SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
XIII. Collation
Civil Code, articles 1061-1077
 spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to bring to collation one-half of
SECTION 5
 the thing donated. (1040)
Collation
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if
the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should
repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious. (1036)
Article 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if
the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any
case remain unimpaired. (1037)
Article 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive with their uncles,
aunts, or cousins, inherit from their grandparents in representation of
their father or mother, they shall bring to collation all that their parents, if
alive, would have been obliged to bring, even though such
grandchildren have not inherited the property.
They shall also bring to collation all that they may have received from
the decedent during his lifetime, unless the testator has provided
otherwise, in which case his wishes must be respected, if the legitime
of the co-heirs is not prejudiced. (1038)
Article 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the
inheritance of their ascendants any property which may have been
donated by the latter to their children. (1039)
Page 1 of 24
Article 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be
brought to collation; but if they have been given by the parent to the
Article 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical attendance,
even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or
customary gifts are not subject to collation. (1041)
Article 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children
a professional, vocational or other career shall not be brought to
collation unless the parents so provide, or unless they impair the
legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum which the child
would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his
parents shall be deducted therefrom. (1042a)
Article 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of
his children, election expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be
brought to collation. (1043a)
Article 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of
jewelry, clothing, and outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except
insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the sum which is disposable
by will. (1044)
Article 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to
collation and partition, but only their value at the time of the donation,
even though their just value may not then have been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total loss or
destruction, be it accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or
account and risk of the donee. (1045a)
Article 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-
half shall be brought to the inheritance of the father, and the other half,
to that of the mother. That given by one alone shall be brought to
collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a)
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 2 of 24
Article 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be reduced by an Article 1077. Should any question arise among the co-heirs upon the
amount equal to that already received by him; and his co-heirs shall obligation to bring to collation or as to the things which are subject to
receive an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same collation, the distribution of the estate shall not be interrupted for this
nature, class and quality. (1047) reason, provided adequate security is given. (1050)

Article 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article be 


impracticable, if the property donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall
be entitled to receive its equivalent in cash or securities, at the rate of
quotation; and should there be neither cash or marketable securities in 

the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary shall be
sold at public auction.
Read:

If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs shall only have a 1. Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil 144 

right to select an equivalent of other personal property of the 2. Tordilla v. Tordilla, 60 Phil 162

inheritance at its just price. (1048) 3. Adan v. Casili, 76 Phil 279 

4. Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil 135 

Article 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation 5. Vda. De Rodriguez v. CA, 91 SCRA 540 (read separate opinion)

shall not pertain to the estate except from the day on which the 6. Lucerna Vda. De Tupas v. RTC, 144 SCRA 622 

succession is opened. 7. De Roma v. CA, 152 SCRA 205 

8. Pagkatipunan v. IAC, 198 SCRA 719 

For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits and interest of 9. Zaragoza v. CA, 341 SCRA 309 

the property of the estate of the same kind and quality as that subject to 10. Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. CA, 91 SCRA 540 

collation shall be made the standard of assessment. (1049) 11. Lauro G. Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118449, February
11, 1998

Article 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee the 12. Eloy Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112483, October 8,
necessary expenses which he has incurred for the preservation of the 1999
property donated to him, though they may not have augmented its
value.

The donee who collates in kind an immovable which has been given to
him must be reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which
have increased the value of the property, and which exist at the time
the partition if effected.

As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of the donee, no
reimbursement is due him for them; he has, however, the right to
remove them, if he can do so without injuring the estate. (n)


SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Case #1: In re will of Ignacio Abuton y Poncol, deceased.
TEODORA GUINGUING, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGAPITO ABUTON
and CALIXTO ABUTON, opponents-appellants. [G.R. No. 23035.
October 13, 1925.]
FACTS: The deceased Ignacio Abuton died testate and he left two sets
of children from his two marriages. Ignacio married Dionisia Olarte, to
whom he had 12 children with (three are already deceased) and later
on when Dionisia died, Ignacio married petitioner Teodoro Guinguing, to
whom he had 4 children with. Ignacio’s will was presented for probate
and a certain Gabriel Binaoro was appointed as administrator of
Ignacio’s estate. Complying with his duty, Binaoro submitted to the
court an inventory of the properties belonging to Ignacio at the time of
his death. In this inventory he included only the lands which the testator
had devised to the children of the second marriage (Teodora), omitting
other lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were
claimed by the children of the  first marriage as having been derived
from their mother, Dionisia.  as an advancement. As we gather from the record, the crux of the
Accordingly, on March 14, 1922, Teodora Guinguing, in representation
of herself and her four minor children, presented a motion in court,
asking that the administration be required to amend his inventory and to
include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the
hands of his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been
delivered to said children as an advancement. The purpose of
the motion was to force the first set of children to bring into collation the
properties that had been received by them, in conformity based partly
on the supposition that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a
liquidation of the conjugal property pertaining to himself and Dionisia
Olarte. This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the
first marriage, respondents namely, Agapito and Calixto Abuton Olarte.
RTC RULING: In favor of Agapito and Calixto. The RTC ruled that no
property has been acquired by the testator during his second marriage
and that the administration was Concerned only with property that had
been acquired before the death of Dionisia. The trial judge further found
that after the death of Dionisia, Ignacio had liquidated the ganancial
Page 3 of 24
estate pertaining to them and had divided among the  first set of
children all of the property that pertained to the first wife in the division,
with the exception of the home-place in the poblacion, in which the
testator had continued to reside till death. The share pertaining to the
testator in said division was, so the court found, retained in his own
hands; and this property constituted the proper subject matter of the
present administration proceedings. Accordingly an order was entered
to the effect that the administrator should include in the inventory of the
estate of Agapito Abuton all of the property of which the testator was
possessed at the time of his death. From this order the two opponents
of the motion appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the properties given by Ignacio to his children by his
first marriage may be collated as well?
RULING: NO, the properties given by Ignacio to his children by his
first marriage may not be collated as well. They are not considered
cortroversy consists in the fact that among the properties
remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton at the time of his death
was a piece of land covered by a composition title No. 11658,
issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the same time
that this title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other
titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654, covering adjacent properties to be
issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No.
11658 was issued in the name of Dionisia Olarte the opponents
(Teodora et al) appear to believe that this land was her (Teodora)
particular property and should now vest exclusively in her heirs.
This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the
land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the spouses
(Ignacio and Dionisia) during their marriage, and the circumstance
that the title was taken in the name of the wife does not defeat its
presumed character as ganancial property. Therefore, in
liquidating the ganancial property of the rst marriage it was within
the power of the surviving husband to assign other property to the
rst set of children as their participation in the estate of their
mother and to retain in his own hands the property for which a
composition title had been issued in the name of the wife.
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
The contention made in the first assignment of error, to the effect that
an order of the character of that appealed from cannot be made by a
court without formal notice being given to all persons in interest, in the
same manner as if a new action had been begun, is clearly untenable,
since all the he is are already virtually represented in the administration
and are bound by all proper orders made therein, so far and so far only
as such orders have legal effect. This is not inconsistent with the
proposition that contested claims of ownership between the
administrator and third persons should be tried in separate
proceedings, which is entirely true. The question here is merely
between some of the heirs and the administrator, as representative of
all persons in interest. Besides, it should be pointed out, the inclusion of
a property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of
possession; and if it is  finally determined that the property has been
properly included in the estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits
and interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art.
1049, Civ. Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to
collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to
the obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the
administration proceedings.
The second and third assignments are directed to the supposed errors
of the court in having based its ndings as to the property belonging to
the estate of Agapito Abuton in part upon the recitals of his legalized will
(Exhibit A) and in part upon the recitals of a previous will (Exhibit l),
which had been superseded by the last. This older will appears to have
been produced by the representatives of the rst set of children in the
proceedings for the pro. bate of the will which was admitted, and was
attached to that expediente. It is said in appellants' brief that this
document was not introduced in evidence at the hearing of the present
controversy.
It was not error, in our opinion, for the trial court to look to the recitals of
the legalized will for the purpose of determining prima facie whether a
certain piece of property should or should not be included in the
inventory without prejudice of course to any person who may have an
adverse title to dispute the point of ownership. The use made of the
superseded will (Exhibit 1) in the appealed order is of more
Page 4 of 24
questionable propriety, but we are of the opinion that the facts stated by
the court can be su ciently made out from the other evidence submitted
at the hearing.
 
