Nre - 190130 CD

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34597 November 5, 1982

ROSITO Z. BACARRO, WILLIAM SEVILLA, and FELARIO MONTEFALCON,
petitioners,
vs.
GERUNDIO B. CASTAÑO, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Felipe G. Tac-an counsel for petitioner.
Gerundio B. Castaño counsel for private respondent.
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal taken by petitioners from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants

to jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff the sum of (1) P973.10 for
medical treatment and hospitalization; (2) P840.20 for loss of salary
during treatment; and (3) P2,000.00 for partial permanent deformity, with
costs against the defendants.
The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We
quote:
... In the afternoon of April 1, 1960, he (appellee) boarded the said jeep
as a paying passenger at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental. It was then fined to capacity, with twelve (12) passengers in
all. 'The jeep was running quite fast and the jeep while approaching the
(Sumasap) bridge there was a cargo truck which blew its horn for a right
of way. The jeep gave way but did not change speed. ... When the jeep
gave way it turned to the right and continued running with the same
speed. In so doing ...the driver was not able to return the jeep to the
proper place ... instead, it ran obliquely towards the canal; that is why,
we fell to the ditch. ... When the jeep was running in the side of the road
for few meters, naturally, the jeep was already inclined and two
passengers beside me were the ones who pushed me. I was pushed by
the two passengers beside me; that is why, when I was clinging, my leg
and half of my body were outside the jeep when it reached the canal. ...
My right leg was sandwiched by the body of the jeep and the right side
of the ditch. ... My right leg was broken.' He was rushed to the Saint
Mary's Hospital where he stayed for about two (2) months. 'My right leg
is now shorter by one and one-half inches causing me to use specially
made shoes. ... I could not squat for a long time; I could not kneel for a
long time; and I could not even sit for a long time because I will suffer
cramp. ... With my three fingers I am still uneasy with my three fingers
in my right hand. There is a feeling of numbness with my three fingers
even right now.
xxx xxx xxx
From appellee's version just set out, it appears that after he boarded the
jeep in question at Oroquieta, it was driven by defendant Montefalcon at
around forty (40) kilometers per hour bound for Jimenez; that while
approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming
from behind blew its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep; that
the latter, without changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right,
such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around twenty
(20) meters, and that thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver
was unable to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or
diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into
a ditch pinning down and crushing appellee's right leg in the process.
Throwing the blame for this accident on the driver of the cargo truck,
appellants, in turn, state the facts to be as follows:
In the afternoon of April 1, 1960, plaintiff Gerundio Castaño boarded the

said jeepney at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis occidental. While
said jeepney was negotiating the upgrade approach of the Sumasap
Bridge at Jimenez, Misamis Occidental and at a distance of about 44
meters therefrom, a cargo truck, owned and operated by a certain Te
Tiong alias Chinggim, then driven by Nicostrato Digal, a person not duly
licensed to drive motor vehicles, overtook the jeepney so closely that in
the process of overtaking sideswiped the jeepney, hitting the reserve tire
placed at the left side of the jeepney with the hinge or bolt of the siding
of the cargo truck, causing the jeepney to swerve from its course and
after running 14 meters from the road it finally fell into the canal. The
right side of the jeep fell on the right leg of the plaintiff-appellee, crushing
said leg against the ditch resulting in the injury to plaintiff-appellee
consisting of a broken right thigh.
and take the following stand: 'The main defense of defendants

appellants is anchored on the fact that the jeepney was sideswiped by
the overtaking cargo truck' (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3-4, 7).
It must be admitted, out of candor, that there is evidence of the

sideswiping relied upon by appellants. ....
This appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals

asserts that the latter decided questions of substance which are contrary to law
and the approved decisions of this Court. Petitioners alleged that respondent Court
of Appeals erred (1) in finding contributory negligence on the part of jeepney driver
appellant Montefalcon for having raced with the overtaking cargo truck to the
bridge instead of slackening its speed, when the person solely responsible for the
sideswiping is the unlicensed driver of the overtaking cargo truck; (2) in finding the
jeepney driver not to have exercised extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight
and utmost. diligence of very cautious persons, when the diligence required
pursuant to Article 1763 of the New Civil Code is only that of a good father of a
family since the injuries were caused by the negligence of a stranger; and (3) in
not considering that appellants were freed from any liability since the accident was
due to fortuitous event - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the overtaking cargo
truck.
We are not persuaded. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken
his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per
hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about
twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of the truck.
Hereunder is the testimony of private respondent Gerundio B. Castaño on this
point:
Q At that time when you rode that jeep on your way to

Jimenez, you said that the jeep was running quite fast for a
jeep, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said that it is quite fast for a jeep, do you mean
to tell this Court that the speed of that jeep could not be made
by that particular jeepney?
A It can be made but it will not be very safe for that kind of
transportation to run that kind of speed.
Q What was the speed of that jeep in terms of miles or

kilometers per hour?
A About 40 kilometers or about that time during that trip per

hour.
Q And you said also that there was a cargo truck that was
behind the jeep, is that correct, while you were already
approaching the Sumasap bridge?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How about the speed of that truck as the jeep you were
riding was approaching the Sumasap bridge? What was the
speed of that truck, fast or not fast?
A Naturally, the truck when it asks for a clearance that he will

overtake it will run fast.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now comparing the speed that you mentioned that the jeep
was negotiating in that place and the cargo truck, which ran
faster-the jeep or the cargo truck?
xxx xxx xxx
A Naturally, the truck was a little bit faster because he was

