Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 1

Kundakunda on the modal modification

of omniscient jīvas

Ana Bajželj

I.

The whole of Jaina theoretical and practical enterprise is based on the notions of perfection and
perfectibility. Even though perfection is not attainable in our time and place, its attainability is
supported by the lives of the many omniscients (kevalin), perfect beings of the past and present, 1
who reached perfection by way of progress through their individual efforts. Their perfection is
expressed as the full manifestation of their essential qualities (guṇa), namely, consciousness
(cetanā), energy (vīrya), and bliss (sukha), achieved by the complete release of destructive
(ghātiyā) karmans that used to hinder them. They attained perfection while still embodied in a
human form, the only bodily state in which jīvas are capable of completely actualizing their
potential in the sense of fully perfecting themselves. The achievement of perfection is, thus, not
synonymus with the release from saṃsāra and a kevalin attains liberation (mokṣa) only once
all non-destructive karmans that determine bodily existence run out as well. However, the non-
destructive types of karman do not in any way impede the perfect operation of kevalin’s
qualities. Moreover, the achievement of kevala is irreversible, meaning that perfection lasts
forever from the moment it is accomplished (cf. Jaini 2001a: 102, 105–6). 2

With reference to the Jaina author Kundakunda, the present paper strives to understand the
ontological nature of omniscience (kevala-jñāna) as the perfect mode (paryāya) of cetanā. 3

1
While Bharata-kṣetra, our part of the middle cosmos (madhya-loka), undergoes temporal cycles that affect the
possibility of the attainment of perfection, in certain other parts of it perfection is always reachable (Jaini 2001b:
31–2).
2
Such irreversibility does not hold for the stages of spiritual development up to the attainment of kevala-jñāna.
More precisely, on the fourteen-stage Jaina ladder of purification, the point from which a fall is no longer possible
is kṣīṇa-moha, the twelfth stage, which comes one before the attainment of kevala-jñāna. Throughout all the stages
prior to it, it is possible to relapse. The path to perfection is, therefore, by no means linear (Jaini 2001b: 157–9).
3
Whereas for Kundakunda all guṇas are inherent characteristics of living substances (jīva), particular paryāyas
are their non-inherent characteristics, even though every guṇa of every jīva must always be expressed as a certain
paryāya in each moment in time (Padmarajiah 1963: 261–5). Individual paryāyas are, therefore, necessary yet
2 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

The main issue that the paper will address is whether cetanā of a kevalin continues to modally
change or whether Kundakunda allows for some existents that are wholly devoid of modal
modification. Being perfect, kevala-jñāna indicates a reaching of a certain modal manifestation
of cetanā that cannot be surpassed, and since the Jaina doctrine, as indicated above, denies the
possibility of a digression from a perfect to a less-than-perfect level, kevala-jñāna once reached
is forever. In the sense of not being able to be bettered or worsened, that is, not being able to
undergo qualitative change as a cognitive faculty, 4 it is unchangeable, stable, permanent. An
anticipated implication of a mechanism with such a clearly marked interminable pinnacle would
be that kevala-jñāna is a state rather than a process, representing a single everlasting mode of
cetanā. That would, however, contradict and, thereby, compromise Kundakunda’s general
ontological descriptions of the dynamics of all substances (dravya) as being characterized by a
coordinated relationship between permanence and change rather than a subordinate relationship
between the two on the one hand or a complete absence of either one or the other on the other
hand. The Pravacana-sāra I.10 and II.4 read: 5

ṇatthi viṇā pariṇāmaṃ attho atthaṃ viṇeha pariṇāmo /

davvaguṇapajjayattho attho atthittanivvatto //

There is no object without modification, there is here no modification without an object.

The object, being substance, quality, and mode, is developed from existence. 6

sabbhāvo hi sahāvo guṇehiṃ saha pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ /

davvassa savvakālaṃ uppādavvayadhuvattehiṃ //

The nature of existence is indeed the own-nature of substance with qualities [and] its
own variegated modes, at all times with coming forth, passing away, and continuity. 7

replacable – until, of course, the arising of the perfect paryāya. For Kundakunda’s accounts of the relationship
between dravya and paryāya, dravya and guṇa, and guṇa and paryāya, see PañS 12–3, 44–7, 50; PS I.18, I.87,
II.1, II.3, II.9, II.16, and II.18.
4
Qualitative change here refers to a change in kind and in this particular case involves distinctions with reference
to the “how” of cetanā. Modifications from a less to a more manifested cetanā and vice versa are examples of
qualitative changes. Their nature is determined by the amount of karmic matter that affects the cetanā. The final
qualitative change of cetanā is its advancement from an imperfect to a perfect condition.
5
For general introductions to and studies of Jaina ontology with reference to the notions of permanence and change,
see Tatia 1951, Padmarajiah 1963, Dixit 1971, Matilal 1981: 35–40, Jhaveri 1990, Jaini 2001b: 90–3, and Dasgupta
2006: 173–5. For a particular focus on Kundakunda, see Upadhye 1984: 61–5, Soni 1991, and Bajželj 2013.
6
All translations are the author’s.
7
See also PañS 6, 8–11; PS II.3, II.7, II.9–12, II.17, II.19, II.27, and II.60.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 3

According to these statements, every object (artha) undergoes modification (pariṇāma) in the
form of continuously arising (utpāda) and passing (vyaya) modes, a characteristic that is to the
same degree as permanence imprinted in the very nature of existence (sad-bhāva). If one were
to insist on the universality of this permanence-in-change ontology, the reasoning that the
cetanā of a kevalin no longer undergoes modal change would have to be incorrect. As an
existent object, kevalin’s jīva is by definition a substance that possesses qualities and modes,
with the latter being variegated (citra) and in constant flux.