Case #2: In re Intestate estate of the deceased Francisco Tordilla,
GAUDENCIA TORDILLA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MOISES
TORDILLA,opponent-appellant. [G.R. No. 39547. May 3, 1934.]
FACTS: A intestate proceeding for the distribution of deceased
Francisco Tordilla was filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur, leaving as
his only heirs - respondents legitimate son Moises Tordilla and his
widow, and petitioner Gaudencia Tordilla, a recognized natural
daughter.
 This is especially true as to the first and second assignments of error
which read:
"I. In including in the partition that residential lot containing 3352 square
meters and more fully described as parcel (2) in the decision (69-70 R.
A.).
II. In including ten (10) carabaos and six (6) cattle (Items 8 and 9 in
Dec. at pp. 70-71 R. A.) among the properties partitioned and in not
holding that said animals do not exist and never came to the
possession of the estate."
In a prior proceeding between the deceased and a third party, the third
party was given a right to repurchase the land there in question. But the
fact, standing alone, does not remove the lot from the properties left by
the deceased. The fact is whether or not the third party had exercised
his option to repurchase. That fact was well known to appellant and
was easily susceptible of definite and accurate proof. He has seen fit to
leave the record in doubt and, therefore, the finding of the trial court will
not be disturbed.
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
The same remarks are true as to the number of carabaos and cattle
that the deceased had at the time of his death.
ISSUE: Whether a value which was stated in a deed of donation cannot
be questioned when the properties are brought into collation?
RULING: NO, a value which was stated in a deed of donation can
be questioned when the properties are brought into collation, as
stated in Article 1045 of the Civil Code which provides for the
assessment of the property at its actual valuation at the time of
donation. The recital in the deed cannot therefore be controlling.
The actual value at the time of the donation is a question of fact
which must be established by proof the same as any other
fact. The trial court, with much experience, and after study of the
evidence produced, held that the actual value of one of the
properties was greater than that recited in the deed of donation,
and also fixed the fruits and income from the donated properties
at a higher  figure than appellant thought just. The fruits and
interest produced by property subject to collation must be
ascertained under article 1049 of the Civil Code. (See Guinguing
vs. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil., 144.) There is some doubt in our
mind as to the real value of the parcel in question and the amount
of the income from the donated properties. But we cannot state
from the fragmentary evidence which has been brought to our
attention that the opinion of the trial court is contrary to the weight
of the evidence, and, in case those figures are incorrect, what are
the correct figures.
The seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error refer to the validity
of Exhibit H, a contract entered into between the appellee and the
appellant in another case and signed shortly before the death of their
father. The contract is in the nature of a compromise and covered two
items, namely,  first, the support of the natural daughter which the
brother agreed to assume for one year and, second, a proposed
division of their future inheritance upon the death of their father. It is
assumed that appellant has complied with his terms of the contract, and
the father died before the obligation of the brother terminated. The
second portion of the contract Exhibit H clearly relates to the
Page 5 of 24
anticipated future inheritance and, therefore, is null and void under the
provisions of article 1271 of the Civil Code which reads:
"ART. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not out of the
commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
"Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division
intervivos of the estate, in accordance with article 1056.
"Any services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the
subject-matter of a contract."
The action of the trial court in holding Exhibit H to be uncontroverted
and predicating its nal action on the terms of that document was
erroneous and contrary to law.
The tenth assignment of error reads: "In adjudicating to the natural
daughter the same share or amount of properties as that adjudicated to
the legitimate son." This assignment of error is based on article 840 of
the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or
descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each of
the legitimate children who have not received any betterment, provided
that a su cient amount remains of the disposable portion, from which it
must be taken, after the burial and funeral expenses have been paid.
"The legitimate children may pay the portion pertaining to the natural
ones in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a fair valuation."
Appellee contends that article 840 of the Civil Code has been repealed
by the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the statement of this court in
Concepcion vs. Jose (46 Phil., 809). It is true that in the majority
decision in that case it speaks of article 840 being repealed. While, with
the question there considered, namely, from where the funeral
expenses should be taken, the Code of Civil Procedure changed the
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
rule as to those items from what had formerly been in the Civil Code, by
reading the whole decision we have no hesitancy in saying that what
the court then had in mind was not a repeal of the article but in fact
merely a modi cation thereof. In the case of In re Intestate Estate of
Tad-Y, found in the same volume (46 Phil., 557), this court, speaking
through the Chief Justice, applied article 840 of the Civil Code in the
following language:
"To determine the share that pertains to the natural child which is but
one- half of the portion that in quality and quantity belongs to the
legitimate child not bettered, the latter's portion must rst be ascertained.
If a widow shares in the inheritance, together with only one legitimate
child, as in the instant case, the child gets, according to the law, the
third constituting the legitimate in full ownership, and the third available
for betterment in naked ownership, the usufruct of which goes to the
widow. Then the natural child must get one-half of the free third in full
ownership and the other half of this third in naked ownership, from
which third his portion must be taken, so far as possible, after deducting
the funeral and burial expenses. . . . ."
Our attention has not been called to any case in which this court has
treated article 840 as entirely and completely repealed.
We are therefore of the opinion that this case must be disposed of
according to the above quotation from the case of Tad-Y.
The eleventh assignment of error relates to a matter of accountancy
which the court ordered to take place after its original decision had
become in force and needs no further discussion at this time.
The decision and orders of the trial court must therefore be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings consonant with this
opinion.  collation. It also found that the alleged receipt by the plaintiff from his
 