able to overtake.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how far more or less was the jeep from the bridge
when the truck was about to or in the process of overtaking
the jeep you were riding?
A When the truck was asking for a clearance it was yet about
less than 100 meters from the bridge when he was asking for
a clearance to overtake.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you remember the distance when the truck and the jeep
were already side by side as they approach the bridge in
relation to the bridge?
xxx xxx xxx
A They were about fifty meters ... from fifty to thirty meters
when they were side by side from the bridge.
xxx xxx xxx
Q .... You said before that the jeep and the truck were running
side by side for a few meters, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am asking you now, how long were they running side by

side-the jeep and the cargo truck?
A About 20 meters, they were running side by side.
Q And after running side by side for 20 meters, the jeep and
its passengers went to the canal?
A Yes.
Q You said on direct examinaton that when the jeep (should

be truck) was blowing its horn and asking for a way, you said
that the jeep gave way and turned to the right and did not
recover its position and the jeep fell into the ditch, is that what
you said before?
A The jeep did not recover. It was not able to return to the
center of the road. It was running outside until it reached the
canal, running diagonally.
Q When the jeep gave way to the cargo truck, the jeep was at
the right side of the road?
A Already on the right side of the road.
Q And this jeep was running steadily at the right side of the
road.
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the jeep gave way to the cargo truck and it kept its
path to the right, it was still able to maintain that path to the
right for about twenty meters and while the jeep and the cargo
truck were running side by side?
A Yes.
Q When the truck and the jeep were already running side by
side and after having run twenty meters side by side, do you
know why the jeep careened to the ditch or to the canal?
A I do not know why but I know it slowly got to the canal but I
do not know why it goes there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when the jeep was about to be lodged in the canal,
you stated that the jeep was running upright, is that a fact?
A Yes.
Q So that the terrain was more or less level because the jeep
was already running upright, is that not correct?
A The jeep was running on its wheels but it is running on the

side, the side was inclining until it reached the ditch.
Q You mean to tell the Court that from the entire of the fifteen
meters distance from the side of the road up to the place
where the jeep was finally lodged that place is inclining
towards the right?
A When the jeep left the road it was already inclining because
it was running part side of the road which is inclining.
(Transcript of March 25 and 26, 1963).
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was
overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have
been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting
narrower the truck would be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped
it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the
right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge
at the same time.
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on the part of the
jeepney driver to exercise extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight and
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, when the diligence required pursuant
to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only that of a good father of a family. Petitioners
contend that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver
of the truck. However, the fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the
private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the
exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the Passengers safely as

far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and
obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A

common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead
of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
"using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a
passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely,
the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court
in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a
fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case - the
sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have
been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not
wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated September

30,1971, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, ** Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

11) Bacarro v. Castano 118 SCRA 187
Facts:
Castano filed a complaint for damages against Montefalcon because the

former sustained a broken leg due to the latter’s reckleness in driving
his passenger jeep. During the excursion, Montefalcon had been racing
side by side with a truck w/c was asking to overtake it. In response,
Montefalcon allowed the truck some clearance, but decided to race it to
the Sumapsap bride. As the two neared the bridge, the road narrowed.
Despite this, Montefalcon continued to race with the truck. As a result
thereof, the jeepneey fell into a ditch, thereby causing Castano to break
his leg. (naipit. my leg and half of my body were outside the jeep when
it reached the canal. ... My right leg was sandwiched by the body of the
jeep and the right side of the ditch. ..)
In his defense, Montefalcon claimed that his jeepney was sideswept. His
claim was supported by evidence.
Issue:
w/n Montefalcon is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Castano. It reasoned:
had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck
was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck,
there would have been no contact and accident. He should have
foreseen that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting
nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would
be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise
stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the
right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross
the bridge at the same time.
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on the part
of the jeepney driver to exercise extraordinary diligence, human care,
foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious person, when the
diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only that
of a good father of a family. Petitioners contend that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the truck.
However, the fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the
private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of
Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code
which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of
petitioner Montefalcon.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the Passengers

safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights
and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the
Code of Commerce and by special laws.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary

diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the
new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary
diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in
the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely,
the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon
respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the
accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the alleged
fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the
cargo truck, was something which could have been avoided considering
the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to
admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
ROSITO Z. BACARRO, WILLIAM SEVILLA, and FELARIO MONTEFALCON,
petitioners,
vs.
GERUNDIO B. CASTAÑO, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
ER:
 Castaño boarded a jeep being driven by Montefalcon. While approaching
Sumasap Bridge, a cargo truck coming from behind blew its horn to signal its
intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep gave way by swerving to the right,
such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around twenty (20)
meters, and that thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable
to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely ran unto an inclined
terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing
Castaño’s right leg in the process.
 WON Montefalcon was negligent? Yes, the fact is Montefalcon did not
slacken his speed. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was
getting narrower, the truck would be too close to the jeep and would
eventually sideswiped it.
 WON only diligence of a good father of a family is required of Montefalcon?
No, reliance on Art. 1763 is misplaced. There was a contract of carriage
hence extra-ordinary diligence is required of the common carrier as provided
for in Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code.
 Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil
Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a
common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide “using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons.” (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured,
or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed
to be at fault.
Facts:
 CASTAÑO boarded the jeep at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis
Oriental. The jeep was filled to capacity, with 12 passengers in total.
 The jeep was running quite fast and while it was approaching the Sumasap
bridge, there was a cargo truck who blew its horn, signaling its intent to
overtake.
 The jeep gave way, by swerving to the right, but it did not change speed (40
km/hr). The cargo truck and the jeep were running side by side for a distance
of around 20 meters. The driver of the jeep was not able to return the jeep to
the proper lane and instead ran obliquely towards the canal until it fell into the
ditch.
 When the jeep was running on the side of the road, the road was inclined a
little and Castaño was pushed outward by the passengers beside him such
that he was clinging with his leg and half of his body outside the jeep.
 The jeep then fell, breaking the leg of Castaño.
 Castaño was rushed to St. Mary’s Hospital where he stayed for 2 months.
Because of the accident, his right leg is now shorter by 1 ½ inches
necessitating him to use specially made shoes. He complained that he was
not able to squat, kneel, nor sit for a long time because of his leg. He also lost
two fingers on his right hand and the remaining 3 fingers feels numb up to
this time.
 Montefalcon’s defense hinged on his allegation that the accident was
because the cargo truck overtook the jeep so closely that in the process of
overtaking sideswiped the jeep, hitting the reserve tire placed at the left side
of the jeep. This caused the jeep to swerve and run into the ditch, falling into
the canal.
 CFI decided in favor of Castaño and the CA affirmed.
 Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON Montefalcon, the driver, is negligent? YES
WON only diligence of a good father of a family required of Montefalcon? NO
WON the accident was a fortuitous event? NO
Held: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
Montefalcon was negligent
 Had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was
overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would
have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the
speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the
road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the jeep and would
eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep
when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the two
vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.
Exercise of extraordinary diligence required

