1

Vladimir Katasonov

IS MATHEMATICS REALLY A LANGUAGE OF NATURE?

«Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our
gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and
read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark
labyrinth»1. This famous quote from Galileo is used almost every time the genesis of modern
natural science is described. Indeed the quote points to an important characteristic of the modern
science, the fact that so much of it is written in the language of mathematics.

For the pioneers of modern natural science such as Descartes, Leibnitz and Newton basic
analytical geometry and the basics of differential and integral calculus were quite enough.
Consequently some philosophers and historians of science have conclusded that modern science
was founded on the only adequate form for physics and study of nature - the mathematical
language.2 Thus the point of view of a famous historian of science Alexandre Koyré has become
popular, according to which the XVII century early scientists replaced the world of
approximations characteristic for the antiquity and the Middle Ages with the world of precision
(l’Univers de la précision).3

The world, however, remained the same. The issue concerns only the language of its description.
The presentation of the laws of physics in the form of mathematical equations has become self-
evident, with only a few historians of science remembering Galileo’s critical and at that time
novel insight that the laws of physics may be expressed mathematically. Galileo recognized the
enormity of the change. Until then, It was necessary to argue for it because the previous
scientific tradition – the physics of antiquity and the Middle Ages was associated with the sort of
non-mathematical dialogue and discussion introduced by Aristotle. According to Galileo, this

1
Galileo G. The Assayer (1623), translated by Stillman Drake. Internet resource:
http://jraissati.com/PHIL201/Galileo_1623_TheAssayer.pdf
2
Nevertheless, hesitations in the omnipotence of mathematics as a means of the knowledge of the world are voiced
from time to time. See, for instance: Penrose R. The Emperor’s new mind. Oxford, 1989; Mathematics and
Sciences. Edited by Ronald E.Mickens. Word Scientific, 1990; Simms, Eva-Maria. Goethe, Husserl, and the Crisis
of the European Sciences. Duquesne University (http://www.janushead.org/8-1/simms.pdf) Janus Head. Summer Field Code Changed
2005 | 8.1 P.160-172; Larenz, Rudolf. Physics – “alienation from” instead of “orientation towords” the Creator ?;
In: ARTIKULY. Roczniki Teologii Moralnej. T.3(58), 2011. P.5-37; Mellett, Tom. Goethean science: Bringing
chaos to order by looking phenomena right in the “I” (http://southerncrossreview.org/6/goethe.htm)
3
Koyre A. Du monde de “l’a-peu-pres” a l’Univers de la precision // Koyre A. Les etudes d’histoire de la pensee
philosophique. Paris, 1961. P.311-329.
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non-mathematical worldview had been challenged, found wanting and been superceded. The
language of mathematics was where discovery lay.

§ 1. The science of antiquity and Galileo

To recognize the enormity of this change we need to recognize that Aristotelian physics was
qualitative. To understand movement in a particular situation, for example, one needed to
consider the four acting Aristotelian causes: formal, material, final and efficient. In current
thinking, only one out of these four causes has retained its place in the modern physics – the
efficient one.

That said, Aristotelian physics was a well-thought out logical scheme, based on the solid
foundation of metaphysics, the perfection of which is impossible to miss if some effort is spent
on its understanding. Aristotle rejected the possibility of uings mathematics in natural science
because in his understanding mathematical objects were necessarily abstract. To use
mathematics as a tool for enquiry meant isolation individual features under investigation and
seeing them apart from the real physical thing. This separation between analysis and reality
caused a problem. In science, the physical, material thing itself must be discussed. Consequenly,
Stagirite concluded that reality itself and should not be reduced to mathematics.

In addition, not only did the Aristotelian idea of mathematics prevented him from creating
mathematical physics, Aristotle also shared the dominating conviction of the majority of antique
philosophers that it is impossible to apply mathematics to the study of natural processes because
in the material world everything is changing. For them, everything was in movement, πάντα ρέι
– “everything flows”, “you cannot enter the same river twice”.4 So how can you measure this
moving element, the material world, when it is constantly changing?.