Are the perfect cognitive functions of a kevalin, then, static or dynamic? The same question
applies to the other qualities of kevalins, that is, vīrya and sukha, which like the quality of
cetanā perform perfectly without the possibility of improvement or digression. The present
paper will analyze the quality of cetanā only, for the most part discussing kevala-jñāna, which
Kundakunda mentions most frequently, and to a lesser extent perfect perception (kevala-
darśana), the other component of the two-fold application (upayoga) 8 of cetanā. However, a
similar course of analysis could also be applied to the other essential qualities of perfect jīvas.
The objective of this paper, then, represents one aspect of a broader endeavor to grasp the
meaning of perfection in an ontological model that accepts permanence and change as co-
existing and equally real.

The paper will consult four of Kundakunda’s texts, that is, the Pañcāstikāya-sāra
(Paṃcatthiya-saṃgaha), the Pravacana-sāra (Pavayaṇa-sāra), the Niyama-sāra, and the
Samaya-sāra. Throughout the analysis, these texts will not be considered as reflecting a single
unified thought of Kundakunda and the diversity between them will be highlighted. Concerning
the topic at hand, the discrepancy between some of the texts is, in fact, quite significant. As will
be further elaborated later on, the texts propose two rather divergent definitions of kevala-jñāna
with respect to the object(s) of cognition. One suggests that a kevalin cognizes all objects and
the other that the actual object of perfect cognition is only one’s self (ātman). 9 This is one of
the reasons why Kundakunda’s thought is particularly interesting with regard to the issue that
will be addressed. The paper will investigate whether the noted divergence between

8
The term upayoga has been translated variously by different authors. In his paper on the concept of upayoga in
Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, Jayandra Soni translates it as “function,” “application,” and “faculty” of the jīva but
notes that others have rendered it into English as “spiritual function,” “consciousness,” and “cognition” (Soni
2007: 299–300). A. N. Upadhye translates upayoga as “manifestation of consciousness” and W. J. Johnson as
“consciousness manifested or applied in jñāna or darśana” (Upadhye 1984: 68–9 and Johnson 1995: 104).
9
The fact that the texts dealt with here offer two different perspectives was already noted by Bhatt 1974.
4 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

Kundakunda’s definitions of kevala-jñāna in any way affects its ontological status in relation
to the issue of change.

Apart from that, Kundakunda also seems a suitable choice to study with respect to the outlined
problem since he is one of the early Jaina thinkers that understand kevala-darśana and kevala-
jñāna to be two aspects of the application of cetanā that function simultaneously rather than
successively. 10 For example, in his Niyama-sāra 159, he says:

jugavaṃ vaṭṭai ṇāṇaṃ kevalaṇāṇissa daṃsaṇaṃ ca tahā /

diṇayarapayāsatāpaṃ jaha vaṭṭai taha muṇeyavvaṃ //

It should be known that just as light and heat of the sun exist [simultaneously], so jñāna
and darśana of one who is endowed with omniscient knowledge exist simultaneously. 11

Jayandra Soni explains that if the operation of kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna was successive,
a kevalin “would always be deprived of one or the other of these qualities, even though both
qualities are in a perfected, unhindered condition” (Soni 1991: 83, cf. Singh 1974: 62–7). This
characteristic of the simultaneous (yugapad) existence of the two perfect cognitive functions in
an omniscient being (kevala-jñānin) distinguishes the extraordinary, perfect operation of cetanā
from its ordinary, imperfect operation where jñāna is preceded by darśana. The simultaneity
of the two cognitive operations is very significant for the purpose of this paper, since it does
away with the possible explanation that the dynamics present in the perfect cetanā are that of
kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna functioning separately, one after another, taking turns, in the
sense of one perfectly capturing the objects of its cognitive grasp for a moment, upon which
the other one takes over, and so forth. In short, the issue that this paper is concerned with is
whether, while simultaneously functioning with kevala-darśana and regardless of what object
it is grasping, kevala-jñāna can still fit some type of a permanence-in-change ontological model,
keeping in line with the seemingly universal statements that Kundakunda’s texts propound.
Although there exist several studies on the topic of kevala-jñāna in Jainism, it seems that none
so far have addressed this particular issue in detail. 12

10
Such is also the general Digambara take on the subject.
11
See also PS I.47 and I.50.
12
For introductions to and studies of the topic of omniscience in Jainism, see Pathak 1931, Tatia 1951: 69–70,
Solomon 1962, Bhattacharya 1966: 393–7, Singh 1974, Soni 1996, Fujinaga 1999: 23–6, Fujinaga 2000: 717–30,
Jaini 2001b: 266–71, Fujinaga 2006: 107–16, Qvarnström 2006: 89–106, and Fujinaga 2007: 379–86.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 5

II.

The present paper will approach the outlined problem by looking at what possible ontological
models of kevala-jñāna even present themselves in Kundakunda’s texts and then by exploring
whether change has any place in them. As was already noted, kevala-jñāna as a perfect
cognitive process cannot suffer any qualitative change, from which follows that if change is to
be an integral part of kevala-jñāna, if will need to be change of a different kind. Various
possibilities for this will be explored. To systematize the analysis of Kundakunda’s accounts of
kevala-jñāna in order to examine which possible ontological models might be construed on
their basis, they will be looked at in two groups they roughly fall into: (1) those with respect to
what object(s) a kevalin cognizes, which are principally epistemological in nature and (2) those
with respect to the nature of kevala-jñāna itself, where epistemological descriptions are
commonly accompanied by ontological accounts.

