Brunczel, Balázs - Disillusioning Modernity. Niklas Luhmann's Social and Political Theory

Disillusioning
Modernity
Niklas Luhmann‘s Social
and Political Theory
Balázs Brunczel
PETER LANG
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
The work of Niklas Luhmann is the most innovative and comprehensive
attempt to describe modern society. His views, in turn, have triggered the
most intensive criticism ever in social sciences. This book presents his ex-
traordinarily complex theory in a step-by-step fashion and in a way under-
standable for those who are not familiar with his thought. It examines his
views on politics, which, the author argues, is the best way to demonstrate
the provocative character of his theory. The book not only facilitates the
understanding of Luhmann’s theory but is also useful for getting an insight
into the methodological problems of the social sciences and the theoreti-
cal issues of modern society. Whether we agree with Luhmann or not, his
thoughts on democracy, legitimacy, human rights, and the welfare state
may help us understand the society we live in. The reader may consider
his disillusioning findings as challenges that can contribute to the solution
of the problems our society faces.
Balázs Brunczel is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science of

the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest.
www.peterlang.de
Disillusioning Modernity
Balázs Brunczel
Disillusioning
Modernity
Niklas Luhmann‘s Social
and Political Theory
Peter Lang
Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Wien
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To my wife, Zsuzsa, and my son, Benjámin
Contents
Introduction 11
PART I: The Structure of Luhmann’s Theory
CHAPTER ONE: General Characterization of Luhmann’s

Theory 17
A) Luhmann’s Theoretical Objectives 17
B) The Circular Structure of Luhmann’s Theory 20
C) The Levels of Abstraction in Luhmann’s Theory 24
D) The Explanatory Power of Luhmann’s Theory 29
E) The Relation of Luhmann’s Theory to Philosophy 32
F) The Way to Reconstruct Luhmann’s Theory 34
CHAPTER TWO: General Systems Theory 39
A) System as Difference 39
B) Observation as Operation 42
C) Operational Closure and Autopoiesis 46
D) Structure 49
E) Structural Coupling 52
F) Meaning 55
G) Complexity 57
CHAPTER THREE: Theory of Social Systems 61
A) Defining Communication 62
B) Communication and Its Environment 66
C) Systems Theory and Action Theory 68
D) Double Contingency 71
8 Contents
CHAPTER FOUR: Theory of Society 77

A) Interaction, Organization, Society, and Protest Movements 78
B) World Society 80
C) Communication Media 82
i) Language 84
ii) Dissemination Media 86
iii) Symbolically Generalized Communication Media 89
D) Theory of Evolution 93
i) General Theory of Evolution 95
ii) Societal Evolution 98
E) Differentiation of Society 102
i) Segmentary, Center/Periphery, and Stratificatory Differentiation 105
ii) Functionally Differentiated Society 107
iii) Societal Integration 113
CHAPTER FIVE: Societal Structure and Semantics 117
A) Semantics 118
B) Sociology Of Knowledge 120
C) Semantics Of Stratified Society 126
D) Transition To Modernity 128
E) Semantics Of Modern Society 134
PART II: Politics in Luhmann’s Theory
CHAPTER SIX: Theory of Politics 139

A) Politics as Functional Subsystem 140
i) The Function of Politics 140
ii) Power 141
iii) The Differentiation of Political System 143
iv) The Binary Code of Politics 145
B) State 147
C) Legitimation 151
D) Democracy 160
E) Public Opinion and Public Sphere 163
F) Welfare State 168
Contents 9
G) Summary 172
CHAPTER SEVEN: Luhmann’s Theory in the Context of Social
and Political Philosophy 175
A) Realism versus Constructivism 176
B) Methodological Individualism versus Methodological Collectivism 197
C) Universal Human Rights versus Cultural Relativism 206
D) Ideologies 216
i) Conservatism 219
ii) Liberalism 222
iii) Social Democracy 225
iv) Summary 229
CHAPTER EIGHT: The Criticism of Luhmann’s Theory 231
A) Criticisms of Luhmann’s Theory 233
B) The Essentially Distinct Character of Politics 241
C) The Unworkability of Luhmann’s Political Theory 249
Conclusion 259
Bibliography 269
Index 301
Introduction
Niklas Luhmann’s accomplishment in the field of social theory is outstanding

in several respects. First, its extent is considerable: during his career he en-
riched the literature of the social sciences with sixty books and hundreds of
articles. This accomplishment is even more remarkable if we take into ac-
count that his analyses spread over a variety of topics and disciplines and are
united in an interconnected system, whose coherence is ensured, on the one
hand, by the particular theoretical objective that determines Luhmann’s œu-
vre, and on the other, by the unified theoretical tools applied for the analy-
ses. In short, he sought to elaborate an extraordinarily complex and
multifaceted theory of society by applying his general systems theory. No
less amazing is the radicalism with which he strove to reform social scientific
methodology in almost every respect. All this suggests—both to Luhmann’s
followers and perhaps to his critics as well—that his theory of modern society
is the most comprehensive, most unified, and most detailed one, also that it
explores the most aspects and reveals the most new interconnections of
modern society.
Another respect in which Luhmann’s theory surpasses those of others
cannot be regarded as an explicitly positive feature although one can see it as
necessary: the difficulties arising in the course of interpreting the theory. On
the one hand, these difficulties stem from the extremely abstract terminol-
ogy of the theory, which is highly unusual compared not only to everyday
language but also to the scientific idiom. On the other hand, they are attrib-
utable to the immensely difficult, net-like structure of the theory, that is, to
the fact that its conclusions can be properly understood and accepted only in
the light of other findings, and that there is no exclusive position from which
one could gradually and convincingly expound it.
Lastly, Luhmann’s theory owes its distinctiveness to the debates sur-
rounding it. It is hard to find a single social scientist who has triggered as
much and as intense criticisms in the world of the social sciences as he did.
The tempestuous reception of his theory is only partially attributable to the
above-mentioned radical theoretical innovations. I will argue that it is more
likely due to the theory’s provocative findings about the features and possi-
bilities of our society. According to Luhmann, almost all theoretical and
12 Introduction
practical endeavors that aim at offering solutions to the challenges modern

society faces are illusions.
Relying on these findings, I believe there is no room for doubting that
Luhmann’s thoughts provide valuable ideas for many disciplines, and one
does not have to be his adherent to accept this. By embedding the key ques-
tions of the social sciences in a new, all-embracing theoretical framework,
Luhmann revealed numerous new aspects and relationships of these topics,
and this alone can open up new prospects for research even for those who do
not accept his methodological principles or theoretical findings.
In a single book, of course, I cannot present all the details of a theory of
such scope and complexity; neither can I discuss all of its aspects. At the
same time, I think that by analyzing the two topics I have singled out—the
structure and political aspects of the theory—the above-mentioned peculiar
features of the theory can be properly illuminated.
To this end, in Part I of this book, I provide an analysis of the structure
and architecture of the theory. This analysis consists in identifying and char-
acterizing its most important components, presenting the relationships be-
tween them, and revealing the endeavors that lead Luhmann to the radical
theoretical decisions mentioned above. To fulfill these tasks, it is, of course,
inevitable to proceed to some extent selectively. However much we try to ex-
plore all the important questions, there will always remain areas where one
would wish for further analysis. Moreover, because of the complex, circular,
or net-like structure of Luhmann’s theory—further complicated by the fact
that he changed or reformulated his views on more than one occasion—such
a reconstruction could also be accomplished in a different order and with dif-
ferent emphases, and the theory would appear in that case slightly different.
Thus, I deem it important to emphasize that the perspective from which I
have chosen to present Luhmann’s theory is only one among a variety of al-
ternatives, and other approaches are no less justifiable. Nevertheless, I think
that the exposition of the theory in this order and with these emphases
is an important—while not exclusive—step on the way to understanding
Luhmann’s thoughts.
I begin Part I with a preliminary chapter, in which I present the most im-
portant characteristics of the theory before entering into a detailed, system-
atic discussion. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an
overview of Luhmann’s theory, which makes it easier to understand the in-
terconnections within the theory itself and the theoretical decisions he
made. Furthermore, this overview will help me justify why I expound the
Introduction 13
components of Luhmann’s theory in the order chosen. To this end, I present

the contents and the structure of the remaining chapters in Part I (from
Chapter Two to Five) at the end of Chapter One.
The subject matter of Part II is constituted by Luhmann’s thoughts on
politics. The reason for selecting politics is my belief that both Luhmann’s
theoretical or methodological innovations and the provocative character of
his theory will chiefly make themselves manifest in a discussion of his views
on politics. At first glance, politics does not seem to have an outstanding role
in the œuvre of Luhmann, a graduate in law and a professor of sociology. He
elaborated his theory of society partly in opposition to ideas that placed poli-
tics in the center or on the top of society. As we will see, politics is only one
of the many subsystems of society in Luhmann’s theory, and as such, it can
control neither other subsystems nor society as a whole. At the same time,
however, it is also true that politics played an exceptional role in the debates
that Luhmann’s thoughts triggered. His theoretical or methodological inno-
vations would perhaps have not been considered so provocative without
their ramifications for political practice. For example, the reason Luhmann’s
thesis that society consists of closed, autopoietic systems has elicited so
fierce debates was primarily that these theoretical decisions resulted in find-
ings about the inoperability of the welfare state. This also means that the
best way to demonstrate the consequences of his abstract theoretical or
methodological decisions is to analyze politics.
In Part II, I first explore how Luhmann characterizes politics as one of the
functional subsystems of society and analyze the way he reformulates some
key concepts of political science—state, legitimacy, democracy, public opin-
ion, and welfare state—based on his theoretical findings (Chapter Six). The
reason why I have chosen these five concepts is that Luhmann has a quite
pointed opinion of them, which is different from that of mainstream political
science; moreover, his reinterpretations of these concepts illustratively em-
body the theoretical endeavors that take shape in the course of the exposi-
tion of his theory in Part I.
Because of the complexity and abstract character of Luhmann’s theory, in
any analysis of his views on politics, it is worth expanding the scope beyond
political science to include social and political philosophy, and epistemology.
In the next chapter (Chapter Seven), therefore, I explore and place
Luhmann’s thoughts in the context of four debates in social and political phi-
losophy. These debates include the conflict between realism and constructiv-
ism in the field of epistemology and the philosophy of science, the opposition
14 Introduction
of methodological individualism to methodological collectivism, the contrast

between universal human rights and cultural relativism, and the relation of
Luhmann’s theory to the most influential ideological movements. It is per-
haps not entirely clear why I place the conflict between realism and con-
structivism—a conflict about an epistemological issue—in a series of analyses
that focus on politics. My reason for doing so is that debates in social and
political philosophy can often be traced back to epistemological issues
(Alexander 1988: 197–199), also because one of the recent phases in the real-
ism–constructivism conflict, the science wars as it is called, had political as-
pects, too. Thus, we can say that these four debates play a central role in
social and political philosophy, and being so, they can serve as good tools for
a contextual analysis of Luhmann’s theory. These topics will also shed light
on the peculiarities of Luhmann’s theory because he, as we will see, cannot be
easily placed in either of the rival camps, and because he provides very inno-
vative conceptual and theoretical solutions to reformulate, or perhaps to
transcend, these problems.
Finally, a criticism of Luhmann’s theory is offered (Chapter Eight). First I
present and catalog recurring criticisms raised against him then offer my
own critical remarks on his thoughts on politics.
PART I
The Structure of Luhmann’s Theory

CHAPTER ONE
General Characterization of Luhmann’s

Theory
Before entering into a detailed, systematic reconstruction of Luhmann’s the-

ory in the course of the next chapters, I deem it advisable to discuss some
points that have a bearing on his theory as a whole. The reason for this
is that when examining his theory, we intensively face the problem—
characteristic, to some degree, of any theory—that individual statements or
theoretical decisions are understandable only with a preliminary knowledge
of the entire theory. But a thorough analysis of details would be required to
support the findings on the latter. Therefore, in this chapter I outline some
general features of Luhmann’s theory without a detailed exposition of and
argument for these features because it would be possible only with the
knowledge of further analyses.
I consider the preliminary discussion of five points especially important:
examining Luhmann’s theoretical objectives, the circular structure of his
theory, its levels of abstraction, explanatory power, and relation to philoso-
phy. Finally, mentioning other possible ways to expound Luhmann’s theory, I
argue on behalf of the mode of reconstruction I have chosen.
A) Luhmann’s Theoretical Objectives
When in 1969 Luhmann was appointed professor of sociology at the newly

founded University of Bielefeld, he was asked to outline the research projects
he was working on. His answer was: “Theory of society; duration: 30 years;
costs: none” (Luhmann 1999a: 11; my translation).1 Thus, as a first approxi-
mation—which is by no means final and must be subjected to further
correction—we can state that Luhmann’s main objective is to construct a
1 Luhmann has turned out to be quite precise in estimating the time he would need; his mag-
num opus, The Society of Society (Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft), in which he sought to sum-
marize his theory of society, was published in 1997, one year before his death.
18 The Structure of Luhmann’s Theory
theory of society: a sociological theory. He was convinced that sociology

lacked a comprehensive theory and expressly spoke of the theoretical crisis
of the discipline.2 According to Luhmann, this crisis consisted in the fact that
although sociology achieved significant results in the field of empirical re-
search, these results did not lead to the formulation of a unified theory.
Moreover, quite a few sociologists regarded such efforts as impossible or
even needless.3 As opposed to them, adherents of comprehensive social theo-
ries considered this kind of theoretical endeavor not only an end in itself but
also a prerequisite for research on both the micro- and middle-levels. Ac-
cordingly, Luhmann’s standpoint can be defined as consisting of two steps:
first, he argues for the necessity of a comprehensive theory in sociology; sec-
ond, he seeks to prove that the role of such a theory can be played most suc-
cessfully by systems theory.
The aim of distinguishing between these two steps is to illustrate that
Luhmann, in certain respects, takes the same side as his greatest opponent,
Jürgen Habermas. Declaring the indispensability of a comprehensive theory
of society and striving to construct it are common points of both his and
Habermas’s theoretical objectives.4 Their disagreement consists in the way
such a theory needs to be constructed and the kind of function it ought to
fulfill in society. This also means that Luhmann caused turmoil in the Ger-
man social scientific life of the 1960s. At the time, an opposition of two camps
characterized German sociology. One of these was critical theory, which
sought to construct a comprehensive theory of society with a view to achieve
wide-ranging and radical social changes. According to this approach, the
2 See, e.g., the first lines of his Social Systems (Soziale Systeme), which is regarded as a milestone
in Luhmann’s œuvre (Luhmann 1995a: xlv). Luhmann has repeatedly spoken of this crisis
since the beginning of his career (e.g., Luhmann 2005a5: 143).
3 Looking back on the history of sociology, we can see that the search for a comprehensive
theory was by no means trivial. Quite the contrary, the avoidance of the question referring
to society as a whole is far more characteristic (Bechamann 1998: 166). The success of em-
pirical research automatically decreased the demand for theories or relegated theoretical
questions to the level of mere methodology. As a result, more and more complex techniques
of data collection and more and more refined methodological devices emerged in sociology,
accompanied by an indifference towards or low standards of the theoretical underpinnings
of data collection (Balogh and Karácsony 2000: 21).
4 This is how Habermas praises Luhmann’s efforts in their co-authored book, which started a
debate that was to span over the next decades: “Luhmann occupies a special position in the
context of present-day sociology. He self-confidently renews the claim of the great tradition
to grasp society as a whole.” (Habermas 1971: 142; my translation)
General Characterization of Luhmann’s Theory 19
theory of society plays a political role: it is necessary if we are to accomplish

social changes. Moreover, since these changes have to be comprehensive, we
are in need of a comprehensive theory. The opposite approach—which can be
roughly called positivist—refused both the necessity of a comprehensive the-
ory of society and the workability of wide-ranging social changes.5 Conse-
quently, only leftist critical theory sought to construct a comprehensive
theory, while blaming its political opponents for their lack of such efforts.
Luhmann turned this constellation upside down: not unlike the leftists, he
endeavored to build a comprehensive theory of society, but at the same time,
he harshly criticized the endeavors of the Left to change society, and thus—
even if his ideological stance is a far more difficult question—he has come to
side with the political right. As a result, critical theory was attacked on home
ground and had to face a very ambitious competitor in constructing a theory
of society.6 This fact also makes it obvious why leftist thinkers still regard
Luhmann as one of their foremost opponents.
Defining Luhmann’s theoretical objectives as an endeavor to construct a
comprehensive theory of society requires further refinement. According to
him, one should not fail to see that science or scientific activity, that is, the
theory itself, is also a part of society. Thus, if a theory of society does strive to
be universal, it has to contain itself as well. In Luhmann’s words, a theory of
society has to be autological (Luhmann 1999a: 16), which means that it has to
raise questions related to theory construction or questions that belong to the
philosophy of science and epistemology. Accordingly, Luhmann’s theoretical
objectives cannot be regarded as a construction of a purely sociological the-
ory because it is inseparable from philosophical or, more precisely, epistemo-
logical questions.7 Moreover, this relationship also holds true in the opposite
5 Luhmann described the opposition of positivist and critical theories in such a way that
whereas the former look for an answer to the question “What is the case?” the latter en-
deavor to answer the “What is behind it?” The sharpest manifestation of this debate came to
be known as the “positivism dispute.”
6 For this reason, Luhmann’s theory was to some extent attractive for leftist thinkers as well,
and some representatives of the camp of critical theory even joined him; the best example
being Rudolph Stichweh, who became one of Luhmann’s most renowned followers
(Demirovic 2001a: 22–24).
7 Some argue that the theory of society did not simply spread over the boundaries of sociol-
ogy but in fact acted as a formative force in the emergence of a new discipline, one mainly
built on the findings of philosophy and sociology (see, e.g., Balogh and Karácsony 2000:
14–27). Others, in turn, accept the dismantling of disciplinary boundaries but reject that this
direction because according to him epistemology is not complete without a

theory of society.8 In short, they are in a circular relationship to one another:
both of them presuppose the other. Hence, Luhmann’s objective is to con-
struct a theory that describes society as reflecting on the relationship be-
tween society and cognition, where the latter is part of the former.
B) The Circular Structure of Luhmann’s Theory
The main factor that makes Luhmann’s theory difficult to understand and
expound is that its parts mutually reinforce each other: to understand one
part requires knowing all the other parts as well.9 The relationship between
the various parts of the theory is anything but linear; thus, it cannot be re-
constructed by deducing its findings from any of its theorems taken to be
true independently of the others. For this very reason, Luhmann himself
calls his theory circular.10 Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call it
networked because its elements not only form a circle without cross-
connections, but their arrangement is best conceived of as a network, which
does not have a privileged element underlying all the others.11
resulted in the birth of a new discipline (see, e.g., Némedi 2000). Whether one considers so-
cial theory a new discipline or simply a transdisciplinary theory that relies on existing disci-
plines, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that the works of both Luhmann and
Habermas are ideal-typical examples of theories of this kind, also that it is mainly owing to
these men that the question of disciplinary boundaries came to the fore of social scientific
discussion with such an intensity.
8 This statement, that is, Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge, will be explored in Chapter Five.
9 This is why Luhmann considers it misleading to single out one concept from his theory—
however important that concept may be—and to discuss it without the other elements of his
theory. In this case individual concepts are overestimated, while the complexity of the
structure of the theory is underestimated (Luhmann 1993c: 141).
10 Of course, Luhmann’s theory is not the first or the only one built this way. Both before
Luhmann and after him, we find many theorists denying the possibility of founding philoso-
phical or sociological theories on unquestionable grounds. Moreover, we may say that anti-
foundationalism has become a most influential trend in recent philosophy (e.g., Bence 2000:
339–340, Kelemen 2000: 296).
11 Jens Soentgen compares Luhmann’s theory to a labyrinth because we cannot find a point in
it that would offer a view on the whole (Soentgen 1992: 456–457). Luhmann himself also uses
the labyrinth analogy sometimes (Luhmann 1995a: lii).
As a consequence of this, we are facing a problem here: the theory can

only be understood as a whole, yet this is impossible because in reading,
treating, and reconstructing it we cannot manage without isolating a straight
line of argument. We cannot read Luhmann’s books but sequentially; we can-
not formulate our thoughts but sequentially.12 So we need to enter the circle
somewhere, and the essential question is where to do it.
There is no unique or privileged “entry point” because in this case we
may also regard the theory as linear. There are, however, questions or points
of departure that can significantly contribute to an understanding of the
theory, and by exploring them, we can gain important insights into the en-
tire theory as well. The entry point chosen in this chapter is the emergence
of modern society and its influence on the history of ideas. If we are able to
reconstruct in what the essence of this change and its effects consist, we can
form a more exact notion of the circular structure of Luhmann’s theory and
the interconnections between its parts.13
To understand the significance of the emergence of modern society, first
we have to distinguish between “structure of society” and “semantics.” There
is no room to analyze these concepts in detail here; we need to content our-
selves with the fact that they are comparable to the duality of social context
and thought, which is the main subject matter of the sociology of knowledge.
The term “semantics,” which may sound a bit strange, can be replaced by
cultural achievements that are the subject of the history of ideas (Luhmann
1995a: 163, 1998a1: 19).14
The distinction between social structure and semantics, however, re-
quires not two but three components: we need something to make this
12 This circular or networked structure of Luhmann’s theory is probably the reason why there
is more than one attempt to treat it in the form of a lexicon (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito
1999; Krause 2001). Furthermore, there have been endeavors to demonstrate the connec-
tions between the elements of his theory using such multimedia tools as CD-ROMs
(Bardmann and Lamprecht 1999).
13 The emergence of modern society I regard as a suitable breaking point only in this respect,
that is, for the sole purpose of demonstrating the structure of Luhmann’s theory. I do not
say, however, that we should begin the reconstruction of the entire theory at this point. In
the latter case, I think it is more advisable to begin at the most abstract level, as I will argue
in Chapter One, Section F.
14 Nevertheless, this meaning of semantics goes beyond its original linguistic application and is
accepted in the history of ideas today. Its widespread use is chiefly due to Reinhart
Koselleck, who Luhmann also mentions in his references (Luhmann 1998a1: 19, n. 13).
distinction; in other words, the distinction between structure and semantics

is itself a semantic distinction. Hence, our three components are social struc-
ture, semantic tradition, and a semantics that examines the relationship be-
tween the first two (Luhmann 1998c1: 1). With these three components we
can formulate three theses that, in my opinion, will demonstrate the essence
of Luhmann’s theory most illustratively and present its circular structure
most dramatically. Evidently, these three theses can only be explained and
supported exhaustively in the later sections of this book. The three theses are
as follows:
1) The transition from premodern to modern society, a process spanning
several centuries, can be characterized as a structural change of society or,
more precisely, as a transition from a hierarchical to a functionally differen-
tiated society.
2) This structural change, in turn, triggered essential changes in seman-
tics. Both before and after this change, there was nothing it could have been
compared to; that is to say, modern semantics as a whole—including all fields
of science and all the arts—can be interpreted as a reaction to this structural
change of society.
3) The requirements for a modern society can be best fulfilled by
Luhmann’s theory, and the semantics of modernity worked on solutions that
mostly tended towards his theory. In other words, the structural change that
took place and its influence on semantics can be most adequately described
by Luhmannian semantics.
Accordingly, the above-mentioned circularity consists in the following.
The thesis that Luhmann’s theory is the most appropriate to describe modern
society is deduced from the features of the structure of society. At the same
time, in order to discover the characteristics of this structure and the kinds
of requirements it raises for semantics, moreover, to decide whether we can
speak of such requirements at all, we need a semantics.15 Thus, the features
of the structure explain the suitability of semantics, whereas it is exactly due
to this semantics that the structure appears such as it is. Here we encounter a
15 Using Endre Kiss’s typology, we can call this kind of theory structure “undefined” semantics,
as opposed to “proved” semantics, which is characteristic of positivism. While the latter
strives to build on proved theorems as “pre-semantics,” the former seeks to legitimize itself
underway (Kiss E. 2006a: 5–7). Thus, Luhmann’s solution is not without precedents. Hegel,
Husserl, or postmodern philosophy may be mentioned as examples in this connection.
circularity, a paradox, and the task of the theory is, as Luhmann puts it, to
“unfold” it (Luhmann 1998c1: 1–2).
The distinction between these three components and the formulation of
these three theses also help us systematize Luhmann’s work and clarify the
connections between its parts: most of his writings can be related to one
of these components—i.e., structure of society, semantic tradition, and
Luhmann’ semantics—even if not exclusively; that is to say, they also relate
to the other two to some degree.
Luhmann’s books about individual functional systems constitute the gist
of his researches on the structure of society.16 Of course, these cannot stand
without Luhmann’s semantics as methodology; furthermore, in these books
we also find explorations of how semantic tradition has been moving towards
Luhmann’s standpoint, and these explorations serve as a support for his the-
ses on the structure of society.
Luhmann’s writings on the semantic tradition, the subject matter of the
history of ideas, are to be found in the four volumes of Social Structure and
Semantics (Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik) (Luhmann 1993a, 1998a, 1998b,
1999b) and in his book Love as Passion (Liebe als Passion) (Luhmann 1986). The
peculiarity of these writings is that their author’s motivation to write them
was not merely an interest in the history of ideas, but he intended them to
support his theory. By analyzing the semantic tradition, Luhmann endeav-
ored to strengthen the thesis that the emergence of modern society could be
seen as the formation of a functionally differentiated structure of society,
and that the most suitable way to describe this society is his own theory. A
circular theory cannot be established from outside; therefore, one can argue
for it only from inside, by demonstrating the efficiency of its applicability.
Luhmann’s studies on the history of ideas can be regarded as internal sup-
ports of this kind. Of course, discussions belonging to this group cannot be
understood without recourse to the other two components because semantic
tradition has to be analyzed in relation to the structure of society and by ap-
plying Luhmann’s special semantics.
16 These are: Economy as a Social System (Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft) (1990c), Science as a Social
System (Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft) (1992), Art as a Social System (Die Kunst der Gesellschaft)
(2000a), Politics as a Social System (Die Politik der Gesellschaft) (2002a), Religion as a Social System
(Die Religion der Gesellschaft) (2002b), Education as a Social System (Das Erziehungssystem der Ge-
sellschaft) (2002c), Law as a Social System (Das Recht der Gesellschaft) (2004a).
Finally, the most detailed and systematized exposition of Luhmann’s own

semantics can be found in the book Social Systems (Luhmann 1995a), designed
to be a methodological foundation.17
This systematization helps us illustrate that Luhmann pursued a definable
objective in his seemingly diverging researches: his objective was to unfold
the paradox arising from the endeavor to construct a theory of modern soci-
ety and the circularity between such a theory of society and epistemology.
Additionally, we can see that Luhmann strove to compensate for the lack of a
foundation—which results from the circularity of his theory—by producing
an œuvre of enormous extent, by ensuring the transparency of connections
between the elements of this œuvre, and by creating and maintaining a co-
herence of these connections.18
C) The Levels of Abstraction in Luhmann’s Theory
Until now we characterized Luhmann’s theoretical endeavor as one applying

systems theory to form a theory of society. This, however, has to be refined
in some respects, and the best way to do it is to reconstruct the abstraction
levels of his theory.
17 Of course, these are only examples taken from Luhmann’s œuvre. Here I cannot enter into a
discussion of the classification of the books and papers Luhmann wrote; however, I consider
such a classification realizable at least to the extent that we could distinguish in Luhmann’s
writings the three components mentioned above, one of them usually being more empha-
sized than the rest. There are some writings in which these three components have almost
the same importance, among them Luhmann’s summary work, The Society of Society (Die Ge-
sellschaft der Gesellschaft) (Luhmann 1999a).
18 See, e.g., this Luhmannian passage: “In this respect, the explorations that follow depend
both theoretically and methodologically on very abstract conceptual decisions. The reasons
for this lie in a circular argument: the suppositions just formulated on the features of mod-
ern society and on the question of what can be handled in this relation as sufficiently evi-
dent facts depend, of course, on the mode of observation and the distinctions with which the
theory of society grounds itself. This cannot be circumvented because the theory of society
has to be formulated within society ultimately. ‘Methodology’ cannot offer points of depar-
ture introduced ab extra and accepted a priori, either. When all this is taken into account,
one option remains: to proceed as transparently as possible as far as the structure of the
theory is concerned and to present concepts as decisions that can be changed with recogniz-
able consequences.” (Luhmann 1999a: 43; my translation)
First, we need to distinguish between “society” and “sociality” (Gesell-

schaft and Sozialität or Soziale, in German). In the course of the last decades,
the term society came to be replaced with the term sociality in an ever-
expanding area within the German language; for example, the term “theory
of society” (Gesellschaftstheorie) was replaced with the concept of “social the-
ory” (Sozialtheorie).19 The term sociality has a broader meaning, and society is
but one of its subcategories (Burth 2003: 296). For Luhmann, “sociality” or
“social systems” also represent a wider category comprising all social phe-
nomena; “society” or “societal systems” are only subcategories of it, whereas
other types of social systems—organizations or interaction systems—belong
to here as well.20
What can be properly called “systems theory” or “general systems the-
ory” also needs clarification. If by systems theory or general systems theory
we mean theories that call themselves so, we can speak of systems theory
only since the first half of the previous century, especially since Ludwig von
Bertalanffy (Karácsony 2003). However, in exploring the development of sys-
tems theories, Luhmann goes back to antiquity although he is aware of the
fact that neither the term systems theory is applicable to these conceptions
in the strict sense, nor earlier thinkers knew the concept of system. Luhmann
distinguishes three periods within the systems theoretical tradition con-
ceived in this wider sense: the guiding paradigm of the first period was the
part/whole distinction; that of the second (to which von Bertalanffy be-
longed) was the system/environment differentiation; and the third one is the
theory of self-referential systems (Luhmann 1995a: 5–11).21 Luhmann builds
his own theory on this last one, using Heinz von Foerster’s cybernetic sys-
tems theory and the theory of autopoietic systems developed by the neurobi-
ologists Humberto Maturana and Fransisco Varela.
19 There is a change in content behind this. István Balogh and András Karácsony summarize
this change as follows: “the concept of society is not built on the philosophical category of
totality anymore; it is now built on the network and organization of social interactions be-
tween people.” (Balogh and Karácsony 2000: 25; my translation)
20 In this book, I will use this distinction between sociality and society, or social and societal.
Practically, this means that the term “societal” is used in cases in which “social” would be
more common in English.
21 For the opposite view, one stating that we cannot speak of the existence of genuine systems
theory in sociology before Parsons, see Dieckmann 2004: 13–19.
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish general systems theory from

its sociological adaptation. General systems theory22 is a transdisciplinary
theory that endeavors to grasp the isomorphies of different disciplines by
using one comprehensive theory. Although it cannot be classified as an
autonomous discipline, this fact alone does not exclude the possibility that
theoretical approaches of this kind can stem from an actual discipline. The
sociological adaptation of general systems theory is the general theory of so-
cial systems. Talcott Parsons’s work cannot be ignored in this field. Keeping
in mind that he belonged to the second period of systems theoretical think-
ing and not to the third, the most recent one, Luhmann borrows a variety of
insights from him. The general theory of social systems consists of theorems
that cannot be applied to other kinds of systems—for example, to psychic
systems—but holds true for all subcategories of social systems. In most of his
writings, Luhmann listed three systems as subcategories of this kind: societal
systems, organizations, and interaction systems; at the end of his life, how-
ever, he came to construct a fourth type of system, the protest movements,
an independent subcategory of social systems (Luhmann 1999a: 847; 863–
864).23 Nevertheless, his views on the status of this fourth type of social sys-
tem are not clear, and therefore I have omitted it from the following figure,
which demonstrates the different levels of systems:
22 General systems theory is not to be confused with the theory of general systems because the
subject-matter of the latter should be composed of such strange and problematic entities as
“general systems” (László 1986: 91–92).
23 This question will be discussed in Chapter Four, Section A.
General systems
theory
Technical Biological Social Systems Psychic Systems

systems systems
Interaction Organization Society
Figure 1: Levels and types of systems (reproduced, with modifications, from

