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AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949)

American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.

No. 27

Argued November 8-10, 1948

Decided January 3, 1949

335 U.S. 538

Syllabus

1. The amendment to the Arizona Constitution which provides that no person shall be denied the opportunity to
obtain or retain employment because of nonmembership in a labor organization and forbids anyone to enter into
an agreement to do so does not deny employers, labor unions or members of labor unions freedom of speech,
assembly or petition, or impair the obligation of their contracts, or deprive them of due process of law, contrary
to the Constitution of the United States. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
ante, p. 335 U. S. 525. Pp. 335 U. S. 539-540.

2. Nor does its failure to forbid like discrimination against union members deny them equal protection of the
laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment -- especially in view of the fact that certain Arizona statutes make
it a misdemeanor for any person to coerce a worker to make a contract "not to join or become a member of a
labor organization" as a condition of employment in Arizona, and make such contracts void and
unenforceable. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U. S. 1. Pp. 335 U. S. 540-542.

67 Ariz. 20, 189 P.2d 912, affirmed.

In a suit by certain labor unions, an officer of one of them, and an employer for a declaratory judgment and
equitable relief against enforcement of the "Right to Work Amendment" to the Arizona Constitution, an
Arizona trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the amendment did not violate the Constitution
of the United States. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed. 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P.2d 912. On appeal to this
Court, affirmed, p. 335 U. S. 542.

AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in
this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel
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of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned
back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be
increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of
the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law,
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in
effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner
and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions
that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

G.R. No. L-42226, July 26, 1935

o Meaning of "newspaper of general circulation"

FACTS:

Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines
Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the
only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the
proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only
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twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, they questioned
whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation
as contemplated by the law.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement

o Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

HELD:

The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to
therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words,
the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published
for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in
Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties
to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants
argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of
two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
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Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.

Catalan vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After
38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16,
1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest,
but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the petition for nullity of marriage between Orlando and
Merope

RULING:

Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted
a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved
that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the
trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same. The case was remanded to the trial court for its proper disposition.

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity
of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interestand
must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality
to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as
it affects their successional rights. Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides: a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs.

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.

Facts:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of the income
tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228.
These losses enabled them to be exempt from paying income tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent
was therefore claiming a refund. Respondents submitted requirementsbut the petitioners ignored their claim. On
April 14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the
petition stating that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax
refund.

According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be filed after
the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any supervening cause that may
arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the
New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days; months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset
to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the
prescriptive period.

Issues:

Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000 considering that the
last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.

Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap8 Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall apply. In the case at
bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose 365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292
Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be composed of 12 months regardless
of the number of days in a month. Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000.
Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is the last day prescribed to file a petition.

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK

G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the
Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in
addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to
Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of Frank, he should
become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in
traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
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Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date until the date of his
arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the
contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount
the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as
half-salary for the period consumed in travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a
part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially
altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars

ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?

HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed

1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine
Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of
changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of
the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing
the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had
not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms
of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be
enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois,
he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of
the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said
Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the
contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that
matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the
place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
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LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a
US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was
born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in
California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3
children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage.
He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The
trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when
he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is
valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was
contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s
will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams
(President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against President
Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority
to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which
are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist
control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in
these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the
District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before
President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when
President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold
delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to
deliver his commission.
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Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and
Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the
Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and
the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein
specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside
the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes
the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it
also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the
federal government.
Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo
is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include
Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband.
She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There
was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their
children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months
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later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She was battered again. Her
husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA
reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be
taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a
law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law.