As already noted, with regard to the objects that kevala-jñāna grasps, Kundakunda’s texts
propose two different interpretations, with the second not quite opposing but rather subsuming
the first. The first (1a) description defines kevala-jñāna as the knowledge of everything and the
second (1b) as the knowledge of the self, which is mistakenly understood as the knowledge of
everything from the vyavahāra-naya, that is, the ordinary or worldly point of view. The first
(1a) understanding of kevala-jñāna can be found particularly prominently in the Pañcāstikāya-
sāra and the Pravacana-sāra. For example in the Pañcāstikāya-sāra 151, Kundakunda says:

kammassabhāveṇa ya savvaṇhū savvalogadarasī ya /

[…]

With the nonexistence of karmans, [one is] all-knowing and perceiving all cosmos
[…]. 13

Once the karmic veil that sullies the cognitive functions is lifted, one becomes all-knowing
(sarvajña) and perceiving all cosmos (sarva-loka-darśin). In the Pravacana-sāra I.21, the “all”
that a kevalin knows is articulated as “all dravyas and paryāyas” (sarva-dravya-paryāya),
which are immediate (pratyakṣa), that is, cognized directly:

pariṇamado khalu ṇāṇaṃ paccakkhā savvadavvapajjāyā /

13
See also NS 96–8; PañS 28–9, 151, 163; PS I.16, I.22, I.26, I.32, I.35; and SS 160.
6 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

[…]

For one who is transforming into knowledge, all substances and modes are immediate
[…].14

According to this interpretation, a kevalin then directly, without the interference of the senses
or any other karmic factors, 15 knows every single dravya and every one of their paryāyas in the
whole of cosmos (loka). How precisely does this work? For one, such cognition does not occur
gradually. As noted, Kundakunda understands the perfect functioning of cetanā to operate in
the form of the simultaneous activity of kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna. Perfection is,
therefore, not gradually accumulated but rather experienced in full. Every dravya and every
paryāya must be cognized in every single moment. Furthermore, Kundakunda does not
understand the simultaneous operation of kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna in the sense of them
functioning together in each moment in time, knowing all dravyas with all of their current
paryāyas in one particular moment and then all dravyas with all of their subsequent paryāyas
in the next. Even though simultaneously grasping the whole of reality in each particular moment,
this type of cognition would inevitably arrive at partial knowledge only, omitting an infinity of
past and future paryāyas of all dravyas in each instance. Insisting on the simultaneity of
knowing every single dravya with all the paryāyas that ever were, are, and will be, Kundakunda
extends perfect cognition from the present into the past and the future, remarking in the
Pravacana-sāra I.48:

jo ṇa vijāṇadi jugavaṃ atthe tikkālige tihuvaṇatthe /

ṇāduṃ tassa ṇa sakkaṃ sapajjayaṃ davvam egaṃ vā //

He who does not simultaneously know the objects in the three times, located in the three
worlds is not able to know even a single dravya with [its] paryāyas. 16

It should be underlined that kevalin’s cognition is not omnipresent only temporally in all the
three times (traikālika) but also spatially, for it extends, as Kundakunda says, to all of the three
worlds (tribhuvana), that is, the upper, middle, and lower parts of cosmos. One whose cognition
is not pervasive in both of the manners stated, says Kundakunda, is not able to properly know

14
The fact that a present active participle (pariṇamat) is used to mark the subject could here be taken as an
indication of kevala-jñāna being a process rather than a state, so a continuous transforming into all substances and
modes rather than a one-time tranformation. Barend Faddegon translates the word as “evolving” (Faddegon 2014:
13). See also PS I.8–9, I.19, and I.65.
15
See PS I.22, I.54, I.57–58, and II.105–6.
16
See also PS I.37–40, I.47, I.49–51, and I.61.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 7

even a single dravya with its paryāyas. Whoever does not know all, cannot even know one. In
order to follow through with such an unconditional statement, he must add that, in fact, as he
highlights in the Pravacana-sāra I.23, kevalin’s cognition extends also beyond cosmos:

ādā ṇāṇapamāṇaṃ ṇāṇaṃ ṇeyappamāṇam uddiṭṭhaṃ /

ṇeyaṃ loyāloyaṃ tamhā ṇāṇaṃ tu savvagayaṃ //

The self is described as having the extent of knowledge [and] knowledge the extent of
the knowable. The knowable is the loka and aloka, therefore knowledge is all-
pervading. 17

The stretch of kevalin’s cognition is, thus, entirely unbounded. All-pervading (sarva-gata), it
reaches objects infinitely far away in space and time. Yet, it equally well also grasps objects
that are nearby, the closest of those being the kevalin itself.

The next step after illuminating the scope and nature of the cognized content according to the
first (1a) definition is to investigate what kind of ontological interpretations of the cognitive
process based on this definition are conceivable and whether it is possible to incorporate change
into them. Since kevala-jñāna as a cognitive faculty has been demonstrated to be qualitatively
stable and since this part of the analysis revolves around cognitive content, it seems appropriate
to examine cognitive content itself with regard to the possible dynamic nature of kevala-jñāna.
Could the change in kevala-jñāna come from the cognized content rather than from the
cognitive faculty?

