ARTICLE 89.

MODES OF EXTINGUISHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE V AMISTOSO (G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y

BROCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his
daughter, AAA,[1] alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The Information[2]
specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision[3] finding Amistoso guilty, not
of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article
266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the
RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape,
he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy[-
]Five Thousand Pesos (PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs.[4]
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[5] dated August 25, 2011, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012,
affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346[6] and the latest jurisprudence on awards of
damages. The appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated March 23, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION.

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

without eligibility for parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, he is
ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[7]
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision[8] dated January
9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso,
expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is
DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further ORDERED to pay
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision.[9]
However, in a letter[10] dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-
Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the
Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
Muntinlupa City. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death Report[11] signed by
Marylou V. Arbatin, MD, Medical Officer III, NBP, stating that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at
about 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of Cardio Respiratory Arrest. Roque’s letter was
received by the Court on February 12, 2013.

Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), Officer-in-Charge,

Maximum Security Compound, NBP, wrote another letter[12] dated February 12, 2013, likewise
informing the Court of Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012. PIS Lansangan appended to
his letter a mere photocopy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate.[13] The Court received PIS
Lansangan’s letter on February 18, 2013.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso and
which was apparently also unaware of its client’s demise, still filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[14] of the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013.

In a Resolution[15] dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified true
copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate within 10 days from notice and deferred action on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Court’s former
directive.

In a letter[16] dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan
finally provided the Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate.[17]

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas,[18] the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. (Citations
omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case.[19]

Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court
of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not
immediately informed of his death.

Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013,
even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision
has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NOTE PIS Lansangan’s letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the Court with a certified true
copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate;

(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. 10106
before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason of Amistoso’s death on December 11,
2012; and

(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision dated
January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the Court’s actions in the preceding paragraphs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V RONIE DE GUZMAN (G.R. No. 185843, March 03, 2010)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RONIE DE GUZMAN, APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and reconsideration of our
Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant Ronie de Guzman.

Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of
rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty
as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court
further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision dated March 27, 2008, appellant's
conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an
aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages.
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal.

In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for failure of appellant to
sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision as would warrant the exercise of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision of the CA was affirmed
in toto.

In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted marriage on
August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered
Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage [1]
and a joint sworn statement ("Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay")[2] executed by appellant
and private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage between them.
Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be
released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In its Comment/Manifestation,[4] appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed
no objection to the motion, finding the marriage to have been contracted in good faith, and the
motion to be legally in order.

The motion should be granted.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads -

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

xxxx

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Article 344 of the same Code also provides -

ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. - x x x.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him. x x x.

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the

offender and the offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of
chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may
have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony. Parenthetically, we would like to
mention here that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar circumstances was
decided by this Court in 1974, or around 36 years ago.

Based on the documents, including copies of pictures[7] taken after the ceremony and attached
to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant to have been
contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other
and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect
for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we must
accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the
RPC.

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman is ABSOLVED of the two
(2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent
marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of Corrections for appropriate action. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 90. PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES

ISABELITA REODICA V CA (G.R. No. 125066, July 08, 1998)

ISABELITA REODICA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña
Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscal’s Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
(docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with “Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury.” The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused,
Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing
plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and
operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid
damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919
driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the
damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily
injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision[3] convicting petitioner
of the “quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries,” and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant,
Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542),
Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. [4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical
injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is
not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988,
p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio’s
book, p. 718).[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and
medical expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti
Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant’s Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this
motion and directed petitioner to file her brief.[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND
MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES,
AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]
... ... ...
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION
OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the
following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE
SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY
SOURCE.
A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME
CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING
OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
 THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN
THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND
NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE
THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A
SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but
likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but
People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor
– not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have
pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property,
instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, “do not … rate a
single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months,” citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12]
thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in
filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones
menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA
363, 365).

... ... ...

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different
from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses
of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave
felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information.

She then suggests that “at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and
not six months as imposed by the lower courts.”
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it
prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or
almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already
prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light
offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok’s criminal liability therefor was already extinguished
(Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of
Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok’s motion to
quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial
Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight
physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure;
therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of
limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period,
instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial
court to “complex” reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property
because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results
thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had
jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly
took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the
OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioner’s defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the
prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days
after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the
OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG’s
reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
“complexing” of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property;
besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v.
Gorgonio,[20] two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v.
Garcia[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to “complex” damage to
property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise “inapposite,” for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect;
otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in
Zaldivia[24] favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light
felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies
to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor
imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However,
we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
is the proper penalty.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in
the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a
duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may
be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the
proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this
being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the
reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the
first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence
which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been
malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is
higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329
were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of
Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2
months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at
the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition
of the penalties therein provided “the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard
to the rules prescribed in article 64.”