Page 6 of 24
Case #3: FELIX ADAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. AGAPITO CASILI and
VICTORIA ADAN, defendants-appellees.  [C.A. No. 299 . March 18,
1946.]
FACTS: Petitioner Felix Adan commenced an action to secure the
judicial partition of deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno’s estate (6 parcels
of lands) with the CFI of Camarines Sur against his sister and her
husband respondents Agapito Casili and Victoria Adan. Four of the six
parcels of land are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: The four lots in question were
ceded by the deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno to Victoria Adan as her
share of the inheritance; and that Felix has received more than his
share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property.
Expenses of the plaintiff as a student from 1918 to 1925 -> P3,000
Twelve carabaos received by the plaintiff from his mother, at P30 each -
> P360
Three hundred cavans of palay, at P4.20 a cavan -> P1,260
Cash taken by the plaintiff from his mother in 1927 -> P1,110

Two parcels of land bought by the plaintiff with money he received from
his mother -> P1,220
RTC RULING: Found that the alleged donation by the deceased
Simplicia Nepomuceno of the four parcels of land in question had not
been duly proven, there being no written document to support it, and
that therefore the said four parcels of land should be brought into
mother of P1,110 in cash and of P1,220 with which the plaintiff
purchased the two parcels of land mentioned in defendants' answer,
had not been satisfactorily proven. It found, however, that the plaintiff
received from his mother during her lifetime various sums aggregating
P3,000 for his expenses while studying surveying in Manila, one-half of
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 7 of 24
which, or P1,500, should be brought into collation; that he also received plaintiff took possession of twelve carabaos belonging to his mother
or took from his mother twelve carabaos worth P30 a head, or P360, all and that the value of said animals was P30 a head.
of which amounted to P3,120 - more than the value of the four parcels
of land now in the possession of the defendants. Hence it absolved the It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied
defendants from the complaint without any finding as to costs. surveying in Manila and that during his studies his mother and sister
sent him money for his support and expenses, amounting to
ISSUE: Whether the four lands which were allegedly donated to Felix approximately P500 a year. Although the defendants claim that his
should be subject to collation? studies lasted from 1918 to 1925, we sustain the contention of the
plaintiff and appellant in his brief that it took him only two years to finish
RULING: YES, the four lands which were allegedly donated to the course of surveying, because it is a matter of common knowledge
Felix should be subject to collation. Felix received a total of that surveying is a two-year course, and it is probable that the rest of
P2,630.00.  the time was spent by him in acquiring a high-school education.

Received by Felix during Simplicia’s lifetime: Under article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education,
attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive,
Cash -> P1,110
 apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not
Twelve carabaos, at P30 a head -> P360
 subject to collation. But article 1042 of the same Code provides that
Three hundred cavans of palay, at P2.20 a cavan-> P660
 expenses which may have been incurred by the parents in giving their
Amount spent by the plaintiff's mother to give him a professional career, children a professional or artistic career shall not be brought to collation
to wit, P1,000, of which one-half is collationable -> P500 unless the parent so orders or they encroach upon the legitime. It also
provides that in cases in which it is proper to collate them, the money
We find no competent evidence in the record to disprove or impeach which the child would have spent if it had lived in the house and
the testimony of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff took and company of its parents shall be deducted therefrom. Since the career of
received from his mother during the latter's lifetime P1,110 in cash and surveyor is a professional one, and since the expenses incurred by
300 cavans of palay in the manner and under the circumstances plaintiff's mother in giving him that career encroached upon the
narrated by the defendant spouses as witnesses in their own behalf. legitime, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for
The 300 cavans of palay was taken by the plaintiff from the granary of him during the two years he studied surveying, the other half being
his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of twenty-peso and five-peso considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he had
bills and amounting in all to P1,110 was taken by the plaintiff from his lived in the house and company of his mother.
mother's trunk on an occasion when she suffered a collapse and when
the plaintiff took some money from the same trunk with which to pay for The claim of the plaintiff that parcel No. 4 described in the complaint
injections. As we have said, the plaintiff did not testify to deny the produced 800 cavans of palay a year which he contends should form
testimony of the defendants. It is admitted in the brief for the plaintiff part of the estate, has not been established by competent evidence.
and appellant that the latter took 300 cavans of palay from his mother's The plaintiff claims that at the rate of 800 cavans a year parcel No. 4
granary, but it is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the produced from 1938 to 1943 a total of 3,200 cavans, which at P2.50 a
absence of plaintiff's testimony to support such claim, there is no basis cavan amounted to P8,000. Such claim seems to us highly
upon which to sustain it. It was also proved during the trial that the exaggerated. considering that the value of said lot No. 4, as alleged by
the plaintiff himself, was only P693.55. It seems to us unbelievable that
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 8 of 24
a piece of land worth less than P700 could produce a net income of the fruit or interest of the money and other property received by the
P8,000 in five years. plaintiff.

The unfair exaggeration in which plaintiff and appellant indulges may be
further noted from the fact that while he in his brief appraises the 300
cavans of palay taken by him at P1.50 a cavan, he values the 3,200
cavans of palay which he claims was produced by lot No. 4 at P2.50 a
cavan.
It will be noted that, by a different process of reasoning, based upon our
own independent study of the evidence, we arrive at the same result as
that reached by the trial court, namely, that the plaintiff is not entitled to
the relief he seeks.