Since Kundakunda insists on the temporal and spatial omnipresence of kevalin’s knowledge, it
seems that there is not much room for the inclusion of change in the cognitive content. Precisely
because knowledge is co-extensive with the knowable (jñeya-pramāṇa), as Kundakunda says
in the above-mentioned Pravacana-sāra I.23, changes in the knowable – once it is all known –
cannot affect the process of knowing. Even though the objects that kevala-jñāna cognizes are
themselves incessantly modally changing, the past, present, and future paryāyas are all grasped
at the same time. This means that the cognitive content pertaining to kevala-jñāna does not
qualitatively change in the sense of a kevalin perfectly cognizing an altered modal variation of
reality in different moments in time. Since future paryāyas are already known, it cannot be so
that the kevalin’s perfect cognition could continue adjusting to the momentary modal changes

17
See also PS I.61. Had knowledge not been able to penetrate into aloka, kevalin’s cognition would exclude the
full knowledge of ākāśa, the dravya of space. Only knowing loka, the limited cosmic part of ākāśa, it would be
unacquainted with the infinity of aloka. See also PS I.26 and I.32.
8 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

in the constellation of reality. Any such change would indicate a lack of complete knowledge,
impairing perfection. 18 Such all-inclusive cognitive content of kevala-jñāna, furthermore,
cannot quantitatively change in the sense of a kevalin cognizing less at a certain moment in
time and more at another. 19 In line with the definition of kevala-jñāna as simultaneous and
omnipresent knowledge of all dravyas and paryāyas, the cognitive content is, then, qualitatively
and quantitatively invariable. This means that if kevala-jñāna is to be characterized by change,
the change cannot come from the cognitive content as defined here.

The other (1b) definition of kevala-jñāna with respect to the cognitive object is kevala-jñāna
as perfect knowledge of the self. As has already been indicated, Kundakunda does not simply
reject the first definition of kevala-jñāna as knowledge of all dravyas and paryāyas by
introducing a novel one. He rather subsumes the first definition under the second by relating it
to the worldly frame of reference. The two-tiered definition is found in an articulate form in the
Niyama-sāra. In Niyama-sāra 158, Kundakunda says:

jāṇadi passadi savvaṃ vavahāraṇaeṇa kevalī bhagavaṃ /

kevalaṇāṇī jāṇadi passadi ṇiyameṇa appāṇaṃ //

From the worldly point of view, a venerable kevalin knows and perceives all, (but)
invariably one endowed with perfect knowledge knows and perceives one’s self. 20

So whereas from the worldly point of view, a kevalin is thought to cognize all dravyas and
paryāyas, the cognized object is actually one’s self, and kevala-jñāna, therefore, incurvatus in
se. The Samaya-sāra mainly speaks about the relationship between the self and karmic matter,
while hardly even mentioning the other substances. Such definitions as were noted to feature in
the Pañcāstikāya-sāra and the Pravacana-sāra are absent and the focus is directed to knowing
the self. The Samaya-sāra 14 describes the self as the object of cognition from the pure point
of view (śuddha-naya) in the following way:

jo passadi appāṇaṃ abaddhapuṭṭhaṃ aṇaṇṇayaṃ ṇiyadaṃ /

avisesam asaṃjuttaṃ taṃ suddhaṇayaṃ vijāṇīhi //

18
The inclusion of future paryāyas in the cognitive scope of kevala-jñāna, of course, poses problems of
determinism and free will.
19
Quantitative change here refers to a change with reference to the amount. In the case of cetanā, the more severely
karmically tainted it is, the lesser is the objective spectrum that it can cognize. With the purification, cetanā attains
a more extensive view of reality.
20
See also NS 145–7.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 9

Recognize him who perceives the self to be unbound and untouched, without another,
constant, without difference, and uncombined as one with a pure view. 21

The thought continues in the Samaya-sāra 15:

jo passadi appāṇaṃ abaddhapuṭṭhaṃ aṇaṇṇam avisesaṃ /

apadesasuttamajjhaṃ passadi jiṇasāsaṇaṃ savvaṃ //

He who perceives the self to be unbound and untouched, without another, and without
difference, perceives the whole doctrine of the jinas, which is the core of the scriptures.

In contrast to the previous principle of the necessity of knowing all so as to even know one,
now knowing one, or rather, the one, becomes knowing all.

From an ontological perspective, it is important to investigate whether this difference in the

definition of cognitive content unlocks any opportunities for integrating change into the
operation of kevala-jñāna. The cognitive object is one and the same self, constant (niyata) and
without difference (aviśeṣa) in perfection. The main issue that this paper revolves around, that
is, whether the perfected self has one or many paryāyas, has not yet been resolved, but the
answer to it is at this point of discussion quite irrelevant. Since kevalin’s cognition
simultaneously grasps all past, present, and future paryāyas, their number does not make a
difference. Even if there was an infinite number of past paryāyas, a single present paryāya, and
no future paryāyas, all that are knowable would be known. Nor does it matter whether all
knowable paryāyas belong to only one dravya as is the case with the second (1b) definition
currently examined, or an infinity of them as was the case with the first (1a) definition. 22
Whatever the focus, all there was, is, and will be within that focus is cognized and it is owing
to this all-pervasive character of perfect cognition that also in the case of cognizing only a single
dravya of the self, cognitive content is both quantitatively and qualitatively stable.