Luhmann 1995a: 2).
According to Luhmann, the reason why it is important to clearly distinguish

between these system levels is that this way we can foreclose certain objec-
tions against systems theory and avoid some false conclusions. As typical
false views Luhmann mentions the idea that systems theory treats society on
the analogy of organisms, or that a theory of sociality could be constructed
by means of interaction theory. He also rejects the idea that findings in the
field of technical systems could be transferred to the level of general systems
theory (Luhmann 1995a: 3). All this can be prevented if we keep the above
figure in mind: the findings can be transferred automatically only from top
to bottom but not vice versa. That is, the findings of general systems theory
must be true for a theory of social systems, but the same does not apply to
the opposite direction.
Although general systems theory represents a very high level of abstrac-
tion, we have not reached the top of the edifice of Luhmann’s theory yet.
General systems theory is only a subtype of difference theory, also known as
form theory. Luhmann grounds this theory, which represents the most ab-
stract level, on the ideas of George Spencer Brown.24 According to Luhmann’s
difference theory, every observation or description begins with a difference,
24 Luhmann also mentions Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida as famous representa-
tives of difference theory (Luhmann 2004c: 67–70).
and systems theory, or the system/environment difference,25 is one of such

differences; thus, systems theory is not the only but, according to Luhmann,
the most promising alternative to describe the world.
Therefore, the structure of Luhmann’s theory can be reconstructed as fol-
lows. On the first, the most abstract level, we find difference theory. General
systems theory, one of the possible forms of difference theory, occupies the
second level. Since general systems theory is more encompassing than the
theory of social systems, Luhmann feels himself entitled to borrow from the
findings of other disciplines, mainly cybernetics and biology, and the key
concept of his general systems theory is autopoiesis, a concept lifted from
neurobiology.26 According to Luhmann, the best way to construct a compre-
hensive theory of sociality is the sociological application of general systems
theory; this is the general theory of social systems, which at the same time
represents the third level. Finally, social systems can be decomposed into so-
ciety or societal systems, organizations, and interactions, and these three
types compose the fourth level. Of these, the exploration of society or socie-
tal systems constitutes the major part of Luhmann’s work.27
The hierarchical structure of Luhmann’s theory reconstructed this way
seems to contradict the above findings on its circular structure. For this rea-
son, it is important to emphasize that this hierarchy only applies to the ab-
straction degrees of the levels, whereas the lower level cannot be deduced
from the upper one. The more abstract level of the theory we reach, the emp-
tier it becomes. At the top we find only this: “Draw a distinction!” Difference
theory in itself says nothing about the kind of difference that should be ap-
plied. The system/environment difference, that is, choosing systems theory,
25 The formulation that systems theory is the application of the system/environment differ-
ence is not identical with system/environment difference as a guiding paradigm, that is,
with the second instance of systems theoretical paradigms discussed above.
26 A significant portion of criticisms raised against Luhmann states that by applying the prin-
ciple of autopoiesis for describing social systems, Luhmann makes a methodological mistake
because Maturana and Varela designed the principle for biology. Accordingly, Luhmann
would make the exact same mistake that he just wanted to prevent by distinguishing be-
tween levels of systems theory and by emphasizing that findings cannot be transferred be-
tween theories on the same level. Luhmann seeks to repel this attack by saying that first he
generalizes the theory of autopoiesis, and he applies it to describe social systems only
afterwards.
27 Luhmann’s analyses on organization theory are also important because this field was his
original research area, and he published his first writings on this topic (Karácsony 2001).
can be justified only by applying this theory later and exactly the same way
as we have seen it when discussing the circular structure of the theory.
D) The Explanatory Power of Luhmann’s Theory
Explanations of social phenomena and methodological problems related to

them belong to the most important topics of sociology or social philosophy.
Having acquainted ourselves with Luhmann’s theoretical objective, that is,
the construction of a comprehensive theory of society, and in the light of his
immense œuvre that results from this endeavor, we expect his works to pro-
vide a treasury of explanations for social phenomena. In many respects,
however, it is doubtful whether Luhmann’s findings can be regarded as
explanations.28
First, because of the circular character of his theory, there is no static
point from which we could deduce inevitable statements. Instead, we must be
satisfied with the fact that the findings themselves support each other; in
other words, their justification lies in the coherence of the theory as a
whole.29
In addition to the circular structure of the theory, another argument is
offered for the problematic character of explanations, which is related to the
complexity of the world. This argument can be summarized as follows: it is
28 The nature of explanations is also a topic of philosophical disputes. Thus, if we want to ex-
plore whether Luhmann’s theory provides explanations, we have to face the difficulty of
finding the criteria of explanations. If we say that explanations consist in finding causes, we
will accept only causal explanations as legitimate. Although this is not indefensible, there
are approaches that define the domain of explanations in a wider sense. For instance, ac-
cording to Reiner Schützeichel, “by explanations, we mean such an answer to a contrastive
why- or how-question whose epistemological function consists in strengthening the coher-
ence of our knowledge.” (Schützeichel 2003: 22; my translation) This definition does not
limit the range of explanations too narrowly, and accepts, among other things, functional or
structural types of arguments as explanations. Schützeichel puts Luhmann’s theory in the
category of “evolutionary explanations;” he considers it to be an explanation consisting of
accidental mechanisms (Schützeichel 2003: 24). Thus, although one may regard Luhmann’s
theory as an explanation, it is an explanation that includes exactly those things, namely the
accidents, which should be eliminated by explanations.
29 Based on the explanations they use, Schützeichel distinguishes between two main types of
theories: foundationalist and coherence theories, and puts Luhmann in the second category
(Schützeichel 2003: 12–13).
impossible for us to completely grasp the complexity of the world; therefore,

all observations about or descriptions of it are selective; in other words, they
make certain things visible, while hiding all the others. In describing modern
society, Luhmann wants to prove that there is no exclusively correct schema
of observation; we could always have chosen differently. Consequently, every
observation and every description, including his own theory, are contingent.
There are, of course, better and worse schemata of observation; the findings
resulting from the elaboration and detailed explication of our initial choice
can support our decision, but we cannot fully describe all the features of the
world using one single theory. Our initial choice always determines the fur-
ther steps of how our theory is constructed; thus, there will always remain
things that cannot be grasped by our theory. The fact that not every aspect of
the world can be grasped by a single theory means that the explanations our
theories provide can never be complete.
If every theory is contingent and none of them can completely describe
the world, or in other words, if there is always yet another theory that would
provide additional findings, then the question to be asked is how Luhmann
can prove his statement that his theory is the most productive tool to de-
scribe modern society. To answer this question, first we need to know that
Luhmann endeavors to prove—which, of course, can only be accomplished
with the help of circular argumentation—that the structure of society need to
be compatible with the theories that describe society. In the case of modern
society, this means that we cannot accept a priori theorems; that is, we can
always raise the question of why we have chosen this or that approach over
others. According to Luhmann, modern society requires that the theories de-
scribing it be free from any a priori assumptions. Therefore, Luhmann’s ob-
jective is to elaborate a theory that goes as far as possible in asking questions;
in other words, he considers nothing to be given. This way Luhmann wants to
ensure that his theory meet the requirements of modern society. In other
words, questioning everything and taking nothing as a priori, he endeavors
to construct a conceptual framework, which can be used to describe or re-
construct every social phenomenon. His objective is “to seek theories that
can succeed in explaining the normal as improbable” (Luhmann 1995a: 114).
Therefore, first and foremost his theory can be called reconstruction: his ob-
jective is not to describe new phenomena but to reformulate everything that
other theories have striven to grasp and to present, and he wants to accom-
plish this by means of a theory that assumes nothing as a priori and thus
meets the requirements of modern society.
The statement that Luhmann’s main purpose is not the description of new
phenomena but the reformulation of existing results by means of a concep-
tual framework that meets the criteria of modern society does not, of course,
mean that his theory would not provide us with new knowledge. The growth
of knowledge means that by describing different phenomena with the same
single conceptual framework, we can reveal new relationships between them.
Therefore, the results of the procedure, which Luhmann calls functional
method,30 does not lie in finding necessarily connected causes and effects—
according to him, such necessity does not exist anyway because due to the
incomprehensible complexity of the world, every causality is inevitably se-
lective and simplifying—but in creating more and more complex and abstract
possibilities of comparison (Luhmann 2005a2: 44, 1999a: 42).
Relying on these findings, we can see that Luhmann’s theory also contains
some presuppositions: for example, his idea that we cannot completely grasp
the world can be regarded as a presupposition (Kiss, G. 1990: 11). Accordingly,
instead of a theory that is free from all presuppositions, it is more suitable to
speak of a theory that has as few as possible—that is, as general as possible—
presuppositions. If we cannot eliminate presuppositions, the best we can do
is to generalize them as much as we can.
In sum, none of the theories can, according to Luhmann, offer explana-
tions that are inevitably true because all of them presuppose something that
can be questioned; that is, they include decisions and thus can describe real-
ity only selectively. Consequently, we have to endeavor to construct a theory
that is as abstract and as complex as possible. This kind of theory will make it
possible to reveal the consequences of our theoretical decisions; that is, we
will be able to see the presuppositions individual conceptual or methodologi-
cal decisions are based on and the findings they produce. Thus, Luhmann
strives to describe the performance of his own theory as well as those of
other theories with “if-then” relationships. In other words, Luhmann en-
deavors to construct a theory that includes competing theories or conceptual
systems as less abstract than his own.31 Therefore, Luhmann’s aim is to elabo-
rate a theory that treats everything that is pre-given in other theories as
contingent. Being so, the special character of his theory consists in the fact
that it describes social phenomena without relying on any presuppositions or
at least relying on more abstract presuppositions than other theories.
30 Functional method will be discussed in Chapter Seven, Section B.

31 Klaus Podak also calls Luhmann’s strategy “including rivalry” (Podak 1984: 737).
E) The Relation of Luhmann’s Theory to Philosophy
Relying on these findings, we can clearly posit that Luhmann’s theory is not
to be regarded as a merely sociological construct because many of its ele-
ments belong to the domain of philosophy, more precisely, to epistemology.32
This mixture of sociological and philosophical elements renders the recep-
tion of the theory more problematic and intensifies the resistance to it:
sociologists consider it too philosophical;33 philosophers see it as too
sociological.34
In spite of this, Luhmann has made several remarks hostile to philosophy
and often confronted his theory with philosophical approaches, describing
the latter as remnants of a past age. All this makes the positioning of his the-
ory more difficult.35 This apparent contradiction can be resolved by taking
into consideration that it is not the philosophical or epistemological ques-
tions that Luhmann saw as false but only asking them before sociological ex-
plorations. Ever since sociology was born in the 19th century, philosophy has
taken priority over it: philosophy answers certain questions before sociologi-
cal research; that is, by means of its own a priori decisions, underlies the
methodology and conceptual framework of sociology (Luhmann 1992: 7–8;
Clam 2002: 11–12). Luhmann breaks with this; his objective is to construct a
new, circular relationship between them, a relationship in which they mutu-
ally suppose each other: “We try to unite the theory of functional differentia-
tion with the nowadays unavoidable radicalism of epistemological questions,
and to transfer considerations from one to the other and back again”
(Luhmann 1992: 10; my translation).
Thus, Luhmann’s critical remarks about philosophy attack philosophy as
interpreted as a theory that underlies sociology preliminarily. Instead, he
opts for a position that problems that theretofore belonged to philosophy
32 The fact that Luhmann’s theory cannot be understood or can be misunderstood without phi-
losophical examinations, is especially emphasized by Gripp-Hagelstange 1997: 9–14, and
Clam 2000a: 75–77, 2000b: 296.
33 For example, they blame Luhmann that his theory is no more than a construction of a con-
ceptual structure, which does not yield any answers to sociological questions (Esser 1991:
9–13).
34 At the beginning of his career, he was criticized for trying to solve philosophical problems
with sociological tools (Hondrich 1973: 91).
35 For this reason, we may call Luhmann an anti-philosopher (Spaemann 1996: 62–63).
should be embedded within the framework of a theory positing a circular re-

lationship between the theory of society and epistemology.
Of course, Luhmann was not the first to question the primacy of philoso-
phy. We can find other examples in the history of philosophy and the social
sciences.36 Recently several disciplines—from neurobiology through cognitive
science to linguistics—have claimed for themselves the examination of spe-
cific epistemological questions and refused the priority of philosophy within
their enclosures (Luhmann 1992: 8–9).37
We cannot simply regard Luhmann’s work as an effort to connect phi-
losophical and sociological explorations; we can also say that he strove to
construct a comprehensive theory that includes both philosophy and sociol-
ogy. Characterizing Luhmann’s theory as more comprehensive than philoso-
phy means that everything philosophy takes as given is contingent in it.
From the perspective of Luhmann’s theory, all philosophies that do not ques-
tion the questionable and choose one alternative while ignoring others are
simplifications.38
According to Luhmann, the main flaw of the philosophical tradition con-
sists in the fact that lacking a theory of modern society, it was unable to ade-
quately reflect on the relationship of knowledge and society. Luhmann’s
objective is to explore this relationship, and this objective explains the pro-
grammatic title of his six-volume collection of essays: “Sociological Enlight-
enment” (Luhmann 2005a3).39
This ambitious and radical character of Luhmann’s endeavor, the effort to
construct a theory that includes or exceeds philosophy, is what his followers
admired the most, and this is what at the same time elicited the criticism of
his opponents.
36 According to Jean Clam, Heidegger was the first to question the model based on the primacy
of philosophy (Clam 2002: 12–13).
37 For the naturalist revolt in linguistics and cognitive science against the aprioristic approach
of philosophy, see Kertész 2000.
38 The best example of this is ontology characterized by Luhmann as taking the difference of
existence/non-existence as an initial distinction. It is but one of a variety possible differ-
ences, though.
39 This topic will be discussed in Chapter Five, Section D.
F) The Way to Reconstruct Luhmann’s Theory
There are several factors making it more difficult to decide which way to fol-
low in the course of reconstructing Luhmann’s theory. On the one hand, due
to its circular structure, we cannot find an exclusive point of departure; we
have several possibilities to identify the elements or concepts with which to
begin the explication of the theory. A further difficulty is that Luhmann has
on many occasions integrated the thoughts of other authors into his key con-
cepts, a fact which eventually caused some shifts of accent in his theory.40
Nevertheless, it seems practical to begin the reconstruction of the theory
with the most abstract level and to proceed gradually towards its more con-
crete parts. I have opted for this method and will analyze the key concepts
and accents that were characteristic of the last period of Luhmann’s work.
Before, however, I begin to expound the concepts in the order chosen, I
briefly survey other viewpoints that could have also been applied in the
course of reconstructing the theory,41 thereby hoping to justify my choice.
Let me start with the question of textual and contextual analyses.
Luhmann is primarily known as a systems theorist, so it would be logical to
present his thoughts in the context of systems theories. This would mean to
first outline the history of systems theories and the views of systems theo-
rists who are most important for an understanding of Luhmann’s theory, and
then to examine Luhmann’s theory against this background, thereby reveal-
ing the concepts or thoughts he took over from others and the way he modi-
fied or rejected the views of his predecessors. Since, however, Luhmann has
radically reinterpreted the fundamental concepts and theorems of systems
theory, I do not think it is advisable to present his thoughts from the per-
spective of systems theoretical antecedents. If the systems theoretical con-
text is rejected as a point of departure, it will be easier to get rid of such
systems theoretical stigmata as rigidity, technocratic social steering, deter-
minism, and merely analogical ways of thinking, which, in my opinion, do
not hold true for Luhmann’s theory. Another reason for the textual analysis
is that the peculiarities of Luhmann’s concepts and findings—which
distinguish his theory from other kinds of systems theories—can only be
40 To emphasize the ever evolving character of Luhmann’s theory, Tim Murphy speaks of
Luhmann’s thinking instead of his thoughts (Murphy 2006: 56–57).
41 For a brief survey of the kinds of solutions scholars have chosen to present Luhmann’s the-
ory, see Krause 2001: 3–6.
understood with the help of other concepts and findings of his theory. In
other words, no contextual analysis can be achieved without a textual ex-
amination that presents Luhmann’s theory in its entirety. A final point
against a systems theoretical context as a point of departure is that at least in
the last period of his life, Luhmann’s systems theoretical ideas did not serve
as a point of departure but rather as a subtype of a more general level, the
difference theory. All this, of course, does not mean that I will not refer to
systems theoretical or other contexts in presenting Luhmann’s theory. Quite
the contrary, I will always mention if a concept or a thesis is lifted from other
thinkers and point out the way they are modified.
The next dilemma arises from the fact that there is a fairly well marked
borderline in Luhmann’s theory, the so-called “autopoietic turn,” which di-
vides the theory into two parts. At the beginning of his career, Luhmann did
not have the concept of autopoiesis yet, but this concept came to be an essen-
tial element of his theory in his second period, which began in the 1980s. This
does not simply mean that some of his older concepts were replaced by new
ones; this can be seen as a certain shift of accent. The shift implies that in-
stead of the structures of the system, its elements came to prominence
(Balogh and Karácsony 2000: 295–297). The difference between the two peri-
ods suggests that we ought to begin the reconstruction with the first period,
and then, relying on it, we could examine the new features the second period
yielded.42 I think, however, that there is no significant difference between the
two periods as far as the theoretical objective or the main message of the
theory is concerned, and thus it is unwarranted to speak of a genuine “turn.”
In fact, in his second period Luhmann strove to solve theoretical problems
that he already discussed in the first period by means of a more elaborate
and more profound conceptual framework.43 Thus, I consider it more produc-
tive to present the theory with the help of a conceptual framework that
Luhmann himself regarded as more elaborate (Krause 2002: 6). Due to this
choice, some aspects of the theory—which could be revealed by a different
42 Stefan Lange chose this chronological presentation in his work on Luhmann’s theory of poli-
tics (Lange 2003). In the case of politics, this can be justified by the fact that Luhmann dis-
cussed some topics and concepts of political theory only within his early conceptual
framework, and after elaborating his autopoietic systems theory, he never returned to them.
43 Of course, changes in content did also occur in Luhmann’s theory. I will signal them at the
appropriate places. I believe, however, that the “autopoietic turn” does not occupy a special
position in this respect, and most of these changes cannot be derived from adopting the
principle of autopoiesis.
way of reconstruction—inevitably fall into the background. By way of com-

pensation, however, we will be given a most coherent and most understand-
able way of reconstructing the theory.
One could also opt for a mode of reconstruction that seeks to present the
theory as a gradual generalization, that is, as extending an originally organi-
zation theoretical idea first to general systems theory and then to difference
theory (Schmid 1996: 139–140). This could be justified by Luhmann’s career:
initially he worked as a public servant, and in that period he mainly focused
on questions of administration and organization theory although he applied
a conceptual framework as well as an abstraction level that were very un-
usual in that field then. I think, however, that proceeding from the more
concrete to the more abstract level could offer an obvious solution in the
course of elaborating a theory, whereas the opposite direction is more effec-
tive in the case of its reconstruction because we can analyze every subse-
quent level as a special subtype of an already discussed more abstract one,
thus taking advantage of differentia specifica.
One could raise a fourth objection against beginning the analysis of the
theory with its most abstract level, that is to say, difference theory, and to
gradually explain the lower levels from there, first examining general sys-
tems theory, then the theory of social systems, and finally the theory of soci-
ety. This objection is based on the fact that Luhmann did not expound the
first two levels—difference theory and general systems theory—in the form
of a separate book, and what is more, he did not actually write any studies
aiming to discuss these levels systematically. Although general systems the-
ory and partly difference theory is discussed in abundant detail in the pub-
lished material of a course (Luhmann 2004c), this is not a work Luhmann
intended for publication. These two part-theories, of course, play a major
role in his other works; for example, his work of utmost importance, Social
Systems, is a sociological application of general systems theory, and differ-
ence theory takes a prominent part in his other most important book, The
Society of Society. This, however, is not to be taken as a separate and system-
atic exposition of these theory levels. Such an exposition was accomplished
in the case of the other two levels—in the case of the theory of social systems
and the theory of society—in the two books just mentioned. In the case of dif-
ference theory, this seems to be an especially unsettling defect because in
Luhmann’s later works this theory became dominant to such an extent that it
almost suggests a second paradigm change. Accordingly, Luhmann’s œuvre
can actually be divided not into two but three periods, the second paradigm
change consisting in the shift of accent from autopoiesis to difference theory

(Baecker 2004: 7–8). This does not imply that Luhmann rejected or in the
least modified his concept of autopoiesis, only that the theory of autopoietic
systems increasingly appears as a special subtype of a more general theory,
difference theory, and other subtypes (like medium/form theory) also play
an important role.44
Nevertheless, the fact that Luhmann did not expound these theory levels
in their own right in special books or studies, I do not consider a valid reason
for rejecting a reconstruction that begins with these levels. Since Luhmann’s
examinations on difference theory quickly transform into general systems
theory, I deem it more advisable to discuss these two levels in the same chap-
ter. Thus, the way of reconstructing the theory will be as follows: In Chapter
Two I analyze difference theory and general systems theory; in Chapter
Three I discuss their application to social phenomena, that is, the theory of
social systems; and in Chapter Four I examine one of the subtypes of social
systems, the theory of society. Finally, in Chapter Five I attempt to demon-
strate the circular structure of Luhmann’s theory by analyzing his sociology
of knowledge; that is, I show why the requirements he postulates concerning
theory construction, requirements leading to a difference theoretical point of
departure, can be derived from the characteristics of modern society.
44 Dirk Baecker notes that due to this shift, Luhmann would have probably written his funda-
mental book, Social Systems, in a different way. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht also emphasizes these
three periods in Luhmann’s œuvre (Gumbrecht 2001: 49–50).
CHAPTER TWO
General Systems Theory
I begin the detailed, systematic reconstruction of Luhmann’s theory with an

analysis of difference theory and then discuss general systems theory, which
will soon be interwoven with the former. Since difference theory represents
the most general level, we cannot rely on any a priori concepts or theorems
in the course of discussion. In other words, this most general level of the the-
ory has to yield a point on which a conceptual framework for the description
of social phenomena can be built. This construct needs to be void of any pre-
supposition, or relying on the findings of the previous chapter, perhaps it is
more correct to say that it ought to be based on as few and as general pre-
suppositions as possible. This does not imply that relying on this most gen-
eral level and with the help of compelling conclusions, Luhmann endeavors
to deduce why society is such as it is. This is not a deduction; we are dealing
with a reconstruction; that is, our objective is a reformulation of social phe-
nomena in terms of a conceptual framework that takes nothing as a priori.1
A) System as Difference
Thus, the question is to be put as follows: If nothing is given, how can we find
a basis from which we can speak of something? To describe this situation,
Luhmann introduces the term “unmarked state,” sometimes also called
“unmarked space,” a concept he borrows from George Spencer Brown
1 For a better understanding of this theoretical objective, I mention the (partially) similar en-
deavors of two other thinkers. The first is René Descartes and his methodological skepticism
(Descartes 1996: 16–23). Although he occupies a very distant place from Luhmann as regards
the history of ideas, their common endeavor to find a point that cannot be questioned con-
nects them. Moreover, Descartes was included in Luhmann’s reading list, which he compiled
for his autodidactic philosophical and sociological study project while working as a public
servant (Bangó 2004: 16). The second example is Max Weber, who, in the course of construct-
ing his sociological theory, sought to answer the question of what can be taken as given.
When he found the answer in the individual, he strove to interpret every social phenome-
non by using only individuals as given (Weber 1978: 13–18; cf. Erdélyi 2003: 13–38).
(Spencer Brown 1994: 5). Although the term “space” is used, it is not a real
space or spatial extension Luhmann refers to. It is something more general.
Not only is space unmarked, but no division of time is introduced either.
What is, then, the basis in this unmarked state that enables one to speak
of something, to be able to, for example, denote a table? If we say, “this is a
table” or simply refer to it as “this one,” we suppose that we have already
distinguished this particular object from others; that is, we do not proceed
from an unmarked state. Therefore, to be able to say “this is a table,” first we
need to distinguish this particular object from everything else. Thus, the first
step is a distinction, a difference, an outlining of a boundary by means of
which we can distinguish “this one” from all the others. Only after drawing a
distinction can we point to one side of it, only then can we say “this one” or
call it a table. Being so, the most fundamental thesis of Luhmann’s theory is
that difference is prior to identity (Luhmann 1999a: 60–62, 2004c: 67–74).
In addition to the name “difference theory,” Luhmann also uses the term
“form theory.” It is because relying on Spencer Brown’s terminology, he also
calls the distinction, the demarcation of something from everything else, a
“form,” which is the unity of difference. The form has two sides: the inside,
which has been indicated, and the outside, where everything else can be
found. Form means the unity of these two sides because neither can be con-
ceived of in itself but only together with the other one. The concept of a table
supposes that we can speak of something that is not a table and vice versa.
“Both sides of the form are the other side of the other side.” (Luhmann
1999a: 60; my translation)2
On closer inspection, we realize that the concept of form actually consists
of two elements: distinction and indication. Distinction in itself says nothing:
it does not make it possible to speak of the table because it only means
that we have distinguished between two sides but have indicated neither
of them yet. We cannot say either “table” or “everything else.” We need a
second step: we have to indicate one of the two sides. Indication in itself is
also meaningless as it is only possible if a distinction has already been made,
2 One can speak of distinction or form in three different senses. The first is to distinguish
something from everything else; this holds for the example of the table. In the second sense,
a preliminary selection has already been accomplished, and one distinguishes something
only in a context, for example, in a set of integers. Third, distinction can mean a choice be-
tween two values, for instance, legal/illegal or true/false (Luhmann 1999a: 62). Of course,
the latter presuppose an advanced stage of theory construction.
General Systems Theory 41
that is, if there exists something that can be indicated (Luhmann 1992: 81,
2004c: 74). Consequently, “this is a table” consists of two elements: distinc-
tion and indication. Although distinction precedes indication—this is why we
call this concept a “difference theory”—the two elements always suppose
each other and cannot be conceived of separately.
This definition of form contains a circularity, a paradox: form is a distinc-
tion between distinction and indication (Luhmann 1999a: 57). Distinction
presupposes itself. Luhmann calls this feature of the form—using Spencer
Brown’s terminology—a “re-entry,” that is, the re-entry of the form into the
form or the re-entry of the distinction into the distinction (Luhmann 1999a:
45, 2004c: 80).
With the help of the concepts of distinction and indication, Luhmann de-
fines the most fundamental component of his theory: observation. Observa-
tion is the unity of distinction and indication; it is a form, a drawing of a
distinction (Luhmann 1992: 82). Since, according to what has been said above,
neither distinction nor indication can be conceived of separately, they can-
not be the building blocks of the theory. Only observation can be the smallest
unit: it is the fundamental unit on which every other element of the theory
has to be built.
The foregoing constitutes Luhmann’s difference or form theory. It is the
most abstract level of which every other theory is a concretized form, and
systems theory is only one of them. Luhmann includes semiotics, mathemat-
ics, and the medium/form theory in this category (Luhmann 2004c: 75–76).3
Moreover, he states that the thought of, for instance, Ferdinand de Saussure,
Gabriel Tarde, René Girard, Gregory Bateson, and Jacques Derrida can be sub-
sumed under the umbrella term difference theory (Luhmann 2004c: 67–70).
Let us now see how the question of general systems theory connects with
difference theory. According to difference theory, every observation about or
description of the world begins with the application of a distinction. Numer-
ous possible distinctions can be made: existence and non-existence, object
and subject, individual and collective, etc. The choice of an initial distinction
will influence all possible further distinctions. For example, if the difference
of existence and non-existence is chosen, all further distinctions need to be
accomplished either on the side of existence or on the side of non-existence.
It is impossible to be and not to be at the same time. Later we will see that
3 Medium/form theory will be discussed in Chapter Four, Section C.

Luhmann always applies this difference theoretical method; he always intro-

duces a new concept as a form of three components: the two sides of the form
and their unity, which is something that accomplishes the distinction.
Relying on these findings, systems theory observes the world by means of
a specific distinction, the system/environment difference. According to
Luhmann, system is a form with two sides: the system can be found inside it,
while outside we find the environment. In other words, system is the unity of
the system/environment difference (Luhmann 1999a: 62–93, 2004c: 66–67).
Consequently, system and environment are inseparable: they are two sides of
the same distinction, two sides of the same form, and both of them suppose
the other. We can also see that this definition of system contains the paradox
of form mentioned above: it includes itself.
B) Observation as Operation
In the previous chapter we have concluded that the smallest building block
on which the whole theory needs to be constructed is observation. Luhmann
defines observation very abstractly: according to his theory, not only people
or psychic systems can be observers, he emphasizes that this concept is also
applicable to communication systems, that is to say, to social systems. He also
implies that the concept of observation is applicable to biological systems; for
example, the immune system observes the condition of the body (Luhmann
2004c: 147–149).
Another characteristic feature of observation is that it is defined as being
an operation that draws a distinction. Operation is an event that does not
have a temporal duration. It has only a momentary existence; when it comes
into being, it immediately ceases to exist, and the same event cannot occur
anymore (Luhmann 1992: 36–37, 2004c: 109–110). Every thought, every per-
ception, every word uttered has but a momentary existence; they fade away
immediately. We cannot speak of the same thought, perception, or communi-
cation a moment later.4
This operationalist standpoint strongly determines the whole of
Luhmann’s theory: the fact that he defines observation, the fundamental
building block of his theory, as an operation that has a momentary existence
4 Thoughts and perceptions are typical operation modes of psychic systems, whereas commu-
nication is the operation mode of social systems, as we will see it in Chapter Two, Section C.
implies that every social and psychic phenomenon—including, among other

things, memory and social structures—needs to be built exclusively of ele-
ments that lack duration, also that we cannot introduce anything with a
permanent existence into the theory as a priori. Of course, we may attribute
continuity to some social and psychic phenomena but cannot take it as a pri-
ori: we need to reconstruct how it came into being, and in the course of this
reconstruction, only operations as momentary events can be used. Thus,
Luhmann’s objective is to reconstruct all social and psychic phenomena, as-
suming that only operations without duration are real.
All this immediately raises the question: If only operations lacking dura-
tion are to be considered real, then how can we speak of systems? According
to the foregoing discussion, the distinction between system and environment
cannot mean that the system “exists” as something given, like an essence or
a substance, which can then be distinguished from its environment because
in that case we would work with the assumption that the system is something
that has a permanent existence. We need a system concept that assumes that
only the operation of observation is given in reality and nothing else. Let us
proceed from the fact that Luhmann defines system as a form having two
sides, that is, as a system/environment difference. Here we are dealing with
an observation that applies the system/environment difference. One side
of this distinction, the system, is but another difference of system/environ-
ment. Thus, the system/environment difference—actually the definition of
the system—occurs during the operation of observation twice: first as an ac-
complishment of this distinction and second as a side of this distinction. In
some respects, the two are identical as we are dealing with the same sys-
tem/environment difference, but at the same time, they are also different
because one of them forms a part of the other. Luhmann dissolves this para-
dox by saying that one of these distinctions precedes the other. This way, he
introduces the difference of former and latter, that is, time.5 Now we have
two different operations applying the same system/environment difference.
This implies that the operation of observation has to connect to another op-
eration of the same kind; in other words, one side of the distinction has to be
the same operation. The same holds true for the second operation: it has to
connect to a third one, the third to a fourth, and so on. To be able to consti-
tute a system, operations always have to connect to operations of the same
5 In other words, Luhmann dissolves the paradox using the concept of time instead of resort-
ing to the help of substance (Nassehi 1993: 479).
kind, more precisely, to operations applying the same system/environment

difference. With this, we have also answered the question of in what sense we
are entitled to speak of systems having duration in time: operations belong-
ing to the same system (applying the same system/environment difference)
connect to one another and for that reason constitute a system (Luhmann
1999a: 62–64, 2004c: 77–78).
Luhmann thus defines system in such a way that he does not assume
anything as given except for short-lived operations. We can only speak
of systems as far as operations use the system/environment difference.
The statement that a system is an aggregate of operations using the sys-
tem/environment difference characteristic of the system does not com-
pletely hold true because this would mean that these operations exist
simultaneously. However, as they are real only for a moment and follow each
other, they cannot be real at the same time. For Luhmann, everything that
has an existence exists simultaneously (Luhmann 2004c: 199).
It results from these findings that operations cannot exist without a sys-
tem, that is to say, they are always operations of a system. Operations only
exist for a moment: when they come into being, they cease to exist, and the
same operation cannot come into being again. Had they not connected to
other operations, that is, had they not constituted a system, they would not
exist at all. For example, we cannot conceive of a thought that does not con-
nect to the network of other thoughts, one that would occur for a moment
without antecedents and consequences. This also implies that only systems
are able to observe, that is, the observer is always a system (Luhmann 2004c:
141–142).
I have so far been speaking of observation as operation, using the two as
synonyms. Luhmann, however, makes a clear distinction between them, at-
tributing a very special relation to these two concepts in his theory. On the
one hand, they are closely connected to each other: according to the opera-
tionalist view I discussed above, every observation is an operation, and be-
cause an operation has to distinguish two sides, every operation is an
observation. On the other hand, however, they cannot be used as synonyms.
Observation is not an operation for itself because it cannot observe itself as
an operation. Every observation has a blind spot, which is the observation
itself as an operation, as a drawing of its own distinction. Moreover, opera-
tion is a “blind” drawing of a distinction, and it is only visible for another ob-
servation. Therefore, the difference between observation and operation is
that observation is not operation for itself, and operation cannot observe
itself (Luhmann 1992: 77–78, 2004c: 143–145; cf. Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito
1999: 123–128; Esposito 1996: 271–275).
Due to the existence of a blind spot in observation, the observer, that is,
the system, is never able to observe itself completely; there will always be a
part that remains invisible to it. The blind spot cannot be eliminated with the
help of further observations because the latter also have their own blind
spots. Thus, with every observation something unobservable comes into be-
ing (Luhmann 2004c: 145–147).
Still, another observer can observe the blind spot in an observation. This
is a second observation which Luhmann calls—using Heinz von Foerster’s
terminology—second-order observation. We can speak of second-order ob-
servation if an observer is observed, and both observed and observer can be a
psychic or a social system. Second-order observation can perceive the blind
spot in first-order observation; that is, it can see what the first cannot. A sec-
ond-order observation does, however, belong to the same kind of operation
as first-order observations, and as such it also has its own blind spot, which,
in turn, can be perceived by yet another, third-order observation, and so on
(Luhmann 2004c: 155–160).
Another key concept in Luhmann’s theory is self-reference. Self-reference
means that operations connect to operations belonging to the same system;
that is, there is an operation of the same type on one side of the distinction
drawn by them. When defining form, however, we have seen that one side of
the form is impossible without another one. Thus, self-reference is impossi-
ble without reference to the environment, without the existence of other-
reference (Fremdreferenz). Consequently, operations always have to contain
both self-reference and other-reference (Luhmann 2004c: 81–82). There is no
pure self-referential operation exclusively referring to itself. On the one
hand, this means that an operation always has to demarcate a system to
which it belongs: communication and thinking have to be distinguished from
their environments; this is why self-reference is needed. On the other hand,
these demarcations in themselves, as mere self-references, are not sufficient:
communication and thinking always have to have subject. To this end, we
need other-references as well.6 This is the reason why Luhmann calls this
6 Here we are dealing with the self-reference of operations, which is called basal self-
reference by Luhmann. One can also speak of the self-reference of processes and systems.
By process Luhmann means operations connecting to one another, and the self-reference
of processes he calls reflexivity; examples for the latter include research on research or
kind of self-reference accompanying (mitlaufende) self-reference (Luhmann

