevic, the ex- ex also welcome additions
also welcome YRS operations,
Communist, however,
Communist, however, and he despised Karadzic and
he despised around Bihac.“
actions around
actions Bihac. 4 ..
the SDS as unfit
the SOS unfit and corrupt rulers who
corrupt rulers who siphoned
siphoned off
money and supplies
money fill their
supplies to fill own pockets
their own instead of
pockets instead The YRS
VRS was
was able
able to adapt its
its combat
combat doctrine
doctrine to
helping the army
helping army fight. could the
fight.22 Nor could the general
general openly
openly counter increasingly effective
counter increasingly Bosnian Army
effective Bosnian Army attacks
defy Belgrade. on which he
defy Belgrade, he depended for money money and as the year
as year progressed. Faced with
progressed. Faced with a long frontage and
long frontage
a
logistic
logistic support prosecute the war:
support to prosecute war; he knew
knew as as well a manpower
manpower shortage, the Main
shortage. the Main Staff's objective in
Staff’s objective in
a
anyone that the Bosnian

as anyone
as Serbs could
Bosnian Serbs could not afford
afford a
a
“
· See Chapter 21. ·· Mladic’s Own: The Bosnian Army:· for
Bosnian Serb Army,”
'
Mladic's Own: for a

a
schism with
schism with Serbia. So, despite Mladic’s
Serbia. So, Mladic's dislike of the of the
the VRS
VRS throughout the war.
general
general survey of
Contact Group plan,
Contact he tacitly
plan, he tacitly backed Milosevic in
backed Milosevic in the
the " See Annex 46:
·· Annex the Ropes: An
On the Analysis of
An Analysis of VRS Resilience,
VRS Resilience.
dispute blamed Karadzic for promoting
dispute and blamed promoting another
another for a more in-depth discussion of
for VRS problems during 1994.
of VRS
a
“Chetnik-Partisan”
"Chetnik-Partisan" split
split among
among the Serbs. This did
the Serbs. did not
222
222

formulating defensive doctrine
formulating defensive doctrine was to artificially
to artificially beginning of 1994,
beginning Sarajevo had an Army that
1994, Sarajevo that was
was
create a layered
layered "defense
“defense in depth."
depth.” The The outer layerlayer doing this,
capable of doing this, although
although not in
in the
the most effi
effi-
consisted
consisted of a thick mines, followed by
thick carpet of mines, by an
an cient or desirable
desirable manner.
outpost line,
line, then a mainmain defensive
defensive lineline of interlocking
interlocking
bunkers and trenches. Brigade-level
bunkers Brigade-level reserves were were commander Delic was
Army commander was the
the architect of thethe coun
coun-
then stationed behindbehind thethe main
main line. interaction of
The interaction
line. The try-wide
try-wide attrition
attrition strategy that
that was
was the
the foundation
foundation of
these elements, with with supporting
supporting artillery, should have
artillery, should the Army’s
the Army's plans.
plans. Put
Put simply,
simply, the numerically superior
the numerically superior
the effect. The
the desired effect. VRS appears to have assumed
The YRS ARBiH would bleed its opponent
ARBiH opponent with many wounds
with many wounds
that,
that, given
given thethe frontage
frontage a brigade might hold—often
brigade might hold-often by attacking
by everywhere, winning the
attacking everywhere, war even if it
the war
20 kilometers
kilometers or more-the
more—the ARBiH would be able to lost most of the
lost the battles. The Army’s new
The Army's new doctrine
doctrine fitfit
infiltrate and storm at least some portion
infiltrate portion of the VRS
the YRS with this strategy: it would
with would seek to to achieve
achieve a continual
continual
line. The
line. minefields, combined
The minefields, combined with with a rain of mortar series of limited sustainable without
limited gains sustainable without artillery
artillery
and artillery fire, were designed
artillery fire, designed to slow slow this penetra-
penetra support or motorized transport and roll the
motorized transport frontline
the frontline
tion and thin the
tion the Muslim infantry
infantry as they passed back
back a kilometer
kilometer atat a time ifif need be.
be.
through
through the the Serb front.
front. The line infantry
The line infantry holding
holding thethe
main
main defensive
defensive line line would add their own own attrition
attrition From
From the Presidency in Sarajevo
the Presidency Sarajevo all the way
all the way toto the
the
effect, but these older troops would withdraw
older troops withdraw rather infantry
infantry platoon
platoon advancing toward a local
advancing toward ridge line,
local ridge line.
than try to stand and be overrun. When, hopefully
overrun. When, hopefully the Bosnian
the Government had a coherent political
Bosnian Government political-
depleted of a considerable
considerable portionportion of their
their strength, military strategy whose
military goals and means matched. It
whose goals It
the
the Muslim troops graduallygradually slowed
slowed to a stop, the the Serb was hardly an ideal
hardly an ideal strategy—no
strategy-no armyarmy in the world
in the
reserves, picked
picked men formedformed intointo elite "intervention"
“intervention” has ever been enthusiastic
enthusiastic about warswars of attrition—but
attrition-but
counterattack and drive
units, would then counterattack drive the
the weak
weak- it was one that offered
offered a realistic
realistic prospect
prospect of victory
victory
ened ARBiH
ARBiH units out of the the Serb defenses. Corps Corps- on the horizon, distant though
the horizon, though that horizon
horizon might
might be.
be.
level intervention
level intervention forcesforces provided
provided the the vital
vital stiffening
stiffening
for the local units
the local counterattacks. To
units in such counterattacks. To make up
for the overall manpower
the overall manpower shortages. these few few mobile
mobile The Bosnian Army
Army in 1994:
1994: Fighting the War
Fighting the War of
reserve formations
formations were repeatedly shifted shifted across the the Attrition
Attrition
country, from
country, from battle to battle .5
to battle.5
Thanks to the
Thanks the vision and dogged determination
determination gener-
gener
Chapter 52
Chapter ated by the
the chaotic first days of the
chaotic first the war, the Bosnian
war, the Bosnian
Bosnian Government Objectives and Military Army had by by the beginning of 1994
the beginning evolved into
1994 evolved into anan
Strategy in 1994 effective light
effective infantry force
light infantry force able to to defend govem
govern-
ment-held territory against most Bosnian
ment-held territory Bosnian Serb
Serb Army
As 1994 began, the Bosnian Government's
the Bosnian Govemment’s first prior
first prior- attacks and to conduct modest offensive
to conduct offensive operations.
operations.
ity was
ity was to
to end the conflict—by sword
the Croat-Muslim conflict-by sword Steady improvements
improvements in training,
training, leadership,
leadership, and
or pen. Happily for thethe Bosnian Army, that
Bosnian Army. conflict
that conflict equipment
equipment had all all worked
worked to to raise
raise the capabilities of
the capabilities
was ended by treaty a few few weeks
weeks intointo the allow
the year, allow- Sarajevo's forces. Morale had been boosted
fighting forces.
Sarajevo’s fighting boosted
ing
ing the Army to concentrate on its its primary adver
primary adver- battlefield successes against the
by battlefield
by the HVO,
HYO, and the the
sary-the VRS—and its
sary—the YRS-and its primary
primary objective-the
objective—the signing of a federation
signing federation agreement between the Bos
the Bos-
Muslim-majority territories.
recapture of lost Muslim-majority territories. To To do nian Muslims and Croats
nian Croats gave the ARBiH the
the ARBiH final lift
the final
the ARBiH
however, the
this, however, ARBiH would have to go over to it needed to shift
shift to the
the strategic offensive
offensive against the the
the offensive, with
the strategic offensive, with all
all that
that it implied The
implied. . The Serbs.
military leaders needed an
govemment’s military
government's overall
an overall
offensive strategy, a doctrine
offensive doctrine and tactics that fit this
that fit Organizationally,
Organizationally, the force was
the force was much
much the
the same as
as the
the
strategy but could carried out with
could still be carried with the Army’s
the Army's one launched early in
launched early in 1992. The ARBiH
1992. The ARBiH was
was divided
divided
limited resources, and a training
limited program that would
training program into five
five corps
corps headquartered at Sarajevo,
Sarajevo, Tuzla,
produce a force
produce force disciplined proficient enough to
disciplined and proficient
the maneuvers
execute the maneuvers required
required by by the
the strategy. By the the
223
223

Zenica. Travnik, and Bihac.
Zenica, Travnik. Bihac. (The former 6th Corps
(The former Corps training. In
training. all of these
In all ARBiH
these areas, the
the
ARBiH had propro-
Konjic was deactivated
headquartered at Konjic deactivated early
early in the
the gressed beyond its initial focus
beyond its focus on
on basic
basic survival
survival and
year.
year, at the
the same time the new new 7th Corps was was estab
estab- was slowly mastering
was mastering the much more difficult
much more difficult chal
chal-
lished at Travnik.) Most of these
lished these corps were further
corps were further lenges of conducting
lenges conducting large-scale
large-scale operations.
operations. The
The
subdivided
subdivided into "Operational
“Operational Groups," semiperma-
Groups,” semiperma ARBiH had by by this
this point established officer
point established officer and
nent groupings
groupings of several
several brigades
brigades that provided
provided an an soldier training
soldier training schools
schools to help establish
establish uniform
uniform
intermediate. division-level of command.
intermediate, division-level command. The brigade
brigade improve skills across
standards and improve across the board.
board. Of
remained
remained the the primary maneuver unit,
primary maneuver unit. usually
usually com-
com necessity. most of the
necessity, lessons of warfare
the lessons were still
warfare were
2,000 troops
1,500 to 2.000
prised of 1.500 troops but sometimes
sometimes ranging
ranging being learned the hard
being hard way
way in
in the more
more demanding
demanding
in size from
from several
several hundred to over over 3,000.
3,000. Some
Some academy of the battlefield.
and less forgiving academy battlefield.
important
important changes were under way, however, as
way. however. as the
the
Army began to differentiate its units
to differentiate units and establish
establish the
the Increasingly sophisticated
Increasingly sophisticated tactics
tactics emerged that played
played
elite, all-volunteer
all-volunteer assault formations usually desig
formations usually desig- to the
to Army’s
Army's strengths as
as an
an infantry
infantry force
force and were
were
nated either "liberation brigade" or
“liberation brigade” or “light
"light brigade”
brigade" intended to
intended to strike
strike at
at the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs’
Serbs' advantages.
advantages.
that would
would make its offensive
offensive strategy possible.‘
possible.' Elite "recon-sabotage" units would scout
“recon-sabotage” units scout the battle
battle-
field before
field before attacks and identify weaknesses in
identify weaknesses in the
the
In material Bosnian Army still lagged
material terms the Bosnian lagged glar-
glar enemy lines.
enemy units would conduct
These same units
lines. These conduct sabo
sabo-
ingly behind
behind its Bosnian
Bosnian Serb opponent. An
Serb opponent. An elaborate tage operations
operations early
early in
in the disrupt VRS
the battle to disrupt YRS com
com-
network
network of overseas fundraising
fundraising operations
operations had mand control links,
mand and control links. destroy artillery observation
destroy artillery observation
helped bring substantial sums of money
bring in substantial money from from the posts. and knock
posts, knock out key
key strongpoints,
strongpoints, softening
softening the
the
Bosnian diaspora:
Bosnian diaspora: between April April 1992 and the the end of enemy for the
enemy the main
main attack. Handpicked
Handpicked assault
assault units
units
1993, Bosnian Army received
1993. the Bosnian received some $24 million would spearhead the main
would main infantry assault, followed
infantry assault,
from contributions and was
from overseas contributions was able to use this
to use by the
by territorially based regular
the territorially regular infantry.
infantry.
money
money to
to purchase infantry weapons.
infantry weapons, ammunition,
ammunition.
uniforms, and other military
uniforms. supplies" These
military supplies." These acquisi
acquisi- During 1994
1994 these cumulative improvements in
cumulative improvements in Bos
Bos-
tions
tions still the Bosnian
still left the Bosnian military
military terribly deficient in
terribly deficient in nian Army organization,
nian equipment. and training
organization, equipment, training were
were
the crucial weapons-and. just as signif
crucial area of heavy weapons—and, signif- to produce proficient forces
increasingly proficient
produce increasingly forces that proved
proved
icantly. ammunition for the
icantly, in terms of ammunition few artillery
the few artillery able—at on occasion—to
able-at least on occasion-to mount
mount coordinated
coordinated
pieces. tanks, and mortars the
pieces, tanks. ARBiH had seized
the ARBiH seized or attacks involving
involving multiple brigades. The Army still
multiple brigades.
captured. The Army'sArmy’s logistic
logistic system was still rudi-
was still rudi lacked
lacked the equipment
equipment and logistic
logistic infrastructure
infrastructure nec
nec-
mentary but workable
workable and dealt adequately
adequately with with essary for sophisticated
sophisticated and sustained
sustained combined-arms
combined-arms
recurring
recurring problems standardization, supply,
problems of standardization. supply, and operations, but it had developed
operations, developed aa war-fighting
war-fighting
distribution. Its greatest shortcoming
distribution. shortcoming was lack of
was lack method commensurate with
method commensurate the material
with the material and human
human
mobility: it had too few APCs or even trucks
few APCs trucks to to allow
allow resources
resources available
available to it. Although still not
to it. capable of
not capable
infantry to exploit
its infantry exploit breakthroughs effectively. and
breakthroughs effectively, the VRS
defeating the
defeating YRS in
in set-piece or of retaking
set-piece battles or retaking
could not adequately support
its brigades could reinforce
support or reinforce and holding large tracts of Serb-held
holding large Serb-held territory.
territory. the
the
Without the force
each other. Without multiplier of mobility,
force multiplier mobility, Bosnian Army was
Bosnian prepared to try fighting
was prepared fighting its way
way out
out
the
the manpower
manpower advantage that the the planners relied on
planners relied of the comer.
corner.
could not be
could exploited because not enough
be fully exploited enough riflerifle-
could be
men could be brought
brought together at critical times
at critical times and Chapter
Chapter 53
53
places. Bosnian Croat War
Bosnian Croat War Aims
Aims and
Military
Military Strategy in
in 1994
1994
None of the gains the
the Army had made in organization,
in organization.
size,
size. or even weaponry were as
weaponry were as its
important as
as important At
At the beginning of 1994,
the beginning 1994, the overriding Bosnian
the overriding Bosnian
improvements
improvements in
in strategy,
strategy. doctrine,
doctrine, tactics, and Croat objective was
Croat political objective was simply
simply toto get out of the
the
'
Croat-Muslim conflict
conflict itit had started the previous
previous year.
year.
·A organized into three
brigade was usually organized
A liberation brigade three or four
The HVO
HYO had little prospect of additional
little prospect additional gains;
gains;
battalions with a total
battalions of 1.000
total of 2,000 troops
1,000 to 2.000 troops and
and (relatively)
robust fire
robust support. A
fire support. brigade was usually organized
A light brigade organized into six would in
would all likelihood eventually
in all eventually lose the surrounded
lose the surrounded
seven companies
or seven total of
companies with a total than 1,000
of less than 1,000 troops.
troops. These
sometimes blurred. and
distinctions sometimes there were many “mountain”
and there --mountain"
that were
brigades that
brigades were elite
elite assault
assault units.
224
224

enclaves
enclaves around Vitez, Kiseljak, and perhaps
around Vitez, perhaps Zepce;
Zepce; Ante Roso's
Ante Roso’s job was to improve and professionalize
to improve professionalize
and was with a serious
was faced with problem of limited
serious problem limited man-
man the
the HVO
HYO into
into a compact, effective fighting
compact, effective force. At
fighting force. At
power
power and mounting casualties.s. Having
mounting casualtie tried to ride
Having tried ride the very least, he
the very he had to deal with the HVO’s
with the HVO's most
most
the
the tiger, the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Croats
Croats were
were looking for a way way to unruly and unreliable
unruly unreliable elements Rasim Delic,
elements. . Under Rasim
dismount.
dismount. TheThe international community—led by the
international community-led the the Bosnian Army had cracked
the Bosnian down on its renegade
cracked down
diplomatic
diplomatic efforts
efforts of the
the United States-and
States—and the the units
units in Sarajevo the previous
Sarajevo the previous year. The HVO
year. The HYO had yet
Croatian Government
Croatian Government offered
offered the
the Bosnian Croats that
Bosnian Croats to deal with
with its own ill-disciplined criminal elements,
its own
escape. The
The Washington Agreement was a political
Washington Agreement especially in places
especially in like Kiseljak
places like Mostar. 7 Most
Kiseljak and Mostar.7
and military about-face
about-face that
that made the former adver-
the former adver HVO
HYO troops
troops were draftees or or reservists,
reservists, and when
when
saries into
into overnight allies—but it got the
overnight allies-but Bosnian
the Bosnian they were not defending
were not defending their home
home areas their
their fight
fight-
Croats
Croats out of a bloody destructive conflict
bloody and destructive conflict that
that ing spirit
ing spirit tended toto wane.
wane.
they were losing and allowed
were losing allowed them to redirect
redirect their
resources and attention in another direction
resources direction. . Roso's solution
Roso’s solution to the problem
to the was to
problem was to develop
develop a a cadre
of all-volunteer professional HVO
all-volunteer, , fully professional HYO units—the
units-the
That direction
That direction was to be toward
toward southwest Bosnia . In
southwest Bosnia. four HVO Guards
four HYO Brigades and the
Guards Brigades the HVO’s
HVO's Special
Special
tenuous alliance with the
alliance with Bosnian Army on its right
the Bosnian right Operations Command—which
Operations Command-which could could be be employed
employed
flank, and substantially
flank, substantially assisted by majormajor elements of throughout Croat-held Bosnia and provide
throughout Croat-held provide an an offen-
offen
the
the Croatian
Croatian Army from from across thethe border, the HVO
border, the HYO sive
sive punch the lightly armed and ill-motivated
that the
punch that ill-motivated
began to drive
drive west first
first through
through Kupres
Kupres and then on Home Defense
Home Regiments. which Roso formed
Defense Regiments, formed (from
(from
through Livno and Glamoc
through Livno Glamoc. . The combined HV/I-IVO
The combined HY /HYO the HVO’s
the HVO's locally raised could not. Almost
brigades) could
raised brigades)
offensive concluded
offensive concluded the with significant
the year with significant territo
territo- all the HVO’s
all of the HVO's heavy
heavy equipment (tanks,, APCs,
equipment (tanks APCs, and
rial
rial gains and set
set the
the stage
stage for continued
continued operations
operations heavy artillery pieces)
heavy artillery were concentrated
pieces) were concentrated in in the
the
the
the following year thatthat would eventually
eventually do much
much to Guards
Guards Brigades
Brigades and the the corps-level
corps-level artillery units.
artillery units.
conclude
conclude the war.
the war. This concentration
concentration of force force into
into a handful
handful of unitsunits was
was
only
only possible
possible after the the conclusion
conclusion of the the Croat-
Croat
Muslim
Muslim war war allowed
allowed the the HVO
HYO to demobilize
demobilize most most of
HVO in 1994:
The HVO the Slow Lane
Caught in the
1994: Caught Lane its troops and after the
its troops ARBiH offensives
the cascade of ARBiH offensives
tied down
down the VRS and allowed
the YRS allowed the HVO to assume a
the HYO
H V0 are pretty feeh/e
The HVO fighters hut
feeble fighters they have
but they hal'e more relaxed
relaxed defensive posture in
defensive posture in most
most areas facing
areas facing
very strong
strong artillery.
artillery. the Bosnian
the Serbs..
Bosnian Serbs
—Emir, a Bosnian
-Emir, Army soldier
Bosnian Army soldier The formation
The formation of the the HVO Guards Brigades
HYO Guards Brigades improved
improved
outside Donji Vakuf,
outside Donji Vakuf, November
November 1994
1994 the force’s
the offensive capabilities,
force's offensive capabi Iities, but organizational
organizational
changes alonealone could
could not address the the HVO’s
HVO's funda
funda-
When Ante Roso took
When Ante took charge of the HVO in Novem
the HYO Novem- mental personnel
personnel problems. Despite Roso’s
problems. Despite Roso·s best
ber I1993,
993, he
he found himself playing
found himself playing organizational
organizational efforts, , the
efforts HVO still suffered
the HYO suffered from
from too many politi
too many politi-
catch-up ball against his
catch-up ball his Serb and Muslim opponents.
opponents. cally connected but less than talented officers
cally connected officers and a
Backed by Zagreb
Backed established as early
Zagreb and established 1991,
as 1991,
early as shortage of competent
competent junior-grade officers and NCOs
junior-grade officers NCOs
the HVO was in
the HYO in organizational second place at the
organizational second the who could maintain
who could discipline and train the
maintain discipline the troops.
troops.
war’s outbreak
war's outbreak inin April
April 1992—lacking
1992-lacking the the fully
fully Indeed,
Indeed, the the establishment
establishment of the Guards Brigades
the Guards Brigades inin
formed military
formed infrastructure of the
military infrastructure the VRS
YRS but far some ways
ways aggravated the the HVO’s
HVO's problems
problems by draw
by draw-
ahead of the
the virtually
virtually nonexistent Bosnian Army.
nonexistent Bosnian Army. TheThe ing the most
most talented and best motivated soldiers
ing off the motivated soldiers
HVO had in large measure failed
HYO failed to evolve since
to evolve since the
the and leaving
leaving thethe Home
Home Defense Regiments even
Defense Regiments
war’s beginning
war's however, while at least one of its
beginning, , however, weaker than before.
weaker before.
ARBiH—had.
adversaries—the ARBiH-had.
adversaries-the
225
225