Both definitions that describe kevala-jñāna with regard to its cognitive object, then, affirm that
the changing dynamics of kevala-jñāna cannot originate in the content of its cognition, it being
qualitatively and quantitatively steady. Earlier, it was also affirmed that kevala-jñāna itself as
perfect knowledge cannot qualitatively change, that impossibility belonging to the very nature
of perfection as it is conceived in Jainism. Is there an alternative ontological model that would

21
For a more detailed study on the worldly and pure points of view in the works of Kundakunda, see Bhatt 1974.
22
The singularity and infinity are, of course, consistent. If a kevalin knows only the self, it will continue knowing
only it, and so also in the case of the infinity of dravyas, where it will continue knowing the whole infinity of them.
10 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

tolerate the qualitative stability of kevala-jñāna and the qualitative and quantitative stability of
its content, yet still permit some sort of dynamics?

III.

In order to explore the possible solutions to this question, it is important to examine the second
(2) set of descriptions of kevala-jñāna that were mentioned, namely, the definitions that touch
on the nature of kevala-jñāna itself and in addition provide the ontological bases for the
epistemologies they introduce. A significant example (2a) of such a definition is found in the
Niyama-sāra 10–15, which describes how the perfect modes of cetanā come about and what
their nature is. Kundakunda says:

jīvo uvaogamao uvaogo ṇāṇadaṃsaṇo hoī /

ṇāṇuvaogo duviho sahāvaṇāṇaṃ vibhāvaṇāṇaṃ tti //
kevalam iṃdiyarahiyaṃ asahāyaṃ taṃ sahāvaṇāṇaṃ tti /
[…]
taha daṃsaṇauvaogo sasahāvedaraviyappado duviho /
kevalam iṃdiyarahiyaṃ asahāyaṃ taṃ sahāvam idi bhaṇidaṃ //
[…]
pajjāo duviyappo saparāvekkho ya ṇiravekkho //
ṇāraṇārayatiriyasurā pajjāyā te vibhāvam idi bhaṇidā /
kammopādhivivajjiyapajjāyā te sahāvam idi bhaṇidā //

Jīva is made of upayoga. Upayoga is towards jñāna and darśana. Jñāna-upayoga is of

two kinds – innately produced jñāna and non-innately produced jñāna. Innately
produced jñāna is perfect, unassisted by senses, and independent. […] In that manner
darśana-upayoga is also of two kinds, with a variety of the innate and the other. It is
said that the innate one is perfect, unassisted by senses, and independent. […] A mode
has two varieties – dependent on itself and others and independent. Human, hellish,
subhuman, and heavenly [states] are said to be non-innately produced modes. Modes
that are free from the limitations of karman are said to be innately produced.

It was already during the course of the discussion about the first (1a) definition that the direct
nature of kevala-jñāna was remarked upon. Kevala-jñāna was described as the immediate type
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 11

of cognition, meaning that it arises without any interference of karmic factors. 23 According to
the criterium of whether the modal manifestations of darśana and jñāna occur in dependence
on or independently of (nirapekṣa, asahāya) external factors, the above-cited Niyama-sāra 10–
15 distinguishes between darśana and jñāna arising from their own-nature (svabhāva), that is,
innately, and darśana and jñāna arising in dependence on external factors (vibhāva), that is,
non-innately. Innately produced darśana and jñāna are kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna, and
these are free from the limitations of karman (karma-upādhi-vivarjita). Could this definition
help in figuring out the ontology of kevala-darśana and kevala-jñāna? Does an innately
produced mode indicate a specific kind of ontology and does it necessarily mean a singular
mode in opposition to the manifold character of non-innately produced modes?

The Niyama-sāra and the Pravacana-sāra provide two examples of modal dynamics with
regard to innately produced modes that may prove productive for the issue at stake. The first
(2b) relates to the substance of matter (pudgala) and the second (2c) to the substance of time
(kāla). In a section where Kundakunda speaks about pudgala as existing in the form of basic
particles (paramāṇu) and aggregates (skandha) thereof, the above-noted division between
svabhāva and vibhāva paryāyas recurs. He describes the modification of basic particles, which
possess the guṇas of colour, taste, smell, and touch, as innately produced and that of pudgala
in the aggregate form (skandha-svarūpa) as non-innately produced. In the Niyama-sāra 28 he
says:

aṇṇaṇirāvekkho jo pariṇāmo so sahāvapajjāvo /

khaṃdhasarūveṇa puṇo pariṇāmo so vihāvapajjāyo //

Modification [of basic particles] that is independent of the other is an innately produced
mode. However, modification in the aggregate form is a non-innately produced mode.

This means that like perfected jīvas, basic material particles also have only innately produced
modes that arise independently of the other (anya-nirapekṣa), that is, external factors. What is
significant to note with the example of pudgala is that the modes of material particles are,
according to the Pravacana-sāra, unambiguously plural in number in the case of at least one
guṇa, that is, the guṇa of touch (sparśa). What is more, they are qualitatively changing. In the
second śruta-skandha of the Pravacana-sāra, basic particles are described as qualitatively
changing along the guṇa of touch in the degrees of dryness (rūkṣatva) and cohesiveness

23
The indirect or non-immediate types of knowledge are all the others, namely, abhinibodha/mati, śruta, avadhi,
and manaḥparyāya. See NS 12 and PañS 41.
12 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

(snigdhatva) and it is precisely these modal modifications that enable basic particles to join into
aggregates. 24 The Pravacana-sāra II.73 explains:

ṇiddhā vā lukkhā vā aṇupariṇāmā samā va visamā vā /

samado durādhigā jadi bajjhanti hi ādiparihīṇā //

The cohesive and dry transformations of particles, either even or odd, join when in a
state of two degrees more than even […]. 25

This is a very interesting example of modal modification, which topples the idea that an innately
produced paryāya must be single only. Paryāyas of material particles are produced innately,
yet they are many. From this follows, that also paryāyas of kevala-jñāna could potentially be
many. Another point that the example of the modal modification of material particles
establishes is that innately produced modes can be qualitatively changing, meaning that
qualitative change is not always dependent on the presence of an external factor. This, however,
is also a feature in which the modal modification of material particles deviates from the case of
kevala-jñāna, which is qualitatively stable. The case of material particles (2b), thus, proves
useful for the issue of the dynamics of perfect jīvas but only to a certain extent.

Shortly after the description of pudgala in the above-cited Niyama-sāra 28,

Kundakunda moves on to explain the nature of the immaterial inanimate substances of space
(ākāśa), medium of motion (dharma), medium of rest (adharma), and kāla. In the Niyama-sāra
33, he says the following (2c) with regard to their modal dynamics:

[…]
dhammādicaoseṇaṃ sahāuguṇapajjayā hoṃti //

[…]
The four [substances] of dharma etc. [= adharma, ākāśa, and kāla] have innately
produced modes and attributes.

Like the perfect jīvas and basic material particles, the four immaterial inanimate substances
also have innately produced paryāyas. Further descriptions of the nature of the independent
modal modification of these substances are very scarce in all of the texts analyzed here, with

24
The other guṇas of material particles, namely, colour, taste, and smell, are not explicitly described as changing
qualitatively when particles are isolated and not in an aggregate formation, which is the reason why the primary
focus here is on the guṇa of touch.
25
See also PS II.74.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 13

the exception of those concerning the substance of kāla. 26 Kundakunda describes the modal
dynamics of kāla by referring to basic material particles. In the second śruta-skandha of the
Pravacana-sāra, he explains that a single basic material particle gives measure to a single
space-point (pradeśa). 27 In the Pravacana-sāra II.46 and II.47, he utilizes this definition to
clarify the modal character of kāla:

samao du appadeso padesamettassa davvajādassa /

vadivadado so vaṭṭadi padesam āgāsadavvassa //
vadivadado taṃ desaṃ tassama samao tado paro puvvo /
jo attho so kālo samao uppaṇṇapaddhaṃsī //

A moment is without space-points. It occurs while that substance the measure of which
is a space-point [i.e. material particle] crosses a space-point of the substance of space.
A moment is equivalent to the crossing of the space-point. The object which is before
and after that is kāla. A moment is originated and passing away. 28

This account very much agrees with the descriptions of the general dynamics of substances that
were mentioned at the beginning of the paper. Kāla is the substance that persists throughout the
origination (utpanna) and passing away (pradhvaṃsa) of its paryāyas, which are referred to as
moments (samaya). Each samaya lasts as long as a single material particle takes to cross a
single space-point. According to this criterium, which is the only one stated, samayas as the
paryāyas of kāla are matching. In this correspondance, the samayas of kāla differ from the
multifarious paryāyas of the guṇa of touch belonging to basic material particles. With it, the
possibility of an existence of a dravya with a succession of paryāyas that are innately produced
but do not undergo qualitative change, is established. The changing character of kāla would in
this case not refer to a change in kind or amount. It would rather indicate the coming and going
of the particular elements of the modal sequence and these elements would – despite the
continuous progression of their coming and going – remain qualitatively identical to one
another. Might such also be the ontology of perfect jīvas?

26
For dharma see PañS 84.
27
See PS II.48.
28
See also PS II.50–1.
14 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

IV.

At the beginning of this paper, a series of qualitatively different paryāyas of perfect cetanā was
excluded as impossible from the moment of the attainment of perfection. Throughout the
discussion, which discarded the possibility of change in the perfect cetanā arising from
cognitive content, the alternative to a series of qualitatively different paryāyas proposed was
either a single everlasting perfect paryāya or a series of paryāyas that would not suffer
qualitative but another type of change. As pointed out, in the case of the first, the dynamic
nature of jīvas’ cognitive functions would be concluded with the attainment of perfection.
Despite the changing of everything else, kevalins would be characterized by staticity only. In
the case of the second, however, modal dynamics of jīvas’ cognitive functions would not simply
stop when reaching perfection but rather take on a different character than before. By drawing
parallels with the modal modification of kāla, a possible ontological model for the perfect
cognition of jīvas, retaining both permanence and change, emerged. According to this model,
modal change of perfect cognition would stand for a momentary arising of qualitatively
identical modes of kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana. 29 Such a model would match the general
ontological descriptions of reality as marked by both permanence and change, as well as
facilitate the everlasting perfection of kevalins.

In the Pravacana-sāra, however, Kundakunda’s ontological account of kevalins seems

to depart from the general ontological descriptions that the accounts of kāla are so perfectly
accommodating. For example, the Pravacana-sāra I.17 says:

bhaṃgavihīṇo ya bhavo saṃbhavaparivajjido viṇāso hi /

vijjadi tass’ eva puṇo ṭhidisaṃbhavaṇāsasamavāyo //

In the case of him [i.e. a kevalin] becoming is without destruction and decay devoid of
production. Moreover, he is the coming together of stability, production, and loss.

