Article 70.

Successive Service of Sentence

PEOPLE VS. RENE ESCARES (G. R. Nos. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957)

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 13, 1950, sis separate informations for robbery were filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against Salvador Poblador, Armando Gustillo and Rene Escares. When
these cases were called for hearing on March 2, 1951, Rene Escares was still at large
and, by agreement of the parties, they were tried jointly against Salvador Poblador and
Armando Gustillo. A decision was thereafter rendered against them finding them guilty of the
crimes charged and convicting them accordingly.

On April 21, 1954, Rene Escares was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in each of the six
above-mentioned cases but later he asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty
and substitute it for a plea of guilty. The trial court granted the petition and forthwith it rendered
a decision of the following tenor:
''When these cases were called for trial, the accused asked permission to withdraw his former
plea of not guilty and substitute it with that of guilty in all these cases. The Court granted said
petition, and the accused forthwith freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty in all these cases.

"Wherefore, the Court finds the accused Rene Escares guilty of the crimes charged in the
information in all these cases, and, in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences said accused to twelve (12) years, six (6) months,
and ono (1) day in all the cases, with all the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs."
Rene Escares appealed from the decision but having taken the case to the Court of
Appeals, the latter certified it to us on the ground that the only issue involved is one of law.

The only question raised in this appeal refers to the penalty imposed on the appellant. He
contends that since he pleaded guilty to all the crimes charged and there is no aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reduced to the
minimum.

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded
guilty in accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is
prision correctional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should
be applied in its minimum period in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not
offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one
month and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should
be sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall not be
less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision,
correctional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision
correctional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. But in applying
the proper penalty, the trial court imposed upon appellant the three fold rule provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This is an error for said article can only be
taken into account, not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed.

The penalty imposed upon appellant by the trial court should therefore be modified in the
sense that he should suffer in each of the six cases an indeterminate penalty of not less than 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision
correctional, plus the corresponding accessory penalties provided for by law. These penalties
should be served in accordance with the limitation prescribed in paragraph 4, Article 70, of the
Revised Penal Code.

Modified in the sense above indicated, we affirm the decision of the trial court, with
costs against appellant.

ARTURO A. MEJORADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. Nos. 51065-72, June 30, 1987)

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the Sandiganbayan
finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Eight informations were flied by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried
before the Sandiganbayan. The eight informations substantially allege the same set of
circumstances constituting the offense charged. Criminal Case No. 002 reads as follows:

That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to February 1978, in
the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being employed in the Office of the Highway District
Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila as Right-of-Way-Agent, conspiring and confederating together
with two (2) other John Does whose true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown,
with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate the approval of one Isagani de Leon's
claim for the payment in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his land
expropriated by the government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta.Cruz-Calamba
Road, 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in the
discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and after said claim was approved and
the corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of
P7,200.00 give only P1.000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and
converting to themselves the amount of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to
Isagani de Leon and the government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.
Contrary to law.

Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private party,
the PNB Check number, the amount involved and the number of John Does, the seven other
informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.

The facts as found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:

Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in
the Bureau of Public Works on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of
the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to December 31,
1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by
highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
incurred by said owners.

Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed
Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road, 2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were lsagani de Leon,
Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran,
Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November, 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and
informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada required the
claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of
Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements"
pertinent to their claims. The claimants compiled without bothering to find out what the
documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.

In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish" the value of the respective
properties of the claimants were made to appear very much higher than the actual value
claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the
improvements "as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value
declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was in turn
supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an
assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish as per
assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00
and P200.00, respectively, it turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property are not
really intended for the claimants as trey were registered in the names of other persons, thus
showing that they were all falsified.

A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of
the Highway District Engineer at the provincial Capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive
payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the
checks by certifying as to their identities and guaranteeing payment.

Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them
to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them
leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left,
explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants
were helpless to complain because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the Provincial
Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in their supporting sworn statements what they
later testified to in court.

Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:

I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have
been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;

II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted in
accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;

III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the
three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;

IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and
the offense proved;

V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in arriving at
a verdict of conviction of petitioner is correct as a question of law which this Honorable Court is
authorized to pass upon.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to alleged the essential ingredients or
elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

The section under which, the accused-petitioner was charged provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
* * *
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Petitioner enumerated three elements which in his opinion constitute a violation of Section 3 (e).

First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty or granting licenses or
permits or other concessions. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with the
duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer contemplated
by Section 3 (e).

Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public
officer declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion
of officers and employees of offices or government corporations which under the ordinary
concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting
licenses or permits or other concessions.

The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public officer. This,
the informations did not fail to allege.

Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions.

Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the
payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District
Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the
government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of
complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer
to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis
of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-
way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by
highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a
large proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual
damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference was done through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.

Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the
complainants and the government must have been caused by the public officer in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage was caused
to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his official administrative functions, therefore,
he is not liable for the offense charged.

The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner
took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the
aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified
declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part
of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the
claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.

In view of the above holding, We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the allegation
that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery.
Contrary to the petitioner's averment, We find no variance between the offense charged in the
informations and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to establish through the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how, through evident bad faith, petitioner
caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner
divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part of the scheme which
commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could
work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the
widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz - Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution
clearly establish a violation of Section 3 (e).

II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this
case. He argues that before the Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial body, at
least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly constituted and appointed.

We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288,
December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the petitioner De Guzman questioned the
authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on the same ground that herein
petitioner assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan saying
that:

Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices, it
does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of
P.D.1606 provides that the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each"
while Section 5 thereof Provides that the unanimous vote of three justices in a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division
functions independently of the other. As long as a division has been duly constituted it is a
judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly
constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of judgment as required by
Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.

III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment. Petitioner
impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate
penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty
but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed [People v. Escares, 102 Phil 677
(1957)]. Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be
inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It
merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight
informations filed against the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v.
Peralta (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):

. . . Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties
as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime
committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage
against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the
appropriate penal sanctions.

In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as
harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v. People, G.R. No. 57601-06, July 20, 1982, 115
SCRA 790, 792).

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing discussion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Article 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minors

RENNIE DECLARADOR VS. HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON (G.R. NO. 159208, August 18,
2006)

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending
the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High
School in President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador
was stabbed to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health Physician Pilar
Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds
on different parts of the body.[2]

On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the Family Court. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-
Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one
YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple fatal stab wounds
in the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne
Declarador.

The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering that the attack was made by
the accused using a long knife which the latter carried along with him from his house to the
school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting
upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. [3]
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on
May 20, 2003 finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of
the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
court finds CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil
indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney's
fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of One Million Three
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).

The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the
Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in
case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom
of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.

Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in
conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional Rehabilitation
Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors,
the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth,
Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the
Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would turn 18 on June 3,
2003.[5]

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial court's decision
suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.

Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit
of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable
by death,[6] reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Ondo,[7] petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.

In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering
that the offense charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines;
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court assailing the
order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows
the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did not abuse its discretion
in suspending the sentence of the accused.

In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.

The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent's sentence cannot be suspended since he was
charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the
entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually
imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for
by law.

The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition;
(2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this
Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales
and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.

The petition is granted.

On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the
offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari.[8]
This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object.[9] Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined
the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion of the RTC decision.

On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an
order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[10] A
direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.[11] This is an established policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. [12]

However, in Fortich v. Corona,[13] the Court held that considering the nature and importance of
the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court
may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it.[14] Moreover, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
interests of justice so require.

In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the
application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either
evident premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is
reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the
evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest
of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further
proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any other
responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period
as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or
responsible person under whose care he has been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court
may require the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the
court a social case study report over the offender and his family.

The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court
may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.

The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the
Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3,
Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be
suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set
the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence
which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or
guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and
supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar
activities; Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for
juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.

The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the
compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit
regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may
set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile,
his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has
once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment
the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended
sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to
be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." [15] The word "punishable" does not mean
"must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified.[16] In U.S. v. Villalon,[17] the Court
defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to the
possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not
which is imposed.

The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty
therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty
imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. [18] Despite the
disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the
sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of
the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in
that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been
deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to
maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to
death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.

Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one
uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments
and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto. [19] Statutes in
pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national
policy.[20]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent
Judge suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL PADUA VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008)

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June
14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed
Michael Padua's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua's
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 [3] and
July 28, 2004[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his
petition for probation.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the
RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6]
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous
drugs.[7] The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation
of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i),
committed as follows:

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17)
years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops,
which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.

Contrary to law.[8]
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty.[9]

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua's counsel manifested that
his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the
benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The
prosecutor interposed no objection.[11] Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order[12]
stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-
arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found
Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of
Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and
therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine
pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation[15] dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is
a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968[16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of
1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.

