TANO V SOCRATES
a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's
FACTS:
-Dec 15, 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng
Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92
w/c took effect on 1 Jan 1993, banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City from 1 Jan 1993 to 1 Jan 1998 and
providing penalties for violation therefor
-Jan 22, 1993: To implement said city ordinance,
then Acting City Mayor Lucero issued Office Order
No. 23 authorizing the conduct of necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and
lobster being shipped out from the Puerto
Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any
port w/in the jurisdiction of the City to any point
of destination either via aircraft or seacraft. The
purpose of inspection is to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit
and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to
compliance with all other existing rules and
regulations on the matter. Said order further
provides that any cargo containing live fish and
lobster without the required documents as stated
therein must be held for proper disposition.
-Feb 19, 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan enacted Res’n No. 33 prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling
and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period 5yrs in and
coming from Palawan waters; and enacted
Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose.
-Tano, et al argue that implementing said
ordinances meant depriving all the fishermen of
the province of Palawan and the City of Puerto
Princesa of their only means of livelihood and
petitioner marine merchants from performing
their lawful occupation and trade. A number of
the petitioners were even charged criminally for
violating said ordinances.
-Without seeking redress from the concerned
LGUs, prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked SC’s original jurisdiction by filing
this petition which they caption as one for
"Certiorari, Injunction with Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction, w/ Prayer for TRO." They
pray that SC declare as unconstitutional the said
issuances; enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
restrain respondent prosecutors and judges from
assuming jurisdiction over & hearing cases
concerning violation of said issuances.
[SC: More appropriately, the petition is, and shall
be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition.]
-Petitioners argue that said issuances violate
due process of law, the equal protection clause,
the non-delegation doctrine, the non-impairment
clause, as well as Sec 2, Art XII and Secs 2 and 7
of Article XIII of the 1987 Consti.
-Respondents argue that the said issuances are
power under the general welfare clause (Section
16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [LGC]),
and its specific power to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment. They likewise
maintained that there was no violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
-Upon motion of petitioners, SC issued a TRO
directing Judge Miclat to cease and desist from
proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of
the petitioners impleaded in the criminal cases
pending before his sala.
-OSG was excused from filing a comment,
considering that respondents were already
represented by counsel. SC thereafter resolved to
consider the comment on the petition as the
Answer, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
-22 April 1997: SC ordered impleaded as party
respondents the Dept of Agriculture and the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and
required the OSG to comment on their behalf. But
in light of the latter's motion for an extension of
time to file the comment which would only result
in further delay, SC dispensed with said comment
and deliberated on the pleadings filed.
PRELIMINARIES: There are two sets of
petitioners in this case.
1. Individuals who were criminally charged with
violating said issuances seek to prevent the
prosecution, trial and determination of the
criminal cases until the constitutionality or
legality of the ordinances they allegedly violated
shall have been resolved.
2. The rest of the petitioners [76 fishermen and
the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
(private association of several marine
merchants)] claim that they would be adversely
affected by the ordinances.
ISSUE: WON the writs of certiorari and
prohibition should issue
HELD:
As to the first set of petitioners, NO. This
special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground
of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of
action.
-There is no showing that said petitioners, as the
accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions
to quash [MTQ] the informations therein & that
the same were denied. Even if petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not
forthwith give rise to a COA under Rule 65, ROC.
-Where MTQ is denied, remedy therefrom is not
certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to
go to trial w/o prejudice to reiterating special
defenses involved in said motion, and if, after
trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. And, even where in an
exceptional circumstance such denial may be the
subject of a special civil action for certiorari, MFR
must have to be filed to allow the court
concerned an opportunity to correct its errors,
unless such motion may be dispensed with
because of existing exceptional circumstances.
Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has
been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65
is still unavailable absent any showing of the
grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof.
As to the second set of petitioners, NO. The
instant petition is obviously one for declaratory
relief; as such, their petition must likewise fail. SC
is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved; SC merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.
Even granting arguendo that the first set of
petitioners have a COA ripe for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here
a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and
no special and important reason or exceptional
and compelling circumstance has been adduced
why direct recourse to us should be allowed.
While SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTCs
and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
-People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed w/ the RTC, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's
time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket.”
-Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants
and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts
must be put to a halt, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court,
but also because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication
of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court, the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural
obstacles, SC opted to resolve the case on its
merits considering that life-time of the challenged
issuances is about to end1 and that the
ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the
exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to
the protection and preservation of the
environment [issues are novel and of paramount
importance].
-Laws (including ordinances enacted by LGUs)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To
overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
Conflict with the Consti must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if
well-founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
-After scrutiny of the challenged ordinances and
the provisions of Consti petitioners claim to have
been violated, SC finds petitioners' contentions
baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws.