29
The author owes the conception of this idea to several sources. In a private correspondence, when asked how
one could imagine the dynamics of jīvas after the annihilation of all destructive karmans, Piotr Balcerowicz
suggested that one way of conceiving of it, could be a series of identical paryāyas. In a private conversation, Kamal
Chand Sogani proposed that the modality of perfect jīvas is a kind of turning unto itself. The third source is the
first volume of A History of Indian Philosophy, where Surendranath Dasgupta in the concluding chapter “Mokṣa
(emancipation)” of the section dedicated to Jainism without giving a reference includes the following description:
“In the saṃsāra stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining
the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and
thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge,
etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities” (Dasgupta 2006: 207).
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 15

Such a description is a turning upside down of his statement in the Pravacana-sāra II.8, where
he – employing the same terminology – says exactly the opposite about existents in general:

ṇa bhavo bhaṃgavihīṇo bhaṃgo vā ṇatthi saṃbhavavihīṇo /

[…]

Becoming is not without destruction and neither is destruction without production.

[…] 30

Whereas in the case of all existing entities, becoming (bhava) is accompanied by destruction
(bhaṅga) and destruction by production (saṃbhava), in the special case of kevalins becoming
is without destruction and decay (vināśa) without production. Thus, kevalins represent a point
of the coming together (samavāya) of stability (sthiti), production (saṃbhava), and loss (nāśa).
What could such a statement indicate? At no point does Kundakunda reduce the ontology of
kevalins to absolute permanence only. It seems that he merely plays around with the same
terminology that he uses to illustrate the general ontological dynamics, drawing attention to the
fact that in the case of kevalins the ordinary relations between paryāyas start to crumble. Why
does he do that?

A reason for it may be to highlight the ontologically unique nature of kevala or more
specifically, the exceptional modal condition of kevalins. The fact that on their path to
perfection jīvas qualitatively change from being imperfect to perfect is an aspect in which the
ontological condition of jīvas fundamentally differs from that of all the other substances. It
differs from basic material particles, since these are always qualitatively changing. Yet, it also
differs from the substance of kāla, even though they might eventually both comprise of a series
of identical paryāyas. The paryāyas of kāla, which were interpreted as qualitatively identical
to one another, always were, are, and will be innately produced and qualitatively identical,
whereas among jīvas, only kevalins possess modes that come about without any external
influence and no longer suffer qualitative change. Perhaps Kundakunda, then, utilizes the
above-noted wordplay to draw attention to the divide between the modal condition before and
after the jīvas’ attainment of perfection and the exceptional ontological event that is the
transition from one to the other.

If the ontology of the perfect condition of cetanā were to consist of a series of qualitatively
identical paryāyas, this series may, indeed, be described as one where becoming occurs, yet is

30
See also PS I.18.
16 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

without destruction, since the arising of any new mode would not impair the perfection of their
predecessor, and likewise, it may also be described as one where destruction is not accompanied
by production, since the decay of any old mode – qualitatively speaking – would not bring about
anything new. Due to the attainment of perfection, the old modal relations would converge but
not collapse into an immutable existence. This model of the dynamic, yet unique nature of the
perfect cognitive functions of jīvas which preserves the universal character of Jaina ontology
seems more credible than the alternative static model which disrupts it.

Abbreviations

NS – Niyama-sāra
PañS – Pañcāstikāya-sāra
PS – Pravacana-sāra
SS – Samaya-sāra

Bibliography

Bajželj, Ana. 2013. “The Jain Ontological Model According to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti.”
Asian Studies, 1 (17)/1, 3–16.
Bākalīvāla, Pannālāla (ed.). 1969. [Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya-sāra] Ś rı̄matkundakundasvāmi-
viracitaḥ, Tattvadı̄pikā-Tātparyavṛtti-Bālāvabodhabhās ̣eti t ̄ ̣ıkātrayopetaḥ,Sujānagaṛha-
nivāsı̄pannālālabākalı̄vālakṛta-pracalitahindı̄bhās ̣ānu-vādasahitaḥ, Pāḍhamanivāsi-
paṇdị tamanoharalālena saṃ śodhitaś ca. Agāsa: Ś rı̄paramaśrutaprabhāvaka-man ̣d ̣ala-
Ś rı̄madrājacandra-jaina-śāstramālā,Ś rı̄mad-rājacandra Āśrama.
Bhārilla, Hukamacanda (ed. and trans.). 1960. [Kundakunda, Niyama-sāra] Niyamasāra:
Śrīmad Padmaprabha Maladhārīdeva Tātparyavṛtti nāmaka saṃskṛta ṭīkā sahita. Jaipur:
Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal Sarvodaya Ṭraṣṭ.
Bhārilla, Hukamacanda (ed. and trans.). 1990. [Kundakunda, Pravacana-sāra] Pravacanasāra.
Jaipur: Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal Smārak Ṭraṣṭ.
Bhatt, Bansidhar. 1974. “Vyavahāra-naya and Niścaya-naya in Kundakunda’s Works.”
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 28, Supplement II: XVIII. Deutscher
Orientalistentag, 279–91.
Bhattacharya, Hari Satya. 1966. Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics. Bombay: The Seth Santi Das
Khetsy Charitable Trust.
Chakravarti, A. (ed. and trans.). 2001. [Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya-sāra] Ācārya
Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāya-sāra (The Building of the Cosmos). New Delhi: Bharatiya
Jnanpith.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 17

Chakravarti, A (ed. and trans.). 2008. [Kundakunda, Samaya-sāra] Ācārya Kundakunda’s