Of course, in antiquity there existed the ancient Pythagorean tradition, from which the phrase
“everything is a number” remained. This tradition influenced Plato in particular, who attempted
to give a mathematical construction of the 5 traditional elements of the antique cosmos in his
“Timaeus”. There was also the genius Archimedes, who formulated the lever rule and, according
to the tradition, discovered the law which bears his name. Nonetheless the majority of the Greek
scientists held the opinion that mathematical physics is a round square (or, rather, square circle).5
Composed of the four elements – earth, water, air and fire – the things of the sublunary world

4
See, for example, the utterances of Heraclites in the book: Fragments of Early Greek Philosophers. Part I.
(Fragmenty rannikh grecheskikh filosofov. Chast’ I. In Russian) M., 1989, p.177.
5
In particular, the area of a square is easily found and the area of a circle is a classical impossible task of “squaring
a circle”.
 3

can neither produce a smooth surface, nor a perfect sphere, so how could the rules of
mathematics can be applied? On the other hand, it was possible to apply maths in the
superlunary world, where everything consists of the fifth element, ether. In Greek thought, ether
could take precise geometrical forms, in particular, the heavenly bodies surrounding the earth
consist of ether. Such perfection meant that mathematical astronomy was possible, and great
examples of it, from Eudoxus to Ptolemaeus, are clear examples of the achievements possible
within antique science. But they phiolosopers were in agreement: mathematical physics of the
sublunary world is impossible.

§2. Of spheres and planes

Against this background, however, Galileo was among those who undertook the most difficult
task to prove that it is possible to use mathematics in physics.6 He attempted it in many of his
works and still was unable to prove it decisively! For example in his famous condemned book
“The Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican” (1632) he
approaches this task two times. On the second day of the dialogues, Simplicio, who is advocating
the traditional Aristotelian physics, remarks that all mathematical statements are not applicable
to material objects at all. To argue his case, he takes the example of a sphere and a plane. While
it is mathematically possible when studying geometry to say that a sphere touches a plane at one
point only, this could not be said of real objects the physical world. Mathematics again could not
describe the real world. Galileo’s port-parole, Salviatti, offers a whole discourse aiming to refute
this, and attempts to find a solution to the issue: “Then when ever in concrete you do apply a
material sphere to a material plane, you apply an imperfect sphere to an imperfect plane
[because it is impossible to make a perfect material sphere and plane – V.K.], and these you say
do not touch only in one point. But I must tell you, that even in abstract an immaterial sphere,
that is, not a perfect sphere, may touch an immaterial plane, that is, not a perfect plane, not in
one point, but with part of its superficies, so that hitherto that which falleth out in concrete, doth
in like manner hold true in abstract”7.Thus, says Salviatti, f your mathematics describes a non-
perfect sphere and plane, then, mathematics and reality can match

but the argument is clever, but did instead of proving that a material sphere touches the material
plane in one point, Salviatti concludes that the solution require diminishing the beauty and

6
Another one was Descartes. His approach was more radical.
7
Galileo G. Dialogues on two world systems. Tr. Thomas Salusbury. P.185. London,1661. See on Archimedes
Project: http://archimedes.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/cgi-bin/toc/toc.cgi?dir=galil_syste_065_en_1661;step=thumb.
 4

hence value of the components.: “And it would be a new thing that the computations and rates
made in abstract numbers, should not afterwards answer to the Coines of Gold and Silver, and to
the merchandizes in concrete. But do you know Simplicius, how this commeth to passe? Like as
to make that the computations agree with the Sugars, the Silks, the Wools, it is necessary that the
accomptant reckon his tares of chests, bags, and such other things: So when the Geometrical
Philosopher would observe in concrete the effects demonstrated in abstract, he must defalke the
impediments of the matter [how??? – V.K.], and if he know how to do that, I do assure you, the
things shall jump no lesse exactly [??? – V.K.], than Arithmetical computations. The errours
therefore lyeth neither in abstract, nor in concrete, nor in Geometry, nor in Physicks, but in the
Calculator, that knoweth not how to adjust his accompts. Therefore if you had a perfect Sphere
and plane, though they were material [?!? – V.K.], you need not doubt but that they would touch
only in one point”.8

This discourse is amazing in its pathos: “Don’t doubt !..” But did Galileo manage to prove – for
it was his problem – that the material sphere touches the material plane in one point? In no
way. The process of measurement or the application of mathematics to physics is compared here
to the employment of mathematics in trade, in evaluating the amount of goods etc. As concerns
“the Coines of Gold and Silver” and monetary units in general, it is more simple: all monetary
units are discrete, and in this sense they always correspond to some integer (in arithmetic). But if
you take “the Sugars, the Silks, the Wools”, then the difficulties immediately arise: it is
impossible to measure them precisely, the values of their amounts are always approximate, and
so is their price, even if the weight of boxes, wrappers and other packing is discarded.