-There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman2 protected by Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
is self-described as "a private association
composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners
Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as "merchants;"
while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
1
Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January
1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February
1993, is effective for only five (5) years.
2
SC cited and applied Webster definitions: A marginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured
by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering
the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood.
"fishermen," without any qualification, however,
as to their status.
-Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily
not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen,
but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation's marine wealth. Anent Section
7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of
their protection, development and conservation.
The ordinances in question are meant precisely to
protect and conserve our marine resources to the
end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not
only for the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.
-LGC provisions invoked by respondents merely
seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. Sec
5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the
general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers to the
local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for
the people of the community."
-In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to LGUs under the General
Welfare Clause, and under the other sections,
which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically,
these Ordinances find full support under the
Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan
Act (RA 7611).
-It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have
two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a "closed season" for the species of fish
or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of
five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the
marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the Province of Palawan from further destruction
due to illegal fishing activities. The
accomplishment of the first objective is well
within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws
in municipal waters. The realization of the second
clearly falls w/in both the general welfare clause
of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder
to cities and provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment.
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Palawan for exercising the requisite political will
to enact urgently needed legislation to protect
and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide
of ecological destruction. We hope that other
local government units shall now be roused from
their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in
the battle against the decimation of our legacy to
future generations. At this time, the
repercussions of any further delay in their
response may prove disastrous, if not,
irreversible.
Disposition Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
[Note: Please see full case for the separate
opinions of Justices Mendoza and Bellosillo. I
opted not to include them here since their
discussions did not touch upon the CivPro topic
under consideration: certiorari.]
VELARDE V SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
FACTS:
 January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society
(SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Manila
against Mariano “Mike” Velarde, His
Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive
Minister Eraño Manalo, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Bro. Eliseo Soriano. SJS
sought the interpretation of certain
constitutional provisions, specifically
concerning the separation of Church and
State, as well as a petition for declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of
religious leaders endorsing certain
candidates and asking members of their
flock to vote for a specific candidate.
 All respondents of the initial case sought
for the dismissal of the petition on the
common ground that aforesaid petition by
the SJS did not state a cause of action and
had no justiciable controversy. They were
ordered to submit a pleading by way of
advisement which was followed closely by
another Order that denied all Motions to
Dismiss.
 Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva
and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo
moved to reconsider the denial. His
Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, asked for
extension to file memorandum. Only Bro.
Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by
submitting his Memorandum. The Motions
for Reconsideration were denied as well.
 Main contents of assailed Decision:
 Aforementioned actions of
respondents in the initial case
 That the trial court had jurisdiction
over the Petition because "in
praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article
II, Section 6 of the Fundamental
Law, [the Petition] has raised only
a question of law." A lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in
the Petition – separation of Church
and State – followed.
  A quo, it also mentioned
that "[e]ndorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any
public office is a clear violation of
the separation clause."
 After its essay on the legal issue, however,
the trial court failed to include a
dispositive in its Decision.
 Petition for Review thus filed by
respondent Velarde.
ISSUES:
Procedural Issue: Did the Petition for
Declaratory Relief filed by the SJS with the RTC of
Manila have the necessary requisites?
- Justiciable controversy?
- Ccause of action?
- Legal standing?
RULING:
The Petition of Bro. Mike Velarde is
meritorious.
“WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED.
The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision
and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are
hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief
is DISMISSED for failure to state a
cause of action.”
REASONING:
 Petition for Declaratory Relief, Sec. 1 Rule
63 of the Rules of Court
"Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any
person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument,
whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder."
 Procedural Issue:
Requisites for Petition for Declaratory
Relief
 Justiciable Controversy
- Refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not
one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory
- SJS failed to show an existing
controversy in their Petition, as well
as the legal right of petitioners
being violated by the respondents
therein
- Elections had not even started yet
 SJS was questioning a mere
possibility
- Premise was highly speculative and
theoretical, thus insufficient
- No factual allegation that SJS’
rights were being subjected to any
threatening, imminent and
inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief
sought
- Judicial power and duty of court
cannot be exercised when there is
actual or threatened violation of
right
- All that the 5-page SJS Petition
prayed for was "that the question
raised in paragraph 9 hereof be
resolved," seeking an opinion of
court more than anything else
- Courts, however, are proscribed
from rendering advisory opinions
 Cause of Action
- An act or an omission of one party
in violation of the legal right or
rights of another, causing injury to
the latter
- Essential elements: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such
defendant’s act or omission that is
violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the former to the
latter
- HOWEVER, in special civil actions
for declaratory relief, the concept
of a cause of action under ordinary
civil actions does not strictly apply,
only that a breach or violation
should be impending,
imminent or at least
threatened
- Petition of SJS, however, discloses
no specific allegation. Interest can
only be inferred in so far as the SJS
“has thousands of members who
are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters and who are keenly
interested in a judicial clarification
of the constitutionality of the
partisan participation of religious
leaders in Philippine politics and in
the process to insure adherence to
the Constitution by everyone.”