The RTC in an Order[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to
conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the
said petition within five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-
Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation. [18]

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an
Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 [19] of Rep. Act No.
9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael
Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and
submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua
y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D.
603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the
suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not
find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by
minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program
for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of
R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article
VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with
Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the
Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and
convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said
section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:

"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. - Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended." (underlining supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y
Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004.
He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but
the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF

THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER'S RIGHT AS A MINOR
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE
ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
 II.

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED['S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER

RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
OTHER PURPOSES.[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its
Comment[23] as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING
SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE
SAME LAW.

II.

SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "RULE ON JUVENILES

IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW" HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua's petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua's right
under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25] the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3)
Does Section 32[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law" have application in this case?

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua's petition
for certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[27]

"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is
"excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [28]

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua's petition for probation shows that the RTC
neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied
the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua's petition for
probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for
selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. - Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. [29] If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.[30] Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.[31]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in
Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons
convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand
in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 [32] and 15[33] of
the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug
traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are
categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users
and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. [34] The Court of Appeals also
correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of
Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law
could have easily declared so.[35]

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while
protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is
meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the
first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of
selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section
5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344,
the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has
application in this case. Section 68[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer
be retroactively applied for petitioner's benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence. Section 40[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once
the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child,
order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21
years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child [39] for purposes of applying
Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far
as his case is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE VS. RICHARD O. SARCIA (G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009)

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On automatic review is the decision[1] dated My 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-
appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape [3]
committed against AAA,[4] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of
the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death
penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.

The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old
girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA's father filed a complaint[5] for acts of lasciviousness
against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.[6] The Information[7] dated
September 5, 2000 reads:

That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of

Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was
then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father;
and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes
imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay.

On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision[9] finding the accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.

The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
accused- appellant.[10]

Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's Brief[11] on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief[12] on December 15, 2004.

Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[13] modifying the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to
this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.

As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court.
We quote the fallo of the CA decision:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y

Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of
(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.[14]

In our Resolution[15] of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective supplemental briefs. Accused- appellant filed his Supplemental Brief[16] on April
7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to
have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.

In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

[AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].

II

THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.

III

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD
SARCIA

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:

On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates],
was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.

Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.

Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and underwear. He also removed
his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on
top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down
movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray."
She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.

[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellant's dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's]
mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA's] mother answered that
they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.

Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her
clothes. Appellant then left.

Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she
found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked
her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her
any further question and just accompanied her home.

At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that
her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating
sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA's cousin] came to
their house and told [AAA's] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down
movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAA's]
father was working in Manila.

Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it
was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2)
Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of [AAAj's
examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of
Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal
certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]'s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital
vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits
little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars"
means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is
a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain
trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical
instrument or penis.[17]

On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:

Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Dona Tomasa, Guinobatan,
Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA's] parents, because sometimes they go to
their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father
retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in the
Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his
mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing
in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His
father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Dona Tomasa both of
Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was
between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan.
Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at
Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon after
school before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the
church in Dona Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting
other girls ... and was most surprised when he Vas accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling
Crisologo and the latter's place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed
Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was
imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against
him with the docile cooperation of [AAA's] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAA's] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two
(2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was
filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn
about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his
sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he
did not do such thing and recalled CA Record, pp. 77-105. telling his sister they can go to a
doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister
again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.

On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA's] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA
mother's] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of
money by his father to the AAA's family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against
him but the instigation of Saivacion Bobier.

Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay,
testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against
Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape
case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative to said
case.[18]

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA
and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and
time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case,
and the only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Saivacion Bobier get a conviction
of this same accused in a murder case filed by said Saivacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the
same Saivacion Bobier helped AAA's father in fding the said case for rape. Accused-appellant
also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation
to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital
bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."

In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA's and
her cousin's testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time
of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited
her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw
accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a
loud voice contrary to AAA's testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started
the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the
latter's mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however
testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the
cousin testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that
there were only four of them who were playing at that time.

As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor

details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses
and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.[19] The alleged
inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It
is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant
who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA
was sexually abused by accused- appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the
rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified,
they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and
their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is
more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.[20]

Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA's inability to recall the exact date when the incident in
1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication
of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential
and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness.[21] In People v.
Purazo,[22] We ruled:

We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for
the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that
where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime
charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that
the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain
the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the
specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of
the court.

Also in People v. Salalima,[23] the Court held:

Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the
victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of
carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the
actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we
ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994" ''sometime
in the year 1991 and the days thereafter" "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions
prior and/or subsequent thereto'" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In this case, AAA's declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:

The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-
examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and date
in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA's] sworn statement mention the
month and date but only the year.[24]

Likewise, witnesses' credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant's claim that the only
reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this
same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."

The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of
her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In People v. Coloma[25] we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long
history of rape by the victim's father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the
complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show
that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the
complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA's parents to
immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant's father in the latter's
testimony, thus:

Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife
told you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.

Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during
that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were
able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.[26]

Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof
that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the
girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal
knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of
these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free
consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.[27]

Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows:
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there
was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of
lacerations in the victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its
absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.[28] What is important is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility,
and that is sufficient to convict the accused.

Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have
ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over the appellants' defense of denial and alibi. [29] The shallow hypothesis
put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the
following conclusion:

...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.

AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the
testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable
for a girl of complainant's age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had
she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of
tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious
as rape to any man if it were not true.[30] Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child
of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they
were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter's transgressor punished
accordingly.[31] Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss
now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [32] was the
governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said
law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years
of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was
committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth
certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be
imposed.

However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CA's conclusion that the accused- appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he
was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in
any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact
date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it
being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. [34]

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.[35] Thus,
the proper imposable penalty for the accused- appellant is reclusion perpetua.

It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code,
in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes,
the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages
should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.

A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in
order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is
included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:

Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall

include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime.

Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor[36] ratiocinated as follows:

The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party
as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be
considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and
the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on
like considerations, the jurisprudenttal path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction.
Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended
law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not Jess than P75.000.00.
This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial
fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence
of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)

The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,[37] we held:

xxx Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation. are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)

In another case, this Court also explained:

What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages
awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815).[38] (Emphasis Supplied)

Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her
family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of
injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending
this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission
of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral
or evidentiary certainty of his minority.

In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to
depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape,
considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This
was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,[39] a case decided on July 28,
1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to
P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty
imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.

The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome[40]
and People v. Quiachon[41] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.

Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:

"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 ... Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
jurisprudence on qualified rape."

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.

People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,
correctly awarded the following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the
crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty;
P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in
R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the
award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of
the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has
been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.[42] Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should
likewise be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[43]

In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should
be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be
likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award
of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00[44]
and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00. [45]
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the
sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as
he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[46] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law[47] Accused-appellant is now approximately 31
years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.

R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application
of this Act. x x x

The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the
Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to
accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty
of the offense charged. It reads:

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.[48] The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply
to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish.[49] Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between
a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations [50] on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent
portion of which is quoted below:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could
be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration
of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied)

Nonetheless, while Sec, 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conilict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years, (emphasis ours)

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Sees. 38 and
40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. [51] However, accused-appellant
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for
the confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.[52]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on
accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;[53] and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary
damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.
 ROBERT REMIENDO VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 184874, October 09, 2009)

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated October 3, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29316 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert
Remiendo y Siblawan."

The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both dated March 10, 2008, against
petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan (Remiendo), that read—
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999

That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl
below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000

That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl
below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled "not guilty" to both charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. Both the prosecution
and the defense presented their respective evidence, summarized by the CA in its Decision, to
wit:
The prosecution presented the following version of facts:

The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At the time of the commission of the
offense, she was a minor below 12 years of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert
Remiendo as he was residing near the house where her family used to stay. Sometime in March
1997, she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant inside said house. On that day, her
parents and brother left for work after breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-
appellant came in, pushed her into the room, and threatened to kill her if she reported what
happened. He undressed himself and the complainant. The latter was standing and refused to
remove her panty but she obliged when accused-appellant insisted. Then he made her lie on
the bed and placed his penis in her vagina. The complainant struggled, moved, and pushed
accused-appellant. She felt pain when accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She
cried until accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because accused-appellant warned her
not to, or else he would kick her. She put on her clothes after accused-appellant left. Her
parents arrived in the afternoon but she did not tell them what happened to her because her
mother might whip her.

Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted by accused-appellant, which took
place in the house of the latter. At that time, she was on her way to see her mother at her
workplace after she had lunch. When she passed by the house of accused-appellant, the latter
pulled her into his house and brought her into his room. She cried and shouted but accused-
appellant told her to keep quiet. She struggled but was helpless because accused-appellant was
stronger. They were alone in the room. Accused-appellant removed his clothes and told her to
remove her panty. Afraid, she removed her panty and was made to lie on the bed. Accused-
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. She kept on moving but she could
not push away accused-appellant. She moved her shoulders and pushed accused-appellant
with both hands but he was stronger. Afterwards, accused-appellant moved away and
threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded that she would not tell
anyone. Later, she executed a sworn statement and identified accused-appellant as the person
who raped her.

Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-
Cordillera Administrative Region, physically examined the complainant on 2 January 1998. Said
medico-legal officer testified that [AAA] was thirteen (13) years old and a Grade III pupil at
Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at the time of the examination. She was four feet and eleven inches
(4'11") tall, weighed 78 pounds, fairly nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious,
coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no extra-genital injuries. Upon
examination of her genital area, he found old lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock
positions, which meant that her hymen was altered by a hard rigid instrument. The lacerations
were done more than three (3) months prior to the examination. To determine the approximate
size of the object that the hymenal opening could accommodate, he inserted a test tube. The
2.5-centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by the hymenal orifice. He noted
that the vaginal walls were lax and the ridges inside were smothered. The complainant told him
that accused-appellant raped her. He presented a written report of his findings.

On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted an examination of the mental
condition of the complainant. The latter was also scheduled for psychological examination to be
conducted by Elma Buadken. The result of the examination showed that [AAA] is suffering from
psychosis and organicity. She has a below average intelligence quotient of 88, but not on the
level of mental retardation. She can perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her studies,
she can hardly comprehend what is being taught to her. Having psychosis means that her brain
is afflicted with a disease. Her medical history showed that she suffered head and body injuries
brought about by being sideswiped by a motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She was confined in
the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries substantially contributed to her present condition.
Organicity, on the other hand, means that the complainant suffers from a cloud of memory,
upward rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss of consciousness, and epileptic
seizures. Her psychosis occurs after seizure. She is not, however, insane. During a seizure, she
does not know what is going on, but afterwards she returns to her level of consciousness. With
regular medication, her seizures will be greatly minimized. During her interview, the complainant
had a seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her consciousness level returned. The
complainant then revealed that accused-appellant and a certain Reynoso Cera raped her. The
psychiatrist opined that during the rape, she did not have a seizure because if she had, she
would not have remembered what had happened. The fact that she was able to narrate what
happened and who raped her suggested that she was on her conscious level at such time. A
written report of the foregoing findings was submitted in court.

The defense presented the following version of facts:

Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she was a friend, playmate, and neighbor
of the complainant. She testified that she and [AAA] played together and talked about their
"crushes." The complainant told Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on accused-appellant.
Sometime in April or May 1997, the complainant said that her brother had molested her, and
that he and his father had sexual intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy, Tuba.
Sometime in August 1997, the complainant confided that Reynoso Cera raped her in his house.
She told Lea Chiwayan that she did not feel anything because she was used to having sexual
intercourse with brother and father. One Saturday afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the
complainant were playing when they saw accused-appellant going to the basketball court near
the church. They followed him and watched a basketball game. After the game, Lea Chiwayan
went home with the others while the complainant stayed behind. A few seconds after they left,
the complainant ran after them and told them that something happened between her and
accused-appellant. She said that accused-appellant pulled her towards the back of the church
and had sexual intercourse with her. The complainant later took back what she said because
she was only joking. She then asked Lea Chiwayan not to tell the accused-appellant. However,
Lea Chiwayan told accused-appellant what the complainant told them. Accused-appellant
confronted the complainant. He flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He said,
"what are you saying, why did I do that, if I like and I do it, I'll not do it with you, you should be
ashamed of yourself." He then borrowed the vehicle of a certain Junie, started the engine, and
stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the exhaust pipe were directed at the complainant.
Later, Lea Chiwayan learned that [AAA] filed a case against accused-appellant.

Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school year 1997-1998, testified that the
latter was unruly and a liar. The complainant would pick fights and steal money from her
classmates. However, the witness admitted that there was no written record in school that she
reprimanded complainant for her behavior. She knew that the complainant had an accident
before.

Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-appellant was one of his drivers. He
described accused-appellant as a hardworking and industrious person. When he learned that
Robert Remiendo was accused of rape, he was outraged because he knew the daily activities of
accused-appellant. The latter could not have done such act under his strict supervision.

Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as she was a townmate of his mother.
In September 1996, he and his parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the complainant
figured in an accident at that time, he was the one who informed her parents. The first time he
saw the complainant was during the time when he was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw
the complainant and her playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to alight from the vehicle.
Sometime in June 1997, he again saw the complainant and her sister playing inside the jitney.
He told them to alight as they were disturbing him. On the day he was playing basketball at the
church grounds in Badiwan, Lea and Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if it was
true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the latter was and went to see her. Out of anger, he
borrowed the vehicle of Junie, started the engine, directed the exhaust pipe at the complainant,
and revved the engine so the smoke would go straight to her. He slapped her and said "if I
would like someone, it would not be you because there are a lot of girls better than you." During
the Christmas party in Badiwan, he again saw the complainant roaming around the dance area.
He told her to get out as she irritated the people dancing. The complainant said nothing and left
the dance floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and smiling. He learned that he
was charged with two (2) counts of rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.[6]
In its Joint Judgment[7] dated October 27, 2004, the RTC found Remiendo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as charged in the Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999 and in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-
3000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum for each count of rape.

He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) by way
of moral damages, and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of exemplary
damages.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail
Warden of Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Robert
Remiendo, to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the
expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his
information, guidance and compliance.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA
affirmed the RTC, modifying only the civil liability imposed upon Remiendo. The fallo of the CA
Decision reads—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment
dated 27 October 2004 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the civil liability of accused-appellant. He is ordered to
pay the complainant, for each count of rape, the sum of (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b)
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007 Decision, but the CA denied the motion
in its October 3, 2008 Resolution; hence, this petition alleging that—
(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE COURT A QUO CONVICTING PETITIONER OF STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE
BENEFIT ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC ACT 9344 KNOWN AS THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.[10]
Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite the purported absence of
competent proof that AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the alleged commission of the
crimes. According to him, the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the prosecution during
its formal offer of exhibits was not admitted by the RTC in its Order[11] dated September 14,
1999 because "it was neither identified by any witness, nor marked as exhibit during the trial
though reserved for marking during the pretrial." He further posits that, on the basis of the
testimonies of the defense witnesses and the Elementary School Permanent Record, [12] AAA
was more than 12 years old in March and May 1997.

Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age, Remiendo then questions her credibility
as a witness, claiming that she was smiling during her testimony; and that her failure to flee from
the situation, even taking off her panties herself, belies her charges of statutory rape against
him.

We disagree.

As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl
below 12 years old is statutory rape. Its two elements are: (1) that the accused has carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with
a girl under 12 years old is always rape.[13]

As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim, the Court, in People v. Pruna,[14] laid
down the following guidelines:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. [15]

In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a certified true copy of AAA's Certificate of Live
Birth[16] as part of the testimonies of AAA and her mother that AAA was born on February 21,
1986. It was reserved for marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution, as shown in the
Pretrial Order[17] dated November 16, 1998. During the trial, in order to abbreviate the
proceedings, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimony of AAA's mother, specifically on
the following facts:

1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-CR-2999 and 98-CR-3000;

2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her
daughter which she subscribed before NBI agent Atty. Dave Alunan; and

3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against Reynoso Cera and Robert
Remiendo is the alleged statutory rape against [AAA].[18]

And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement that AAA was born on February 21,
1986.[19]
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth)
in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil
Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child,[20] and it does not
need authentication. It can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, despite the September 14, 1999 Order, the RTC correctly appreciated the same in its
Joint Judgment.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live Birth was not appreciated by the RTC,
the prosecution was able to establish that AAA was below 12 years old during the two occasions
of rape per the guidelines laid down in Pruna. It is significant to note that both AAA and BBB
testified that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. This fact was neither denied nor objected to
by the defense. The argument of Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial
that AAA's birthday was February 21, 1984 cannot stand. As quoted by Remiendo in his
petition—
Court:

Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date of [AAA] was February 21,
1983. Do you agree that that is an entry there?

Pros. Suanding:

Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.[21]

This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the birth date of AAA. A judicial
admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case and it dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.[22] In this case, what was only admitted was that the entry of AAA's date of
birth appearing in her school record is February 21, 1983. There was no such admission that the
said date was the correct birthday of AAA. And as between the school record and the
testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB, the latter must prevail.

As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence instructs us that the trial court's
assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly.[23]

Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, inasmuch as
no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a public
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl
of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime
so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[24]

What is more, AAA's testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal examination
showing healed lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape
victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that
the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence
to show any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against the accused
or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[25] In this case, Remiendo failed to convince us to
rule otherwise.

Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,
otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.

The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads -

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall be likewise
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.[26]
Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with discernment in the
commission of the crimes charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from criminal
liability.