1995a: 446).
If it is accepted that the basic element of the theory is observation, and
everything else has to be reconstructed with recourse to it, it also follows
that we have to ascribe every statement to an observer. We cannot simply say
that a system or the world is such and such; we always have to add to which
observer it appears as such (Luhmann 2004c: 141).
This does not mean that the observer would be a priori in Luhmann’s the-
ory. The basis is observation as operation, and everything is to be built from
it, the observer itself being no exception to the rule. Consequently, the ob-
server, whether it is a subject—this Luhmann does not think to be a useful
concept—a consciousness or a social system, can only be the result of further
construction.
C) Operational Closure and Autopoiesis
Summarizing the foregoing, we can declare that there is a circular relation-

ship between the concepts of system and operation: they presuppose each
other. On the one hand, systems do not have an autonomous existence sepa-
rated from operations; they are produced in such a way that operations draw
the system/environment distinction characteristic of the given system and
thus continually connect to each other. On the other hand, operations are
impossible without a system; they can only exist as operations of a given sys-
tem (Luhmann 2005f1: 27–28).
From this we can deduce one of the key theorems of Luhmann’s theory:
that of operational closure. This theorem states that no operation of a system
can leave the system, also that operations not belonging to the system cannot
enter the system. In other words, there is no transfer of operations between
system and environment or between two systems. This is because operations,
as we have seen above, are only possible if they connect to other operations,
and this connection is created by reproducing a specific system/environment
difference. If an operation does not repeat the system/environment
distinction of the preceding operation, or if it draws a different kind of
teaching the teaching. The self-reference of systems is called reflection. In this case,
self-reference has a bearing on the whole system; an example for this is the self-observation
of a societal system (Luhmann 1995a: 443–444).
system/environment distinction, it cannot connect to the previous op-

eration, that is, it cannot come into being. To draw this specific sys-
tem/environment distinction means that the operation belongs to a given
system. Thus, the operations of a system can never leave the system. Simi-
larly, it also follows that an operation cannot enter a system from the outside
either because in such a case it would break through the boundary of that
system, thus producing a temporal occurrence, which would contradict the
rule that operations do not have a temporal duration (Luhmann 2004c:
92–93).
Another key concept of Luhmann’s theory is autopoiesis, perhaps its most
determining and most famous element. The theorem of autopoietic or self-
producing systems states that a system produces its operations exclusively
by means of its former operations. The principle of operational closure and
that of autopoiesis actually state the same thing: according to the former, no
operation of a system can leave the system and no other operation can enter
it; according to the latter, a system produces its operations from its own pre-
vious operations.
The concept of autopoiesis or autopoietic systems comes from the Chilean
neurobiologists Humberto Maturana and Fransisco Varela. They designed it
exclusively for a theory of living systems, in an attempt to answer the ques-
tion of what distinguishes these from non-living systems (Maturana 1987:
94). The concept of autopoiesis has found widespread application in many
disciplines; Luhmann is not alone to attach great importance to it.7 However,
there is no scientific consensus among those who apply the concept. Some of
the adherents of autopoietic systems theory, including Maturana himself,
criticized Luhmann. The major difference between Maturana’s and
Luhmann’s concepts of autopoiesis is that whereas the former originally de-
signed it for a theory of biological systems, the latter not only generalized it
but also applied it to a variety of systems.
Luhmann considers the theory of autopoietic systems a general systems
theory and distinguishes its three subtypes: biological, psychic, and social
systems. Biological systems are constituted by organisms, psychic systems
are a product of consciousnesses,8 and social systems are created by
7 For a comprehensive overview of the application of autopoietic systems theory, see Mingers
1995.
8 To be more exact, by consciousness Luhmann means the medium of psychic systems or the
form in which they appear (Luhmann 1995a: 218–219). For the sake of simplicity, however,
communication. The fact that all three are considered autopoietic systems
means that they all have a peculiar kind of operation, which clearly distin-
guishes each system type from the others. Luhmann, of course, pays the larg-
est amount of his attention to the operation type of social systems, namely
communication. Although he occasionally explores the operation type of
psychic systems, his views on this type went through a series of modifica-
tions. Initially he considered thought to be of this type (Luhmann 2005f3:
60),9 but later he replaced it with perception, more precisely, the concentra-
tion of attention (Luhmann 2004c: 30). Luhmann did not pay much attention
to the third type of operation, that of biological or organic systems. Some-
times he seems to be of the opinion that in this particular case there is no
need to assume that operation is an event as it can have temporal duration
(Luhmann 2004c: 109–110).
The principles of operational closure and autopoiesis deny the possibility
of a transfer of operations between systems. No transfer exists between two
consciousnesses: perceptions of the one will never be transferred to the
other. They will always remain exclusively private. No transfer is possible be-
tween psychic and social systems either: the perceptions of consciousness
will never be able to enter communication.
The sharp distinction between biological, psychic, and social systems is
the result of a theoretical decision. It cannot be conceived of as an a priori
fact; we should be able to demonstrate the considerations that have lead to it
as well as the benefits expected from it. In this case, this has special impor-
tance because the distinction between these three types of systems contra-
venes sociological tradition. The radical divergence consists in the fact that
Luhmann does not regard people as a part of social systems; in his theory,
society is not composed of individuals. Luhmann, as it were, has “cut up”
human beings: their body belongs to the biological system, their conscious-
ness is part of the psychic system, while both are but environments of the so-
cial system.
henceforth I will use the terms psychic system and consciousness as synonyms like
Luhmann often did.
9 Luhmann also speaks of notions (Vorstellung), which he uses to denote observed thoughts
(Gedanke) (Luhmann 2005f3: 61). In Social Systems, however, he only speaks of notions and
does not mention thoughts (Luhmann 1995a: 262 ff.; note that the English translation ren-
ders Vorstellung as “thought.”)
To demonstrate the benefits of this decision for theory construction re-

quires a systematic exposition of the theory. Before doing that, however, it
is worth summing up how the foregoing analyses lead to the necessity of
distinguishing between these three types of systems. Luhmann’s objective is
to find a base from which to reconstruct social phenomena—in fact, the
world—without presuppositions. This base he finds in observation. To further
eliminate presuppositions, he opts for an operationalist standpoint and de-
fines observation as an operation lacking temporal duration. We have seen
how he constructed a systems theory on this difference theoretical and op-
erationalist ground. All this, however, implies some peculiar characteristics
of the systems, which primarily consist in operational closure and autopoi-
esis. The boundaries of systems cannot be drawn just anywhere; they have to
be drawn so that systems constructed this way must comply with the re-
quirements of operational closure and autopoiesis. According to Luhmann,
this can only be achieved by distinguishing between the above-mentioned
three system types. If, conversely, people were regarded as a part of society,
the theorems of operational closure and autopoiesis would be violated.
Thus, Luhmann says, we can choose between two alternatives: either we
draw system boundaries in compliance with methodological requirements
and close off people from social systems, or we follow the tradition or our
emotions10 and regard people as a part of society. In the latter case, we yoke
theory with methodologically problematic presuppositions.
D) Structure
One of the most interesting parts of Luhmann’s theory is the definition of

structures. The reason for this lies in an obvious contradiction: although
structures are of primary importance for systems, Luhmann’s methodol-
ogical objectives diametrically oppose theoretical endeavors that empha-
size this importance. He criticizes structural theories on the grounds that
they assume structures as given because they do not try to explain the emer-
gence of structures and as such are founded on illegitimate ontological
10 Luhmann often characterizes his theoretical decisions as rigorous enforcements of meth-

odological requirements, while he thinks his critics prefer emotional moments. Luhmann
believes this to have been the reason why Maturana did not accept the theorem of
autopoiesis of communication systems (Luhmann 2004c: 113).
presuppositions (Luhmann 1995a: 278–282). He regards a priori structures as

one of the least defensible tenets of Parsons’s systems theory (Luhmann
2004c: 14). Luhmann’s methodological endeavor may be called post-
structuralist, and the task he faces may be conceived of as the construction of
a post-structuralist concept of structure.
The construction of a new concept of structure is made more difficult by
the fact that Luhmann seeks to reconstruct every social and psychic phe-
nomenon with the exclusive help of operations, that is to say, events lacking
temporal duration. Thus, only transitory operations are considered real and
nothing else. By structure, however, we usually designate something perma-
nent in time. Therefore, the problem is how to construct a phenomenon that
exhibits at least some permanence and repeatability, although not complete
immutability, by using operations with only a transitory existence.
We have to construct the concept of structure from the operation of ob-
servation, which consists in a distinction. There are no a priori prescriptions
for the distinction we need to draw for we can draw each distinction in a dif-
ferent way, which, in turn, means that the operation of observation is con-
tingent. For the functioning of autopoietic systems, however, the operations
that take place are by no means a matter of indifference. Accordingly, it is
essential for us to limit the range of possible operations. The task of struc-
tures is precisely this limitation: they constrict the range of connectable op-
erations, thereby ensuring the autopoiesis of the system. This limitation
means that distinctions, which are theoretically contingent, will appear as
given and fixed.
Structures cannot exist in isolation from operations: we can only speak of
them in so far as and so long as operations use them. In other words, struc-
tures are nothing more then the limitedness of the connectibility of opera-
tions (Luhmann 1995a: 283–284), and their reality lies in the fact that they
are used (Luhmann 2004c: 328–329). In short, it is not by their stable and con-
stant existence, which is independent of momentary operations, that
structures ensure the autopoiesis of the system, but by constricting the con-
nectibility of operations. Being so, there is a circular relationship between
structures and operations: operations are impossible without structures as
they can only exist if they connect to each other, this is what structures en-
sure, whereas structures exist in so far as they are used by operations
(Luhmann 2004c: 108–109).
Let us demonstrate the concept of structure using language as an exam-
ple. In this case, structure building—that is, limiting the possibilities and
fixing theoretically contingent decisions—consists in the fact that when us-

ing language, we assume that both grammatical rules and denotations of
words are given. If we want to be understood, rules and words cannot be used
arbitrarily; we have to adjust them to the expectations of our communication
partners. In short, language has a structure assumed to be given when used.
This structure is, however, not necessary: it can be questioned as it is also a
result of selections, which means that both grammatical rules and denota-
tions of words could be different. That we do not alter them is not because
they are based on a priori and inalterably fixed patterns; the reason is that if
everybody altered them arbitrarily, it would lead to considerable confusion
both in the functioning of society and in the consciousness of the individual.
Nevertheless, the alterations within and the evolution of languages prove
that they are not inalterable prescriptions. Thus, the structures of language
consist in the fact that certain kinds of choices, albeit theoretically contin-
gent, are taken as given, and by using language, we do not, or only in excep-
tional cases, thematize them as contingent. The fact that we have to comply
with these rules constricts our possibilities of using language; this is how the
range of possible connectable operations is narrowed down. 11
The example of language also illustrates that structures do not have an
autonomous existence, separate from operations. Language exists only in so
far as and so long as it is used by mental or communicative operations, that
is, if and only if we think or speak in a given language. If nobody speaks a
language, and all written material disappears, language will die out.
We can describe structure formation as a double selection (Luhmann
2005a5: 151), that is, as a reflexivity of selection or a selection of selection
(Luhmann 1995a: 44). The first level of selection is structure itself: it limits
the range of the connectable operations of a system. The second level is
constituted by operations: they always have more possibilities to choose
from; thus, they are also selective even though their selectivity is a selected
one. Returning to the example of language: although grammatical and
11 The relationship between structure and language is a rather difficult issue because accord-
ing to Luhmann, language is not a system, whereas only systems can have structures. Never-
theless, language plays an important role in the building of structures of communication
and psychic systems. Thus, we can speak, even if in a restricted sense, of structures of lan-
guage. I believe that in spite of these difficulties we can most expressively demonstrate
Luhmann’s structure concept by means of language. Language will be discussed in detail in
Chapter Four, Section C, Subsection i.
denotational rules limit the range of possible sentences, they do not deter-
mine them completely because we can choose from an infinite repertoire;
still, as a result of the first selection, the second selection is constricted and
selected.
We have so far characterized structures as limitations of possibilities, but
at the same time, structure formation also means the increase of the number
of available possibilities. This seemingly paradoxical statement can be re-
fined again with the help of language. Language, it is true, limits the range of
communicative possibilities by means of rules, but simultaneously it allows
for the emergence of a virtually unlimited range of possibilities. We can
choose from a practically infinite number of possible sentences. We may
imagine how difficult or rather impossible communication would be had this
selectivity of structures not existed. In that case, we would be forced to
communicate the grammatical rules with each sentence formed. Thus,
Luhmann’s thesis does in effect mean that the reduction of complexity re-
sults in an increase in complexity (Luhmann 2004c: 123).
The theorem of autopoiesis, which deals with the self-production of op-
erations, has a twin as far as structures are concerned. This twin is the prin-
ciple of self-organization, which states that the structures of a system are
solely reproduced by the operations of that system, also that there is no
structure transfer originating from the environment of the system. To take
an example, in the course of learning or socialization, there is no transfer of
data, norms, patterns, etc., which enters the system from the outside because
according to the principle of self-organization, systems can only learn or be
socialized by their own operations (Luhmann 2005f3: 81–85, 2004c: 105–106).
E) Structural Coupling
In the foregoing, an emphasis was put on the sharp separation of systems.

The theorems of operational closure, autopoiesis, or self-organization, how-
ever, do not imply that the systems are independent and do not require one
another. Communication, for example, is completely dependent on psychic
systems because only they are able to perceive, while communication cannot
come into being without this perceptive capacity. Consequently, the question
of what features systems have is by no means unrelated to other systems. At
the same time, as we have seen, the operations and structures of a system are
produced by the system itself, given that no transfer from the environment is
possible. Therefore, the task is to reconcile the autonomy of systems in

launching operations and forming structures, that is, their autopoiesis and
self-organization, with the interdependence of systems.
These apparently contradictory requirements are reconciled with the
help of the concept “structural coupling.” As we have seen, autopoietic sys-
tems are systems determined by structures: the range of their possible opera-
tions is defined by their structures. Structural coupling means that the range
of possible structures by which the autopoiesis of a system can persist is
limited. This limitation, in turn, arises from the fact that a system has to be
compatible with its environment. Thus, the environment influences the sys-
tem in a certain sense although this influence is to be understood in a very
special sense. System and environment or two systems remain impenetrable
for one another. Their connection is limited to the structures: the range of
workable structures depends on the environment of the system or on other
systems, while the operations of the system are produced exclusively by the
system (Luhmann 1999a: 100–101).
Structural coupling also means that a narrow zone emerges, in which a
system can get into contact with its environment. A prerequisite to establish
such a zone—a prerequisite for the system to be able to respond to changes in
the environment—is that every other effect be excluded. Let us consider how
little a fraction of the color spectrum our sight is limited to. The prerequisite
for sight is exactly this limitation of the visible spectrum; otherwise, our
brain would not be able to manage the enormous amount of incoming infor-
mation. Similarly, structural coupling is a very selective mechanism: it ex-
cludes a vast number of possibilities so that the system could cope with
processing the rest. This selectivity is also a prerequisite for the system to be
able to construct complex structures (Luhmann 2004c: 121–122). This is yet
another way to formulate the theorem mentioned above: reducing complex-
ity is a prerequisite for an increase in complexity.
Thus, structural coupling divides the events occurring in the systemic
environment into two groups: those excluded and those included. Excluded
events cannot be taken into account by the system. Nevertheless, they can
also have an effect on the system even if this effect can only be destructive,
like the ultra-violate radiation that can destroy our sight. The events that are
included by structural coupling have information value for the system, as
Luhmann puts it, they can irritate the system. As per what has been said,
irritation cannot mean that something comes through the boundary of
the system and enters it from the environment. In view of this, Luhmann
reformulates the concept of information. As opposed to the conventional

view, by information he does not mean something that is disposable and
transferable. According to the methodological requirements discussed above,
we have to think of information in terms of events. Information is a choice of
possibilities determined preliminarily. In order to obtain information, we
need a limited domain of possibilities; in short, we need structures. Informa-
tion is a selection done by the system itself. Moreover, it is a selection from a
domain of possibilities produced by the system even though, due to struc-
tural coupling, it seems as if this selection came from the environment
(Luhmann 1995a: 67–68, 2004c: 127–130).
The thesis of operational coupling contends that there cannot be any op-
erational connection between system and environment. We can speak, how-
ever, of a causal connection, which is due to structural coupling itself. By this
Luhmann means that owing to the structural coupling of two systems, it ap-
pears to an observer as if one of the systems caused a change in the other
(Luhmann 1999a: 96).12
The concept of interpenetration is closely related to that of structural
coupling. This relation is so tight-knit that Luhmann sometimes questions
the necessity of their separating (Luhmann 2004c: 267–268). The two con-
cepts have different theoretical roots; the concept of structural coupling
stems from Maturana, whereas the concept of interpenetration was elabo-
rated by Parsons. Using the concept of interpenetration, Parsons also de-
scribed the interdependencies of systems. As the term itself suggests, Parsons
took interpenetration to mean that systems enter or partially overlap one
another (Luhmann 2004c: 39). According to the Luhmannian definition of sys-
tem, this is impossible because if there cannot be transfers between systems,
we cannot speak of their overlapping either. In spite of this, Luhmann does
not completely reject the concept of interpenetration. He reformulates it: we
can speak of interpenetration if two systems mutually presuppose the per-
formances of each other. A good example would be the relationship of psy-
chic and social systems because the formations of any of them are
inconceivable without those of the other. The similarity of the conceptions of
interpenetration and structural coupling is obvious. According to Luhmann,
their difference lies in the fact that while interpenetration is formulated
from the point of view of the system, structural coupling implies the point of
12 I return to Luhmann’s special concept of causality in Chapter Two, Section G and in Chapter
Seven, Section B.
view of an external observer. Even though he does not completely reject the
concept of interpenetration, there is a noticeable shift of emphasis towards
structural coupling in his œuvre: while in his foundational book, Social
Systems, he devotes an entire chapter to interpenetration (Luhmann 1995a:
210–254), in his late monographic work, The Society of Society, in which struc-
tural coupling is discussed in detail, interpenetration is given less than one
paragraph (Luhmann 1999a: 108).
F) Meaning
The concepts discussed thus far—operational closure, autopoiesis, structure,

or structural coupling—are equally valid for all three kinds of autopoietic
systems (the social, psychic, and biological) distinguished by Luhmann. The
concept of meaning (Sinn),13 however, has certain limitations, as it is charac-
teristic only of two types of systems: the psychic and the social. By taking
the concept of meaning to be equally applicable to both kinds of systems,
Luhmann widens its usage: in the philosophical and sociological tradition
meaning, mostly regarded as a fundamental concept, is primarily discussed
in relation to subject.14 Luhmann, however, rejects subject as a fundamental
concept for methodological reasons. Consequently, he needs to reformulate
the concept of meaning—which, nevertheless, he also considers a fundamen-
tal concept of sociology—in such a way that it become compatible with the
theoretical findings discussed above.
According to Luhmann, meaning is equally characteristic of social and
psychic systems, which cannot be conceived without meaning. Every com-
munication is meaningful (sinnhaft) communication, and every thought is
meaningful thought. Meaning interpreted in this way cannot be negated be-
cause a communication or a thought negating meaning is also meaningful.
Thus, meaning has no counter-concept.15 When we say about something that
13 I translate Sinn as ”meaning” although ”sense” would also be acceptable (cf. Moeller 2006:
225).
14 Max Weber’s sociological theory, the first in which the concept of meaning played an impor-
tant role (Schülein 1982: 649–653) is, of course, also connected to the individual (Weber 1978:
4).
15 For Luhmann world and reality are also concepts that cannot be negated (Nassehi 2000: 47).
it is “meaningless,” we simply use the word in another sense (Luhmann

2004c: 233).
The fact that communicative and conscious operations have meaning
means that the distinctions they draw have a special character: on one side of
the distinction, there is an actuality; on the other side, there is a potentiality.
In other words, when we communicate, there are always other possibilities
that we do not communicate or actualize, and the same is true in the case of
thoughts. Thus, the fact that a communication or a thought is meaningful
means that they always have a horizon of possibilities. This does not apply
to events outside the social and the psychic systems. The events of nature
happen necessarily; there are no other possibilities. If they are interpreted as
an actualization of a possibility, it is done by a social or a psychic system as
an observer; meaning does not belong to nature in this case either (Luhmann
1999a: 49–50).
Meaning is a form with two inseparable sides, actuality and potentiality.
In order to be able to speak of an actuality, we need other possibilities, and to
be able to speak of a possibility, we need to actualize it.16
Meaning makes it possible to reduce the complexity of the world in such a
way that it is preserved. Meaning implies that some possibilities are actual-
ized, while others are not. However, the latter do not cease to exist: they are
preserved as possibilities. They remain available for further operations to be
actualized later (Luhmann 1995a: 60–61).
Luhmann distinguishes three dimensions of meaning: factual, temporal,
and social. By asserting that meaning has three dimensions, he means that
they are respects in which one can say that something actualizes a possibil-
ity. All three can be described using a specific difference: in the case of fac-
tual dimension, the difference is that of internal/external, which can be
different from the system/environment distinction; in the case of temporal
dimension, the difference is that of before/after; and in the case of social di-
mension, it is a distinction between ego/alter. The three dimensions of mean-
ing constitute three double horizons; the difference characteristic of a given
dimension is infinitely repeatable on both sides of the distinction. In the fac-
tual dimension, that is to say, either on the internal or the external side of a
distinction, we can always repeat the internal/external distinction; in time
dimension we can always speak of before/after; and in social dimension we
16 Luhmann defines the concept of meaning with the help of medium/form theory, too, which I
will discuss in Chapter Four, Section C.
can always speak of ego/alter from the point of view of either. To make the
last one clearer: I can regard myself as another one for the other, then I can
take into account that the other takes into account that I regard myself this
way, and so on ad infinitum (Luhmann 1990b1: 36–39, 1995a: 76–80, 2004c:
239–242).
Of course, one may ask now why meaning has three dimensions and why
these three. Luhmann is aware of the legitimacy of such questions, and his
answer is simple: Show me a fourth dimension or prove that any of these
three can be omitted! In short, he does not consider them deducible; he sim-
ply states that if we scrutinize meaning, we find these three dimensions, and
they can only be verified by showing that this division works. Most often,
space is proposed as the fourth dimension, but according to Luhmann it is
not separable from the factual dimension (Luhmann 2004c: 239).
G) Complexity
In accordance with the method of reconstruction I outlined at the end of

Chapter One, the foregoing analyses focused on the late period of Luhmann’s
œuvre. In the case of the concept of complexity, however, it is necessary to
briefly dwell on his first or “pre-autopoietic” period as well. The main reason
for this is that in his early period the key issues of his theory were complex-
ity and its reduction.
The role played by the concept of complexity in Luhmann’s theory reveals
an important difference, a point of disagreement, between his approach and
the philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment. According to Luhmann, the
philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment can be characterized as an en-
deavor to find a solid ground on which a theory describing complex social
phenomena can be constructed in a systematic fashion. In the course of con-
struction, however, philosophers had to constantly realize that the things
they thought to be solid were in fact unstable, and because of this, they failed
to describe society in its full complexity. In other words, the ultimate prob-
lem they were struggling with was that of complexity. Therefore, Luhmann
suggests, we need to proceed in the opposite direction. Let our point of de-
parture be complexity; let us begin the construction of our theory with the
premise that the world cannot be known in its full complexity, also that eve-
rything that can be said about it is only possible by resorting to reductions.
Consequently, all our statements will be exclusively and necessarily selective
and contingent; there will always remain alternatives (Luhmann 2005a3: 91–
94). One of the best examples for this paradigm shift is the question of causal
explanation. Luhmann argues that instead of trying to describe social phe-
nomena with compelling causal relationships and, with it, instantly facing
the problem that our descriptions are incomplete, we should proceed from
the fact that every cause has countless effects and every effect has countless
causes. Causal explanation is a reduction: we pick one cause and one effect
ignoring the rest. Causal relationships are therefore necessarily selective and
contingent (Luhmann 2005a1: 20–23).
Thus, Luhmann’s point of departure is the premise that the world is too
complex for us to completely know or to consider all facts. He assigns
systems the task of reducing this complexity. If system formation means
reducing the complexity of the world, then the complexity of systems is al-
ways of a lower level than that of their environment. The ungraspable and
unmanageable complexity of the world is made “processable” because of this
reduction. Therefore, systems have a certain intermediary or unburdening
function. For example, social systems mediate between the complexity of the
world and the people inhabiting it, by unburdening the latter from the task
of managing the former (Luhmann 2005a3: 96, 2005a5: 147).
Luhmann defines the concept of complexity with the help of systemic
elements and the relations existing between them. If the number of elements
increases, the number of their possible relations increases exponentially, and
soon a point will be reached beyond which not every connection can be real-
ized simultaneously. In short, complexity means that we cannot take every
possibility into account, which implies that we have to make a selection
(Luhmann 2005b4: 257–258). Luhmann argues that the concept of complexity
defined this way will be applicable not only to systems but also to their envi-
ronments because we can speak of both elements and their relations in the
environment. Nevertheless, we have to take into consideration that the envi-
ronment is always an environment of a given system, and therefore the ele-
ments and relations we identify are always elements and relations from the
perspective of a given system. Thus, the complexity of the environment is
always dependent on a system (Luhmann 1995a: 24, 2005b4: 263–266).
The differentiation of systems, another key element in Luhmann’s the-
ory,17 can also be explained by resorting to complexity. Systems manage the
17 The differentiation of systems should not be confused with the theory of difference.
demand for the reduction of complexity by means of differentiation. Subsys-

tems come into being that are only sensitive to specific kinds of information,
whereas ignoring all others. The theorem formulated above—the reduction
of complexity produces an increase in complexity—also holds good here. This
means that the more a system reduces or “processes” the complexity of its
environment, the more complex internal structures will be able to develop
(Luhmann 1971b: 309).
That Luhmann regards complexity as a point of departure has various
theoretical consequences.18 One of these is that every observation and de-
scription of the world is necessarily selective and contingent, and therefore
there is no absolute truth.
The problem of complexity and its reduction also play an important
role in the second period of Luhmann’s career. He still maintains the original
concept of complexity although slightly adjusts it to his new difference theo-
retical viewpoint. Now complexity is a form with two sides, one side repre-
senting a situation in which all relations existing between elements can be
realized simultaneously, whereas the other represents a condition in which
the same is impossible (Luhmann 1999a: 137–138, 2005e1: 60–62). He notes,
however, that the theory of autopoietic systems and the operationalist view-
point make it doubtful whether we can speak of elements and relations. Op-
erations can indeed be seen as elements, but what are relations? In the last
years of his life, he mentions that the concept of complexity needs to be re-
thought, but did not live to undertake this task (Luhmann 2004c: 178–180).
18 When in the 1960s Luhmann based his social theory on the concept of complexity, he was a
pioneer. Nowadays, however, complexity is one of the fundamental concepts of the social
sciences. John Urry goes as far as speaking of a “complexity turn” (Urry 2005: 1).
CHAPTER THREE
Theory of Social Systems
In this chapter, the scope of analysis will be restricted to social systems. Con-
structing a theory of sociality (or of society, which is a more limited category
than the former) is the par excellence objective of Luhmann’s work. He ar-
gues that the most effective way to reach this objective is to apply a more
general theoretical toolkit, that is, general systems theory, in the description
of social phenomena. Since we are thus dealing with the specification of a
more general level, now it can be understood why this level, the theory of
autopoietic systems—also difference or form theory, which are even more
general—had to be discussed first. The fact that general systems theory
represents a more abstract level than the theory of social systems means that
the findings of the former must apply to the latter as well. Consequently, we
need to construct a theory of social systems—one that claims to hold true for
every social phenomenon—that complies with the theorems of autopoiesis,
operational closure, structural coupling, etc.
This requirement might seem to be ambiguous because it appears to sug-
gest that first we establish compelling theoretical and methodological re-
quirements to which we then adjust the theory of society. This, however, is
not the case. As we have seen in the foregoing, Luhmann does not accept ex-
clusive or compelling points of departure or fundamental principles. Being
so, he cannot substantiate his general theory in itself and cannot endow it
with exclusivity. Instead, the plausibility of the theory can only be reinforced
if it works well in the course of its application, that is, if it functions properly
as a theory of sociality—also as a theory of consciousness and of living organ-
isms—and if convincing and coherent findings can be derived from it. Hence,
there is a circular relationship between general systems theory, which repre-
sents a more general level, and the theory of social systems, which is a sub-
category of the former. On the one hand, general systems theory needs the
confirmation provided by the theory of social systems. It cannot manage
without the latter; it is empty without it. On the other hand, the theory of so-
cial systems can only provide this supporting function if the findings of gen-
eral systems theory that I discussed in the previous chapter are presumed to
be given. Thus, in the course of theory construction, Luhmann emphasizes
the methodological principle that every description and every theory is the
result of a choice: we could have decided otherwise, but having made this or
that decision, it henceforth will bind us in the consecutive steps of theory
construction.
In the previous chapter we have seen what it means to conceive of the
theory of social systems as a specification of general systems theory. It has
been mentioned that Luhmann distinguishes between three types of autopoi-
etic systems: biological, psychic, and social. The conclusions made in that
chapter hold true for all three system types, and the concepts presented
there are also characteristic of all three. The only exception is the concept of
meaning, which is only applicable to psychic and social systems, and as such
it serves as a kind of limiting criterion. The real limiting criteria, that is, the
specifics of different system types, are the operations, or more exactly, the
types of operations.
The operation type characteristic of social systems is communication very
much like thought and perception are operation types of the psychic sys-
tems. Social systems are constituted by interconnected communicative op-
erations. Accordingly, the criterion of sociality is whether something can be
considered a communication or not. If we now apply the findings of the pre-
vious chapter to the theory of social systems, we can state that social systems
owe their reality exclusively to communicative operations; the former do not
have an autonomous existence, one that is separate from the latter. At the
same time, communicative operations can only be conceived of as operations
of a given system because there is no communication that is not an operation
of a social system. Moreover, and consistent with the theses of operational
closure and autopoiesis, communication can only connect to communication:
communication can only originate from communication, or in Luhmann’s
words, “only communication can communicate” (Luhmann 2005f2: 38;
my translation). In what follows, I first explore how Luhmann elaborates
his communication concept, a theory that meets these methodological
requirements.
A) Defining Communication
Communication is usually defined as a transmission. According to the trans-

mission model of communication, one of the participants in the communica-
tive process, the sender, transmits a message or information to the other, the
Theory of Social Systems 63
receiver. Luhmann, however, argues that this model does not meet the re-
quirements of the theory of autopoietic systems. The first problem is that we
suppose the transmitted message to be the same for both sender and receiver
(Luhmann 1995a: 139–140, 2004c: 290–291). 1 But how can we be certain that
the information has the same meaning for both? What would guarantee the
sameness of meaning? Autopoietic systems theory contends that it is the so-
cial and the psychic systems themselves that determine their own states. Ac-
cepting the transmission model would, in turn, mean that communication
ensures that the states of two consciousnesses are the same, which would be
in contradiction with the principle of autopoiesis. Of course, the emergence
of complex social systems is inconceivable without the premise that people
participating in an exchange need to mean something similar when uttering
certain words to designate certain things. However, according to Luhmann’s
theoretical objectives, we cannot take this for granted in the way the trans-
mission model does, but we need to reconstruct how it comes into being.
There is another problem with the transmission model, which is related
to the mechanism of transmission. As we have seen, Luhmann does not ac-
knowledge the existence of temporal durability either in the case of social
systems or in that of psychic systems; he seeks to construct everything from
operations that have only a transitory existence. The very concept of trans-
mission, however, needs something that is both constant and durable, some-
thing that as such can be transferred from a sender to a receiver. In short,
the concept of transmission is impossible to be reconciled with our methodo-
logical requirements.
Let us now have a closer look at the alternative provided by Luhmann to
replace the transmission model. He argues that communication is a unity
consisting of three components: information, utterance, and understanding.
As all three components are selections, communication is a simultaneous re-
alization of three selections. All three are necessary, and communication can
only be realized if a unity between them is formed. Furthermore, the three
components can only be conceived of as constituents of communication: we
1 The best known version of the transmission model is the work of Claude Shannon and
Warren Weaver. According to this model, the sender and the receiver are connected by a
channel, which is used to transmit a sign. The sign needs to be encoded by the former and
decoded by the latter, but during its transmission it can be altered by an external source of
noise; in other words, the decoded sign may differ from the one originally encoded
(Shannon-Weaver 1986: 6–7).
cannot speak of information, utterance, or understanding without the other

two, and without a unity that binds them. Thus, they are not already and
readily available building blocks from which one can construct communica-
tion (Luhmann 2005f4: 113–114). Before entering into a discussion of the
question of what is meant by the unity of the three components, we first
need to explore them one by one.
We begin with the concept of information, which has been cursorily men-
tioned in the previous chapter.2 As we have seen, Luhmann does not regard
information as a kind of unit that can be sent to here or there. Information is
a selection, which one chooses from a set of possibilities. Thus, we first need
a set from which to choose; we need a horizon of possibilities, which is itself
already a result of selection. In the case of information, therefore, we are en-
titled to speak of a twofold selection: first a horizon of possibilities comes
into existence, and then we choose one of the possibilities offered. Forming a
horizon of possibilities is, in fact, a formation of structures; thus, information
always presupposes structures. As structures are always structures of sys-
tems, information is always dependent on systems; in other words, it is
information for only a given system. Thus, the first component of communi-
cation, information, is the result of a selection, a choice of one possibility
from a horizon of possibilities, which is pre-selected by the structures of a
system (Luhmann 1995a: 67–69, 2004c: 293–296).
The second component is utterance (Mitteilung). Utterance is also a selec-
tion because there are numerous possibilities of uttering information and
there is no one single compelling prescription according to which one has to
choose (Luhmann 1995a: 140, 2004c: 296).
The concepts of information and utterance are generally part of our cus-
tomary idea of communication. The third component, understanding (Verste-
hen), however, usually means a conscious process, that is, something belong-
ing to psychic systems. Luhmann defines it as a component of communi-
cation, that is, as something belonging to a system, which is per definitionem
completely closed off from psychic systems. Moreover, for him understand-
ing is not identical with proper understanding; it also includes misunder-
standing.3 Understanding consists in distinguishing between information and
2 See Chapter Two, Section E.