Samayasāra. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith.
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 2006. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 169–207.
Dixit, K. K. 1971. Jaina Ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology.
Dundas, Paul. 2002. The Jains. London and New York: Routledge.
Emmrich, Christoph. 2003. “How Many Times? Monism and Pluralism in Early Jaina
Temporal Description.” In: Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion (ed. Piotr Balcerowicz).
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 69–88.
Faddegon, Barend (trans.). 2014. [Kundakunda, Pravacana-sāra] The Pravacana-sāra of
Kunda-kunda Ācārya, Together With the Commentary, Tattva-dῑpikā, by Amṛtacandra Sūri (ed.
F. W. Thomas). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fujinaga, Sin. 1999. “Kundakunda on Sarvajña.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 47/2,
23–6.
———. 2000. “Akalaṅka’s Theory on Sarvajña: Proving the Existence of Omniscience.”
Indian Culture and Logic (Fukuoka), 10, 717–30.
———. 2006. “Why Must There Be an Omniscient in Jainism?” In: Studies in Jaina History
and Culture: Disputes and Dialogues (ed. Peter Flügel). London and New York: Routledge,
107–16.
———. 2007. “Hemacandra on Sarvajña.” In: Studia Indologica: Professor Satya Ranjan
Banerjee Felicitation Volume (ed. Jagat Ram Bhattacharyya). Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers,
379–86.
Glasenapp, Helmuth von. 1942. The Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy. Bombay: Trustees,
Bai Vijibai Jivanlal Panalal Charity Fund.
———. 1999. Jainism: An Indian Religion of Salvation. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1992. On Being and What There is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of
Indian Ontology. Albany, New York: SUNY Press.
Hiriyanna, Mysore. 2005. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Jain, Pannālāl (ed. and trans.). 1919. [Kundakunda, Samaya-sāra] Samayasāra: Ātmakhyāti-
Tātparyavṛtti-Ātmakhyātibhāṣāvacanikā iti ṭikātrayopetaḥ. Agas: Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśram.
Jaini, Padmanabh S. 2001a. “On the Sarvajñatva (Omniscience) of Mahāvīra and the Buddha.”
In: Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies (ed. Padmanabh S. Jaini). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
97–121.
———. 2001b. The Jaina Path of Purification. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
———. 2010. Collected Papers on Jaina Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Jhaveri, Indukala H. 1990. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariṇāma. Ahmedabad:
Gujarat University.
Johnson, W. J. 1995. Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism
with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
———. 2014. “Jainism: From Ontology to Taxonomy in the Jaina Colonisation of the
Universe.” In: Categorisation in Indian Philosophy: Thinking Inside the Box (ed. Jessica
Frazier). Farnham Surrey, England; Burlington: Ashgate, 133–145.
18 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas

Matilal, Bimal K. 1977. “Ontological Problems in Nyāya, Buddhism and Jainism: A

Comparative Analysis. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 5/1–2, 91–105.
———. 1981. The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-Vāda). Ahmedabad: L. D.
Institute of Indology.
———. 2008. Logic, Language and Reality. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Padmarajiah, Y. J. 1963. A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge.
Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal.
Pathak, K. B. 1931. “Kumārila’s Verses attacking the Jaina and Buddhist Notions of an
Omniscient Being.” Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, XII, 123–31.
Qvarnström, Olle. 2006. “The Jain-Mīmāṃsā Debate on Omniscience.” In: Studies in Jaina
History and Culture: Disputes and Dialogues (ed. Peter Flügel). London and New York:
Routledge, 89–106.
Ramaiah, C. 1978. The Problem of Change and Identity in Indian Philosophy. Tirupati: Sri
Venkateswara University.
Sain, Uggar (trans.). 2006. [Kundakunda, Niyama-sāra] Acharya Kundakunda’s Niyamasāra.
New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith.
Schubring, Walther. 1957. “Kundakunda echt und unecht.” Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 107, 537–574.
———. 2000. The Doctrine of the Jainas: Described after the Old Sources (trans. Wolfgang
Beurlen). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Singh, Ramjee. 1974. The Jaina Concept of Omniscience. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of
Indology.
Solomon, Esther A. 1962. “The Problem of Omniscience (Sarvajñatva).” Adyar Library
Bulletin, 26/1–2, 36–77.
Soni, Jayandra. 1991. “Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya in Jaina Thought.” Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 19, 75–88.
———. 1996. “The Notion of Āpta in Jaina Philosophy.” The 1995 Roop Lal Jain Lecture.
Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies.
———. 2003. “Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on Anekānta-vāda.” In: Essays in Jaina Philosophy
and Religion (ed. Piotr Balcerowicz). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 25–35.
———. 2007. “Upayoga, according to Kundakunda and Umāsvāti.” Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 35/4, 299–311.
Tatia, Nathmal. 1951. Studies in Jaina Philosophy. Banaras: Jain Cultural Research Society.
Upadhye, A. N. (ed. and trans.). 1984. [Kundakunda, Pravacana-sāra] Ś rı̄ Kundakundācārya’s
Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra): A Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text
Critically Edited With the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena and a Hindī
Commentary of Pāṇḍe Hemarāja. Agas: Parama-Ś ruta-Prabhāvaka Mandal, Shrimad
Rajachandra Ashrama.
Wiles, Royce. 2001. “The works of Kundakunda: An Annotated Listing of Editions,
Translations and Studies.” In: Vasantagauravam: Essays in Jainism (ed. Jayandra Soni).
Mumbai: Vakils, Feffer and Simons, 183–224.
 Kundakunda on the modal modification of omniscient jīvas 19

Wiley, Kristi. 2000. Aghātiyā Karmas: Agents of Embodiment in Jainism. PhD thesis. Berkeley:
University of California.
Zaveri, Jethalal S. and Muni Mahendrakumar (ed. and trans.). 2009. [Kundakunda, Samaya-
sāra] Samayasāra. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati University.