On the other hand, we find that the price of P4.20 a cavan claimed by
the defendants for the 300 cavans of palay was also exaggerated. We Case #4: TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BALDOMERO J.
accept the testimony of Pedro Fabricante, a rebuttal witness for the LESACA. CONSUELO F. LESACA AND JUANA F. LESACA,
plaintiff, to the effect that in 1928 the price of palay in Libmanan executrices-appellants, vs. JUANA FELIX VDA. DE LESACA,
oscillated from P1.20 to P2.20 a cavan, depending upon the season of claimant-appellee. [G.R. No. L-3605. April 21, 1952.]
the year in which the grain was sold. Since the plaintiff himself claimed
that the price of palay in Libmanan was P2.50 a cavan, we accept the FACTS: Three appeals were the subjects of the petition at bar.
maximum price given by the witness Fabricante, to wit, P2.20, as the
most reasonable. Appeal No. 1 ->  Deceased Baldomero J. Lesaca was survived by his
second wife claimant-appellee Juana Felix Vda. De Lesaca and his two
Summarizing the evidence, we find that the plaintiff has received from children with her, executrices-appellants Consuelo Lesaca and Juana
the estate of his mother the following: Lesaca (Baldomero’s children from his first marriage) and three
acknowledged natural children with a third woman. Proceedings for the
Cash -> P1,110
 probate of Baldomero's will and for the administration of his estate of
Twelve carabaos, at P30 a head -> P360
 the deceased was instituted with the Court of First Instance of Manila
Three hundred cavans of palay, at P2.20 a cavan-> P660
 by Juana.
Amount spent by the plaintiff's mother to give him a professional career,
to wit, P1,000, of which one-half is collationable -> P500
 CFI RULING: At the instance of the widow but over the opposition of
Total -> P2,630.00 the co-executrices and the three acknowledged natural children,
granted each of the two minor children a monthly allowance of P100 for
The defendant Victoria Adan, on the other hand, received from her living expenses, "plus an extra sum of P300 for their matriculation and
deceased mother the four parcels of land in question, the agreed value uniforms," and later ordered the co-executrices to deposit in court all
of which is P2,783.55. It was proven during the trial that she spent the allowances in arrears. Moreover, it held that the amounts it had
P300 for the funeral of the deceased, and deducting that sum from the authorized to be paid to the minors should be considered allowances
value of the property she received would leave only P2,483.55 as her for support, to be deducted from their hereditary portion only in so far
net share, which is less than that received by the plaintiff. Whatever as they exceed what they are entitled to as fruits or income, and
produce the defendants may have obtained from the four parcels of requiring the co-executrices to deposit in court "all the amounts due the
land received by them must have been compensated more or less by said minors, namely P2,955.83, if and when the financial condition of
the estate under administration so warrants."
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
APPELLANTS CONTENTIONS: The co-executrices refused to make
the deposit, contending that if any amount were to be paid for the
support and education of the minors the same should be charged
against their share of the inheritance.
APPELLEE’S CONTENTION: Counsel for the appellant minors,
however, contends that Art. 1430 should be harmonized with Art. 1041,
which provides that "allowances for support, education, attendance in
illness, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary
equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation," because
the allowances mentioned in the latter article refer to no other than the
allowances for support given to the children of a deceased person.
ISSUE: Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to the
legitimate minor children of the deceased pending liquidation of his
estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the
inheritance?
RULING: YES, the allowances for support granted by the court to
the legitimate minor children of the deceased pending liquidation
of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their
share of the inheritance.  the consorts, does not constitute as conjugal property.
Article 1041 is found under the section on "Collation," which
refers only to property or rights received by donation or gratuitous
title "during the lifetime of the decedent." (Civil Law by Padilla,
Vol. I, p. 1125), and is based on the philosophy that such
donations in no way impoverish the donor or enrich the donee
since ordinarily they are not taken from the capital but rather from
the fruits thereof which would anyway have been consumed or
spent during the life of the donor and therefore would form no part
of his inheritance. (7 Manresa, 5th ed., p. 625.) But allowances
given to the heirs pending the liquidation of the estate of the
decedent stand on a different footing.


Page 9 of 24
Appeal No. 2 -> Deceased Baldomero Lesaca lived with Juana Felix
and only married a year before Baldomero died. In 1930, a certain
Ramon Garcia conveyed under a pacto de retro sale three parcels of
land for P2,500 with Baldomero. Afterwards, Consuelo and Juana
Lesaca reconvened back the lands to Ramon for the same sum. Now,
Juana Felix claims that the sum paid (P2,500) was from the conjugal
property and she petitions the court to order Consuelo and Juana to
give her one-half of the said sum (P1,250). However, this was opposed
by Consuelo and Juana Lesaca who claims that the sum they paid
Ramon came from the products of their mother’s property. 
CFI RULING: Granted Juana Felix’s petition in an order dated March
11, 1949, holding that the sum in dispute was conjugal property,
"considering that the reconveyance was effected after the
marriage.” and directing that one-half of said sum be paid to the widow.
ISSUE: Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of
land sold a retrovendedo before such marriage to one of the consorts,
constitutes conjugal property or not?
RULING: NO, the money received after marriage, as purchase
price of land sold a retrovendedo before such marriage to one of
According to the briefs Garcia sold the land for P2,500 to Lesaca
before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix and repurchased it for
that same amount after said marriage. If the money paid by Lesaca
was his own exclusively, surely the mere fact that it was returned
or repaid after marriage cannot convert it into conjugal property. It
is true that under Art. 1401 of the Civil Code of 1889 property
obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of
either of them belongs to the conjugal partnership. But the article
refers to property obtained during the marriage, and while counsel
for the widow cites the case of Marata vs. Dionio (G. R. No. 24449,
unreported) wherein this Court held that though there is no
technical marital partnership between persons living maritally
without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between
them an informal civil partnership which would entitle the parties
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
to an equal interest in property acquired by their joint efforts, in
the present case there is no showing that the sum paid to Garcia
was earned by the joint efforts of the deceased and his widow. In
the absence of such proof the sum must be deemed to have been
the property of the deceased to whom the land for which it was
given in payment was sold by Garcia. It follows that the order
below adjudging one-half of the sum in question to the widow is
erroneous. But the claim that the sum in question belongs to the
co- executrices as an inheritance from their deceased mother has
not been upheld by the trial court, and as a question of fact cannot
be urged in this appeal, which, with the conformity of the parties,
has been submitted to this Court as involving questions purely of
law. Moreover, as stated in the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 28, 1949, the Clerk of Court of First Instance
certifies that no evidence has been submitted or taken in
connection with the motions that gave rise to the present appeals.
 
Appeal No. 3 -> Deceased Baldomero did not cultivate his land
personally but had it cultivated by one who gave him a certain
percentage of the crop every year by way of rent.
Page 10 of 24
this case the conjugal partnership) in proportion to the time the usufruct
may last. (Art. 474, old Civil Code.).
ISSUE: Whether a standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and
harvested after the death of one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and
income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-
half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse?
RULING: YES, a standing crop of palay planted during coverture,
and harvested after the death of one of the consorts, constitutes
fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil
Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the
surviving spouse. Baldomero's participation (as rent) in the palay
planted by the lessee in June or July and which must have been
harvested on the following November, if not before, accrued
during coverture. Such being the case it should belong to the
conjugal partnership. It is immaterial that the rent was actually
received after the dissolution of the marriage through the death of
one of the spouses. It is the date of accrual that is important.