Chapter 54
Chapter have decided
decided to to simply
simply contain
contain the
the pocket, either for
pocket. either
My Ally—The End
.\I_\v Enemy, My Ally-The End of the Croat
the Croat- military reasons or political ones. Perhaps
military Perhaps the Bosnian
Bosnian
Muslim War
Muslim War and the Washington Agreement,
the Washington Army leadership
leadership concluded containment of the
concluded that containment
January-March 1994'
1994* Croat-held enclave would
Croat-held enclave would be adequate—especially
adequate-especially in in
view
view of the
the Croat
Croat threats to to demolish
demolish the the Vitez muni
muni-
By early 1994,
1994. developments
developments borne of necessity
necessity had tions
tions plant rather than allowallow itit to fall into
into Muslim
Muslim
ARBiH at least on a par militarily with
put the ARBiH with the hands-and they could
hands—and could have decided
decided that their mili
that their mili-
HVO. The
HYO. HVO was
The HYO still probably
was still probably better organized
organized tary resources werewere better directed elsewhere. ItIt is
directed elsewhere. is also
also
on the level and had on average more
the unit level more and better possible that
possible that at this delicate juncture—with
this delicate juncture-with Croat Croat-
equipment. The Bosnian
equipment. Bosnian Army had, however, made
had. however. Muslim peace talks talks under
under way
way and the the international
international
major
major advances in organization, discipline. and coor-
organization, discipline. coor community"s
community’s attention focused focused on the Bosnian Gov
the Bosnian Gov-
dination of larger military
dination was a fairly
operations. It was
military operations. ernment-the Sarajevo
emment—the Sarajevo leaders
leaders concluded
concluded that that the
even fight,
fight, and-even
and—even with
with the
the Croatian
Croatian Army's inter-
inter political fallout after a bloody
political fallout crushing of the
bloody crushing the enclave
enclave
vention Herceg-Bosna—the Bosnian
vention in support of Herceg-Bosna-the Bosnian would have outweighed military gains.
outweighed the military gains. Whatever
Whatever
Army had thethe weight
weight of numbers
numbers on its side. the reason, the
the reason. Bosnian Army failed
the Bosnian failed toto press home
home the
advantage at at a crucial moment. The Bosnian
crucial moment. Bosnian Croats
Croats
The
The new year's
year’s fighting
fighting commenced
commenced on 9 January
9 January counterattacked and regained
counterattacked regained aa little
little breathing
breathing space,
space.
1994
1994 with
with a Bosnian
Bosnian Army attack on the the Vitez
Vitez and the
the Vitez-Busovaca
Yitez-Busovaca enclaveenclave remained
remained in in Croat
Croat
enclave-just
enclave—just hours before before peace talks began between hands.13 11'4
hands.1. ~
Croat
Croat and Muslim representatives in Germany. Germany. Gov Gov-
ernment 3rd Corps Corps troops
troops surprised
surprised the defenders of
the defenders While the Vitez battles raged and the
the Vitez fiercest battles of
the fiercest
the HVO Vitez Corps
the HYO Corps District withwith a predawn
predawn attack 1994 Croat-Muslim war
the 1994 war flared
flared in
in the central Bos
the central Bos-
and attempted to cut the Vitez-Busovaca enclave
the Vitez-Busovaca enclave in nian Lasva
Lasva Valley,
Valley. the
the other towns
towns along
along the Croat
Croat-
two at its narrowest
two narrowest point. Infantry battles raged in
point.88 Infantry Muslim faultlines
faultlines were
were by by no means peaceful.
peaceful.
the Vitez suburbs on 9 and 10
the January. supported
IO January, supported by Muslim-held east east Mostar
Mostar suffered
suffered anan unrelenting
unrelenting
the liberal use of heavy weapons
the liberal weapons fire fire on both sides. artillery bombardment
artillery bombardment from from the HVOHYO Mostar Corps Corps
Another Bosnian
Another Bosnian Army drive drive from
from the the south against District that devastated the the eastern half of the city.city.
Croat-held Kruscica further
Croat-held further squeezed the HVO posi
the HYO posi- Southeast of Mostar,
Mostar. Muslim-held Blagaj Blagaj was was also
also
tions toto the
the point where the
point where Croats held
the Croats held only
only a few
few shelled frequently
shelled frequently from adjacent Croat-held
from adjacent Croat-held Buna.Buna.
hundred meters on either side of the the road. The desper-
road. The desper Even though
Even though the Serbs were
the Serbs were the primary foe
the primary foe of the
the
HVO defenders hung
ate HYO hung on doggedly
doggedly as the the two
two sides defenders of Maglaj,
Muslim defenders Maglaj. there werewere also
also
house-to-house and hand-to-hand
battled each other in house-to-house hand-to-hand exchanges of mortar fire and occasional
mortar fire occasional infantry
infantry
fighting
fighting over shattered buildingsbuildings that changed hands clashes between
between thethe ARBiH Operational Group
ARBiH 7th Operational
each day. At times reduced to a little little less than a the HVO
and the HYO l111 Brigade forces
th Brigade
1 1th forces along
along thethe northern
northern
kilometer-wide isthmus, they still
kilometer-wide isthmus, still managed to retain retain edge of the Zepce enclave.l5
the Zepce enclave. 1~ Bosnian
Bosnian Croat
Croat forces
forces
control of the
control vital east-west road link.
the vital link, but their south of Konjic west of Jablanica
Konjic and west Jablanica also
also periodi
periodi-
traffic was always
traffic always vulnerable Bosnian Army
vulnerable to Bosnian cally shelled Muslim-held positions
cally shelled villages. The
positions and villages.
gunfire.9 10 11 12
gunfire_9101112 Bosnian Army continued
Bosnian continued to to occupy most of Gomji
occupy most Gornji
Vakuf,
Yakuf. but the CroatsCroats had the preponderance of artil
the preponderance artil-
Suddenly—roughly the
Suddenly-roughly the third January—the
week of January-the
third week lery in
lery the area and frequently
in the frequently shelled the Muslim
shelled the Muslim-
government forces let up on their offensive
government forces offensive on the
the held parts of the town.
held town. The Kiseljak enclave enclave waswas not
not
Vitez enclave for reasons that
Vitez remain unclear.
that remain unclear. The pressed nearly
nearly as
as hard as nearby Vitez,
as nearby Vitez. but sporadic
sporadic
Bosnian offensive may simply
Bosnian Army offensive simply have run out of shelling occurred
fighting and shelling
fighting occurred in that area as
in that well. In
as well.
with its exhausted troops daunted by the
steam. with the pros
pros- none of these variedvaried areas was was either side
side able
able to make
make
infantry assaults across level
pect of infantry ground, for
level ground. for that
that is significant gains,
any significant however. and the
gains. however. outlines of
the outlines of aa
probably would have been necessary to overrun
what probably overrun potential military stalemate were
potential military becoming visible
were becoming visible toto
the
the Croat positions: or the Bosnian
Croat positions; Government may
Bosnian Government both sides.
sides.
'
· Sec 47, bearing
See Annex 47. the same
bearing the same title. for more
more details.
details.
226

With both the the Bosnian
Bosnian Army and HYO HVO offensive
offensive backward in terms of its
step backward sovereignty. Its
its sovereignty. Its leaders
leaders
efforts
efforts stymied
stymied at the the beginning February, it fell to
beginning of February. to knew,
knew. however,
however. that to maintain
that to maintain the
the support
support of the
the
Zagreb—with the
Zagreb-with the strong prodding
prodding of thethe international
international international
community they had to to be seen
seen to agree
community—to formally
community-to broach the
formally broach the subject of a peace to something.
to something. Much more important,
important. the Croat-Mus
the Croat-Mus-
arrangement. The The Croatian
Croatian Government
Government had been lim peace offered the ARBiH an
offered the an escape from from its des-
des
feeling more than the
feeling the usual
usual heat as UN
heat as UN Secretary
Secretary Gen-
Gen perate two-front
two-front war
war and allowed
allowed it to concentrate
concentrate on
eral Boutros-Ghali
Boutros-Ghali publicly accused the the Croatian
Croatian its crucial
its operations against its Bosnian
crucial operations Bosnian Serb Serb foes.
foes .
Army of sending
sending units into into Bosnia,
Bosnia. and ItalyItaly threat-
threat The Bosnian
The Bosnian Croats
Croats were
were probably
probably even less enthusi-
enthusi
ened toto call
call for European
European Union sanctions
sanctions against astic about thethe political arrangements of the Bosnian
the Bosnian
Croatia
Croatia. . Determined
Determined to to avoid
avoid economic
economic sanctions
sanctions like
like Federation,
Federation. but.but, by early 1994,
by early 1994. they were
were even more more
those that
that were hurting
hurting Milosevic in
in Serbia.
Serbia. Tudjman
Tudjman anxious
anxious than the the Muslims to get losing mili
get out of a losing mili-
Foreign Minister Mate
ordered his Foreign Granic to meet
Mate Granic tary struggle. Having narrowly
struggle. Having avoided international
narrowly avoided international
with
with Bosnian
Bosnian President
Izetbegovic in in Geneva
Geneva and sanctions for their
censure and sanctions their military intervention in
military intervention in
issue aajoint
issue joint statement calling for Bosnian Bosnian GovemGovern- Bosnia, the
Bosnia. the Bosnian Croats now
Bosnian Croats now came out of the the war
war
ment-Bosnian
ment—Bosnian Croat Croat talks to explore
explore the possibilities
the possibilities as peace brokers.
brokers. Zagreb's improved standing
Zagreb’s improved standing withwith the
the
for a cease-fire.
cease-fire. ARBiH commander commander Delic duly duly met international community
international helped itit secure a much-
community helped much
with HVO
with commander Roso in Kiseljak 10
HYO commander IO days later needed $125 million loan loan from the World Bank
from the Bank
to
to open thethe talks.
talks.1617181920
10 17 18 1~ 20 shortly
shortly thereafter25 allowed the
thereafter"~ and allowed the Croatian military
Croatian military
to disengage from
to disengage from Bosnia
Bosnia and devote its its energies
only their second meeting in
At only in Zagreb
Zagreb on 23 Febru
23 Febru- toward Croatia’s core
toward Croatia's concem—the reconquest
core concern-the reconquest of
ary.
ary, the two Army commanders
the two commanders signed cease-fire
signed a cease-fire Serb-held Krajina.
Serb-held
and mutual
mutual withdrawal
withdrawal agreement-to
agreement—to the the surprise
surprise of
many.2| Even more surprising,
many. 21 Even the cease-fire
surprising, the cease-fire agree-
agree A
A temporary convergence of three self-interests,
temporary convergence codi
self-interests. codi-
ment that took effect at noon
that took noon on 2525 February generally
February generally fied
fied in
in a treaty essentially imposed from
essentially imposed outside, was
from outside. was
held, though
held. without several days of lingering
though not without vio
lingering vio- not a very
very auspicious genesis for the
auspicious genesis the Bosnian
Bosnian Federa
Federa-
lence. At the beginning of March the
the beginning two sides began
the two tion the time,
tion.. At the time. however,
however. it was thethe best arrangement
exchanging
exchanging prisoners, tensions very
prisoners, and tensions very gradually
gradually available, and in
available. circumstances even
in such desperate circumstances
began to subside over most of Bosnia. Both sides cau
Bosnia. Both cau- an imperfect peace and an
an imperfect alliance was
an uneasy alliance was a vast
tiously
tiously drew
drew their heavy weapons
weapons backback from
from the
the con-
con improvement over
improvement over what
what had gone before.
before. Bosnia’s
Bosnia's
frontation lines,
fmntation descended.22.22 23
lines. and a tenuous peace descended 2-' Croats and Muslims might
Croats might still cocked
still keep one eye cocked
toward
toward the other, but at
the other. at least they could
could both
both start
start
The Croat-Muslim peace was formalized
The formalized by the the Wash
Wash- looking toward
toward their
their common
common Serb enemy. enemy.
ington Agreement signed in
ington Agreement the US
in the capital I1 March
US capital
1994. Under
1994. Under its the military
its terms the military adversaries
adversaries of the
the Within days of the signing of the
the signing the draft
draft Croat-Muslim
Bosnian Army and the
Bosnian the HVO
HYO would be be transformed
transformed Federation
Federation agreement on 1I March 1994. UNPROFOR
March 1994, UNPROFOR
into “Federation Army”
into a "Federation consisting of two
Army" consisting two separate new role
adopted a new cease-fire monitors.
role as cease-fire monitors. juxtaposing
juxtaposing
but cooperating forces. This military
cooperating armed forces. military arrange-
arrange UN
UN peacekeepers between the two
between the two formerly
formerly warring
warring
further elaborated in
ment was further in the “Split Agreement''
the "Split Agreement” the combatants
parties as the withdrew from
combatants withdrew from the confron
the confron-
signed
signed by the two army commanders
the two commanders in that Croatian
that Croatian tation lines the full
lines and the full terms of their new alliance
their new alliance
city
city on 12 March-24As if
12 March.24 lifted from
if lifted from George Orwell’s
George Orwell's worked out. UN
were worked UN peacekeepers were were quickly dis-
dis
“1984,” two
"1984," two former
former warring factions overnight
warring factions overnight patched to former ARBiH
to take over former ARBiH and HVO HYO check
check-
allies against a third
became allies third opponent.
opponent. points in and around
points Mostar, Vitez,
around Mostar, Vitez, Gornji
Gomji Vakuf,
Yakuf.
Prozor, Konjic,
Prozor. Konjic. and Jablanica.26
Jablanica. 2' Following an an arrange-
arrange
Although none of the
Although fundamental stake
the parties had a fundamental similar to that
ment similar that agreed toto for the
the Sarajevo
Sarajevo heavy
heavy
in the long-term success of the
the long-term newborn Bosnian
the newborn Fed
Bosnian Fed-
eration, each had valid
eration. valid reasons for signing. The
signing. The
Sarajevo-based Bosnian
Sarajevo-based Government arguably
Bosnian Government arguably took
took a
227
227

weapons exclusion zone—and
weapons exclusion zone-and that that would later be be The VRS
The YRS Main
Main Staff's strategic offensive—which
Staff’s strategic offensive-which at at
copied
copied inin the
the Dayton Agreement-the two
Dayton Agreement—the two sides least initially appears to have
have been designated “Drina
designated "Drina
agreed to withdraw their heavy
withdraw their heavy weapons
weapons a setset distance
distance 93”—involved four separate campaigns
93"-involved campaigns oror operations
operations
from
from the former confrontation lines
former confrontation lines (10 km for mor
(IO km mor- during this
during this period:
period:
tars, km for tanks and artillery)
tars. 20 km artillery) or to place
place them
into five UN-monitored collection
into five points. 27 282”3°
collection points.27 28 29 30 •' The primary
primary campaign
campaign against the Olovo area and
against the
Tuzla-Zenica road
Tuzla-Zenica road links during November
links during November 1993—
1993-
UNPROFOR’s role
UNPROFOR's role in facilitating
facilitating the Croat-Muslim January 1994.
January 1994.
peace was a largely
largely unrecognized UN success
unrecognized UN success in
in Bos-
Bos
nia. This isis in spite of the
the fact
fact that many—if not
that many-if •' An
An operation to eliminate
operation to Teocak-Sapna salient
eliminate the Teocak-Sapna salient
most—of the heavy
most-of heavy weapons
weapons were were never withdrawn
withdrawn east of Tuzla during November-December 1993
during November-December 1993
or turned
turned in as as agreed and that numerous
numerous cease-fire
cease-fire (which was
was coordinated with the
coordinated with the Olovo operation).
operation).
violations
violations and interethnic
interethnic disputes occurred long
disputes occurred long after
the agreement was signed.signed. The bottom
bottom line was that
line was that •~ An operation against the Maglaj-Tesanj salient
operation against salient dur
dur-
the pointless, debilitating
the pointless, debilitating Croat-Muslim conflict conflict had ing December
ing December 1993—March
1993-March 1994
1994 (also coordinated
(also coordinated
ended, and it was UNPROFOR
ended. UNPROFOR that that in
in some measure
measure with the Olovo operation).
with operation).
helped make
had helped make this possible. This illustrated
this possible. cru
illustrated aa cru-
cial fact about peacekeeping operations in
peacekeeping operations Bal
in the Bal- •' An operation
operation to seize the Grabez
seize the Grabez plateau and road/
road/
kans:
kans: UNUN forces
forces could
could and did did play important role
play an important role rail links
rail links along Una River near Bihac city
along the Una city in
in monitoring
in monitoring and facilitating
facilitating agreements
agreements that served
that served February 1994.
February 1994.
the genuine interests of the
genuine interests involved. Sadly,
the parties involved. Sadly,
such circumstances
circumstances were were all
all too
too rare in thethe Bosnian
Bosnian None of these campaigns
None campaigns succeeded
succeeded in achieving
achieving their
their
war.
war. objectives.
objectives.
Chapter
Chapter 55 Battle of Olovo began in early
The Battle early November
November 1993, 1993,
“Drina 93":
Operation "Drina
Operation 93”: soon after ARBiH
soon ARBiH troops
troops had taken the neighboring
neighboring
The Bosnian Serb “End
The the War”
"End the War" Offensive, HVO-held town
HYO-held town of Vares.
Vares. Olovo laylay on the main
main road
to March
November 1993 to March 1994 between Tuzla and Sarajevo—already
between Sarajevo-already largely con-
largely con
trolled
trolled byby the VRS—and secondary routes
YRS-and secondary routes between
between
As
As discussed earlier, Bosnian
discussed earlier, Bosnian Serb military strategy
Serb military Zenica. The Main Staff’s
Tuzla and Zenica. Staff's objective
objective was
was toto
during
during late 1993 early 1994
1993 and early focused on
1994 focused inflicting
on inflicting capture the
capture the town
town and then drive
drive some distance north,
some distance north,
a decisive
decisive military
military defeat on a significant
significant portion
portion of cutting these roads and probably
cutting probably consolidating
consolidating its
the Bosnian
Bosnian Army to force the Bosnian
force the Government
Bosnian Government gains.3232 If
gains. If this was successful, the VRS
was successful, forces—up to
YRS forces-up
to accept a peace settlement
to settlement on Serb Serb terms. The The pri-
pri 10,000 troops
I0,000 drawn from
troops drawn from at different VRS
at least three different YRS
mary operation
mary undertaken to achieve
operation undertaken achieve this objective,
objective, corps—could
corps-could then renew renew the attack and push push toward
toward
around Olovo,
around Olovo, sought
sought to physically sever Tuzla and
to physically the VRS-controlled Ozren
the YRS-controlled salient, some
Ozren salient. some 35 kilometers
kilometers
northeastern Bosnia from
northeastern from Zenica central Bosnia.
Zenica and central Bosnia. from Olovo.
from Olovo.33 13
The Serbs
Serbs apparently
apparently hoped that. if
hoped that, this occurred,
if this occurred,
Sarajevo would surrender
either Sarajevo surrender or could cut a
or they could The VRS
YRS advance
advance on November—under the
on 8 November-under the com
com-
separate peace agreement with more independent-
with the more independent mand of the Main Staff and the Drina Corps—
mand Corps-
minded Muslim
minded Muslim mayor,
mayor, Selim Beslagic, as
Selim Beslagic, as they had attempted to encircle
encircle the town
town from
from east and west.34
west.·'4
Abdic.“31 If
with Fikret Abdic. neither of these options
If neither options panned
panned Only the western
western prong any success,
prong had any success, seizing
seizing sev-
sev
the VRS
out, the YRS would then eliminate
eliminate the the 2nd
2nd Corps
Corps in villages before
eral villages running into
before running strong resistance
into strong resistance
the giant Muslim-held pocket around Tuzla. As
pocket around As the from Bosnian Army
from Bosnian Army 2nd Corps
Corps troops line of
along a line
troops along
VRS
YRS was to find,find, however,
however, its ability
ability toto defeat hills. Repeated
Repeated attacks during the rest of the month
during the month
entrenched Bosnian
entrenched Bosnian Army units weakened consid
units had weakened consid-
erably
erably since the start of the war.
since the war.
228
228

and through the end of December achieved little gain. or HVO
HYO lines even though they pushed the the operation
particularly
particularly after 2nd Corps committed many of its into mid-March. 45 With the
into mid-March.45 signing of the
the signing the Washington
Washington
troop reserves together with elements of the
together with the 3rd and Agreement and the the HVO
the lifting of the blockade of
HYO blockade
6th Corps ..15
Corps.35 Maglaj on 19 19 March, the VRS
March, the YRS broke off thethe offensive
offensive
for good .
good.464h
The YRSVRS renewed the advance during mid-January

mid-January
after Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps
Corps reinforcements rotated into In western Bosnia
Bosnia the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps,
the YRS Corps , under
line.3616 On 12-13 January
the line. January, , the Herzegovinian
Herzegovinian units Major General Grujo Boric, attacked on 6 February February to
broke through the the ARBiH front, pushing to withinwithin seize the Una River line
the Una to secure the
line to the Serb republic’s
republic's
3 kilometers of Olovo. Again,, however, ARBiH
Olovo. Again "border"
“border” and capture the rail line
the rail line along
along the river.47The
the river.47 The
reserve units from Ilst, st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps
Corps were able battle turned into a seesaw fight fight with Brigadier Atif
with Brigadier Atif
to stop the advance. The Main Staff Staff broke off the
the Dudakovic’s ARBiH
Dudakovic's ARBiH 5th Corps,
Corps, as as first the VRS
first the YRS
offensive by the end of January
offensive ..17
January.37 would seize key hills overlooking
would overlooking the river, and Mus
the river, Mus-
lim troops would
would take them back. The The last surge
The near-simultaneous attack against the half
the northern half occurred during thethe last week of February,
February, and the the bat
bat-
of the Sapna-Teocak
Sapna-Teocak salient to capture the the dam for the
the tle ended with
with the Corps still in
the 5th Corps control of its main
in control main
Serb-held Ugljevik power plant-designated
plant—designated Opera - line.
line.48
48
tion "Kladanj 93”—also failed to achieve its goals.'