- General averment  not enough to
constitute a legal right or interest
 - In the whole Petition, there is no
single allegation of fact upon which
SJS could base a right of relief and
even granting that it sufficiently
asserted a legal right it wanted to
protect, there was no certainty that
such right would be invaded by
said respondents
 Legal Standing
- Defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case,
such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged act
- Parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In SJS’s Petition, there
is no indication, whether implied or
explicit, of taxpayer’s money being
wrongfully disbursed
- There was also no showing that as
a political party or with
members as voters, they would
be adversely affected by the
alleged acts if issue were not
resolved. No allegation that they
had suffered or would be losing
votes through the actions of the
therein respondents.
- The allegedly keen interest of its
"thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters" is too general and beyond
the contemplation of the standards
set by Philippine jurisprudence
 Sans legal standing, SJS insisted that
the Court take cognizance of the
Petition as it raised “issues of
paramount public interest.” This had
already been done in a prior case, that
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora, where the Court
entertained IBP’s petition despite a
lack in locus standi. In this case,
however, despite being given the
opportunity to substantiate otherwise
barren allegations concerning the
supposed constitutional issue,
counsels for both sides – particularly
respondent SJS – made no satisfactory
allegations or clarifications.
 Regarding proper proceedings before
the trial court, the following must be
noted in order to not waste precious
judicial time and effort:
 Based on aforementioned procedure of
court proceedings, following
conclusions may be made concerning
proceedings conducted in the RTC of
Manila:
- Initial pleading of the SJS was
grossly inadequate  did not even
specify relief
Relief - a specific coercive
measure prayed for as a result
of a violation of the rights of a
plaintiff or a petitioner
- Apparently, contrary to the
requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16
of the Rules of Court, the Motions
(of therein respondents) were not
heard. Worse, the Order
purportedly resolving the Motions
to Dismiss did not state any reason
at all for their denial, in
contravention of Section 3 of the
said Rule 16. There was not even
any statement of the grounds
relied upon by the Motions; much
less, of the legal findings and
conclusions of the trial court
- The RTC issued its "Decision"
without allowing the parties to file
their answers. For this reason,
there was no joinder of the issues
- The questioned Decison was utterly
lacking in requirements prescribed
by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court
- Trial court indeed acted with
inexplicable haste, with total
ignorance of the law, with grave
abuse of discretion
ALMEDA VS. BATHALA MARKETING
INDUSTRIES
FACTS: Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries
renewed its contract of lease with Ponciano
Almeda, the father of Romel Almeda and the
husband of Eufemia, who are the petitioners in
this case. The contract of lease contains the
following provisions which give rise to the instant
case, to wit:
“SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties
hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on
the present rate of assessment on the property,
and that in case the assessment should hereafter
be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
imposed by authorities on the lot and building
where the leased premises are located, LESSEE
shall pay, when the rental herein provided
becomes due, the additional rental or charge
corresponding to the portion hereby leased;
provided, however, that in the event that the
present assessment or tax on said property
should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to
reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in
proportion to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or
devaluation of Philippine Currency should
supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall
be the basis of payment;”
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano
died. Petitioners therein in a letter, advised
respondent Bathala that it would be assessed and
collect VAT from its monthly rentals. In response,
Bathala contend that VAT may not be imposed as
the rentals fixed on the contact of lease were
supposed to include VAT, in lieu that there
contract was established when the VAT law has
been effected. However, respondent received
another letter from the petitioners informing the
former that its monthly rental should be
increased by 73% pursuant to condition no. 7 of
the contact and Article 1250 of the civil code.
Bathala opposed the said increased arguing that
there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant
the application of the said Article. Hence,
respondent Bathala instituted an action for
declaratory relief to determine the correct
interpretation of the conditions no. 6 and 7 of the
contract of lease. In turn, petitioners instituted an
action for ejectment, rescission and damages
against respondent for failure to heed the
demand to vacate the premises. In addition, they
moved to dismiss the action for declaratory relief
since respondent already breach the obligation
and the case would not end the litigation and
settle the rights of the parties. The RTC ruled in
favor of Bathala. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the
matter was raised before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief was
proper considering that Bathala was in breach of
obligation when it filed the action before the trail
court?
HELD: YES. Petitioners insists that respondent
was already in breach of the contract when the
petition was filed. We do not agree. After
petitioners demanded payment of adjusted
rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and
conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners
even during the pendency of the present suit.
There is no showing that respondent committed
an act constituting a breach of the subject
contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
from instituting before the trial court the petition
for declaratory relief.
A. Requisites of Declaratory Relief:
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an
action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the
documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy
or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
B. On the issue on the separate actions instituted
by the petitioners:
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not
proper because a separate action for rescission,
ejectment and damages had been commenced
before another court; thus, the construction of
the subject contractual provisions should be
ventilated in the same forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the
petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed
in view of the pendency of a separate action for
unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the
same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban,
the unlawful detainer case had already been
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of
the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner
in that case who insisted that the action for
declaratory relief be preferred over the action for
unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at
bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial
court, where the rescission case was on appeal,
itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings
pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated
in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol where the declaratory
relief action was dismissed because the issue
therein could be threshed out in the unlawful
detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was
already a breach of contract at the time of the
filing of the declaratory relief petition. This
dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from
applying Teodoro to the instant case.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the
Court is disposed to entertain the instant
declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it,
notwithstanding the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court.
The resolution of the present petition would write
finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle
once and for all the question of the proper
interpretation of the two contractual stipulations
subject of this controversy
Held: YES. Petitioners insist that respondent was
already in breach of the contract when the
petition was filed, thus, respondent is barred from
filing an action for declaratory relief. However,
after petitioners demanded payment of adjusted
rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and
conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners
even during the pendency of the present suit.
There is no showing that respondent committed
an act constituting a breach of the subject
contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
from instituting before the trial court the petition
for declaratory relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition
is not proper because a separate action for
rescission, ejectment and damages had been
commenced before another court; thus, the
construction of the subject contractual provisions
should be ventilated in the same forum.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should
be dismissed in view of the pendency of a
separate action for unlawful detainer. In this case,
however, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial
court, where the rescission case was on appeal,
initiated the suspension of the proceedings
pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
 C.F Sharp Kabushiki (Kabushiki) incurred
several obligations from several creditors,
including petitioners herein
 C.F. Sharp & Co (CF Sharp) anticipated
that the creditors of Kabushiki will run
after it
 Hence, C.F. Sharp prayed for injunctive
relief against the petitioners' demand for
the payment of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha's liabilities
 C.F. Sharp alleged that it is separate and
distinct from Kabushiki. That the former is
organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines while the latter is under the
laws of Japan.
o That it had no participation
whatsoever or liability in
connection with the transactions
between the latter and the
defendants.
 CF Sharp also prayed for declaratory relief
that it is separate and independent
corporation, it is not liable for the
obligations and liabilities of Kabushiki.
 As the creditor-defendants are non-
residents, without business addresses in
the Philippines but in Japan, CF Sharp
asked the court to effect extraterritorial
service of summons.
 Judge Amores authorized the
extraterritorial service of summons on
creditors
 Naturally, the creditors opposed and filed
"Special Appearance to Question
Jurisdiction of This Honorable Court Over
Persons of Defendants"
o Alleged that lower court does not
and cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of defendants on
the grounds that private
respondent's action does not refer
to its personal status

KAWASAKI PORT SERVICES ET. AL. V. JUDGE o The action does not have for
AMORES subject matter property
contemplated in Section 17 of Rule
Doctrine: An action purely for injunction is a 14 of the Rules of Court, that the
personal action as well as an action in personam. action does not pray that
As a personal action, personal or substituted defendants be excluded from any
service of summons upon the defendant, not interest or property in the
extra territorial service, is necessary to confer Philippines;
jurisdiction upon the Court over the defendant

FACTS:
 o And that no property of the
defendants has been attached
o Action is in personam; and that the
action does not fall within any of
the four cases mentioned in
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
 Defense: affects status of CF Sharp and
liability for Kabushiki’s indebtedness
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent's
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief
is within the purview of the provisions of Section
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
HELD: This Court had ruled that extraterritorial
service of summons is proper only in four (4)
instances, namely: "(1) when the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiffs: (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in
such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when
the defendant non-resident's property has been
attached within the Philippines." (De Midgely v.
Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23 [1975]; The Dial
Corporation v. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737 [1988]).
In the case at bar, private respondent has two (2)
alternative principal causes of action, to wit:
either for declaratory relief or for injunction.
Allegedly, in both cases, the status of the plaintiff
is not only affected but is the main issue at hand.
As defined, "Status means a legal personal
relationship, not temporary in nature nor
terminable at the mere will of the parties, with
which third persons and the state are concerned"
t is easy to see in the instant case, that what is
sought is a declaration not only that private
respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute
on that matter but also that it is separate and
distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and
therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness.
It is evident that monetary obligations does not,
in any way, refer to status, lights and obligations.
Obligations are more or less temporary, but
status is relatively permanent. But more
importantly, as cited in the case of, the prevailing
rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a
disputed fact would be determinative of issues
rather than a construction of definite stated
rights, status and other relations, commonly
expressed in written instrument, the case is not
one for declaratory judgment." Thus, considering
the nature of a proceeding for declaratory
judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to
declare rights and not to determine or try issues,
there is more valid reason to adhere to the
principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is
unavailable where judgment would have to be
made, only after a judicial investigation of
disputed issues. In fact, private respondent itself
perceives that petitioners may even seek to
pierce the veil of corporate identity.
Finally, the alternative relief sought is injunction,
that is to enjoin petitioners from demanding from
private respondent the payment of the
obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K., It was not prayed
that petitioners be excluded from any property
located in the Philippines, nor was it alleged,
much less shown, that the properties of the
defendants, if any, have been attached.
TAMBUNTING VS. SPS. SUMABAT
FACTS: Facts: Spouses Sumabat and Baello were
the registered land owners of a parcel of land in
Caloocan. In May 1973, and in order to obtain a
P7,727.95 loan from petitioner Tambunting, the
spouses mortgaged said land to the former.
Subsequently, Tambunting assigned his rights to
the mortgaged to Commercial House Finance
(CHFI). And because respondent spouses have
not been paying their monthly amortizations,
they were informed that their indebtedness has
ballooned to P15k.
And so, CHFI and Tambunting filed a case for
foreclosure but was restrained by Branch 33 of
the RTC of Caloocan. The reason for the restraint
was because the respondents were able to file an
action for declaratory relief with said RTC. In their
action, respondents were praying that the court
rule on the extent or amount of their actual
indebtedness.
In said RTC case, which was filed March 1979,
herein petitioners were declared in default. Thus,
even when the Tambunting, et al moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that
“mortgaged deed/contract had already been
breached prior to the action”, said motion was
denied for having been filed out of time.
On Jan. 1981, the RTC rendered a decision finding
that respondents liability, by virtue of their
mortgage deed/contract, was P15,743.83.
Pursuant to this decision, the respondents made
a consignation with the RTC in said amount.
After almost 14 years, or on Feb 1995, CHFI again
foreclosed on the contested land. The
respondents came to know of this because they
received a notice of foreclosure sale, to be
conducted by the sheriff, of the land in question
This time, the petitioners filed an action with
Branch 120 of the RTC of Caloocan for injunction
against the foreclosure sale. But, the sale still
pushed thru, with CHFI being declared the
highest bidder. A new TCT was then issued to
CHFI. Thus, respondent spouses amended their
complaint to an action for nullification of the
foreclosure/sheriff’s sale, the new TCT of CHFI, as
well as reconveyance.
On Feb 2000, Branch 120 of the RTC declared the
foreclosure sale as void. It likewise ruled that
reconveyance of the property should be made to
the respondents. This decision was grounded on
the fact that consignation of P15k has already
been made by CHFI pursuant to the earlier
decision of the Branch 33 of the RTC.
After a denial of petitioner’s MR, they filed
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. The
petitioners argued that RTC, Branch 33, erred
when it ordered the consignation of P15k. As
earlier pointed out, the action in first case was for
declaratory relief. But petitioner points out the
fact that respondents are not entitled anymore to
file an action for declaratory relief because there
had already been a violation of the mortgaged
contract when the spouses defaulted on their
amortizations. Furthermore the action for
foreclosure by CHFI on 1995 has already
prescribed
ISSUES:
1. Was the decision of Branch 120 of the RTC
wrong when it ordered the nullification of the
foreclosure sale on the ground that consignation
has already been made in a previous case?
2. Was the foreclosure action in 1995 and
subsequent sale of the property already barred
by prescription?
3. Thus, should the action for nullification and
reconveyance filed by the respondents be
dismissed?
HELD: The trial court erred when it affirmed the
validity of the consignation. The RTC should have
been barred from taking cognizance of the action
for declaratory relief since petitioners, being
already in default in their loan amortizations,
there existed a violation of the mortgage deed
even before the institution of the action. Hence,
the CFI could not have rendered a valid judgment
in Civil Case No. C-7496, and the consignation
made pursuant to a void judgment was likewise
void.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by
a person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order, regulation
or ordinance before breach or violation thereof.
The purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of
the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.
Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action.
Nonetheless, the petition must fail.
Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A mortgage
action prescribes after ten years.
Here, petitioners’ right of action accrued in May
1977 when respondents defaulted in their
obligation to pay their loan amortizations. It was
from that time that the ten-year period to enforce
the right under the mortgage started to run. The
period was interrupted when respondents filed
Civil Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977
and the CFI restrained the intended foreclosure of
the property. However, the period commenced to
run again on November 9, 1977 when the case
was dismissed.
A. Nature of Declaratory Relief:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by
a person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order, regulation
or ordinance before breach or violation thereof.
B. Purpose of Declaratory Relief:
The purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach.2 It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of
the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING
HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.
FACTS: This instant consolidated petitions seek
to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court
which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive
Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits
the importation of used vehicles in the country
inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
On December 12, 2002, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156
entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial
policy and directions for the motor vehicle
development program and its implementing
guidelines."The said provision prohibits the
importation of all types of used motor vehicles in
the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or
the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.
Consequently, three separate actions for
declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy
Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures
Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of
Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be
rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO
156 unconstitutional and illegal.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring
that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes
an unlawful usurpation of legislative power
vested by the Constitution with Congress and that
the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic
Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which allows the free
flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.
The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied
on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for
the President to issue the same. It held that the
prohibition on the importation of use motor
vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on
the legislature and absent any enabling law, the
exercise thereof by the President through an
executive issuance is void.
ISSUES: Whether there is lack of locus standi for
respondents to question the validity of EO 156,
the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a
declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability
of a judgment on the pleadings in this case
HELD: Petitioners argue that respondents will not
be affected by the importation ban considering
that their certificate of registration and tax
exemption do not authorize them to engage in
the importation and/or trading of used cars.
They also aver that the actions filed by
respondents do not qualify as declaratory relief
cases. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for declaratory relief may
be filed before there is a breach or violation of
rights. Petitioners claim that there was already a
breach of respondents’ supposed right because
the cases were filed more than a year after the
issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-
2003, numerous warrants of seizure and
detention were issued against imported used
motor vehicles belonging to respondent
ASSOCIATION’s members.
Petitioners’ arguments lack merit. The
established rule that the constitutionality of a law
or administrative issuance can be challenged by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of
its enforcement 11 has been satisfied in the
instant case. The broad subject of the prohibited
importation is „all types of used motor vehicles.
‰ Respondents would definitely suffer a direct
injury from the implementation of EO 156
because their certificate of registration and tax
exemption authorize them to trade and/or import
new and used motor vehicles and spare parts,
except „used cars.‰ 12 Other types of motor
vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents
and not falling within the category of used cars
would thus be subjected to the ban to the
prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly,
respondents have the legal standing to assail the
validity of EO 156.
As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a
vehicle for assailing the executive issuance,
suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of
respondents will not affect the case. In
Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v.
Province of Cebu, 371 SCRA 196 (2001), the Court
entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally
settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of
the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a
violation of the right of the party affected. We
find no reason to deviate from said ruling mindful
of the significance of the present case to the
national economy.
RAFAEL R. MARTELINO v. NATIONAL HOME
MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition with urgent prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary
injunction filed before the RTC of Caloocan
City against the NHMFC and HDMF and Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo.
 Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing
loans from respondents who directly released
the proceeds to the subdivision developer,
Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).
o However, Shelter failed to complete the
subdivision according to the subdivision
plan. Petitioners spent their own
resources to improve the subdivision roads
and alleys, and to install individual water
facilities.
o Respondents failed to ensure Shelter’s
completion of the subdivision.
 o Respondents ignored their right to
suspend amortization payments for
Shelter’s failure to complete the
subdivision, charged interests and
penalties on their outstanding loans,
threatened to foreclose their mortgages
and initiated foreclosure proceedings
against petitioner Rafael Martelino.
o Hence, they prayed that respondents be
restrained from foreclosing their
mortgages.
 The RTC set the PI hearing, but said order,
including the summons and petition, were
served only on the NHMFC and Sheriff Castillo.
Subsequently, the RTC ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the respondents from foreclosing the
mortgages on petitioners’ houses.
 RTC’s RULING: In dismissing the case, the
RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of
the subdivision should have been brought
before the HLURB. It also ruled that no
judicial declaration can be made because the
petition was vague. The RTC assumed that
the subject of the petition was Republic Act
No. 8501 (Housing Loan Condonation Act of
1998) which was cited by petitioners. But the
RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state
which section of the law affected their rights
and needed judicial declaration. Moreover,
the RTC noted that respondents still
foreclosed their mortgages, a breach of said
law which rendered the petition for
declaratory relief improper. The proper
remedy was an ordinary civil action.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUES: Whether or not –
(1) The preliminary injunction order against
the HDMF is valid – NO
(2) The petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition was properly dismissed – NO
HELD:
Preliminary Injunction
 We affirm the RTC and Court of Appeals ruling
that the preliminary injunction order is not
valid against the HDMF. §5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court expressly states that “No
preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined.”
 In the case at bar, petitioners even admit that
the HDMF was not notified of the PI
hearing. Petitioners do not contest the lower
courts’ ruling that the July 9, 1998 Order
cannot apply to the HDMF. They merely
contend and insist that HDMF voluntarily
submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction. However,
such contention is immaterial because the
issue involved is the validity of the PI order
absent a notice of hearing for its issuance to
the HDMF.
Declaratory Relief and Prohibition
 The ruling that the Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Prohibition is improper is correct,
because the Petition must be filed before the
occurrence of breach or any violation. Under
§1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for
declaratory relief before breach or violation of
a deed, will, contract, other written
instrument, statute, executive order,
regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation.
 However, petitioners had already suspended
payment of amortizations. Clearly giving the
HDMF a right to foreclose the mortgage for
failure to pay the debt secured by the
mortgage. Petitioners’ actual suspension of
payments defeated the purpose of the action
to secure an authoritative declaration of their
supposed right to suspend payment, for their
guidance.
o Thus, the RTC could no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory
relief because there was an occurrence of
breach before filing the action.
 PURPOSE OF THE ACTION: Secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach.
 WHEN TO FILE THE ACTION: It may be
entertained only BEFORE the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, contract
to which it refers. Where the law or
contract has already been contravened prior
to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the court can no longer assume jurisdiction
over the action.
The Dismissal of the Petition was Improper
 If the petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition was vague, dismissal is not
proper because the respondents may ask
for more particulars. Notably, the NHMFC
never assailed the supposed vagueness of the
petition in its motion to dismiss nor did it ask
for more particulars before filing its
answer. When the RTC also set the pre-trial
conference and ordered the parties to submit
their pre-trial briefs, it even noted that the
issues had already been joined. Petitioners
fairly stated also the necessary ultimate facts,
except that their action for declaratory relief
was improper.
 The RTC made an assumption that RA No.
8501 was the subject matter of the case. But
while the petition mentioned the law, the
 declaration that petitioners sought was not
anchored on any of its provisions. The
petition only stated that despite the effectivity
of said law, respondents still acted in bad faith
and with undue haste in threatening
petitioners with foreclosures, instead of
encouraging them to avail of its benefits.
 COMMENTO: The Condonation Act took
effect, but instead of applying for condonation
and for the restructuring of their loans,
Petitioners filed an erroneous petition before
the RTC (siguro akala nila automatic un…yay,
wala na silang utang!). On the other hand,
the RTC was incorrect on the point that the
case should have been filed before HLURB.
The jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and
decide cases is determined by the nature of
the cause of action, the subject matter or
property involved and the parties. In this
case, the petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition did not involve an unsound real
estate business practice, or a refund filed by
subdivision buyers against the developer, or a
specific performance case filed by buyers
against the developer.
Conversion of the Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Prohibition to Ordinary Action
 GENERAL RULE: §6, Rule 63 allows the course
of action.
 However, petitioners failed to specify the
ordinary action they desired. The Court cannot
assume that they seek annulment of the
mortgages and further, the issue was not
raised before the RTC. Therefore, the CA
properly refused to entertain the issue as it
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Conversion of Petition for Declaratory
Relief to an Action for Prohibition
 GENERAL RULE: In De La Llana, etc., et al. v.
Alba, etc., et al., the Court considered a
petition erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition as an
action for prohibition. The case involved the
constitutionality of BP Blg. 129, it was held
that: that if the petition has far-reaching
implications and it raises questions that
should be resolved, it may be treated as one
for prohibition.
 Under the circumstances, action for
prohibition is still improper. PROHIBITION is a
remedy against proceedings that are without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or
other plain, speedy adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. But here, the
petition did not even impute lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents and Sherif
Castillo regarding the foreclosure
proceedings.
VELASCO V VILLEGAS
DOCTRINE: A petition for declaratory relief did
not lie, its availability being dependent on there
being as yet no case involving such issue having
been filed.
Even if such were not the case, the attack against
the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the
brief of [the Respondents], [the Ordinance] is a
police power measure… This Court has been most
liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause… [T]his clause has been
given wide application by municipal authorities
and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners question the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila.
The Ordinance states that: "It shall be
prohibited for any operator of any barber
shop to conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in
any adjacent room or rooms of said barber
shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is
located as long as the operator of the
barber shop and the room where
massaging is conducted is the same
person."
2. Petitioners’ contention: The Ordinance
amounts to a deprivation of property of
Petitioners of their means of livelihood
without due process of law.
3. Petitioners admitted that criminal
cases for the violation of this
ordinance had been previously filed
and decided.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition
for declaratory relief was proper
HELD: No, it was not.
1. [The SC agreed with the lower court, when the
lower court] held that a petition for declaratory
relief did not lie, its availability being
dependent on there being as yet no case
involving such issue having been filed.
2. Even if such were not the case, the attack
against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed
out in the brief of [the Respondents], [the
Ordinance] is a police power measure. The
objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be
able to impose payment of the license fee for
 engaging in the business of massage clinic
under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by
Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure
than the ordinance regulating the business of
barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers."
This Court has been most liberal in sustaining
ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918
decision, this Court, through Justice Malcolm,
made clear the significance and scope of such
a clause, which "delegates in statutory form
the police power to a municipality. As above
stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in
its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the
courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."
As it was then, so it has continued to be.
There is no showing, therefore, of the
unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD V 6. The RTC ruling on the motion for
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
FACTS:
1. The Philippine Veterans Bank, pursuant to
its mandate to provide financial assistance
to veterans and teachers under Republic
Acts 3518 and 7169, established pension
loans for bona fide veterans and
beneficiaries, as well as salary loan
products for teachers. As these clientele
do not have security other than their
continuing good health or employment, to
secure their loans, the PVB devised a
program by charging a premium, a higher
fee known as Credit Redemption Fund
(CRF) from the borrowers. Special Trust
Funds were established by PVB for the
loans of its clientele and in case of death
of the borrower, the fees charged from
him and credited to the trust funds will be
used to fully pay the loan.
2. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that
PVB’s collection of the CRF violated
Section 54 of Republic Act No. 8791 which
prohibited banks from directly engaging in
insurance business as insurer. Thus, it
wrote the PVB to inform it that CRF is a
form of insurance, based on opinion by the
Insurance Commission and should be
discontinued. PVB then stopped collecting
the fees.
3. The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution
No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust and
Investment Department to return to the
borrowers all the balances of the CRF; and
to preserve the records of borrowers who
were deducted CRF pending resolution of
ruling of the Office of the General Counsel
of the BSP. The BSP denied PVB’s request
for reconsideration, hence it filed a
petition for declamatory relief before the
RTC of Makati City.
4. The Monetary Board moved to dismiss the
petition, citing that the petition should not
prosper because of the prior breach of PVB
by Section 54 of RA 8791. The RTC
dismissed the petition for declaratory
relief, ruling that the issue of whether or
not PVB violated Section 54 of Republic
Act 8791 should be resolved in an ordinary
civil action, not a declaratory relief.
5. Almost year later, it filed a Motion to
Admit Motion for Reconsideration, stating
that it did not receive a copy of the order
until September 3, 2008, which the
Monetary Board opposed, alleging that per
certification by the Philippine Postal
Corporation, the order was served on
respondent on October 17, 2007.
reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled
that the collection of the CRF by PVB did
not constitute engaging in the issuance
business as an insurer, hence not a
violation of Section 54 of RA 8791.
Accordingly, it declared MB Resolution No.
1189 null and void. Its motion for
reconsideration denied, it filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari to contest the RTC decision, on
the issue of whether or not the petition for
declaratory relief is proper.
ISSUE: Was the petition for declaratory relief
proper?
HELD:
 Declaratory relief is an action by any
person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive
order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising
from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute; and for a
declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute
 In CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau
of Internal Revenue, the SC that in the
 same manner that court decisions
cannot be the proper subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief,
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
cannot be subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief for the simple
reason that if a party is not agreeable
to a decision either on questions of
law or of fact, it may avail of the
various remedies provided by the
Rules of Court.
 In this case, the decision of the BSP
Monetary Board cannot be a proper
subject matter for a petition for
declaratory relief. The BSP Monetary Board
is a quasi-judicial agency and the MB
resolution it issued was in its exercise of
quasi-judicial powers or functions.
o The authority of the petitioners to
issue the questioned MB Resolution
emanated from its powers under
Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and
Section 66 of RA No. 8791 to
impose, at its discretion,
administrative sanctions, upon any
bank for violation of any banking
law.
o The nature of the BSP Monetary
Board as a quasi-judicial agency,
and the character of its
determination of whether or not
appropriate sanctions may be
imposed upon erring banks, as an
exercise of quasi-judicial function
and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
 Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that
the court a quo’s Order dated September
24, 2007, which dismissed respondent’s
petition for declaratory relief, had long
become final and executory.
o To recall, said Order was duly
served on and received by
respondent on October 17, 2007,
as evidenced by the Certification
issued by the Philippine Postal
Corporation. Almost a year later,
however, or on October 15, 2008,
respondent moved for
reconsideration of the court a quo’s
Order of dismissal, claiming it
received a copy of said Order only
on September 3, 2008.
o Thus, respondent’s self-serving
claim should not have prevailed
over the Certification issued by the
Philippine Postal Corporation. It was
error for the trial court to entertain
it for the second time despite the
lapse of almost a year before
respondent filed its motion for
reconsideration against said Order.

 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ

of government other than a court and
other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making. The very
definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-
judicial powers.
o It recognizes the need for the
active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters
calling for technical knowledge and
speed in countless controversies,
which cannot possibly be handled
by regular courts.

 A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which

applies to the action, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action