3 “This concept of understanding also includes misunderstanding in so far as it does not cause
any break in autopoiesis. On the basis of misunderstanding one can communicate with oth-
ers for a very long time. It is not necessary at all, and would seriously burden the communi-
utterance. This is of crucial importance for communication because commu-

nication can only come into existence through understanding, that is,
through distinguishing between information and utterance (Luhmann 1995a:
140–141, 2005f4: 111). If we do not distinguish between these two compo-
nents, we cannot speak of communication. To take an example, when we see
a person shaking his head, it is not yet a communication in itself but only a
perception. Communication only comes into being if we think that that per-
son wants to say something by doing this; that is, we distinguish between ut-
terance (shaking the head) and information (denial or negation). It is
precisely this distinction that Luhmann calls understanding. In short, under-
standing is the circumstance by which the distinction between perception
and communication begins life. Perception and communication are com-
pletely different operation types: the former belongs to psychic systems, the
latter to social systems.4 Luhmann also considers understanding a selection;
by this he means that there is always more than one possibility for what we
can regard as utterance or as information. This also implies that understand-
ing is not merely a duplication of information (Luhmann 2005f4: 112).
With this, we have answered the question of what the unity of communi-
cation consists in: communication is a synthesis of three selections (informa-
tion, utterance, understanding), and their unity is born with the assistance of
understanding, which distinguishes between the first two (Luhmann 2004c:
298–299). The fact that the operation of communication contains three com-
ponents corresponds to the most abstract level of Luhmann’s theory, that is,
to difference or form theory. We have seen that operation is always a distinc-
tion, a form with two sides. This, however, requires not two but three com-
ponents because in addition to the two sides, we need something that
distinguishes between them. Thus, according to the form or difference the-
ory, we always need three components; one of them distinguishes between
the other two, and the unity of form is constituted by this component. The
same modus operandi applies to communication.
cation process, if all misunderstandings had to be explained.” (Luhmann 2004c: 297; my

translation)
4 In this case, however, it cannot be maintained that information is only possible as a compo-
nent of communication, as Luhmann states it elsewhere (Luhmann 2005f4: 114). Perception
is also a kind of information. Thus, information can be obtained in two different ways: either
someone communicates it to us, or we perceive it ourselves (Berghaus 2003: 77).
We have seen5 that the self-reference of operations means that operations

always need to use a system/environment distinction characteristic of the
given system. Furthermore, self-reference is always and necessarily accom-
panied by other-reference as well. As regards communication, the self-
reference/other-reference distinction corresponds to the difference of utter-
ance/information. The internal, self-referential side of distinction is utter-
ance, whereas the external is information. The fact that we call information
other-reference does not mean it is something outside the system. Informa-
tion is produced by the system and inside the system, but because it is other-
reference (it refers to the environment), it ensures that the system is open to
its environment. Owing to information, communication always contains
something that is not communication but forms an environment for commu-
nication (Luhmann 1999a: 77). Consequently, even though social systems
cannot communicate with their environment, they always communicate
about their environment (Luhmann 1999a: 96
B) Communication and Its Environment
In agreement with our findings about operational closure and autopoiesis,

communication systems cannot have operational connections with their en-
vironments. In the communicative process, nothing enters communication
from consciousnesses, and vice versa, communication does not penetrate
consciousnesses. This, however, should not be taken to mean that communi-
cation is independent from its environment. Thus, in this chapter we explore
what Luhmann’s theory says about the relationship between communication
and its environment.
To begin with, it goes without saying that communication has a variety of
environmental conditions. For example, it stands to reason that communica-
tion could not exist without consciousnesses. It is also easy to accept that
communication has certain biological prerequisites, among them a proper
blood circulation in the brain (Luhmann 2004c: 265–266). By this, however,
we have not given a full account of this relationship. In addition to environ-
mental connections, there must be other kinds of relations between commu-
nication and its environment because the participating consciousnesses
5 See Chapter Two, Section B.

undergo a change in the course of communication, and the theory has to

somehow take this into account.
The relationship between communication and psychic systems is de-
scribed by the concept of structural coupling or interpenetration, which I
discussed in the previous chapter. According to Luhmann’s thesis, communi-
cation systems are structurally coupled with consciousnesses and only with
consciousnesses. It is the perceptions of consciousnesses that connect the
communication systems to the world. Thus, events occurring in the environ-
ment can only influence communication through consciousnesses (Luhmann
2005f2: 45, 2004c: 270–271). The fact that the perceptions of psychic systems
mediate between the external world and communication does not mean that
perceptions enter communication. They remain operations in the conscious-
nesses all the time; only the information about this perception will be a part
of communication. For example, seeing something is not a part of communi-
cation, but saying that we have seen something is.
It is structural coupling or the interpenetration of communication and
the psychic systems that makes it possible for these systems to build highly
complex structures. This means that due to interpenetration, systems take
certain contingent environmental conditions as given; this is how they re-
duce the complexity of their environments. Reducing the complexity of the
environment, in turn, makes it possible for systems to increase their own
complexity. In the case of communication systems, this means that commu-
nicative operations can proceed without taking all the aspects of their envi-
ronmental conditions into account; for example, it is irrelevant here whether
individual consciousnesses mean the same thing when using the same ex-
pression, or what precisely happens in individual consciousnesses at a given
moment. Highly complex structures of communication systems would not be
able to emerge if all such aspects were for some reason to be taken into ac-
count, simply because due to their sheer quantity, it would be unmanageable
(Luhmann 2004c: 268–269).
The same is true for psychic systems: they also owe the formation of their
complex structures to the interpenetration with communication systems;
this interpenetration Luhmann calls socialization. He transforms the concept
of socialization to some extent and reformulates it using his theory of auto-
poietic systems. Due to the impossibility of any transfer between different
kinds of systems, he cannot accept the usual definition of socialization, ac-
cording to which socialization is a transmission of cultural patterns. Instead,
he reinterprets socialization by claiming that psychic systems build their
structures exclusively by their own operations; thus, socialization is actually

self-socialization. The building of structures, however, is made possible by
the interpenetration of psychic and social systems. Here, too, interpenetra-
tion reduces complexity and unburdens psychic systems; thus, it makes it
possible to increase the complexity of the psychic system. This consists in the
fact that due to socialization, we take the functioning of social systems as
given; for example, parlance, the validity of social norms, or the functioning
of institutions are taken for granted (Luhmann 1995a: 240–244). Besides,
Luhmann argues, there is another reason to conceive of socialization as
self-socialization: it enables us to give a better account of the diversity of in-
dividuals or of their deviations from norms occurring in the course of the
process of socialization (Luhmann 2004c: 136–137).
In Luhmann’s theory, the structural coupling of social and psychic sys-
tems is ensured by language. Language is double faceted: it can be used by
thinking—that is, privately—and by communication. Language establishes a
connection between these two in such a way that they remain, as far as their
operations are concerned, completely closed off for each other. In other
words, although both psychic and communication systems build their struc-
tures mainly with the help of language, they have completely different op-
eration modes. Language as structural coupling ensures that both psychic
and social systems are able to attain enough complexity in the course of their
co-evolution. Needless to say, Luhmann does not say that either communica-
tion or thinking would be reducible to language since we can speak of both
non-verbal communication and thoughts that cannot be expressed in words.
We can, however, safely state that without language neither social nor psy-
chic systems could have reached such a high degree of complexity they have
now (Luhmann 1999a: 205, 2004c: 275–278).6
C) Systems Theory and Action Theory
By considering communication the exclusive building block of social systems,

Luhmann revolts against a traditional concept in sociology: sociological theo-
ries usually regarded—and partly still regard—action as the basic unit or cri-
terion of sociality. In the early years of his career, in the 1960s and 1970s,
6 The question of language will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, Section C, Subsection i.
Luhmann also believed that social systems were built from actions. Still
faithful to the sociological tradition and mainly as a result of Parsons’s influ-
ence, he was thinking in terms of action systems. At the same time, however,
above and beyond action, communication did play an important role in his
early writings: he argued that action in itself cannot be the criterion of so-
ciality because there exists non-social action as well,7 whereas communica-
tion always presupposes at least two participants. Therefore, both were made
by Luhmann to play a role in the definition and characterization of social sys-
tems;8 yet their relation to each other was not entirely clear.9
From the late 1970s, however, Luhmann expressly regards communica-
tion as the basic unit of sociality. It is worth dwelling on the question of what
lies behind this change. Rudolf Stichweh points out two important reasons:
On the one hand, there are some inconsistencies in Luhmann’s early theory
mainly due to the fact that action as the basic unit of sociality is incompatible
with the theoretical requirements of the theory of autopoietic systems. On
the other hand, the attention of the social sciences was increasingly focused
on newly discovered phenomena, like information society and globalization,
and a theory of society based on communication seemed to be more suitable
to describe these phenomena.10
In spite of this communication theoretical turn—which was reasonably
radical against the background of mainstream sociology—it would be a gross
error to say that Luhmann completely rejected action theory. According to
him, sociological tradition was dominated by a misconception, which set
7 Social action is, of course, only a subtype of actions for Max Weber, too (Weber 1978: 22).
8 To quote just one example: “Society is an encompassing system of all those actions that are com-
municatively accessible for each other.” (Luhmann 2005b1: 12; my translation; italics in the
original)
9 At the same time, when exploring the question whether communication or action should be
regarded as the unit of social systems, we have to take into consideration that the question
of operations or operation types became a key question of Luhmann’s theory only after his
“autopoietic turn” in the 1980s. Before this turn, we cannot speak of his operationalist
stance; therefore, the question of the basic unit of social systems was perhaps not a vital
topic for him. Moreover, Luhmann’s conceptual and methodological tools were underdevel-
oped to discuss this question satisfactorily.
10 Stichweh 2000a: 9–12. At the same time, it is also true that Luhmann did not accept the view
that the term “information society” described a new type of society (Luhmann 1999a: 1090,
1996b). The concept of globalization he also regarded as problematic because it posited the
existence of regional societies (Luhmann 1997). Luhmann’s concept of world society, which
is opposed to the concept of globalization, will be discussed in Chapter Four, Section B.
action theory in opposition to systems theory and considered them to be

mutually excluding (Luhmann 2005c1: 59, 2004c: 255; Schneider 2003: 42).11
Luhmann, in turn, argued that the elements of both approaches could actu-
ally be found in comprehensive sociological theories. When inspecting either
Max Weber’s or Émile Durkheim’s theories, one can find both action theo-
retical and systems theoretical components (Luhmann 2005c1: 60). And
Talcott Parsons’s entire œuvre was governed by a thesis according to which
“action = system” (Luhmann 2004c: 18–19). Thus, Luhmann concludes, one
should not regard action theory and systems theory as opposing alternatives.
Rather, the real problem is how the theory of sociality should conceive of
their relation (Luhmann 2005c1: 60).
Luhmann contends that there are several reasons why action cannot ful-
fill the role of the basic unit of sociality. The first of these is a problem I men-
tioned earlier: action is not always social and social action is only a subtype
of action. Thus, if we want to define the basic unit of sociality with the help
of action, we need more criteria. This, however, is problematic given that it is
required that the operations themselves produce the boundaries of a system.
Another problem arises from the fact that if we regarded action as the fun-
damental operation mode of social systems, we would have to assume the
concept of subject as given because action is always an action of a subject. As
Luhmann finds subject too problematic an idea, he refuses to accept it as an a
priori fundamental concept (Luhmann 1995a: 137). Communication, however,
is defined in his theory without any reference to the subject even though he
does not, of course, question that communication is impossible without
psychic systems. As a further argument against action theory, Luhmann
mentions that the internal and external boundaries of action, that is, the
boundaries between action and its effects on the one hand, and between ac-
tion and its motivations on the other, are not clear enough (Luhmann 2004c:
252–254).
Consequently, in so far as we conceive of social systems as autopoietic
systems and accept the findings discussed in the previous chapter, action is
not suited to fulfill the role of the operation mode of social systems. How-
ever, communication, in the very sense discussed above, is suitable for this
11 The sharp opposition of action theory and systems theory is an important point of departure
for the adherents of the former as it makes it possible for them to emphasize the empirical
and theoretical importance of actors, which contradicts systems theory, as Mathias
Heidenscher puts it (Heidenscher 1992: 440).
function. Yet Luhmann does not want to completely eliminate the concept of
action from his theory: although he rejects it as a fundamental concept, ac-
tion as a constructed or reduced concept does play a crucial role in the the-
ory of sociality. Communication as a synthesis of three selections is not
directly observable for the psychic and social systems; it can only be inferred.
According to Luhmann, communication can only be observed as action
(Luhmann 1995a: 164). The fact itself that communication is regarded as ac-
tion implies that it gains a directedness from the sender to the receiver. Ac-
tion is, in fact, a reduction of communication to one of its components,
utterance. This reduction is necessary when communication is observed ex-
ternally, and it is equally necessary for communicative operations, which can
only connect to each other if they observe communication as reduced to the
action of utterance. Being so, it is necessary to reduce communication to ac-
tion, but it does not follow that the two would be identical. “Therefore it is
not false, only one-sided, for a communication system to interpret itself as an
action system.” (Luhmann 1995a: 165)
To sum up, according to Luhmann, action theory is not inconsistent ei-
ther with systems theory or with communication theory. The concepts of ac-
tion and communication do not exclude one another; the difference between
the two lies in their respective abstraction levels. Action is a less abstract,
that is, more reduced concept, which is, nevertheless, indispensable since
both the external observation and self-observation of social systems are
made possible by it.
D) Double Contingency
One of Luhmann’s most important methodological principles is that he as-

sumes nothing to be a priori; he supposes that everything is contingent.
Therefore, his theory needs to reconstruct all social phenomena in such a
way that it is known beforehand that they could be different. In Luhmann’s
words, the objective of social theory is to understand the normal as improb-
able (Luhmann 1995a. 114). One of the best expressions of this objective is the
question “How is social order possible?” How is it possible that the institu-
tions of society function, and there is a good chance that our expectations are
fulfilled? In Luhmann’s theory this question is posed and answered by using
the concept of double contingency.
The question raised by the concept of double contingency fits in a trend

that can be regarded as one of the most characteristic features of the modern
history of ideas. With the transition to modernity, absolute validities ceased
to exist: people began to seek the whys and wherefores of everything and, as
a result, everything needed justification.12 The perhaps most important
stages anticipating this turn are Descartes’s methodological skepticism and
in social and political theory Thomas Hobbes’s thoughts on the constitution
of authority (Luhmann 1995a: 114–115, 2004c: 316–317). The theories of social
contract are perhaps the best examples to illustrate the question “How is
social order possible?” and as such can be conceived of as theoretical prede-
cessors of the concept of double contingency. Issues that earlier theories of
social order had assumed to be given and sacred—among them, that of le-
gitimacy—appeared in the light of social contract theories to be in need of
explanation and justification. Critics of social contract theories, however,
have pointed out why these conceptions provided but imperfect answers to
the semantic challenges of modernity, which needed to question all founda-
tions: social contract theories were for the most part blamed for taking for
granted the existence of a social order, which ensured that contracts were
kept.13 Thus, while Luhmann regards social contract theories as attempts to
grasp one of the most important theoretical challenges posed by the transi-
tion to modernity, he also holds that these theories stopped halfway and thus
did not answer but only displaced the question of how social order is born.
According to Luhmann, although the concept of double contingency poses
the same question that social contract theories sought to answer, it does it on
a more abstract level, free of presuppositions. The concept of “double con-
tingency” comes from Talcott Parsons and is considered one of the key con-
cepts of contemporary social theory. Now it is used by sharply opposed
schools of thought.14 Parsons introduced double contingency in the context
of the problem of how an interaction between two actors can come into exis-
tence. There are two actors, called “ego” and “alter.” Both have needs, but
12 The semantic changes triggered by the transition to modernity will be discussed in detail in
Chapter Five, Section D.
13 This kind of criticism appears very early, for example, in David Hume’s works (Hume 1984:
590–600).
14 For example, the concept of double contingency plays an important role in Habermas’s the-
ory, too (Habermas 1996: 17–18). For a comparison of the different formulations of double
contingency, see Kron, Schimank, and Lasarczyk 2003: 374–376.
the fulfillment of the needs of ego depends on the needs of alter and vice
versa. Both of them have several possibilities to enact and which to choose
from. If ego wants his needs to be fulfilled, their fulfillment depends on both
his selection and the choice alter makes, the latter being a reaction to the
selection of the former. Thus, contingency exists in a double sense: the ful-
fillment of the needs of ego is dependent on the selections both ego and alter
makes, and it is true vice versa. The question is, then, how the mutual ful-
fillment of expectations and needs is made possible. In other words, how
likely it is that ego will act the way alter wants him to, and how ego can ex-
pect that alter will also act as expected (Parsons 1968: 436–437).
Parsons’s answer is that the coordination of the actions of ego and alter is
based on common values and norms. Accordingly, he places the cultural sys-
tem above the social system in his theory. Common cultural norms and value
consensus are prerequisites for the formation of social systems; their func-
tion is to regulate the solution of the problem of double contingency (Parsons
1968: 437–438; cf. Luhmann 1995a: 104, 2004c: 318–319).
It is easy to guess why Luhmann does not consider this solution satisfac-
tory. In Parsons’s theory, both cultural norms and value consensus are seen
as given, and his theory fails to account for their origin. The fact that ego and
alter accept the same norms and values is by no means self-evident. Accord-
ing to Luhmann, it is precisely these kinds of facts that a theory of sociality
needs to explain and reconstruct, and therefore it needs to treat them as con-
tingent, not as a priori. In short, he seeks to discuss and solve the problem of
double contingency on a much more abstract level than Parsons did.
Luhmann argues that the problem of double contingency emerges as a re-
sult of an encounter of two systems, which are completely opaque for each
other (Luhmann 1995a: 105–106). For example, it is obvious that two psychic
systems are completely opaque for one another. But Luhmann does not limit
the concept of double contingency to psychic systems; in his view, systems
involved in such a situation can also be social. The point is that they need to
be completely opaque, meaning that they need to appear as black boxes to
each other: “The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two
black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have dealings with one another.”
(Luhmann 1995a: 109)
The solution to the problem of double contingency consists in the expec-
tation that the participants will mutually satisfy the needs of the other: I will
do what you want if you do what I want. The most important question, then,
is how this happens if, unlike Parsons, we do not have a priori norms or a
value consensus to rely on. Luhmann’s answer is that the solution needs to be
sought in time. One of the two participants acts first, thereby bringing the
other into a situation in which he will face a choice: he either accepts this
first step or refuses it. Of course, the other is always free to step away; in this
case no social system will come into being. If, however, he stays, his possible
choices will be restricted by the first step. Thus, the circular situation of
double contingency becomes asymmetric by someone breaking the circle and
acting first (Luhmann 2004c: 319–320). Consequently, Luhmann eliminates
the need for consensus from the solution of the problem of double contin-
gency: conflicts can also restrict possibilities since participants in a conflict
also expect this or that behavior from each other (Luhmann 2004c: 336–337).
The solution to the problem of double contingency (the appearance of ex-
pectations for the behavior of others) is the sine qua non for the emergence of
any social system (Luhmann 1995a: 110). Thus, the formation of social sys-
tems is an answer to the problem arising from the fact that ego and alter are
opaque for each other, yet both are in need of coordinating their actions.
The formation of social systems does not, however, imply that ego and al-
ter will somehow cease to be black boxes for each other, neither that they
will become transparent for the emerging social system. The formation of so-
cial systems does not mean that the behaviors of ego and alter would become
at once controllable or calculable either for each other or for the emerging
social system. Their behaviors are not stabilized; only expectations for the
behaviors are developed (Luhmann 1995a: 110). For Luhmann, “social order”
is, in fact, not an “order;” it is only an expectation of an order.
The emergence of expectations is nothing else but structure formation;
the structures of social systems are expectation structures. It is not merely
expectations that the formation of social systems require; what is needed are
reflexive expectations or expectable expectations, in other words, expecta-
tions of expectations (Luhmann 1995a: 303–306).
Luhmann distinguishes between two peculiar types of expectations: one is
cognitive and the other is normative. Their peculiarity is due to the fact that
they contain preliminary directives for situations in which we become disap-
pointed in our expectations. We can speak of cognitive expectations if our
expectations are changed or abandoned as a result of our disappointment;
these expectations are thus able to learn. Normative expectations, in turn,
are not able to learn because they are preserved in spite of disappointment
(Luhmann 1995a: 320–321).
Luhmann introduces the concept of person in the context of double con-

tingency. Although the concepts of person and psychic system are closely re-
lated, Luhmann considers it important to distinguish between the two. By
“person” he means a psychic system that is observed by another, psychic or
social, system. This is what also happens in the situation of double contin-
gency: when two psychic systems meet, they appear to each other as persons
(Luhmann 1995a: 109, 2005f6: 138). Person can also be defined with the help
of a two-sided form, by using the distinction person/non-person (Unperson).
On the side of person, we find individually attributed behavioral possibilities
that can be expected from the person; on the other side, there are those un-
attributed possibilities that theoretically could be attributed to it. Person
as a form means the restriction of behavioral possibilities; its function is to
reduce complexity (Luhmann 2005f6: 142–143). It is precisely this restrict-
tion, this limitation function, that connects the concept of person to double
contingency. The situation of double contingency, the needs of one partici-
pant for the performance of another, is what enforces the restriction of be-
havior. “Persons are therefore condensed as a side-effect of the need to solve
the problem of double contingency in social situations, which is indispensa-
ble for the formation of social systems.” (Luhmann 2005f6: 143; my transla-
tion) According to Luhmann, the concept of person—due to its restrictive,
reductive function, by which the range of expectable behaviors is fixed—also
supports the structural coupling of psychic and social systems (Luhmann
2005f6: 146).
One of the most frequently asked questions about social contract theories
mentioned above is whether they are to be seen as historical or merely as
hypothetical models. The same can be asked about double contingency.
Luhmann’s answer is that neither the issue of nor the solution to the problem
of double contingency is a historical process. It should not be assumed that
first the situation of double contingency is born, and then social systems
emerge from it. The problem of double contingency only arises if social order
is problematized, if it is assumed that every social phenomenon is contin-
gent, in other words, if an answer to the question “How is social order possi-
ble?” is attempted, and we do not stop halfway, as Parsons did in deducing
social order from common norms and value consensus. If the question is
posed with methodological strictness, all social situations lead to the problem
of double contingency, Luhmann says (Luhmann 2004c: 321–322).
CHAPTER FOUR
Theory of Society
In the previous chapter, I discussed social systems, exploring characteristics

that hold true for all types of social systems. In other words, I narrowed
down the theory of autopoietic systems to the theory of social systems. In
this chapter, I will limit the subject even more and analyze one single type of
social systems: society.
As we have seen in Chapter One, Luhmann’s main purpose is to construct
a theory of society. Throughout his career, he did not cease to emphasize
that contemporary sociology lacked such a theory, also that, except for a few
exceptions, sociologists did not even consider such a theory necessary. Al-
though sociological research has achieved remarkable feats in exploring
some social phenomena, neither mainstream sociological tradition nor new
schools have been able to produce satisfactory findings about society as an
all-encompassing whole.1
Luhmann did not overlook the question why the construction of an ade-
quate theory of society had previously failed. In his view, this is mainly due
to some obstacles inherited from the theoretical tradition. They produced
theoretical expectations that, in spite of having been unrealizable, took root
in scholarly discussions so deeply that there seemed to be no way to elimi-
nate them. According to Luhmann, four theoretical obstacles impeded the
construction of a satisfactory theory of society, namely the theses
1. “that a society consists of concrete human beings and relations between

human beings;
2. that society is consequently constituted or at least integrated by consen-
sus between human beings, correspondence of their opinions, and com-
plementarity of their goal definitions;
1 According to Luhmann, Talcott Parsons may well be the only exception to this (Luhmann
1999a: 21).
3. that societies are regional and territorially limited units, so that Brazil is
a different society from Thailand, the US different from Russia, and then,
supposedly, also Uruguay a different society from Paraguay;
4. and that therefore societies can be observed from the outside just as
groups of people or territories.” (Luhmann 1999a: 24–25)2
Luhmann’s theory of society, a sharp refutation of these four theses, took its
final shape in a book topping one thousand pages, The Society of Society (Die
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft). This theory of society actually comprises three
theories: a theory of differentiation (actually his systems theory), a theory of
communication, and a theory of evolution.3 Before exploring each of them in
detail, I first discuss two essential questions related to the Luhmannian con-
cept of society: the first is why society differs from other types of social sys-
tems, whereas the second is why the concept of society needs to be separated
from geographical boundaries.
A) Interaction, Organization, Society, and Protest Movements
Society or societal systems are a subtype of social systems. In many of his

works, Luhmann initially distinguished two other subtypes: interaction and
organization. In his later works, he added to these a vaguely characterized
fourth type, protest movements. Let us now see the difference between his
four types of social systems.
We need a definition of these system types that complies with the re-
quirements of autopoietic systems theory. Basically, this means that all
system types, including the four just mentioned, are to be founded on a
difference by which systems separate their own operations from all others.
Accordingly, the definitions of the four system types ought to be derived
from specific differences, which—due to the fact that these systems are
2 English translation by Hans-Georg Moeller (Moeller 2006: 229-230).

3 Luhmann seeks to make organic connections between these three theories by stating that
they can be attributed to the three dimensions of meaning. The theory of differentiation
deals with the factual dimension, the theory of evolution with the temporal dimension, and
the theory of communication with the social dimension (Luhmann 1999a: 1137–1138). For
the dimensions of meaning, see Chapter Two, Section F.
Theory of Society 79
considered autopoietic—need to be generated exclusively by operations spe-

cific to this or that system.
In the case of interaction, the underlying distinction is the difference be-
tween presence and absence (Anwesende/Abwesende). This difference defines
the types of communication that belong to the system: those that can be at-
tributed to physically present communication partners. This also entails that
perception is of essential importance for interaction systems, which does not
apply to other types of social systems. In other words, interaction systems
come into existence if two or more psychic systems perceive that others per-
ceive them (Luhmann 1995a: 412, 2005b1: 10–11, 2005c2: 93).
A second type of social systems is organization. The underlying distinc-
tion separating organizations from their environment is the difference be-
tween members and non-members (Mitgliedschaft/Nichtmitgliedschaft). We are
entitled to speak about an organization only if its membership requires cer-
tain conditions, that is, if it is a result of a decision. Thus, the specific opera-
tion mode of organizations is decision. The criteria of membership are
defined by decisions, which are also results of decisions. Thus, decisions are
produced by decisions, which constitutes the operational closure as well as
the autopoietic character of organizations (Luhmann 1999a: 830–831, 2005b1:
13–14, 2006: 63). That organizations have members does not in itself mean
that people are their components. Organizations are social systems consist-
ing of communications, whereas people and psychic systems simply inhabit
their environments (Luhmann 2006: 88–92).
A third type of social systems is society. Luhmann defines society as a
comprehensive social system encompassing all communications. Therefore,
the distinction underlying society is the difference between communication
and non-communication. In other words, everything that is communication
is inside society, and everything else is exterior to it. Thus, society—as op-
posed to other types of social systems—does not have a social environment,
which means that no communication is to be found in the environment of
society. The moment communication comes into existence, it becomes a part
of society (Luhmann 1999a: 78–79).
In the greater part of his œuvre, Luhmann does not conceive of protest
movement (Protestbewegung) as an independent type of social systems. From
the 1990s, however, he views it as an autopoietic system, which cannot be pi-
geonholed in any of the other three types (Luhmann 1999a: 847, 863–864).
He does not state categorically—actually he hesitates to accept—that it is an
independent type (Luhmann 1999a: 813). The difference defining protest
movements is based on the subject matter of protest. On one side of the

difference, we find the objectives for which a movement fights, whereas the
other hosts the repudiation of these objectives. Thus, the distinction underly-
ing protest movements is constituted by the difference between standing for
an objective and being opposed to it. According to Luhmann, this difference
is also manifest in the opposition “we and the society;” that is, protest
movements present themselves as if they were outside society even though
in reality they are part of it (Luhmann 1996c: 176–179, 1999a: 852–853).4
The four types of social systems are interconnected by elaborate connec-
tions that will be discussed later. For now, suffice it to highlight only three
aspects. First, the distinction between these four system types should not in
itself be interpreted as if they were independent of one another. It is, for ex-
ample, obvious that society cannot exist without interactions, also that the
creation and functioning of organizations is inconceivable without complex
societal prerequisites. Second, the three system types do not exclude each
other: a communicative operation may at the same time belong to an interac-
tion, to an organization, and to society (Luhmann 2005b1: 22). Finally, the
distinction between these system types is not based on an a priori schema;
their materialization is the result of evolutionary processes (Luhmann
2005b1: 15).
B) World Society
The fact that society is built up from communication has radical conse-
quences for the way the boundaries of a society are drawn. According to the
prevailing view in the sociological tradition, the boundaries of societies are
identical with the frontiers of countries; that is, the criterion of belonging to
a society is to be subject to a state power.5 Of course, nobody denies today
4 This characterization of protest movements seems to betray that Luhmann did not sympa-
thize with them. However, as Kai-Uwe Hellmann points out, Luhmann attributes an immuni-
zation function to these movements, thereby assigning them an important role in the
functioning of modern society (Hellmann 1996: 10–12).
5 Cf., e.g., Anthony Giddens’s definition: “A society is a group of people who live in a particular
territory, are subject to a common system of political authority, and are aware of having dis-
tinct identity from other groups.” (Giddens 1994: 746) It is worth noting that in the subse-
quent editions of the same book, Giddens modified his definition, dropping the criterion of
common political authority.
that societies are increasingly influenced by processes spreading across

frontiers, as it can be seen in recent discourses on globalization. Mainstream
approaches, however, proceed from a concept of society that is closely asso-
ciated with that of a country. When it comes to discussing the importance of
global entities, these entities are regarded as aggregates of regional societies
(Luhmann 1999a: 158–160, 2005b2: 83, n. 8). Thus, the regional level is always
placed before the global, and the fundamental units of analysis are regional
societies bounded by national frontiers. In other words, regional societies are
considered the building bricks of global systems, which systems, in turn, can
be endowed with homogenizing and conflict-generating powers.
In Luhmann’s theory this relationship is inverted: he starts with the
global level and explains regional differences on the basis of it. In other
words, society is not conceived of as a regional society fenced in by state
frontiers; it is a world society. This thesis is not simply, let alone decisively,
influenced by 20th-century discourses on globalization. The hypothesis of
world society is a logical consequence of the theoretical foundations that I
discussed earlier. If society is defined as an autopoietic system constituted by
communicative operations, and if the boundaries of this system are exclu-
sively drawn by its own operations, it follows that the boundaries of society
extend as far as communication reaches. And state borders cannot act as bar-
riers to hold it up.
Thus, all communication belongs to the same society, that is, to world so-
ciety. This thesis, however, needs to be further refined. First, this has not al-
ways been the case because there used to be geographical obstacles that held
up communication. For example, it is obvious that prior to the discovery of
America, American and European societies had not constituted a common
societal system. Furthermore, not only the discovery of the New World was a
prerequisite for the birth of a world society, technological achievements that
made real-time communication possible were also indispensable. As
Luhmann puts the advent of these achievements to the latter half of the 19th
century (Luhmann 1999a: 148), it is not incorrect to speak of societies in the
plural when the earlier periods of history are concerned.
Second, it cannot be said that every societal subsystem functions at a
global level. Whereas the irrelevance of regional frontiers seems to be plausi-
ble in the case of the scientific and economic subsystems, Luhmann does not
assert that this also holds true for the legal and political subsystems
(Luhmann 1999a: 166–167). Although the latter are enclosed by regional bor-
ders, this does not mean that we should abandon the global perspective in
these cases. For example, Luhmann argues that the reason why the political
system is broken up into nation states is that the otherwise global political
subsystem is unable to fulfill its function, that is, it cannot produce collec-
tively binding decisions, on the level of world society.6
Finally, it is important to emphasize that Luhmann does not claim that
world society is homogeneous. Neither does he say that regional differences
will disappear. Although one can indeed observe certain homogenizing ten-
dencies, regional differences and peculiarities do not vanish. Quite the con-
trary, sometimes they even increase. What Luhmann emphasizes is that
regional differences can be explained with world society, the participation in
it, the relations to its structures, and the reactions to it (Luhmann 1999a:
167).
C) Communication Media
It is with communication theory that I now begin my discussion of

Luhmann’s three theories (systems theory, communication theory, and evo-
lution theory) that constitute his theory of society.
Luhmann’s communication theory focuses on the notion of communica-
tion media. From the beginning of his career, the theory of communication
media played a central role in his œuvre. In his later works, however, his
concept of medium was partially reformulated with the help of me-
dium/form theory, which he borrowed from Fritz Haider. Although Luhmann
considers the latter a subtype of the form or difference theory, the notion of
form he uses here is not identical with the two-sided form that I discussed in
Chapter Two. One side of this distinction is occupied by “medial substratum,”
which is an aggregate of loosely coupled elements, whereas the other side,
form, represents the close coupling of the same elements. Medium itself is
the unity of their distinction.7 For example, the letters of the alphabet can be
regarded as a medial substratum, that is, as loosely coupled elements, and
6 Politics as a global functional subsystem will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight,

Section B.
7 Therefore, it is not exact to speak of a medium/form distinction because the two sides of the
difference are occupied by the medial substratum and the form, and the medium is the unity
between them. Nevertheless, I will use the medium/form pair for the sake of simplicity, also
because Luhmann himself does the same.
their forms, the closely coupled elements made up from letters, are the
words. Form itself can also be a medium because words can be conceived of
as a medial substratum; in this case, their closely coupled elements are the
sentences (Luhmann 1999a 159–196, 2004c: 225–228). Medium/form theory
has a wide range of applications: not only communication media, but also the
medium of meaning can be described with it (Luhmann 2004c: 229–235).
Moreover, this theory is a subtype of the form or difference theory, which
represents the most general level of Luhmann’s theoretical construct, and
this subtype is independent of systems theory.
To understand Luhmann’s theory of communication media, let us recall
his theoretical objective to reject presuppositions and consider all phenom-
ena contingent, that is, in need to be explained. In the case of communica-
tion, this means that we cannot assume as given that communication will be
understood and accepted or even that it can reach the addressee. Thus, a
theory of society or communication has to explain how this is possible.
Luhmann argues that a theory of communication ought to answer three fun-
damental questions; in other words, communication is an improbable phe-
nomenon for three reasons (Luhmann 1990b2: 87–88):
1. Understanding is improbable because the participants in communicative

situations are psychic systems, which are per definitionem completely
nontransparent for each other. What is it that ensures that the addressee
will understand what the other wants to communicate?
2. It is also improbable that communication will get through to addressees
that are far in space and time.
3. It is improbable that communication will be successful, that is, the ad-
dressee will accept it and will act according to the expectations of the
other.
In modern societies, however, these three conditions need to be fulfilled:

people need to understand what we want to say, communication needs to get
through to addressees that are far in space and time, and our expectations
for the actions of others need to have a good chance to be fulfilled. According
to Luhmann, it is the very objective of communication media to ensure the
fulfillment of these conditions, that is, to transform the improbability of
communication into probability. In accordance with the three improbabili-
ties, there are three types of communication media: the duty of language
is to eliminate the improbability of understanding; dissemination media
(Verbreitungsmedien)—i.e., writing, printing, and electronic media—ensure

that addressees will be reached; and success media (Erfolgsmedien)—i.e., sym-
bolically generalized communication media—help accept communication.
i) Language
Language is the most important and most essential communication medium.