We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness. [27]

Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that Remiendo acted with discernment, being
able to distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts
against AAA. During the rape that occurred in March 1997, Remiendo waited for AAA to be left
alone at her house before he came, and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her
should she shout for help. In May 1997, Remiendo again ravished AAA in the room of his house
when the latter passed by and, thereafter, threatened to kill her if she told anybody about what
had just happened. Per his own testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong because
he claimed to have been enraged when he was asked by AAA's playmates if he indeed raped
AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving up the engine of a jitney and directing the smoke
from the exhaust pipe towards her.

Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, [28] and having
acted with discernment, but having already reached 21 years of age at the time of the imposition
of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is rendered moot
and academic in view of Section 40[29] thereof which provides -
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[30]
Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated on October 27,
2004. Thus, at the time of the imposition of his sentence, Remiendo was already 22 years old
and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the application of R.A. No. 9344.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision dated November 16, 2007 and the
Resolution dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO (G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011)

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim's positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[1] For it to prosper,
the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to
have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[2]

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final
and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence
on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic
Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and
Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,[3] appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this
Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.[4]

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 2003[5] filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],[6] appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or
less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being
only five years old.[7]

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense
admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she
was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their
respective versions of the story.
 Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito][12] may be
summarized in the following manner:

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF's house is along the road.
That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road,
appellant has to pass by FFF's house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every
minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He
bore no grudge against appellant prior to the incident.[13]

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time -
playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his
way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident. [14]

At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter
CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned
without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her
aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].[15]

Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
Rum.[16] At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.[17] He was wearing sleeveless
shirt and a pair of short pants.[18] All of them left the store at the same time.[19] Julito proceeded
to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went
towards the direction of the "lower area or place."[20]

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants[21] when he
held her hand while on the road near the store.[22] They walked towards the rice field near the
house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].[23] There he made her lie down
on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. [24] Already half-naked
from waist down,[25] he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.[26] She felt pain and cried.[27] Afterwards,
appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.[28] She, in turn, went straight home crying.[29]

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.[30] She was without
slippers.[31] He found her face greasy.[32] There was mud on her head and blood was oozing
from the back of her head.[33] He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that
was already turning black.[34] She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud
on her vagina.[35] AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store[36] to the grassy area at
the back of the house of the Perochos;[37] that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her
panty, choked her and boxed her breast;[38] and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.[39]

True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.[40] He asked the appellant
what he did to AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that
AAA followed him.[42] FFF went home to check on his daughter,[43] afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,[44] and boxed him.[45]

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
house of Rita.[46] AAA and her mother MMM arrived.[47] AAA was crying.[48] Julito pitied her,
embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped
her.[49] Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.[50] Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you
really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question. [51] Appellant's
aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded,
"Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."[52] Julito did found
the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.[53]
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident
blottered.[54] FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health
center.[55] Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical
certificate[56] dated 29 January 2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock position

Impression

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,[57] AAA submitted herself to another examination at
the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of
the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
2003,[58] the pertinent portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is
no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)[59]

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate
his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that
he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime.[60] Luzvilla even went further
to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. [61] In addition,
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant's aunt, Gloria,[62] testified on the behavior of
Julito after the rape incident was revealed.[63]

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the
back of FFF's house.[64] He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order
to access the road or to fetch water.[65] He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for
FFF,[66] and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached
him.[67]

At about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle
Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant's uncle
sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had
a watch .[68]

Appellant's aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She
also observed that appellant's white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. [69]

At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen
having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.[71] She went out to relieve
herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.[72] From where
she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.[73] AAA's face was covered and she was wiggling.[74] This did not alarm her because she
thought it was just a game.[75] Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.[76] Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,[77] running
towards the house of Rita.[78] AAA was slowly following behind.[79] Luzvilla followed
them.[80] Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.[81] The child did not answer.[82]

Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified
that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the
appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This
time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant's uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.[83]

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o'clock in the evening, she was watching the
television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing
only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what
happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia's advice, Julito released her and went out of the
house.[84]

Appellant further testified that at past 7 o'clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at
him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8
o'clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.[85]

On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,[86] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs [87]

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that
appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old
when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.[88] The trial court appreciated the evidence
and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.[89] Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is
amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in
view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.[90]

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to
indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. [91]

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant's Notice of
Appeal.[92] This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs.[93] Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.[94]

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
RAPE"[95] by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty
and will not suffice to support a conviction."[96]

Our Ruling

We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three
well-entrenched principles:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[97]

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to
convict the accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings
of the examining physician.[99]

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime,[100] except when it is established that it was physically impossible for
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[101]

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even
in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts
culminating in the insertion of appellant's organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the
medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

AAA testified:

PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else
did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.[103]

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-
phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all -
she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is
essential to show that rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally
badges of truth and honesty.[105]

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal
lacerations at 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an
object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of
the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ. [107]

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration

conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. [108]

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the
commission of the crime are now in dispute.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.[109]

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good
look at him during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her
life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the
situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her
hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she
called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive.
The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else - one Julito Apiki, but the child, on
rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger,
and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.[112]

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court
of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs
and the scant or full realization of their oath,"[113] unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted." [114]

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness' attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to
someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant's positive identification of
accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latter's testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from
the child."[115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his
denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even
destroyed the credibility of the appellant's very testimony.

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy
Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long
before he bought Tanduay at the store.

This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape
incident because he was then at work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to their
house for the second time and boxed appellant. [117] It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session started only
after the appellant's errand to the store.[119]

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary
to Gloria's statement that her husband was at work.

Luzvilla's testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia

Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla's claim that
Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution,
as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in
saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla's recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-
shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvilla's story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita's house three (3)
minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA
arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court's appreciation in
order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father
that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among
strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the
child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only
later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a
look at her ? just as Julito Apiki said.[120]

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having
been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses
cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other."[121]

Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his
whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.

We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of
the crime.[122]

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was
so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[123]

In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission
of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by
foot.[125] Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim,
this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast
asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have
merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout. [126]

In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the
appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise
disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant's part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant's sister-
in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant's physical presence in the fishpond at
the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant's house
where the rape occurred, was a stone's throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that
the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is
unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost
four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting
and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters
away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the
way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to
the fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their
sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human
experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just
behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from
the road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after
buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle's house. [129] Unfortunately,
the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the
immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.[130]

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been
at the time and place of the commission of the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still
under review.[133] (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment,
in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.[134]

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.[135] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. [136]

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong.[137] Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor's cunning and shrewdness.[138]

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken
her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant's mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.[139]

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that
she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law
prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old[141] applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; [142] and (2) the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing
the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.[143]
Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of
penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.[145] Consequently, in its appreciation
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one
degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.[146]

We differ.

In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. [150] The
respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are,
therefore, proper.[151]

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary damages
should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the
Period of Suspension of Sentence

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of
conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, [154]
the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156]

overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in
conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension
of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. [157]

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this
Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could
be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same position.[160]

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law and
Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five
(25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age
limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at
the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that
the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.[164]

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to
effect appellant's confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. URBAN SALCEDO (G.R. No. 186523, June 22, 2011)

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
November 24, 2008, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule
56 of the Rules of Court. The CA found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187 and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.

A close examination of the records would reveal the CA's narration of the antecedent facts to be
accurate, to wit:

Accused-appellants interpose the present appeal to the Decision of branch 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Isabela City, Basilan, convicting them for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Ransom, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. After arraignment and due trial, accused-
appellants were found guilty and, accordingly, sentenced in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 to
Reclusion Perpetua, and in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187 to the
Death Penalty.

The Decision in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joe Guillo, the Court
finds the following accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. "Wahid Guillermo Salcedo"/"Abu Urban"

2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. "Abu Sahrin"
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. "Abu Ajid"
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. "Abu Habs"
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. "Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk"
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. "Abu Jar"
 7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. "Abu Jakaria" (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. "Abu Jaid" (in abstencia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.ka. "Abu Black" (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. "Abu Annik" (in abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. "Abu Harun"
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. "Abu Jude"
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. "Abu Teng"/"Abu Umbra," and
17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. "Abu Bashier"

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA is hereby imposed on them.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Joel Guillo by way of moral
damages the sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with
proportionate costs against them.
On the other hand, the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164 decreed as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, the court finds the
following accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. "Wahid Guillermo Salcedo"/"Abu Urban"

2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a "Abu Sahrin"
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. "Abu Ajid"
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. "Abu Habs"
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. "Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk"
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. "Abu Jar"
7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. "Abu Jakaria" (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. "Abu Jaid" (in abstentia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. "Abu Black" (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. "Abu Annik" (in abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. "Abu Harun"
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. "Abu" Jude"
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. "Abu Teng"/"Abu Umbra," and
17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. "Abu Bashier"

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme
penalty of DEATH.
The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Reina Malonzo by way of moral
damages the sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with
proportionate costs against them.

Likewise, the lower court, in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165 decreed as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the kidnapping of Shiela Tabuñag, the (court) finds the
following accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. "Wahid Guillermo Salcedo"/"Abu Urban"

 2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. "Abu Sahrin"
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. "Abu Ajid"
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. "Abu Habs"
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. "Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk"
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. "Abu Jar"
7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. "Abu Jakaria" (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. "Abu Jaid" (in abstentia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. "Abu Black" (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. "Abu Annik" (in abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. "Abu Harun"
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. "Abu" Jude"
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. "Abu Teng"/"Abu Umbra," and
17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. "Abu Bashier"

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme
penalty of DEATH.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Shiela Tabuñag by way of moral
damages the sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with
proportionate costs against them.
And in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, it entered its judgment against the accused-appellants as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, the court finds the
following accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. "Wahid Guillermo Salcedo"/"Abu Urban"

Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a "Abu Sahrin"
Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. "Abu Ajid"
Haber Asari, a.k.a. "Abu Habs"
Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. "Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk"
Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. "Abu Jar"
Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. "Abu Jakaria" (in abstentia)
Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. "Abu Jaid" (in abstentia)
Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. "Abu Black" (in abstentia)
Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. "Abu Annik" (in abstentia)
Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. "Abu Nadim"
Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. "Abu Harun"
Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. "Abu" Jude"
Sonny Asali, a.k.a. "Abu Teng"/"Abu Umbra," and
Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. "Abu Bashier"

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme
penalty of DEATH.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay to the heirs of Ediborah Yap by way
of civil indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00 and,
considering the attendant aggravating circumstances, the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

The salient facts in this case are the following:

On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuñag, Reina Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving their duty
shift as nurses at Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan. Joel Guillo, the
hospital accountant, on the other hand, had just finished his duty and decided to rest in the
doctors' quarter.

At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by
Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and took control over said
hospital. Previously, however, another group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu Umran hiked
towards Lamitan for the sole purpose of reinforcing the group of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Sabaya. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the hospital, a firefight had already ensued
between the military forces and the group of Janjalani and Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band
also became entangled in a firefight with a civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet, who was
killed during the encounter. Moments later, the band fled to different directions, with its
members losing track of one another.

Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on that early morning, as the people were thrown into a
frenzy by the shouting, window glass breaking, and herding of hostages from one room to
another by the ASG. The group was also looking for medicine and syringes for their wounded
comrades as well as food and clothing. The firefight lasted until the afternoon of June 2,
2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the evening, the ASG and the hostages, including those from
the Dos Palmas Resort, were able to slip out of the hospital through the backdoor, despite the
intense gunfire that was ongoing. Hence, the long and arduous hiking towards the mountains
began.

On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of
Abu Ben in Sinagkapan, Tuburan. The next day, Himsiraji Sali with approximately 60 followers
also joined the group. It was only on the third week on July that year that the whole group of
Abu Sayaff was completed, when it was joined by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. "Abu
Umran."

Subsequently, new hostages from the Golden Harvest plantation in Tairan, Lantawan were
abducted by the Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.

On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded and
was warned of the consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate with the ASG. Hence,
the ASG formed a "striking force" that then proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.

On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from the other hostages and taken to
Zamboanga City by Abu Arabi with two other ASG members on board a passenger watercraft to
stay at a house in Sta. Maria. Later on October 13, 2001, a firefight broke out between the ASG
and the military, giving Joel Guillo and 3 other hostages the opportunity to escape from their
captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuñag was released together with 2 other hostages from Dos
Palmas, allegedly after paying ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon after also released by order of
Khaddafy Janjalani on November 1, 2001.

Finally, after a shootout between the ASG and the military on June 7, 2002, at Siraway,
Zamboanga del Norte, Ediborah Yap, died at the hands of her captors. Thereafter, a manhunt
by the military was conducted, where the accused-appellants were subsequently captured and
held for trial.
Hence, criminal informations for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7659 were filed against 17 ASG
members on August 14, 2001, October 29, 2001, March 6, 2002, and March 12, 2002. As
defense for the accused-appellants, 11 of the 17 of them raise the defense of alibi. Among them
were Jaid Awalal, Imran Hakimin Sulaiman, Toting Hano, Jr., Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla,
Mubin Ibbah, Absmar Aluk, Bashier Abdul, Annik/Rene Abbas, Haber Asari, Margani Hapilon
Iblong, and Nadzmer Mandangan. On the other hand, Bashier Ordonez, Sonny Asali, Lidjalon
Sakandal/Sabandal, and Abdulajid Ngaya claimed that they were merely forced by the Abu
Sayyaf to join the group. The defense of being deep penetration agents of the military was
conversely raised by 2 accused-appellants, Urban Salcedo and Kamar Jaafar.

After due trial, the court a quo, on August 13, 2004, rendered the appealed decisions which
convicted all the accused-appellants of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. [2]

In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joel Guillo, accused-appellants were
sentenced to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina
Malonzo, they were sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the kidnapping of
Sheila Tabuñag, they were sentenced to Death; and in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the
kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, they were also sentenced to Death.

The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty of death
imposed on accused-appellants. However, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo, [3]
and the amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this
case to the CA for intermediate review.

On November 24, 2008, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, We hold to AFFIRM the appealed judgments
with the modification that the penalty of death be reduced to Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal
Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187.

SO ORDERED. [4]

Thus, the case is now before this Court on automatic review. Both the prosecution and the
accused-appellants opted not to file their respective supplemental briefs with this Court.

In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it was argued that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was further averred that
some of the accused-appellants were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for fear
for their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of them, namely, Wahid Salcedo,
Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors at
the time the alleged kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344 (otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-
appellants. It was then prayed that accused-appellants Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni
Hapilon Iblong, Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon Sakandal and Sonny
Asali be acquitted, while the sentence for the rest of the accused-appellants be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, appellee maintained that the State had been able to prove accused-
appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the defense failed to adduce proof of
minority of the four accused-appellants.

The Court finds no reason to reverse or modify the ruling and penalty imposed by the CA.
The defense itself admitted that the kidnapped victims who testified for the prosecution had
been able to point out or positively identify in open court all the accused-appellants [5] as
members of the ASG who held them in captivity. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses
were unwavering in their account of how accused-appellants worked together to abduct and
guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off military forces who were searching and trying to rescue
said victims, and how ransom was demanded and paid. The prosecution likewise presented
two former members of the ASG who testified that they were part of the group that reinforced
the kidnappers and helped guard the hostages. They both identified accused-appellants as
their former comrades.

In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants could muster are denial
and alibi, and for accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged
minority. Accused-appellants' proffered defense are sorely wanting when pitted against the
prosecution's evidence. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellants. More so where, as in the
present case, the accused-appellants failed to present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission thereof. [6] In People v. Molina, [7] the Court expounded, thus:

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill
motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of them
institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not
commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the
defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x [8]

Furthermore, the detention of the hostages lasted for several months and they were transferred
from one place to another, being always on the move for several days. Thus, in this case, for
accused-appellants' alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all those
months. This they were not able to do, making the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.

Some of the accused-appellants maintained that they were merely forced to join the ASG.
However, the trial court did not find their stories persuasive. The trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court
which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses. [9] The Court again
explained the rationale for this principle in Molina, [10] to wit:

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed
as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude,
having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand,
and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the
witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the
Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the
trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the
outcome of the case. [11]

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.

Lastly, the Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's ruling regarding the minority
of accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on
August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987; Salcedo said he was born on
January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was
indeed July 13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June
of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the defense absolutely failed
to present any document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they present
testimonies of other persons such as parents or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:

Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven
to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of
these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

xxxx

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where
the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall
be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. [12]

It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court was hearing the case and even at the
time it handed down the judgment of conviction against accused-appellants on August 13, 2004,
R.A. No. 9344 had not yet been enacted into law. The procedures laid down by the law to prove
the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in place. Hence, the rule was still that the
burden of proving the minority of the accused rested solely on the defense. The trial court, in
the absence of any document stating the age of the aforementioned four accused-appellants, or
any corroborating testimony, had to rely on its own observation of the physical appearance of
accused-appellants to estimate said accused-appellants' age. A reading of the afore-quoted
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining accused-appellants' age is
also sanctioned by the law. The accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger
than twenty-four years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have been under
eighteen (18) years old when the crime was committed. [13] As discussed above, such factual
finding of the trial court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA, must be
accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accused-appellants were indeed less than
eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed, at this point in time, the applicability of
R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as follows:

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That the suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -
xxxx

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. [14]

If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and 1987, then they have
already reached 21 years of age, or over by this time and thus, the application of Sections 38
and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic. [15]

However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be borne in mind that if indeed,
an accused was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
then as held in People v. Sarcia, [16] such offenders, even if already over twenty-one (21) years
old at the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No.
9344 which provides, thus:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in cooperation with the DSWD.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, the evidence before the Court show that accused-appellants
Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, were not minors at the time of the commission of the
crime, hence, they cannot benefit from R.A. No. 9344.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 24, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C No. 00239, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA (G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011)

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision [1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment [2] dated September
14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and
Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the
time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust
team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers
who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The
two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of
selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each
other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the
latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police
officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon
rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials
Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of
shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of
P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made
an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu
which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as
RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso
(P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the
laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet
examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos
marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination
revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked
as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:

Criminal Case No. 10250

That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point
zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [3]

Criminal Case No. 10251

That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero
point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [4]

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment [5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined
and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of
R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to
death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby
sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing
0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED. [6]

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated
September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba
guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. [7]

Thus, the present appeal.

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-
buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.
Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is
on the prosecution.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took
place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-
bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your
buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen
Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this
Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible
apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request
for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.

Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?

xxxx

Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.

Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?

A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there
should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.

Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.

Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.

Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?

A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the
pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there
was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to
the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The
poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already
given by the suspect.

Q: What did you do next after that?

A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline]
substance, we immediately approached the suspect.

Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone
or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights
and we immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the
search of the suspect.

Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.

xxxx

Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso
bills as marked moneys. [8]

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. [9] From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well
established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer
were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were
also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-
bust operation was conducted.

To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic
containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and
that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:

Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of
suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the
result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

xxxx

Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the
marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is
positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x [10]

The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court
stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by
law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is often utilized by law enforcers for
the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.
[12] In People v. Roa, [13] this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and

importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 [14] of Republic Act
No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to
maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not,
by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation.
After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 [15]
of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. [16] A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.

Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes [17] is quite
instructive:

In People v. Ganguso, [18] it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led
to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the
buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca, [19] that there is no rigid or textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.
[20]

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as
they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial
court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court. [21]

In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the
appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of
dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of
the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the
appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of
shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
[22]

As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from
him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit
reasonable doubt, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:

Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from
your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also
found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no
money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.

Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested
by the police?
A: No, sir.

Q: It was taken from your possession?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for
ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said
powder?
A: Yes, sir. [23]

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. [24]

Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of
custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon
were present in the buy-bust operation.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there
is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. [25] Its non-
compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. [26] What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. [27] In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers
Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector
Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any
way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of
custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken
after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:

Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline]
in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.

xxxx

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights
and immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the
search of the suspect.

xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay
officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.

Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of P100.00
peso bills as marked moneys.

Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the
marked moneys?
A: On the ground.

Q: Who picked these marked moneys?

A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.

Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets
of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with]
these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. [28]

As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated
item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking [29] of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. [30]

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss
the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years
old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no
longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The
RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and
Youth Welfare Code [31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law, [32] the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence
under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court
[Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

xxxx

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application
of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia [33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt,
Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail
of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the
CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when
RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. [34]

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA

No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: [35]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.
- A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 [36] of the
same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the
technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle
was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon, [37] thus:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in
said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties
were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties
then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with
the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special
laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of
penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal
or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly
punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal
Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

xxxx

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the
degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the
scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or
more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even
more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination
of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner
not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by
analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to
be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in
their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be
no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to
be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of
and is accordingly addressed to Congress. [38]

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be appreciated in
fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying
the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor
and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there
being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. [40] The ISLAW is
applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty
(reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
would be the proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. HALIL GAMBAO (G.R. No. 172707, October 01, 2013)

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision[1] dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding
accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony
Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman
Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.

The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal
information[3] which reads:
 Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659

That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her
release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to
her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:[4]

Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries,
which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11
August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went
to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to
have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said
passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified
as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two
returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan
offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing
the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back later that
evening.[5]

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s

residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs. [6]
Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan
(Levy), and the house companions.[7] As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son
Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun
at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet.[8] Levy thereafter proceeded
to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.[9]

Chan was forced to board a “Tamaraw FX” van.[10] After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to
shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women, [11] later
identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). [12]
Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas,
Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).[13] Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that
she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.[14]

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the “Tamaraw FX”
van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was
brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom
Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).[15]
Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. [16] At about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the
room with a handgun and asked Chan “Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?”[17] Another man,
whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim
informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. [18] Chan
was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get
the P75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.[19] The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated
the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to
deliver P400,000.00 at the “Chowking” Restaurant at Buendia Avenue. [20]
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who
were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping,
were informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s
release.[21] During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed
a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors
observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The
inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the
Elizabeth Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in
the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.[22]

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at “Chowking” Restaurant
at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately
and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a
light blue “Tamaraw FX” van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money
and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully
intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao
and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.[23]

At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later
identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas. [24]

During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of “not guilty” to “guilty.” The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: “It would mean the moment you withdraw your
previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving
evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly]
sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your
entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?” Eddie Karim
answered, “Yes.”[25] On hearing this clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested,
through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court
separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of
them answered in the affirmative.[26] Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his
plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of plea.[27]
Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,[28] the trial
court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.

On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Hence, they appealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of
the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the
supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to
pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages.

It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.[29]
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the
appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the
records.

In a Resolution[30] dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs,
supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed collectively.

Insufficiency of Evidence

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness,
Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.

This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chan’s
testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the
accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified
them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is
primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are
accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted
with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered.[31] In People v. Tañedo,[32] this Court had occasion to
reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they
testified in court.[33] It can be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are
replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are
giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.

Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her
argument bereft of merit.

The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people
apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning
of 14 August 1998,[34] and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate
evidence working against her defense of denial.

Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It
is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification
of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.[35]

The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of
witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead
this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.

Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty
for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records[36] shows that on 7 October 1998, the
accused-appellants withdrew their plea of “not guilty” and were re-arraigned. They subsequently
entered pleas of “guilty” to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in
People v. Oden,[37] laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.[38]
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part
of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the
court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.[39] Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of
the plea.[40]

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on
a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for
deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence[41] and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a “searching
inquiry,” we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:

1. Ascertain from the accused himself

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the

custodial and preliminary investigations; and

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge’s intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had

conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve
as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the

penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.
For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
 parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully
explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.

6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and

understood by the latter.

7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is
truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact
the crime or furnish its missing details.

It is evident from the records[42] that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The
questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records [43] that
Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty
and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not
mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by
the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the
penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s
seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is
inadequate:
Atty. Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused
Ferrer: Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned
Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable
penalty is lowered, Your Honor.

Court: You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead
guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.

Atty. Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting

Ferrer:

Court: Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no
condition attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty.
[44]

Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court will still
not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, we still
agree with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases
are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial
court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this
case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.[45] The manner by which
the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the
accused.[46]
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the
basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
which was properly appreciated by the trial court.[47] The prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

Degree of Culpability

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy,
insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his
argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based
on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.[48] On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their
argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during
the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he
was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the “Tamaraw FX” at the
Nichols Tollgate.[49] Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established
that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation. [50] This
Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. [51] Once conspiracy is shown, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[52] Moreover, Chan positively
identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing
opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same
may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission
of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense.[53] The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the
accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There
were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming
back to the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in
guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom
money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered
evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.

In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,[54] she directs this Court’s attention to the manifestation
made by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was
concerned.[55] However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,[56] once
the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so
in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.

The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several
times under oath during the trial.[57] Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real
name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why
she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the
other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew
had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing
crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware
of the consequences of the unlawful act.

As reflected in the records,[58] the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold
her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the
testimony[59] of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where
the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the
kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but
rather only as an accomplice to the crime.

Jurisprudence[60] is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the

Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that
there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by
previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming
arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that
she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being
guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would
have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add
to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed.[61] It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence
and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for
ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.[62] Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,[63] where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.

Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no
doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of
kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the
provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,[64] we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and
reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the
passing of R.A. No. 9344,[65] a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment
is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an
exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,[66] the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,[67] the suspension of sentence can be
availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no
longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,[68] the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for
ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the principals would
bear (Reclusion Perpetua).[69] Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the
penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the
maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in

accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto[70] that the age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material.
What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that
Perpenian’s actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense.
For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.

We note that in the Order[71] dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary
evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian
is Larina Perpenian.

In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal
and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death [72] having occurred before rendition of
final judgement.[73]

There is prevailing jurisprudence,[74] on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this
case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:[75]
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs
no proof; and

3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty
warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros[76] is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each
principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity
and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable
for the total amount of P300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for
P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is
broken down into P10,666.67 civil indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67
exemplary damages for each principal; and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral
damages and P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No.
00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice
in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in
the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the
crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on
several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN
PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed
on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute
for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision,
the action he has taken thereon.

SO ORDERED.

ROSAL HUBILLA VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014)

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,[1] and to apply the
principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict
with the law.[2] The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the
penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Antecedents

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide
under the following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon,
Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a
knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death, per
Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the
damage and prejudice of the deceased's heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

Acts Contrary to Law.[3]

The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows:

Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he,
together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching
the graduation ceremony of the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason
Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed
the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the victim, this
witness demonstrated that with the appellant's left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant
stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.

He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the
hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito's companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the
testimony of Dequito on all material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the
[elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son
stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,
however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her
son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the
day after.

She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities. She,
likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.

Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated
by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further,
stated that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.

The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon
High School campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking
towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of
four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He
was not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after
leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who
ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked
why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend,
Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay
hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the
person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it. [4]

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and
funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[5]

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the
penalty and the civil liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006, [6] disposing
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years
of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount
of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php
16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the
victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on
December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:[7]

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision
promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED
such that the judgment shall now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prison
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount
of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php
16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the
victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for
appropriate action on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing
the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to
the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the
lower courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1)
whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation
and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the
penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other
international agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime,
being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30,
2000,[8] such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to
prision mayor.[9]

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional
(i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence,
prision mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10 years -was proper because
there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years
and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to
enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic
Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[10] (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding
principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is
that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the
personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.[11] Consistent with this principle, the
amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere
allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even
for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,[12] which disqualifies from probation
an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the
petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to
remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child
in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the
child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer
legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a
child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international
agreements.

A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act
No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized,
subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for
the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the
letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the
petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements[13] supports the course of action taken herein. The
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines),[14] the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
(Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty[15] are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided
it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve
his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child's
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the
order to remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of
Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or
other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE VS. REY MONTICALVO (G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013)

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457
dated 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the Decision[2] of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Catarman, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-3460 dated 18 October 2005
finding herein appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape of a demented person committed against AAA,[3] thereby imposing upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in an Information[4] dated 30
April 2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening in Bgy.
XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
[H]onorable [C]ourt, the above-named [appellant], actuated by lust and with lewd design, with
force and intimidation, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with [AAA], 12 years old and is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or
has mental disability, without the consent and against the will of said victim.[5] [Emphasis
supplied].

On arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY[6] to
the crime charged.

At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of
facts.[7] The pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the private offended party; (2)
BBB, mother of AAA; (3) Analiza Pait (Analiza), neighbor and friend of AAA; (4) Dr. Jesus
Emmanuel Nochete (Dr. Nochete), Medical Officer IV, Northern Samar Provincial Hospital; and
(5) Dr. Vincent Anthony M. Belicena (Dr. Belicena), Medical Specialist II, Northern Samar
Provincial Hospital. Their testimonies established the following facts:

AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape
incident.[8] She and appellant, who was then 17 years old,[9] are neighbors - their respective
houses are adjoining each other.[10]

In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sari-sari
store of AAA’s mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the
said sari-sari store. Shortly, thereafter, appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the
back of their house. AAA acceded and went ahead.[11]

Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look for her one peso
coin, followed them until she reached a papaya tree located three and a half meters away from
the place. Analiza hid under the papaya tree and from there she saw appellant undress AAA by
removing the latter’s shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw
Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without
telling BBB what she saw.[12]

Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie
down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull movements. Afterwards,
appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home.[13]
When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother, BBB, where
she came from and why she came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their
house as appellant brought her there and had sexual intercourse with her.[14]

The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the Northern Samar
Provincial Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr. Nochete.[15] The medical examination
yielded the following:

The findings are:

= Confluent abrasion 1 x 1 inches, 2 inches below the umbilicus.

Genitalia Exam:

= Admits 1 finger with ease.

= (-) vulvar swelling, (-) erythema.
= (+) complete healed hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock, 7 o’clock & 10 o’clock position.

Gram Stain [R]esult: Negative for spermatozoa.[16]

Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those complete healed hymenal
lacerations more than a month prior to the date of the examination. He also clarified that even
though AAA has no fresh hymenal laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual
intercourse was committed on her on 9 December 2002. It is possible that AAA did not sustain
any fresh hymenal laceration because the vaginal canal has become loose. He did not also find
any trace of spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina, its presence being dependent on whether the
appellant did ejaculate or not.[17]

AAA was also examined by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar Provincial
Hospital, who found that AAA is suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation, meaning,
AAA is suffering from the specific form of below average intelligence that has a low reproduction
functioning resulting in impaired functioning. This finding was obtained through mental
examination and actual interview of AAA. Dr. Belicena, however, recommended a full battery of
psychological testing to determine AAA’s exact mental age.[18] Dr. Belicena’s finding was
reduced into writing as evidenced by a Medical Certificate[19] dated 18 May 2004.

For its part, the defense offered the testimonies of (1) Pio Campos (Pio), neighbor and friend of
appellant; (2) Cesar Monticalvo (Cesar), appellant’s father; (3) Alexander Sanico (Alexander),
Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar; and (4) appellant, who invoked the defense of
denial and alibi to exonerate himself from the crime charged.

Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002, at around 1:00
p.m., he, together with Pio and a certain Dinnes Samson, was having a drinking spree in the
house of one Adolfo Congayao (Adolfo). They finished drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was
too drunk, Pio assisted him in going home. He went to sleep and woke up only at 12:00
midnight as he needed to urinate. He went back to sleep and woke up at 6:00 a.m. of the
following day, i.e., 10 December 2002. He was surprised that AAA charged him with rape. He
was then arrested at around 3:00 p.m. of 10 December 2002. [20]

Appellant disclosed, however, that the house of Adolfo, where they had their drinking spree, is
more or less six (6) meters away from the house of AAA. In fact, he could still see the house of
AAA even when he was in the house of Adolfo. He similarly admitted that he knew very well
that AAA is suffering from mental abnormalities. He also divulged that he asked Pio to testify on
his behalf.[21]
Appellant’s testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his father, Cesar, who
also admitted that he personally knew AAA as she is their neighbor. Cesar also knew that AAA
is suffering from mental disorder.[22] Both Pio and Cesar confirmed that on 9 December 2002,
they brought appellant to his bedroom and let him sleep there because he was too
drunk. Thereafter, Pio and Cesar engaged in a drinking spree inside the latter’s house,
particularly at the kitchen that is more than two (2) meters away from appellant’s bedroom,
which lasted until 11:00 p.m. Pio and Cesar likewise stated that there was no moment that
appellant went out of his bedroom since the time they brought him there.[23]

Alexander, another defense witness, presented appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth [24] to prove
that the latter was only 17 years old during the commission of the crime, i.e., 9 December
2002.[25]

The trial court, convinced about the merits of the prosecution’s case rendered a Decision on 18
October 2005, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a
demented person and sentenced him to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and
ordered him to indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

On appeal, the following errors were assigned:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [APPELLANT] FOR THE
CRIME OF RAPE OF A DEMENTED PERSON DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE [APPELLANT’S] AGE, BEING A MINOR, AT

THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY.[26]

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the
trial court’s Decision dated 18 October 2005.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the
testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete were replete with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Firstly, while the Information stated that appellant raped AAA on or about the
9th day of December 2002 at around 7:00 p.m., Analiza testified that it was in the afternoon of
the same day when she saw and heard appellant calling AAA to go to the kiln at the back of
their house, and while she saw appellant undress AAA, she did not actually see the sexual
intercourse because the appellant saw her watching them, so she ran away. Secondly, BBB’s
testimony that on 9 December 2002, AAA confided to her that she was raped by appellant early
that night was inconsistent with the testimony of Analiza that it was in the afternoon of the same
day when she saw appellant and AAA going to the kiln, where the former undressed the
latter. Thirdly, Dr. Nochete’s testimony clearly stated that the hymenal lacerations on AAA’s
vagina could have possibly been sustained by her a month ago, which does not support AAA’s
claim of rape on 9 December 2002. Even granting that appellant, indeed, raped AAA on 9
December 2002, it is highly implausible that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina were already
completely healed when she was examined by Dr. Nochete on 10 December 2002, which was
only after less than 24-hours from the date the alleged rape was committed.

Appellant also questions the credibility of AAA as a witness given her condition as a mental
retardate. Appellant opines that AAA, could not perceive and is not capable of making known
her perception to others. As such, she can be easily coached on what to say or do.

Appellant finally avers that granting arguendo that he is guilty of the crime charged, he was only
17 years old at the time of its commission as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. This fact
was even attested to by the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar. Given his minority
at the time of the commission of the crime charged, the court should have considered the same
as privileged mitigating circumstance in imposing the penalty against him.