In fact, Galileo says that it is possible to estimate the amount of goods, not to clearly find out
“how many grams?” but just estimate: about a kilogram, or, roughly, two tons. It is enough for
the calculations in trade and economics. But he suggests the same thing to the philosopher-
geometer, i.e. the physicist of the new formation. Here it is not enough. The mathematical
physics claims to express the very “physical truth” precisely, and it is suggested to her to just
make numerical estimations of the physical phenomena… It remains unclear, too, how is it
possible to “defalke the impediments of the matter”, as Galileo says.9 What does it mean that
“the things shall jump no lesse exactly”? What does this exactness mean? The convergence of
true size with the calculated one? But the fact is, we don’t know the “true size”… Neither does
he say how to make a perfect material plane and sphere10 It is also totally wrong that if we make

8
Ibid.
9
Below we will discuss how this is done in the modern physics.
10
Although in this question the crafty Galileo also suggests some artisan “decisions”.
 5

such a material sphere and plane, they could touch in one point. In geometry, when two bodies
touch, the point of touch belongs to both bodies, for instance to a plane and a sphere
simultaneously. This is implied by the very definition of touching. But for material bodies it is
impossible, because the characteristic feature of matter is its impermeability. Galileo, as far as
we know, never mentions this obstacle for touching of material bodies.

It turns out, that Galileo Galilei, a noted inventor, a superb dialectician in the original sense of
this Greek word, builds a new mathematical physics, spends a lot of effort to prove its
fundamental thesis about the applicability of mathematics to the study of the material nature, but
nevertheless does not succeed in providing the new science with a solid foundation. Who is
right? the Greeks or the Modern science? Can mathematics be applied to natural science, or,
more precisely, can the behavior of the material nature, the “physical truth”, be expressed in the
language of mathematics?

Greeks refused to build mathematical physics for reasons of principle. Not only because
everything in the material world is in the process of change, “everything flows”, but also because
of the Greeks’ understanding of the correspondence between number and value, or arithmetic
and geometry. In the present-day mathematics, geometry is fully arithmetized: each point of the
space has its precise coordinates and, thanks to analytical geometry, geometrical problems can be
solved analytically, working with the equations of curves, planes etc. But in Greek mathematics,
arithmetic and geometry were sciences not reducible to each other.

First of all, the very notion of number differed from ours. For the antique mathematics the term
“number” always means a natural number. Neither our fractional numbers, nor the negative ones,
or (especially) the irrational numbers are numbers in the sense of the antique mathematics.
Antique mathematics does not know the last ones. Instead of the fractional numbers, the Greeks
consider the ratio of values, i.e. commensurate and incommensurate segments. However it did
not come to the Greek mind to call this ratio a number. Neither does antique mathematics know
negative numbers. Greeks understand well that if you have a unit of length, you can make a
correspondence between some of the segments and a number, their length, if a finite number of
the units of length fit into these segments. But if a segment is not measured by the finite number
of individual segments, then the unit of length can be divided into smaller equal (“aliquot”)
segments and we can try to measure the segment under consideration with these smaller “units”.
If the unit of length and the measured segment are commensurate, it is always possible to find
such a subdivision and the length of the segment can be expressed through these “parts of a unit”
(through a rational number in our language).
 6

The so called Euclid’s algorithm allows in this case to find the common measure of the
segments. But it is to the Greeks that we owe the discovery of the irrationality, the irrational
ratio. If we take the diagonal of the square with the side 1, it will be incommensurate with this 1:
no aliquot part of the side of the square will fit n integer times into the diagonal. The discovery
of incommensurability was a shock to the Greek scientific and philosophical thought. It was a
fatal blow to the Pythagorean hopes that “everything is a number”. It turned out that not
everything can be measured! Not even in geometry,11 all the more so in physics, in the material
world! Echoes of this discovery are present in many fields of the Greek culture.12 The
“Apollonic” clarity of the precise numerical ratios were not enough for understanding the world.
Immeasurable abysses were discovered: Euclid’s algorithm applied to incommensurate segments
extends to the irrational infinity…