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault
(culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as
infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both.
Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony – not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the
Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared
that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is
no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony.
Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a
single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one
information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil.
1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a
separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363,
365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less
grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e.,
charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect
was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information.[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on
him the penalty for each of them.[29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it
is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.” Section 32(2)[31] thereof
provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over “all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.”

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the
imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question
thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which
court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the
contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place
offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months
were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those
penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale
in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall
within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the
same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable
penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which
was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave
felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five
years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to
determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the incident
in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period “shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information,” does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for
preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. [33] Thus, in Francisco
v. Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint
even with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in
the instant case, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly
with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation;
provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only
by information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. [37] Hence, in case of conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal
Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein
was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled “An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.” Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is
suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly,
this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what
could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper
court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the
quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case.
We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the
information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision
was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 91. COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES

CABRAL V PUNO (G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976)

EUGENIO CABRAL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BULACAN, AND SILVINO
SAN DIEGO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ANTONIO, J.:
Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving
the Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag
Branch, and to prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an
Information on September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral
of the crime of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the
signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment,
petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charged, as
the said document of sale of lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original
certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and since then
Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and exercised acts of
ownership thereon, which facts are apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to
Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a
Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information
on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding
that the factual averments contained in the motion to quash were supported by the evidence.
Private prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a
motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by
petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having
filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the
same factual averments contained in the criminal Information. Acting on the motion for
reconsideration, respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno, now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975
the Fiscal to "make known his position to the Court." In compliance with said Order, the Fiscal
submitted his comment dated May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego, stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October
1970, and "* * * that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the
respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning and import in determining once and for
all the direction and thrust of these evidence of both parties."

Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March
25, 1975, and reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order on
the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by
instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to intervene in the
prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second motion for
reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the issue of whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discussed in the
pleadings,[1] this case was deemed submitted for decision without need of memoranda.

The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, and he recommends giving due
course to the petition and the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor
General, the Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of
the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become final and
executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom
within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on March
31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2)
months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long been final.

We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a
motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.[2] Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal' liability." Petitioner was charged with the
crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code,
which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes in ten (10) years. [3] Here, San
Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

In Pangan v. Pasicolan,[4] where the trial court set aside its own order dismissing the criminal
case nine (9) months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null and void for want of
jurisdiction, as the first order had already become final and executory.

"Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga setting
aside its order of September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against petitioners nine months
thereafter, or on June 11, 1957. The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter
that order. While the court may find it necessary to hear the views of a private prosecutor before
acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow that it can set aside its order
dismissing the case even if the same has already become final. There is no law which requires
notice to a private prosecutor, because under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted 'under
the direction and control of the fiscal' (Section 4, Rule 106). It appearing that the order in
question was already final, the court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the subsequent order."

And likewise, in People v. Sanchez,[5] it was held that "a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, * * *. Under the circumstances, the
sentence having become final, no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if
erroneous * * *". We hold that these rulings are applicable to the case at bar.

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop
the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the
motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private
prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. [6]

"The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized under the old Code of Criminal
Procedure. Under Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall be 'under the
direction and control of the fiscal' without the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order
No. 58 subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right 'of the person injured to appeal
from any decision of the court denying him a legal right', said right to appeal by an offended
party from an order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the offended party. * * * (U)nder the
new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the direction and control of the prosecution, without being
subject to the right of intervention on the part of the offended party. To permit an offended party
to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal would be
tantamount to giving said party as much right to the direction and control of a criminal
proceeding as that of the fiscal."[7]

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the
criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara,
on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948
was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with
the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same
property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of
dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged
document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party has no
right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case, and consequently cannot ask for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.[8]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975
and September 3, 1975, of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to
costs.

PEOPLE V REYES (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MIZPAH R. REYES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art.
172, Revised Penal Code (RPC).] Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime
prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC).] The ten (10) year prescriptive period
commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents . . .” [Art. 91, RPC.] In the instant case, the public document allegedly
falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered on May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in
the name of the accused, private respondent herein, Mizpah R. Reyes. The two informations for
falsification of a public document subject matter of the controversy were, however, filed only on
October 18, 1984. The complainants claim that they discovered the falsified notarized deed of
sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked with determining whether the crime has prescribed
which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from the time
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City
registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, the husband having
died on September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the
following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat,
Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.

