SALARY AND PERQUISITES AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1) Yap vs Commission on Audit
Doctrines:
a) Disbursement of Public Funds - Any
disbursement of public funds, which
include the salaries and benefits to
government officials must a) be
authorized by law and b) serve a public
purpose. In view of the public purpose
requirement, the disbursement of public
funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees
should be granted to compensate them
for valuable public services rendered, and
the salaries and benefits paid to these
employees must be commensurate with
services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must
be shown to be necessary or relevant to
the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and
employees. It is on the part of the
employee or official to prove that law
authorized his allowances or benefits and
that there was a direct and substantial
relationship between the performance of
his public functions and the grant of the
disputed allowances given to him.
b) Jurisdiction of COA – The 1987
Constitution has made the COA the
guardian of public funds, vesting it with
broad powers over all accounts pertaining
to government revenue and expenditures
and the uses of public funds and property
including the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for
such review, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations. In light
of the express provisions of the law
granting COA its power and authority, the
Supreme Court found it proper to rule
that the exercise of its general auditing
power is among constitutional
mechanisms that give life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form
of government.
2) Gloria v Court of Appeals
Doctrine: Payment of Back wages during
suspension - Preventive suspension pending an
appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if the respondent
is exonerated and is found not guilty. Hence, he
should be reinstated with full pay for the period
of suspension if he wins. On the other hand, if the
conviction is affirmed, the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal. To be entitled to
compensation, the employee must not only be
found innocent of the charges but his suspension
must likewise be unjustified.
3) Constantino-David v Pangandaman-Gania
Doctrine: This Court held that the situation where
the CSCs participation is beneficial and
indispensable often involves complaints for
administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty,
being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official
duties, and the like, where the complainant is
more often than not acting merely as a witness
for the government which is the real party
injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a
ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the
respondent employee is understandably adverse
to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as
representative of the government may appeal
the decision to this Court to protect the integrity
of the civil service system. The CSC may also seek
a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals
that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate
as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to establish a career service,
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit
and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels
and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability.
Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the
adverse decision does not preclude the private
complainant in appropriate cases from similarly
elevating the decision for review.
In the case at bar, the CSC is not the real party-in-
interest as this suit confronts the Decision of the
Court of Appeals to award back wages for
respondent arising from an illegitimate personnel
and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is
different from an administrative disciplinary
 SALARY AND PERQUISITES AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
proceeding where the injured party is the
government. This Court fail to see how the
assailed Decision can impair the effectiveness of
government, damage the civil service system or
weaken the constitutional authority of the CSC so
as to authorize the latter to prosecute this case.
As a rule, the material interest for this purpose
belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal
dismissal and the execution of the Decision
devolves upon it.
4) Galang v Land Bank
Doctrine: Reinstatement is the issuance of an
appointment to a person who has been
previously appointed to a position in the career
service and who has through no delinquency or
misconduct, been separated therefrom, or to the
restoration of one who has been exonerated of
the administrative charges filed against him. In
the present case, since Galang was absolved of all
the administrative charges against him, the CA
ordered his reinstatement and payment of back
wages. Back wages represent the compensation
that should have been earned but were not
collected because of unjust dismissal. An illegally
dismissed employee who is later reinstated is
entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue
to him by virtue of the office he held.
5) Balitaosan v Secretary DECS
Doctrine: The general rule is that a public official
is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. Since the petitioner in this
case did not render any service during the period
for which he is now claiming his salaries, there is
no legal or equitable basis to order the payment
of back wages thereof. His reinstatement was not
a result of exoneration but an act of liberality of
the Court of Appeals hence, the payment of back
wages must be denied.
6) Request of CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes
Doctrine: Step increments that are to be given to
deserving officials and employees shall be based
on two criteria: 1) merit system – for those who
have served very satisfactory or outstanding
performance in assigned functions for two
consecutive rating periods. 2) length of service –
for those who have rendered continuous
satisfactory service in a particular position for the
last 3 years.
7) Profeta v Drilon
Doctrine: The GSIS has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a member is
qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension
benefit under PD 1146, based on its computation
of a member’s years of service with the
government. The computation also includes not
only the full time but also part time and the other
services with compensation as may be included
under the rules and regulations prescribed by the
system.
8) GSIS v Fernando P. De Leon
Doctrine: The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is
that social legislations must be liberally construed
in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement laws in
particular are liberally construed in favor of the
retiree because their objective is to provide for
the retirees sustenance and hopefully even
comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning
a livelihood. The conversion prohibited under RA
8291 is voluntary conversion, a choice to be
made by the retiree himself. However, the
respondent on this case has no choice but to look
for another law that would cover his monthly
pensions. The GSIS should not have suspended
the monthly pension of the respondent since the
conversion was not of choice but of necessity.
9) DIONISIO RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
GR No. 111812; May 31, 1995
Doctrine: It is well established in this jurisdiction
that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to standards that the law prescribes.
10) LIWAWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION
GR No. 141309; June 19, 2007
 SALARY AND PERQUISITES AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Doctrine: General rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
However, a public officer is by law not immune
from damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions.
11) FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN &
JUAN PONCE ENRILE
GR No. 91391; January 24, 1991
Doctrine: Where the petitioner exceeds his
authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or,
as contended by the private respondent,
"maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile
by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in
derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question
that a complaint for damages may be filed
against him. High position in government does
not confer a license to persecute or recklessly
injure another.
12)LOIDA Q. SHAUF v. CA
GR No. 90314; November 27, 1990
Doctrine: The doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity.
13)M.H. WYLIE & CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS v.
AURORA RARANG & IAC
GR No. 74135; May 28, 1992
Doctrine: Public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there
is showing of bad faith.
14)OSMUNDO G. RAMA v. CA, Et. Al
GR No. L-44484, March 16, 1987
Doctrine: A public officer who commits a tort or
other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the
scope of his duty, is not protected and is
personally liable therefor like any private
individual. A public officer by virtue of his office
alone, is not immune from damages in his
personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in
bad faith.
15) HON. EXPEDITO PILAR v. SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF DASOL, PANGASINAN
GR No. 63216; March 12, 1984
Doctrine: A public officer who commits a tort or
other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the
scope of his duty, is not protected and is
personally liable therefor like any private
individual.
16) Correa vs. CFI of Bulacan
92 SCRA 312
Here, the judgment of the trial court, which was
armed by the Court of Appeals, found petitioners
personally liable for the payment of the salaries
which the dismissed policemen failed to receive
because of their illegal removal from office.
In the discharge of governmental functions,
"municipal corporations are responsible for the
acts of its officers, except if and when, and only
to the extent that, they have acted by authority
of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof."
A public officer who commits a tort or other
wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope
of his duty, is not protected by his office and is
personally liable therefor like any private
individual. This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer
removes another officer or discharges an
employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying
that by reason of non-compliance with the
requirements of law in respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside their
official authority.
17) Alinsugay vs Court of Appeals
148 SCRA 521
“It matters not that the appointments of the
petitioners had been attested by the
Commissioner of Civil Service and that they had
served for several years because the
appointments having been made without the
approval of the Provincial Board of Cebu, they
were not valid appointments"
 SALARY AND PERQUISITES AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
By force of logic, the power and authority
conferred by law on a body to approve
appointments, carries with it the corresponding
power to disapprove. In the absence of proof of
malice on the part of private respondents, they
cannot be held liable for their official act.
18) Estrada v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001
We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by
the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio . "
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea
if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has
not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional commission make it clear that
when impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be
filed against him.
19) Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,
16 Phil 534
No one can be held legally responsible in
damages, or otherwise, for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority under the law to
do. The Governor-General had authority, under
the law, to deport or expel the defendants, and
the circumstance justifying the deportation and
the method of carrying it out are left to him. He
cannot, therefore, be held liable in damages for
the exercise of
such power.
20) Office of the Court Administrator v.
Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1
Its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as
respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly
asserted, to foreclose administrative action
against him or to give him a clean bill of health in
all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the
same, was simply saying that the prosecution was
unable to prove the guilt of the respondent
beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua
non for conviction because of the presumption
of innocence which the Constitution guarantees
an accused.
Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence
which, though insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil
cases; this is preponderance
of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial
evidence" rule in administrative proceedings
which merely requires in these cases such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
21) Mollaneda v. Umacob,
G.R. No. 140128, 6 June 2001
The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a
matter of practical administrative procedure, the
aid of subordinates to investigate and report to
him the facts, on the basis of which the officer
makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law.
Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule
that the dismissal of a criminal case against an
accused who is a respondent in an administrative
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
does not foreclose the administrative proceeding
against him or give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. In dismissing the case, the court is
simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction because of the presumption of
 SALARY AND PERQUISITES AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
innocence which the Constitution guarantees an
accused. However, in administrative proceedings,
the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.

22) Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015

In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the

Court held:

The concept of public office is a public trust and

the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea
that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he
was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term.