CFI RULING: Declares that the 1,040 cavans of palay of the value of
P20,800 received as rent on Baldomero's land for the agricultural year
1946-1947 should be considered conjugal property so that one-half
thereof should go to Juana Felix. Since this happened after his
marriage to Juana Felix - and which must have already matured or
been near maturity at the time when the conjugal partnership was
dissolved by the death of Baldomero in November, 1946. Under Article
1380 of the old Civil Code "after the marriage has been dissolved, the
uncollected fruits or rents shall be divided pro rata between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased in accordance with the
rules which govern in cases of termination of usufruct," the conjugal
partnership being considered usufructuary of the private property of
each spouse. As rents are civil fruits (Art. 355, old Civil Code) they must
be deemed to accrue from day to day and belong to the usufructuary (in
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Case #5&10: Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA VALERO
VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ and ROSIE VALERO DE GUTIERREZ,
petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN
VALERO-RUSTIA, respondents-appellees. [G.R. No. L-39532. July
20, 1979.]
FACTS: Spouses Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero, did not beget
any child during their marriage. In 1951, Beatriz adopted respondent
Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt her but
because he had two children from his first marriage, petitioners Flora
Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez, Jose was
disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption
proceeding that he consented to Carmen’s use of his surname Valero.
Later on, Jose donated to Carmen (now Mrs Rustia) one-half
pro indivisible share (apparently his inchoate share) in the two conjugal
lots located at San Lorenzo Village. Beatriz consented to Jose’s
donation of his share to Carmen. However, when Jose made his will, he
did not mention the donation made to Carmen, Jose only enumerated
the conjugal properties he have with his wife (this includes the two lots
located in San Lorenzo Village) and devised to Beatriz some of those
properties, enough to constitute as legitime and bequeathed the
remainder of his estate to Flora and Rosie.
Afterwards, the Valero spouses conveyed through a deed of absolute
sale the San Lorenzo lots along with its improvements to Carmen for
P120,000. The sale was registered and the respective TCTs covering
the said lots were issued to its new owner, Carmen. Later, Carmen
mortgaged the said lots to serve as a security for the P50,000 loan she
asked from Quezon City Development Bank.
When Beatriz died intestate, she was survived by Jose and Carmen,
the latter was named administratrix by Beatriz’s estate. A month later,
Jose died testate, survived by Flora and Rosie. Jose’s will was
probated, the executor who was Atty Celso Unson, submitted an
inventory and included in the list of the conjugal properties forming part
of Jose’s estate are the two lots located in San Lorenzo Village. For this
Page 11 of 24
reason, Carmen filed a motion for the exclusion of the said lots from
Jose’s estate, contenting that she was now the registered owner,
attaching the Torrens title to the motion. However, this was opposed by
Atty Unson on the ground that the donation of these two lots were
subject of collation and involves Jose’s title to the lots as well. In
addition, Atty Unson revealed that he was informed by Rosie and Flora
that the two lots should be included in the inventory. To which, the
probate court first ruled that the two lots should be excluded from the
inventory of the testator's estate but with the understanding "that the
same are subject to collation”. Afterwards, Carmen filed a motion for its
reconsideration, insisting that she is the owner of the two San Lorenzo
Village lots as indicated in the Torrens titles. No one opposed that
motion. At the hearing of that motion, Carmen's lawyer apprised the
court that Atty Unson informed him over the phone that he was not
opposing the motion. 
PROBATE COURT RULING: The two lots were unconditionally
excluded from the inventory of Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning "that
they are not subject to collation”. Denied Flora’s motion for
reconsideration.
CA RULING: Held that the probate court’s order of exclusion dated
August 9, 1973 was interlocutory and that it could be changed or
modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings. It further held that it was immaterial whether the two lots
were donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to avoid
payment of the donor's and donee's taxes". According to the Appellate
Court, it was immaterial because under article 1061 of the Civil Code,
only compulsory heirs are required to make collation for the
determination of their legitimes and, under section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court, only heirs are involved in questions as to advancement
and Mrs. Rustia is not an heir of the testator, Jose M. Valero.
ISSUE: Whether both the probate court and the CA erred when they
decided on the issue of collation before settling the issue of the
Beatriz’s and Jose’s estates?

SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
RULING: YES, both the probate court and the CA erred when they
decided on the issue of collation before settling the issue of the
Beatriz’s and Jose’s estates. In this appeal, it is not proper to pass
upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia's
titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below
have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.
We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate
court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a
supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case
which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of collation was not yet
justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not
necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter
of collation.
Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether
Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that
may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues
should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched
upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates
of the deceased Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the
lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the conjugal estate of the
deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as contemplated in
section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176 (Pages 223
and 235-6, Rollo).
We have examined theexpedientes of the two cases. We found that the
proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of
collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The
numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate action has
been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles to
the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation.
Page 12 of 24
Case #6: PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-
appellant , vs. BRANCH XLII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent , and TUPAS FOUNDATION,
INC., private respondent-appellee. [G.R. No. L-65800. October 3,
1986.]
FACTS: Deceased Epifanio Tupas left a will which was admitted to
probate. Epifanio was survived by his widow petitioner Partenza
Lucerna, his only surviving compulsory heir. In Epifanio’s will, he listed
Lot nos. 837, 838 and 839 as among his assets. However, at the time
of Epifanio’s death, aforementioned lots were already donated to the
Tupas Foundation Inc., the latter was able to obtain the respective titles
of the lots and was now its owner.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Partenza contested the said donation
made by Epifanio to Tupas since she claims that it left her practically
destitute of any inheritance. 
Partenza filed a suit against Tupas Foundation with the CFI of Negros
Occidental in order to declare the donated lots as inofficious and
therefore reducible, as it prejudiced her legitime, Partenza prays to
have at least half or justified proportion to be restored and conveyed or
delivered to Partenza.
CFI RULING: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her
claim on several grounds, viz.: Article 900 relied upon by Partenza is
not applicable because the properties which were disposed of by way
of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer
part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978;
(2) the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate;
and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory
heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to
collation under Art. 1061, C.C.”
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
ISSUE: Whether the donation inter vivos of the lots by Epifanio may be
declared as inofficious and thus, may be reduced at the instance of
Epifanio’s widow, Partenza?
RULING: YES, the donation inter vivos of the lots by Epifanio may
be declared as inofficious and thus, may be reduced at the
instance of Epifanio’s widow, Partenza. Since it is clear that the
questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made
to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely
disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as
inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is
inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established
by the Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by
extension, of the disposable portion. Deducting the legitimes from
the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable
portion by which the donation in question here must be measured.
If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not
exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it
does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess
be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-
appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R.
Tupas. The case was remanded to the trial court for it requires
appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the
production of evidence in the Court a quo.
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain
limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than
he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what
is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though
without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the
donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil
Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is
in putable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death
for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory
heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well
Page 13 of 24
of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the
language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation
to the latter class of donations. The fact, therefore, that the donated
property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the
time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates
and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos . 6 The further fact that the
lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor
is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert
that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what
was within his power to give.
These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on
the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure has been
correctly outlined:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time
of the testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to
be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time
they were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the
total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each
respective compulsory heir. 
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-
appellant Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so
much of the donated property in question, as may be found in excess of
the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas,
determined in the manner above-indicated.
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 14 of 24
  PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062,
claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited
Case #7: BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE such collation and the donation was not officious.
COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma, respondents. [G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:llcd
1987.]
"IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
FACTS: Deceased Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
daughters petitioner Buhay de Roma and respondent Rosalinda de Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino
Roma when she died intestate. Administration proceedings for at naninirahan at may pahatirang- sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San
Candelaria’s estate with the CFI of Laguna was instituted by Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong
respondent Felicidad Caringal. Buhay was appointed administratrix and ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE
in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included on na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na
the inventory.  ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring
ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing
the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to lupa;
collation. 
"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari
CFI RULING: In favor of Buhay, * which held that Candelaria, when she sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. masisira ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat
Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of Buhay and ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagi ng aking kabuhayan na
Felicidad as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay
the free portion of Candelaria's estate.  Libre Disposicion." 