“Kladanj 93"-also goals.38 8
VRS East Bosnian
The YRS Bosnian and DrinaDrina Corps
Corps began their
assault on 20 November
assault November 1993.1993, attempting to sever the the February 1994: The
February 1994: The First Sarajevo Marketplace
Marketplace
half of the salient via converging
top half converging attacks from the the the International
Shelling and the International Response’
Response•
Zvornik and Priboj
direction of Zvornik Although the
..19 Although
Priboj.39 VRS
the YRS
made some gains, counterattacks by 2nd Corps Corps forces The Sarajevo area had been relatively
relatively quiet during
during the
the
recaptured VRS attempts
recaptured all lost territory. YRS attempts to renew the the early part of 1994 except for the the usual Serb siege tac tac-
advance persisted until late December, when the the tics of sniping
sniping and sporadic shelling and occasional
sporadic shelling occasional
operation was called off .40
off.40 standup clashes along the frontline.
along the frontline. OnOn 55 February
February
1994, however, a 120-mm
120-mm mortar roundround sailed into
into the
the
At the beginning December, Ilst
beginning of December. Krajina Corps
st Krajina Corps crowded Markale
crowded Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo,
in downtown Sarajevo ,
Colonel Vladimir
troops under the command of Colonel Arsic,
Vladimir Arsic, killing 68 people and wounding approximately 200
wounding approximately
in conjunction
conjunction with HVO troops, assaulted
with local HYO assaulted 2nd more. It was one of the
more.4949 It the worst incidents in
shelling incidents
worst shelling in
Corps elements under Mustafa
Corps elements Mustafa Ceravac around the Bosnian war.
the Bosnian war.
Maglaj-Tesanj. final objective of the
Maglaj-Tesanj.“I 41 The final the operation
remains unclear, but the YRS VRS probably
probably hoped to break International outrage over the
International the grisly
grisly attack prompted aa
up the enclave, securing the Serb-held
Serb-held Doboj and UN call for
UN cease-fire and a NATO
for a cease-fire NATO intervention
intervention
areas, as well as capturing lines of communica-
Ozren areas, communica threat The new UN
February.5050 The
threat on 9 February. UN commander,
tion
tion.42 VRS/HVO forces were quickly
.42VRS/HVO quickly able to cut the
the General Michael Rose, set
Michael Rose, four-part cease-fire
set out a four-part cease-fire
main road link between Tesanj and Maglaj Maglaj.. Continued
Continued proposal that the creation of
included the
that included of a 20-kilometer
20-kilometer
attacks during the rest of December, however, gained
attacks zone around thethe city from
from which
which all heavy weapons
weapons
ground, , pushing closer to Maglaj city
minimal ground
only minimal would be
would be excluded, and the the NATO
NATO ultimatum
ultimatum backed itit
but achieving no breakthroughs. The YRS VRS halted the
the up. The deadline for
up.“51 The compliance was 20 Febnlary.
for Serb compliance February .
attack by I1 January.
attack January.43
43
At first
At first the Bosnian Serb political
the Bosnian political and military
military leaders
VRS renewed the operation two weeks later, but
The YRS refused to comply, fearing that without
comply, fearing without their heavy
attack to the
this time shifted the main attack the northwest weapons the the VRS
YRS forces would
would be overrun by thethe
links in the
against road links Usora area
the Usora while making sup-
area while sup '
• See Annex
Annex 48: The Guns
48 : Sarajevo, 1994: The Guns Are Silenced, . But
Arc Silenced But the
assaults around Maglaj city from the
porting assaults the south and
Continues. . for
Siege Continues for more details.
the east (in Ozren) .-1-1
Ozren).44 failed to make more
The Serbs failed
than minor gains and were unable to break the ARBiH
the ARBiH
229

Bosnian
Bosnian Army infantry.
infantry.5252 The
The 1717 February
February Russian
Russian On
On the NATO ultimatum
the other hand, the NATO ultimatum did did take the
offer
offer to send a battalion
battalion of paratroopers
paratroopers to helphelp moni
moni- international community
international community another step step toward
toward direct
direct
tor the
the agreement broke
broke the ice and won compli
won Serb compli- involvement in
involvement in former Yugoslavia. As
former Yugoslavia. As itit had with
with its
its
VRS immediately
ance. The YRS immediately undertook
undertook to to pull
pull out the
the Mount Igman ultimatum in
Igman ultimatum 1993, NATO
in 1993, NATO had successsuccess-
majority
majority of its heavy weapons,
weapons, placing
placing the
the rest under fully forced
forced the Serbs (with
the Serbs (with Russian
Russian help)
help) toto comply
comply
what was regarded as UN control-51
control.53 By the deadline,
the deadline, Western demand. Nevertheless,
with a Western
with Western self
Nevertheless, Western self-
VRS had more or less completed
the YRS withdrawal,
completed the withdrawal, congratulation for this apparent success ignored
congratulation ignored its
leaving
leaving about half its heavy weapons
weapons (anything
(anything minimal impact
minimal impact onon the larger war
the larger war and again reaffirmed
reaffirmed
UN-monitored storage sites and
20 mm and over) in UN-monitored West's sentimentally
the West’s shortsighted focus
sentimentally shortsighted focus on on
redeploying
redeploying the other half.
half. Sarajevans
Sarajevans could
could now
now Sarajevo
Sarajevo rather than on the actualities of the broader
the actualities broader
move
move around thethe city relatively safety for the first
city in relatively first conflict.
conflict.
time in almost two years.
Chapter 56
Chapter
Superficially,
Superficially. thethe strong Western
Western response had a major major The
The Bosnian
Bosnian Army’s
Army's “Spring Offensive”
"Spring Offensive"
impact.
impact. The
The shelling
shelling stopped, people were no longer longer Commences, March 1994
1994
dying,
dying, and citizens could walk freely
citizens could freely around
around the
the city.
city.
The city's
city’s tram cars started up again,
again. and food
food was In March the Bosnian
Bosnian Army kickedkicked off its long
long-
allowed
allowed in more regularly. Nevertheless, the frontlines
regularly. Nevertheless, frontlines anticipated
anticipated "spring offensive." With the conclusion
“spring offensive.” conclusion of
sporadic clashes
were still manned, and sporadic clashes between the the Croat-Muslim conflict
the conflict the previous year, the Army
the previous
two forces
forces continued.
continued. The YRS VRS could
could very
very easily
easily for the first time could
the first could go on the strategic offensive
the strategic offensive
full-scale siege if
resume a full-scale if its masters chose to to defy
defy the Bosnian
against the Bosnian Serbs.
Serbs. There
There had been local
local offen
offen-
the NATO threat. Essentially,
the NATO Essentially, the
the city remained under
city remained during 1993,
sives during
sives war with
1993, but the war with the Croats
Croats had
siege without shooting. As Silber and Little note,
without the shooting. made any comprehensive operations out of the
comprehensive operations the ques
ques-
tion. Now, in
tion. Now, in the spring of 1994,
the spring 1994, the Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Even
Even as the gunsfinallyfell
the Serb guns silent, it
finally fell silent, was
was ready flex its muscles,
to flex
ready to intending to employ
muscles, intending employ itsits
became clear that the siege would remainremain as numerical superiority in
numerical superiority multiple, simultaneous
in multiple, simultaneous
tight as ever. interpositioning of
ever. The interpositioning of UN
UN troops
troops attacks in
in the hopes that the SerbsSerbs would not have the
along frontline, particularly in the city cen-
along the frontline, cen reserves to counter them all.
to counter all.
ter,
ter, brought
brought the eventual partition of
eventual partition Sarajevo—
of Sarajevo-
aim—a step closer.
a key Serb war aim-a closer54
54 The Serbs appear to
to have been surprised
surprised when
when the
the
offensive began with
spring offensive
spring with a strike
strike toward
toward the long
long-
The Serbs had clearly
clearly made the difficult situ-
the best of a difficult situ prize of Donji Vakuf
sought prize
sought Yakuf on 16 March,
on 16 March, beginning
beginning
complying with
ation, complying with the letter of the agreement with the capture of the peak at
with at Mala Suljaga
Suljaga and the
yielding nothing
while yielding vital to Serb interests.
nothing vital cutoff
cutoff of the from Bugojno to Donji
supply from
the water supply
Yakuf. 5h 57
Vakuf.56 ARBiH 7th Corps elements (the 370th
57 ARBiH 370th
The strategic impact minimal. The
impact was minimal. The ultimatum
ultimatum had "Donji Vakuf”
“Donji Yakuf' Mountain
Mountain Brigade,
Brigade, probably
probably supported
supported
no effect on any Serb military operations going
military operations going on at by at “Bugojno” Mountain
at least the 307th "Bugojno" Brigade and
Mountain Brigade
the time of the incident, Maglaj
incident, such as those at Maglaj- elements of the 7th Corps’
Corps' elite
elite assault brigades)
brigades) con
con-
Tesanj Bihac,55
Tesanj and Bihac, 55 and it had little
little or no deterrent to advance against the VRS
tinued to Infantry Divi
YRS 30th Infantry Divi-
VRS ((or
effect on YRS or ARBiH)
ARBiH) planning
planning for the rest of the
the sion/I st Krajina Corps,
sion/ 1st capturing one tank and a
Corps, capturing
year. It
It did not influence ARBiH decision
influence the ARBiH decision toto substantial amount
substantial equipment. 58 Although the
amount of other equipment.58 the
March, nor did it
offensive in March,
assume the strategic offensive was to fall short of the town
attack was town itself,
itself, the Bosnian
Bosnian
from attacking
stop the Serbs from Gorazde in response
attacking Gorazde advanced to within heavy
Army advanced heavy mortar range and had
during
during April. The only effect was to to decrease the
the certainly progressed far
certainly progressed far enough
enough toto alarm
alarm the town’s
town's
for 60 A
Serbs' ability to pressure the Bosnian
Serbs’ ability Bosnian Government
Government for Serb population.
Serb population.595960 VRS counterattack
A YRS counterattack on on
a capitulation
capitulation by threatening and punishing
punishing its capital.
capital.
230

22 March recouped
recouped some of thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Serb losses,.
Serb losses looked for an
leaders looked
leaders an important
important territorial holding of
territorial holding
and the two armies battled it out for the
the two the next week
week or the Bosnian Government
the Bosnian Government that they could could put in jeop
in jeop-
so. 61 6‘52
so.6| When the
" When the government
government offensive
offensive halted around
around ardy."7 1 The
ardy. chosen target for the
The chosen the operation
operation waswas the
the
29 March,
March. the Bosnian Army had advanced the
the Bosnian the front
front- Gorazde enclave. . If
Gorazde enclave If Sarajevo
Sarajevo refused
refused to accept the the
lines
lines about 5 kilometers
kilometers to
to the
the west. 6 ·1 6~
west.6364 Serb
Serb terms, the the VRS
YRS was was prepared to eliminate
eliminate thethe
enclave,
enclave. which
which would also consolidate
consolidate another Serb
Serb
the very end of March,
At the March. thethe Bosnian
Bosnian Army mounted
mounted war
war aim-the occupation of the
aim—the occupation the Drina valley.
valley.
the
the first
first of its many
many assaults on the Vlasic
the Mt. Ylasic
feature-a
feature—a huge, Serb-held mountain overlooking
Serb-held mountain overlooking Preparations for Operation
Preparations Operation "Zvezda
“Zvezda (Star)
(Star) 94"
94” began
Travnik—apparently as a secondary
Muslim-held Travnik-apparently secondary late March.
in late
in March . General the VRS
General Mladic and the YRS Main
Main
effort
effort in support of the the ongoing
ongoing attack toward
toward Donji Staff began shifting reinforcements to
shifting reinforcements to the
the Gorazde
Gorazde
Yakuf.
Vakuf. The
The efforts Vlasic were to continue
efforts against Mt. Ylasic continue increasing VRS
area, increasing YRS troop
troop numbers from 7,500
numbers from 7,500
well into April. After weeks
into April. weeks of uneventful skirmish
uneventful skirmish- troops to 13,000
troops 14,000 men,
13.000 to 14,000 men. plus additional armor
plus additional armor
ing,
ing, elements of the ARBiH’s
the ARBiH 's newly
newly formed Corps
formed 7th Corps artillery. Major
and artillery. Major General Radovan Grubac's
General Radovan Herze-
Grubac’s Herze
finally broke
finally broke through
through the lines of the
the lines “Vlasic” Opera-
the "Ylasic" Opera govina Corps
govina Corps assumed commandcommand over the the entire force
force
tional
tional Group/I
Group/1stst Krajina Corps April and made
Corps on 28 April drawn from the
drawn from Sarajevo-Romanija, Drina,
the Sarajevo-Romanija, Drina, and Herze
Herze-
some important
important tactical
tactical gains.65 VRS, however.
The YRS,
gains. 65 The however, govina
govina Corps.
Corps. The Bosnian Army’s
The Bosnian Army's Gorazde-based
Gorazde-based
contained
contained the the advance the the following day and recaprecap- East Bosnian
Bosnian Operational
Operational Group under Colonel Ferid
Group, , under
tured some of the the lost territory
territory over the two
the next two Buljubasic, had been cut off from
Buljubasic. from central Bosnia in in
weeks. 67 1993 and could receive only
could receive only minimal
minimal helphelp infiltrated
infiltrated
weeks.‘)6666 7 1993
through lines. Buljubasic had an
Serb lines.
through Serb an estimated 8,0008,000
In the Tesanj area north of Maglaj,
the Tesanj Maglaj. the the Muslim coun-
coun troops to defend the
troops to the enclave,
enclave. not all
all of them equipped
equipped
teroffensive
teroffensive came only only days after a local local cease-fire
cease-fire with
with even small
small arms and withwith negligible
negligible artillery
artillery and
between the HVO and the
the HYO ARBiH was
the ARBiH was arranged on armor.
no armor.
19
19 March. On On 23 March, the ARBiH’s displaced
the ARBiH's displaced
“Teslic” Mountain
204th "Teslic" Mountain Brigade
Brigade spearheaded a drive drive preparation for the
Artillery preparation the offen sive began on
offensive
toward original hometown
toward its original hometown, , now now in Serb hands a 28 March. The ground assault started the
The ground the next day
6" The along axes,, with
few
few kilometers
kilometers to thethe west.
west.6868 69 The first
first attacks were along three axes with the
the main
main advance coming from
coming from
successful, , and by 26 March the
quite successful ARBiH had
the ARBiH the southeast. It
the It took
took until however. for the
April. however,
until 55 April, the
kilometers deep along
made gains of I1 to 2 kilometers along a Serb troops
Serb troops to break throughthrough Muslim
Muslim forces
forces in thethe
6-kilometer front against YRS
6-kilometer front VRS "Doboj"
“Doboj” Operational
Operational south.. Over the
south the next five
five days, the VRS
days, the YRS closed
closed inin on
Group 9 forces.
Group The advance looked
forces.7070 The looked promising,
promising. and the town, seizing
the town, seizing most of the the southern (right) bank of
(right) bank
hopes were high that Teslic itself
high that itself might
might be be reached in in the
the Drina
Drina. . Stubbornly
Stubbomly, , the the Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government
the near future,
the future, but it was
was not to to be. Infantry battles
be. Infantry rejected as as blackmail
blackmail the demands for a universal
the Serb demands univer sal
and exchanges of shelling continued into
shelling continued into early April,
April , cease-fire in
and permanent cease-fire exchange for the
in exchange halting
the halting
but the
the government
government advance was halted 5 or 6 kilome- kilome their nutcracker
nutcracker drive Gorazde. As shells
drive on Gorazde. shells began
ters
ters east Teslic.
east of Teslic. dropping around and into
dropping around into the town. UN
the town, UN and Western
Western
leaders expressed concern concern about the the fate of UNUN and
international personnel
international personnel stationed there and about the the
VRS Counterstroke:
VRS Counterstroke: The Assault on Gorazde,
on Gorazde, town itself
town itself. . To warn the Serbs off,
warn the two NATO
off, two air
NATO air-
April 1994•
April 1994’ strikes—the first
strikes-the first in history—were flown
in its history-were flown against
against
VRS targets on 10
YRS IO and 1111 April. The Serbs
April. The Serbs reacted by by
For the Bosnian Serb
the Bosnian Serb political and military
military leadership
leadership seizing and locking up a score of UN
seizing personnel in
UN personnel in
the onset of the
the the Muslim "spring offensive” looked
“spring offensive" looked Serb territory
Serb holding them until
territory and holding until after the crisis
the crisis
ominously
ominously like like the
the beginning
beginning of a protracted war of
protracted war of Nevertheless, the
had ended. Nevertheless. the pinprick NATO
NATO attacks
attrition. . In hopes of forcing
attrition forcing the
the Bosnian Government
Bosnian Government
to accept Serb terms for a permanent. country-wide
permanent, country-wide
cease-fire that
cease-fire that would effectively
effectively end the war, the
the war. the Serb
'
Annex 49 for
· See Annex detailed
for a more deta iled account.
231
231

seemed to
to have had the
the desired effect of forcing the
desired effect the The VRS
VRS Fails to Widen
Fails to the Corridor at
Widen the at Brcko,
Brcko,
VRS to break off its offensive.
YRS offensive. April 1994 72
April 1994 72
The Serbs had only however, and on 15