§ 3. Edmund Husserl on the method of mathematical physics

Edmund Husserl was perfectly aware of all the problems connected to mathematical physics. In
his last unfinished book beginning with the review of the crisis of the modern European science
in the 20th century, he analyses the issue of “Galilean science” and mathematical natural science
in detail. The main thing he stressed was that the application of mathematics to physics was not
some trivial and self-evident measurement of physical values. Its application is a special method
used in physics. Aiming at creation of a new universal science, phenomenology, with its own
new method, the philosopher showed the peculiarity and the particularity of the method of
mathematical physics. As with any method, this last one has its own justification, but its limits as
well.

“In an actual measurement made in relation to contemplated experienced data, of course, only
empirically inaccurate quantities and numbers corresponding to them are found. But measuring
art in itself is at the same time the art to advance the "accuracy" of the dimension in the direction
of ever greater perfection. It is an art not as a ready method of producing whatsoever, it is also a
method to improve your technique again and again thanks to the invention of new means of art

11
It is the inattentiveness to the problem of mathematization of space which allows Koyre to talk about the
“universe of precision”, connected with the modern science. In the aforementioned article he writes: “Unlike space,
which is essentially measurable as a whole in its essence, which is perhaps the very essence of measurable and
appearing before us only as something demanding measure, time, being essentially immeasurable as a whole etc
[My translation from French].” (Koyre, ibid., P.320). The measurability of the geometrical space, as an even more
difficult problem of the structure of physical space has always been a problem.
12
Platonic dualism is also connected with this. Mathematical incommensurability served as an illustration for the
idea that the Platonic Demiurge could not subdue the self-will of matter (ἀνάγκη, “ananke” – necessity) at the
creation of the world. In “Timaeus” Plato, describing the creation of the material elements, writes: “as regards the
numerical proportions which govern their masses and motions and their other qualities, we must conceive that God
realized these everywhere with exactness, in so far as the nature of Necessity submitted voluntarily or under
persuasion (italics mine – V.K.), and thus ordered all in harmonious proportion” (Plato, Timaeus, 56c)
 7

(for example, its instruments).”13 Paradoxically, the justification of the method of mathematical
physics, where measurement is on the foreground, consists, in some sense, in … its inaccuracy,
in the process of advancing its limits more and more, in the evermore searched for and found
precision of measurements. “According to our observation, - writes the author of “The Crisis of
European Sciences”, - Galileo’s idea is a hypothesis, and a very notable one; the actual natural
science, confirming this hypothesis for centuries, turns out to be no less remarkable a
confirmation. Notable, because even confirmed, the hypothesis still remains a hypothesis;
confirmation (the only thinkable for it) is the endless course of confirmations. The very essence
of natural science, its a priori mode of being, consists in endlessly being a hypothesis and
endlessly being a confirmation.”14

At no point of the historical development of mathematical physics have we any reduction of

this, so to speak, “epistemological tension”: all theories remain rooted in the fundamental
hypothesis of the possibility of mathematization of nature. And besides, it is impossible to
reduce this tension in science existing in history in principle: “… In the total idea of physics
there is this “in infinitum” as a constant form of that inductivity of a special kind which was for
the first time introduced into the historical world by geometry. In the endless progress of correct
theories and in some of them, collected under the title “Natural Sciences of that or other age”, we
have the progress of hypotheses, which are totally hypotheses and confirmations. Progress
implies growing perfection; generally speaking, in relation to all natural science, it means, that it
approaches itself more and more closely, approaches its “final” true meaning, gives better and
better “idea” of what is “true nature”. But the true nature is enclosed in the infinite not as, let’s
say, pure straight line; as an infinitely far “pole” it is also the infinity of theories and is thinkable
only as confirmation, i.e. is correlated with the infinite historical process of approximation.”15