 There was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the
herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles
1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of
extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
o Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
o Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
o Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and
obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws.
 Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil
Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a
common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide “using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons.” (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured,
or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed
to be at fault.
Accident was not a fortuitous event

 The sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which
could have been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge
which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of
Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y

MALECDAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY,
FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT,
DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs
of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia
Cudiamat, respondents.
Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.

Antonio C. de Guzman for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against
petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident
which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among
others, it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal
was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and
safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat.
However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said
driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought
his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging
said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not
absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it
was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject
incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of
damages in their favor by way of a counterclaim.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of
petitioners, with this decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that

Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause
of his death. Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay
the heirs of Pedrito Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the
amount defendants initially offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of
the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision 3
in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside the decision of the lower
court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents:
1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for

death of the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;
3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as

actual and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 4, 1990, 5
hence
this petition with the central issue herein being whether respondent court erred in
reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and
liable for the damages claimed.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a

rule are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is
subject to settled exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate
court are contrary to those of the trial court, in which case a reexamination of the
facts and evidence may be undertaken. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as to who between the petitioners an the
victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we have had to conduct an evaluation of the evidence in this case for the prope
calibration of their conflicting factual findings and legal conclusions.
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a moving vehicle, especially with one of
his hands holding an umbrella. And, without having given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to
board the bus. But defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this connection, it is safe to
assume that when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was open instead
of being closed. This should be so, for it is hard to believe that one would even attempt to board a vehicle (i)n motion
if the door of said vehicle is closed. Here lies the defendant's lack of diligence. Under such circumstances, equity
demands that there must be something given to the heirs of the victim to assuage their feelings. This, also considering
that initially, defendant common carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It did offer a certain monetary
consideration to the victim's heirs. 7
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees'own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is evident that the subject bus was
at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain
Miss Abenoja alighted from the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the victim did indicate his
intention to board the bus as can be seen from the testimony of the said witness when he declared that Pedrito
Cudiamat was no longer walking and made a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him. It
was at the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the platform of the bus when the latter made
a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in prematurely stepping on the
accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that
the platform of the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The defendants-appellees utterly failed
to observe their duty and obligation as common carrier to the end that they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to the circumstances
of each case (Article 1733, New Civil Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the above holding of the Court of Appeals. Its
aforesaid findings are supported by the testimony of petitioners' own witnesses. One of them, Virginia Abalos, testified on
cross-examination as follows:
Q It is not a fact Madam witness, that at bunkhouse 54, that is before the place of the incident, there is a crossing?
A The way going to the mines but it is not being pass(ed) by the bus.
Q And the incident happened before bunkhouse 56, is that not correct?
A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9
The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:
Q When you arrived at Lepanto on March 25, 1985, will you please inform this Honorable Court if there was anv
unusual incident that occurred?
A When we delivered a baggage at Marivic because a person alighted there between Bunkhouse 53 and 54.
Q What happened when you delivered this passenger at this particular place in Lepanto?
A When we reached the place, a passenger alighted and I signalled my driver. When we stopped we went out because
I saw an umbrella about a split second and I signalled again the driver, so the driver stopped and we went down and
we saw Pedrito Cudiamat asking for help because he was lying down.
Q How far away was this certain person, Pedrito Cudiamat, when you saw him lying down — from the bus how far
was he?
A It is about two to three meters.
Q On what direction of the bus was he found about three meters from the bus, was it at the front or at the back?
A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both
between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim
boarded the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on
where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
deceased was guilty of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since
the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not
in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus,
once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor,
every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting
to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop
their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are
liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while
they are doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent
under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th
bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. 13
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. 14
An
ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving
conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers
board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience
both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such
an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to
such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to
those alighting therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordina diligence
for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. 16
A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances. 17
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger.
By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured victim immediately
to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can
even be stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could have forthwith turned
at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight
and to deliver a refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the victim. The vacuous reason given by petitioners that it was
the wife of the deceased who caused the delay was tersely and correctly confuted by respondent court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they had to wait for about twenty minutes for
Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed deserves scant consideration. It is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife
whose husband is at the verge of dying to have the luxury of dressing herself up for about twenty minutes before
attending to help her distressed and helpless husband. 19
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to Bunk 70 was to inform the victim's family
of the mishap, since it was not said bus driver nor the conductor but the companion of the victim who informed his family
thereof. 20
In fact, it was only after the refrigerator was unloaded that one of the
passengers thought of sending somebody to the house of the victim, as shown by
the testimony of Virginia Abalos again, to wit:
Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?
A I asked them to bring it down because that is the nearest place to our house
and when I went down and asked somebody to bring down the refrigerator, I
also asked somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat.
COURT:
Q Why did you ask somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A Because Mr. Cudiamat met an accident, so I ask somebody to call for the
family of Mr. Cudiamat.
Q But nobody ask(ed) you to call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A No sir. 21
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent Court of Appeals in computing
the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim
of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would
have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other incidental expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased may fairly and reasonably be fixed at
P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In adjudicating the actual or compensatory damages, respondent court found that the
deceased was 48 years old, in good health with a remaining productive life expectancy of 12 years, and then earning
P24,000.00 a year. Using the gross annual income as the basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it accordingly awarded
P288,000. Applying the aforestated rule on computation based on the net earnings, said award must be, as it hereby is,
rectified and reduced to P216,000.00. However, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the death indemnity is hereby
increased to P50,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Civil Case No. 584-R, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City.
2 Rollo, 51.
3 Penned by Justice Bonifacio A. Cacdac, Jr., with Justices Gloria C. Paras and Serafin V.C. Guingona concurring.
4 Rollo, 26-27.
5 Ibid., 48.
6 Sabinosa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 175 SCRA 552 (1989).
7 Original Record, 169; Judge Rodolfo D. Rodrigo, presiding.
8 Rollo, 25.
9 TSN, January 20, 1987, 26-27.
10 TSN, November 18, 1986, 3-4.