only paused, however, April
15 April the VRS
As the YRS waswas driving on on Gorazde
Gorazde and its its embattled
embattled
VRS redoubled
the YRS redoubled its efforts.
efforts. Serb troops quickly
Serb troops Muslim garrison, General Novica Simic’s
garrison, Major General Simic's VRSYRS
smashed ARBiH defenses along along allall three axes and East Bosnian Corps
East Bosnian Corps also
also launched
launched itsits planned
planned attempt
drove to to the
the outskirts
outskirts of town.
town. The
The ARBiH lost lost the
the to widen the
to widen corridor. The attack
Posavina corridor.
the Posavina was similar
attack was
entire southern bank, except for parts of the town
southern bank, town to the successful
to the successful operation
operation undertaken
undertaken the previous
previous
itself, while Serb troops
itself, troops fanned around the northern
fanned around northern July. Simic hoped
July. hoped his
his troops,
troops, reinforced
reinforced with
with elements
elements
and eastern sides and almostalmost completely encircled the
completely encircled the of the
the Main Staff’s
Staff's 65th Protection Motorized Regi
65th Protection Regi-
town.
town. Gorazde
Gorazde was at the mercy mercy of the the VRS.
YRS. Individu
Individu- ment, could
could widen the corridor
widen the corridor by about 22 kilometers,
by about kilometers,
ally
ally and through
through the UN,UN, Western
Western leaders again tried
again tried biting off the
biting northernmost part of aa Muslim
the northernmost Muslim salient
salient
the Serbs to agree to a cease-fire
to get the cease-fire and demanded
demanded pointed
pointed atat Brcko town.73
town. 71 The Serb
Serb assault
assault against
against the
a withdrawal
withdrawal fromfrom a 3-kilometer
3-kilometer zone around around Gorazde
Gorazde ARBiH 1st
ARBiH !st Operational Group/2nd Corps (and
Operational Group/2nd (and the
the
town, plus the
town, establishment of a 20-kilometer
the establishment 20-kilometer zone HVO 108th
HYO Brigade) began
108th Brigade) began onon 13 April.74 After trying
13 April.74 trying
free of heavy weapons.
weapons. Though Radovan Radovan Karadzic to into ARBiH/HVO
to break into positions for the better part
ARBiH/HVO positions
came to an an agreement withwith the UN on 18
the UN April, fight
18 April. fight- of a week,
week, the East
East Bosnian Corps had to give
Bosnian Corps give up
up with
with
continued, and on 20 April
ing continued, April the YRS VRS tried
tried to
to cap-
cap no gains
gains in any territory broke off the
territory and broke the attack
attack byby
ture a Muslim-held ammunition
ammunition factory.
factory. A A NATO
NATO 20 April.
20 April.
ultimatum on 22 April
ultimatum April directed
directed the SerbsSerbs to comply
comply
with the agreement or face large-scale
with airstrikes, and
large-scale airstrikes, Chapter
Chapter 57
57
the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Serb leadership
leadership at last suffered
suffered thethe plan to to ARBiH Spring
The ARBiH Spring Offensive Continues,
Continues,
take effect.
effect. Despite
Despite sporadic
sporadic clashes
clashes overover the next few few April-June
April-June 1994
1994
days,
days. the YRS VRS withdrawal
withdrawal and the arrival of new
the arrival new UNUN
troops
troops to monitor
monitor the
the agreement were were reasonably
reasonably the ARBiH
While the ARBiH in isolated
isolated Gorazde
Gorazde hunghung on
on the
the
smooth.
smooth. edge of complete
complete defeat,
defeat, the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army inin the
the core
core
government-held area of central
government-held central Bosnia waswas continu
continu-
The Bosnian
The Bosnian Serb
Serb offensive
offensive had drastically shrunk the
drastically shrunk ing to attack the Bosnian
ing Serbs in
Bosnian Serbs in all directions. The
all directions.
size of the Gorazde enclave, but it failed
Gorazde enclave, failed to achieve the
to achieve the ARBiH
ARBiH not resumed its March offensives
not only resumed offensives inin the
objective
objective of ending
ending the war.
war. The Bosnian Government
The Bosnian Government Donji
Donji Vakuf. Mt. Vlasic,
Vakuf. Mt. Vlasic, and Tesanj-Teslic
Tesanj-Teslic areas but but
refused to
refused to accept Serb demands for a nationwide nationwide also
also launched
launched a whole series of concurrent
whole series concurrent attacks:
attacks:
cease-fire that
cease-fire that everyone
everyone could see would lock in
could see in the
the Brgule near Vares,
against Brgule
against against Mt.
Vares, against Mt. Stolice
Stolice in
in the
Serbs’ territorial
Serbs' territorial gains. Instead, the Bosnian
gains. Instead, Bosnian Army Majevica hills east
east of Tuzla and Mt.Mt. Vijenac in in the
offensive operations
stepped up its offensive west-central
operations in west-central Ozren mountains near Banovici,
Ozren mountains Banovici, and easteast of Kladanj.
Bosnia even as the YRS
Bosnia VRS was grinding against
grinding against
Gorazde, and the Bosnian
Gorazde, Bosnian Government
Government almostalmost cercer-
tainly Gorazde be crushed
tainly would have let Gorazde crushed and occu occu- Donji Vakuf, April
Donji Vakuf, April 1994‘
1994'
without yielding to
pied without to the Serb demands. In
Serb demands. In the
the
event, the international
community did did intervene
intervene At
At the
the very beginning of April
very beginning Bosnian Army 7th
April the Bosnian
through NATO to save the
through NATO Gorazde with
the core of Gorazde with some again attempted to advance
Corps again
Corps advance the remaining dis
the remaining dis-
minatory airstrikes and 12
minatory airstrikes 12 days later the threat of Donji Vakuf
toward Donji
tance toward Vakuf against the VRS
against the YRS 30th
30th Infan
Infan-
substantial ones. It
more substantial It would appear that. that, having
having try Division.75
try Hopes were
Division. 75 Hopes high after the initial attack
were high attack
debated the pluses and minuses among themselves,
minuses among themselves. '
Karadzic and the Serb leaders (under
the other Serb (under pressure
· See Annex Donji Vakuf,
Annex 50: Donji Vakuf, 1994 for a more detailed account.
concluded that the
from Milosevic) concluded
from retaliation they
the retaliation
might suffer outweighed
might suffer outweighed the gains
gains anticipated. Over
anticipated. Over-
riding
riding their earlier calculations, the
earlier calculations. the Serbs gave up both
nationwide victory
their hope of a nationwide victory and their fallback
fallback
objective
objective of completely
completely eliminating
eliminating the enclave.
the enclave.
232
232

on 2 April,
April. which
which placed the advanced 7th Corps
the most advanced Corps 27 May,
27 May. again charging the Stolice
charging up the mountain and
Stolice mountain
units about 5 kilometers
kilometers southeast of Donji Yakuf. Vakuf.76 Banj 86 The
Brdo. 85 86 The Serbs counterattacked
counterattacked and drove drove
7" Banj Brdo.85
ARBiH forces
forces continued
continued to to press the
the attack from
from two
two south several kilometers Stolice, retaking
from Stolice.
kilometers from retaking much
much
directions, advancing
directions. advancing from from Prusac
Prusac toto the
the south and of the
the ground
ground they had lostlost to
to government
government forcesforces ear
ear-
Bugojno to thethe east. 77 The
east.77 The attack was again halted by lier in the
lier in the month.87 the June cease-fire
When the
month. 87 When cease-fire took
took
defenses,, however.
tough Serb defenses however, and the the offensive
offensive had effect, the Bosnian
effect, the Bosnian Army had very very little show for its
little to show
wound
wound down Fighting slowed
April.78 Fighting
down by 6 April.78 slowed substan-
substan effort, having
effort, having been pushed
pushed back out of most most of its
tially during
during the
the rest of April May, while the
April and May, the Bos
Bos- recently
recently wonwon territory.
territory.
nian Army spent the the time building
building up its forces
forces in
in the
the
area for yet another attempt.
Kladanj, May 1994"
May 1994 ..
April 1994•
Mt. Stolice, April 1994' During the the latter half of AprilApril and thethe first week of
first week
May, UN
May, UN observers
observers noted a steady buildup buildup of govern-
govem
The
The Majevica region
region around thethe "Sapna
“Sapna thumb
thumb”" east ment forces—including
forces-including the the spearhead 7th Muslimski
of Tuzla had been relatively
relatively quiet thus far, with
with only
only Brigade—and military
Brigade-and supplies in
military supplies in the
the Kladanj area.area,
occasional
occasional Serb shelling
shelling and intermittent
intermittent infantry
infantry north of Sarajevo
Sarajevo and south of Tuzla. Tuzla.88 The govern
88 The govern-
fighting.
fighting. But
But this calm
calm waswas not to
to last. There
There was a ment also began restrictingrestricting the movements of UN mil
the movements mil-
crucial prize in
crucial prize in the hills—the Stolice
the Majevica hills-the radio
Stolice radio itary observers south of
itary observers Tuzla—an almost
ofTuzla-an almost certain signsign
tower, atop 916-meter
tower, 916-meter Mt. Majevica itself.itself. This tower
tower of an impending offensive
an impending offensive.89 The UN—and
.89 The UN-and the the Bos
Bos-
was a vital communications node, serving
vital communications serving as a relay
relay nian Serbs-watched
Serbs—watched and waited waited for the the blow to fall.
fall.
radio, television
for radio, television, . and telephone communications.
communications. It was not long
It was long in in coming.
coming. The The expected offensive
offensive
Both
Both sides wanted control
control of the
the summit
summit and thethe trans-
trans rolled eastward from
rolled eastward from Kladanj against the the VRS
YRS Drina
mitter, and 1994
1994 was to to see
see a prolonged
prolonged struggle
struggle on Corps in
Corps the second
in the second weekweek of May—concurrent
May-concurrent with with
the
the slopes of the mountain.
the mountain. the other 2nd
the Corps attacks at Mt.
2nd Corps Stolice and Mt.
Mt. Stolice
Vijenac in
Vijenac in the
the Ozren mountains-moving in
Ozren mountains—moving in the
the gen-
gen
The Bosnian Army began massing
The Bosnian massing its forces
forces in the
the eral direction Vlasenica. Sekovici,
direction of Vlasenica, Sekovici , and Han Han Pijesak.
Pijesak.
April, and government
area in April, government forces first assaulted
forces first By 1515 May the the UN was was reporting substantial Bosnian
reporting substantial Bosnian
the mountain on 11
the mountain May.”79 The
11 May. ARBiH 2nd Corps
The ARBiH Corps Army gainsgains in in the
the area. 90 The really
area.90 really significant
significant break
break-
mounted
mounted repeated attacks against the the VRS
YRS Tactical
Tactical through
through came on 16 16 May whenwhen the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian
Group "Majevica"/East
Group “Majevica”/East BosnianBosnian Corps
Corps deployed
deployed on advanced to to a line
line connecting
connecting the the Sokolina and Bijela
Mt. Majevica and a secondary elevation on adjacent
secondary elevation Stijena
Stijena peaks and captured some 32 square kilome- kilome
Banj Brdo.8080 At least two
Banj Brdo. ARBiH brigades
two full ARBiH brigades were ters .9192
ters.9| 92 The
The VRS
YRS responded
responded with with several daysdays of very
very
committed
committed to to the fiercest of the
the fiercest the government
government assaults heavy shelling
shelling and a short counterattack
counterattack on 21 21 May.
May.939 -1
9‘ The Bosnian
on 14
14 and 15 15 May.
May. The
The Serbs replied
replied with
with heavy shell-
shell 94 The Bosnian Army nibbled nibbled away
away at at the
the Serb
Serb
ing Bosnian towns
ing of Bosnian towns and withwith infantry counterattacks
infantry counterattacks advancing a kilometer
defenses, advancing kilometer at at aa time
time in the hilly
in the
on 15
15 and 16 16 May. 82 During the
8182 the attack, Bosnian
Bosnian and wooded terrain, 95 but subsided
wooded terrain,95 subsided in early June to
in early
May.8|
forces got close enough
Army forces enough to shell
shell and damage the the record an
record an advance of some 15 15 km
km at its furthest
furthest
Stolice relay-temporarily
Stolice relay—temporarily shutting
shutting downdown Serb TV TV point.9696 The
point. Bosnian Army’s
The Bosnian Army's gains in in this
this area were
were
and telephone linkslinks in the
the region-but
region—but could could not cap-
cap more important
important morallymorally than militarily,
militarily. but that
that was
ture and occupy
occupy the summit.8383 Fighting
the summit. Fighting tapered off accomplishment
accomplishment enough. enough.
around 20 May, as the offensive subsided
the offensive subsided and the the Bos
Bos- " Annex 52:
·· See Annex Kladanj. 1994
52: Kladanj. I 994 for
for a more detailed account.
nian Army paused to to regroup reinforce. 84 Appar
regroup and reinforce.84 Appar-
undaunted, . the
ently undaunted the ARBiH
ARBiH resumed
resumed the the attack on
“
See Annex
· Sec Annex 51: AA Contest of
of Wills: Mt. Majevica
Wills: The Struggle for Mt. Majevica
the Stolice Transmitter. 1994 for a more detailed
and the detailed account.
233

The Bosnian Serbs on
on the Attack—Cemerska
the Attack-Cemerska Mt. Vlasic,
Vlasic, May
May 1994
1994
Planina, May 1994
Planina,
After a short lull, government
government forces
forces resumed
resumed their
their
As the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Army was ending ending its successful
successful operaopera- against Mt. Vlasic
attacks against on 24 May, launching
Ylasic on launching aa
tion near Kladanj, the the YRSVRS was preparing both its
preparing both major
major assault along the Vlasic
along the Ylasic frontline
frontline in
in an
an effort
effort to
counterattack there and a new attack some 35 kilome-
35 kilome encircle the mountain.
encircle the mountain. Although the the 7th Corps was
was
ters to the
the southwest
southwest in the Cemerska
Cemerska Planina-Nisici able to press the Serb-held
Serb-held flanks
flanks back
back and gain
gain con
con-
Plateau
Plateau area. objective of the new attack was
area. The objective was toto trol of much
trol much of the Vlasic
Ylasic feature’s perimeter, itit was
feature's perimeter, was
further
further secure the road between the Serb-held western
the Serb-held western unable to complete
unable the encirclement,
complete the encirclement, and the the VRS
YRS
Sarajevo
Sarajevo suburbs and the Pale-Romanija area through
the Pale-Romanija through “Vlasic” Operational
"Ylasic" Operational Group couldcould still
still resupply
resupply their
their
ARBiH-controlled Cemerska
the capture of the ARBiH-controlled Cemerska Plan- Plan forces mountain. ItIt was,
the mountain.
forces on the was, however,
however, aa close-run
close-run
ina and possibly
possibly the town of Breza.
the town Breza. After receiving
receiving thing: Bosnian Serb
thing: Bosnian Serb reserves were all but exhausted,
were all exhausted,
reinforcements
reinforcements from from the the lst
1st Krajina Corps
Corps and assem-assem the VRS
and the was just
YRS was just barely
barely able
able to maintain
maintain the line.
line.
bling
bling his ownown elite assault units for the the operation.
operation.
Major General
General Stanislav Galic’s YRS
Stanislav Galic's VRS Sarajevo-
Sarajevo
Romanija Corps
Romanija Corps began its attack on 18 May. More
18 May. The Spring
The Spring Offensive
Offensive Draws to a Close
Draws to Close
than a week of fighting
fighting failed
failed toto dislodge Brigadier
dislodge Brigadier
Yahid
Vahid Karavelic's ARBiH 1st
Karavelic’s ARBiH Corps forces
1st Corps from their
forces from their As inin March,
March, the Bosnian
Bosnian Army had failed failed to reach its its
hill positions
positions overlooking
overlooking the the road. The battle ended objectives
objectives at Donji Vakuf,
at Donji Teslic, and Mt. Vlasic
Yakuf, Teslic, Ylasic or or
27/28
on 27 /28 May withwith little
little or no Serb gainsY
gains.97 7 control of the peak
gain control at Mt.
peak at Mt. Stolice,
Stolice, although
although itit had
had
had reasonable
reasonable success easteast of Kladanj. TheseThese setset-
backs left the force undaunted, however,
the force however, and in all of
in all
Tesanj-Teslic, May-June 1994•
Tesanj-Teslic, 1994* the contested areas—Donji
areas-Donji Vakuf, Tesanj-Teslic, Vla
Yakuf, Tesanj-Teslic, Yla-
Stolice-the ARBiH
sic, and Stolice—the
sic, ARBiH continued
continued to regroup
regroup and
After a pause of several weeks, weeks. the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian preparing for bigger
reinforce. preparing
reinforce. bigger and better attempts
again attempted to to advance in the Tesanj-Teslic area
the Tesanj-Teslic later in
in the
the year. Neither the
year. Neither the battles nor
nor the war war were
were
around 22 May—this time with
22 May-this with the limited
the more limited over by any means,
by any the ARBiH
means. and the ARBiH attacks continued
continued
objective
objective of capturing intermediate elevations.
capturing several intermediate elevations. inflict casualties
to inflict casualties on the VRS
on the could ill
that itit could
YRS that ill afford.
afford.
HVO’s lllth
The HYO's 111th "Zepce" Brigade—Operational
“Zepce” Brigade-Operational
Group 7-South's
Group 7-South’s former
former foes-appears
foes—appears to con
to have con-
99‘00
tributed at least two two tanks to Even
fight?‘398 99 11x1 Even
to the fight. The June 1994
The Cease-Fire: Just Long
1994 Cease-Fire: Enough To
Long Enough To
these more modest objectives
objectives proved
proved to be unattain
to be unattain- Reload
Reload
however, and the ARBiH
able, however, ARBiH was unable unable to push the
confrontation lines
confrontation lines very far against determined
determined resis- resis After one of the meetings in
many meetings
the many Geneva, one of the
in Geneva, the
tance by the YRSVRS I1st st Krajina Corps' Doboj” Opera
Corps’ Doboj" Opera- Bosnian
Bosnian war’s many cease-fires
war's many cease-fires was signed on
was signed on 88 June
Group 9.
tional Group
tional 9.““ Bosnian Army did
101 While the Bosnian did gain 1994. The agreement, which included
1994. included all
all three ethnic
ethnic
control over a line
control line of peaks between 5 and 15 15 kilome
kilome- factions,
factions, was proposed for four months
was originally proposed months butbut
ters Teslic, it was unable
ters southeast of Teslic, unable to push the the last was
was reduced to four
reduced to four weeks
weeks at the last minute
at the minute after the
few kilometers
few kilometers to the west to
to the to reach thethe Veliki
Yeliki Usora
Usora Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs rejected the original
Serbs rejected duration. 104 As
original duration.‘°" As itit
river valley,
river north-south road into
valley, the adjacent north-south into Teslic,
Teslic, turned out, the truce never entirely took
never entirely hold. As
took hold. As the
the
or the town
orthe of Teslic itself.
town ofTeslic itself. Despite 7-South’s best
Despite OG 7-South's Bosnian Army went
Bosnian went ahead with planned offensive
with aa planned offensive
efforts, it was unable to achieve
efforts, achieve the territo
hoped-for territo-
the hoped-for against Vozuca tip of the Ozren
at the southern tip
Yozuca at Ozren salient,
salient,
country-wide cease-fire
rial gains before the country-wide
rial cease-fire took took the agreement unraveled
unraveled aa little
little more
more each day
day and
‘03
effect on 10 June.‘02
10 June. 111
~ 103 had broken
broken down completely within three weeks.“‘5
down completely weeks. 1115
'
Teslic, 1994 for more details.
See Annex 53: Tesanj and Teslic.
· See
234