CA RULING: Reversed the trial court’s order, the CA held that the deed ISSUE: Whether the phrase “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception mababawing muli" in the deed of donation may be considered as an
to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the expressed prohibition of collating Candelaria’s properties?
net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property,
between Buhay and Rosalinda. RULING: NO, the phrase “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" in the deed of donation is means that the
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Felicidad vigorously argues that it is, donation made is irrevocable, but it does not necessarily exempt it
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code.  from the collation required under Article 1061.
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties.
As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation
as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition
against collation. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime"
and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a
lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose,
given the precise language of the document, that he would have
included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the
donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the
clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an
implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to
the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.
Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed
donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an
express prohibition to collate, and we see none. The intention to
exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as
an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent
such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the
petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the
respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X,
Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,
7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time
would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render
their decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned
provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987
Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed
with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases
that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious
studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
Page 15 of 24
Case #8: CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN, FLORA VELASQUEZ,
BENJAMIN VELASQUEZ, RODOLFO VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO
VELASQUEZ, NAPOLEON VELASQUEZ, MANUEL VELASQUEZ,
JULIO VELASQUEZ, VICTORIA VELASQUEZ, CARLOS
VELASQUEZ, LEONOR VELASQUEZ, ELENA VELASQUEZ,
PATROCINIO VELASQUEZ, PATRICLA VELASQUEZ, SANTIAGO
ZAPANTA, HERMINIGILDO SISON, ALFREDO AGAPITO, MOISES
SANTOS, MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN, AGAPITO MANALO,
MIGUEL ANGELES, MATIAS ALVAREZ, PATRICIO LAYSA, TEOFILO
DE LUNA, ISIDRO ANINAO, APOLINAR CASAL, MOISES
GALLARDO, BONIFACIO PEREZ, DELFIN LAYBA, AND
HERMOGENES FLORES, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, JOSE R. VELASQUEZ, JR., LOURDES
VELASQUEZ, EDGARDO VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ,
MINERVA VELASQUEZ, CYNTHIA VELASQUEZ, CESAR
GONZALES, ADOLFO GONZALES, EVELYN GONZALES, AMELITA
GONZALES, RUBEN GONZALES, AND CARMENCITA GONZALES,
respondents. [G.R. No. 70722. July 3, 1991.]
FACTS: The principal litigants in this case are the successors-in-
interest of Jose Velasquez, Sr. who died intestate on February 24,
1961. Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13 petitioners are their children namely:
Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Julio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon,
Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos. On the other hand, the
private respondents are the descendants of Jose Velasquez, Sr. with
his first wife Victorina Real who died in 1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna.
Private respondents Jose Velasquez, Jr. (substituted after his death
during the pendency of this suit by his surviving spouse Teresa
Magtibay and their children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and
Lourdes Velasquez are two of the five children of Jose Velasquez, Sr.
and Victorina Real. The other three, Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda, all
surnamed Velasquez, all died before the commencement of this case.
Amelia Velasquez died without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was
survived by private respondents Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and
Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez, his children, forced heirs and lawful
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
successors-in-interest. Lutgarda Velasquez was survived by private
respondents Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Amelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all
surnamed Gonzales, likewise her children, forced heirs and
successors-in-interest.
After the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no dissolution of the first
conjugal property has been made. Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr.
enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and administration of the whole
conjugal property of the first marriage. In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr.
took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second wife although they cohabited
as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon after his first wife's death.
From this marriage, the other 13 co-petitioners were born. Neither had
there been any liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after the
death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the
controversies in the instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting
claims from both sides of the two marriages.
In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second
wife although they cohabited as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon
after his first wife's death. From this marriage, the other 13 co-
petitioners were born. Neither had there been any liquidation of the
second conjugal partnership after the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in
1961. This situation gave rise to the controversies in the instant case
spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two
marriages.
The trial court appointed two sets of commissioners one on January 31,
1975, for the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of Jose
Velasquez, Sr., and the other on November 15, 1976, to determine
which of the parcels of land listed in such inventory submitted by the
first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage or to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Based
on the Report and Inventory submitted on May 29, 1975, the
commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by the late
Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his marriage with Victorina Real. On the
other hand, the commissioners listed the following properties as
Page 16 of 24
acquired by Jose Velasquez, Sr. on February 11, 1921 or after the
death of Victorina Real.
RTC RULING: Declaring the properties listed in the Inventory submitted
by the Commissioners on May 9, 1975, as belonging to the estate of
the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr.
and Victorina Real;
"2) Confirming all the conveyances, either by way of sale or donation,
executed by Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime;
"3) Declaring null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales,
transfers, assignments or conveyances: (a) the sale executed by
Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan in
favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan (sic); (b) the deeds of assignments
executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, covering the
properties listed in Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory; and ordering
defendants (petitioners) to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) the parcels of land covered by Patent Titles Nos. P-2000
to P-2012;
"4) Declaring as null, fictitious and fraudulent the sales by Canuta
Pagkatipunan in favor of her children and her sister Magdalena
Pagkatipunan and brother-in-law Moises Santos, listed in paragraph 13
of the Amended Complaint; declaring the plaintiffs owners of the said
properties; and ordering the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her
children-defendants to deliver possession of said properties to the
plaintiffs;
"5) Ordering the partition of the house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon
City in the following manner:
"(a) One-half undivided portion to defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan; and
the other half appertaining to Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided among
his heirs, to wit:
1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
1/18 undivided portion to Lourdes Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia
and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Teresa Magtibay and her children
Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita,
Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;
1/18 undivided portion to each of the defendants Flora,
Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel,
Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez;
"6) Ordering the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children-
defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00, as
reimbursement for attorney's fees;
"7) The defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children-defendants
are likewise ordered to pay the costs of this suit;
"8) The case against the other defendants, other than Canuta
Pagkatipunan and her children and the spouses Moises Santos and
Magdalena Pagkatipunan, is ordered dismissed." (pp. 614-617, Rollo).
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC ruling.  lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
ISSUE: Whether the issue to be tackled first is the donation made by
Jose being inofficious?
RULING: NO, it appears that there was no determination
whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to
determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said
property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he
executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court.
Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not
Page 17 of 24
such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the same
may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious.
It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to
the heirs may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. In the assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of and
exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned
by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to inherit
from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the
conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private
respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. Clearly, the trial
court failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the
Civil Code:
"ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
"To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he
made them."
"ART. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition."
It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose
Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. They include
among others, the donation made in favor of Guillermo Velasquez on
February 26, 1953, consisting of 403,000 square meters (Items 5 and
6); the donation made in 1926 in favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr.,
consisting of 450,000 square meters (Item No. 18); the donation in
favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item No. 27), and the donation in favor of
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Canuta Pagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square meters (part of Item
No. 29) (Commissioner's Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360).
It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross
value of the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina
Real. Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship. Likewise, no
collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was
undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime
so that the same may be considered subject to reduction for being
inofficious.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:
 spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan resold (sic) the
"Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.
"Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate
of which the testator could have disposed by his last will.
"Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable
portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this
Code."
With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting
collation, which are ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this
Court finds that the lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining
portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely
speculative and conjectural.
Relative to the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan to the spouses
Magdalena Pagkatipunan and Moises Santos; the resale of the same
property to her; and the subsequent deeds of assignment she executed
in favor of her children, the trial court had clearly established that
Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over the
said properties. Hence, the trial court, as well as the respondent court
are correct in ruling that the said sales and assignments are null and
void, sham and fictitious.
Page 18 of 24
The pertinent portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
"From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before
this Court and before the Commissioners, these properties were
acquired on November 19, 1918 by the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr.
and Victoria Real from Estanislao Balasoto (Exh. H-5, Commissioner).
Said property was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
names of said spouses. (Exh. H-Commissioner). On March 4, 1967,
defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan sold the same property to the spouses
Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1-
Commissioner). The vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the sister of
the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration
No. 4843 (Exh. H-2-Commissioner) was issued in the names of the
same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-3- Commissioner).
Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in the
name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit H-4-Commissioner). During the
pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by
Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, the defendants Flora,
Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel,
Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez.
Said defendants-children of Canuta Pagkatipunan caused the issuance
of free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed
to them respectively by their mother (Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L).
"It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the
Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Canuta Pagkatipunan had no right to
alienate the same. Her conveyance of the same property to her brother-
in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10) days after she
executed her sale, the same property was resold to her by the vendees.
She utilized said conveyance and reconveyance only for the purpose of
securing a tax declaration in her name over said property. Her
subsequent subdivision of said lot and transfer of the subdivided lots to
each of their children further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the
plaintiffs of their rightful shares in the disputed property." (Rollo, pp.
606-607)
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they
did not rebut the foregoing findings of the trial court but merely held on
to their argument that since Free Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012
were already issued in their names, their title thereto is indefeasible and
incontrovertible. This is a misplaced argument.prcd
The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels
of land does not warrant the reversal of the trial court's ruling that the
above mentioned sales and assignments were sham and fictitious. A
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding
upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the
land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered
thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an
action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years
(Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11,
1969, 176 SCRA 340).
Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said
parcels of land but acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former
may be held to act as trustees for the benefit of the latter, pursuant to
the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code:
"ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of
the questioned titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should
be made in favor of the private respondents. The reason is that it is still
unproven whether or not the private respondents are the only ones
entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria
Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the
herein petitioners are also entitled to participate in his conjugal share.
To reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone
would not only be improper but will also make the situation more
complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of
all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.
Page 19 of 24
Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the
respondent appellate court proper and in accord with law insofar as it
adjudicated the one-half (1/2) portion of the house and lot situated at
West Avenue, Quezon City, as belonging to the petitioners to the extent
of their respective proportional contributions, and the other half to the
conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan.
We must modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the conjugal share
of Jose Velasques, Sr. (1/2 of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the entire
house and lot) to his 18 heirs.
As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the
compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without (1 ) determining
first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all
the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3)
ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs.LLjur
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court as modified by the
respondent appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE except insofar as it:
(a) declared the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the
commissioners on May 9, 1975 as belonging to the estate of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina
Real;
b) declared null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales,
transfers, assignments or conveyances:
1) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister
Magdalena Pagkatipunan; 2) the resale of the same property executed
in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan; and 3) the deeds of assignments
executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her 13 children; covering
the properties listed in Items 7 and 8;
c) declared as null and void all the other conveyances made by Canuta
Pagkatipunan with respect to Item No. 13 of the inventory; and
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
d) dismissed the case against the other defendants except Canuta
Pagkatipunan and her children and the spouses Moises Santos and
Magdalena Pagkatipunan.
Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Laguna, for further proceedings and the same Court is directed to:
1. a)  follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed;
 FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain
2. b)  expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal
dispositions of
 complaint against her brother Florentino and his wife Erlinda for the
the first conjugal partnership properties not only by Canuta
Pagkatipunan but also by the other heirs as can be shown in the
records;
c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the
residential house in Quezon City with his conjugal share under his first
marriage, if any, to determine his net estate at the time of his death.
 