This substitution of the true being, or life-world (Lebenswelt) with the world of the
mathematized theories began, according to Husserl, already with the mathematization of
geometry, which took place progressively in the 16th-17th centuries. It is not accidental that one
of those who brought that process to an end, Rene Descartes, is simultaneously also one of the
creators of the modern mathematical physics.16

13
Husserl E. Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phaenomenologie. Part II, § 9,
P.43. (My translation from German). Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2012.
14
Ibid., P.44.
15
Ibid., P.45.
16
See book: Katasonov V.N. Metaphysical Mathematics of the 17th Century. (Metafizicheskaya matematika XVII
veka. In Russian). M., 2010. Chapter I.
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“In some sense, - Husserl writes, - this arithmetization of geometry as if by itself leads to the
hollowing of its meaning. The real spatial-temporal idealities, originally acting in geometrical
thinking under the familiar title of “pure contemplations”, turn into, so to speak, pure gestalts of
numbers, into algebraic formations. In algebraic calculations geometrical value retreats by itself
to the second plan and even disappears; only after the end of calculation we remember that
numbers, of course, meant some values. Of course we count here not “mechanically”, as in usual
numerical count, we think that we invent something, make more or less great discoveries – but in
an imperceptibly shifted, “symbolic” sense. Later it leads to the fully conscious methodological
shift: for instance, a methodical passage from geometry to pure analysis, considered to be a
special science, takes place, and the results achieved in it are applied to geometry.”17

Lebenswelt (life-world) is one of the complex and contradictory categories of the Husserl’s
philosophy. It is difficult to give this notion a precise definition, because the philosopher used
that term in many ways and with different meanings. However the critical potential carried by
this name is evident. Life-world calls upon us to return to the immediate universal human
experience of life and reject its substitution with metaphysical fiction, even if it is confirmed to
some extent by the scientific results.

“The apparel of ideas, called “mathematics and mathematical natural science”, or the apparel of
symbols, symbolic-mathematical theories, includes in itself all, that for scientists and simply
educated people substitutes the Life-world, redresses it under the guise of “objectively real and
true” nature. Thanks to the apparel of ideas, we take that which is a method for true being – a
method, aimed at improving rough previsions in an endless progress. These previsions are
initially only possible within the frames of really known and knowable Life-world with the help
of “scientific” previsions: it is thanks to the ideal redressing the very meaning of the method,
formulae, “theories” remained unclear until the origin of the method remained naïve.”18

The question of the justification of the application of this method, stresses Husserl, the
conjugation of geometrical and numerical spaces with the “physical” reality remains suspended
in the air. What does the science turn into then? Does it solve its ambitiously proclaimed goal of
knowledge?

17
Husserl E. Die Krisis…, P.47.
18
Ibid., P.55.
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“Isn’t science and its method similar to some machine, which evidently is very useful and in this
respect reliable; everyone is able to learn to use it, not understanding at all what is its inner
capacity and necessity of the results achieved with its help?”19

For Husserl, Galileo is in this sense both “the genius of revealing and the genius of concealing”.
He discovers the “mathematical nature”, subdued to the universal laws of causation, and starts an
endless process of moving along this road. But at the same time all these new discoveries of
mathematical physics also conceal something, namely, the fundamental truth of the
“unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences”.20 As can be seen from the
quotations above Husserl was not an enemy of modern science. Nevertheless he insisted that its
method is a deviation from the most fundamental discoveries of the antique speculation with its
principal distinction of science proper, ἐπιστήμη, from τέχνη.

§ 4. Infinity

But since the 17th century, physics starts to speak the language of mathematics. Were the
pioneers of that new science, Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton not aware of those
arguments against mathematical language of natural science, which were discovered already in
Antiquity? Quite the contrary! They knew them all, because almost all the main works of the
antique science and philosophy had already been translated into Latin and partially into the new
languages. They are very well aware of the fact of incommensurability, of infinity, into which
Euclid’s algorithm extends when a common measure for incommensurate segments is looked
for, and still… they discuss it in such a way, as if any value can be measured. This paradox is
explained by the fact that attitude towards infinity had changed seriously by the 17th century.
Actual infinity now acts not as an irrational abyss, where any science is impossible.
Philosophical and scientific speculations about infinity are sanctified by the theological tradition:
the notion that the Christian God is actually infinite. The system of Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa
already existed, in which the actual infinitely small element is a common measure for any
values…