Chapter 58
Chapter casualties were heavy,
casualties were shock of the
the shock
heavy, and the the action
action per
per-
The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains,
Ozren Mountains, mitted the VRS
mitted the YRS reinforcements
reinforcements to counterattack
counterattack and
June-July 1994•
1994' drive
drive both 2nd
2nd and 3rd
3rd Corps forces back
Corps forces back to their
their start
start
lines by 4-5 July.
lines by July.
The
The Bosnian Army’s confidence
Bosnian Army's confidence in its ability
ability to take
the
the war to the
the Serbs was growing,
growing, and the the ARBiH The Battle of Yozuca
The Battle Vozuca was was anan eye-opening
eye-opening experience
experience
General
General Staff
Staff prepared plans for a muchmuch more
more ambi-
ambi for both thethe ARBiH
ARBiH and the the VRS.
YRS. The Bosnian Army
The Bosnian Army
tious offensive
offensive in the
the Ozren
Ozren mountains.
mountains. Its Its aim was
was to satisfied itself that
had satisfied that it could
could penetrate Serb Serb
cut off and capture the
the southern end of the the Serb-held
Serb-held defenses and almostalmost defeat a major major VRS force. ItIt also
YRS force. also
Ozren Vozuca, thus freeing
Ozren salient around Yozuca, freeing up an an number of weaknesses
had a number weaknesses and vulnerabilities
vulnerabilities that
important
important road route-the
route—the UN'sUN’s so-called
so-called "Route
“Route the VRS could
the YRS exploit. As
could exploit. the ARBiH
As the General Staff
ARBiH General
Duck”—connecting the
Duck"-connecting the cities
cities of Tuzla and Zenica.
Zenica. would findfind throughout
throughout the the year, their unitsunits often
often
The operation
operation would be be the largest yet conducted
the largest conducted and tended to to overextend themselves during
overextend themselves during anan advance,
advance,
would involve
involve a coordinated
coordinated attack by majormajor elements leaving their
leaving their flanks
flanks open to Serb counterattacks. They
Serb counterattacks. They
of the Corps—up to
the 2nd and 3rd Corps-up 14,000 assault
to 14,000 learned
learned also that command
command and control control during offen-
during offen
troops—directly under General
troops-directly Delic’s supervision
General Delic's supervision. . sive
sive operations
operations was far far more difficult than on
more difficult on the
the
particularly for an
defense, particularly an army
army withwith such
such limited
limited
In a preliminary move, elements of the
preliminary move, the 2nd Corps
Corps tactical communications. The
tactical communications. The Muslims needed tools tools
seized an important hilltop—Vijenac—from VRS
important hilltop-Yijenac-from YRS Ilstst and tactics
tactics to deal withwith thethe Serbs’
Serbs' extensive
extensive mine
mine-
Krajina Corps
Corps troops in May.
May. The
The capture of the
the hill fields
fields and devastating artillery fire.
devastating artillery The VRS,
fire. The YRS, too,
too, dis
dis-
gave the
the ARBiH an an excellent
excellent observation
observation point
point over
over covered several
covered several weaknesses
weaknesses that that needed to be dealt
to be dealt
the
the Krivaja River valley Vozuca while shielding
valley and Yozuca shielding with, notably
with, notably the inadequate training
the inadequate discipline of
training and discipline
towns. The
nearby Muslim-held towns. The defeat was a severe many of its frontline
many infantry units,
frontline infantry units. who
who tended to
psychological
psychological blow
blow to the who lost an
the Serbs, who an entire panic when ARBiH sabotage units
panic when units appeared in in their
their
company
company of troops killed or captured. rear.
rear. Overall, the thinness of VRS
the thinness YRS frontline
frontline defenses
defenses
and the ease with
the ease with which
which the the Muslims usuallyusually pene
pene-
The main
The main operation
operation began on 18 June, breaking
18 June. breaking thethe trated them was troubling. VRS
was troubling. YRS strengths
strengths in in senior
senior
lO-day-old UN-sponsored
10-day-old UN-sponsored cease-fire.
cease-fire. The ARBiH
The ARBiH command leadership, communications,
command leadership, firepower, and
communications, firepower,
called for a pincer
plan called movement with
pincer movement with 2nd Corps
Corps mobility,
mobility, however,
however, allowed the
allowed Serbs to
the Serbs to counter
counter the the
troops attacking from the
attacking from the east
east and 3rd Corps troops
troops more lightly armed Muslim
more lightly infantry and drive
Muslim infantry drive them
from the
from the west to link up in the middle of the
the middle the I 0-
10 Nevertheless, as
back out. Nevertheless,
back the VRS
as the YRS was was to find
find repeat
repeat-
kilometer-wide salient. The
kilometer-wide The initial
initial advance took
took the
the edly
edly over the year, winning battles against
the next year, against thethe
VRS Ozren
YRS Tactical Group
Ozren Tactical “Doboj” Operational
Group of "Doboj'' Operational Muslims was becoming a near-run
was becoming near-run thing.
thing .
surprise and quickly penetrated Serb
Group 9 by surprise Serb lines.
lines.
Over the
Over week, Muslim troops
the next week. continued the
troops continued the Chapter 59
Chapter
attack, gradually
gradually pushing
pushing through
through YRS VRS defenses. By By The Northeast Bosnia Battles,
Battles,
26 June, ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps
June, ARBiH were within
Corps units were August-November
August-November 1994
1994
kilometers of linking up.
3 kilometers
The VRS, however.

The YRS. however, was preparing
preparing a boldbold counter-
counter Brka,
Brka, 3 August 1994
strike, having shifted elite Ilst
having shifted st Krajina and EastEast Bos
Bos-
into the
Corps units into
nian Corps the salient. July an initial
salient. By I1 July In early
In early August.
August, the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army mounted small
mounted a small
counterattack had drawn
counterattack ARBiH 3rd Corps
drawn ARBiH Corps elements attack on the southern side of the
the southern the Posavina corridor,
Posavina corridor.
from their main
away from main axis.
axis. As the troops
the Muslim troops attacking from
attacking from the town of
tiny town
the tiny Brka. 88 kilo
of Gomja Brka, kilo-
maneuvered to
maneuvered block the
to block thrust, the
the Serb thrust, VRS allowed
the YRS allowed southwest of
meters southwest Brcko. (Immediately to the
of Brcko. (Immediately the north
north
them to walk into an uncharted minefield
an uncharted minefield upon
upon which
it had previously
previously targeted artillery.
artillery. The ARBiH
The ARBiH
'
details, see
• For more details. Annex 54
see Annex of Vozuca.
54:: The Battle of Vozuca. Ozren
Mountains, , June-July
Mountains June-July 1994.
235
235

of Muslim-held GornjaGomja Brka was the Serb-held village
Serb-held village The operation
operation began on 15 with aa new
October with
15 October new Opera
Opera-
of Donja Brka. 11>o)Paired
Brka.'°") Paired in a relatively
relatively flat
flat and strate-
strate 212nd Corps attack toward
tional Group 2/2nd
tional toward the Skipovac
Skipovac
gically important
important area, the the Brka towns
towns were logical
logical Vis Hill,
area, north of Vis Hill, that quickly took
took another
another 2020
targets for anan attack byby either side. On On 3 August,
August. the
the kilometers of territory.“
square kilometers territory. 116 Two days later, the
Two days
Bosnian
Bosnian Army commenced
commenced with with artillery
artillery and mortar
mortar 2nd Corps
Corps attacked at Gradacac
Gradacac and Doboj, and
fire
fire in the early morning, followed by an
early morning, an infantry
infantry ARBiH troops
troops penetrated 4 kilometers
kilometers into
into the front
front-
assault on Donja Brka. 1117In what
Brka.107 what appears to to have been line defenses of VRS
line Tactical Group 4 units
YRS Tactical units northeast
'7 YRS reinforcements allowed
a very limited, surprise
very limited, attack, the Bosnian
surprise attack. Army’s
Bosnian Army's of Gradacac.l
Gradacac. 117 VRS reinforcements allowed the Serbs Serbs
Corps grabbed about 4 square kilometers
2nd Corps from
kilometers from to contain
contain thethe Muslim
Muslim advance
advance over the next week,
over the week,
Tactical
Tactical Group "Posavina"/East Bosnian Corps
“Posavina”/East Bosnian Corps and although the
although the ARBiH heldheld onto most of its
onto most its initial
then halted to to secure their gains. 1118The Bosnian
gains.‘Ox Bosnian Serbs
Serbs gains.I18 In their attack toward
gains. 118 In toward Doboj, however,
however.
shelled
shelled the lost territory
territory heavily
heavily and counterattacked
counterattacked ARBiH forces
forces failed
failed to dent Serb defenses in
Serb defenses in aa week
week
several times during remainder of August
during the remainder August and intointo fighting. 119 A renewed
of fighting."" renewed attack on 8-10
8-10 November
November
September.
September, but at the end of the day the Bosnian Gov
Bosnian Gov- also went
also went nowhere.120
nowhere. 1111
ernment still both Gomja
still held both Gornja and Donja Brka")9 Brka. 1119“0 l"
1111111
Tesanj-Teslic: The
Tesanj-Teslic: The Bosnian Army's Third Try,
Bosnian Army’s Try,
The Battle of Vis,
Vis, 8-12
8-12 August 1994 "2
August 1994 112 October-November
October-November 1994*
1994•
August
August also saw a small-scale
small-scale government
government operation
operation The Bosnian
Bosnian Army’s
Army's most
most ambitious effort of the year
ambitious effort year
to seize important high ground
important high around Vis
ground around Vis Hill,
Hill, in
in the in the
in the Teslic
Teslic area began on October and would con
on 33 October con-
Trebava region, north of the
Trebava region, town of Gracanica.
the town Gracanica. On On tinue for nearly
tinue nearly two months. The ARBiH’s
two months. ARBiH's October
October-
8 August ARBiH 212th Liberation
August elements of the ARBiH Liberation November offensive was to be significantly
November offensive significantly larger
larger and
Brigade, reinforcing
Brigade, reinforcing Operational
Operational Group 212nd2/2nd Corps,
Corps. more complex than its
more complex previous efforts
its previous in the area,
efforts in
attacked and seized 14 kilometers of territory
14 square kilometers territory consisting of major
consisting major efforts by both
efforts by Operational Group
both Operational
from VRS '"Doboj''
from YRS “Doboj” Operational Group 99 units.
Operational Group units."3
11.1 7-South east of Teslic
7-South east Teslic and by the 3rd
by the 3rd Corps’
Corps' Opera
Opera-
Muslim troops held on to to most of their
their gains,
gains. although
although tions Group 3-North well to the south
tions south of Teslic.
Teslic. Each
Each
the Serbs may have regained some territory over the
some territory of the two
two operations groups contributed
operations groups contributed three rein
rein-
next three days. forced
forced brigades attack. for aa total of perhaps
brigades to the attack,
16.000 men, one of the biggest troop com—
14,000 to 16,000 com-
mitments of the
mitments the year in
in Bosnia.
Bosnia.
Attacks at Doboj-Gradacac,
Corps Attacks
The 2nd Corps Doboj-Gradacac,
October-November 1994 "4
October-November 1994 m The battle was to extend over
was to period of weeks
over a period weeks and
achieve
achieve another partial success for the Bosnian
another partial Bosnian Army,
successful operation
Following its successful operation in August
August near with
with substantial advances in
substantial advances south but only mar
in the south mar-
Gracanica, the
Gracanica. ARBiH 2nd Corps
the ARBiH scheduled for Octo
Corps scheduled Octo- progress in
ginal progress
ginal north near Teslic
the north
in the Teslic itself.
itself. The
The first
first
larger one against VRS
ber a much larger “Doboj” Opera
YRS "Doboj" Opera- day's attacks in
day’s in the southern
southern area
area-spearheaded
spearheaded by by
tional Group 9 forces
tional in the Doboj-Gradacac
forces in Doboj-Gradacac sector. the 7th Muslimski Brigade
Brigade and the “El
'"El Mujahid”
Mujahid"
attack, which brought
The new attack. brought together all all of 2nd Detachment of foreign
Detachment foreign Islamic volunteers
volunteers and fol
fol-
Corps’s new
Corps's new elite liberation
liberation and light
light brigades, called
brigades, called lowed 319th Mountain
by the 319th
lowed up by 330th Light
Mountain and 330th
for thrusts along toward Doboj. Modrica.
along three axes: toward Brigades-caught the
Brigades—caught the Serb defenders off guard,
Serb defenders guard. and
'5
and Obudovac-Pelagicevo. Unfortunately, the
Obudovac-Pelagicevo.l 115 Unfortunately, the axes, approximately kilometers were
approximately 20 square kilometers captured in
were captured in
while in
in the same region,
region, do not appear to to have been a matter hours. 1' 1 A
of h0urs.'2' A similar drive west of Teslic—
drive west Teslic-
mutually supporting or to
mutually supporting to have had a single
single objective.
objective. with
with the 202nd Mountain Brigade
the 202nd Brigade taking the lead—
taking the lead-
offensive made some good
The offensive tactical gains.
good tactical gains, but the
the ‘
2nd Corps was unable to beyond its capture of
move beyond
to move For more details,
· For details. see Annex Tesanj and Teslic,
Annex 53: Tesanj Teslic. 1994.
the VRS front
the YRS front defenses.
236
236

suffered
suffered badly. 122 Bosnian
badly.122 Bosnian Serb
Serb forces the lst
forces of the Kra
I st Kra- defensive,
defensive, and over
over 100 kilometers of territory
I 00 square kilometers territory
jina Corps' “Doboj” Operational
Corps’ "Doboj" Operational Group 9 halted the were captured—a
were captured-a significant gain by
significant gain the standards of
by the
ARBiH after only modest advances, and-probably
ARBiH and—probably war. The Bosnian
Bosnian war.
the Bosnian Bosnian Army had fallen
fallen short
short
reinforced----counterattacked
reinforced—counterattacked on 10 IO and 1111 October.
October.123
123 of its goals,
goals, but the
the effort
effort had brought
brought its
its own
own
‘34 YRS artillery also retaliated with heavy shelling of
124 VRS artillery with shelling rewards.
rewards.
Muslim-held villages
villages in the area. The The government
government
forces
forces advanced as far as the suburb of Banja
the Teslic suburb Banja Chapter 60
Chapter 60
VVrucica
rucica but could further.‘25125 '26
could go no further. 126 Last Man
Last Standing-The ARBiH-VRS
Man Standing—The ARBiH-VRS Battles in
in
Central
Central Bosnia, August-November
August-November 1994
1994
While the Bosnian
While Bosnian Government
Government advance was was being
being
stopped cold in the north, the 3rd Corps attack in in the
south was continuing
continuing to make steady gains. As The Bosnian Army Capture
The Bosnian Capture of Brgule,
Brgule,
OG 7-South
7-South drew
drew limited
limited Serb reserves into
into the August
August 1994
1994
defense of Teslic, 3-North was
Teslic, OG 3-North to make fur
was able to fur-
ther advances, pushing
pushing north and west to to take another In July, the ARBiH lst
the ARBiH I st Corps preparations for
Corps began preparations
kilometers or so in a series of short
50 square kilometers an operation to seize
an operation control of aa Serb
seize control salient jutting
Serb salient jutting
advances of 2 to 3 kilometers
kilometers a day along
along a 10 I 0- into Muslim lines
into lines toward
toward Vares
Vares and centered on on the
'27
kilometer-wide
kilometer-wide front.
front. 127 village of Brgule.‘3‘
village Brgule. rn The elimination
elimination of the salient
salient
would further
further threaten the Serb-held
Serb-held road
road toto the Serbs’
Serbs'
October it began to look like
By late October like the two-front
the two-front western Sarajevo suburbs
western Sarajevo suburbs and put the the ARBiH
ARBiH in in aa bet
bet-
attack might
might succeed. Operational
Operational Group 7-South7-South was position for future
ter position future operations
operations toward
toward Sarajevo.I32
Sarajevo. 132
still fighting Banja Vrucica, close enough
fighting in Banja enough to Teslic The offensive
offensive began on on 1I August.
August. TheThe lst
I st Corps
to worry
worry the Meanwhile, OG 3-North
the Serb defenders. Meanwhile, troops from either
troops attacked from side of the HVO-held
either side HYO-held
was advancing
advancing slowly but seemingly
seemingly inexorably. Bos
inexorably. Bos- pocket, quickly seizing
Dastansko pocket,
Dastansko Brgule, and then
seizing Brgule,
forces made several counterattacks
nian Serb forces counterattacks around
around pushing south. Within a week,
pushing south. week, ARBiH
ARBiH forces
forces had
Teslic, retaking
Teslic, retaking some territory,
territory, but the
the ARBiH 3rd most of the
secured most salient.131 By
the salient.133 By 111 August, the VRS
1 August, YRS
Corps countered with
Corps with yet another assault by by OG 33- Sarajevo-Romanija Corps controlled
Sarajevo-Romanija controlled aa much
much reduced
reduced
North on 8 November.
North November. Once
Once again, the crack 7th Mus
the crack Mus- fragment
fragment of territory
territory in thethe area.‘34
area. 114
limski Brigade
Brigade led the way
way in anan advance that seized
kilometers over the next 10
30 more square kilometers days. 128 '29
IO days.128 129
130
110
The ARBiH
September: The at Sarajevo/Sedrenik
ARBiH at Sarajevo/Sedrenik
ARBiH 3rd Corps

The ARBiH Corps advance from from 8 to 17 17 Novem
Novem- Since the
Since the 55 February
February marketplace shelling and the
marketplace shelling
ber was to mark the last major major success in in the Tesanj
Tesanj- establishment of the 20-km
establishment 20-km heavy weapons exclusion
heavy weapons exclusion
winter set
Teslic area, as winter set in and the ARBiH 3rd
the ARBiH 3rd Corps’
Corps' zone, Sarajevo
zone, Sarajevo had been largely quiet for most
largely quiet most of
elite units were redirected towardtoward the Kupres
Kupres and 1994. "Quiet" was
1994. “Quiet” relative term, as
was a relative as sporadic
sporadic sniper
sniper
fronts. In the
Donji Vakuf fronts. end, VRS
the end. YRS troops from
troops from and small-arms
small-arms fire terrorize the civilian
continued to terrorize
fire continued
“Doboj” OG were able to hold
"Doboj" hold on,
on. pushing
pushing govern-
govem population city. The artillery
population of the city. mortar fire
artillery and mortar fire
forces back a short distance from
ment forces from the Teslic sub-sub most of the
that had caused most the casualties
casualties and devastated
digging in along
urbs and digging along a newnew confrontation
confrontation lineline portions of the
portions essentially been halted,
city had essentially
the city halted, how
how-
opposite 3-North. Even
opposite OG 3-North. Even though
though the
the objective
objective of ever,
ever, by the exclusion
by the exclusion zone.
zone.
Teslic was never reached, the ARBiH October-
the ARBiH October
November offensive
November offensive can be considered
considered a substantial
substantial The one noteworthy
The noteworthy break
break in the calm
in the calm came in
in
success. The Bosnian Army’s 3rd Corps
Bosnian Army's demon
Corps had demon- September, when
September, Bosnian Army launched
when the Bosnian launched aa very
very
ability to effectively
strated its ability mount sizable,
effectively mount coordi
sizable, coordi- small to capture part of
small attack to of the Sedrenik
Sedrenik
nated operations responsibility. VRS
operations within its area of responsibility. YRS
Doboj Operational Group forces,
Operational Group forces, which had begun
begun thethe
year on the offensive, were forced
the offensive. forced to end it on the
237
237