Without it, we would not be able to speak of the other two. Although nonver-
bal communication also exists, without language no social or psychic system
could obtain such a high degree of complexity that they obviously have.
Luhmann’s findings on language, as usual, break with some generally held
views. First, linguists, who predominantly rely on Ferdinand de Saussure’s
concept of language (Saussure 1986: 14), regard language as a “system,”
which, of course, is different from Luhmann‘s definition. For, according to
him, language is not a system. From this it follows that language does not
have an autonomous operation mode. Although the operations of communi-
cation and psychic systems both use the medium of language, neither of
these are identical with it, and there is no other operation mode that could
be called language. Finally, language is not built of acts or actions (Luhmann
2004c: 279–280).
Although language plays a reasonably important role in Luhmann’s the-
ory, there is no single or exclusive definition of language in his works, which
would provide us with clear guidance as to what he actually means by it. He
offers various definitions mainly relying on Spencer Brown’s difference the-
ory, that is, on two-sided forms.8
One of these forms, the medium/form distinction, has just been discussed.
According to it, language is a medium built of words and sentences, where
the latter are regarded as close couplings of the former (Luhmann 1999a:
219–220).
Another definition of language is that it is a use of sings. Thus, the next
two-sided form is sign. One side of sign-as-a-form is occupied by designator,
whereas the other is reserved for designatum. Sign itself is the unity of
the distinction between these two. Luhmann compares his own concept of
8 For an analysis of how Luhmann’s views on language changed in the course of his life, see
Srubar 2005: 602–610. Here I do not discuss Luhmann’s earlier conceptions of language and
restrict my analysis to the views he elaborated in his later works.
language to that of Saussure, who also defined language as a distinction be-

tween designator and designatum (signifiant and signifié) (Saussure 1986: 65–
67). For both of them, this distinction is to be found in language. Although
designator designates the designatum, the latter is also a part of language.
Therefore, it cannot be said that language establishes a direct contact with
the external world, or that it represents it. Quite the contrary, for, according
to Luhmann, the function of language as a use of signs is to isolate communi-
cation from the external world because it is this isolation that makes the re-
lationship of designator and designatum independent from the context of
their application, and thus it becomes knowable. In other words, sign is a
generalization (Luhmann 1999a: 208–210).9
Having defined language as a use of signs does not, however, provide in
itself a satisfactory explanation of the nature of language because it still
needs to be explained how it actually helps understanding. According to the
above, language has to transform the improbability of understanding into
probability. As we have seen in the foregoing,10 understanding is, in fact, a
distinction between utterance and information. In the case of language, this
distinction is nothing else but the difference of designator/designatum: un-
derstanding comes into existence if the addressee distinguishes between des-
ignator and designatum. Luhmann argues that one of the most important
evolutionary feats of language is that it increases the probability of this dis-
tinction, that is, the probability of understanding (Luhmann 1999a: 210–211).
If someone talks to us, it is very likely that we will think she intends to say
something; in other words, we will distinguish between utterance and infor-
mation, between designator and designatum. This does not apply to other,
nonverbal forms of communication. For example, in the case of a gesture, it
is not entirely obvious whether the other wants to communicate something
to us.11
9 In Luhmann’s theory, two other distinctions fulfill a function similar to the difference of
designator/designatum; in the case of verbal communication, it is the difference between
sound and meaning, and in the case of written communication, it is the distinction of char-
acter and meaning (Luhmann 2005g: 92).
10 See Chapter Three, Section A.
11 Yet another important function of language (ensuring structural couplings between social
and psychic systems) has already been discussed in Chapter Three, Section B.
ii) Dissemination Media
So language is charged with the elimination of the first improbability of

communication: that of understanding. The second improbability arises from
the difficulties of reaching addressees that are located far in time and space.
It is the so-called dissemination media (writing, printing, and electronic me-
dia) that solves this problem.
Illiterate cultures were confined by the limits of verbal communication.
Those participating in it had to be simultaneously present, which considera-
bly limited the expansion of society and therefore the increase of its com-
plexity. This state of affairs radically changed with the invention of writing.
Writing ensures that communication can get through to addressees distant in
time and space. Thus, writing brought a quantitative change in the develop-
ment of societies: societies much bigger and much more complex than in ear-
lier cultures evolved because due to writing, communication was able to
reach more and more people.
The impact of writing, however, does not consist in quantitative changes
only. In comparison to their illiterate ancestors, literate cultures have vari-
ous radical qualitative differences, which Luhmann summarizes in seven
points (Luhmann 1999a: 289–290):
 With writing, a communication medium was born that could function in

a society only; the mere existence of interaction systems was insufficient
for it. As a result, the differentiation of society and interaction systems
grew.
 Before the invention of writing, culture had been transmitted with the
help of objects, rituals, festivals, etc. They did not disappear, but owing
to writing, a social memory independent of human neuro-physiological
and psychic mechanisms came to existence.
 As writing is independent of the control of interaction, the chances of
refusing communication and those of disappointment increase. More in-
formation usually means fewer acceptance.
 Writing intensifies the differentiation of the factual, social, and temporal
dimensions of meaning. In the case of factual dimension this means that
topics of communication become independent of the participants and
whereabouts. The social dimension also differentiates itself, which
means that reflecting on the opinion of participants becomes possible. In
the case of temporal dimension, Luhmann speaks of the objectivation of

time.
 Writing uses abstract signs, which makes it possible to use signs for indi-
cating other sings.
 Writing “modalizes” reality; the world is conceived of according to its
possibilities: there are necessary things, contingent realizations, and
mere possibilities.
 Writing symbolizes absent people and things. Communicative operations
can therefore get through to them. The possibilities of second-order ob-
servation are based on this, and this kind of observation implies that the
range of criticism widens.
The arrival of the next dissemination medium, printing, yielded similar

quantitative and qualitative changes. Quantitative changes consisted in the
multiplication of the number of books and readers (Luhmann 1999a: 291).
Qualitative changes were, however, more important; Luhmann attributes to
printing a key role in the emergence of modernity. This does not mean that
the wide-ranging social changes characteristic of modernity are exclusively
due to a single technical invention. Although printing emerged in China
much earlier than in Europe, it did not stimulate similar changes there. It
was not printing in itself but the reading of the printed texts that led to sig-
nificant societal changes; in other words, a multitude of readers was also
needed. The importance of printing lies precisely in the fact that a wide
range of people could afford to pay for books, thereby stimulating the dis-
semination of texts (Luhmann 1999a: 292–293).
One of the crucial social impacts of printing was a change in the relation-
ship of author and audience. This change can be primarily conceived of as a
gradual destruction of authority because “if [people] can read the Bible, they
can read other books as well” (Luhmann 1999a: 292; my translation). The
mere repetition of texts was replaced by their comparison, which gave rise to
extended criticism. Another important change was that the demand for nov-
elty came into prominence, which Luhmann regards as one of the most im-
portant features of modernity (Luhmann 1999a: 294).12
The third kind of dissemination media is electronic media, which includes
phone, fax, radio, television, movies, the internet, etc. Their appearance had
12 For an explanation of the impact of printing, see Berghaus 2003: 149–163.

quantitative and qualitative effects as well, but they are difficult to assess as
of yet. Recent discussions in the social sciences subsume these trends under
such headwords as information society, network society, knowledge society,
mediatization, etc. Luhmann rarely deals with the implications of electronic
media; he mentions only a few characteristic trends. He argues, for example,
that the diffusion of electronic media means that society becomes increas-
ingly dependent on technology, in other words, on structural couplings with
its environment. In addition, this dependence implies a huge increase in
communicative possibilities. It results, for example, in the breaking down of
the residual temporal and spatial limits of communication and, with it, in the
emergence of real-time communication (Luhmann 1999a: 302). He believes
that electronic media provides further arguments for world society, that is to
say, for the thesis that society cannot be limited by regional boundaries
(Luhmann 1999a: 304).13
Luhmann summarizes the most important social effects of the three types
of dissemination media as follows: “If there is a continuous trend in the evo-
lution of dissemination media, which begins with the invention of writing
and ends with modern electronic media, it can be grasped in a summary fash-
ion as a movement from hierarchic to heterarchic order, also as a withdrawal
of spatial integration of societal operations.” (Luhmann 1999a: 312; my trans-
lation) The breaking down of hierarchy is nothing else but a continuous
eradication of authority. As printing wore down the authority of religion, we
are now witness to a similar phenomenon: information and communication
technologies question the authority of experts in so far as laymen are also
able verify and doubt the statements of experts with the help of networked
computers. It does not mean that trust is unneeded in contemporary societal
communication. It means that trust is not related to persons or social
statuses anymore; it is related to systems (Luhmann 1999a: 312–313). The
other characteristic feature of the trend, the withdrawal of spatial integra-
tion, means that the degree of freedom of the systems, that is, their number
of realizable possibilities, no longer depends on their spatial location. Unlike
in the Middle Ages, when location was a decisive factor in gaining access to
rare manuscripts, today everything is available in or via libraries (Luhmann
1999a: 314).
13 For the social impact of electronic media, see Berghaus 2003: 164–175.
In order to avoid confusion, a few words are in order about the relation-
ship of mass media and dissemination media. The three kinds of media dis-
cussed in this chapter (writing, printing, and electronic media) are not
conceived of as systems by Luhmann, whereas mass media are. We will see
later that modern society is characterized by a differentiation of such func-
tional subsystems as law, science, politics, or economy. The most recent
among them is the subsystem of mass media. Although its emergence as a
functional subsystem presupposes the diffusion of printing and that of elec-
tronic media, it is not identical with either of these (Berghaus 2003: 176–177).
iii) Symbolically Generalized Communication Media
In the previous chapter, we have seen a distinctive trend in the historical de-
velopment of dissemination media. This is due to the fact that the more ad-
dressees communication is able to reach in time and space, the less it can rely
on authority and the less it can be controlled by a center. In short, the im-
probability of the acceptance of communication, the third improbability of
communication, is more and more likely. The improbability of acceptance
becomes increasingly probably precisely because of achievements that strive
to eliminate the second improbability, that of dissemination. Societal mecha-
nisms meant to solve the third improbability are the symbolically general-
ized communication media.
As it is Parsons who coined the term, Luhmann builds the theory of sym-
bolically generalized communication media, albeit with substantial modifica-
tions, on Parsons’s theory14. The problem to be solved by symbolically
generalized communication media, that of the improbability of accepting
communication, is, in fact, another way to ask the question “How is social or-
der possible?” In my discussion of the problem of double contingency,15
I mentioned that answering this question is one of the key issues in the
social theoretical tradition, also that it is one of those very points at which
Luhmann breaks with the tradition. Social theories usually attempt to answer
14 Jan Künzler emphasizes the differences between the media theories of Luhmann and
Parsons. He argues that because of the divergences of their fundamental presumptions, the
only feature shared by the two theories is the term “communication media” (Künzler 1987:
319).
15 See Chapter Three, Section D.
this question with reference to normative factors, including the ideas of

natural rights, social contract, or moral sense. Luhmann considers these ex-
planations insufficient because they assume too much as given and do not go
far enough in their inquiries. For example, they do not query what ensures
the recognition and observance of natural law, the entering into a contract,
or the acceptance of moral principles. Social theories regarded, and still re-
gard today, these kinds of unquestioned assumptions as given, and Parsons is
no exception to this rule. In his work, symbolically generalized communica-
tion media are subordinated to common normative values. Luhmann re-
moves the normative elements from Parsons’s theory, while retaining
symbolically generalized communication media. This way, the latter become,
albeit in a very abstract sense, the functional equivalents of morality: while
previous theories of society sought to find an explanation to the problem of
social order with the help of morality, Luhmann argues that this is possible
without recourse to morality, solely by symbolically generalized communica-
tion media (Luhmann 1999a: 316–317).16
The first two words of “symbolically generalized communication media”
need a bit of an explanation. Luhmann clarifies the meaning of the word
“symbolic” with the help of the concept of sign. As we have seen, sign is a dis-
tinction between designator and designatum. Therefore, we can call a sign
symbolic if a designator not only refers to a designatum, but also acts as a
possible substitute for it. “Generalized” refers to the fact that these media
are applicable independently of situations (Luhmann 1999a: 319–320).
In Luhmann’s words, the function of symbolically generalized communi-
cation media is to ensure a highly improbable coupling of selection and moti-
vation. As we have seen, Luhmann defines communication as the common
realization of three selections: information, utterance, and understanding.
Since this definition excludes acceptance, addressees have two options: they
can either reject or accept communication. Thus, symbolically generalized
communication media are special communication media that guarantee that
with the act of communication, a motivation to accept it also emerges. For
example, in the case of money as a symbolically generalized communication
medium, this means that its acceptance meets with the consensus of all, al-
though money as a means of payment is of highly dubious transaction value:
16 Luhmann also defines his relation to Parsons in such a way that he generalizes Parsons’s
findings on symbolically generalized communication media (Luhmann 2005b3: 214–215). For
a comparison of the media theories of the two authors, see Künzler 1987.
one gets a piece of paper in exchange for goods. It should be noted that in the
case of symbolically generalized communication media, “motivation” and
“acceptance” have nothing to do with psychic systems, which means that
they are not mental states. The point is that the acceptance of communica-
tion needs to underlie all further communications. As regards the success of
communication, it is irrelevant what happens in psychic systems; it does not
matter at all whether one finds pleasure in payment or not (Luhmann 1999a:
320–322).
Luhmann believes that the theory of symbolically generalized communi-
cation media is applicable in different fields of society. In his view, money,
power, truth, values, art, and love belong to this kind of media (Luhmann
1999a: 336). He thinks that these media are similar in many respects, but he
does not consider their common features to be of logical necessity, to be true
for all kinds of media to the same extent.17
The most important common feature of symbolically generalized com-
munication media is that they have a binary code.18 These codes are two-
sided forms. As their names show, they have two values: they are either true
or false, either legal or illegal. Also, they are preference codes: they have a
positive and a negative value. One of these values, and only one of them, can
be attributed to each communicative operation that uses a given symbolically
generalized communication medium. Thus, something is legal or illegal, but
cannot be both at the same time; there is no third option. Therefore, an ei-
ther/or situation emerges, which makes communication a lot more simple,
thereby supporting the connectibility of communicative operations. The
transition between the two sides is easy since if we know what is true, we also
know what is false. However, it is difficult to convert different codes: the
transition between true and beautiful is fairly problematic. The transition
from positive to negative values and vice versa becomes easier if codes are
detached from moral judgments, if, for instance, the distinction between true
and false is independent of the difference between morally good and bad.
17 For an enumeration of the characteristics of symbolically generalized communication me-

dia, see Luhmann 1999a: 359–393; cf. Hohm 2000: 80–88.
18 Béla Pokol collects the terms Luhmann uses to designate codes (Pokol 2003: 59). In the 1970s
he used Zweierparadigma (double paradigm), binare Schematismus (binary scheme), and Leitdif-
ferenz (guiding difference). In the 1980s he coined the term binare Code (binary code), which
then became best known although he also used einheitliche Code (unified code) and Zentral-
code (central code) in his late works, or simply spoke of codes (Luhmann 1999a: 359 ff.).
Since these codes are “empty”—the binary code of true/false does not con-
tain any guidance for the nature of true—we need something that fills them
up with content. This requirement is met by programs, in the case of sci-
ence, by theories and methods. It is the differentiation between codes and
programs that makes possible a common realization of invariance and
variability: scientific theories can change with the code remaining stable
(Luhmann 1999a: 359–368).
An important characteristic of symbolically generalized communication
media is that they make second-order observations, observations on observa-
tions, possible. For example, in the case of economy, it is the prices that make
it possible for us to get information on how others observe the system; a case
in point being the price at which they are willing to buy or sell (Luhmann
1999a: 374–376).
Symbolically generalized communication media—like every communica-
tion—are structurally coupled with psychic systems. In the case of these me-
dia, this coupling is of a special kind because it always contains a reference to
the bodies of the participants. This reference Luhmann calls “symbiosis.”
Symbiotic symbols—also known as symbiotic mechanisms (Luhmann 2005c4:
264)—regulate the way the human body is taken into account in communica-
tion. Symbiotic symbols are a kind of mediating mechanisms; they represent
the organic features of humans in social systems. For example, in the case of
the medium of truth, the symbiotic symbol is physical perception; in the case
of money, the needs; in the case of power, force; and in the case of love, sexu-
ality (Luhmann 1999a: 378–382).
Symbolically generalized communication media are especially prone to
inflation and deflation. Luhmann generalizes a character of one specific me-
dium, that of money, and makes it applicable to every other medium. By the
inflation of a medium, he means that it supposes more trust than it can guar-
antee, whereas deflation means that its potential of gaining trust is not util-
ized. Thus, the inflation of power means that politics undertakes more tasks
than it can accomplish, and its deflation means that politics does not utilize
its full potential (Luhmann 1999a: 382–386).
A further important characteristic of symbolically generalized communi-
cation media is that they can serve as catalyzers for system formation. It is
not necessary for every medium to give rise to a separate system, but when a
functional subsystem arises, it needs its own medium. The reason for this is
that the binary code of a medium makes it possible for communications be-
longing to a system to be distinguishable; thus, the unity of the system can be
formed, and as a result of this, the system can be differentiated from its envi-
ronment. For example, the code of true/false was needed for the differentia-
tion of science as a functional subsystem because it is this code that can
distinguish scientific communication from every other communication.
Communicative operations using this code belong to the scientific system
and the rest to its environment (Luhmann 1999a: 387–393).
D) Theory of Evolution
The second constituent of Luhmann’s theory of society is a theory of evolu-

tion. Like systems theory, the theory of evolution is a research field encom-
passing several disciplines. It seeks to describe the isomorphies of natural
and social phenomena. Thus, in the same vein as general systems theory, its
proper designation is the “general theory of evolution,” and the theory of so-
cial evolution is merely one of its subtypes. However, in spite of its general
character and, again, similar to systems theory, its theorems and notions
generally originate from definite fields of science. It is here that biological
references are to be found most frequently—primarily due, of course, to
Darwin’s theory19—and this is also true in the case of Luhmann’s own theory
(Luhmann 1999a: 425).20
None of the three components of Luhmann’s theory of society (communi-
cation theory, evolution theory, and systems theory) is suited in itself to de-
scribe society; each needs to be supported by the other two.21 The role of the
theory of evolution in the description of society is to explain how societal
19 It is a widespread belief, held most notably by Friedrich August von Hayek, that Darwin took
the idea of evolution from the social sciences. Von Hayek argues that the origins of the the-
ory of evolution are to be sought in Bernard Mandeville’s works, which served as a founda-
tion for the theories of David Hume and Edmund Burke. Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson
also played an important role. The Mandevillean tradition includes the continental histori-
cist schools, for example, the theories of Johann Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Carl von
Savigny. In short, the idea of evolution had been well known in the social sciences long be-
fore Darwin. It was in this evolutionist milieu that he transferred the idea to the field of bi-
ology (Hayek 1978).
20 However, Luhmann notes that the diffusion of the notion of evolution is to be attributed to
Herbert Spencer, rather than to Darwin (Luhmann 1999a: 425, n. 24).
21 Luhmann’s theory is not the only example for the combination of the theory of evolution
and systems theory; their combination is better conceived of as a rule, not as an exception
(Csányi 1989: xiii; Kiss E. 2003b: 140–143).
systems and structures change in time, and how they attain an ever increas-
ing complexity. Both systems theory and communication theory are tacit
about the kinds of systems and structures that evolve and about the changes
they undergo. For example, autopoiesis is only a principle of operation and
as such does not have any explanatory power as regards the kinds of struc-
tures that will be built on the basis of this operation mode. As opposed to the
embryo, which contains everything the organism will become in the biologi-
cal sense, social and psychic systems do not have a predetermined path of
development at the moment of their emergence (Luhmann 2004c: 131–132).
Therefore, the theory of evolution has to explain these changes and devel-
opment paths. In other words, its objective is to explain the transformation
of improbable into probable: how it is possible that structures depending on
various prerequisites, and being therefore improbable, evolve and function
in an almost self-evident way (Luhmann 1999a: 414). We must not, however,
expect genuine explanations from the theory of evolution because according
to Luhmann this theory can provide neither causal explanations nor progno-
ses. It cannot explain why something had to inevitably evolve the way it
evolved, neither are we able to construct reliable predictions for the future
with its help (Luhmann 1999a: 416, 429).
Before entering into a detailed analysis of Luhmann’s theory of evolution,
it is worth surveying the theories and notions that earlier fulfilled the role
that Luhmann attributes to the theory of evolution. It will be easier to see
what Luhmann’s theory of evolution stands for if we first explore for what it
does not (Schmid 2003: 122–125).
The earliest attempts to understand the emergence of the complexity of
the world, the theories of creation, taught that God created both the natural
and the social worlds. In the 17th century, these theories were gradually re-
placed by those of progress. It is not immediately obvious that the theories of
progress contradict the theory of evolution because, as Luhmann himself
notes, the idea of progress is often connected to the theory of evolution.22 He
argues, however, that the theories of progress entail many ideas that are un-
acceptable for the modern theories of evolution: that progress aims at a defi-
nite end, that development proceeds along a unilinear trajectory, or that
progress is governed by universal laws (Luhmann 1999a: 421–422, 2005c3:
22 The fact that the theories of evolution are often coupled to theories of progress provides
many points of attack against the former; that is why it is important to emphasize the break
with the theories of progress (Luhmann 2005c3: 210).
223–224). Phase theories, that is, theories that divide the history of society
into phases, are closely connected to the theories of progress; Luhmann actu-
ally regards them as applications of the latter. Although Luhmann distin-
guishes his theory from phase theories (Luhmann 1999a: 422), the periods of
society he establishes according to differentiation forms23 resembles phasal
divisions.
Theories of planning also represent an approach that can be set up
against the theory of evolution. In spite of this, Luhmann does not regard
them as real alternatives to the latter. He argues that it would be more pre-
cise to say that planning is a part of evolution, and that the subject matter of
the theory of evolution is systems that plan themselves (Luhmann 1999a:
430).
These, therefore, are the alternatives with which Luhmann contrasts his
own theory of evolution. Furthermore, we will see how he rejects and refor-
mulates some concepts of the Darwinian and neo-Darwinian theories of evo-
lution, among them natural selection and accident.
i) General Theory of Evolution
Luhmann turns to his general systems theory to construct, or to be more

precise reconstruct, the concepts and notions of the general theory of evolu-
tion. He also attempts to show that if one chooses this way, the problems,
contradictions, and debates associated with those theories of evolution that
are built on other terminologies will disappear.
Let us first explore the mechanisms that Luhmann uses in describing the
process of evolution. He classifies his own theory among the neo-Darwinian
theories of evolution, which use two mechanisms, variation and selection, to
describe the process of evolution. Luhmann borrows both concepts, adding to
them a third one, restabilization (Luhmann 1999a: 451).24 He regards varia-
tion and selection as two sides of a form, which means that the findings I
made earlier on two-sided forms also hold true for them. Most important of
these findings is that the two sides always suppose each other. Variation is
impossible without selection since variation is not the same as change—in
23 The differentiation forms of society will be discussed in Chapter Four, Section E.

24 Donald T. Campbell also uses these three concepts of evolution theory (Schmidt-Wellenburg
2005: 118).
that case, variation would coincide with evolution—but an emergence of

variations for the purposes of selection. And vice versa, selection needs
variations, or there would be nothing for it to choose from (Luhmann 1999a:
451).
Luhmann associates each of the three mechanisms of evolution with a
systems theoretical concept. Variation is associated with operations since
deviations can emerge in the course of reproducing operations. Selection is
associated with structures as it is structures that determine which operations
are connectable; in short, it is structures that select the operations. Restabili-
zation is associated with systems; it is an incorporation of structural changes
into the system. The relationship of the three mechanisms to each other is
sequential in time because variation needs to precede selection, and the lat-
ter needs to precede restabilization. At the same time, however, their rela-
tionship can also be considered circular because stabilized functioning is a
prerequisite for variation (Luhmann 1999a: 455).
To fully understand the relationship between systems theory and evolu-
tion theory, it is worth recalling what has been said about the autopoiesis of
systems. The main prerequisite for autopoiesis is that operations need to be
connectable. Every operation needs to be followed by another operation that
is able to connect to the former. The connectibility of operations is, in turn,
guaranteed by structures, which limit the range of possible operations. How-
ever, the requirements that guarantee the operability of a system are not
necessarily satisfied by one single structure; there are several options to se-
lect from. Thus, although structures can change, this change is not arbitrary
at all because the new structures that emerge need to guarantee the auto-
poiesis of the system, too. This double characteristic of structures—they can
change but not at random—is the basis of the evolution of systems (Luhmann
1999a: 437–438).
As has been mentioned, Luhmann rejects or reformulates certain evolu-
tion theoretical concepts and theorems. One example is the concept of acci-
dent. This concept usually plays an important role in the discussions of the
mechanisms of evolution, and Luhmann’s theory is no exception. He rejects
the standard definition of accident, which considers accident a negation of
causality, a lack of explanations by appropriate causes. Instead, he defines
it with the help of his difference theory, that is, using the two-sided form.
According to this theory, accident means that the two sides of the distinction
are independent of one another. In the case of the difference variation/se-
lection, this consists in the fact that variation occurs without our prior
knowledge whether the resulting variant will be positively or negatively se-

lected. The difference of selection/restabilization can also be described by
accident. It means that it is not known beforehand whether the restabiliza-
tion of the system will be achieved after a positive or negative selection
(Luhmann 1999a: 426, 449). It is the mutual independence of variation and
selection that can be considered the Luhmannian condition for evolution.
One can only speak of evolution if this condition is fulfilled.
Further examples for the rejection or reformulation of evolution theo-
retical concepts include “natural selection” and “adaptation to the environ-
ment,” that is, concepts referring to the relationship between the system and
its environment. As per natural selection, variation belongs to the system
and selection to the environment; it is the environment that decides whether
a mutation is possible or not. In autopoietic systems, however, the environ-
ment cannot decide which operation or structure can come into existence;
this always needs to be done by the system. This means for the theory of evo-
lution that selection is not accomplished by the environment but by the sys-
tem itself, by the system’s own structure; in short, selection is self-selection
(Luhmann 1999a: 435–436). Adaptation to the environment, another accepted
concept in the literature of evolution theory, is related to this. Luhmann
argues, however, that evolution cannot result in but rather presupposes ad-
aptation; only systems having complex structural couplings with their envi-
ronments are capable of survival and evolution (Luhmann 1999a: 433). Thus,
Luhmann’s criticism of the conventional concepts of natural selection and
adaptation to the environment is directed against their tenet that there is a
straight, operational connection between the system and its environment, a
tenet which is in obvious conflict with his findings about autopoietic systems.
However, he does not mean by this that the evolution of systems is inde-
pendent of their environments. The functioning of systems, as has been said
in connection with structural coupling, has numerous environmental pre-
requisites.25 What Luhmann means is that these couplings or prerequisites
are not observable and controllable by the system or by external observers.
On the grounds of these systems theoretical assumptions, evolution consists
in the fact “that structural changes, precisely because they can only occur
within the system and in an autopoietic fashion, do not depend on the pleas-
ure of the system but occur in an environment, which is unobservable, or at
25 See Chapter Two, Section E.

any rate not deliberately observable, for the system” (Luhmann 1999a: 433;
my translation).
ii) Societal Evolution
According to Luhmann, the above findings about the theory of evolution—

very much like those about general systems theory—are applicable to all
kinds of systems. The theory of societal evolution is a concretization of these
findings in such a way that the peculiarities of societal systems, most impor-
tantly, communication theoretical assumptions, are taken into account. In
what follows, therefore, I will explore the workings of the three mechanisms
of evolution (variation, selection, and restabilization) in society.
Variation is associated with operations, which in a society means com-
munication. Here the mechanism of variation is made possible by the option
of negation (Luhmann 1999a: 459). Variation means the rejection of commu-
nication, the unfulfillment of an expectation. In other words, the circularity
of evolutionary mechanisms that I discussed above (variation presupposes a
stabilized expectation structure) is also true here. Variation is independent
of selection; therefore, any communication that diverges from expectations
is open to acceptance or rejection. Variation, therefore, is not the same as
novelty because the latter already implies acceptance (Luhmann 1999a: 461).
Luhmann emphasizes the “trivial character” of variations, that is, the fact
that they are neither revolutionary ideas nor inventions (Luhmann 1999a:
462).
In Luhmann’s theory of evolution, evolution and the mechanisms of evo-
lution are also the outcome of evolution. This means that variation, or the
possibility or frequency of negation, depends on certain societal factors that
are not a priori but are the outcome of an evolutionary process (Luhmann
1999a: 460). Luhmann mentions two societal prerequisites for variations:
writing and societal institutions that support the acceptance of conflicts
(Luhmann 1999a: 464). I have already discussed the impact of writing on in-
creasing the possibility of rejecting communication.26 An example for the lat-
ter is law: one of its functions is to make possible the occurrence of conflicts
26 See Chapter Four, Section C, Subsection ii.

by transforming them into legal actions to be settled by a third party

(Luhmann 1999a: 466–469).
The second mechanism of evolution, selection, is associated with
structures. In the case of social systems, structures are expectations for
communication. These expectations determine whether the variations
provided by language—that is, rejections and divergences—will be accepted
or not.
We have seen that, according to Luhmann, the most important feature of
evolution consists in the fact that variation and selection are independent of
each other. Neither of them can determine the other although they presup-
pose each other since they constitute two sides of the same form. Their inde-
pendence, the possibility of evolution, is not a priori in society but is the
result of evolution. In the case of interaction systems, that is, social systems
constituted by presence, the two mechanisms are not independent. When a
variation occurs, for example, an opinion diverging from what is expected
appears, it cannot be ignored. Hence, we cannot speak of a selection that is
independent of variation, and therefore neither can we speak of evolution.
Thus, the criterion of evolution is the emergence of societal systems that are
independent of interactions. In the early, tribal, or in Luhmann’s words,
segmented, societies this was not achieved: it was predictable what the opin-
ions that diverged from the expectations would result in, and it was known
what was acceptable for the society. In short, variation and selection were
not yet independent of each other, and therefore we cannot speak of evolu-
tion either. The differentiation of interactions and society came into exis-
tence when society became more complex. Writing played a major role in
this development because one of the most important consequences of its
emergence was that communication became independent of interactions,
which meant nothing else but the differentiation of interaction systems and
society. This made possible the detachment of variation and selection, that is
to say, socio-cultural evolution (Luhmann 1999a: 478–480).
When variation and selection became independent, there was still more
than one possibility for selection. Luhmann mentions two of these possibili-
ties, which can be associated with two types of societies that replaced seg-
mented society: stratified and functionally differentiated societies.27 One of
the possibilities is that selection is accomplished by religion; it is religion
27 These will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, Section E.

that determines whether the emerging variations will be accepted or not.

The other possibility is that symbolically generalized communication media
take over the task of selection. The most important difference between the
two kinds of selection is that religion means a uniform selection criterion for
the whole society, while this is not the case with symbolically generalized
communication media. Money, power, and scientific truth represent differ-
ent types of logics for selection, and none of them is able to control the other
fields or society as a whole (Luhmann 1999a: 480–484).
As long as selection was performed by religion—it was the case in pre-
modern, stratified societies—it was guaranteed that selections could not lead
to the destabilization of society. Luhmann argues that the mechanisms of se-
lection and restabilization were not distinguishable in these societies
(Luhmann 1999a: 480–484). The restoration of stability became a problem
only later when the task of selection was taken over by symbolically general-
ized communication media. In this case, selection mechanisms are independ-
ent of one another; they follow their own logic, and no central mechanism
exists that could coordinate them. Thus, selections—that is, what symboli-
cally generalized communication media classify as worth accepting—do not
take into account the stability of the entire society. For example, the medium
of money selects exclusively consistent with its own logic and not according
to the benefits of society as a whole. Therefore, selection and restabilization
are detached. According to Luhmann, the latter mechanism consists in the
formation of functional subsystems, in other words, in the functional differ-
entiation of society (Luhmann 1999a: 491). This means that selection mecha-
nisms—the independent and uncoordinated functioning of symbolically
generalized communication media—are stabilized in society by subsystems
that emerge for them: the functioning of selection mechanisms is channeled
by the differentiation of subsystems that do not directly influence or disturb
one another. This stabilization or restabilization through subsystem forma-
tion is not conducted by a central mechanism; it is the result of a time-
consuming evolutionary process.28
The fact that restabilization is achieved by the differentiation of func-
tional subsystems also means that restabilization itself becomes a main
stimulator of variation, also that the two are inseparable (Luhmann 1999a:
28 Since the concept of stability is usually related to ideas like control over the entire system,
Luhmann emphasizes that stability has a new meaning in his theory; it can be called dy-
namic stability (Luhmann 1999a: 495).
492). For example, it is functionally necessary for economic and scientific

subsystems to produce growing profits and an increasing number of scien-
tific results.
This survey of the three mechanisms of evolution is meant to illustrate
Luhmann’s thesis that evolution itself is subject to change; the characteristics
of evolutionary mechanisms also change together with the transformation of
society. In the earliest, tribal or segmented, societies, the mechanisms of
variation and selection were not detached, and for this reason we cannot
speak of evolution. Socio-cultural evolution began with the emergence of
stratified, hierarchical societies. In the latter societies, however, the differen-
tiation of selection and restabilization was missing because selection, mainly
determined by religion, served to maintain the stability of the whole society.
The detachment of selection and restabilization only succeeded in the third
type of society, that is, in functionally differentiated modern societies. Here,
however, restabilization is due to the stimulation of variation; hence, these
two mechanisms cannot be detached. Consequently, in all three types of soci-
ety, there are two mechanisms of evolution that cannot be detached. The dif-
ferentiation forms of society (segmentary, stratificatory, and functional) are
the products of evolution. At the same time, however, these differentiation
forms affect evolution itself as they make the detachment of evolutionary
mechanisms easier or heavier (Luhmann 1999a: 498).
One of the most interesting questions about evolution theory is whether
there is a regularity in systemic changes. As per the above findings, it is
probably easy to see now that Luhmann refuses all sorts of ideas about per-
fection, linear developmental trajectory, and teleology. In his theory, how-
ever, we find an idea, which in a sense determines the direction of societal
evolution. It is the increase in complexity. Luhmann argues that in the course
of evolution, systems always reach a state that makes higher complexity to
be possible than it used to be (Luhmann 1999a: 505). This, however, is not
meant to be construed that increase in complexity is a general selection cri-
terion. Increase in complexity as a selection criterion is incompatible with
the autopoietic operation mode of the system, according to which systems
themselves decide about selection. Instead, Luhmann comes to the conclu-
sion that increase in complexity is a byproduct of the autopoietic operation
mode (Luhmann 1999a: 447–448).
Luhmann defines the results of evolution, that is, evolutionary achieve-
ments, with the help of increasing complexity: evolutionary achievements
are structural arrangements that are able to survive in a more complex
environment than their functional equivalents (Luhmann 1999a: 506). There-

fore, evolutionary achievements cannot be interpreted in themselves but
only with reference to other alternatives that fulfill similar functions. When
evolutionary achievements become stable, it is impossible, or it would have
catastrophic consequences, to abandon them and return to a state of reduced
complexity (Luhmann 1999a: 508). Thus, except for cataclysms, there is no
way to return from stratified society to a segmented one, or from modern
society to one that is stratified. It is also impossible for any type of media,
written, printed, or electronic, to cease to exist without being replaced by
new, more effective functional equivalents.
With the help of evolutionary achievements, the development of society
can be divided into subsequent periods. Evolutionary achievements marking
epochal transformations on the level of society can come from two areas:
communication media and the differentiation form of society. As regards
communication media, two important leaps can be pointed out in the evolu-
tion of society: the emergence of writing and that of printing. On the basis of
the differentiation form of society, we can distinguish between segmented,
stratified, and functionally differentiated societies (Luhmann 1999a: 516).
The two divisions are dependent on each other: according to Luhmann, the
essential changes in communication media resulted in a transformation of
the differentiation form of society. To take an example, writing acted as the
foremost impetus for the transition from segmentary to stratificatory differ-
entiation, and printing was one of the major prerequisites for the emergence
of a functionally differentiated society. Therefore, evolutionary achieve-
ments enable us to closely observe the intertwining of the three components
of Luhmann’s theory of society: systems theory, communication theory, and
evolution theory.
E) Differentiation of Society
If we want to single out the most important feature of societies in Luhmann’s

theory, it is the differentiation form of society. He is not alone in assigning
utmost importance to societal differentiation; it appears in many a classical
work in the history of sociology, including those of Émile Durkheim, Max
Weber, and Georg Simmel (Luhmann 1999a: 595; Degele 1999: 345; Hagen
2000: 29–30; Nassehi 2004: 98–99).
In Luhmann’s theory, differentiation is a synonym for the differentiation

of systems, which means that other systems are formed within a system; in
other words, the distinction of system/environment is repeated inside the
system, and the rest of the original system becomes an environment for the
evolving subsystem. Thus, system differentiation produces an environment
inside the system (Luhmann 1999a: 597). For example, the environment of
the economic subsystem within the society is that particular part of society
that does not belong to the economic subsystem, and there can be further
systems in this environment, such as science or politics. This means that
subsystems have two kinds of environments: system internal and system
external. The former is the societal environment, whereas the latter is a non-
societal environment, an example of which is psychic systems.
Luhmann points out that system differentiation in the sense used by him
is not the same as the distinction part/whole, that is, the division of the
whole into parts.29 Rather, every subsystem reconstructs the whole system
with the help of its own system/environment difference. Therefore, a system
is not divided into parts; it is multiplied (Luhmann 1999a: 598), which also
means that the exact opposite of the usual systems theoretical theorem holds
true: the whole is less than the sum of its parts.
The formation of subsystems does not mean that the events occurring in
society could be attributed to this or that subsystem; these events can be de-
scribed from the points of view of more subsystems. For example, something
can be economically profitable, scientifically false, and aesthetically beautiful
at the same time. The particular type of society in which this is realized,
modern society, may be called polycontextual society.
The fact that one of the most important characteristics of societies is
their form of differentiation is closely related to another key concept of
Luhmannian systems theory, to complexity, or more precisely, to the reduc-
tion of complexity. The task of systems—and thus the task of society—is to
reduce complexity. Luhmann’s thesis is to be construed that it is the differen-
tiation form of society that predominantly determines the extent to which
society can reduce complexity and thus the complexity of the structures it
can build. The differentiation form of society, as we have seen in the previous
chapter, strongly influences other characteristics of society: the possibilities
of societal evolution, other kinds of differentiation (such as differentiation
29 Thus, Luhmann breaks with the decomposition paradigm, which was also characteristic of
Parsons (Stichweh 2001: 27).
of roles and concepts), the norms that are valid in society, and the self-
description of society (Luhmann 1999a: 611).
The form of differentiation indicates the relationship between the subsys-
tems. Luhmann distinguishes four differentiation forms of societies
(Luhmann 1999a: 613):
 In the case of segmentary differentiation, societal subsystems are equal

to one another; society is divided into tribes that are distinguished
according to their origin or residence and are in equal relationship to
one another.
 Center/periphery differentiation means that the different parts of soci-
ety are not equal, and that there is a center. In this kind of society, we
can also find tribes: there can be numerous tribes or families both in the
center and the periphery, but the center/periphery differentiation is
prior to segmentary differentiation.
 In a stratified or hierarchical society, societal subsystems are similarly
unequal; they are in a superordinate/subordinate relationship.
 The last differentiation form Luhmann mentions is functional differen-
tiation. In this case, subsystems are specialized in order to fulfill certain
functions. Here we can speak of both equal and unequal subsystems.
Subsystems are equal as regards their inequality; in other words, al-
though they differ, none of them rises above the others.
In distinguishing societies with the help of these four differentiation forms,

Luhmann does not mean that only one form can be found in a given society.
In most of societies, there is more than one form, but there is always a pri-
mary or dominant one, which serves as a framework for the others.30 In
stratified societies, for example, segmentary differentiation is also present in
addition to superordination/subordination, but it is incapable of transgress-
ing the limits set by the primary form of differentiation, that is, stratifica-
tion. It is the primary differentiation form that produces the stratum of
nobility, and segmentary differentiation, the differentiation on the basis of
families, is only possible within the framework of the former, that is, inside
the stratum (Luhmann 1999a: 612).
30 Although Luhmann speaks of four forms of differentiation, he divides the history of society
into three periods only; both the center/periphery and stratificatory differentiations are
characteristic of the type of society that preceded modernity.
Similarly to other typologies in Luhmann’s theory, this list is not a result

of deduction; it is based on an analysis of the historical forms of societies.
And Luhmann does not exclude the possibility that other forms of differen-
tiation can emerge. He observes, however, that in the course of the evolution
of society, only a few differentiation forms emerged that proved to be stable,
adding that tried and tested forms took priority. Whether new forms of dif-
ferentiation will emerge and stabilize cannot be inferred using deduction;
evolution has the final word (Luhmann 1999a: 614).
Yet another important problem is the way persons are integrated into dif-
ferent types of society. Luhmann defines the concept of integration with the
help of the familiar two-sided form, using the difference inclusion/exclusion.
Inclusion means that a person is taken into account in and by the system,
whereas exclusion is defined as a lack of such an event. Defining integration
as a two-sided form also implies that we are entitled to speak of inclusion
only if there is exclusion as well (Luhmann 1999a: 620–621). The types of in-
clusion and exclusion vary with the differentiation forms of society, thereby
constituting one of the most characteristic features of societies.
i) Segmentary, Center/Periphery, and Stratificatory Differentiation
The first of the four forms of differentiation is segmentary differentiation. In

this case, the basis of differentiation is the family, which Luhmann regards as
an artificial not a natural social phenomenon; that is, we can only speak of
families within the framework of society. There can be further units linking
society and family, such as villages and tribes. The societal status of individu-
als is fixed on the basis of belonging to this or that family or tribe, and their
upward social mobility is close to impossible. These societies live in orality,
their communication is limited to presence. Due to this fact, societal systems
and interactions are not separated (Luhmann 1999a: 634–653).
In a segmented society it is the norms of mutuality that need to ensure
the equality of the various subsystems and the immutability of society. How-
ever, this situation gradually changes and societies that admit inequality will
emerge. Luhmann refrains from pointing a causal explanation for this trans-
formation; for example, he does not refer to the growth of population, the
emergence of agriculture, or the trade of luxury goods. Instead, he names a
few structural problems in segmented societies, which could eventually lead
to instability or even the dissolution of this particular differentiation form.
Segmentary differentiation is neither natural nor a priori: norms are needed

for its preservation; therefore, its survival is not guaranteed. As an example
of mechanisms that threaten the equality of subsystems, he mentions fami-
lies that overcome other families. This can also happen using peaceful means;
for example, in the event a family becomes richer than other families, the
principle of mutuality is not applicable anymore. Moreover, segmented
societies do not completely lack differences in rank: it is not impossible
that for some reason a person or a family commands greater respect than
others. Although for some time these differences are usually confined to the
framework of tribal society, they may gradually become the primary form of
differentiation. In such a case, it is these differences that pave the way for
the emergence of a new type of society (Luhmann 1999a: 653–662).
In this new type, inequality becomes the primary principle of differentia-
tion and structure formation. To describe this kind of society, Luhmann uses
two forms of differentiation, those of center/periphery and stratificatory dif-
ferentiation, respectively. As a result, these societies can be called town-
based and nobility-based at the same time.
According to Luhmann, the center/periphery differentiation can also be
found in segmented societies, but only within the framework of segmentary
differentiation. But as soon as new forms of differentiation emerge in the
center—such as the division of labor—a new type of society is born with
them. In the case of the center/periphery differentiation, the segmented
structure may remain in the periphery, whereas new forms emerge in the
center; such a new form is, for example, stratification. Therefore, it is the
center/periphery differentiation that makes possible the differentiation of
differentiation forms, in other words, the different possibilities of develop-
ment. Luhmann points out three consequences of this: the emergence of ter-
ritorial differentiation, the formation of identity—this is also due to the help
of such differences as, for example, that of civilization/barbarians—and the
appearance of claims to expand rule beyond existing borders. The cen-
ter/periphery differentiation may involve both towns and empires. In the
former case there is more than one center, whereas empires regard them-
selves as centers of the world (Luhmann 1999a: 663–678).
Another type of differentiation based on inequality is stratification by
rank. Certain differences in rank can be found in segmented societies, too,
but they are not essential for the stability of society. One is entitled to speak
of stratified societies if differentiation by rank becomes the basis of main-
taining societal order. Stratification by rank is more abstract than the other
two forms of differentiation as the latter are based on spatial separation. Al-
though the upper stratum is inconceivable without the lower one and vice
versa, it is the former that plays the decisive role in the emergence of strati-
fied society: we may speak of stratification if an upper stratum is differenti-
ated from a lower one by endogamy, and this differentiation is confirmed by
norms, that is to say, by internal and external regulations of the activities of
the strata, also by semantics, for example, by the semantics of the accepted
superiority of the nobility. Belonging to a stratum determines the behavior of
people in all areas of society; differentiation by rank regulates the inclusion
and exclusion of individuals (Luhmann 1999a: 678–706).
Stratification applies to families, not to individuals. This means that the
mobility of individuals does not conflict differentiation by rank. This needs to
be emphasized because the reason for the dissolution of stratified societal
order is often attributed to the mobility of the rising bourgeois class.
Luhmann, however, does not consider such a view to be empirically confirm-
able; instead, he argues that mobility can also be detected in stratified soci-
ety, but it does not endanger its stability. According to him, the conflict
between stratification and mobility is due to the erroneous assumption that
people are the building blocks of society. Since his society is not composed
from people but from communication, the conflict between the stability of
stratified society and that of mobility disappears. Thus, in his view, the sta-
bility of society requires the stability of the rules of communication. If it is
not the emergence of a new class that disintegrates stratified societal order,
we need to look for another reason, which, according to Luhmann, is to be
found in the differentiation of functional subsystems (Luhmann 1999a: 706).
ii) Functionally Differentiated Society
The fourth form of differentiation is functional differentiation. While in

stratified society there is a superordinate/subordinate relationship between
societal subsystems, none of the subsystems is superior to the others in func-
tionally differentiated society because none of them is able to control the
other subsystems or society as a whole. This is actually the type of society
that exists today. According to Luhmann, the basic structure of society did
not change from early modernity to the present. All we can say is that certain
characteristics of the new type of society went through a gradual crystalliza-
tion process to become visible in our time. However, the structures of society
have not changed since the emergence of functional differentiation. In other

words, Luhmann refutes ideas that claim that there have been changes of so-
ciety-wide significance since the formation of modern society, these changes
may be construed to mean the formation of socialist or postmodern societies.
At the same time, as we will see, the way Luhmann depicts modern society
resembles in some respects what is usually characterized as postmodern.
Thus, according to him, postmodern theories do, in fact, recognize the socie-
tal structure that was formed in early modernity.31
Since in stratified society it is religion and morality that ensure the exis-
tence of a hierarchical order, the transition to functional differentiation can
be characterized as the process of becoming independent from them. Hence,
the formation of functional subsystems is to be seen as the detachment of a
communication of a given subsystem from religion and morality, which de-
tachment is governed by the logic of the system, by its own binary code.
Luhmann considers the emergence and stabilization of functionally dif-
ferentiated society as a highly unlikely process. It should not be conceived of
as a change determined by historical necessities. It is to be noted, however,
that irreversible processes begin when the transformation is well along
(Luhmann 1999a: 707). Such a transition, of course, does not happen over-
night; it is the result of a long process, which surfaced in the late Middle Ages
to become irreversible only at the end of the 18th century (Luhmann 1998a1:
26–27). Not every functional subsystem emerged simultaneously; there was a
transitional period that spanned centuries, in which the two differentiation
forms, the stratified and the functional, lived together.
As was the case with the formation of stratified society, Luhmann does
not consider the transition to functionally differentiated society explainable
by a small set of reasons. Nevertheless, he lists some factors that fostered the
transformation; they are as follows:32
 In stratified society the resources, such as power or money, were concen-

trated at the top of the hierarchy. This concentration created an oppor-
tunity to use these resources innovatively and independently from any
31 This does not mean that it would be correct to characterize Luhmann as postmodern. For a
discussion of this question, see Chapter Seven, Section A.
32 In expounding the five factors I rely on Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg’s work (Schmidt-
Wellenburg 2005: 139–140); see also Luhmann 1999: 708–742.
religious bond, which, in turn, facilitated the emergence of the special

logics of functional subsystems.
 There were no clan structures in Europe; stratification did not have any-
thing to do with clans, it involved families. Clan structures could prevent
the functioning of mechanisms that fostered functional differentiation.
Such mechanisms are, for example, market orientation and regulation by
law.
 A unified empire could not emerge in Europe. Owing to differences
in culture and language, experimental areas for changes evolved.
Thus, the transition did not need to occur on an extended territory
simultaneously.
 As has already been discussed,33 owing to printing, the possibility of
comparing texts appeared. This spurred the emergence of critical ways
of thinking, which corroded the societal order, which was sanctified by
religion and ensured the stability of stratified society.
 The institutions that served the maintenance of the established stratified
order sometimes also involved opposite tendencies. For example, al-
though the status of the nobility was fixed in Europe in constitutions
that aimed to preserve their privileges, this way the privileges became
visible, which, in turn, offered an opportunity of criticism and change.
Regulation by law may sometimes lead to the reinforcement of efforts to
change it.
The most important characteristics of functionally differentiated society and

its subsystems can be summarized as follows (Luhmann 1999a: 743–776):
 Subsystems specialize in one single function.

 No single subsystems can command and control the others as the rela-
tionship between them is not that of superordination/subordination.
Thus, no center exists from which society as a whole could be controlled.
Moreover, none of the subsystems is able to represent the whole of soci-
ety in the same way the supreme stratum represented it in hierarchical
societies.
 Functional subsystems define their own identity exclusively, as opposed
to stratified society, whose subsystems gain their identity by means of
33 See Chapter Four, Section C, Subsection ii.

their rank difference to other subsystems, in other words, by the order of

the whole of society.
 Luhmann conceives of functional subsystems in terms of autopoietic
systems; therefore, the characteristics discussed in Chapter Two, such as
the principles of operation closure, autopoiesis, self-organization, or
structural coupling, apply to them. It is for this very reason that he
states that the connections between functional subsystems are basically
the same as those between communication, psychic, and biological sys-
tems. This is worth mentioning because in the latter case one can argue
for the closure of systems from one another by pointing out that they are
fundamentally different systems with completely different operation
types. It seems to be highly plausible that there is no operational connec-
tion between them; for example, operations of a consciousness can never
be a part of communication. However, as the functional subsystems
within society consist of operations of the same kind, that is, of commu-
nications, it seems to be possible that there can be operational transit be-
tween them. Luhmann is also aware of this, and, as we will see, in his
theory he allows for opportunities to establish operational connections
between functional subsystems through organizations.
 Luhmann argues that two things ensure the autopoiesis and operational
closure of subsystems. One of them is function-orientation, which means
that function serves as a distinct reference point for the self-reference of
the system. The other is the formation of binary codes. These codes con-
tribute to the autopoiesis of subsystems in such a way that they help to
clearly discern whether this or that communicative operation belongs to
a given subsystem or not. For example, communicative operations using
the code of true/false belong to the scientific subsystem, and only they
do.
 Codes are independent of morality; that is to say, from a moral point of
view, true is not better than false. In spite of this, it is true that codes are
preference-codes: one of the two sides is preferred. But this preference is
not to be construed morally.
 One communicative operation can belong to more subsystems simulta-
neously. For example, paying for something may comply with a legal ob-
ligation or an economic transaction, that is, with operations both in the
legal and in the economic systems. This does not conflict with the auto-
poiesis of these two systems because this operation has utterly different
antecedents and consequences in both systems, and these antecedents

and consequences depend exclusively on them.
 It holds true for subsystems that reducing complexity means an increase
in complexity. Subsystems ignore all aspects of their environments ex-
cept for one, which makes it possible for them to become hypersensitive
in this single aspect. For example, all moral, scientific, aesthetic, etc.
aspects are irrelevant for economy—in so far as they do not appear in the
language of price—and in concentrating exclusively on profitability, the
economic system becomes extremely sensitive in this respect, and there-
fore it can build highly complex structures.
 Every operation implies self-reference and other-reference, that is, a dis-
tinction of what belongs to the system and what belongs to its environ-
ment. The distinction between self-reference and other-reference is, in
Luhmann’s words, “perpendicular” to binary codes. This means that self-
reference and other-reference may both take up both values of
the codes. For example, we can apply the true/false distinction self-
referentially to scientific theories, and we can also explore other-
referentially whether politicians are telling the truth or not.
 Luhmann distinguishes between the function, performance, and reflec-
tion of subsystems. The difference stems from the fact that the observers
are not the same in these three cases. We can speak of function from the
point of view of society as a whole, of performance from the point of
view of another subsystem, and by reflection the self-observation of the
subsystem is meant.
 Whereas in stratified societies people belonged to one subsystem—
everyone was a member of a rank—this is impossible in a functionally
differentiated society because it cannot be said that this person belongs
only to the economic and that person only to the political subsystem.
 Luhmann says that the formation of functionally differentiated society is
characterized by the dominance of second-order observations, or obser-
vations on observations. There were second-order observations in the
other types of society as well, but they only became decisive owing to the
new form of differentiation. For example, the economic system steers it-
self as per demand: economic actors observe how others observe the
market. In the same vein, the main orientation factor in politics is public
opinion, which is also known as observation on observations.
 Characterizing modernity as a functionally differentiated society does
not exclude the existence of other forms of differentiation. This means
that functional differentiation is the primary form of differentiation,

whereas other forms are only possible within the functional subsystems.
For example, the political subsystem—which, according to the above and
similarly to all other subsystems, needs to be conceived of on the level of
world society—is divided into states, which can be alternatively de-
scribed as a segmentary differentiation.
 In his early writings, Luhmann believed that some subsystems of society
could achieve functional primacy over the others. Functional primacy
does not mean that a subsystem controls the others; it means that in
certain periods of societal evolution, it has higher complexity and more
autonomy or is better structured than the others. This special subsystem
cannot completely determine the evolution of society because it also de-
pends on other subsystems. It may be regarded, however, as the guiding
force of evolution because it does define certain options for other sub-
systems (Luhmann 2005a7: 284–286; Pokol 1987: 250–252). The early
Luhmann argues that the economic subsystem had functional primacy in
modernity. In his later works, however, he seems to reject this meaning
of functional primacy and says that we can speak of functional primacy
in so far as one function has priority over the others in a given subsys-
tem, that is, in so far as subsystems specialize in one single function
(Luhmann 1999a: 747).
 The transition from stratified to functionally differentiated society does
not mean that strata completely disappeared. Of course, there remain
rich and poor in modern society, too, and such differences influence all
fields of life. The change consists in the fact that these differences no
longer constitute the basis of the societal order.
In short, we can say that the most important difference between functionally
differentiated and stratified societies—the very reason why this new type of
society has been stabilized—is that functional differentiation, more than any
other form of differentiation, makes possible the birth of highly complex so-
cietal formations and mechanisms. It creates opportunities to increase the
efficiency of scientific research, economic development, and other areas to
an extent that was inconceivable in earlier societies. The most important rea-
son for this is that these areas have become autonomous subsystems that
specialized to fulfill one single function, and they have become independent
from religious-moral bonds. This also means that increasing complexity can
be explained with the end of supervision over the whole society, as a result of
which the harmonization or co-ordination of subsystems has become

impossible. 34
iii) Societal Integration
Thus, the increase in complexity and efficiency produced by functional dif-

ferentiation is inseparable from giving up control over or the co-ordination
of society or its subsystems. At the same time, it is also true that the func-
tionability of subsystems depends to a large extent on the performance of
other subsystems. Let us consider, for example, the number of scientific, le-
gal, political, etc. prerequisites that the functioning of modern economy has.
In other words, the autonomy of systems does not mean that they become
independent from their environment; on the contrary, their dependence
seems to increase. Therefore, we can say that although systems become in-
dependent, their dependence on their environment increases.35 It follows
34 Luhmann does not provide us with a definitive list of all functional subsystems and their
most important characteristics. Moreover, he modified his views during his career. In the
table that follows, I provide an overview of the subsystems, their functions, symbolically
generalized communication media, and binary codes (based on Krause 2002: 43; Lange 2003:
172).
Subsystem Function Medium Code

economy reducing scarcity money payment/nonpayment
law ensuring the fulfillment law, jurisdic- legal/illegal
of expectations tion
science producing new truth true/false
knowledge
politics producing collectively power power/powerlessness
binding decisions government/opposition
art representing the world forming, convincing/unconvincing
work of art beautiful/ugly
education selecting for the career career praise/reproof
religion eliminating contingency belief immanent/transcendent
intimacy interpenetration love loved/not loved
mass media self-observation of information informative/non-
society informative
35 Luhmann states that the principle of constant sum, which in this case would require that
becoming independent lead to a decrease in dependence, is not applicable here (Luhmann
2004c: 117).
that it would be a partial characterization of society to describe it as a mere

aggregate of autopoietic subsystems; doing so would mean that the survival
of society is not explained satisfactorily (Luhmann 1999a: 776). In this subsec-
tion I explore the way the functional subsystems’ requirements for their en-
vironments and for one another are fulfilled in a society lacking a center
from which to command and control subsystems.
The first concept we have to take into consideration regarding the inte-
gration36 of society is structural coupling. Structural coupling cannot only
exist between communication and psychic systems but between different
communication systems as well, for example, between functional subsystems.
Analogously to structural couplings between communication and psychic
systems, it holds true for this case as well that the autopoietic closure of
functional subsystems is impossible without structural couplings with other
functional subsystems. It also holds that the structural couplings of the sys-
tems do not contradict autopoiesis; on the contrary, the multitude of struc-
tural couplings is a reason for the autonomy of systems: since the subsystems
are coupled with several—or almost all—other subsystems, that is, since they
are not only dependent on one but on many other subsystems’ performance,
none of the subsystems can control the others. There are many structural
couplings in society; in fact, every functional subsystem can be coupled with
all the others, and there can be more structural couplings between two sub-
systems as well. Taking some examples: between political and economic sys-
tems, the taxes and the contributions, between legal and political systems,
the constitution, and between legal and economic systems, the property and
the contracts constitute structural couplings. Of course, not every structural
coupling has the same significance for a given subsystem; there are ones
that exert much greater influence on it than the others (Luhmann 1999a:
778–788).
Structural couplings inside the society have a special feature, which is
only peculiar to them: while in the case of structural couplings between so-
cial and psychic systems, we cannot speak of operational connection, that is,
there cannot exist any transition between communicative and conscious op-
erations, in the case of structural couplings between functional subsystems,
it is possible. This is because functional subsystems consist of operations of
36 In this subsection I use the concept of integration to describe the relationship between indi-
vidual societal subsystems. That is to say, “integration” does not refer to the inclusion of
persons in society as it did in the previous sections of this book.
the same kind, that is, of communications. Thus, besides structural couplings
there also exist operational couplings, which do not substitute for the former
but presuppose them (Luhmann 1999a: 788).
Operational couplings between functional subsystems are accomplished
by organizations. As it was mentioned before, by “organizations” Luhmann
means a type of social systems, which differentiate from their environment
by the distinction of members/non-members. Their typical communicative
operation is decision; thus, organizations are autopoietic systems constituted
by a recursive network of decisions. Organizations are evolutionary achieve-
ments; they presuppose a quite complex development stage of society
(Luhmann 1999a: 829–833).
Organizations have a special feature: they can communicate with other
organizations in their environment. According to Luhmann, other kinds of
social systems cannot do this. Hence, it follows that communication between
different social systems is only possible through organizations (Luhmann
1999a: 834).
Organizations can also be established outside the functional systems;
however, they typically operate inside them; thus, we can speak of economic,
political, scientific, etc. organizations. This, however, does not mean that
functional subsystems can work in full as organizations because none of the
organizations can comprehend all the operations of a functional system
(Luhmann 1999a: 841).
Thus, organizations play an important role in functionally differentiated
society because they make communication between functional subsystems
possible; this is why functional subsystems need organizations. But since
functional subsystems cannot become organizations—that is, a functional
subsystem and an organization working in it can never be identical—they
themselves do not communicate with one another in this case either
(Luhmann 1999a: 843).
The idea that organizations make communication between functional
subsystems possible has become dominant in Luhmann’s late writings, while
in the early period of his work, he had emphasized the impossibility of com-
munication between subsystems. Although the two ideas are reconcilable
with each other—because what communicate with each other are not func-
tional subsystems but only the organizations operating within them—this
means a kind of shift of accent. Moreover, this shift means that Luhmann has
got closer to the ideas that he so sharply opposed formerly, that is, to the
ideas stating that integration of society is realized by organizations, proce-

dures, and mediating mechanisms (Kneer 2001: 409–410).
In connection with the question of society-wide coordination or integra-
tion, it seems to be reasonable to touch upon the theme of morality because
we usually attribute these functions to it. Regarding premodern societies,
Luhmann also thinks so. As we have seen, according to him, the religious-
moral ethos was what fulfilled the task of ensuring stratified societal order.
Thus, there can arise the question whether morality plays or could play a
similar role in functionally differentiated society.
Luhmann’s answer is definitely: no. The most important characteristic of
the transition to functionally differentiated society is that functional subsys-
tems have become independent of the religious-moral bonds, and exactly this
independence renders the increase in complexity of society possible. Taking
into account that in Luhmann’s theory evolution prefers the more complex
states, we have to say that society integrated by morality is over, once and
for all.
Can we then speak of morality in functionally differentiated society? And
if so, what kind of role it plays? Luhmann gives a positive answer to the first
question: in modern society, there also exists morality, that is, moral com-
munication. Moral communication is similar to the functional fields in that it
also has an own binary code, but it also differs from them in that it is not dif-
ferentiated as a separate functional subsystem; it can appear in all subsys-
tems. Regarding the binary code of morality, Luhmann defines it—instead of
the good/bad dual—as esteem/disesteem (Luhmann 1999a: 397).
And to the question of what the role of morality is if it can no longer ful-
fill the task of integrating the whole society, Luhmann gives the answer that
morality has a kind of alarm function in modern society. Moral communi-
cation becomes more intensive if there emerge difficulties that cannot be
solved by symbolically generalized communication media or by the func-
tional subsystems. Typical difficulties of this kind are, for example, the social
and ecological problems (Luhmann 1999a: 404). According to Luhmann, this
manifests itself in the fact that if society faces an unsolvable problem, one
begins to speak of ethics, such as bioethics, business ethics, or ecological eth-
ics (Luhmann 1999d: 247). Thus, morality, even if it cannot integrate modern
society, does indicate when it should be integrated.
CHAPTER FIVE
Societal Structure and Semantics
In discussing the structure of Luhmann’s theory, we have seen that one of its
most important characteristics is circularity. Circularity means that we can-
not describe society in such a way that first we decide certain epistemologi-
cal questions and thus elaborate a methodology, and then we describe society
with the help of this methodology. This procedure presupposes that episte-
mological questions can be solved without exploring society, or in other
words, that the description of society is possible from outside the society. In
Luhmann’s view, this is a false assumption. The process of cognition, that is,
the description of society happens inside the society, namely—if it is a scien-
tific description—in the scientific system. This implies that all that a scien-
tific observation says about society can be and has to be applied to this
observation itself as well. The observer observes society from a certain place
of society, and according to Luhmann, this circumstance influences the cog-
nition itself. Thus, cognition cannot be explored independently of societal
structure; that is, epistemological questions cannot be solved without explor-
ing society. At the same time, however, we need certain tools to describe so-
ciety, such as concepts and methodology; that is, we have to solve certain
epistemological questions. Thus, theory of society and epistemology mutually
suppose each other; neither of them is possible without the other; this is in
what the circularity of Luhmann’s theory consists.
This circular structure—as we have already discussed it1—makes the ex-
amination of the theory very difficult because we have to break the circle
somewhere to begin reconstructing the theory, but due to the circularity, we
cannot substantiate our initial theses. Nevertheless, I deemed it advisable to
break the circle on the most abstract level; that is, I began the reconstruction
with analyzing difference or form theory, then general systems theory,
which is a subtype of the former, then theory of social systems, which is an
application field of general systems theory, and then society as a type of so-
cial systems. Thus, we are now on the level of society, and according to
1 See Chapter One, Section B.

Luhmann, by analyzing society, we can gain insight into epistemology. In this

chapter, I endeavor to close the circle and to explain that if we describe mod-
ern society as Luhmann did, it results that we have to opt for the epistemo-
logical point of departure we have chosen; that is, I endeavor to explain why
difference theory is the most adequate tool to describe modern society.
The idea that the characteristics of society influence cognition is, in fact,
the fundamental principle of sociology of knowledge. Luhmann also calls his
examinations in this field sociology of knowledge, and the duality of social
context and knowledge—which are the basic concepts of sociology of knowl-
edge—appears in his theory as societal structure and semantics. We have dis-
cussed societal structure in the previous chapter; in what follows, thus, I
examine what is meant by semantics in Luhmann’s theory and what kind of
relationship exists between societal structure and semantics.
A) Semantics
To understand Luhmann’s concept of semantics, let us recall briefly what we

have said about meaning. In Luhmann’s theory meaning—which is a common
medium of social and psychic systems—stands for the difference of actual-
ity/potentiality. In every case when we say or think something, we exclude
other possibilities, but owing to meaning, these possibilities are not lost but
preserved as potentialities.2
The other key concept that is necessary for the understanding of the role
of semantics is complexity. Owing to meaning, we have countless communi-
cation possibilities: a vast number of possibilities are associated with every
actuality. It is impossible to take into account all of them in communication.
But for the operability of society, there is a need for some systematization,
that is, a need for reducing complexity. Some of the countless possibilities
have to be chosen and stabilized. This selecting and stabilizing function is
fulfilled by semantics. “Thus, semantics is a meaning that is highly general-
ized and available relatively independently of the situation.” (Luhmann
1998a1: 19; my translation) Semantics, as opposed to a mere aggregate of
meaningful communicative operations, is a conglomerate of forms selected
and generalized from the former. Thus, semantics separates the meaning
2 See Chapter Two, Section F.