It is within the frame of the same ideology that differential and integral calculus appear.21
Leibniz calls it “metaphysics of geometers”.22 The main thing happening here is the growth of

19
Ibid., P.56.
20
See a famous article: Wigner E. The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences//
Communications in pure and applied mathematics. Vol. 13, No. I (February 1960). New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
21
More info in articles, devoted to the problem of infinity, and in the book: Katasonov V.N. The One Who Wrestled
with the Infinite. Philosophical-religious aspects of the genesis of G. Cantor’s theory of sets. (Borovshiysya s
beskonechnym. Filosofsko-religioznye aspekty genezisa teorii mnozhestv G. Kantora. In Russian) M., 1994.
 10

the conviction that everything can be measured. Any segment may be correlated with a chosen
measurement unit in a numerical way. Not only a commensurate segment, but also a
incommensurate one. In the last case its value will be an irrational number. And although we’ll
have to wait until the last quarter of the 19th century for a strict conception, nevertheless already
the 17th century manipulated (geometrical) values as with numbers. The concept of irrational
number was already “in the air”.

But what exactly does it mean? An irrational number is an endless non-periodic fraction. We
cannot know the endless totality of its signs. Although in some cases we can know any number
of signs in this sequence, we can never know them all. Irrational numbers in this sense act as
some kind of symbol of the endless process and are never given as actuality. Mathematics, of
course, operates with them as a given reality, but the very nature of these numbers immediately
leads to the dichotomy of theoretical mathematics: the one, in which the existence of these
numbers is proven, and the other, so to speak, the practical, computational mathematics, in which
we can only approximate them endlessly…23

It is necessary to note, that the strict building of the theory of actual numbers essentially uses the
idea of the actually infinite set. The theory of sets, since its emergence in the works of G. Cantor,
had to be based on axioms, validity of which is not recognized by many scientists (for instance,
the very axiom of the existence of actually infinite set; the axiom of choice; the so called
consistency of the set of natural numbers). Inside the theory of sets, some problems were put
forward that have not been solved (e.g.so called, continuum- hypothesis), and after the famous
works by Gödel and Cohen, the logical incompleteness of this theory became clear. All this
indicates that in the actual infinity, the human mind meets an object, for which the problem of
the commensurability of this object to this mind remains open and its solution highly doubtful…

§ 5. Measurements and Technologies

22
Specifically, Leibniz writes: “…fate has bestowed upon our age especially the fact that after so many years of
oblivion the torch of mathematics, as I call it, shone again. For Archimedean techniques of exhaustion through the
indivisible and infinite were discovered and developed, that could be called metaphysics of geometers, and that, if I
am not mistaken, were unknown to most of the ancients, with the exception of Archimedes [italics mine – V.K.]”
(Leibniz G.W. Works in 4 volumes. (Sochineniya v 4 tomakh. In Russian) Vol.3. M., 1984, p.452). New
mathematics, which emerged in the XVII century: analytical geometry, mathematical analysis, theory of
probabilities, projective geometry – in the active process of its application in the new physics is in many respects
permeated by new metaphysical presuppositions, which act as a foundation not just for a new science, but for a new
civilization (See the aforementioned book: KatasonovV.N. Metaphysical Mathematics of the XVII Century; as well
as the work: Katasonov V.N. Physics, Mathematics, Metaphysics of Our Civilization// Metaphysics, Century XXI.
(Fizika, matematika, metafizika nashey tsivilizatsii//Metafizika, Vek XXI. In Russian) Issue 3, M., 2010.
23
A famous American logician and philosopher of science W. Quine called irrational numbers a myth. (On what
there is. P.18 // From a logical point of view. N-Y., 1961).
 11

At the moment we are interested not in the logical-mathematical side of the problem of
measurement, but in its practical meaning, namely the meaning for the physical science. So it
seems Galileo was right. With the help of a real number everything can be measured. Any value,
generally speaking, has a numerical equivalent. But it is only generally speaking… What
happens in the measurements of any experiment, in any measurements of a physical value in
general? To make a measurement, we use different devices. In the simplest case a ruler with
graduation. But we can never measure the length of a studied object precisely. Either its “edge”
is in between the grades of the ruler, or even if it seems to be just opposite one of them, we still
will never be able to say with certainty that we have established the length precisely. For the
very grades of the ruler, the very marks have some density and thus we return back to the
problem in the initial stage of the measurement. Also every device used for measurement, from a
ruler to a super-precise microscope, has its own limit of accuracy, under which it does not
discern lengths.