neighborhood
neighborhood in thethe northeastern part of the city north
city north seizing key
seizing hilltops in
key hilltops in the first two days of the opera
first two opera-
of Sarajevo's ARBiH lst
Sarajevo’s old quarter. ARBiH I st Corps
Corps forces
forces pushing Muslim troops
tion and pushing troops back
back over
over the next
from Muslim-held Grdonj neighborhood
from the Muslim-held launched
neighborhood launched week for an
week an advance of as as much
much as as 22 kilometers
kilometers inin
a surprise attack against VRS Sarajevo-Romanija
YRS Sarajevo-Romanija some locations.1.
locations.‘3914
Corps-held Sedrenik
Corps-held beginning on 18
Sedrenik beginning 18 September.
September.135135
The Bosnian
The Bosnian Army gained territory
territory on the first
first day, The ARBiH lst Corps commander,
I st Corps commander, Brigadier
Brigadier General
General
and fierce
fierce clashes continued
continued as the Serbs counterat-
counterat Yahid Karavelic,
Vahid Karavelic, was
was then able to
to shift
shift reinforcements
reinforcements
tacked the following day. After a two-day UN
fight, UN
two-day fight, to Cemerska
to Cemerska from Operational Group 33 and the
from his Operational
spokesmen reported the YRS VRS had recaptured some of Sarajevo Operational
Sarajevo Operational Group, denying the Serbs
Group, denying Serbs any
any
the
the initially ceded area. fighting event
area. The isolated fighting further gains. By 14
further gains. October the ARBiH
14 October ARBiH waswas begin
begin-
concluded
concluded with minor ARBiH
with minor ARBiH gains. ning to counterattack and on
ning 15 October
on 15 October recaptured
the important
the Mosevacko hill. Fighting
important Mosevacko Fighting continued
continued
over the
over the next two again the
two days, but again the two
two sides were
were
Vlasic, September 1994•
Mt. Vlasic, 1994* stalemated. 140
stalemated.I40
At the beginning
beginning of September, the the Bosnian
Bosnian Army 7th the battle ended the ARBiH
After the ARBiH 1st I st Corps
Corps began
Corps launched what appears to have been one last
Corps planning to recapture all
planning all of the lost ground from
lost ground from the
the
attempt for the year against the Vlasic feature near
the Mt. Ylasic VRS
YRS Sarajevo-Romanija
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Corps while simultaneously
simultaneously
Travnik, and the YRS
Travnik, VRS "Ylasic"
“Vlasic” Operational Group
Operational Group eliminating the
eliminating the rest of the Serb-held salient south of
Serb-held salient
responded withwith another limited
limited counterattack in the the Brgule near Nisici.““
Brgule On 6
Nisici. 141 On 6 November
November the the ARBiH
ARBiH
Vlasic-Turbe area on 6 September.13"
Ylasic-Turbe September.136 The The Bosnian
Bosnian struck,
struck, seizing the remaining
seizing the YRS-controlled hills in
remaining VRS-controlled in
capturing some additional
Army units succeeded in capturing additional Cemerska Planina while crushing
Cemerska Planina crushing the salient north of
salient north
ridge lines, failed to
lines, but again failed control of the
to gain control the Nisici. Despite the VRS’s
Despite the YRS's best efforts, the Bosnian
efforts, the Bosnian
mountain. With winter
mountain. winter approaching,
approaching, the government
the government Army had held ground and had taken even more
held its ground more
reluctantly
reluctantly abandoned the idea of occupying Vlasic in
occupying Ylasic Serb
Serb territory.
territory.
ARBiH redirected some of its forces
1994, and the ARBiH forces on
Vlasic southwest to
Ylasic to support its October-November
October-November
Vakuf and Kupres
offensives in the Donji Yakuf
offensives Kupres areas. Stolice ... Again, November 1994“
. . . Again, 1994••
Meanwhile, the
Meanwhile, Bosnian Serbs relied
the Bosnian primarily on
relied primarily
artillery the remainder of the
fire for the
artillery fire the year, continuing
continuing In early
early November
November the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps
the Bosnian
environs and occasionally
to shell Travnik and its environs occasionally again made a serious to capture the Stolice
serious attempt to Stolice
sending small infantry probes in
small infantry in the direction of
the direction radio relay in
radio relay the Majevica hills. Preliminary
in the Preliminary probes
probes
Turbe.
Turbe. appear to have begun as
as early as mid-October
early as mid-October when
when
"'recon-sabotage" groups
“recon-sabotage” the area looking for
groups scouted the
VRS '43
weaknesses
weaknesses in
in the East Bosnia
YRS East Bosnia Corps’
Corps' lines.142
lines. 142143
Fro: Nisici
To and Fro: Nisici Plateau and Cemerska Planina,
Planina, The Bosnian
The Bosnian Army’s
Army's main offensive effort—directed,
main offensive effort-directed.
October-November 1994
October-November once again, at the Stolice
again, at Stolice transmitter-began
transmitter—began on
on
9 November.144
9 November. 144 By 13 November
By 13 November the attackers
At the October, the YRS
beginning of October,
the beginning VRS finished
finished plans claimed the capture of several important
claimed important hills—
hills-
effort—Operation "Brgule
for a renewed effort-Operation “Brgule 94”—to
94"-to including Velika and Mala Jelika—but
including nearby Yelika Jelika-but not
unfulfilled objective
achieve its unfulfilled objective inin the Cemerska Plan-
the Cemerska Plan Stolice itself. 145 '4"
Stolice itself.145 14" Once fighting raged around
Once again fighting around
it,
ina area,
area. securing the road route to the
securing the the Serb-held west
Serb-held west- the Stolice
the Stolice transmitter
transmitter and again damaged it, but the
suburbs.I37
Sarajevo suburbs.
ern Sarajevo 137 Major General
General Dragomir
Dragomir Bosnian Army still failed
Bosnian failed to gain control of
gain control the Mt.
of the Mt.
Milosevic’s Sarajevo-Romanija
Milosevic's Sarajevo-Romanija Corps Corps received rein rein- Majevica
Majevica summit.147148
summit. 147 148
forcements for the assault from
forcements from thethe Drina
Drina and Herze
Herze-
Main Staff.13 The 4 October "
govina Corps,
govina Corps, plus the
the Main Staff.‘38 8 The October For a more detailed account,
·· For account. see Annex 51: A Contest of
see Annex of Wills:
A
Wills:
a
ARBiH 1st
quickly penetrated ARBiH
attack quickly I st Corps
Corps lines,
lines, The Struggle for Mt.
Mt. Majevica Stolicc Transmitter,
Majevica and the Stolice Transmitter. 1994.
'
details, see
· For more details. Annex 55: Mt.
see Annex Vlasic, 1994.
Mt. Vlasic.
238
238
Digitize-clby Go gle Origi11alfrom

As 1994 drewdrew to a close.
close. the situation in
the situation the Majevica
in the announcement caused substantial
announcement consternation in
substantial consternation in the
the
hills was not far different from what
different from what had prevailed
prevailed camp. ARBiH
Federation camp.
Federation ARBiH and HVO officials met in
HYO officials in
when the
when the year had begun. Small Small infantry clashes—
infantry clashes- Sarajevo on 15
Sarajevo 15 September
September to resolve their differences
resolve their differences
generally begun by Bosnian
generally begun Bosnian Army forces-erupted
forces—erupted while playing down the
playing down the rift in their public statements.
in their
occasionally
occasionally on the the slopes
slopes below
below the the Stolice
Stolice transmit-
transmit US
US diplomatic pressure helped
diplomatic pressure crisis within
helped to avert a crisis
ter,
ter, but the
the confrontation
confrontation lines
lines advanced marginally, , if
advanced marginally if the nascent Federation,
the the HVO
Federation , and the HYO eventually
eventually
at all. The VRS
all. The shelled Tuzla and the
YRS shelled smaller towns
the smaller towns of reversed position
reversed position again and agreed to cancel plans to
cancel plans
the
the "Sapna thumb” regularly,
“Sapna thumb" regularly, causing substantial
causing substantial withdraw from
withdraw from the fight.101'62
the fightm 162'63
163
destruction
destruction but accomplishing
accomplishing little little from
from a military
standpoint.
standpoint. Casualties
Casualties piled
piled up on both sides of the the Meanwhile, the Bosnian Army pressed on with
the Bosnian with its
confrontation
confrontation line, little visible gain.
line, but for little gain . offensive south,
successful offensive
successful south , advancing
advancing the
the frontline
frontline up
to 10
to IO km
km on
on 15 16 September
15 and 16 September and capturing
capturing a total
total
“’5 '66 16
'67
Chapter 61
Chapter 61 of 30 to kilometers.164164
to 40 square kilometers. 165166 7 Steady fight-
Steady fight
Army Operations in Southeast
Bosnian Army Southeast Bosnia, ing continued
ing continued through the following week,
through the week , but with
with
1994‘
September-November 1994* smaller
smaller Bosnian advances.I68168
Bosnian Army advances. There was a brief
There was
lull, followed by a renewed
renewed Bosnian
Bosnian Army effort effort
along
along thethe Borci-Glavaticevo
Borci-Glavaticevo line line southeast of Konjic
Konjic
September 1994
Konjic, September beginning 23
beginning September. 169At
23 September.‘°° At thethe beginning
beginning of Octo-
Octo
ber, the Bosnians extended their
the Bosnians slightly fur
their advance slightly fur-
The Muslim-held town Konjic—40 km
town of Konjic--40 km southwest
southwest ther, taking important Kiser hill
the important
taking the hill south of Konjic
Konjic
of Sarajevo-was
Sarajevo—was shelled
shelled regularly
regularly (though
(though not espe-
espe continuing on to the
and continuing the south.
south.170 170 These
These gains, how
gains, how-
cially heavily) during most of 1994,
heavily) during but, on the
1994, but. whole,
the whole, ever,
ever, concluded the advance
concluded the advance. . Back and forth
forth fighting
fighting
the
the area was a secondary
secondary theater and infantry infantry clashes continued through
continued through the
the rest of the year—in which the
the year-in the
were minor and infrequent. Beginning in late August,
infrequent. Beginning August, VRS reclaimed some of their
YRS reclaimed their lost
lost land-but
land—but the front-
the front
though,
though, the
the pace of fighting
fighting began to escalate-possi-
escalate—possi— lines had generally
lines stabilized.l7l171
generally stabilized.
bly as both sides sent out infantry
infantry probes
probes to determine
determine
15°‘5'
149150 '52 ‘53
15115215
weaknesses
weaknesses in each other's
other’s Iines.
lines.I49 Bosnian
-1 Bosnian At
At the the battle,
conclusion of the
the conclusion Bosnian Army had
the Bosnian
battle . the had
Serb
Serb shelling Konjic
shelling of Konjic also increased
increased.‘54 . 154On 11-12
11-12 almost 100
captured almost kilometers . In terms of net
100 square kilometers. net
September,
September, the ARBiH 4th Corps
the ARBiH commenced its
Corps commenced its gains, the
gains, the Konjic-area offensive
offensive was was to be one of the
main
main operation
operation against thethe VRS
YRS Hezegovina
Hezegovina Corps, Corps, ARBiH’s
ARBiH 's most
most successful
successful operations
operations of thethe year.
year.
launching
launching infantry
infantry assaults on three Serb-held
Serb-held sub- sub
urbs: Bijela, Borci,
urbs: Glavaticevo.1555 The
Borci , and Glavaticevo.15 Bosnian
The Bosnian
Army made steady advances
advances over
over the the next fewfew daysdays,. October 1994: The Mt.
1994: The Controversy
Mt. Bjelasnica Controversy
systematically eliminating VRS
systematically eliminating YRS bunkers
bunkers and strong- strong
occupying Bijela—a
points and occupying
points sizable village south-
Bijela-a sizable south At
At 2,067 meters. Mt.
2,067 meters, Bjelasnica—slightly south
Mt. Bjelasnica-slightly south and
'57 1
. 156157 ‘58
Konjic—on 15
east of Konjic-on 15 September
September.‘56 58 west of Mt. lgman-was
west Igman—was one of thethe highest peaks in
highest peaks in
Bosnia.
Bosnia . Its
Its towering height had added value
towering height value as the site
as the
Up through the capture of Bijela, the
through the the HVO’s
HYO's 56th
56th of a huge
huge radio
radio and television
television transmitter-one
transmitter—one of
"Herceg Stjepan” Home
“Herceg Stjepan" Home Defense Regiment—the local
Defense Regiment-the local Sarajevo's more
Sarajevo’s recognizable landmarks.
more recognizable landmarks . Both
Both Igman
lgman
unit
unit in
in the area—participated in
the area-participated in the offensive, occupy
the offensive. occupy- and Bjelasnica
Bjelasnica had been captured by thethe Bosnian
Bosnian
ing its section
ing of the
section of confrontation line
the confrontation line and supporting
supporting Serbs
Serbs inin mid-1993
mid-1993 but were under UN
placed under
were placed control
UN control
the Bosnian Army with
the Bosnian with mortar fire!”9 On 15
mortar fire.'5 15 Septem-
Septem the threat of NATO
after the airstrikes compelled
NATO airstrikes the VRS
compelled the YRS
ber, however,
however, the HVO reversed
the HYO position and indi
reversed its position indi- to withdraw
to withdraw from the mountains.
from the mountains . Since
Since the
the 14
14 August
August
cated it was
was pulling out of the
the line. 160This
line.160
'
details, see
• For more de1ails. see Annex 56: Battles for Herzegovina.
56 : The Banles Herzegovina,
1994 and
1994 and Annex 57: ··Twin
“Twin Peaks
Peaks”:
..: The Battles
Ballles for Mts. Bjelasnica
and Treskavica, . 1994.
and Treskavica 1994 .
239

1993 UN-imposed
1993 UN-imposed demilitarization
demilitarization agreement, the the UN
UN the Bosnian hotly threatened retaliation,
Bosnian Serbs hotly retaliation, imply
imply-
held control with the understanding
control of the peaks with understanding thatthat ing that they would
would resume shelling Sarajevo in
shelling Sarajevo in defi
defi-
UN peacekeepers would
UN would keep the DMZ free of com-
the DMZ com ance of the
the heavy weapons zone. 180‘8‘
exclusion zone.‘80
weapons exclusion 181The
batants or equipment from the factions.‘72
from any of the factions . 172 UN
UN took immediate action,
took immediate hoping to forestall
action , hoping forestall a gen
gen-
Despite
Despite the
the ostensible demilitarization, however,
ostensible demilitarization, however, the the eral VRS offensive by forcing
YRS offensive forcing the Muslims off the the
Bosnian Army kept troops on both peaks, and proba
Bosnian proba- mountains themselves.
mountains French UN peacekeepers
themselves . French
bly
bly as many as 1,500 to ARBiH troops
to 2,000 ARBiH troops occupied
occupied swept over the the Igman Bjelasnica areas on 77 Octo
Igman and Bjelasnica Octo-
“UN controlled"
the "UN controlled” mountains
mountains at any given time. In
given time. ber,, forcing
ber forcing Bosnian soldiers out of their
Bosnian Army soldiers their posi
posi-
addition, Bosnian
addition, Bosnian Army forces
forces worked
worked on prepared tions—occasionally with
tions-occasionally with the additional persuasion of
additional persuasion
defenses, bunkers. trenchlines within the
bunkers, and trenchlines demilita
the demilita- French warning
French warning shots-and destroying their
shots—and destroying their bunkers
bunkers
rized zone. UN
rized UN peacekeepers had tried but failedfailed toto with
with antitank rockets. 182
antitank rockets.‘82
sweep the
the government forces the mountains
forces off the mountains in in late
late
1993.
1993. At this
this point,
point , a clearer picture to emerge of
picture began to
what had taken place during the attack that night.
during the night.
Around the
the end of September
September. . the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian First,
First , the
the UN
UN retracted its charge that the Bosnian
Bosnian
began massing its force around Mt. Bjelasnica
forcess on and around Bjelasnica Army had mutilated the enemy corpses. Instead,
mutilated the Instead, itit
for a substantial offensive
offensive through thethe demilitarized
demilitarized turned out that four sentries had their throats slit slit in
in a
zone and against Serb positionspositions on the mountain’s
mountain's farfar commando-style operation
commando-style operation. . Others
Others had been shot at
at
side.
side.‘73 The first
m The first of October marked the
October marked the commence-
commence close range but apparently during
during combat. What What had
ment of a major ARBiH offensive
major ARBiH offensive operation
operation in the the happened began to to look less and less likelike a massacre.
massacre .
Bjelasnica-Treskavica
Bjelasnica-Treskavica area against the VRS Sarajevo
the YRS Sarajevo- Under closer scrutiny,
Under closer the evidence
scrutiny, the evidence pointed
pointed instead to
Romanija
Romanija and Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps.Corps. TheThe attack was was sophisticated. swiftly executed sabotage operation
a sophisticated, operation
kicked
kicked off by probably
probably two two full lst Corps brigades,
1st Corps brigades, as against the command post of the
the command the VRS
YRS Trnovo battalbattal-
well as elements of at least three other brigades, brigades , fur
fur- ion.18·1An
ion.‘83 An indignant
indignant Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government demanded a
ther supported by the InteriorInterior Ministry’s
Ministry's elite “Lasta”
"Lasta" formal apology for UN
formal apology UN Special Envoy Akashi’s
Special Envoy Akashi ' s earlier
earlier
(Swallows)
(Swallows) Special battalion.‘74
Special Police battalion. 174 The
The offensive
offensive assertions that the Bosnian Army had executed its
the Bosnian
first directed against the village
was first village of Rakitnica
Rakitnica on prisoners. The UN
prisoners . The lamely countered with
UN lamer with the charge
the Bjelasnica and soon
the slopes of Mt. Bjelasnica soon expanded to that the Bosnian Army was
the Bosnian was not supposed to to be operat
operat-
include fighting
include fighting along
along thethe entire Bjelasnica-Treskav
Bjelasnica-Treskav- ing in the demilitarized
ing zone in
demilitarized zone in the
the first place. 184
first place.‘84
frontline.I75
ica frontline. town of Trnovo itself
175 The town itself came under
Bosnian Army artillery
Bosnian fire the following day.
artillery fire 176(Still
day.‘76 Meanwhile. UN
Meanwhile. UN forces
forces continued
continued to force
force government
government
further toto the south, the
the south. the ARBiH
ARBiH 4th Corps Corps also tooktook troops off the the mountains,
mountains, both to to preserve UN credi
UN credi-
the
the offensive from Konjic
offensive from Konjic toward Kalinovik .) French
toward Kalinovik.) French forestall VRS
bility and to forestall YRS retaliation
retaliation against Sarajevo
Sarajevo
UN
UN peacekeepers blocked blocked some 300 Bosnian Bosnian Army city. 185‘86
city.‘85 186 On
On 9 9 October, Bosnian Serbs,
October, the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian
Bosnian
troops transiting
transiting the mountain on 3 October,
the mountain October, but oth-oth Government. and the
Government. the United
United Nations
Nations agreed to to form
form aa
‘78
ers were clearly
clearly getting through.
through.‘77177 m joint commission
commission to inspect
inspect the demilitarized
demilitarized zone
zone and
verify that it had been cleared of government
verify forces . 187
government forces.‘87
Controversy
Controversy erupted the the following week,
week. on 6 6 Octo
Octo- The dispute dragged on, however,
The however , asas the Bosnian
Bosnian
ber, when
when the Bosnian Serbs charged that a Bosnian
the Bosnian Bosnian Government kept putting
Government putting off the inspection of
the joint inspection
Army sabotage unit had massacred and then mutilated mutilated the mountains. . Worse
the mountains Worse yet,
yet. the Bosnian Army mounted
the Bosnian mounted
troops—including four
20 Serb troops-including four female
female nurses—at
nurses-at a a second attack through
through the Igman DMZ
the Igman DMZ to ambush a
VRS battalion headquarters location
YRS battalion location near Mount VRS
YRS unitunit just
just outside the area. The Bos
demilitarized area.
the demilitarized Bos-
UN initially appeared to
Bjelasnica. . The UN
Bjelasnica corroborate
to corroborate nian
nian Serbs
Serbs retaliated with
with heavy weapons fire
heavy weapons fire from
from
the Bosnian Serb reports, and UN
the Bosnian UN Special Envoy
Special Envoy within the
the exclusion
exclusion zone.
zone.
Yasushi Akashi told reporters that in
Yasushi in many cases thethe
“mutilated or burned
Serb bodies had been "mutilated disfig
burned and disfig-
ured."17 What exactly
ured.”‘79 9 What exactly had happened atop the snow
the snow-
mountain, however.
covered mountain. however, remained obscure, and
remained obscure.
240