Societal Structure and Semantics 119
that can be used again and preserves it for societal communication. In other
words, semantics proposes topics for societal communication; it orientates
communication by rendering some of the communication possibilities more
probable (Luhmann 1998a1: 17–19).
Luhmann distinguishes between two levels of semantics. We can speak of
semantics in a wider sense, which includes all the themes of everyday
communication; it may as well be a cursing or a joke. The second level is the
so-called cultivated (gepflegt) semantics. This is a further systematization of
semantics—which in itself is already a processing and systematization of
meaning—in the form of text. Thus, the difference between everyday and cul-
tivated semantics consists in the degree they are processed and systematized
(Luhmann 1998a1: 19; cf. Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 1999: 169). Luhmann
only explores the latter, the cultivated semantics; thus, in what follows, I also
mean cultivated semantics by the term semantics.
This definition of semantics may seem to be quite abstract and strange.
Nevertheless, it is not an extraordinary thing. Luhmann’s concept of seman-
tics is very close to what we usually call culture. Luhmann formulates the re-
lationship between culture and semantics in such a way that semantics is a
narrower concept than culture because it means that part of culture that is
preserved for communicative aims. Thus, semantics is that part of culture
that is provided for us by the history of concepts and ideas (Luhmann 1995a:
163).3 By “semantics” Luhmann means concepts, ideas, world views, scientific
theories, or works of art.
This use of the concept of semantics could be disturbing because it differs
from the more widespread meaning of semantics, that is, from its linguistic,
semiotic application. Luhmann itself also mentions that this choice is not
the best in all respects, but this use of the term is also accepted owing to
Reinhart Koselleck’s work, from whom Luhmann has also taken the concept
(Luhmann 1998a1: 19).
3 Nevertheless, by “culture” Luhmann also means proposals for topics of communication;

thus, it is defined in the same way as semantics. Their difference probably consists in the
fact that semantics is that part of culture that has remained and gone down to posterity.
B) Sociology of Knowledge
Having gotten acquainted with the concepts of societal structure and seman-
tics, now we can explore Luhmann’s views on their relationship. To this end,
I will examine in what Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge consists.
The fundamental thesis of sociology of knowledge can be formulated in
general that there is a relationship between knowledge or cognition and so-
cietal context in which cognition happens (Stehr and Meja 1981: 11). Al-
though sociologists of knowledge usually explore how the features of society
influence cognition, this does not imply that they would deny the connection
in the opposite direction, that is, that knowledge is a formative factor of soci-
ety (Karácsony 1995a: 12). Thus, it would be an oversimplification to say that
the sociology of knowledge claims that the societal context determines cog-
nition. The reason for this is not only that this statement does not contain
the connection in the opposite direction, but that the term “determine” sug-
gests that a definite manner of cognition will necessarily be typical in certain
societal context. Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge also rejects the societal
determination of cognition, and we will see that—although he definitely re-
gards societal structure and not semantics as the main force behind the
change—he also ascribes to semantics certain catalyzing role in the change of
society.
Although Luhmann calls his method sociology of knowledge, this does not
mean that he applies the theorems of sociology of knowledge automatically,
or that he joins one of the approaches of sociology of knowledge. Like in
other cases when his theory meets existing approaches—it may be systems
theory, communication theory, or evolution theory—he deems it necessary to
radically rethink the concepts and theorems of sociology of knowledge. Ac-
cording to Luhmann, the former and recent theories of sociology of knowl-
edge are based on false presuppositions and methodological failures. Partly
owing to this, the criticisms of sociology of knowledge were very frequent,
and neither is it too popular nowadays. Despite the fact that sociology of
knowledge has been brought into being by modernity, and that it could pro-
vide an adequate epistemology for modern society, it is often regarded as the
enemy of modernity, as a kind of counter-enlightenment (Luhmann 1998a1:
12).4
4 For this kind of criticism of sociology of knowledge, see, e.g., Popper 2001: 212–223.
According to Luhmann, one of the fundamental errors of sociologies of

knowledge—thus the reason for their failure—is that they cannot fully get rid
of representation theory of cognition, that is, the idea that we somehow map
the world by cognition. This connects to the conception that more and more
knowledge leads to a better adaptation of the society to its environment. Al-
though the tradition of sociology of knowledge criticized these ideas, it did it,
according to Luhmann, not radically enough. A real break with them can only
be fulfilled by his systems theory (Luhmann 1999b1: 159).
As a further argument for applying systems theory in sociology of knowl-
edge, Luhmann mentions that sociology of knowledge has to study the char-
acteristics of society and cognition in the same theoretical framework, which
requires an extraordinarily complex and abstract point of view. The com-
plexity and abstraction level needed for this can best be ensured by general
systems theory because it describes the structure of society and semantics by
the same theoretical framework (Luhmann 1998a1: 15).
The main thesis of Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge reads that there is a
relationship between the structure and the semantics of a given society. By
having a closer look at these two fundamental concepts, it might be difficult
to understand in what the difference between them consists. At first sight,
these concepts fit into the accustomed scheme of sociology of knowledge: we
are seemingly dealing with a relationship between certain characteristics of
society and the level of ideas or thinking. But in Luhmann’s theory, society
consists of communication, and the structure of society does not have any
existence beyond the fact that it is actualized by communicative operations.
Furthermore, the task of structures is to limit the possibilities of communica-
tion by making contingent options appear as given. Above, however, we have
defined the function of semantics very similarly: semantics proposes themes,
limits the range of possible communications; therefore, it means structure
formation; that is, we can also speak of semantic structures. Thus, we have
two concepts—societal structure and semantics—and none of them have any
existence beyond communicative operations, and both of them fulfill the
function of selecting and limiting the possibilities of communication. In what
consists, then, their difference?
To clarify this difference, we have to go back to the concepts of observa-
tion and operation. As we have seen,5 the two concepts cannot be conceived
5 See Chapter Two, Section B.

without each other—every observation is an operation, and every operation

is an observation—but despite of this, it is important to distinguish between
them. Their difference consists in the fact that, on the one hand, operation in
itself is blind, a mere drawing a distinction; on the other, observation cannot
observe itself as an operation. Luhmann defines the relationship between so-
cietal structure and semantics with the help of the difference of these two
concepts. Formation of societal structures refers to the operational level,
where the limitation of possibilities thus the ensuring of the connectibility of
communicative operations is accomplished by system differentiation, that is,
by formation of subsystems. On the other hand, formation of semantic struc-
tures happens on the level of observations; semantic structures lead observa-
tion by proposing themes, thus by limiting options of observations or
descriptions (Luhmann 1999a: 537–539; cf. Stäheli 1998).
Now we turn our attention to the most important question of sociology of
knowledge, that is, to the question in what the relationship between these
two things consists. The connection between societal structure and seman-
tics is established in Luhmann’s theory by complexity. As we have seen, the
function of semantics is to select communicative possibilities and to stabilize
the options, that is, to propose themes for communication. And the reason
why this is necessary is that a mere aggregation of communicative operations
would be too complex and unsystematized to ensure the functioning of soci-
ety. Thus, we need semantics because of the complexity of society; hence, it
follows that if complexity changes, most likely semantics will also have to be
modified because otherwise it will not be able to fulfill the task to reduce
complexity (Luhmann 1998a1: 22–24).
Therefore, the question is when the complexity of society changes. In the
previous chapter, we have seen that the complexity of society and its capabil-
ity to reduce complexity depend on its structure, that is, on its differentia-
tion form. Consequently, if the differentiation form of society changes—that
is, if segmented society is replaced by stratified, and stratified by functionally
differentiated—its complexity and its capability to reduce complexity also
change (Luhmann 1998a1: 21–22). Thus, we can sum up the relationship be-
tween societal structure and semantics as follows: when the primary differ-
entiation form of society changes, the complexity of society significantly
increases, which produces semantic changes because semantics has to adjust
itself to the increased complexity.
Thus, the relationship between societal structure and semantics consists
in the fact that the different types of society, that is, the different forms of
differentiation, need different kinds of semantics. Therefore, Luhmann’s

sociology of knowledge explores how semantics has changed with the transi-
tion from medieval, hierarchical society to modern, functionally differenti-
ated society. Before entering upon analyzing this question, let us have a look
at what the peculiarity of this definition of sociology of knowledge is.
Most of the sociologies of knowledge endeavor or endeavored to explain
the differences in ways of thinking or world views of a given society in a
given age, for example, by attributing the ways of thinking or world views to
certain societal contexts, groups, or classes. What Luhmann’s sociology of
knowledge explores is, however, not the differences within a given society
but the semantic changes produced by the transition between different types
of society. His sociology of knowledge does not provide any guide to the
question of what the reason for the different ways of thinking or world views
is in a given society. He does not deny that thinking or cognition is influ-
enced by the societal environment, but does not analyze this question in his
sociology of knowledge. The reason for this is probably that he holds that be-
cause of the very high complexity of society, we cannot identify within it
groups or classes to which we could attribute certain ways of thinking or
world views with complete certainty.
Consequently, if we analyze Luhmann’s theory with the usual expecta-
tions for sociology of knowledge, we will be disappointed. On the other hand,
regarding the analysis of the transition from hierarchical to modern society,
Luhmann holds his endeavor to be pioneering. He complains that the emer-
gence of modernity was discussed mainly on the level of the history of ideas,
that is, on semantic level, and these examinations have not been connected
to a suitably detailed analysis of society. Although there are renowned
schools discussing the history of concepts and ideas in a societal context—
the best examples are the two schools established by Quentin Skinner and
Reinhart Koselleck—their concepts of society are, according to Luhmann, not
suitable from a sociological point of view (Luhmann 1998c1: 2).
Luhmann considers evolution theory applicable to semantics as well;
thus, we can speak of evolution of ideas. Furthermore, semantic evolution
itself is an evolutionary achievement; thus, the question whether it is possi-
ble, and if so, how it can be characterized, depends on the differentiation
form of society. In segmented societies, because of the lack of writing, we
cannot speak of semantic evolution. Evolution begins in stratified societies,
but it is linked to the upper stratum, or to be more precise, to the literate
strata. In functionally differentiated society, semantic evolution is linked to
the functional subsystems, and we cannot speak of a semantic evolution that

proceeds independently of the subsystems, on the level of the whole society
(Luhmann 1998a1: 43–45).
Similarly to societal evolution, semantic evolution also presupposes three
evolution mechanisms: variation, selection, and restabilization. These mean
the following (Luhmann 1998a1: 46–52, 1999a: 545–554):
 On semantic level the multiplication of variations is owing to writing,

and it is further increased by the spread of printing. Written text—as op-
posed to the unwritten tradition—affords the opportunity to keep dis-
tance from the text, to criticize it, and this increases the chances for
alternatives to appear. The other factor facilitating variations is that the
transmitted ideas inevitably contain inconsequences, problems, which
stimulate people to solute them, that is, to experiment with alternatives.
Furthermore, Luhmann mentions that often exactly the efforts to elimi-
nate divergences can result in the appearance of variations because
summarizations and systematizations often systematize and make ap-
parent the possible variations as well
 The way the selection of appearing variations is accomplished depends
on the differentiation form of society. In stratified society this happened
on the level of the whole society; in functionally differentiated society
this is the task of the own criteria of the functional systems. Thus, the
transformation of societal structure mainly affects the mechanism of se-
lection. The selection of the emerging new ideas depends on their plau-
sibility and evidence. A semantic is plausible if it is understandable
without any further foundations, and we can also expect the others to
understand it. Evidence is a stricter criterion than this: it means that we
can clearly exclude the alternatives as well.
 In stratified society the function of restabilization was fulfilled by sys-
tematization and dogmatization of knowledge, which proceeded on the
level of the whole society. With the help of this, semantics has become
more learnable and transmittable. With the transition to functional dif-
ferentiation, the dogmatic stabilization of semantics has become harder
and harder because it was not fast enough for modern society. Func-
tional subsystems take over the role of restabilization; thus, restabiliza-
tion is ensured by the differentiation and independence of functional
fields. Consequently, we cannot speak of a society-wide evolution of se-
mantics anymore but only of the subsystems’ own history of ideas.
Until now we have only characterized the relationship between societal

structure and semantics by the thesis that if the structure of society, that is,
its primary differentiation form, changes, this, through an increase in com-
plexity, results in semantic changes. Now we concretize the characteristics of
this relationship in two regards: first, we examine the question in what re-
spect we can speak of a determination of semantics by societal structure;
second, we discuss what we can say about the connection in the opposite di-
rection, that is, about the effects of semantics on society.
Concerning the determinateness of semantics, the type of society does not
completely determine the semantics belonging to it. Consequently, we can-
not deduce or predict what kind of semantics the transformation of societal
structure will produce. What we can predict is not what kind of but that some
kind of semantic change has to happen (Luhmann 1998a1: 36–37).
To characterize the relationship between societal structure and seman-
tics, we can say that societal structure limits the range of possible semantics.
For example, this meant in stratified societies that semantics could not vio-
late the hierarchy of ranks. These kinds of bonds disappear in modern soci-
ety; instead of them, semantics has to comply with the requirements raised
by functional differentiation. The modifications of societal requirements for
semantics cannot be recognized immediately but only from a certain histori-
cal distance. Consequently, a new semantics complying with the require-
ments of the new structures can only evolve if there is enough experience on
the new societal conditions; thus, semantic changes always happen slightly
later than the structural transformations of society (Luhmann 1998a1:
40–41).
The latter finding already suggests that the connection between societal
structure and semantics is not the same in the opposite direction; that is, se-
mantics cannot trigger societal changes. Society does not develop in compli-
ance with conceptualizations of aims or with anticipated states (Luhmann
1998a1: 22–23). Thus, Luhmann rejects the possibility that a new type of soci-
ety can emerge in such a way that first its idea is born, and then people real-
ize it. Semantics only responds to changes. This, however, does not mean
that semantics cannot play an important role in transformations; on the
contrary, it is necessary for them. Regarding the transition to modernity,
Luhmann attributes a prominent role to the spread of printing. Printing sig-
nificantly contributed to the ceasing of authority because as soon as the texts
have become accessible for the public at large, it has become possible to com-
pare and to criticize them. Thus, the erosion of the stratified societal order
has, in fact, begun on the level of semantics, and semantics had an important
catalyzing role in the change. This was rendered possible by the fact that se-
mantic structures are much more flexible and more easily changeable than
the structures of society. The transformation of the latter is a centennial,
complex, and, in Luhmann’s words, highly improbable process, while se-
mantics is much more plastic: on the level of theories or ideas, we can run
forward, experiment, or formulate utopias. And even if most of them remain
theories, the contingency revealed by them—that is, discovering that the es-
tablished order is not necessary—can trigger societal change. This does not
contradict our former finding that societal change is not owing to the birth
of an idea. Semantics is not a cause of the change of societal structures to the
effect that the new society would first emerge on semantic level. But seman-
tics can be regarded as a cause of the change to the effect that discovering
the contingency of ideas, concepts, or theories can trigger societal changes.
Or in Luhmann’s words: “not the content of the ideas but perhaps their con-
tingency can have causal effects in the historical process; thus, we do not
have to assume a downward causation in such a way that an idea goes from
the culture into the heads, and from there into the hands and tongues; in-
stead, we should rather proceed from the fact that the possibility that some-
thing may be different stimulates activities from which the success selects
systematizable contents.” (Luhmann 1998a: 8; my translation)
C) Semantics of Stratified Society
After exploring the most important theorems of Luhmann’s sociology of

knowledge, we examine in this section how the relationship between the
structure of stratified society and the medieval semantics can be described
by this sociology of knowledge. Of course, it is impossible to analyze the
whole pre-modern—or with Luhmann’s words, “old European” (alteu-
ropäisch)—semantics, and the same holds true for the semantic consequences
of the transition to modernity, which we explore in the next section.6 Thus,
in what follows I endeavor to briefly sum up the most important characteris-
tics of pre-modern semantics.
6 For these questions, see Hahn 1981; Karácsony 1995a: 119–136; Schwanitz 1996.
Stratified society is composed of unequal subsystems standing in a su-

perordinate/subordinate relationship with one another. The evolutionary
advantage of this differentiation form consists in the fact that there comes
into existence a relatively limited and confinable stratum, in which, on the
one hand, the goods are concentrated, on the other, an effective communica-
tion can be ensured. By this means, the upper stratum can control and repre-
sent the whole society; thus, this type of society can gain—at least compared
to segmented societies—a relatively high degree of complexity (Luhmann
1998a2: 73–74). Consequently, the most important requirement for the func-
tioning of this society is the maintenance of the hierarchy. This regards se-
mantics as well; thus, the main limiting requirement of this societal structure
for semantics is that semantics cannot erode hierarchy.
The most important semantic requirement stemming from this is that so-
ciety has to be described so that everyone and everything has to have a fix
place in it. In other words, everything has to be necessary: the societal order,
the people’s positions in society, the values, etc. Contingency is not permit-
ted; that is, one cannot say things can be different. Eliminating contingency
and endowing the world with necessity are, according to Luhmann, ensured
by the ontological way of thinking. Since in Luhmann’s theory every observa-
tion is a distinction, the ontological description of the world is it as well. By
ontology Luhmann means a mode of observation that proceeds from the dif-
ference of existence/non-existence and subordinates every other distinction
to this one. This means that truth or morality is also conceived by the differ-
ence of existence/non-existence: if something is true or good, it exists; if it is
false or bad, id does not exist. It is impossible that there exists an alternative
truth or an alternative good, which stems, for example, from a different
point of view. This, of course, does not mean that anything we say is true,
and anything we do is good. Divergences of opinions and moral problems are
unavoidable in society, and semantics has to provide an explanation for
them. The explanation, however, cannot be that different viewpoints result
in different opinions because this would relativize and question the estab-
lished order. Instead, ontology states that the reason for the divergences is
the error. There is always only one truth; the thing is always what it is, but
the observer cannot always recognize it correctly. The ontological way of
thinking results in the “thingness” of the world: the world consists of visible
and invisible things and of relations between them. The ontological way of
thinking affects the temporal dimension as well: St. Augustine asks whether
there exist past, present, and future, and he concludes that only past and fu-
ture exists, and there is no present (see Luhmann 1999a: 893–912).
The acceptance of this semantics and the elimination of diverging opin-
ions are ensured by moral reinforcement. Everything that exists not only is
what it is, but it must (soll) be it. This is a religious reinforcement as well; that
is, the world owes its characteristics to the will of God, and questioning it is
an opposition to God. Thus, in stratified society religion fulfills—of course,
besides other functions—the role of ensuring the unquestionability of the
established world view, and this holds true both for scientific descriptions
of the world and for moral imperatives. Therefore, religion is the most
important means to maintain hierarchy. Thus, it is no wonder that the disso-
lution of this societal order has put religion in the center, and modernity was
often defined against religion.
An important functioning criterion of stratified society is that its up-
permost part has to be able to control the whole society. Thus, it is also a re-
quirement for semantics that it has to depict this part of society as
representing the whole (Luhmann 1990b4: 125). This task is fulfilled in se-
mantics by the distinction of part/whole supplemented by the difference of
upper/lower; that is, the parts are not equal, but there is an uppermost, best
part among them. Although the uppermost, best part is not equal with the
whole, it can represent it. In Luhmann’s view, the part/whole scheme was
applied to describe many things, for example, human body, household, town,
or state (Luhmann 1999a: 912–931).
D) Transition to modernity
In stratified society there were also situations, roles, or problems when func-
tional viewpoints prevailed. These, however, were subordinated to the pri-
mary differentiation form; that is, they could not violate the hierarchy of
ranks. We can speak of functionally differentiated society if it becomes the
primary form of differentiation. This, of course, did not happen overnight,
but it was a result of a centuries-long process. According to Luhmann, the
emergence of some functional systems began in the late Middle Ages, but the
transformation only reached an irreversible degree at the end of the 18th
century (Luhmann 1998a1: 26–27).
The evolutionary advantage of functionally differentiated society is its in-
creased capability to reduce complexity, and this capability is owing to the
emergence of functional subsystems specialized for definite functions. The

prerequisite for an effective functioning of these subsystems is that they
have to follow exclusively their own logics, and that they have to be free
from external control. Therefore, the most important requirements for se-
mantics relate to the autonomous functioning of the subsystems.
The first important new task of semantics is to establish the identity of
the subsystems. In stratified society the subsystems, that is, the strata, were
defined on the basis of the whole: there was a moral-religious description of
the whole society, and this defined the place of the subsystems and the rela-
tionships between them and their environments. This is no more possible in
functionally differentiated society. The identity of the subsystems, however,
has to be established anyhow because—as we have seen it when discussing
general systems theory—the operations of the system have to be self-
referential; that is, they have to refer to the system because they can only en-
sure their connectibility in this way. Since they can no more accomplish this
by defining the system on the basis of the whole society or another system,
there is only one possibility left: the system has to establish its identity by
itself. Luhmann calls this reflection. Functional subsystems are reflective to
the effect that they define themselves and their connections with their envi-
ronments or with other systems autonomously (Luhmann 1998a1: 29–30).
The effect this produces on semantics is that the emerging semantic con-
structions endeavor to describe the subsystems self-referentially, without
reference to the unity of society or to morality. Politics should not be subor-
dinated to morality; the only aim is to keep the power—says Machiavelli.
Economy functions best if it does not take moral principles into considera-
tion; the only aim is to gain profit—suggested Mandeville.
Another semantic effect of functional differentiation is that the relation-
ship between society and person changes. In stratified society, all persons
belonged to one of the strata. A person’s place in society completely deter-
mined its identity: it prescribed the person’s rights and duties, the required
behaviors, whom it could marry, etc. This has changed in functionally differ-
entiated society. Persons no more belong to only one subsystem because a
person can participate in economy, in politics, and in other subsystems at the
same time. On the other hand, a person does not participate in the subsys-
tems as a whole person but only through certain roles, for example, as a con-
sumer or as a voter. A further consequence of the change is that the question
of the persons’ inclusion into subsystems becomes important. A person’s in-
clusion into a subsystem means that the person is taken into account in the
given subsystem; that is, the person can buy and sell in the economic system,
has voting rights in the politics, etc. In functionally differentiated society,
since the differences in ranks gradually disappear, the aim is to include all
persons into all subsystems.7 These changes appear in semantics as ideas of
freedom and equality on the one hand, and as the importance of the individ-
ual’s autonomy on the other. The reason for the latter is that if society can no
more ensure the people’s identity, they have to create it by themselves
(Luhmann 1998a1: 30–32).
The third factor that affects semantics is that the relation of society to its
environment changes. In stratified society, owing to the ontological way of
thinking, the world was such as it was; it was regarded as given, which can-
not be changed and questioned. As the moral-religious reinforcement of the
world became weaker, the search of alternatives began; that is, everything
that was assumed in stratified society as given is now questioned and re-
garded as contingent. This means for semantics that the world is, instead of
an aggregate of fixed things, an infinite horizon of possibilities (Luhmann
1998a1: 33–34).
The fact that these new challenges appear does not mean that there im-
mediately emerges a new semantics that completely complies with the re-
quirements of the new societal structure. As we have seen above, semantics
can only describe societal changes later. The new societal formations have to
function for a time and have to be experienced so that semantics can grasp
them. Furthermore, the whole semantics cannot be re-created overnight; we
always have to use the existing concepts and theories. Thus, the radically
new societal constellations have to be described by a semantics that has been
developed in compliance with the requirements of the former type of society
(Luhmann 1999a: 890–891). Finally, structural transformation has not hap-
pened in all fields of society at the same time; some functional systems be-
came independent earlier, others later. Thus, there was a centuries-long
transitional period—which Luhmann puts from the late Middle Ages to the
end of the 18th century—when the new form of society, that is, functional
differentiation has not completely evolved yet, but the old, hierarchical es-
tablishment was in the process of dissolution. This meant that there was
a need for a semantics that was compatible with both types of society
(Luhmann 1998a3: 169–172).
7 This question will be discussed in Chapter Six, Section F.

The solution for this double requirement was, according to Luhmann, the
semantics of the so-called anthropology of early modernity. By anthropology
Luhmann means that societal changes are mainly interpreted by the concept
of man. The scholars of that age began to research the man, the human na-
ture, the human understanding, the people’s motivations, and their relation
to society or to other people. In Luhmann’s view, anthropology was suitable
to comply with the double requirement for semantics in this transitional pe-
riod; that is, it was acceptable for the old establishment on the one hand, and
it offered a large scope for increase in complexity, which was required by the
new societal structure (Luhmann 1998a3: 173–178).
What made this possible was the indetermination and self-reference of
human being; that is, a conception stating that the man is undetermined re-
garding its attributes, abilities, and knowledge, and that these can only be
developed by the man itself, that is, self-referentially. The reason why the
anthropologic description of the transformations was reconcilable with the
requirements of old society was that religion and morality, in the light of this
description, seemingly maintained their central role. According to anthro-
pology, what has changed was not society freeing itself from the religious-
moral bonds but the people who behaved in a way that was sinful according
to religion. Thus, the possibility of judging the changes in a religious-moral
way remained. In the meantime, however, religion has become a functional
subsystem. Thus, although religion kept the privilege to judge the good and
the bad, it could only do this from a functional subsystem and was not able to
control society (Luhmann 1998a3: 191).8
Regarding the requirements for the emergence of a new society, func-
tional subsystems needed a self-referential semantics that ensured an infinite
horizon or infinite possibilities for different functional fields. The reason
anthropology was able to comply with these requirements was that human
indetermination and self-reference meant openness or sensibility to the
environment (Luhmann 1998a3: 196). This, in turn, offered an opportunity to
concretize this indetermination self-referentially in functional subsystems,
that is, to fill it up with content. In politics the instinct of self-preservation
induces people to establish a state; in economy the endeavor to satisfy
8 This should not be constructed to mean that Luhmann thinks that religion would at some
point completely disappear from modern society. What he means, rather, is that it looses its
central position as an integrative force in society as a whole (Bognár 2008, 2009: 161–162).
desires results in a never-ending search for profit; and in science curiosity

urges people to discover and acquire knowledge.9
According to Luhmann, the contribution of anthropology to the forma-
tion and stabilization of functionally differentiated society consists in the fol-
lowing four factors (Luhmann 1998a3: 227):
 It made possible the inclusion of population in functional subsystems on

a large scale.
 It increased the possibility of negation, in other words, the possibility of
deviations and variations in communication.
 It made possible the independent functioning of function-specific selec-
tion criteria.
 It contributed to the self-referential stabilization of the functional
subsystems.
Nevertheless, anthropology was only a kind of supplementary theory: it did

not describe the real changes, that is, the transformation of the societal
structure. Because of the reasons mentioned above, it was impossible to con-
struct a theory of society that could grasp the real transformation, but the
changes urged the birth of a new semantics. This deficiency was supplied by
anthropology in such a way that it attributed the new phenomena—such as
the indetermination, the emergence of infinite possibilities, or the self-
reference—to the man although these phenomena were, in fact, owing to the
new structure of society.
Luhmann finds nothing exceptionable in this; perhaps this was the best
semantic solution in the transitional period. He, however, finds it to be a
much bigger problem that many elements of this semantics—which was use-
ful in the transitional period but is false after all—have hitherto remained in
the discourses on modernity. Social sciences have up to now failed to con-
struct a theory that could adequately describe in what this transition con-
sists, and what are the most important characteristics of modern society. But
now we cannot say that we have to take into account the requirements of the
old establishment, or that we do not have enough experience on the func-
tioning of modern society. In spite of this, social sciences describe modern
society in an anthropocentric manner today as well.
9 For the concretization of anthropology in functional subsystems, see Luhmann 1998a3:

199–205.
The most typical form of this anthropological or anthropocentric way of

thinking is the philosophy of Enlightenment. The theory of modernity is usu-
ally closely intertwined with the ideas of Enlightenment: the most important
features of modern society are often regarded as the realizations of the pro-
gram of Enlightenment. Thus, it is no wonder that the ideas of Enlightenment
are often targets of Luhmann’s criticism.
On the one hand, Luhmann criticizes the Enlightenment’s concepts of so-
ciety and man. He primarily considers those ideas problematic that refer to
human reason and its role in the functioning of society. In his view, it is ques-
tionable whether merely by reflecting on the reason that is to be found in
all people, we could reach consensus on justice and the proper societal
formations, and we could construct rules with which everyone would be sat-
isfied (Luhmann 2005a3: 83–84).10
The other aspect of Luhmann’s criticism of Enlightenment refers to the
relationship between Enlightenment and modernity. This relationship is of-
ten conceived in such a way that the ideas of Enlightenment have brought
into action the changes that have lead to the birth of modern society.
Roughly speaking, we can say that Enlightenment is the cause, and modern
society is the effect. According to Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge, how-
ever, this relationship is exactly the reverse: semantic changes are only reac-
tions or symptoms triggered by the structural transformation of society.
Roughly speaking again, the emergence of modern society is the cause, and
Enlightenment is the effect.
The reason why Luhmann’s views on the relationship between Enlight-
enment and modernity are important to understand is that by this means we
can see more clearly against what Luhmann’s criticism is directed. According
to the above findings, Luhmann’s criticism of Enlightenment is not identical
with anti-modernism. In fact, Luhmann can be regarded as one of the biggest
apologists of modernity in the 20th century because in his view there is no
return from modernity to a society that is based on a unified, religious-moral
order; furthermore, socialism is not a possible alternative, and we cannot
speak of postmodern society. What Luhmann criticizes is not modern society
but its anthropocentric description that manifests itself in the ideas of the
Enlightenment, and which has influence up to now.
10 We will see real-life examples for this criticism in the discussion of Luhmann’s views on le-
gitimacy, democracy, and public opinion in Chapter Six, Sections C, D and E.
But neither is the term anti-enlightenment a proper word for Luhmann’s

standpoint because he also regards his own theoretical endeavor as enlight-
enment, or to be more precise, as sociological enlightenment. As opposed to
the “ordinary,” anthropocentric enlightenment, which endeavored to de-
scribe the emergence of modernity by philosophical means, Luhmann holds
this task to be accomplishable by means of analyzing the structure of society,
that is, by a sociological approach. Furthermore, the program of sociological
enlightenment aims not only to provide a more adequate description of mod-
ernity, but also to explain why the tradition of Enlightenment described
these changes incorrectly, in an anthropocentric manner. Luhmann calls this
latter endeavor—which was, in fact, the topic of this section—“illuminating
the Enlightenment” (Abklärung der Aufklärung) (Luhmann 2005a3: 85).
E) Semantics of Modern Society
In the foregoing we have discussed in what the transition to modern society

consists, and what kinds of requirements this raises for semantics. Thus,
there is nothing left but to discuss what kind of semantics can best comply
with these requirements; that is, which semantics is best compatible with
modern society.
One of the most important changes that affect semantics is—as mentioned
above—that the world is no longer an aggregate of fixed things. The onto-
logical way of thinking, which was characteristic of stratified society, pro-
ceeded from the fact that there is a substance, which is given, exists, and
always is such as it is. This substance is the same for everyone, but perhaps
there are some who do not recognize it properly. Thus, there was only one
proper viewpoint on the order of the world, and it owed its validity and sta-
bility to the enforcement by religious-moral sanctions. With the transition to
modernity, however, religion and morality have lost their central role in so-
ciety, and they were no more able to eliminate deviant opinions. From that
time on there is not only one proper description of the world, but the world
can be different from various viewpoints; that is, the world has become poly-
contextual. Luhmann’s most important thesis on semantics of modern soci-
ety reads that there is no exclusive viewpoint; that is, there is no description
of the world that would be the only right one. Two other concepts support
this thesis: the concepts of second-order observations and complexity.
According to Luhmann, one of the most characteristic features of the

emergence of modernity is the switch to second-order observations, that is,
to observations on observations or on observers. This relates to the process
mentioned above, that is, to the multiplication of the viewpoints. The fact
that there are more different viewpoints means that the world is not such as
it is, but it is such as it appears for someone. Thus, as opposed to the first-
order observation, we do not observe the world as it is, but we observe how
others observe it. Although we can observe the observer, its peculiar point of
view remains completely inaccessible for us as second-order observers. The
problem is not only that according to someone it is a hare, and according to
the other it is a rabbit, but we cannot know with complete certainty whether
they attach the same mental content to these concepts because we should see
into their heads to decide it (Luhmann 2005e3: 20). Thus, the world can be
observed differently and we cannot compare the different observations. If
they are incomparable, how could we find an exclusive one among them?
The impossibility of an exclusively proper viewpoint is supported by an-
other argument, which is based on the complexity of the world. If we could
take all the possible descriptions of the world into account and produce a
synthesis of them, we could argue that polycontextuality does not exclude
the possibility of an exclusive viewpoint because we can elaborate a descrip-
tion that contains all the possible viewpoints. According to Luhmann, how-
ever, this is not the case; the world is too complex to take every possible
viewpoint into consideration at the same time. As we have seen, complexity
exactly means in Luhmann’s theory that we cannot take into account all pos-
sible relations between all elements; therefore, we have to select from them.
Thus, all descriptions of the world are selective; that is, they show only one of
the possible aspects of it and never every possibility.
Thus, we can reconstruct Luhmann’s thesis stating that there is no exclu-
sive description of the world or society as follows: We could speak of an ex-
clusively proper description of society either if there were a description that
contained all the characteristics of the world, that is, that were not selective,
or if we could anyhow choose an exclusively proper description from the
many possible ones. The first possibility has to be rejected because of the
complexity of the world; the second has to be rejected because the different
viewpoints are unknowable and incomparable. And the structure of modern
society does not render it possible—as religion did it in the Middle Ages—to
sanctify one of these viewpoints or descriptions.
Thus, we cannot proceed from the fact that there exist “the” world, “the”
society, “the” thing, etc. because these are such as they appear for an ob-
server. Likewise, we cannot proceed from “the” observer or “the” subject;
which one should we choose from among six billions?—asks Luhmann
(Luhmann 1992: 63, 1994b: 480).
Thus, we have to construct semantics without presupposing the objects of
observations and their identity as given, but they always have to be produced
by the observers. According to Luhmann, the difference theoretical point of
departure—that says first the object of observation has to be separated from
everything else by a distinction drawn by an observer—complies with this
requirement. By this means, we have arrived at the point where we have
begun the step-by-step exposition of Luhmann’s theory; thus, the circle is
closed.
PART II
Politics in Luhmann’s Theory