In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds
of Lipa City that the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of
"Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under
TCT No. T-9885. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a
notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and
Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on
May 26, 1961. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signature of their parents
were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single
although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was referred
by the complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.) for examination of the
signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio
Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the
accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations both for falsification
of public document, the first in Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it appear in the
notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the accused, participated in the sale
of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second in Criminal Case No. V-1164,
for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by
stating that accused was single.
Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that: (1)
"The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime in the light of
Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606"; and (2) "The trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged and the person of accused because of non-compliance with the pre-conciliation
requirement of P.D. No. 1508." [Rollo, p. 33.]

The trial court granted the motion and quashed the informations in the two (2) cases stating that:

* * *
x x x The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of registration.
The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice to the whole world of the legal status
and the dealing therewith.
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and therefore,
the prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the date the same was
annotated in the Register of Deeds.
In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten (10) years should have started from
May 26, 1960 (sic). Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two
informations were filed, the crimes for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos. V-1163 and V-1164 are quashed.
[Rollo, pp. 33-34.]

From the trial court's order quashing the two (2) informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals (then designated as the Intermediate Appellate Court). In a
decision* promulgated on April 3, 1986, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order.
The Court of Appeals rejected the theory of petitioner that the prescriptive period should
commence on June 1983, when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent deed of
sale. The appellate court sustained the trial court's ruling that the prescriptive period started on
May 26, 1961, when the deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, filed by the
People, through the Solicitor General.

Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of Appeals in dismissing petitioner’s appeal is
the case of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606, where the
Supreme Court made a statement to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public
document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had constructive
notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds.
However, petitioner contends that this particular statement is not doctrine but merely an obiter
dictum.

The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September 24, 1974 of an information accusing
Eugenio Cabral of the crime of falsification of public document for allegedly falsifying on August
14, 1948 the signature of the complainant Silvino San Andres in a deed of sale of a parcel of
land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground of
prescription of the crime, as the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds on August 26, 1948. After hearing the motion, the judge issued a resolution granting the
motion to quash and dismissing the information on the ground of prescription. Private
prosecutor filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Acting on said motion, the
trial court ordered the fiscal to make known his position. The fiscal filed a comment stating that
the crime has not prescribed as the complainant San Diego claimed that he only discovered the
crime in October 1970. Thereafter, the trial court set aside its resolution granting the accused's
motion to quash and reinstated the information. The accused brought the case to the Supreme
Court questioning the trial court's authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to
quash. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused by holding that the aforementioned
resolution has already become final and executory for failure of the fiscal to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. The motion for reconsideration filed by the
private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter's lack of legal standing. Another
reason given by the Court for its decision is the following:

. . . The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2 (f) and 8, Rule 117,
Revised Rules of Court.] Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged
with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Article
90, Revised Penal Code.] Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
* * *
[Cabral v. Puno, supra, at p. 609.]

Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely in issue in Cabral, it is apparent that the
statement of the Court on prescription and constructive notice was not totally irrelevant to the
disposition of the case. Moreover, it is not without any legal basis.

The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world.
The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915): Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and
49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380: Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v.
Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30, 1988, 161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree
No. 1529 (1978).]

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of registered land is presumed to be
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining the nature of the
rule on constructive notice and the presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan v. Gaffud,
G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, that:

* * *
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or
good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
conclusion and useless litigation.
* * *

It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was
executed by some of his heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of
Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between
them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The heirs who were not included in
the deed of partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered
with the Register of Deeds [De la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72
SCRA 514.] Likewise, the rule on constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a
provision in the Civil Code on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is
parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:

Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
* * *
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Underscoring supplied.]

In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 1253, where a
notarial document recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the Court,
interpreting the phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision of the
Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place
from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that
registration is a notice to the whole world. . .” [See also Avecilla v. Yatco, 103 Phil. 666 (1958):
Gerona v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153: Carantes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360, April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA 514: Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No. L-
48430, December 3, 1985, 140 SCRA 311: Cimafranco v. IAC. G.R. No. L-68687, January 31,
1987, 147 SCRA 611: Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.]
However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "the
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." cannot be construed in the same manner
because the rule on constructive notice is limited in application to land registration cases. It is
argued that haste should be avoided in applying civil law presumptions to criminal suits.

Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of construction in civil cases in the
interpretation of criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant. Hence, in Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court applied
the presumption arising from the allowance of will to bar a criminal action. In that particular
case, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The will was
duly probated. Sixteen (16) months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner
for falsification or forgery of the will. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case claiming that
the order probation the will is conclusive as to its authenticity and due execution. The motion
having been denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
which ruled that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to
the due execution and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned,
but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime." But the Supreme Court reversed the CA
decision by ruling that, in accordance with Sec. 625 of the then Code of Civil Procedure which
provides that "the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive
as to its due execution,"** a criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a
will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on constructive notice applies only in civil cases.
It is argued that the law on prescription of crimes is founded on a principle different from that of
the law on prescription in civil actions. The difference it is claimed, precludes the application of
the rule on constructive notice in criminal actions.