Page 20 of 24
Case #9: SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA
ENRIQUE ZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN,
respondents.  [G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000.]
parcels of land situated in the Province of Iloilo. He had four children.
On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his
four children. His youngest daughter, Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan, filed a
delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and
for payment of damages. She alleged that during the lifetime of her
father, he partitioned the properties among his four children. The shares
of his brothers and sisters were given in advance by way of deed of
sale, without valid consideration. At that time she became an American
citizen by marriage, hence, she was prohibited to acquire land in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession. No formal deed of
conveyance, therefore, was executed in her favor covering the lots in
question during the lifetime of her father. Petitioners herein, Florentino
and Erlinda, claimed that Lot No. 943 was sold to them by their father
for valuable consideration, while Lot No. 871 was still registered in their
father's name. They denied partitioning the estate during the lifetime of
their father. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint did not state any cause of action and it failed to implead
indispensable parties. 
TRIAL COURT RULING: Adjudicated Lot No. 871 in the name of Flavio
Zaragoza Cano to Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining to her
share in the estate, while her claim against Lot 943 was dismissed. 
Both parties interposed an appeal in the Court of Appeals. 
CA RULING: Reversed the decision of the trial court in so far as
spouses Florentino and Erlinda Zaragoza were adjudged owner of Lot
943, while it affirmed the decision in all other respects. 
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 21 of 24
Hence, this petition.
Case #11: LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
ISSUE: Whether the partition intervivos by Flavio of his properties APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City,
which inlucde Lots 871 and 943 is valid? and RAMON G. NICOLAS , respondents. [G.R. No. 118449.
February 11, 1998.]
RULING: YES, the partition intervivos by Flavio of his properties
which inlucde Lots 871 and 943 is valid since the legitimise are not FACTS: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-
prejudiced. Legitime may be determined after collation. However, Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife,
in this case collation cannot be done because only one of the Estrellita, is one of the ve siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud
indispensable parties was impleaded. As to the issue of the Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio
validity of title, such issue can only be raised in an action Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo
expressly instituted for that purpose.  Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now
survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children. dctai
The Supreme Court granted the present petition. The decision of the On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with
Court of Appeals was vacated and the complaint for delivery of an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter
inheritance share in the trial court was dismissed for failure to implead Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One
indispensable parties. It is the basic rule in the law of succsession that Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a
a partition inter vicos may be done for as long as legitimes are not "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT
prejudiced. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after No. T- 36734." 1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the
collation, as provided for in Article 1061.  Unfortunately, collation can Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990,
not be done in this case where the original petition for  delivery of Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria
inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand,
The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). 3 In June of the same
institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter
the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.  Parañaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the
Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used
in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred.

Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on
June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde
Massacre”. Petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters.
Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Rafael and
Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Parañaque
property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral expenses
is P3M. The settlement gave: Rafael and Salud (50% bank deposits),
Petitioner (50% bank deposits, car and Paranaque Property)
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Rafael died, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding and
prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate.
Ramon filed another opposition alleging, that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than P6M.
RTC RULING: Appointed Teresita, in turn as the Special Administratrix
of Rafael's estate. Ramon, moved to include petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property, be collated.
Page 22 of 24
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property
to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate
proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to
indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to
warrant collation.
Fourth: What was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired
by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not
become collationable simply by reason thereof.

Since there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the
property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration, the trial
court ordered the properties to be collated.
ISSUE: Whether the properties should be collated.
Fifth: Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited
from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela
property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.

RULING: NO, the properties should not be collated. Collation is

only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other 

compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding.

First: Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's

compulsory heirs. With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner
who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third
person or a stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate
estate proceeding.

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the
title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the
estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and
is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The
probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it
proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the
subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous.
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests
Case #12: ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON,
JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and
ESTHER VILLALON, respondents. [G.R. No. 112483. October 8,
1999.]
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial led Civil Case No. 1177 to annul the donation
(evidenced by a deed of absolute sale in the amount of P1.00) of a
parcel of land to petitioner Eloy Imperial, his acknowledged natural
child. A compromise judgment was approved by the trial court whereby
Leoncio recognized the rights of petitioner over the land while petitioner
agreed to sell a portion of the lot for the bene t of Leoncio. Leoncio,
upon his death, was substituted by his adopted son, Atty. Victor
Imperial, who moved for the execution of the compromise judgment.
Victor died single, and survived by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon,
who became a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Five years after
Ricardo's death, his 2 children, Cesar and Teresa, led Civil Case No.
7646 for the annulment of the donation on the ground of fraud, deceit,
and ino ciousness as Leoncio had no other property at the time of his
death. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. The complaint was amended in 1989 to allege that the
conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor, their natural brother and
predecessor-in- interest. The trial court rendered judgment nding the
donation ino cious which impaired Victor's legitime and ruled that the
action has not yet prescribed. It computed Victor's legitime based on
the area donated. The assailed decision was a rmed on appeal by the
Court of Appeals, hence, this petition.
The Court held that res judicata does not apply when there is no
identity of causes of action and identity of parties between the two
actions led. In the case at bar, Civil Case No. 1177 was an action for
annulment led by the donor against the donee for fraud, while Civil
Case No. 7646 was led by private respondents in representation of a
compulsory heir for inofficious character of the donation.  father in the civil case (regarding the compromise agreement). Victor
Repudiation cannot be presumed by mere substitution of an heir to a
case affecting the subject property, as tacit repudiation of inheritance is
Page 23 of 24
not countenanced and that the death of a compulsory heir does not
even preclude his heirs from impugning an ino cious donation.
In the absence of any speci c provision on prescription for an action for
reduction or revocation of donation, Article 1144 of the Civil Code
applies. It provides for a 10-year prescriptive period commencing upon
the death of the donor-decedent — when the net estate may be
ascertained and on the basis of which the legitimes may be determined.
Thus, the failure of a compulsory heir to contest the donations for more
than 10 years constitutes estoppel.
While the parties may limit the scope of the trial by the terms of the pre-
trial, the same may be disregarded as an issue such as prescription
was manifest in the pleadings of the parties as well as the findings of
fact of the lower courts.
ISSUE: (1) Whether it is proper to reduce the inofficious property
donated? (2) And IF YES, is the action not barred by prescription (lower
courts held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years, both
courts deemed that the action is a real action over an immovable
property)?
HELD: (1) YES,   it is proper to reduce the inofficious property
donated? (2) And IF YES, is the action not barred by prescription (lower
courts held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years, both
courts deemed that the action is a real action over an immovable
property). 
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was
only Victor who was entitled to question the donation.  However,
instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be
substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for
execution of the compromise judgment therein. Victor did not
renounced his legitime merely because he substituted his adopted
merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment.
When Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latter’s death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be
SUCCESSION April 27 Provisions + Digests Page 24 of 24
considered an act of renunciation of his legitime.  He was not precluded Mateo vs. Lagua, which  involved  the  reduction  for inofficiousness of
or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, a donation propter nuptias, the cause of action to enforce a legitime
under Article 772.  Nor are Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Since it is only then that
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
Article 772, and also in Article 1053: “If the heir should die without may be determined.
having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.” It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to
initiate this case.  The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
(2) No. A claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title.  In
Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, the SC declared that what is brought to  
collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property
at the time it was donated.  The rationale for this is that the donation is
a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence,
any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee.

What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an

inofficious donation? The CC specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations:

(1) 4 years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or

adoption of a child;

(2) 4 years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation;

and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives
entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or
their support.

Donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon

the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a
particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the
ordinary rules of prescriptionUnder Article 1144, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the time
the right of action accrues.  Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations. 

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned?