1- Concept of concept as enunciated in the light of John Hospers understanding of language.

John Hospers has his national as the United States of America. He is a professor of philosophy at
the University of Southern California. He was a politician by profession. He has many famous
works but may be his best famous works is: Introduction to philosophical analysis.

According to John Hospers there are four ways to understand what a concept is.

Concepts are the fundamental building blocks of our thoughts and beliefs. They play an
important role in all aspects of cognition.

1- We have a concept of X when we know the definition of the word X, this answer is far
too narrow: we do know the meanings of countless words: “cat” “run” “above” and use them
every day without being able to state a definition for them. Whatever having a concept involves,
it does not require being able to state a definition. And in the case of words like “red” that are not
verbally definable at all, we can never state a definition. Therefore we can never have a concept
of red.

2- We have a concept of X when we can apply the word X correctly; we have a concept of
redness and orangeness when we can correctly apply the words “red” and “orange” in all cases.
This criterion can correctly apply the words “red” and “orange” does not require us to give a
definition but only to use the word with uniform correctness. It is also much more in line with
our actual use of the word with uniform correctness, it is also much more in line with our actual
use of the term “concept”

3- We have a concept of X (of X-ness) when we are able to distinguishing X’s from Y’s and
Z’s and indeed from everything that is not an X. We might well do this whether we had a word
for and normally we would have.

- We have now specified what a concept is in such a way as to make it possible to have a
concept without knowing any words. A dog that can distinguish cats from birds can be said to
have these concepts, although it know no words.

4- To have a concept of X is simply to have some criterion in mind. It would consist in

some kind of “mental content” quite independent of words and quite independent of
distinguishing X’s from Y’s and Z’s. But it is not easy to state what such a criterion in mind
would be like, whether one possessed such a criterion. A criterion for identifying X’s would
automatically be a criterion for distinguishing X’s from non X’s.

- We can have a concept without having an image. If scientists can have a concept of
ultraviolet without being able to visualize ultraviolet, surely a blind man can have concept of red
without being able to visualize red. True, for both the scientist and the blind man have a criterion
for distinguishing X from non-X. But, we can now say, the blind man, though he has a criterion
for distinguishing X from non-X, does not have the same concept as seeing man do, for he does
not have the same criterion for distinguishing red from non-red that seeing men have.

- The blind man must use wave-lengths as his criterion, whereas we use the easily
distinguishable difference in the way red looks. Both have a concept, and there is a high degree
of correlation between the concepts; but they are not the same concept, for there is not the same
means of distinguishing red from non-red. Similarly, a person who could see ultraviolet would
have a concept of it over and above the one we have, for he would be able to distinguish that
color from others by means of direct inspection, without having to resort to instruments for
distinguishing it.