The statute of limitations of civil actions was explained in Penales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73611, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 223, 228 in the following manner:

Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent

and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or death or removal
of witness . . .

On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 389, 405-406 (1923) discussed the
nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases as follows:

* * *
. . . The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence: that the
offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and
that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his
guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of
the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty
and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to
it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it
must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to
the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural
lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt,
and that statutes enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not
merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from
its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained.
* * *

It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that the law on prescription of civil suits is
founded on different policy considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal
actions. However, the Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and
rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on
constructive notice, can not be applied in criminal actions.

The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and
equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding
circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may
be presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where
a particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be
left on a precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party.
After a certain period of time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be accorded respect
by prohibiting adverse claims the factual basis of which can no longer be verified with certainty.
Hence, the law on prescription of civil suits is properly called a statute of repose.

The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a
major consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a
more fundamental principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby
the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute
the criminal act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an
impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of
amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at
p. 405.] Hence, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most
favorable to the accused is to be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parcel, 44 Phil.
437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956).] The application of the rule on constructive
notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be
favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal
informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or
more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has
prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SERMONIA V CA (G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994)

JOSE C. SERMONIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION,

HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, BR. 151, AND JOSEPH SINSAY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. [1] Bigamy
carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty,
this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years.[2] The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x x"[3]

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.[4] At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the
rule on constructive notice.

The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting.[5]

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was
dismissed for lack of merit.[6]

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,[7] such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to
have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in
1992.

Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as
declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady
of Nativity Church in Marikina on 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the
moment of registration the marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from
the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July
1991.

While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, [8] we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding
the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
-

Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied in the case
at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597);
and People v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard
to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting
marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is
not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract
another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest
therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is located.
Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the
said property can easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage,
verification by the offended person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult
as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was
applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary
to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them
that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known
to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the
prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation
urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and
protected by law.[9]

To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary
inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various
local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage
has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a
task to even contemplate.

More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of
such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act
to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the
conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents
registered in the Civil Register.

Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the
marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man?
Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no
priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would
subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law.[10] Obviously, petitioner had no intention of
revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any
third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the
simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set
into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.

Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage
with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the
stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary
concern of our society.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals,
the same is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE V MANEJA (G.R. No. 47684, June 10, 1941)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DIONISIO A.

MANEJA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

DECISION

MORAN, J.:

The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the offense of
false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90,
Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja,
adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the
lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic
case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends.

We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false
testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal
Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in
the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense
until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People vs.
Marcos et al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable
offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents.

If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is
given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case,
depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness
testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty,
the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised
Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the
other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto
mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon
these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted before final judgment in the basic case, it
would be impossible to determine the period of prescription—whether twenty years or five
years—as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in the main case.

The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the
same, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no
moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180. of the
Revised Penal Code—and the instant case falls on one of them—uniformly presuppose a final
judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the
crime of false testimony.

Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, without costs.

ACT NO. 3326, AS AMENDED (An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run)
 ZALDIVIA V REYES, JR. (G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992)

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.[1] The referral-complaint of the police
was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. [2] The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990.[3]

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but
the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained
by the respondent judge.[4]

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against
her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or
both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
Section 9. How commenced. – The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint
shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period
from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have
been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing
of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the
fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be
filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that
the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals:[5]

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try
the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before
the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand,
Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on
October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the
last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that
words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to
discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule
and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section
32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." [6]
Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date
the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure
and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.[7]

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would
have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral
defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is
for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, [8] and is
thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until its too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules
but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced
from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,
1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

PCGG V DESIERTO (G.R. NO. 140231, July 09, 2007)

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), REPRESENTED BY

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN-MANILA, CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR., LORETO
SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA, JOHN DOES, AND NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR
INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Presidential Commission on Good Government[1] (petitioner) filed the herein Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[2] dated May 21, 1999 of
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019[3] against
concerned members of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern
Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo,
Jose Barquillo, Jr., Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the
Order[4] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was
tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever
appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans,
whether behest or non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it
is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect
endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders,
officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of
loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility
of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the
loan release was made."

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the
Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of
NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's
investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of
Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral
or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the
collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal
note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public
land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-
up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6%
of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that
respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the Ombudsman,
prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based
on the available evidence.

In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended

the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause
against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the
Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]

Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its petition alleges that:
A)The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of Prescription
considering that:

1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN

WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15, OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;

2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF

THE BENEFICIARY;

3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE

STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT.
HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT

IS DEEMED WAIVED;

5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE

WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT MOTU
PROPRIO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE "DISCOVERY

RULE" SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;

7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF

BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.[8]

B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by the private respondents of
section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and unrebutted
evidence.[9]
In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of prescription, in view of
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),[10] contends
that its finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents
deserves great weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.

No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.

The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that: (a) the offense leveled against respondents has prescribed; and (b) no probable
cause exists against respondents.

The petition is partly meritorious.

Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject

complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged
with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195,[11] increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.

The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, [12]
as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] where the Court held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations
of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents
in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.

The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase "if the same not be known" in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 does not mean "lack of knowledge" but that the crime "is not reasonably knowable" is
unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which
is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but
only application.[14]
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act
No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.[16]
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,[17] or within three (3) years from the time of
discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no
probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is
empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[18] Settled is the rule that the Supreme
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. [19] Said exercise
of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate[20] and the courts will not interfere in its
exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.[21]

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases,
such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied, [22] none apply here.

After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.

No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[23]
The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[24]

The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint, as approved by

Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as behest.

Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually
foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct loans released by PNB
but merely credit accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland Bank.

Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be
noted that under PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions
imposed to NOCOSII was the execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and
molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a
year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto,
the stockholders of NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their present and future
shares to PNB while the accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant site which was
offered as collateral was estimated to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals offered
by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.

Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the required
clearances were submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the Office of the
President; and having complied with all the documentary requirements, NOCOSII became
entitled to the release of the loan.
Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its paid up capital was
only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to consider the other assets of NOCOSII
which also form part of its capital. x x x [25]
The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne
out by the evidence presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no direct loans released by PNB
but merely credit accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd.
of London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under government control since 1975 when
PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a
comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981
in the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: (1) the Assignment of
Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII
officers pledged their shares of stock, representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock,
and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of
Assignment dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of sugar and
molasses from the operation of its sugar central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North
Cotabato in favor of PNB;[27] (3) the Joint and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975
whereby the NOCOSII officers bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the corporation
for the payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;[28] (4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated
October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various buildings, machineries and equipments,
otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar Mill Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00
in favor of PNB;[29] and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated October 2, 1981
whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural and heavy equipment in favor
of the PNB;[30] fourthly, PNB imposed other conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII
of the Central Bank's approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of the
required clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and/or
Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3) submission by NOCOSII of its
milling contracts covering a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by
NOCOSII of the government permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5)
further increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year
starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all
cash proceeds of NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the bank's
control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of
Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to control all disbursements and
receipts of funds of NOCOSII.

PANAGUITON, JR. V DOJ (G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008)

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C.

TONGSON AND RODRIGO G. CAWILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004
and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.[2]

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay
the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995,
but to no avail.[3]

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson [4] for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)[5] before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.[6] Tongson
claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent
various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of
Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said
checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.[7] He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.[8]

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,[10] after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, [12] which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year
period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March
1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years
had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.[13] Moreover, ACP
Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI
could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.[14] Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.[15]

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, [17]
the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file
three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. [19] On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information[20] charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal
Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. [23] The DOJ also cited
the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings
referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the
prosecutor's office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The
Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition
is a mere photocopy.[26] Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that
subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a
reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently
without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance with Act No. 3326.

Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.[30]

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of
cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being
neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.[31]

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct--the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served,[32] as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently
complied with the verification requirement.

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground
that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003
resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals
shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,[33] a certified true
copy of which was attached as Annex "A."[34] Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a
grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.[37] He
argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in
grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. [38]

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," [39] and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.[41] Act No. 3226
was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing
rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the
criminal proceedings against the accused.[44] These cases were followed by our declaration in
People v. Parao and Parao[45] that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.[46] Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,[47] we held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, [48]
and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In
the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al.,[51] the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted
by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,[52]
another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears
before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.[54]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on
the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from
the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9)
years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks
because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS V HON. LIDUA (G.R. No. 169588, October 07, 2013)

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER AND

AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE NORMA TAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE NELSON
F. LIDUA SR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 3,
BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES” AND “PETER
DOES” RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935
be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It
is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile
by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.[1]

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La
Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan
and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto
Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the
car was then illegally parked and [left] unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value
of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is
?26,250.00. The fines of ?500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ?500.00 were
also not paid by the respondents herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay
and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini
Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John
Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933,
belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell
personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its
owner, Jadewell[,] its use and value which is ?26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of
?500.00 and the declamping fee of ?500.00 were not paid by the respondents. [2]

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other.
Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996
and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia,
Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent
Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City on May 23, 2003.[3] A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent
Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4)
of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.

In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-
respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He
admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the
placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he
removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his
family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he
intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. [4]

In the Resolution[5] of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union,
Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation
of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents,
Prosecutor Banez stated that:

We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of
Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are
absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.

xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel
clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the
prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which
prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents,
except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by
virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of
Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding
informations against them in Court.[6]

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity
of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and
took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered
immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance
No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System
Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth ?26,250.00 and other consequential
damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.[7]

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through
their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8]
on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition
of charges on respondents with more than one offense.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.

3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides:

“Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two
months.”

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7,
2003.

5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this
Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the
offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.[9]

In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February
10, 2004 Order[11] to argue among other points that:

6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of
prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it
may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the
private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the
prescribed period.[12]
Respondents filed their Opposition[13] on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply[14] on April
1, 2004.

The respondent judge released a Resolution[15] dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order
granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground
[sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds
of prescription.

These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of
City Ordinances.

Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia
vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or “AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF
PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN” (Ibid).

Petitioner then filed a Petition[16] for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying
that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted
by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

x x x “[c]riminal actions shall be instituted x x x [i]n x x x other chartered cities, the complaint
shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter” and the
last paragraph thereof states that “[t]he institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the
running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws.”[17]

Petitioner contended further that:

[the] filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the
filing of the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in
determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.

xxxx

The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that
the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be
commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner
to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section
11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases “shall be commenced only by
information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed
Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is [a] violation of
municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court as
required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, “shall
be commenced only by information.”[18]

Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses
charged have not prescribed.

In their Comment,[19] respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse
his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes[21] held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held
that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial
proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the
crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through
Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court
held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an
Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the
respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, “John Does,” and “Peter Does.”

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by
Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city
ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive
period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the
prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that,
in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,[22] respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in
dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for
dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no
offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to
assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed
Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago[23] which held
that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the
crime itself.

In the Reply,[24] petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The
Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the
cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2
of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure[25] and Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari,
“persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition”[26] before the court.

The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period,
Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the
violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other
prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue
that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,[27] this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[28] (Citation
omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the
offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila
and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:

SEC. 451.Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided,
however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and
corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or
component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are
chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,[29] this Court recognized
the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the
charter of Baguio City.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls
the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent
judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured
similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May
11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule
and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of “offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,” the obvious reference is to Section
32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, “the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation.” Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended “when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party.” The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are “judicial proceedings,” contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure
and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to “diminish, increase or modify substantive rights” under Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. [30]

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription
period. The recent People v. Pangilinan[31] categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld
this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws
but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the
petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period
was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the
Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial
Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the
subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file
the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months
from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the
period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he
ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice –
National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I,
Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be
placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.

The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –

a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and

d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:

SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it
states that the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was
committed is an essential element of the crime [,] e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the
provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a “polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged [,] e.g., the domicile in the offense of
"violation of domicile."

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or wit[h] the
Office of the Ombudsman; or

b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed cannot try the case on its merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of
prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the
time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint
or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).

Presidential Decree No. 1275[32] reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and
established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were
assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides
that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union
includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the
cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file
the Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is
applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the
Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects
of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules
but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. [33]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 93. COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO V TORRECAMPO ET.AL. (G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002)

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO, PRESIDING

JUDGE, RTC OF CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH 33 AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution dated June 14, 1999 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.

Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) [2] of the 1978
Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Camarines
Sur. The Information alleged:

That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay Ombao,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted himself in
a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting
the room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting
center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.[3]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978
Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and executory. Thus, the
execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.

On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was submitted by
petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.

During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge
to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was
never apprehended. He remained at large.

Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to quash the
warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.
However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders
of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant of arrest and motion for
reconsideration.

On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed before us.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty imposed
upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the
said provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase “by escaping during the
term of the sentence” thereto, so petitioner claims.

Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari.

The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.

In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:

“Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

‘When and how penalties prescribe – The penalties imposed by the final sentence prescribed as
follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of
arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.’

“And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:

‘Computation of the prescription of penalties – The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it
shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which his Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.’

“The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum to three
(3) years of imprisonment as maximum.

“The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election Code. This
law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the
provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory
character when it provides that:

‘Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.’

“The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in relation to
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10)
years.

“The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment would have
been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for such proceeding. And
he has never been apprehended.

“The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24, 1996.

“The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed.

“The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:

‘1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.

2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.

3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or
gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed another crime.

4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of
the service of the sentence by the convict.’

(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)

“From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because
the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element, to wit – ‘That the
convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence.’ As a
matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.

The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in
Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from
our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, “escape” in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of
the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable
laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because
petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

BENJAMIN PANGAN V HON. GATBALITE (G.R. NO. 141718, January 21, 2005)

BENJAMIN PANGAN Y RIVERA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, AS

THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANGELES CITY, BRANCH 56,
AND COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, AS THE CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ANGELES CITY,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56,
rendered on January 31, 2000.[1]

The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in
Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3.

During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for
decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioner’s constant absence at hearings.

On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of
origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was
returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a
consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin
issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an
order of arrest against the petitioner.[2]

Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and
detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as
respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his
arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and

(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal
Code.[4]
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an
Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein respondent Col. James D.
Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.[5]

In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s detention was pursuant to the order of
commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of the Municipal Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.[6]

On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this
present appeal, which pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him
in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for
under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code:
“The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.

The elements of prescription are:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;

2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence;

3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or
gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime;

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the
service of the sentence by the convict.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence
is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison
and that during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim.
Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for
the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at
large.

“There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.”
(Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance with the Order of
Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for –
“A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and sentencing the defendant
in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention, unless it appears that
the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it.” (U.S. vs.
Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94, Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).

WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles City, January 31, 2000.[7]

From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on a question
purely of law and raised the following issue:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE “SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE
CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE” IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
BE CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?[8]
Petitioner claims that:
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict
successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.[9]
Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs.
Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully submits, not good case
law. It imposes upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the
spirit, nature or essence of prescription of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and
opens the law to abuse by government.

THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A

CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.

It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve
at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then escapes
before the computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner respectfully
submits is not a condition stated in Article 93, which states that, the prescription of penalties
“shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence.”

There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of sentence sets in when
the judgment of conviction becomes final.

The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase “should evade the service of
sentence.” When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The Infante ruling
construes this to mean that the convict must escape from jail “because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.”

Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of the law, then the
phrase “should evade the service of sentence” in Article 93 would have read: “should escape
during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.” The legislature could
have very easily written Article 93 to read this way –
“The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty, and
it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.”

But they did not.

The legislature wrote “should evade the service of sentence” to cover or include convicts like
him who, although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or apprehended by
government for the service of their sentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal,
petitioner was able to successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at
least nine (9) years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years
and 5 months longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.

That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at the Municipal
Trial Court and the promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no
moment. His bond for provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was
surely issued against petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of
conviction was promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioner’s arrest was issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III.

The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence
began on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also
began to run on that day considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never
gave himself up [n]or was [he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his
sentence nor did he flee to some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition
treaty, that 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 when
his judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.

For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9)
years, to arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence [which] should not be
taken against petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period
longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total
extinction of his criminal liability.

To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to run in
favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service of his sentence
imposes a condition not written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the criminal
statutes are construed liberally in favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit
behind or essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.[10]
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden[11]. In said case,
Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and
eleven days, he was granted a conditional pardon. The condition was that “he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Ten years after his release on conditional
pardon, Infante was found guilty by a Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante was
immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the condition of his pardon. One of the issues
raised by Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail – one
year and 11 days – had prescribed. xxx [12]
The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of
prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an
essential element of prescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there
had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the
unserved sentence, and computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for
the prisoner's rearrest.[13]
A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with the present
case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-arrested. Hence, he
had started serving sentence but the State released him. In the present case, the convict
evaded service of sentence from the start, and was arrested eight years later.

The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable decisions of this
Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code[14] has
been interpreted several times by the Court.

The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In that
case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the execution of her
sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never
arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of
arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted
for a light offense and since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already
prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties — the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence". What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the
express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while
serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which
provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks,
false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts
or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression
of the term "jail breaking."

xxx

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by
final judgment — was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does
not run in her favor.[16]
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo,
was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found
Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on
October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest
and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner
filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him
had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del Castillo, on a petition for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial court. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del
Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo and after quoting
the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in
Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from
our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of
the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable
laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because
petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor. [18]
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription of
penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted
by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period
for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty
before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by
escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of
arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense
or charge.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is
AFFIRMED, but petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having fully served his
sentence unless he is detained for another offense or charge.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 95. OBLIGATION INCURRED BY PERSON GRANTED CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES VS GONZALES (152 SCRA 272)

Wilfredo Torres was convicted of a crime in 1979 and sentenced to serve a prison term of 11
years, 10 mos and 22 days to 38 years, 9 mos and 1 day. He was given a conditional pardon on
April 18 1979 on the condition that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines.