On
On 13 VRS Chief of Staff Gen.
October, YRS
13 October. Gen. Milovanovic
Milovanovic the side of Bjelasnica
the south side Bjelasnica with
with heavy
heavy artillery
artillery and
one-week ultimatum,
issued a one-week ultimatum , asserting
asserting that. if the UN
that, if town. 197
captured the town.l97
did not evict Bosnian Army from
evict the Bosnian from Igman
Igman and
Bjelasnica,
Bjelasnica, the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs would reoccupy
reoccupy and The
The Bosnian Army's lst
Bosnian Army’s 1st Corps continued its
Corps continued its advance
advance
scour
scour the
the peaks by force. 188Talks
force.188 Talks broke down on
broke down early November,
in early November, attacking
attacking further
further to
to the
the east
east after
18
18 October when the
October when Bosnian Government
the Bosnian refused to
Government refused taking Javorak and moving
taking moving onto the the Hojta ridge
ridge line
line
withdraw
withdraw the 500 or so troops troops remaining
remaining on the two two connecting
connecting the flanksflanks of Mounts Bjelasnica
Bjelasnica and
mountains—insisting that
mountains-insisting that any withdrawal
withdrawal be be linked
linked to Treskavica
Treskavica.‘98.198 In a successful
successful push
push over
over the next
next few
few
UN assurances that
UN that UNPROFOR would would safeguard
safeguard days. Bosnian Army advanced
the Bosnian
days, the advanced the
the frontlines
frontlines sev
sev-
traffic over the Mt.
traffic Mt. lgman road into
Igman road into Sarajevo.
Sarajevo. TheThe UN eral kilometers
kilometers to the east and took took three towns
towns along
along
refused, and Bosnian
refused, Bosnian SerbSerb retaliation looked immi-
retaliation looked immi the smaller north-south road
smaller north-south several kilome
road that ran several kilome-
nen1.1x9 190The
nent.189190 The 20 October
October deadline
deadline came and went went ters west
ters Trnovo.199199
west of Trnovo. The VRS
The YRS Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps,
Corps .
without incident, however.
without incident. however, leaving
leaving the standoff
the standoff however-hastily
however—hastily reinforced
reinforced by by elements
elements of the
unresolved.
unresolved. Sarajevo-Romanija
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps—halted
Corps-halted the the ARBiH
ARBiH
advance around 66 November,
advance around November , with with the frontl ine still
the frontline
The
The UN went after the the remaining Govem
Bosnian Govern-
remaining Bosnian several kilometers west
several kilometers west of the main highway. 200 20'
main highway.200 201On
troops in the DMZ
ment troops October, , whereupon
DMZ on 24 October whereupon 14-15 December,
14-15 December, the BosnianBosnian Army made made its last push
push
the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Army troops troops opened firefire on a group
group of of the year
year inin the direction of the Trnovo
the direction Tmovo road.
road. Again
French peacekeepers. The
French peacekeepers. The French responded in kind,
French responded kind . the ARBiH
the advanced, , claiming
ARBiH advanced gains of 20 square
claiming gains
and a sharp firefight
firefight ensued before
before tempers cooled
cooled kilometers-but
kilometers—but still failed
still failed to
to secure the road.202
road. 202
and the two
two forces
forces disengaged
disengaged. . An apologetic Bosnian
apologetic Bosnian
Government, apparently
Government, recognizing that it had gone
apparently recognizing At
At the end of the year, Bosnian Army
the Bosnian
year, the Army had taken
taken a
far, ordered
too far. ordered its remaining troops off the mountain.
remaining troops mountain . total of some
total JOOsquare kilometers
some 100 kilometers on
on Mts.
Mts. Bjelas
Bjelas-
The
The three-way standoff—Bosnian Government,
three-way standoff-Bosnian Government, Bos Bos- nica Treskavica and had
nica and Treskavica had captured at least
captured at least five
five
nian Serbs, United Nations—had
Serbs, and United finally been
Nations-had finally highly prized
prized tanks, several small
tanks, several small artillery pieces and
artillery pieces
resolved, for a time,
resolved. time, at least. As October
October drew
drew to a mortars,
mortars, and sizable
sizable munitions
munitions stores. 2032"“205
stores.203 2().1 M Never
Never-
close, the focus
close, focus of activity
activity and attention was to move
move theless,
theless, although the Bosnian
although the Bosnian Government gains were
Government gains were
from
from Mt. Bjelasnica Treskavica, its neighbor
Bjelasnica to Mt. Treskavica, neighbor to
to substantial, they still fell short of their
substantial, their primary
primary goal
goal of
the south. 192193
191192 193
south'19l interdicting capturing the Trnovo road.
interdicting or capturing road. Despite
Despite a
valiant—and
valiant-and partially successful-effort , Tmovo
partially successful—effort, Trnovo still
still
lay out of reach.
lay reach .
Treskavica Offensive
November: The Treskavica
The beginning of November

The beginning November marked
marked the
the transition
transition toto a Nevesinje in November
ARBiH offensive,
new phase of the ARBiH offensive, one directed
directed fur-
fur
toward Mt. Treskavica-another
ther south toward Treskavica—another peak
peak Serb-held Nevesinje
Serb-held Nevesinje was
was about 20 km
about 20 east of
km due east
southeast of Mt. Bjelasnica
Bjelasnica and of equally imposing
equally imposing Blagaj and Croat-held
Muslim-held Blagaj Buna. The con
Croat-held Buna. con-
dimensions (2,088 meters)-and
dimensions (2,088 Sarajevo-Tmovo
meters)—and the Sarajevo-Trnovo frontation line
frontation was well west
line was west of the town,
town, and
and Neves
Neves-
road segment. The The shift October—just as
shift began on 29 October-just as inje had been more
inje more or
or less untouched by
less untouched the war.
by the war. The
The
the Igman-Bjelasnica withdrawal
the lgman-Bjelasnica withdrawal was
was to be com
be com- Bosnian sometimes the HVO
Bosnian Army and sometimes HYO would occa occa-
pleted-when Bosnian Government
pleted—when Bosnian Government troops
troops again
again sionally shell some of the intervening
shell some Serb-held vil
intervening Serb-held vil-
advanced south through
advanced the Mt.
through the Bjelasnica demilita-
Mt. Bjelasnica demilita lages, but.
lages, the whole,
but. on the whole, itit was
was a quiet section of the
quiet section
rized zone to
rized two Serb-held
to attack two Serb-held villages the foot
villages at the foot front.
front.
mountain.194194
of the mountain. Bosnian Army forces
Bosnian shelled
forces also shelled
nearby UN
a nearby observation post with
UN observation with anan artillery piece
artillery piece
'96 The
from within the exclusion
from zone. 195196
exclusion zone.I95 The following
day, the
day. Bosnian Army shelled
the Bosnian shelled Serb-held
Serb-held Javorak on
241
241

The first
first serious
serious action
action in
in the
the Nevesinje
Nevesinje sector began
sector began Croatian Army. The
Croatian Army. VRS proved
YRS able to slow,
proved able slow, but not
shortly after the 15
shortly after 15 September Bosnian Army
September Bosnian Army 4th stop, these advances
stop, ended the
advances and ended the year
year with
with its
its larg-
larg
Corps offensive
offensive fromfrom Konjic,
Konjic, well to the north. north. OnOn est territorial
territorial loss
loss to date and a military problem that
military problem
19 September,
19 September, the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army shifted
shifted its emphasis
emphasis would only grow the following
worse the
grow worse following year.
year.
to the Mostar-Nevesinje
Mostar-Nevesinje axis, axis, while continuing
continuing its its
attacks around Konjic.
around Konjic. These
These efforts continued
efforts continued
through
through 26 September,
September, but with with no
no apparent gains.206
gains. 206 HVO-ARBiH Capture
The HVO-ARBiH Capture of Kupres,
Kupres,
20720820°2'0
201208 2" 212
209 210 211 2‘? The Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Army made made another
another November 1994
1994
offensive
offensive push push in in the Mostar-Nevesinje
Mostar-Nevesinje area against against
the VRS
YRS Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps a month month later,later, this
this time
time The combined
combined Croat-Muslim offensive
offensive began
began with
with the
the
launching
launching infantry
infantry attacks eastward
eastward from from Blagaj
Blagaj capture of Kupres, objective of interest
Kupres, an objective interest to both fac-
to both fac
beginning
beginning on 12 12 October.
October. This effort
effort also halted after
also halted after tions. Kupres
tions. Kupres had been aa prize sought—
long sought-
prize long
a few
few days
days without
without visible
visible gains. 2 1.1214215
gains.213214215 especially by the Bosnian
especially Croats—ever since
Bosnian Croats-ever since the
town's the then JNA
town’s fall to the JNA in first days of the war.
in the first war.
The Bosnian Army’s main
Bosnian Army's offensive effort
main offensive effort came
came the the Besides wanting
Besides avenge aa humiliating
wanting to avenge humiliating Croat
Croat defeat
following month
following month when
when thethe ARBiH
ARBiH 4th Corps Corps and recapture municipality that had
recapture a municipality had aa sizable
sizable prewar
prewar
attempted to cut the road road to Nevesinje.
Nevesinje. The The 4th Corps Croat population, the HVO
Croat population, HYO also
also wanted control of the
wanted control
began its preparations
preparations the night before
the night before the main
main road junction from
road junction from Tomislavgrad toward Bugojno and
Tomislavgrad toward and
assault, with
assault, with elite
elite "recon-sabotage"
“recon-sabotage” elements-most
elements—most Sipovo. 224 The
Sipovo.224 Bosnian Muslims
The Bosnian Muslims hadhad less
less historical
historical
likely from
from the General
General Staff's
Staff’s crack “Black Swans”
crack "Black Swans" attachment to
attachment Kupres itself but
to Kupres but held nearby Bugojno
held nearby
unit—infiltrating Serb
unit-infiltrating Serb lines northwest of Nevesinje.
lines northwest Nevesinje. and wanted
wanted toto control lines of communication
control the lines communication
The conventional
conventional assault began with with the Bosnian
Bosnian from Kupres
from real Muslim
Kupres to the real Muslim objective
objective in
in the
Army shelling
shelling Serb
Serb positions
positions onon the morning of
the morning area—Donji Vakuf,
area-Donji Yakuf, 20 kilometers
kilometers to the northeast.
northeast.
I I1 November,
1 November, followed by infantry attack from
by an infantry from
Blagaj. 2'8 The conventional
conventional assaults had only The Bosnian
Bosnian Army
Army fired
fired the
the first shots of the cam
first shots cam-
216217218
Blagaj.216217 only
limited success, but the infiltration
limited success, infiltration teams appear to paign
paign with
with a unilateral offensive effort
unilateral offensive effort against
against Kupres
Kupres
have caused
caused considerable disruption in
considerable disruption in Serb
Serb rear beginning
beginning on 2020 October,
October, launching
launching infantry
infantry attacks
areas?”
areas. Some of the infiltration
219 Some however, had
infiltration teams, however, against the VRS
against the YRS 30th Infantry Division
30th Infantry Donji Vakuf
Division Donji Yakuf
to fight
fight it out withwith the Herzegovina
Herzegovina Corps,Corps, and
and most
most roughly l4-km
along a roughly
along 14-km front
front northeast
northeast of the town.
town?25225
likely took
took heavy
heavy casualties
casualties on the the way The Bos-
way out. The Bos 226
226 By
By 23 October, the ARBiH
October, the ARBiH had advanced close
advanced close
nian
nian Army offensive
offensive halted
halted around
around 20 November
November with with enough to
enough to Kupres
Kupres to direct mortar
to direct mortar fire into the town?27
fire into town. 227
apparently casualties on
heavy casualties on both sides. 223
220 221 222 m The Bosnian
Bosnian Army’s continued to make
Army's 7th Corps continued make
apparently heavy sides.220221222
slow advances
slow advances inin the difficult, mountainous terrain,
difficult, mountainous terrain,
Chapter
Chapter 62 capturing one peak at a time
capturing time but never able to achieve
achieve
Croat-Muslim Operations
Combined Croat-Muslim
Combined Operations in a decisive
decisive breakthrough. Nevertheless, by
breakthrough. Nevertheless, by 27
27 October
October
West-Central Bosnia, October-November
West-Central October-November 1994*
1994* UN observers
observers were
were reporting
reporting YRSVRS forces
forces inin retreat
and Serb
Serb civilians fleeing town. 228 22"
fleeing the town.228 229
The year was close with

was to close with aa major offensive opera
major offensive opera-
tion in west-central
tion Bosnia, which began
west-central Bosnia, began with
with the cap-
the cap Yet
Yet the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army failed press on
failed to press all the way
on all way
ture of Kupres and then continued
continued northeast
northeast and west into Kupres. This could
into Kupres. been for a variety
could have been variety or
or a
from there. Presaging
from much larger
the much
Presaging the larger combined
combined combination of reasons.
combination reasons. The advance
advance had been slowed
slowed
offensive that would end the
offensive the war
war the
the following year,
year, by fog,
by rain, and the
fog, rain, the need to consolidate gains. Even
consolidate gains. Even
this series was to
series of attacks was to include simultaneous
include simultaneous against thinly stretched
the thinly
against the Serb defenders,
stretched Serb defenders, advances
advances
actions by the Bosnian
actions Bosnian Army, the HVO, and the
the HYO, the in
in the rugged mountains
the rugged mountains northeast
northeast of the town
town had
'
costly and
been aa costly and wearing process. The 7th Corps
wearing process.
• For more details, see
see Annex Donji Vakuf,
Annex 50: Donji Vakuf, 1994 and Annex
Annex
“With Friends
58: "With Like These,
Friends Like These. Who Enemies?'" The HVO
Who Needs Enemies?” HYO-
Bosnian Army Capture of
Bosnian Army Kupres, November 1994.
of Kupres,
242
242
Digitized by o gle Origilial from

leadership
leadership may may simply
simply have concluded
concluded that a pause in in too late for the
the Bosnian
Bosnian Government,
Government, however;
however; the
the
the offensive
offensive would
would be prudent
prudent and that the ARBiH—
the ARBiH- Croats were
Croats were already
already announcing that special
announcing that special police
police
by now just a few
now just few kilometers
kilometers outside town—could
outside the town-could and HVO special
special forces
forces detachments
detachments had
had entered
make thethe final push whenever
final push whenever it cared to; or there maymay Kupres aa little
Kupres little after midday. m 23°
after midday?35 236
have been a prior agreement

agreement with the Croats
with the Croats that
would explain
explain the holdup.
holdup . Whatever
Whatever the cause, the Exactly what Croats and Muslims
what the Croats Muslims had agreed
agreed to
to
Bosnian Army’s delay-of
Bosnian Army's delay—of just a few days—was to
few days-was before the
before the offensive remains unclear.237
offensive remains unclear. 237 It seems most
most
prove crucial.
prove crucial. By thethe first November, the ARBiH
first of November, ARBiH likely that the two factions
the two factions had
had discussed
discussed their
their inten
inten-
7th Corps
Corps had driven
driven to the front
front gates Kupres. . It
gates of Kupres tions to
tions the extent of agreeing
to the agreeing on
on aa simultaneous
simultaneous
was
was to be be the Croats, , however,
Bosnian Croats
the Bosnian however, who
who would attack in the
the direction
direction of Kupres without divulging
Kupres but without
race into
into the
the town
town through other, unguarded
through the other, unguarded gate.
gate. actual operational
actual operational plansplans to
to each other. Probably the
other. Probably the
Bosnian Army did
Bosnian did not have itsits heart set
set on
on capturing
capturing
Through the October, the HVO had remained
the end of October, remained Kupres—before
Kupres-before the the war
war the large Croat
the large Croat population
population
on the sidelines Kupres battle,
sidelines of the Kupres battle, massing
massing its had dominated
dominated the the town—but
town-but it had paid paid the town’s
town's
forces and waiting
forces waiting for the most opportune moment to
opportune moment ransom in
ransom in blood
blood slogging
slogging through the hills to
through the to the
step in. HVO commander
step in. commander Ante Ante Roso's newly estab-
Roso’s newly estab north. Its
north. Its troops
troops were
were undoubtedly
undoubtedly less than pleased
pleased to
lished
lished HVO Guards
Guards Brigades
Brigades had been collecting
collecting inin discover
discover that Croats had meanwhile
the Croats
that the raced in
meanwhile raced in from
from
the area for days and would serve as backbone of
as the backbone the south to occupy
the occupy the town.
town. Regardless,
Regardless, the
the Bosnian
Bosnian
the operation. Three of the four
operation. Three four HVO
HVO Guards
Guards Brigades
Brigades Government leadership evidently
Government leadership evidently arrived
arrived at
at the prag
prag-
were to contribute to the
to contribute the operation, further supported
operation, further supported matic decision
matic decision that that Croat
Croat military
military cooperation
cooperation was was
“Ludvig Pavlovic”
by the elite 60th "Ludvig Pavlovic" Guards
Guards Airborne more important than ownership
more important ownership of traditionally
traditionally Croat
Croat
Battalion, Bosnian
Battalion, Croat MUP
Bosnian Croat MUP special
special police
police troops,
troops. Kupres, recognizing
Kupres, recognizing that that a battle for the
a battle town could
the town could
and HVO corps-level
corps-level artillery. addition, although
artillery. (In addition, although well reignite the Croat-Muslim war
well reignite war that
that had
had already
already
Zagreb
Zagreb vociferously denied any participation
vociferously denied participation inin the proved so destructive
proved both sides.
destructive to both sides.
Croatian Army forces
battle, Croatian forces almost
almost certainly
certainly took
took
part in at least the planning
planning and probably
probably the actual
actual For all
all its flaws
flaws in
in planning and execution,
planning and execution, the Croat
Croat-
execution of the attack.)2
execution attack.)23030 Muslim
Muslim capture Kupres was
capture of Kupres was nevertheless
nevertheless a step in in
the right
the direction—militarily, politically, and
right direction-militarily, and geo
geo-
Bosnian Army on the
With the Bosnian verge of taking
the verge taking the graphically—and
graphically-and a step step closer
closer to both factions’
to both factions' ulti
ulti-
town—and tying
town-and down the Serb
tying down Serb defenders-the
defenders—the time time objective of Jajce. It was
mate objective was still not
not clear
clear whether
whether
had come
come toto launch
launch Operation “Cincar,” the
Operation "Cincar," the Croat
Croat the ARBiH
ARBiHand the HVO HVO were
were marching
marching down
down the
Kupres. Having chosen
capture of Kupres. chosen its moment
moment care- care in cadence
road in racing each other toward
cadence or racing toward the desti
desti-
fully, the HVO pushed
pushed a two-pronged offensive from
two-pronged offensive from nation, however.
nation, however.
the south against the thinly
thinly stretched 7th Kupres-
Kupres
Sipovo Motorized Brigade/2nd
Brigade/2nd Krajina Corps Corps begin-
begin
ning on I1 November.
ning November. One One spearhead drove north from
drove north Year’s Last
The Year's Last Drive
Drive on Donji Vakuf,
on Donji Vakuf,
Sujica along main road into
along the main into Kupres.
Kupres. This western
western November 1994
1994
axis captured
axis captured the
the town Donji Malovan on 1I Nov-
town of Donji Nov
continued several
ember and continued several kilometers
kilometers further
further to to take After the Bosnian
Bosnian Croat capture of Kupres,
Croat capture Kupres, the Bos—
Bos-
smaller Gomji Malovan on 22 November.
smaller Gornji November?31 231 A second
A second nian Army
nian could advance
Army could advance nono further
further south
south and
and once
once
advanced in parallel
spearhead advanced parallel to the east, moving
east, moving again redirected its
again redirected its main
main efforts
efforts toward Donji Vakuf
toward Donji Vakuf
from Ravno
from Ravno to the Serb-held
Serb-held village Rilic on
village of Rilic to the north.
to the north. On 4 November
November the Serb-held hamlets of
Serb-held hamlets
2 November. 2“ Kupres-by
November.232232233 Kupres—by this this point
point an aban
an aban- Koscani
Koscani (about 7 km
km southwest Donji Vakuf),
southwest of Donji Vakuf),
(about 7
doned town—fell to
doned ghost town-fell to the lightning Croat
the lightning advance
Croat advance Kopcici, Urije fell to
Kopcici, and Urije to determined
determined infantry
infantry
on 3 November. The
3 November. ARBiH had meanwhile
The ARBiH meanwhile contin-
contin attacks. 238 After further
attacks.238 probing assaults,
further probing assaults , equipment
equipment
methodical advance
ued its methodical advance and announced
announced the the capture
of the heights
heights at Kupreska
Kupreska Vrata-a
Vrata——a mere 3 km km from
town—that same day.
the center of town-that 234 It was
day?34 was even
even nownow
243
243

shifts,
shifts. and extensive
extensive preparations
preparations in the
the area.
area, the Bos-
the Bos Chapter
Chapter 63
nian Army 7th Corps launched
nian launched a major assault toward
major assault toward The Western Theater
Theater
Donji Vakuf—about
Donji Yakuf-about 16 away—from the south
km away-from
16 km south-
west November.239239 Bosnian
west on 7 November. Croat artillery—
Bosnian Croat artillery-
though not troops-supported
though troops—supported the attack on VRSYRS 30th The Bihac Battles of 1994'
The Bihac 1994•
Division defense lines
lines between Kupres and Donji
between Kupres Donji
Vakufz‘m“
YakuP 40 241 A day of heavy
heavy shelling failed to
shelling failed to pave
pave the
the While
While the
the Croat-Muslim war burned itself out
war burned out and
way Prusac, 7
way past Prusac. 7 kmkm south of Donji Yakuf. Muslim
Donji Vakuf. Muslim then concluded
concluded and the the series of ARBiH
ARBiH offensives
offensives
and Serb troops tried
Serb troops tried to push each other
to push the strate
other off the strate- sprawled across
sprawled the rest of Bosnia in
across the in the
the spring
spring and
gic
gic high
high ground
ground overover the
the next few days. but neither
few days, summer of 1994,
summer I 994, the
the isolated
isolated Bihac pocket
pocket remained
remained a
could
could dislodge
dislodge thethe other. Bosnian Army made
242 The Bosnian
other.242 itself. The hardy
theater unto itself. hardy but still isolated ARBiH
still isolated ARBiH
another hard drive
another drive on I16-20 November, shelling
6-20 November, shelling and 5th Corps (supported by
Corps (supported by a tiny contingent of allied
tiny contingent allied
assaulting Serb-held
assaulting Koscani, which sat
Serb-held Koscani. sat atop high
high HVO fighters)
HYO fighters) continued
continued toto battle no less
less than three
24‘ 245
“5 The
ground overlooking
ground overlooking Donji Vakuf.243
Yakuf. 243 244 end of Bosnian Serbs,
opponents: the Bosnian
separate opponents: Serbs. the Krajina
November and December
November December saw weeks weeks of bitter,
bitter, incon
incon- from Croatia,
Serbs from
Serbs Croatia, and Fikret Abdic's Muslim
Fikret Abdic’s Muslim rebels
rebels
clusive, uphill-and-downhill fighting
clusive, fighting along
along the
the ridge
ridge of the
the Autonomous
Autonomous Province
Province of Western
Western Bosnia
lines surrounding
lines surrounding the town. As
the town. November turned
As November turned into
into (APWB ). On
(APWB). stage of the Bihac enclave,
On the separate stage enclave,
December,
December, both sides abandonedabandoned thethe offensive
offensive and these actors
actors would
would play
play out a bloody
bloody and complicated
complicated
in for a dug-in
settled in dug-in winter
winter facing
facing each other across series of battles during
series the course
during the course of the year.
the year.
the trench lines
lines running
running up and downdown thethe pine-forested
pine-forested
ridges.
ridges. At least until
until the following spring.
spring, the warwar of
maneuver was
maneuver was over.
over. The Demise
The Demise of Fikret
Fikret Abdic’s
Abdic's Empire,
Empire,
January-August, 1994
January-August, 1994
Cooperation between the
Cooperation between the Bosnian
Bosnian Army and the the
Croats
Croats was surprisingly
surprisingly good the last stages of
during the
good during It
It's’s absolutely
absolutely crazy
crazy here. There's's aa joke going
here. There going
the attack on Donji
the Vakuf, even if
Donji Yakuf. if the
the Croats did take
Croats did around.
around. Three people die on
Three people the Abdic side,
on the side, and
and
control of Kupres
control Kupres without signaling their inten
without fully signaling inten- then three
then people die
three people die on
on the Government
Government side. side.
tion to do so. Relations
tion Relations remained
remained good
good enough
enough even Who wins? The
Who The Serbs,
Serbs. 6-0.
6-0.
after the fall of Kupres the Bosnian
Kupres that the Bosnian Croats were
Croats were
supplying
supplying the Bosnian Army with
the Bosnian with weapons during its
weapons during its -A
——A UN official in Bihac,
UN official Bihac, June 1995 m
June 1995 24 ''
attacks on Donji YakuP HVO guns and rocket

Vakuf?“46 HYO rocket
launchers actively
launchers actively supported
supported Bosnian
Bosnian Army units units in In mid-January
mid-January the the Bosnian Government threw
Bosnian Government threw the
the
early
early November,
November. with mixed team of Croat
with a mixed Croat and first punch
first punch in in the continuing,
continuing, back-and-forth
back-and-forth warwar
Muslim
Muslim artillery
artillery spotters directing fire for both
directing fire both between Bosnian Army
between the Bosnian Army and Abdic’s
Abdic's rebels.
rebels.
armies.
armies.247
247 ARBiH 5th Corps forces
ARBiH forces pressed along broad front,
along a broad front,
kilometers and capturing
advancing about 2 kilometers
advancing capturing the town
town
of Skokovi. 250 251 252 The fighting
Skokovi.250251252 fighting paused atat the end of
As I1994
994 drew close, the Bosnian
drew to a close. Bosnian Army had come come
frustratingly close to
frustratingly close Vakuf, but success
to Donji Yakuf. success the month,
month, asas the opposing Muslim
the opposing Muslim factions
factions signed
signed aa
remained out of reach.
remained Alagic’s 7th Corps soldiers
reach. Alagic's soldiers cease-fire and exchanged
cease-fire bodies of those
exchanged bodies those killed inin
see—but not yet enter—Donji
could see-but
could Vakuf from
enter-Donji Yakuf from thethe action.
action.253 Beginning on 16
253 Beginning February, however,
16 February, however, the
southwest. The VRS
hills to the south and southwest. YRS 30th Infan-
Infan tables turned,
turned, as the Abdic
as the forces and the Bosnian
Abdic forces Bosnian
try still held
try Division still held the even higher
higher peaks to the
to the ‘
For more details,
· For details. see
see Annex
Annex 59: The Demise of
The Demise of Abdic’s
Abdic's Empire.
Empire.
northwest and northeast and retained
northwest defen
retained a secure defen- January-August. 1994; Annex
January-August, Operation “Breza
Annex 60: Operation 94,” The
"Breza 94." The Bos
Bos-
sive position for the
sive position the winter months. As
winter months. turned out,
As it turned out. nian and Krajina
Krajina Serb Armies Attack Bihac,
Armies Attack Bihac. September 1994',and
1994; and
control of Donji
war for control
the war Vakuf would be
Donji Yakuf fought
be fought Annex
Annex 61: Punch
Punch and Counterpunch,
Counterpunch, Bihac Operations, October
Bihac Operations, October-
December 1994.
from
from ridge line to
ridge line to ridge line for almost
ridge line almost another year.248
year. 248
244
244

Serbs hit the
the ARBiH 5th Corps Corps with with simultaneous
simultaneous The emphasis
The emphasis of the
the fighting
fighting came to center on
on the
the
attacks from
from twotwo directions. Bosnian Army Brig.
directions.254254 Bosnian key town
key town of Pecigrad,
Pecigrad, which
which had been fiercely
fiercely con
con-
Gen.
Gen. Arif Pasalic
Pasalic confirmed
confirmed on 21 February that
21 February that tested for over week .266 Both
over a week.266 Both the assaulting
assaulting ARBiH
ARBiH
Abdic forces
forces had advanced
advanced to to within 10 10 km
km of govern-
govem Corps and Abdic’s
5th Corps Abdic's defending
defending 4th Brigade
Brigade knew
knew
ment-held Cazin. At
ment-held At the same time, time, UN officials
officials that the town's
that town’s capture would open
open the way for aa Bos
the way Bos-
reported that
that Bosnian forces of Maj.
Bosnian Serb forces Maj. Gen. Boric’s
Gen. Boric's nian Army
nian Anny advance into Velika
advance into Kladusa Abdic’s
Velika Kladusa Abdic's 4th
2nd Krajina Corps
Corps were
were strongly pressuring Bihac and
strongly pressuring Brigade—probably
Brigade-probably the the APWB’s
APWB's best formation—did
formation-did
Bosanska
Bosanska Krupa.255 15" For a ti
Krupa. 155 256 me, the situation
time, looked
situation looked not give
not found itself increasingly
ground, but found increasingly sur
sur-
give ground,
almost
almost critical,
critical, but Dudakovic's resilient 5th Corps
Dudakovic’s resilient Corps rounded by
rounded by fast-moving Bosnian Army
fast-moving Bosnian Anny advances.
advances . The
The
managed to rally yet again. No further
to rally further advances
advances were
were 5th Corps forces had surrounded
Corps forces surrounded the
the town
town on
on three
reported,
reported, and comparatively
comparatively littlelittle fighting took place
fighting took sides by 22
22 June. leaving Abdic’s
June, leaving Brigade block
Abdic's 4th Brigade block-
along
along the Abdic-5th Corps confrontation line
Corps confrontation line during
during ing the government
ing advance but trapped
government advance trapped in
in
most of spring 268269
Pecigrad. 261 268 269
spring 1994. m
1994.257 Pecigradast
When the Bosnian

Bosnian Government
Government signedsigned a cease-fire
cease-fire Desperate. Abdic
Desperate, Abdic appealed for help
help to his
his last
last hope,
hope,
with
with the Bosnian
Bosnian Serbs
Serbs in early June, , it freed up the
early June the the
the Krajina Serbs. The Krajina Serb
Serbs. The Serb Army (Srpska
Army (Srpska
Bosnian Anny
Bosnian Army’s Corps to devote its full
's 5th Corps full attention
attention Vojska Krajina—SVK)
Vojska Krajina-SVK) continued to
had continued to support
support the
the
against the Abdic separatists. Abdic did did not sign the
sign the Abdic
Abdic rebels
rebels with
with artillery
artillery fire
fire but had remained
remained
agreement, and the 5th Corps could finally
Corps could finally divert
divert unwilling to
to commit
commit Serb infantry into
Serb infantry into the battle itself.
the battle itself.
scarce resources
resources to to take on its secondary
secondary opponent.
opponent.258258 On June, UN
On 30 June. UN monitors
monitors reported
reported that the SVK
that the SVK hadhad
The Abdic forces
The forces appear to have struck struck the first blow,
the first blow, removed
removed atat least 20 heavy weapons from
heavy weapons from UNUN-
reportedly
reportedly attacking
attacking government-held
govemment-held territory
territory on monitored weapons collection
monitored weapons collection sites in
in Croatia
Croatia and
and
11 making some initial gains.259260
1 1 June and making The
gains. 259 260 The moved
moved them into Abdic-controlled
them into territory .270 The
Abdic-controlled territory.270 The
battlefield situation
battlefield situation changed rapidly,
rapidly, though.
though, and by by UN was
was extremely concerned that
extremely concerned the SVK
that the SVK would
13
13 June the ARBiH had counterattacked
the ARBiH counterattacked successfully,
successfully, cross over
over to battle the 5th Corps
Corps in Bosnia, but,
in Bosnia, but, in
in the
the
capturing some 30 square kilometers
capturing kilometers and advancing
advancing to the Krajina Serbs
event. the Serbs elected
elected not to commit
commit their
their
the outskirts Pecigrad—a small
outskirts of Pecigrad-a small but crucial
crucial town
town own troops
own directly in
troops directly support of Abdic’s
in support Abdic's failing
astride the north-south highway
the key north-south from Cazin to
highway from to regime.
regime.
Abdic’s stronghold
Abdic's Kladusa. 261 The
stronghold of Velika Kladusa.261 follow
The follow-
ing day, reports emerged that
ing purged his
that Abdic had purged his At
At this point in
this point in the seesaw that Bihac had
seesaw battle that
ranks, arresting
ranks, arresting 500 or more of his own supporters
his own supporters he become,
become, one of the oddest operations of the entire
oddest operations entire
suspected of disloyalty.
disloyalty.262262 Bosnian
Bosnian war
war was
was launched.
launched. The
The intricate
intricate and auda
auda-
cious Operation “Tigar-Sloboda
cious Operation 'Tigar-Sloboda ‘94”
'94" (Tiger-Freedom
(Tiger-Freedom
Whether inspired by Abdic’s
Whether inspired Abdic's leadership
leadership or fear of '94) was
‘94) was to
to prove
prove perhaps the most
perhaps the daring and unor
most daring unor-
arrest, the APWB forces
the APWB forces rallied
rallied on 15-16 June, halting
15-16 June. halting thodox stunt of ARBiH
thodox ARBiH 5th Corps
Corps commander
commander Dudak
Dudak-
the 5th Corps counterattacking near the
Corps advance and counterattacking ovic’s
ovic 's career.
town of Liskovac.
town Liskovac.263 June, however,
263 By 20 June, however. the UN
the UN
government forces
reported that government forces had resumed
resumed their
their The
The first reports of odd
first reports in the Bihac
developments in
odd developments
advance, approaching
approaching to within 13 13 km Abdic’s de
km of Abdic's pocket on 77 July,
pocket came on July, when
when both
both local
local and Western
Western
facto capital of Velika Kladusa.264
facto capital Kladusa. 264 TheThe fiercest
fiercest fighting
fighting news
news organizations that 5th Corps
reported that
organizations reported troops had
Corps troops had
around the town
was in and around Golubovici, which sat
town of Golubovici, sat surrounded the
surrounded French UN
the French UN peacekeeping
peacekeeping contingent’s
contingent's
atop the high
high ground overlooking the approaches
ground overlooking approaches to compound in
compound Bihac city?"
in Bihac Later in
city. 271 Later the day, Abdic’s
in the Abdic's
Velika Kladusa
Kladusa.265 Meanwhile, UN
.265 Meanwhile, UN observers-fear-
observers—fear news
news agency reported that
agency reported the chaos
that the chaos had been caused
caused
ing an escalation
ing conflict—watched nervously
escalation of the conflict-watched nervously by mutinying
by mutinying 5th Corps troops who
Corps troops who had refused
refused to
as
as Krajina Serb Army troops
Serb Anny troops supported
supported thethe Abdic
Abdic continue fighting the Muslim
continue fighting Muslim rebels. On 99 July,
rebels. On July,
with tank and artillery
rebels with fire from
artillery fire from across the
border in
border Croatia.
in Croatia.
245
245

UNPROFOR spokesmen reported gunfire
spokesmen reported gunfire and explo-
explo Meanwhile, as
as Abdic
Abdic and the 5th Corps battled
battled to the
sions itself, but,
sions in Bihac itself, but, as
as the French
French were still con-
were still con north,
north, the
the VRS also continued its
also continued its own
own operations
operations
fined
fined toto base, the
the UN could confirm exactly
could not confirm exactly who
who against Dudakovic’s
against Dudakovic's forces. 283 In July,
forces.283 July, Major
Major General
General
the 5th Corps was
was fighting. Reports began
fighting.272272 Reports filter
began to filter Boric’s 2nd
Grujo Boric's 2nd Krajina Corps hoped
hoped to finally
finally
in that loyal 5th Corps troops
in were battling
troops were battling defecting
defecting occupy all
occupy all of the Grabez
Grabez plateau
plateau and seize
seize the
the south-
south
"peace force"
“peace force” elements
elements who who had gone over to Abdic’s
over to Abdic's bank of the
(right) bank
ern (right) River, which itit had
the Una River, had been
side. Then
side. Abdic’s own
Then Abdic's own brigades-again
brigades—again backed backed by
by trying to
trying do since
to do since 1992.
1992. The capture
capture of these areas
Krajina Serb
Serb artillery mortar fire—mounted
artillery and mortar fire-mounted aa would allow the corps to take important
the corps railroad links
important railroad
supporting
supporting assault along
along part of thethe confrontation
confrontation line.
line. running through
running through the outskirts of Bihac city.
outskirts ofBihac city. The VRS’s
VRS's
Things looked
looked bleak indeed for Dudakovic's
bleak indeed Dudakovic’s 5th previous effort
previous come in
effort had come in February 1994. The new
February 1994. new
Corps—simultaneously fighting
Corps-simultaneously against the Bosnian
fighting against Bosnian operation, “Una
operation, "Una 94,”
94," appears
appears toto have
have begun
begun on on
Serbs, the
Serbs. the Krajina Serbs, the Abdic
Serbs, the Abdic rebels,
rebels, and "peace
“peace 111 JJuly-concurrent
1 uly—concurrent with Abdic/Krajina Serb
with the Abdic/Krajina Serb push
push
force” mutineers within its own
force" mutineers ranks. 273
own ranks?73 Cajici. The first
toward Cajici.
toward objective of the three light
first objective light
infantry brigades
infantry brigades leading
leading the attack was capture
was to capture
On 10 July, however,
IO July, however, the Bosnian Army
the Bosnian Army announced
announced important on the plateau—which
important hills on plateau-which seems to
to have
have
triumphantly
triumphantly that thethe entire
entire "peace force" rebellion
“peace force” rebellion perpetually contested—then
been perpetually contested-then grab the villages
villages
charade, engineered
had been a charade, engineered by by the 5th Corps head
head- lining the Una below
the Una hills. 284 The Serb
below the hills.284 Serb troops
troops
quarters and executed
executed largely
largely through unwitting
through the unwitting again made
again made little
little or
or no
no progress
progress against
against the defending
defending
collaboration the Abdic
collaboration of the Abdic forces.
forces. As itit turned out, the Muslims, 15 July.
Muslims, and the battle had ended by 15 July.
5th Corps had staged a mock mock mutiny,
mutiny, confining
confining the
UN to
UN to base to prevent its finding
prevent its finding out the truth and At beginning of August the
At the beginning center of battle
the center battle shifted
shifted
allowing reporters access only to selected pieces
reporters access pieces of once again
once again to the little town
the little town of Pecigrad,
Pecigrad, where
where
information. The capstone
information. capstone of the effort, however,
the effort, however, was
was Abdic’s
Abdic's surrounded defenders continued
surrounded defenders continued to put
put up
up aa
an
an appeal for assistance
assistance from
from a fictional “Seventh Bri
fictional "Seventh Bri- determined resistance.
determined Bosnian Army
resistance. Bosnian Army forces
forces pounded
pounded
gade” of Abdic
gade" supporters in
Abdic supporters in the town of Izacic. Eager
the town Eager the town
town with
with mortar
mortar and artillery fire, but Abdic’s
artillery fire, Abdic's 4th4th
to
to assist more
more supposed
supposed defectors, Abdic—with Kra
defectors, Abdic-with Kra- Brigade hung
Brigade hung on determinedly?85
determinedly. 285 Pecigrad finally fell
Pecigrad finally
jina Serb
Serb assistance-sent
assistance—sent truckloads small arms,
truckloads of small arms, on 4 August,
on August, after
after the 4th Brigade's commander
Brigade’s commander
launchers, and ammunition
rocket launchers,
rocket ammunition to his his alleged sup-
alleged sup refused a 5th Corps surrender
refused surrender offer
offer and was
was killed by
by
porters. Of course,
porters. course, on arrival, the 5th Corps took
on arrival, took glee-
glee tank round
a tank round immediately
immediately afterward.
afterward.286286 At
At least 800
800
ful possession
possession of both
both the weapons
weapons and the Abdic Abdic Abdic
Abdic defenders—and
defenders-and much-needed weapons—
their much-needed
their weapons-
agents sent to deliver
deliver them.
them. It was was aa classic “Trojan
classic "Trojan were captured,
were captured, and roughly 2,000 Bosnian Army
roughly 2,000 Army
Horse” operation—in reverse.
Horse" operation-in reverse?74274 troops were freed
troops were freed up to fight
fight elsewhere.
elsewhere.287287 The way
way
was open for the 5th Corps to
was open to continue
continue its
its advance.
advance.
In the end, the operation
operation proved
proved a brilliant and com
com-
pletely successful
pletely combination of deception
successful combination exe
deception and exe- On 21
21 August,
August, just hours after Abdic
hours after refused the Bos
Abdic refused Bos-
cution. The desperately
cution. underarmed 5th Corps gained
desperately underarmed gained nian Government’s unconditional
nian Government's surrender demand,
unconditional surrender demand,
additional 3,000
an additional weapons and over
3,000 weapons 200,000 rounds
over 200,000 rounds Bosnian Army
Bosnian troops overran
Army troops overran Velika Kladusa. 288 28"
Velika Kladusa.288 289
of ammunition provided by its APWB

ammunition-provided APWB opponents,
opponents, The Bosnian
Bosnian Government
Government announced
announced aa three-day
three-day
A handful
no less. A
no handful of keykey Abdic supporters
supporters in in Bihac period for any former
amnesty period
amnesty former rebels, hundreds of
rebels, but hundreds
tipped their
had tipped hand, allowing the 5th Corps to
their hand, round
to round Abdic
Abdic soldiers
soldiers abandoned
abandoned their weapons and joined
their weapons
up the enemy sympathizers within its ranks,
enemy sympathizers ranks, and the massive column of 10,000
massive column 10,000 or more refugees flee
more refugees flee-
Dudakovic had achieved
achieved a public relations coup,
public relations coup, ing Velika
ing Velika Kladusa for the Serb-held sections of adja
Serb-held sections adja-
bo

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Balkan battlegrounds : a military history of the Yugoslav conflict,

Public Domain, Google-digitized

We have determined this work to be in the public domain,

Central Intelligence Agency

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Central Intelligence Agency,

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Chapter 5: Goliath Defeated:

Chapter 15: Political Developments

Chapter 22: Bosnian

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Chapter Battles on the Drina,

Section IV: Bosnia

Chapter 33: The

Chapter Battles on the Drina,

Chapter “The Man Who Would Be

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Chapter 73: The

Chapter 75: Abdic-Krajina

Chapter 78: “Who

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Chapter 83: The Battle, 6-11 July

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2—Croatia: Battle of Vukovar,

33—Bosnia: Cemerska, May

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40—Bosnia: Livno Valley,

41—Bosnia: Vakuf, 1994

A: The Socialist Federal

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We are all entitled to

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This work, the first

The history of the most series of armed

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Balkan Battlegrounds provides

Since the breakup of the

A key goal in our study was to

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•' Military Doctrine: they lacked

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In addition, we believe that

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Typically, individual campaign

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recent book Knin Je

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Military Forces and Organizations

JRM Jugoslovenska Ratna

RSK Srpska Krajina

SSNO Savezni Sekretarijat

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ZNG Zbor Narodne

SPS Socialisticka Partija

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Artillery Battery Baterija

Guards Gardijska Brigada ((gbr)

Armor Brigada ((okbr)

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Army General Armijski

Major General General-Major

Junior Lieutenant Potporucnik