What does it mean? Strictly speaking, we can never measure a physical value precisely. In
physics we always have only an estimation of this value with some error, and never a precise
value. Even if we overcome these material obstacles, we still have an insurmountable mountain
ridge of logical obstacles. Namely, if we measure an irrational value, i.e. a segment
incommensurable with the unit of measurement, we shall receive an irrational number as a result.
In other words, an infinite non-periodical fraction. But we cannot know the infinite number of its
signs! It means, by knowing only the finite number of these signs after the comma, we will only
have an approximation to the precise value, only an estimation of the sought value. We cannot
“reset the interference of matter”, as Galileo called it. Mathematics is used in physics only as a
method of estimation and not as a method of precise calculation.

All these obstacles become more evident when we come to technique or, more broadly, to
technologies based on scientific theoretical calculations. Suppose we have to cut 100 cm from a
metal bar to make a shaft for a gear. Due to the reasons described above we will never be able to
do this precisely. We can neither precisely measure the length that was not cut it because of the
inaccuracy of the measuring devices and in the determining the thickness of the cutter, the
wobbling of the disk of the cutter during rotation etc. The piece that was cut off is only
approximately equal to the length required by the design.

But the most difficult thing is that these separate details must be later assembled into something
single, a mechanism, a car etc. The design specifies their sizes in such a way that they “suit”
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each other.24 And what about reality?25 Imagine, we have to put a gear onto the shaft so that it is
rigidly fastened to the shaft and transmit the rotational motion. What should be the size of the
hole in the gear compared to the diameter of the shaft? A little bit more, otherwise the gear
cannot be put on the shaft.26 But what does “a little bit more” mean. Such formulations are
intolerable for technologies, where the size should be known for sure. If the hole is too small
then the gear will not be put on the shaft and if it is too big, it will slide while rotating. What
should be the reasons to choose the size of this hole? The whole technical discipline
“Engineering tolerances and fits” emerges out of these concerns. This discipline remains
technical even if it aims at looking scientifically and being mathematically precise.27 It means
that to reduce the procedure, for instance, of an attachment of a gear to a shaft, to a definite strict
algorithm is impossible. In performing this procedure a certain intuition, a certain craft skill is
always necessary. By the way, the founder of the new European science Galileo Galilei who
earned money by construction and selling different tools before the age of 40 was a very skilled
craftsman.28 However different the craftsman worked and the diverse culture of the
contemporary technique based on science are, in their foundations this technique has the same
nature as crafts and this nature is ineradicable by any sciences and theories of the tolerances.

This theme also has a traditional theological refrain. The Bible is often remembered in
connection with the problem of the mathematization of physics. In the book of Wisdom of