On May 21 1986, the Board of Pardons and parole resolve the recommend the cancellation of
the pardon, having found out that Torres has been charged with 20 counts of estafa at the
Quezon City Trial Court, convicted of sedition by the QC Trial Court on June 26 1985 and had
been accused of other crimes such as swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal
possession of firearms, etc. He was arrested and recommitted on October 10 1986, and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Issue: Whether or not a conviction is necessary to revoke a conditional pardon

Ratio: Torres argued that he has not violated the conditional pardon given him because he has
not been convicted by final judgment. At the same time, he said he was denied his right to due
process as he was not given the opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison.

Citing Tesoro, the Court however said that the since the pardon was extended by the Executive,
the determination of whether or not it has been breached is up to the Executive, not to the
Courts.

This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a convict “who had already been seized in
a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him -, been
convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor,” he was not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole
by committing a subsequent offense.
The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it
upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain
contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency
has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had
expressly contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had
violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison
should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the
following propositions:
 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,

and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive
act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in
order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

The Court however noted that Torres must still be convicted by final judgment of the crimes with
which he was charged before the criminal penalty can be imposed upon him.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.”
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Judgment: Petition dismissed. The decision to take back the pardon is valid.

** Sec 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code: To grant to convicted persons reprieves or
pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentences without
pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to
such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon,
parole, or suspension of sentence.

ART. 159, RPC. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the
convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.

TESORO V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (G.R. No. 46437, May 23, 1939)

EUFEMIO P. TESORO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,

RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

DECISION

MORAN, J.:
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine
of one hundred pesos (P100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This
penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General
Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following
conditions:
"1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first obtaining
the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;

"2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner;

"3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every three
months.

"Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full
force and effect."

On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan,
Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife
of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were attached the affidavits of the
complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for nonappearance of the
complainant.

Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action
aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. On
February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the
aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On February
4, 1938, petitioner addressed a letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the
complainant's wife and included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the
latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer
assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength thereof
and the papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication to
the President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner.
And on February 19, 1938, the President issued the following order:

"To any lawful officer:

"Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
falsification of an official document, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3
years, 6 months and 21 days' imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by
His Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain conditions, one of
which provides that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner, and

"Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the latter part of
September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-law,
Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife, under the following
circumstances: Upon the death on September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose
Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to help in the keeping of the
house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with the
parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from
the house, parolee Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in
having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of taking away the woman from her
legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from his home, and he is now living with her in
adultery.

"Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P. Tesoro and to commit him to the
custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who is hereby authorized to confine said person for
the service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison."

By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director
of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of
Prisons and, upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.

Section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole,
gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:

"To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such sondition3 as he may impose; and to authorize
the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with
the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows:
"The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to
impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National
Assembly."
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so far as it
confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly
repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to specify such power in
connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. This contention is
untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions
and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power
to grant and revoke paroles. (20 R. C. L., 577; 46 C. J., 1205.) If the omission of the power of
parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect would
be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have
been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That such effect was never intended by the
Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.

Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to
investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report to the executive secretary of the board once a
month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his
consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the board. The
duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the
board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by
whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it
the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of
revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and
investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from
making use, of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure the
necessary assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of
persons released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.

Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a
crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime
and will conduct himself in an orderly manner." (Underscore, ours.) It was, therefore, the mere
commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the
petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration
of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Underscore ours,)

Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole.
He claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter
part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when
the parole was supposed to expire. Be that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the
determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of
the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The
petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power
that has granted it, lie cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may
be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after October 28,
1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order of arrest
and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that, upon the expiration of his maximum term
of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires, and, therefore, his liberty becomes
absolute subject to no conditions contained in his parole In other words, he holds the view that
the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original
sentence. We do not subscribe to this contention.

In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said:

"When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was
at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See V.
S. vs. Ignacio [1916], 33 Phil., 202, 204; U. S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is
well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his
original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider
the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the
original sentence. (20 R. C. L., p. 570; State vs. Home [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L. R.
A. [N. S.], 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], 56 Miss., 282.)"
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C. J., 1209.)

The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the duration of
the penalty he has yet to serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 provided that a convict
released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its conditions, shall serve the full sentence of
the court as though no parole has ever been granted him, the time between the parole and the
subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the
period of his subsequent confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative
Code, and section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides that
any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon re-arrest and
confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was
originally committed to prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present case, as the
petitioner was paroled not under the provision thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code. There is, thus, no statutory provision squarely governing the case with
respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In the absence of
such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the
parole that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again
be in full force and effect," it is evident that the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired
portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.