11 See Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 900 (1929).
12 14 Am. Jur. 2d 436.
13 TSN, January 20, 1987, 11.
14 Am. Jur. 2d 414.
15 Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., supra.
16 Art. 1733, Civil Code.
18 Sy vs. Malate Tajdcab & Garage, Inc., 102 Phil. 482 (1957); Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Caguimbal, et al., 22
SCRA 171 (1968).
19 Rollo, 25.
20 TSN, June 20, 1986, 3-4.
21 TSN, January 20, 1987, 16.
22 Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 31 SCRA 511 (1970); Davila, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
49 SCRA 497 (1973).
23 People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 (1990).

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755
FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus
belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro
alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly
accelerated forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their
respective destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital
where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for
the death of Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the operation of the co. and the supervision of
the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at
large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his
negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity
P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages,
actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver
Theodore
HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to
bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of
increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board the
same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection
pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the
carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious
condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the
family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings
Dangwa Transco. Co. Inc. v. CA
Facts:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of
Pedrito Cudiamat. The deceased was attempting to board a bus, but it suddenly
accelerated forward. He fell off and the bus ran over him, resulting to his death.
Issue:
Whether the bus is liable as a common carrier to the deceased who was still attempting
to board
Held:
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable
length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they
are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting
up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.
ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner.
M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review

of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of

October 27, 1982, is hereby affirmed with the modification that appellant
Aboitiz Shipping is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellees the amount
of P30,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; actual damages of
P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income; P7,200.00 as support for
deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by
respondent court, are as follows: .
The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded
the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No.
117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel
arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of
the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After
said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over
the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to
the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') between
the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane
operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1)
hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane
was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from
said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still
loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was
pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes
were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the
vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where
he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause
of his death according to the Death Certificate (Exh. "C") being
"hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone
lacerating the urinary bladder" (See also Exh. "B"). For his
hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses,
Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E",
"E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana who was only forty (40) years old when
he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in good health. His average
annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay
annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior
to his death had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support
or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered
mental anguish and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of
the instant case, they had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten
thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. 2
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner

corporation (Aboitiz, for brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the
accident, the vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the exclusive stevedoring
contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of
Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of
Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against

Pioneer imputing liability thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been
allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was an employee
of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that
Aboitiz had no cause of action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being
sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer is not a
party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in
the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of
damage or injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto
Viana's gross negligence was the direct and proximate cause of his death; and
that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by reason of the pendency
of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the
crane operator, Alejo Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to
pay the Vianas for damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse
Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid the Vianas. The dispositive portion of
said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:
(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs

the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as
actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F
5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years
for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's
parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art.
2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and
costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation

to reimburse defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation the said amounts that it is ordered to pay to herein plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they
similarly raised the trial court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with
gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence presented in support thereof.
In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's motion, that under the
memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for
any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation
of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability
for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of
negligence against the crane operator which the court a quo ruled is never
presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement supposedly
refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it
but not in the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly
invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its liability stems from a breach of
contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party

defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs

the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic)
as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay
computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years
for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for
deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years
pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral
damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for

(sic) any liability for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V
Antonia owned by defendant third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation it appearing that the negligence of its crane operator has
not been established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the
same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial
court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court
erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La
Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is
applicable to the case in the face of the undisputable fact that the factual
situation under the La Mallorca case is radically different from the facts
obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of
the court a quo and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of
Appeals that the deceased, Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory
negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory negligence was
the proximate cause of his death; specifically the honorable respondent
Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent

Court of Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned to pay
damages to the private respondents we respectfully submit that it
committed a reversible error when it dismissed petitioner's third party
complaint against private respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever
damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents
Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of
Appeals found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but
holding that it was the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel
to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct,
immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time
Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than
ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his
presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased
to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or
premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All
persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances,
and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure.12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the
fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example,
such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of
La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and

passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still
a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination
and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises,
but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a
fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent
of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed
reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a
passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad company and
its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his
baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus.
Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However,
although the father was still on the running board of the bus waiting for
the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so
that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It
was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run
over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious
person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a
common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract
of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in
said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's
premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending
circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its
business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was
no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's
premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before
the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence
of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the
petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a

shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark
from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect
to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are
capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an
hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage
whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a
very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the
bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's
cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the
contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition,
we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at
the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As
earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had
already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear
to us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already
docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the
minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be
presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve
his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence
in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage
which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was
admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing
circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said
carrier at the time of his tragic death.
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where
all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage
and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the
passenger safely to his destination, 18which, in the instant case, necessarily
includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while
such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's

death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This
is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the
passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a
stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise
adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree
of care and diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of
the passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented
carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption
against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to
prevent the accident from happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a
cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also
adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity
was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept
petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently
warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious
peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums
loosely placed around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against
entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into
insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the
deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily
diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly
and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the
forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts
approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be exercised "as
far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of common
carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of,
because it could definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in
paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has expressly conceded the
factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present
sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana
was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent

court's declaration that there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation, a confirmation of the trial court's finding to that effect, hence our
conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged
gross negligence of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the
passenger was due to the negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained
both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory. Even
in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the
necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact
which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading
Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party
complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against it.
Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary
diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on,
common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have
said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the
failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger
is the rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Nicolas P. Lapena, Jr. and concurred in by

Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Segundino G. Chua, Rollo, 79-
100.
2 Rollo, 88-89.
3 Annex A, Petition: Rollo, 23-27.
4 Annex B, id.; ibid., 28-30.
5 Annex C, id.; ibid., 31-32.
6 Annex D, id.; ibid 33-38.

7 Penned by Judge Willelmo C. Fortun; Annex E, id.; ibid., 39- 44.
8 Penned by Judge Jose H. Tecson; Annex F, id.; ibid., 45-61.
9 Petition, 4; Rollo, 9.
10 7 SCRA 739 (1966).
11 80 C.J.S. 1086.
12 13 C.J.S. 1073.
13 14 Am. Jur 2d 250.
14 Supra, 743-744.
16 Art. 1755, id.
17 Art. 1756, id.
18 Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., 82 Phil. 359 (1948); Brito Sy vs.
Malate, Taxicab and Garage, Inc., 102 Phil. 482 (1957).
19 Rollo, 16-17.
Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
(179 SCRA 95)
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from Occidental
Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the passengers therein
disembarked through a gangplank connecting the vessel to the pier. Viana, instead
of disembarking through the gangplank, disembarked through the third deck, which
was at the same level with the pier. An hour after the passengers disembarked,
Pioneer stevedoring started to operate in unloading the cargo from the ship. Viana
then went back, remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At that time,
while he was pointing at the crew of the vessel to where his cargoes were loaded,
the crane hit him, pinning him between the crane and the side of the vessel. He
was brought to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May 15). The parents of
Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed a
motion for reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an order absolving
Pioneer from liability but not Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the
incident?
Held: Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or
premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All
persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances,
and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on the attending

circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its
business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors.
Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of
contract where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract
of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier
to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant case,
necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary
diligence while such relation subsists.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120027 April 21, 1999
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and
REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners,
vs.
FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 1 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila. 2
The rule is well-settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally
considered final and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, this principle
admits of certain exceptions, among which is when the findings of the appellate
court are contrary to those of the trial court, a re-examination of the facts and
evidence may be undertaken. 3 This case falls under the cited exception.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother
and legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne, both surnamed Raynera.
Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver,
respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer with plate No. NXC 848, involved in the
accident.1âwphi1.nêt
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his
way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East
Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him
at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets
extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There
were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal
plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left
rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision,
Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D.
Lutelo 6 rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital,
the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera
dead on arrival.
At the time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. He was 32 years old, had a life expectancy
of sixty five (65) years, and an annual net earnings of not less than seventy three
thousand five hundred (P73,500.00) pesos, 8 with a potential increase in annual
net earnings of not less than ten percent (10%) of his salary. 9
On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded 10 from respondents
payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo
Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the
claims.
On September 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila 11 a
complaint12 for damages against respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
In their complaint against respondents, petitioners sought recovery of damages for

the death of Reynaldo Raynera caused by the negligent operation of the truck-
trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights.
In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respondents alleged that the truck was
travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion of the
road, with no tail lights, license plate and early warning device.
At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at about 1.00 and
2:00 in the morning of March 23, 1989, he and his wife went to Alabang, market,
on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road going south, and saw a
parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail lights. They would have
bumped the truck but the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place
was dark, and the truck had no early warning device to alert passing motorists. 13
On the other hand, respondents presented truck helper Geraldino

Lucelo. 14 He testified that at the time the incident happened, the truck was slowly
traveling at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Another employee of
respondents, auto-mechanic Rogoberto Reyes, 15 testified that at about 3:00 in the
afternoon of March 22, 1989, with the help of Lucelo, he installed two (2) pairs of
red lights, about 30 to 40 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates. 16 On his
part, traffic investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del Monte 17 admitted that these lights
were visible at a distance of 100 meters.
On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. It
found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these
circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and tail lights; (2) there
were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts 18 each, on both sides of the steel plates;
and (3) the truck trailer was improperly parked in a dark area.
The trial court held that respondents' negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of Reynaldo Raynera's death, for which they are jointly and severally liable
to pay damages to petitioners. The trial court also held that the victim was himself
negligent, although this was insufficient to overcome respondents' negligence. The
trial court applied the doctrine of contributory negligence 19 and reduced the
responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the victim's own negligence.
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion that it is fair and
reasonable to fix the living and other expenses of the deceased the sum
of P54,000.00 a year or about P4,500.00 a month (P150.00 p/d) and
that, consequently, the loss or damage sustained by the plaintiffs may
be estimated at P1,674,000.00 for the 31 years of Reynaldo Raynera's
life expectancy.
Taking into account the cooperative negligence of the deceased

Reynaldo Raynera, the Court believes that the demand of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20 ratio. Thus,
P1,337,200.00 shall be paid by the defendants with interest thereon, at
the legal rate, from date of decision, as damages for the loss of earnings.
To this sum, the following shall be added:
(a) P33,412.00, actually spent for funeral services,

interment and memorial lot;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(c) cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of
Appeals. 21
After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court held that Reynaldo
Raynera's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause
or his death, 22 and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.
Hence, this petitition for review on certiorari.
In this petition, the heirs of Reynaldo Raynera contend that the appellate court
erred in: (1) overturning the trial court's finding that respondents' negligent
operation of the Isuzu truck was the proximate cause of the victim's death; (2)
applying the doctrine of last clear chance; (3) setting aside the trial court's award
of actual and compensatory damages.
The issues presented are (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b)
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo
Raynera.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Raynera's death was
respondents' negligence in operating the truck trailer on the highway without tail
lights and license plate.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
"Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do." 23
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occured." 24
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs
taken of the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail lights of license
plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs
of lights on top of the steel plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck.
With regard to the rear of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot
report proved that there were no tail lights.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible
in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the
cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with
the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents
installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was
traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in
the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bulbs
were on top of the steel plates, 26which were visible from a distance of 100
meters . 27 Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board,
he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. 28 In
light of these circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless
the victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise dues care and prudence
demanded of him under the circumstances.
Virgilio Santos' testimony strengthened respondents' defense that it was the victim
who was reckless and negligent in driving his motorcycle at high speed. The
tricycle where Santos was on board was not much different from the victim's
motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost
bumped into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle driver was able to void hitting
the truck.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are
presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence". 29 The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle
in front of him.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision
with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was
the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the
last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45,
Manila.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Promulgated on April 26, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 35895, Eighth

Division, Justice Bernardo L1 Salas, ponente, concurred in by Justices
Jaime M. Lantin, Chairman, and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.
2 Dated December 19, 1991, Judge Benito C. Se, Jr., presiding.
3 Cayabyab vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 123 SCRA 1, 4; see

also Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217, Golangco vs. Court of
Appeals, 283 SCRA 493, 503, Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
698, 710; Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465, 470; Remalante
vs. Tibe 158 SCRA 138; Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 126699, August 7, 1998.
4 tsn., February 8, 1991, p. 11.
5 tsn., February 8, 1991, pp. 5-9.
6 Police Spot Report, Exh. G, Original Records, p. 81.
7 Ibid.
8 Per certification issued by Digna S. Remolana, personnel manager,

Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation on May 18, 1989, Exh. D, Original
Records, p. 78.
9 Complaint, Original Records, p. 2.
10 Exh. K, Original Records, p. 85.
11 Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-50355.

12 Complaint, Records, pp. 1-5.
13 Memorandum for the Petitioners, Rollo, p. 186.
14 tsn., February 8, 1991.
15 In the decision of the trial court, he was referred to as Rogo Roberto

Reyes.
16 tsn. January 29, 1991.
17 tsn. October 1, 1990.
18 The trial court's decision stated that the bulbs installed on top of the
steel plates were 50 watts each, but from the testimonies of the
witnesses before the trial court, they said that the bulbs were 30 to 40
watts each.
19 Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148

SCRA 353.
20 Regional Trial Court Decision, CV Case No. 89-50335, Rollo, p. 66.
21 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 35895.
22 Court of Appeals Decision, CA-G.R. No. 35895, Rollo, p. 51.
23 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695,

703.
24 Ibid., at pp. 706-707.
25 Art. IV. Sec. 34 (I) Use of Red Flag — Whenever the load of any
vehicle extends more than one meter beyond the bed or body thereof
there shall be displayed at every projecting end of such load a red flag
not less than thirty centimeters both in length and width, except that
during the hours fixed under sub-section (c) [not later than one-half hour
after sunset and until at least one-half hour before sunrise and whenever
weather conditions so require], there shall be displayed, in lieu of the
required red flags, red lights, visible at least fifty meters away.
26 tsn., October 1, 1990, p. 13.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 tsn., October 15, 1990, pp. 4-6.
29 Cf. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 189 SCRA 158, 168.
Raynera vs. Hiceta
G.R. No. 120027 | April 21, 1999
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Edna Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and
legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne
2. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver,
respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer, involved in the accident.
3. March 23, 1989, at about 2am:
- Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on
the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa.
- The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The
truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on
the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about
35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates.
- The asphalt road was not well lighted.
- At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left
rear portion of the trucktrailer, which was without tail lights.
- Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino
D. Lucelo rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center.
- Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre,
pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
4. At the time of his death, Reynaldo was the manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation; 32 y/o; had a life expectancy of 65 y/o; annual
net earnings of not less than P73,500
5. Heirs of deceased demanded from respondents payment of damages arising from the
death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident
6. Respondents refused to pay the claims
7. Petitioners filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages against respondents
owner and driver of Isuzu truck
- Sought recovery of damages for the death of Raynera caused by the negligent
operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights
8. Respondents:
- Truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark
portion of the road, with no tail lights, license plate and early warning device
9. TC: in favor of petitioners; found respondents negligent because the truck had no
license plate and tail lights; there were only 2 pairs of red lights, 50 watts each, on
both sides of the steel plates; the truck was improperly parked in a dark area; the
respondents’ negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Raynera’s death;
reduced responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of victim’s own negligence
10. Respondents appealed to CA
11. CA: Raynera’s bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate
cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability
12. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were negligent; If so, whether such negligence
was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera
HELD: NO
RATIO:
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”
Proximate cause is “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.”
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs taken
of the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates installed
on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the
steel plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear of the
truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents’ truck was visible in the
highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.
It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed
a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code
(Republic Act No. 4136), respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates,
as the vehicle’s cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling
behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable
him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the
prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50watts bulbs were
on top of the steel plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. Virgilio Santos
admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of
iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. In light of these circumstances, an accident
could have been easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too fast and did not
exercise due care and prudence demanded of him under the circumstances.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are
presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.” The
rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the
situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.

Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to
the Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son.
Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first
assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed
that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was
dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this
Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila

Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults
of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of
that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge
in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to
Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed
Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union)
trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the
starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of
duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa
was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the
Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of
Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was
that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation,
and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the
Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result,
Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of
transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when
the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of
1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers
absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent
acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case
was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that
Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially
reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly
remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for
liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the
statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of
the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in
the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines
expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by
its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically
states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were
taken from Anglo-American Law.2There, the basis of the carrier's liability for
assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine
of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to
transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of
the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that
the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently
follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons
underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216
S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the
special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care
prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers
and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants
charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's
violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's
hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger,
delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care
prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former
must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against
passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove
them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns
of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court
rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.
The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's
action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was
not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was
convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount
recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a
breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy
followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to
other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence
thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764
award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the
passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim
therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral
damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the
circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000
damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to
plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in

plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on
both from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount
is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Section 4, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Republic Act 386.
2
Report of the Code Commission, p. 64.
3
For an extensive discussion, see 53 ALR 2d 721-728; 732-734.
4
Williams vs. Shreveport Yellow Cab Co., 183 So. 120; Southeastern
Greyhound Lines vs. Smith, 23 Tenn. App. 627, 136 SW. 2d 272.
5
10 Am. Jur. 105-107, 263-265.
6
Dixie Motor Coach Corp. vs. Toler, 1997 Ark. 1097, 126 SW 2d 618; Van
Hoeffen vs. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591, 162 S.W. 694;
Brockway vs. Mordenti, 199 Misc. 898, 103 NYS 2d 621; Korner vs.
Cosgrove, 141 NE 265, 31 ALR 1193.
7
Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 7.
8
Record on Appeal, p. 35.
9
Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29 & L-13358, Sept. 29, 1961.
10
Art. 2210, Civil Code.
Maranan vs Perez
Doctrine:
The common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers. (Art. 1759)
Facts:
Rogelio was a passenger in a taxi owned and operated by Perez, when he was stabbed
and killed by the driver, Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide. He was
found guilty.
Maranan, Rogelio’s mother, filed an action to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed
in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Perez
further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
Issue/s:
1. Whether Perez is liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether the dismissal of the claim against Valenzuela is correct.
Held:
1. YES. Unlike the old Civil Code, the New Civil Code expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers (Art. 1759). This rule was adopted from Anglo- American law, where the
majority view, as distinguished from the minority view based on respondeat
superior, is that the carrier is liable as long as the assault occurs within the course
of the performance of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the
act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The
carrier's liability is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers
from assaults committed by its own employees.
2. NO. Plaintiff’s action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the driver
was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he
was convicted by final judgment.
Title: G.R. No. L-22272 Maranan v. Perez Case
Facts of the Case:

The carrier was charged for damages due to the case where his former employee
executed homicide.
According the Civil code of the Philippines, made a point that the common carrier is
"liable for the damages done by his employees to their
passengers" by the wording of Art. 1759 which states that:
"Common carriers are liable for the death or of injuries to passengers through
negligence or willful acts of the former's employers, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the Common carriers."
Antonia Maranan, the mother of the victim filed an action in the court of First Instance
of Batangas to recover damages from Perez who is the carrier and Valenzuela, who is the
suspect found guilty of homicide for the death of Rogelio Corachea, her son. In defense of
Perez claimed that deceased was killed in self-defense because he was the first who
assaulted the driver. In addition to that, the defendant claimed that the death was caso
foruito which means Perez, the carrier is not liable for the damages done. In the end, the
lower court adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Article 1759 of the Civil Code
Issues:
 Whether the carrier did not partake on the crime scene, is responsible for the
protection of the passengers?
 Whether the carrier is not involve in that event, is responsible for the action of his
employees?
 Whether it is not the fault of the carrier committing the crime, is liable due to the
fact that he hired the employee who
failed transporting the passenger to safety?
 Whether it's the employee's fault, the carrier will bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier's employees against
passengers?
Decisions:
The court's decision is yes, the carrier is liable for the damages due to Art. 1759 of the
Civil Code proves his guilt.
The three very least reasons to which the remaining issues are also 'yesy', explained
in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver
v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier
requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the
exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence
and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the
acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said
liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result
of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the
passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier
and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of
the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has
power to select and remove them.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the
Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision
of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death
of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or
how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,

along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit),
and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim
against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had
failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998,
the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against

the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for
lack of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly
and severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the

appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-
appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as
yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when
the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying
the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from
liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows
upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad
by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA
and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their
failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution
of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the
appellate court; viz:
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY

DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the
factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was
not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which
caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have
been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s
conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an
employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a

contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare
at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all
the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court
had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing
the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger

on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if
the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. 5 Such
duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.6 The
statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury,
the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that
negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of
its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire
its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with
Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability
is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established,
the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated
by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a
factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask
further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A
contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort
may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad),
for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly
proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial
justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty
of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless
to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical
relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for
his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable.