24
Taking into account the tolerances. See below.
25
In any case not as Koyre attempted to interpret it. He writes in the aforementioned article: “… Descartes came to
the conclusion about the possibility that all activity may be permeated by theory, i.e. the possibility that the
theoretical reason addresses the reality, about the simultaneous possibility of technology and physics - the
possibility discovering its expression and guarantee in the fact that the act of cognition, disassembling and
assembling again some machine, leads to the understanding of its action, exactly the same way as the structure and
functioning of the plurality of its components is a precise analogue of the procedure, by means of which reason,
analyzing some equation into its factors, comes to an understanding of the structure and composition of this equation
[My translation from French]” (Koyre. P.314). Leaving the question how Descartes understood the application of
mathematics in physics open, we should note that analyzing an equation into its factors (multipliers) and
disassembling a machine into parts are essentially different. In the case of a machine separate parts must also be
adjusted to each other. There is no analogy for it in Descartes’ algebra.
26
Of course, in reality it can be done through warming etc., however in principle this problem does not change but
only becomes more difficult due to the disturbance introduced by the very procedure of warming and cooling. The
gear can also be rigidly fastened to the shaft with bolts, but then inevitably the analogous problems will appear for
bolts and holes, into which they are screwed. We can attempt to cheat on matter but cannot fool it with fine words…
27
Like, the errors at the manufacturing of details are distributed according to the so called normal law from the
theory of probabilities etc. However the applicability of the theory of probabilities to the material world is itself a
major epistemological problem! (See book: Katasonov V.N. Metaphysical Mathematics of the XVII century (any
edition), chapter on the theory of probabilities (In Russian)).
28
Galileo Galilei was a son of Vincenzo Galilei, master of musical instruments. He was raised up in the atmosphere
of constant discussion of artisan and scientific problems and helped his father in his work since early years. It is
interesting that during the Soviet times when the heavy industry was developed, specialists in precise mechanical
engineers were lacking. (This continues up to this day.) It was especially evident in the 60-ies, when super-precise
devices were necessary for the cosmic technology. Scientific knowledge alone was not enough , but a special craft
was needed. There is a story about “uncle Vasya” from somewhere in the Urals, who was alone able to collect a
super-precise device. He could assemble and ‘hit” in such a way, that everything “fell into place”. Galileo was also
such an Italian “uncle Vasya” himself. Or other way round.
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Solomon it says: “thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight”
(Wis.Sol.11:20). A conclusion is made that Revelation itself considers the language of numbers
as a natural one in physics.29 But what number does the quoted biblical fragment mean? Afterall,
antiquity knows only the natural numbers: 1, 2, 3… is it therefore correct to read into this the
contemporary (starting from the end of the 16th century) construction of real number, which uses
the idea of actual infinity?

At the very least, this is a serious hermeneutical problem. If we simply include the contemporary
real numbers in this number then we follow G. Cantor who rejected the traditional theological
employment of this text for the negation of the actual infinity (!!!) in the created world, saying:
but it is not said in finite number, and the logical construction of infinite numbers is already built
by me!..30 In any case, the quoted biblical fragment talks about the precision with which the
world is created. Our world after the Fall – if it is identical to the initially created world is a
serious theological question – does not give us examples of such precision: all so called
measurements in physics are just estimations of values, the question of their precision is
“suspended in the air” of diverse assumptions and postulates… Volens nolens we are reminded
of a statement by a famous mathematician of the XIX century, an opponent of the use of actual
infinity in science, Leopold Kronecker who advocated his position at the congress of
mathematicians in Berlin in 1886: “God created the integers, all the rest is the creation of
man”.31

Let’s take a look at a modern car with sparkling mirror lacquer covering, soft aerodynamic
shape, with the engine running almost silently, filled with all kinds of electronics, etc. What a
perfect creation of technological and scientific thought! What an anthem to the inquisitive human
mind, designing and building such a perfect creation, arguing, it would seem, that we humans
have creative abilities that operate at a level comparable with the Creator of the world! But if we
"look inside" we will soon become aware of a"glitz and misery" of the real technical
implementation of engineering ideas. We will see that all the shafts sit in their holes and nests
unevenly - for it is impossible to carve the details of the exact sizes - all gears, for the same
reason, are asymmetric, all gaps are made more or less "randomly crafted" and that all the visible
splendor is not something which it claims to be... And what does it mean at the "shafts sit in the
nests unevenly?" It means that there is an eccentric,:mismatch of geometrical and physical

29
In his article quoted above Koyre writes: “It is interesting that two thousand years ago Pythagoras proclaimed
number to be the essence of things and according to the Bible God founded the world on “number, weight and
measure”. This was repeated but nobody believed it. At least before Galileo nobody took it seriously” (Koyre,
P.317).
30
See more in book: KatasonovV.N., Wrestling with the Infinite…, p.116-117.
31
Quoted in: Klini S.K. Introduction into Metamathematics. P.19. Amsterdam, 1952.
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centers. This will inevitably lead to the emergence of beats and disturbances in the uniformity of
the rotation, and these beats will inevitably shake and destroy all this seemingly perfect creation.
We might craft with great skill and technological capability, but the old mathematical
uncertainties remain causing everything to go to the point of breakage! The "self-will" of the
matter of which Plato wrote, and which was never forgotten by the ancient Greeks is still not
overcome!..