YUKI, JR., vs.

WELLINGTON CO

G.R. No. 178527 November 27, 2009

FACTS:

Mr. Joseph Chua was the registered owner of a parcel of land, together with a commercial building
erected thereon. In 1981, he leased a portion of the building to petitioner Joven Yuki, Jr., who put up a
business therein under the name and style “Supersale Auto Supply.” The contract of lease between Mr.
Chua and petitioner had a term of five years but was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, the lease was
renewed through a series of verbal and written agreements, the last of which was a written Contract of
Lease covering the period of January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 at a monthly rental of P7,000.00.

In November 2003, Mr. Chua informed petitioner that he sold the property to respondent Wellington Co
and instructed petitioner to henceforth pay the rent to the new owner. After the expiration of the lease
contract, petitioner refused to vacate and surrender the leased premises. Thus, respondent filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether Petition for Review under Rule 42 filed by the respondent is infirm for failure to attach the
annexes to position papers.

Ruling: No.

Section 2 of Rule 42 does not require that all the pleadings and documents filed before the lower courts
must be attached as annexes to the petition. Aside from clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies
of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, it merely requires that the petition be accompanied
by copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition. As to what these pleadings and material portions of the record are, the Rules grants the
petitioner sufficient discretion to determine the same. This discretion is of course subject to CA's
evaluation whether the supporting documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case.Thus,
Section 3 empowers the CA to dismiss the petition where the allegations contained therein are utterly
bereft of evidentiary foundation. Since in this case the CA gave due course to respondent's Petition for
Review and proceeded to decide it on the merits, it can be fairly assumed that the appellate court is
satisfied that respondent has sufficiently complied with Section 2 of Rule 42.

TEDDY MARAVILLA, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH RIOS, Respondent.

Facts: This is a criminal case against petitioner Teddy Maravilla for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental. He was acquitted for failure to establish proof beyong reasonable doubt.

Respondent interposed an appeal before the trial court which modified the award for damages .
Subsequently , petitioner filed a petition for review before but was dismissed for failure to incorporate a
written explanation why the preferred personal mode of filing under Section 11, Rule 13, and for failure
to comply with Section 2 , Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in dismissing the petition due to technicalities.

Ruling: Yes.

Applying the case of Galvez v. CA, there are three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching
pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit: 1.
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it; 2. it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the
petition; 3. a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents
required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Thus, going by the ruling in Galvez, petitioner's failure to attach relevant portions of the evidence and
transcript of stenographic notes - to his Petition, initially, and Motion for Reconsideration, subsequently
- which were not tackled in the decisions of the courts below, but which are material to his claim that
respondent failed to testify as to and prove actual damages, is fatal to his Petition for Review before the
CA. In short, none of the three guideposts spelled out in Galvez were observed in petitioner's case.

BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., Petitioner, v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased)

substituted by Reynaldo P. Villareal, Jr.-spouse, Shekinah Marie Villareal-Azugue-daughter,
Reynaldo A. Villareal ill-son, Shahani A. Villareal-daughter, and Billy Ray A. Villareal-
son,Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing
domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira
A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors of RTW merchandise.

On October 20, 2005, Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against Villareal covering a
1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and
was assigned to Branch 27 thereof.

MetC ruled in favor of Boardwalk. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision. Boardwalk filed its
Petition for Review through mail with the CA but the CA dismissed it outright. Accordingly, Boardwalk
erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have
done so with the CA as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held that as a result
of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was
filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and
beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42.

ISUSUE: Whether CA is correct in ordering the outright dismissal of their petition for review.

RULING:Yes.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. This
being so,

an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations
from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as
the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts
are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity.
Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.

Finally, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance "with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, x x x and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

ELENA JANE DUARTE, Petitioner,

vs.
MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, Respondent.

According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of
P15,000.00 to petitioner thru the help of a common friend, Josephine Dy. Since petitioner was
undecided, respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two days. On February 16, 2002, petitioner told
respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop on installment. Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner
gave P5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to pay P3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and P7,000.00
on March 15, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her second installment of P3,000.00 to Dy,
who signed the handwritten receiptallegedly made by petitioner as proof of payment. But when Dy
returned to get the remaining balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay only P2,000.00
claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00.Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining
balance, respondent thru counsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.

Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, and receiving the demand
letter dated July 29, 2002. Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner said that Dy
offered to sell respondent's laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it, Dy asked if
petitioner could instead lend respondent the amount of P5,000.00. Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy left
the laptop with petitioner. On February 18, 2002, Dy came to get the laptop but petitioner refused to
give it back because the loan was not yet paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of
P3,000.00 to respondent who allegedly was in dire need of money. Petitioner gave the money under
agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent would be considered as partial payments for the
laptop in case she decides to buy it. Sometime in the first week of March 2002, petitioner informed
respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop. Respondent, however, refused to pay and
insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.
Issue: Whether the Petition for Review was timely filed.

RULING: Yes.

That litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43
and 45 of the Rules of Court; counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC Order
dated May 13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004
or until June 11, 2004, within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA. Thus, we find that when
he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.