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 18 It is
an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED
and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 16.
2
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
3
Rollo, pp. 18-19.
4
Arada vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 624.
5
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423.
6
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 575.
7
Article 1763, Civil Code.
8
Gatchalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126; Yobido vs. Court of Appeals, 281
SCRA 1; Landingin vs. Pangasinan Transportation Co., 33 SCRA 284.
9
Mercado vs. Lira, 3 SCRA 124.
10
11
Vda. De Abeto vs. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 30 July 1982.
12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
13
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated

persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special

agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
14
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
15
Air France vs. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722.
16
PSBA vs. CA, 205 SCRA 729.
17
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Manila Railroad vs. Compania
Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875.
18
19
Medina, et al. vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506.
LRT vs. NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT.
He got into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and
Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran
over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the
train driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and
Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver
Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for
compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed

between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train
tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death
after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by
Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert
evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped
the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory
damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and
its obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required
of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art.
2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New
Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use

utmost diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all
circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they
ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to

passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or
(b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case
of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved
of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would

be for a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the
fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent,
would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach –

How then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and
an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would
be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to

actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is
an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (transportation)
Laws Cited: Art. 1755,Art. 1756,Art. 1759,Art. 1763
FACTS:
 October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor)
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”.
 While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the
guard Junelito Escartin approached him.
 Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
 Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by
a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman
 December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children,
filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro
Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the
death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent
 Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence
in the selection and surpervision of its security guards
 LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
 Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task
 RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint
against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
 CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract
of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is

DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is
absolved.
 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers
 Civil Code:
 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances
 Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof
that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and
supervision of their employees
 Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
 Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden
shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure
 Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common
carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage
 GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related
provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that
which breaches the contract)
 EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee, employer can be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
 EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
 Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of
Nicanor for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
 NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability
 Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation
bet. Nicanor and Roman
 Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
Light Rail Transit Authority
vs. Marjorie Navidad
Petitioner: Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) & Rodolfo Roman

Respondent: Marjorie Navidad, Heirs of Late Nicanor Navidad & Prudent Security
Agency
Ponencia: Vitug
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Nicanor, who was drunk, entered the EDSA LRT after purchasing of a ticket. While
Nicanor was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned in the area (working under the Prudent Security Agency)
approached Nicanor and the two had a misunderstanding and fought. No evidence was
presented to show who started the fight.
1. Marjorie, widow of Nicanor, and children filed a complaint for damages against
Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit, and Prudent for the death of her
husband.
a. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent.
b. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards
2. RTC judged in favor of Navidad and ordered Prudent Security and Escartin to pay
damages while Roman and LRTA was dismissed for lack of merit.
3. Prudent appealed to the CA and the CA ruled that Prudent and Escartin were not liable
and that Roman and LRTA was the ones liable.
a. CA ruled saying that although Navidad had not boarded the train yet, a contract
of carriage had already existed when Navidad entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the token and
b. LRTA and Roman failed to show that emergency brakes could not have stopped
the train in time. Prudent was exempted because there was no showing that
Escartin inflicted blows upon Navidad. CA denied MR. hence this petition.
4. Hence this present petition
a. Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended
that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of
the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
ISSUES:
1. W/N LRTA is liable. Yes

2. W/N Prudent is liable? No.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. LRTA is liable
Common carriers are burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence
in ensuring the safety of passengers.
Provisions
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as

far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers

are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
Law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it

not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract
of carriage.
They are liable for death of or injury to passengers
a. Through the negligence or willful acts of its employees

b. Willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission.
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or

been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier
is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
2. NO, Prudent is not liable.
Prudent in this case may only be liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176
and related provisions, in conjunction with Art 2180. The premise, however, for the
employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such
fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families (diligence of a good father) in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been
shown.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Art of the Civil Code can apply.
Liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract
When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties,
the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules
on tort to apply.
In other words, when an act which constitutes the breach of contract,

tantamounts to a quasi-delict, if there had been no contract, the contract can
be said to be have been breached by tort which would mean that the rules
on tort can apply.
There is nothing that links Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.
There is also no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say,
the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical
relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only
for his own fault or negligence.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-34597 November 5, 1982

Felipe G. Tac-an counsel for petitioner.

Gerundio B. Castaño counsel for private respondent.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants

xxx xxx xxx

In the afternoon of April 1, 1960, plaintiff Gerundio Castaño boarded the

and take the following stand: 'The main defense of defendants

It must be admitted, out of candor, that there is evidence of the

This appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals

Q At that time when you rode that jeep on your way to

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was the speed of that jeep in terms of miles or

A About 40 kilometers or about that time during that trip per

xxx xxx xxx

A Naturally, the truck when it asks for a clearance that he will

xxx xxx xxx

A Naturally, the truck was a little bit faster because he was

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q I am asking you now, how long were they running side by

A About 20 meters, they were running side by side.

Q You said on direct examinaton that when the jeep (should

A Already on the right side of the road.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

A The jeep was running on its wheels but it is running on the

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the Passengers safely as

Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated September

Melencio-Herrera, ** Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Castano filed a complaint for damages against Montefalcon because the

w/n Montefalcon is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.

Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Castano. It reasoned:

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the Passengers

Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary

Held: CA decision AFFIRMED.

Exercise of extraordinary diligence required

Accident was not a fortuitous event

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y

Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that

1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for

2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;

3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as

4. The costs of this suit. 4

It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a

A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9

The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:

A It is about two to three meters.

A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)

Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

6 Sabinosa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 175 SCRA 552 (1989).

7 Original Record, 169; Judge Rodolfo D. Rodrigo, presiding.

9 TSN, January 20, 1987, 26-27.

10 TSN, November 18, 1986, 3-4.

12 14 Am. Jur. 2d 436.

13 TSN, January 20, 1987, 11.