Sarao v. Guevarra 40 O.G.

(May 31, 1940)

FACTS:
Sarao (plaintiff) and Pilar Guevarra (defendant) were married. Every attempt to have carnal
access to his wife proved to be futile because she always complained of pains in her genital
organs. Upon the advice of the physician, defendant’s uterus and ovaries were, with consent of
the plaintiff removed due to the presence of a tumor. The removal of said organs rendered
defendant incapable of procreation. Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the
operation, he lost all desire to have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for
annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency.

ISSUE:
Whther or not the marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency.

HELD:
Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase ‘physically incapable of entering into the married state’ as
with the capacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate but the ability to
copulate. Defect must be one of copulation and not of reproduction. Bareness will not invalidate
the marriage. The removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made her unfit
for sexual intercourse. It would appear that it was the memory of this first unpleasant experience
with her that made him gave up the idea of having carnal knowledge of her.

Yu v. Yu, 484 SCRA 353 (March 10, 2006)

FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of
the absolute community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial Court. The
petition contains a prayer for the award of sole custody of his daughter Bianca, subject
to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the RTC
Pasay or before the RTC Pasig

HELD:

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC,
regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas
corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter.

By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he
automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After
the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need
for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family
Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.

Tamano v. Ortiz 291 SCRA 584 (June 29, 1998)

FACTS:
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda and her son filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that
it was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita
as single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
QC RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for
annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda
were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested
in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has
jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be
referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there
are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Shari’a courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the
nature of action.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married
through a civil wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding,
sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and
Muslim law.

People v. Zeta 68 Phil 62 (December 22, 1955)

FACTS:
The petitioner in this case was accused of violation RA 145 which was passed a year after he
initiated an action to assist a certain Eugenio Albiza who was a member of Philippine Armed
Forces and later on of United States Armed Forces in the Far East. The latter suffered disability
while in service in 1942 and in 1946 the respondent and Eugenio had an agreement that Eugenio
will pay the respondent 5% of any amount he could get as prescribed in Sec. 11 of
Commonwealth Act. No. 675 which is in effect at that time.
On June 14, 1947 RA 145 was passed and on June 1951 Eugenio Albiza received his benefits
and as he and the respondent agreed before, he paid the respondent pursuant to their contract.
The respondent was then prosecuted for Violation of RA 145.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 145 shall retroact to the act of the respondent prior its passage.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the legislature had not intended to give RA 145 any retroactive
effect such as to affect contracts entered into under the sanction of the CA No. 675. It further
stated that in general, law operate prospectively only unless that legislative has clearly indicated
its intention that the law operate retroactively.

Gandionco v. Penaranda 155 SCRA 725

FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco p(rivate respondent), the legal wife of Froilan Gandionco (petitioner), filed a
complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition
for support and payment of damages. Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner for concubinage. Respondent Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide
support to the private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal separation
should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the said civil
action.

HELD:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions
arise from or are related to the same offense. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each
other.

Lapuz v. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 (January 31, 1972)

FACTS:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation,
which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action

HELD:
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of
the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before
final decree, abates the action.

Ong v. Ong 505 SCRA 76 (October 23, 2006)

FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. Lucita alleged that
since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical violence
like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. Lucita’s statements about William’s
abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita
consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children. Lucita should be granted a decree of legal
separation

Madriñan v. Madriñan 527 SCRA 487 (July 12, 2007)

FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18,
2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay
and subsequently to Laguna. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons
in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going
to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the
court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody. On October 21, 2002, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition
and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of
the two younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the
visitation rights of petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus as jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the Family Courts under R.A. 8369.

HELD:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in
harmony with the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 (the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in
fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.

De Ocampo v. Florenciano 107 Phil 35 (February 23, 1960)

FACTS:
Jose De Ocampo (plaintiff) and Serafina Florenciano (defendant) were married in April 5, 1938.
They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with
another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed
for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with
several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had
finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June
18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts
with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her after having discovered her adulterous
acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.

HELD:
The Court not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after
the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations
with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and
after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for
her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168 (October 18, 1957)

FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned
by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp,
his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl.
bThereafter the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown
lived martially with another woman and had begotten children by her. The court denied the legal
separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action had already prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.

HELD:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,
because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned
of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of
the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from
and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.

Matubis v. Praxedes 109 Phil 620 (October 25, 1960)

FACTS:
Socorro Matubis (plaintiff) and Zoilo Praxedes (defendant) were legally married on January 10,
1943. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live
separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948,
plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement which provides among others that “neither of
them can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime arising from their
separation.” In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said
Asuncion gave birth to a child. Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the
defendant. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage
by her husband as proven by their “agreement.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.

HELD:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when
cause occurred. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. in writing,
the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

Contreras v. Macaraig 33 SCRA 222 (May 29, 1970)

FACTS:
Elena Contreras (plaintiff) and Cesar Macaraig (defendant) were married on March 16, 1952.
Out of their Marriage, three children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was
living in Singalong with one Lily Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would
be home for three days. During these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from
verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to anger defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has already set in

HELD:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the
date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of
the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social
institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its
status.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano 88 SCRA 803 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,
1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein
she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite
for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground
that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the
lower court granted the wife pendente lite

ISSUE:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

HELD:
Yes. Provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar
her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of
such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record.

Laperal v. Republic 6 SCRA 357 (October 30, 1962)

FACTS:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition which
reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on
January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a
decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; Petitioner
respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using
her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

HELD:
Petition was dismissed. In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her
husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.
Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Van Dorn v. Romilio 139 SCRA 139 (October 8, 1985)

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
 Llorente v. CA 345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on
November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the
US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with
Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth
certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

HELD:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign
law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to
the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the
domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s
will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.