This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

At the outset, paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353,[27] provides for two (2) circumstances when carnal knowledge of a woman with
mental disability is considered rape. Subparagraph (b) thereof refers to rape of a person
“deprived of reason” while subparagraph (d) refers to rape of a “demented person.”[28] The term
“deprived of reason” has been construed to encompass those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.[29] The term “demented,” on the other hand, means
having dementia, which Webster defines as mental deterioration; also madness,
insanity.[30] Dementia has also been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as a “form of mental
disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; x x x
total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved.”[31] Thus, a mental retardate can
be classified as a person “deprived of reason,” not one who is “demented” and carnal
knowledge of a mental retardate is considered rape under subparagraph (b), not
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[32]

In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly used the word demented to
characterize AAA’s mental condition and mistakenly categorized the rape committed by
appellant under subparagraph (d), Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
instead of under subparagraph (b) thereof. Nonetheless, the mistake would not exonerate
appellant. Otherwise stated, his conviction or criminal liability for rape stands though not under
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but under
subparagraph (b) thereof.

Neither can it be said that appellant’s right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was
worded, as follows: “[AAA] is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or has mental
disability.” This fact, however, will not render the Information defective and will not bar this
Court from convicting appellant under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court pronounced that:

x x x In People v. Rosare,[34] the information did not allege that the victim was a mental
retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. This Court however
sustained the trial court’s judgment of conviction holding that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor which formed the basis of the information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated
that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge
against him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact that the victim
was a mental retardate was never alleged in the information and, absent this element, the acts
charged negate the commission of the offense for which he was convicted by the lower court.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu proprio take
cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated
June 2, 1992, which formed the basis of and a copy of which was attached to the information for
rape filed against herein appellant. Therein, it is clearly stated that the offended party is
suffering from mental retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the
charge against him x x x (citation omitted).[35] [Emphasis supplied].

In this case, both the Complaint[36] and the Resolution[37] of the Municipal Trial Court of Northern
Samar, which formed the basis of the Information and copies of which were attached in the
records, stated that AAA is suffering from mental abnormalities – she looked like a retardate and
her focus is not normal. Even, the Resolution[38] of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred
with the aforesaid findings. From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAA’s mental disorder or
mental disability is that of being a mentally retarded and not demented. Thus, there was
substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation.[39] More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution was able to prove that AAA is,
indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said mental condition of the victim.

To repeat, the term “deprived of reason” has been construed to encompass those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.[40] Hence, carnal knowledge of a mental retardate
is rape under subparagraph (b) not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.[41]

The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will or without her consent.[42] Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, specifically states that:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed.

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. [Emphasis supplied].

From the foregoing, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances.
Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the
aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the
facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation
of the latter.[43]

In People v. Dalandas,[44] citing People v. Dumanon,[45] this Court held that mental retardation
can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.[46]
In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental
retardate through, (1) the testimony of her mother; (2) the trial court’s observation; and (3) the
mental examination and actual interview of AAA conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, who found AAA to be suffering from moderate to severe
mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the “specific form of below average
intelligence which has a low reproduction functioning which result to impairment
functioning.”[47] It is also worthy to note that the defense did not dispute, even admitted the fact
that AAA is suffering from mental retardation. The findings of the lower courts about AAA’s
mental condition must be upheld.

The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress between appellant and
AAA. Despite the latter’s mental condition, she narrated before the court in the best way she
could her ordeal in the hands of appellant. As stated by the appellate court, AAA conveyed her
ideas by words and demonstrations.[48] AAA recounted how the appellant sexually abused her
on 9 December 2002 by inviting her to go to the kiln at the back of their house. Thereupon,
appellant suddenly undressed her by removing her shorts and panty. This fact was attested to
by Analiza, one of the prosecution witnesses, who actually witnessed appellant undressing AAA
by removing the latter’s shorts and panty. AAA further testified that after undressing her,
appellant made her lie down, placed himself on top of her and made push and pull
movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped, made her sit down and sent her home.[49] This
testimony of AAA was correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court as coherent and
given in a detailed manner.[50]

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient
rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can
communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the
complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as
feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape
if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it has been
jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies
the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused.[51]

Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA’s testimony, she positively identified the
appellant as the person who raped her.[52] Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what
transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed
the case for the prosecution.[53]

The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete as
regards the exact date and time the alleged rape incident happened, as well as the absence of
fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, pointed to by appellant cannot work in his favor.

Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential matters that do not alter
the essential fact of the commission of rape.[54] A witness is not expected to remember with
perfect recollection every minute detail of her harrowing experience. A minor mistake as to the
exact time of the commission of the rape is immaterial and cannot discredit the testimony of a
witness. This Court has repeatedly held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime.[55] Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission.[56] What is decisive in a rape charge is that the
commission of the rape by the accused against the complainant has been sufficiently
proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.[57]

In the same way, the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina
do not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen, as well as the presence or absence of
spermatozoa, is not also an essential element of rape.[58] As clarified by Dr. Nochete, the
absence of fresh hymenal laceration on AAA’s vagina does not necessarily mean that she did
not engage in sexual intercourse on 9 December 2002. Possibly, AAA did not sustain any fresh
hymenal laceration as her vaginal canal had become loose. And, he did not find any trace of
spermatozoa because its presence depends on whether or not the appellant ejaculated.

Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, be disqualified from
testifying in court.[59] Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded
may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her
perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.[60] If the testimony of a
mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court.[61]

Neither can it be said that AAA was merely coached as a witness by her mother. It is highly
unthinkable that a mother would draw her daughter, a mental retardate at that, into a rape story
with all its attendant scandal and humiliation if the rape did not really happen. No mother in her
right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows the despicable
crime of rape.[62] Moreover, appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA and her
mother to falsely testify against him.

In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive identification of
appellant as her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her part to falsely testify against
appellant, the latter’s defense of denial and alibi must necessarily fail.

Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the
courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light
of positive identification of the accused, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes
significance only when the prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. [63]

Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot prevail over
witnesses’ positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for
the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at
another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical
impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti,[64] which the appellant in this case failed to do.

As aptly observed by the trial court:

The houses of the offended party and the [appellant] are only divided by a fence and the place
of the incident is only at the back of the house of the [appellant]. The defense of alibi must
fail. In addition to the positive identification made by [AAA] and the place of the incident is
adjacent to the houses of the victim and the [appellant], being neighbors, the fact that the
[appellant] alleged that he was having drinking spree at that time and that he was dead drunk at
around 6:00 p.m. of that date, there is no impossibility for the [appellant] to be physically present
at the scene of the incident, because of its proximity.

Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias particularly in cases where the
witnesses are closely associated to the [appellant] as to be interested in the [appellant’s]
acquittal. In this case, the [appellant’s] witnesses are his alleged drinking buddy and his
father. Considering that they are bound by friendship and affiliation, it is conceivable that they
would be inclined to make excuses for him [appellant] from culpability.[65]

All told, appellant’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, thus, his
conviction stands.
As to penalty. Under Article 266-B[66] in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is
committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is
increased to death. But this circumstance must be alleged in the information being a qualifying
circumstance which increases the penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from
simple to qualified rape.[67] In the case at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he
knew AAA to be suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this fact in
the information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. Thus, appellant’s conviction is only for simple rape for which he should be meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the modification of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower courts upon the appellant.

This Court finds merit in appellant’s assertion that he was a minor during the commission of the
crime charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court, the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon,
Northern Samar, brought before it their office records, particularly appellant’s Certificate of Live
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he
was born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the commission of the crime charged on
9 December 2002, appellant was only 17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended,[68] which specifically states that:

ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the
paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

xxxx

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.[69] [Emphasis supplied].

Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is
reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed
by law for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable.[70]

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower
in degree to reclusion temporal), that is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (there being no other
modifying circumstances attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months.[71] With that, the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be
imposed upon the appellant. However, the case of appellant does not, as it normally should,
end at this point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the “Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,” took effect. Section 68 thereof specifically provides for its
retroactive application, thus:[72]

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided
under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately
released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law. [Emphasis supplied].

Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though the crime was committed
four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity. Parenthetically, with more reason should
Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this case as the 2005 conviction by the lower courts was still
under review when the law took effect in 2006.[73]

Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the
judgment of conviction is pronounced.[74] It reads, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. [Emphasis supplied].

However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can
still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:[75]

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. [Emphasis supplied].

At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court was
promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of
Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already moot and academic.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was
still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she is given the chance
to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still
of tender age.[76] The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children
as follows:[77]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v. Sarcia,[78] the case shall be remanded to the court
of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.[79]

As to damages. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by
the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. [80] This
Court affirms both the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded
by the lower courts in favor of AAA. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Case law also
requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from
the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity.[81]

In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages are
awarded to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, this
Court likewise affirms the lower courts award of exemplary damages but increased the same
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.[82]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) appellant is found guilty
of rape under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and not under subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance
appreciated in favor of appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion
temporal and being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the
indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the appellant; and (3) the amount of
exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the amount of P50,000.00
are maintained. This case, however, shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.