CHAPTER SIX
Theory of Politics
After the analysis of the main characteristics of Luhmann’s theory accom-

plished in the previous chapters, in the following section we explore the
political aspects of his theory. The topics of political science or political phi-
losophy appear in Luhmann’s work in two ways. On the one hand, politics is
one of the functional subsystems of modern society, and so all that we have
said about the societal subsystems also applies to it. It has, among other
things, a function, a binary code, and a symbolically generalized communi-
cation medium. This way we can almost automatically reveal the characteris-
tics of politics as a societal subsystem, only by concretizing the above
features: that is, we have to determine its function, binary code, or medium.
Luhmann elaborated the topic of politics as a functional subsystem in his
posthumously published The Politics of Society (Die Politik der Gesellschaft)
(Luhmann 2002a), one of his systematic works examining functional subsys-
tems. Another way of treating topics of political science and political phi-
losophy is found in his books and studies where he discusses some
fundamental concepts or questions of the literature of political science or po-
litical philosophy, such as state, legitimacy, democracy, public opinion, or
welfare state. In this case we are not dealing with a concretization of systems
theoretical concepts but with a reinterpretation of the key concepts of poli-
tics with the help of the systems theory. I consider it important to distinguish
between these two types of examinations because, as we will see, in the latter
case—since these questions stem from the tradition of political theory rather
than from Luhmann’s own theory—Luhmann often has trouble in placing the
concepts in the systems theoretical framework, and sometimes he would
even prefer to eliminate them.
In the following sections, I first explore the characteristics of politics as a
functional subsystem, and then I discuss the conclusions drawn by Luhmann
from the characteristics of the political system conceived like this and from
other premises of his general theory.
140 Politics in Luhmann’s Theory
A) Politics as Functional Subsystem
In this section, I discuss three characteristics of politics as a functional sub-

system—i.e., function, symbolically generalized communication medium, and
binary code—as well as the closed nature of the political system emerging by
means of them.
i) The Function of Politics
Although we can speak of politics as a functional subsystem only in modern

society, it would be quite implausible to assert that before modernity there
was nothing that could be called politics. We have to distinguish between two
meanings of the term: politics as a functional subsystem on the one hand,
and politics as a solution of peculiar problems on the other.1 In the second
sense we can speak of politics in every society, but politics as an independent
subsystem has emerged only in modern society.
The novelty of modern society compared to former social types does not
consist in the emersion of new tasks or new functions, but rather in the es-
tablishment of independent subsystems for these functions, and in the fact
that this constitutes the primary form of differentiation of society. We must
therefore consider the function of politics as a task that had to be faced in
former societies as well.
According to Luhmann, this function consists in producing collectively
binding decisions (Luhmann 2002a: 84, 2005a4: 200). Although Luhmann re-
jects some other approaches by way of this definition —for example, the con-
ception that the task of politics is to ensure common good (Luhmann 2002a:
83)—its novelty falls behind the radicalism to which we have already been
accustomed in the case of his other definitions.2
1 Luhmann does not emphasize the separation of these two meanings but it can be inferred
from his analyses. We will see that Luhmann speaks of the medium of politics, that is, of
power, prior to functionally differentiated society.
2 David Easton and Talcott Parsons also used this definition before Luhmann (Hellmann 2005:
23).
Theory of Politics 141
ii) Power
The function of politics, that is, the production of collectively binding deci-
sions, is inseparable from the question of power because power is indispen-
sable to ensure the collectively binding force of decisions. In Luhmann’s
theory, power is one of the symbolically generalized communication media.
By regarding power as a communication medium, Luhmann breaks with the
anthropocentric ideas of power. In his view, power cannot be interpreted as
an attribute of people or as a causality of behavior but only as communica-
tion, that is, as a social phenomenon. In other words, power only emerges if
the persons concerned behave according to a code that defines the situation
as a situation of power (Luhmann 1990a3: 157).
For Luhmann, power is a subtype of the more general category of influ-
ence. The concept of influence is also related to communication. It is also a
social phenomenon that cannot be attributed to one single person. By influ-
ence Luhmann means the restriction of others’ behavior. There are several
forms of influence, of which Luhmann mentions the three most typical ones.
The first is the absorption of uncertainty, which originates from the fact that
the degree of freedom of the system is so high that it is necessary to reduce
it. The absorption of uncertainty is, in fact, not an obligation but a kind of
voluntary restraint of possibilities. The second type is positive sanction,
which is a characteristic of the exchange of goods; thus, this form of influ-
ence appears in economy. The third type is the negative sanction, and this is
the case when we can speak of power (Luhmann 2002a: 39–46).
The difference between positive and negative sanction is thus a manifes-
tation of the difference between politics and economy as well. Luhmann,
however, slightly softens the difference between the two kinds of sanction by
saying that it depends on our expectations whether we consider something
as a positive or negative sanction. For example, we can regard the with-
drawal of the positive sanctions that have been built into our expectation
structure as a negative sanction, and on the contrary, the absence of regular
negative sanctions can appear as a positive one. All this does not mean any
dissolution of the difference between positive and negative sanctions. Ex-
change of goods continues to be a positive sanction, while political power is a
negative one, and they overlap each other only for the observer (Luhmann
2002a: 50–51, 1990a3: 158–160).
In Luhmann’s view, power as a symbolically generalized communication
medium means that ego regards alter’s decision as a premise in a situation of
decision; that is, the decision of alter limits the range of ego’s possibilities
(Luhmann 2005a4: 205). Formulated in the language of medium/form theory,
the medium is the set of the possible alternatives of decision, while the form
is the possibility that has been realized (Luhmann 2002a: 34).
Power as a promise of negative sanctions is distinguished from positive
sanctions, among other things, by the fact that while the latter have to be ac-
complished by all means—in the course of an exchange we have to obtain the
exchange-value—for negative sanctions the opposite is true. Precisely when
we have to implement negative sanctions, we will not attain what we in-
tended to attain by way of power. Power is based on avoiding negative sanc-
tions, that is, on the assumption that both ego and alter want to avoid them
(Luhmann 2002a: 46–47).
Luhmann reconstructs the emergence of power as follows: Alter wants to
persuade ego to do something that ego would not do voluntarily. In this
situation, alter creates an alternative that raises the prospect of the use of
force or any other negative sanction against ego for the case when ego does
not accomplish the activity alter expects. Both alter and ego want to avoid
this constructed alternative, so it is also preferable to alter not to apply the
negative sanctions. Their use, however, is less uncomfortable for alter than
for ego. In Luhmann’s opinion, a condition for the functioning of power as a
communication medium is that both participants know about the negative
sanctions as a possible alternative, and both of them want to avoid it. This is
why we can say that the basis of power is a fiction, a not realized second real-
ity (Luhmann 2002a: 47). This also means that in Luhmann’s theory there is
no “latent” or “hidden” power, which is invisible for the persons concerned
(Bender 1998: 12).
Since power is based on a fiction—that is, on something that is not pre-
sent and cannot be experienced—symbols gain a special importance. The
owner of power endeavor to substitute and represent power with symbols in
order to make it present. Police and army, for example, has to display by way
of uniforms and other symbols that they have the option of enforcing nega-
tive sanctions (Luhmann 2002a: 47–48).
In spite of the fact that Luhmann considers power to be the most impor-
tant means of politics, he does not assert that politics fulfills its function—
that is, producing collectively binding decisions—solely with the help of this
tool. He mentions charisma and consensus as further means that can help en-
sure the functioning of politics (Luhmann 2002a: 51–54). At another place,
however, he says that power is not only one among several things to ensure
the functioning of politics, but it is the quintessence of politics, and any other
forms of influence can be called political only because they are somehow
based on power. In the process of decision making, although we can endeavor
to reach consensus and to include all persons concerned, it has political rele-
vance only in so far as we can ensure the conditions of decision-making and
carry out the results, that is, in so far as we possess power (Luhmann 2002a:
75–76).
iii) The Differentiation of Political System
In this section, first I briefly touch upon the question of how in Luhmann’s
opinion premodern societies fulfilled the tasks of politics, and then I explore
the changes triggered by the emergence of modern society concerning poli-
tics as well as the significance of the establishment of an independent politi-
cal system.
By exploring societal evolution from the point of view of politics, we can
characterize it as a steadily increasing centralization. Even in segmented so-
cieties there are such conflict situations (such as quarrels between families
or the distribution of certain goods), or organizational tasks (such as war
against an external enemy) that require political decisions. The political
function has thus evolved quite early. In segmented societies, the leaders of
tribes provided it. This was, however, a very rudimentary form of the cen-
tralization of political power. For example, only the nearest relatives could
employ force, and it mostly meant exile from the family (Luhmann 2002a:
70–71).
The centralization of politics is more advanced in stratified societies be-
cause of the establishment of an upper stratum where political power is con-
centrated. But neither here can we speak of an independent political system
because there has not yet emerged a subsystem that is exclusively responsi-
ble for fulfilling all political functions. Thus, the differentiation of roles or
semantics is not sufficient if it is not accompanied by the concentration of all
political functions in one subsystem. In a stratified society, this has not yet
been realized because the political power is divided among different territo-
ries. Here we can distinguish political regimes operating on the level of the
empire, on the level of towns, or connecting to the Church as well, and the
relationships between them are very complex (Luhmann 2002a: 77). Never-
theless, the structure of stratified society has played a very important role in
the emergence of politics as a functional subsystem because it is exactly the

hierarchic structure of society that has rendered possible the concentration
of power, which is a prerequisite for the differentiation of politics.
Politics as an independent system can only evolve with the transition to a
functionally differentiated society, that is, by the structural change of the
whole society. After this transition, solely the political system disposes of the
medium of power. The formation of sovereign states played an important
role in the emergence of the political system because they constituted clearly
distinguishable territories where one political power was responsible for all
political tasks (Luhmann 2002a: 77).
Luhmann characterizes the transition from stratified to functionally dif-
ferentiated society as a switch from a twofold to a threefold differentiation of
politics. In the stratified society, the fundamental orientation scheme was
the superordination/subordination scheme. In compliance with this, politics
functioned according to a twofold difference following the scheme of
command/obedience. In the modern society, this twofold scheme has been
replaced by a threefold differentiation constituted by the triad of poli-
tics/administration/public. In the framework of this conceptual triad,
Luhmann considers politics in a narrow sense, such as selecting issues and
persons, confronting opinions, forming consensus, and all the other func-
tions relating to political parties.3 The most important difference between
twofold and threefold differentiation is that while the former indicates a hi-
erarchic form of power, the latter a circular one. The public influences poli-
tics through parliamentary elections, politics determines aims and priorities
for the administration, and the administration produces collectively binding
decisions and makes the public comply with these decisions. Luhmann calls
this “the circulation of power.” This official circulation, however, also pro-
duces a reverse-direction informal circulation, not regulated by laws. In fact,
in parliamentary elections the public can choose between programs that are
pre-selected by politics; the administration provides proposals for politics in
different committees; and the public expresses its interests to the admini-
stration through different groups or movements (Luhmann 1990a1: 46–51,
2005d4: 153–154).
The prerequisite for the independence and functioning of the political
system is a clear-cut definition of the boundaries of politics, that is, the
3 Luhmann’s definition of politics in this narrow sense roughly corresponds to the sense in
which politics in the policy–politics–polity triad is used.
distinction between communications belonging and not belonging to it.

According to the theory of autopoietic systems, the system itself has to pro-
vide the criteria needed for such definition. Luhmann proposes two solutions
for this question, one related to function and the other to binary code
(Luhmann 2002a: 81–82). The function of politics has already been discussed;
in what follows, we explore the code.
iv) The Binary Code of Politics
When examining the binary code of politics, we face difficulties because in

Luhmann we find more than one such code. Luhmann revised his views on
this question several times; furthermore, in the case of politics, we can speak
of several kinds of codes, such as primary codes, secondary coding, and also
re-coding.
In some functional subsystems we have to distinguish between primary
and secondary codes, and politics belongs to them. In politics the primary
code is constituted by the difference of possession of power and subjection to
power, or power/powerlessness (Machtüberlegenheit/Machtunterlegenheit,
Macht/Ohnmacht). This is a preference code as possessing power is preferable
to being subjected to power (Luhmann 2002a: 88).
The role of secondary codes (Zweitkodierung) is to narrow the range of op-
tions and to limit the arbitrariness of codes. This is accomplished by duplicat-
ing the positive value of the original code with the help of a new binary code
(Luhmann 1999a: 367). In the case of politics, this means to limit the arbi-
trariness of power. The possession of power—which is the positive value of
the code—is duplicated by the duality of legal/illegal; that is, power can be
exercised legally or illegally. Since the difference between legal/illegal is the
code of the legal system, this secondary coding is a kind of intertwining or
structural coupling of the two systems (Luhmann 1979: 129–130, 1999a: 367).4
4 At another place, the intertwining of the codes of politics and law appears in another con-
text. Luhmann says that if we can speak of a political code in stratified society, this function
is fulfilled by the law; that is, politics and law have not yet differentiated from each other.
Furthermore, the law was based on religion or natural law; thus, politics was judged on a re-
ligious-moral basis. In modernity this has changed. On the one hand, law has become posi-
tive; on the other, politics has become autonomous (Luhmann 2005c5: 312). The intertwining
of politics and law in stratified societies was, of course, not identical with the secondary cod-
ing of politics by law. While in the former case the two systems were not differentiated from
The disadvantage of the primary code of politics—that is, of the duality of

power/powerlessness—is that it is too abstract and does not display it clearly
enough who holds the power in a particular situation. This is the reason why
this code has to be complemented by a more representative one, which helps
to unambiguously determine the owner of power. This function is fulfilled by
the differentiation between office holders and those who are subject to the
office (Amtsträger/Amtsunterworfene) or by the duality of government/people.
The office is an actual form of representation of power, and it has the advan-
tage to render it possible to display power in a peaceful way, so that there is
no need of demonstration of force (Luhmann 2002a: 91).
We have to distinguish the secondary coding of power from its re-coding.
Luhmann relates this concept to the emergence of the democratic exercise of
power that we will discuss later. The re-coding of power means that the code
of power/powerless is replaced by the code of government/opposition. This
binary code is also a preference code because being in government is prefer-
able to being in opposition. It is, however, an important difference from the
original code that this new code ensures the continuous presence of the
negative side of the code. While the code of power/powerlessness represents
a kind of static condition where those who do not hold power are excluded
from politics, the code of government/opposition ensures the continuous
presence of the opposition in decision-making and makes it easier to switch
to the other side of the code; that is, the opposition can take over the gov-
ernment. The appearance of the code of government/opposition is thus a
semantic reflection of the emergence of democratic government (Luhmann
2002a: 96–100). According to Luhmann, only the forms of communication us-
ing this code can be regarded as political. If a political movement does not
follow this code—as the Green Party did it in Germany for a time—it will
function in contradiction with the operational prerequisites of modern poli-
tics and will entail difficulties in the political system (Luhmann 1989: 86).
Thus, when Luhmann describes politics as a functional system, the role of
binary code is fulfilled by the code of government/opposition. This means
that political actors always follow this code, or in other words, only those
forms of communications are political that can help keep or take over the
government (Luhmann 2002a: 100). In the discussion of the codes, we have
each other—thus, in fact, we could not speak of binary codes (Bußhoff 1976: 341)—in the lat-
ter case we are dealing with a coupling of two independent systems.
seen that they are inseparable from programs.5 In the case of politics,
Luhmann dedicates relatively little attention to programs; he simply consid-
ers them political programs in the ordinary sense (Karácsony 2000b: 96).
In the series of binary codes, we also have to mention the code of progres-
sive/conservative, which Luhmann regarded in his early writings as the bi-
nary code of politics (Luhmann 1979: 144–145, 2005c5: 314). The main
problem with this code was that it had an actual content as opposed to
the mere formal codes of the other subsystems (Pokol 2003: 60). Although
Luhmann admits the importance of this code or of the more general
right/left scheme in his later works, he does not regard them as the binary
code of politics (Luhmann 2002a: 94–96).
B) State
After exploring how Luhmann concretizes the key concepts of his general
systems theory in the field of politics, now we turn to the discussion of the
classical topics of political theory, beginning with the state.
When we speak of politics, the concept of state comes up almost auto-
matically, at least in the case of modern society. The two concepts are practi-
cally entwined: by politics we usually mean something referring to the state.
Nevertheless, it is not clear at all what we mean by state. Luhmann finds un-
satisfactory the answers offered in scientific literature. These definitions
usually refer to the people constituting the state, the territory of the state,
and the state power without questioning their unity and the very essence of
the state (Luhmann 1990a2: 122).6 In Luhmann’s view, we can clarify the con-
cept of state and its relation to politics with the help of his systems theory. In
his œuvre, however, we can observe a certain hesitation concerning the defi-
nition of the state (Beyme 2002: 135; Lange 2002: 183–185; Nassehi 2002: 244),
and so it is worth discussing his considerations on the state in two sections.
First I explore his works written at the middle of his career, and then I ana-
lyze his posthumous summary on politics.
In the 1980s Luhmann tried to clarify the difference and relationship
between the concepts of politics and state through the difference between
5 See Chapter Four, Section E, Subsection ii.

6 According to Klaus von Beyme, state is usually defined by these three things, but he also
points out that these are problematic (Beyme 1992: 128–129).
system and its self-description. Accordingly, the state is the self-description

of the political system.
To understand this statement, it is worth summing up some of Luhmann’s
findings on the relationship between system and its self-description. First of
all, by self-observation and self-description of societal systems, Luhmann
does not mean observations and descriptions of psychic systems, still less
those of people.7 Self-observation and self-description are accomplished by
communicative operations; thus, in the case of political system, we are deal-
ing with the self-description of the political communication. Second, self-
observations and self-descriptions can never be completely adequate; the
system can never observe and describe itself completely because it always
has a blind spot (Luhmann 2002a: 321). Furthermore, self-descriptions are
more selective than self-observations: while the latter refer to non-recurring
events, self-descriptions mean the preparation of texts to be used by further
communications. The usability in different situations presupposes generali-
zation, simplification, reduction of complexity, and selection. The results of
self-descriptions are thus always reduced notions of the system and not the
system such as it is (Luhmann 2002a: 320, 1990a2: 121).
From the fact that self-description is done through reduction and selec-
tion, it also follows that there is no exclusive self-description because there is
more than one possibility for selection. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
self-description is completely arbitrary. Self-description fulfills a definite
function in the given system by orienting communication, for instance, by
ensuring the connectibility of the operations. The system raises require-
ments for the self-descriptions; that is, it limits the range of the possible self-
descriptions.
In the 1980s, Luhmann did not consider state as a directly accessible state
of affairs, a group of people, or an aggregate of institutions. For him state is
simply a semantic phenomenon, and as such, not a fixed but a changeable
one (Lange 2003: 188). Changeability, however, does not mean arbitrariness:
the state as a self-description of the political system plays an indispensable
role in modern society. Its most important function is to help separating poli-
tics from other spheres of society. This happens by attributing political
7 For this generalized use of observation, see Chapter Two, Section B.

communication to the state; the state is a kind of addressee.8 It is no accident

that the concepts of state and politics, although they are not identical, are
closely connected with each other. In Luhmann’s words, although politics is
not identical with the state, it always refers to the state (Luhmann 1990a2:
123).
In his posthumous summary entitled The Politics of Society (Die Politik der
Gesellschaft), Luhmann has slightly modified his views on state. Although he
does not reject the idea that state is a self-description of political system, this
is only one of its possible interpretations. Luhmann presents four alterna-
tives for the definition of the state. First, we can regard state as a historically
inherited terminology whose only justification is its historical use. Second,
we can define the state as the legitimate side of the distinction of legiti-
mate/illegitimate use of force. The third possibility is to define the state as a
result of the segmentary differentiation of world society. And the fourth one
is when we regard the state as an organization (Luhmann 2002a: 195–196).
According to Luhmann, none of these aspects can be ignored, and they do
not exclude each other. On the one hand, he endeavors to connect self-
description, that is, the semantic function, with the segmentary differentia-
tion of the global political system. He says that the emergence of the concept
of the state that fulfilled communicative functions—to make the political sys-
tem identifiable, that is, to distinguish the legitimate use of force—can be
understood on the basis of a political system interpreted in the context of the
world society. This is so because the concept of the state at the time of its
emergence was interpreted mainly in an international context; that is, it
meant the acknowledgement of a legitimate power over a given territory
against the other actors of the international politics. Furthermore, Luhmann
complements this definition of the state with its organizational aspect. State
as a collectivity has to be able to communicate in world society, and this
can be ensured only by an organization (Luhmann 2002a: 225–226). Thus,
state is one of the political organizations. Nevertheless, it is not only one of
them, but it has exclusive features in a certain respect. The function of the
political system—that is, to produce collectively binding decisions—cannot be
realized with an equal participation of every political organization; a certain
degree of concentration is indispensable. The exclusivity of the state as an
8 From the 18th century, this appeared in the semantics mainly as the distinction between
state and society, by which the differentiation of politics and economy was meant (Luhmann
2005d1: 70).
organization consists in the fact that it concentrates in itself this function. In

Luhmann’s words, the territorial political system differentiates according to
the scheme of center/periphery; the state is the center, the other political
organizations are the periphery. This description, in fact, includes two defi-
nitions of the state: the state as a territorial unit emerging as a result of the
segmentary differentiation of the global political system on the one hand,
and the center of this territorial unit, that is, the state conceived as an
organization on the other (Luhmann 2002a: 243–244). The first, territorial
sense of the state covers the whole political system of a given territory. The
same, however, does not hold for the state conceived as an organization be-
cause, as we have seen,9 an organization can never extend to the whole of a
given functional system.
Thus, three forms of differentiation can characterize the political system.
Functional differentiation is the first one; that is, politics is a functional sub-
system of world society. The political system conceived in this way is a global
one, divided into territorial states, which is its secondary, segmentary form
of differentiation. The states conceived as territorial units further differenti-
ate according to the scheme of center/periphery; the center is constituted by
the state, and the periphery by the other political organizations (Luhmann
2002a: 244).
We can see that towards the end of his œuvre, Luhmann modified his
views on the state. The change primarily consists in the fact that the concept
of state interpreted as a self-description of the political system is supple-
mented by other aspects, i.e., state as a territorial segment of the political
system and as a central political organization. Luhmann gives up the defini-
tion that reduces state to a mere semantic phenomenon, which is a quite
avant-garde idea in the light of the tradition of political science. By integrat-
ing back the territorial and organizational aspects into his theory, he returns
to the more ordinary ideas of political science (Lange 2002: 184–185).
9 See Chapter Four, Section E, Subsection iii.

C) Legitimation
Luhmann analyzed the question of legitimacy or legitimation10 in detail in

one of his earliest books, Legitimation through Procedure (Legitimation durch Ver-
fahren), published in 1969. The question of legitimation well illustrates what
Luhmann means by sociological enlightenment, that is, by the attempt to
reinterpret the anthropocentric ideas of Enlightenment with the help of
sociology.
In Germany, the question of legitimation came into the limelight in the
1960s and 1970s. Both the Left and the Right thought the welfare state un-
dermined its own legitimation basis. They stated that the expectations to-
wards the welfare state constituted a vicious circle because the public
expected increasingly more services from the state. This circle cannot be
continued endlessly: sooner or later the resources will exhaust, and this will
lead to a legitimation crisis (Lange 2003: 71–72). The two camps also provided
proposals to solve this problem of legitimation. Roughly speaking, according
to the Left, the way out was to strengthen the citizens’ participation and to
spread the democratic mechanisms of deliberation. The Right promoted the
values commonly shared by the whole society, proposing that the citizens
should judge the right way of living and virtues in the same way (Lange 2003:
73–75).
Luhmann’s theory of legitimacy is opposed to the fundamental assump-
tions of both approaches. Both kind of legitimation theories agreed that a
decision can be regarded as legitimate only if the persons concerned are con-
vinced of the rightness of the content of the decision. The difference between
them is that one of them wanted to achieve this by strengthening delibera-
tion and participation, while the other by the internalization of certain val-
ues. Luhmann, however, does not accept legitimacy being based on convic-
tion or consensus, and he also refuses the question of legitimacy being
related to the content of the decision.
Luhmann’s first and fundamental thesis on legitimacy is that in modern
society the legitimacy of the decisions is ensured by procedures; that is—as
the title of his book indicates—legitimation emerges through procedures. The
concept of procedure is, of course, by no means unknown to the literature of
10 The concepts of legitimacy and legitimation are usually distinguished from each other in the
literature; the former means a state, while the latter is the process of creating this state
(Bayer 1997: 17). I endeavor to follow this distinction.
political science, but according Luhmann, it is not elaborated enough, and we

do not even know what role it plays in modern society. Its most important
insufficiency is that procedures are usually conceived only from a legal point
of view. According to Luhmann, this has to be supplemented by sociological
analyses; that is, normative and empirical approaches have to be applied to-
gether (Luhmann 1983: 11–13).
The theories of procedure usually find the essence of the procedure
in making righteous decisions. Legal procedures must reveal the justice;
parliamentary elections must result in a decision that suits the will of the
people. In a sociological sense, however, it is very doubtful whether these
procedures really result in righteous decisions. It is primarily the time limit
resulting from the urgency to decide what brings the attainment of justice
into question. The normative elements are obviously indispensable in the
discussion of procedures, but they cannot explain in themselves why we re-
gard these decisions as legitimate (Luhmann 1983: 18–21).
Luhmann endeavors to remedy this deficiency by analyzing the sociologi-
cal aspects of procedures. To understand the sociological relevance of proce-
dures, we have to proceed from the transition into functionally differentiated
society. According to Luhmann, this transition has raised new legitimation
problems. The new, functionally differentiated structure of society opened
the possibility of a much higher societal complexity than segmentary differ-
entiation did. The increase in complexity affected all fields of society, includ-
ing decisions to be made on the level of the whole society; that is, there were
increasingly more questions of increasingly higher complexity that required
collectively binding decisions. At the same time, one of the essential features
of the transition to functionally differentiated society was that the religious-
moral world view has lost its capability to ensure the societal order; thus, it
can no more serve as a legitimation basis for securing the acceptance of the
decisions. More and more decisions of increasingly higher complexity have
to be made, while we cannot refer to religion to ensure acceptance and obe-
dience. In other words, there is increasingly more need for legitimacy, while
earlier means to ensure legitimacy do not work (Luhmann 1983: 29–31).
Procedures serve as a solution for this challenge. First, let us explore what
Luhmann means by the concept of procedure. He defines procedure as a spe-
cial social system, whose aim is to produce single and binding decisions, and
whose existence is limited to the duration of the process of decision making
(Luhmann 1983: 40–41).11 By procedure Luhmann means legal, parliamentary,

and legislation procedures as well as the process of administrative decision-
making. Since procedure is a social system, to understand its essence it is
worth recalling some characteristics of social systems in general. In
Luhmann’s theory, one of the most important functions of social systems is
to reduce complexity, which happens through structure formation. The role
of structures is to narrow the range of alternatives by presenting contingent
possibilities as given or necessary ones. Structure formation makes possible a
double level selection. The first level is the formation of the structure be-
cause the structure itself is a result of selection processes. The second level of
selection is established with the help of these structures, that is, by proceed-
ing from a reduced complexity; thus, the second selectivity is a selected se-
lectivity (Luhmann 1983: 41–42).12
In the case of procedures, structure formation, that is, the first level of se-
lection, is the establishment of legal norms that regulate the procedures.
These legal norms approximately correspond to the constitution. For exam-
ple, for legal procedures, a general norm is equality before the law; for par-
liamentary elections, the universal and equal suffrage and the secret ballots.
On the second level of selection, that is, during the procedures, these
norms—which are results of selections and thus are contingent—are not
questioned but taken as given. The legal norms regulating the procedure—
that is, the first level of selection—limit the possibilities of the procedure, but
they do not completely determine it, and they give free play to the second
level of selection. However, due to the fact that the second level of selection
is based on selected possibilities, the success of the procedure, that is, the
11 Since this definition was formulated before Luhmann’s “autopoietic turn” when the basic
unit of social systems was for him not communication but action, it is worth adding some
remarks on defining procedure as a social system. On the one hand, it is obvious that
Luhmann conceives procedure as an action system although he emphasizes that procedure
cannot be regarded as a definite sequence of actions because in this case it would be identi-
cal with ritual (Luhmann 1983: 38–39). The other question is to which type of social systems
the procedure belongs. Luhmann classifies procedure among interaction systems, but when
he changes from discussing the legal procedure to exploring the procedures of election and
legislation, he emphasizes that the analyses have to be expanded to the level of comprehen-
sive societal systems. This, however, does not mean that he regards procedure as a societal
system, only that for understanding the functions of the procedure, we have to analyze soci-
ety-wide processes (Luhmann 1983: 140).
12 Here Luhmann has not yet used the concept of operation; otherwise, this second selection
could be attributed to the operations.
achievement of a decision, is ensured (Luhmann 1983: 40). To take an exam-

ple, at the end of the legal procedure, the court will find the defendant either
guilty or innocent in any case, and at the end of the parliamentary election, a
seat in the Parliament will be obtained by one of the candidates in any case.
Procedures have two important characteristics: on the one hand, they en-
sure success, that is, a decision will be made however complex the situation
may be; on the other hand, people do not have to reach a consensus on the
result of the decision but only on the norms regulating the procedure. These
norms, as they are much more general, can be accepted much more easily.
These two characteristics ensure that procedures can solve the above-
mentioned legitimation challenge. This challenge, on the one hand, consists
in the fact that several decisions of a complex nature have to be made. This is
ensured by the necessary success of the procedure. The other part of the
challenge is that the earlier means to ensure legitimacy do not work. Proce-
dures solve this problem by placing the need of consensus on a very general
level where there is more chance of agreement between the persons con-
cerned. Obviously, in every society there are some who reject these general
norms as well, for example, those who do not acknowledge the competence
of the court or think that the leaders of the country should not be appointed
through democratic elections. Nevertheless, these procedures are considered
as regular, and their rejection is only marginal. Their wide acceptance is due
to their generality, to the fact that people have to agree only on general legal
norms and not on actual decisions.
The most important consequence for the theory of legitimacy is that the
question of legitimacy does not refer to the content of the decision but to the
procedure. The reason of the acceptance of a decision is not its content but
the way it has been made, that is, the procedure. According to Luhmann, le-
gitimacy is “a general willingness, within certain tolerance limits, to accept deci-
sions whose content is not determined yet” (Luhmann 1983: 28; my translation;
italics in the original).
One could ask why we should regard procedures as legitimate; that is,
what is the reason of the wide consensus on them. Should we not have re-
course to the conviction—rejected by Luhmann—to explain this phenome-
non? Luhmann’s answer is negative. The reason of the acceptance of
procedures as legitimate is not that we are convinced of their righteousness,
but it is based on our learning process. Procedures owe their legitimacy to a
social climate that institutionalizes them as self-evident (Luhmann 1983: 34).
In other words, we hold the established order to be legitimate because it
functions, and what is more, by the term “hold it legitimate,” we do not mean
a conscious deliberation but rather an unreflected compliance with norms.
Furthermore, from the fact that the legitimacy of the procedure is ensured
by its institutionalized functioning, it follows that a mere participation af-
firms it as well; that is, not only the winner but also the loser of the election
or legal procedure contributes to the legitimacy of the procedure (Luhmann
1983: 114).
I examine some further differences between Luhmann’s concept of le-
gitimacy and the classic views on legitimation. Luhmann breaks with the idea
that legitimacy is related to conviction or common values. In his view, le-
gitimacy would be too instable if it required a consensus on the premises of
the decision. Since Luhmann relates legitimation to the process of decision-
making, it is not necessary for people to approve the premises of the deci-
sion. Moreover, an agreement on the premises, that is, a common rationality
or common values, would not ensure the acceptance of the decision anyway
(Luhmann 1983: 31–32).
The next feature of Luhmann’s legitimation concept is that he attributes
an important role to the double character or double aspect of procedure. The
reason of the necessity of this double character is that the procedure of le-
gitimation has to solve a double problem: on the one hand, complex decisions
have to be made, and it is impossible to include everyone in the decision-
making process; on the other hand, such decisions have to be accepted by the
wide public. This duality can be characterized, on the one hand, by the dif-
ferentiation of the operative and symbolic levels (Luhmann 1983: 152).13 The
operative level is the real decision making process; the symbolic one is the
normative description of the procedure, for example, the characterization of
parliamentary elections as effectuating the government by the people. The
two are obviously not identical because it is not the people that govern.
Luhmann also describes the double character of the procedure with the
concepts of production (Herstellung) and presentation (Darstellung), which ex-
press the difference between the real production of a decision, and its pres-
entation (Luhmann 1983: 124, 195–196).14 Taking the example of legislation,
13 For an analysis of the double character of the procedure primarily from the point of view of
civil society and the public, see Cohen and Arato 1992: 321–326.
14 In this early work, Luhmann formulated the difference of Herstellung/Darstellung with the
help of action theory, but these concepts has also gained ground in political science based on
communication theory (Japp and Kusche 2004: 515).
the parliament has to fulfill two functions: it has to pass laws on the one
hand, and to convince the public that in the process of legislation those
alternatives compete with each other that they have voted for or would vote
for in the next election. It is obvious that complex decisions are not taken in
the chamber of the parliament but in various expert committees, through
various conciliation processes, by means of informal contacts and other
mechanisms leading to the final decision. The arguments occurring in these
processes are mainly inconceivable and perhaps uninteresting for the public.
As opposed to this, the function of the plenary session is to ensure that the
politicians can present and debate their arguments in a manner that is un-
derstandable for the public. This is why it is important to distinguish be-
tween these two aspects of legislation.15 The third possibility to describe the
double character of procedures is the distinction between manifest and la-
tent functions. For example, a manifest function of election is to ensure that
the voters can express their wills. At the same time, however, this procedure
has latent functions, i.e., to ensure that people should not want to directly
intervene in politics for four more years, and so an effective decision making
process becomes possible.16
These concept pairs are quite close to one another. All of them describe,
in fact, the same double character of procedures. According to Luhmann, the
additional value of his theory compared to the usual theories of legitimacy
consists in emphasizing this double character. The two aspects can be re-
garded as a distinction between the legal or normative and sociological or
empirical aspects of procedure. The symbolic level, the presentation, and the
manifest functions constitute the legal or normative aspect, while the opera-
tive level, the production, and the latent functions constitute the sociological
or empirical aspect. According to Luhmann, the main failure of legitimation
theories is that they do not distinguish between these two aspects, and this
suggests that the legal or normative interpretation is true in a sociological or
empirical sense as well. From this kind of false legitimation theory, it follows,
15 That is, we can speak of parliament in two senses, for example, in Stefan Lange’s terms,
working parliament (Arbeitsparlament) and speaking parliament (Redeparlament) (Lange 2003:
127). The two aspects do not have the same weight in every procedure. For example, in the
legal procedure, they are very close to each other although we can also find elements that
serve as the symbolic presentation of the roles, such as costumes.
16 Luhmann does not mention the manifest and latent functions in his book on legitimacy, but
in my opinion these concepts describe the double character discussed here (cf. Lange 2003:
124–125). For the latent functions, see Luhmann 2005a3: 87–88.
for instance, that the people really rule in democracy (Luhmann 1983: 153),
and the will of the people really prevails as a result of elections (Luhmann
1983: 13–14). Sometimes other theories have also recognized that the two as-
pects do not coincide, for example, they realized the presence of latent func-
tions. Their answer was, however, that latent functions have to be made
manifest and have to be uncovered.17 According to Luhmann, this is a mis-
taken endeavor because the latency of the function has its own function; that
is, the latent functions can only fulfill their tasks if they remain unobserved
(Luhmann 2005a3: 87–88). Parliamentary elections, for example, could not
fulfill the latent functions mentioned above if the official standpoint were
that we have to go to vote so that the decision makers can work undisturbed
for four more years.
The next important feature of Luhmann’s theory of legitimation is the
emphasis on the complexity reducing function of the procedures. As we have
seen,18 one of the most important functions of systems is to reduce complex-
ity, and since procedure is a social system, the same holds for it. In the case
of the legitimation procedure, the reason of the necessity of complexity re-
duction is that by this means the conflicts and cleavages within the society
do not enter the political decision making process, or they do it only in a re-
duced form. If all the differences of opinions could appear at the same time,
the decision making process would become impossible. The procedure re-
duces these conflicts; for example, they appear in the parliamentary elec-
tions as two or some alternatives (Luhmann 1983: 161).
Another form of complexity reduction is when the roles relating to the
procedures become independent of and differentiate from other roles. People
do not participate in the procedure with their whole personality but only
according to definite roles, for example, as a voter, a representative, a defen-
dant, or a claimant. The aim of separating the roles is to increase the effi-
ciency of the procedure. The decision making process would be confusingly
complex if people’s other societal roles should be taken into consideration.
To take an example, in the procedure of election the role of the voter be-
comes independent of every other role, including the roles relating to voca-
tion or those fulfilled in family. By this means, the voter does not have to
ensure the coherence of all of her roles; her decision in the election does not
17 I think we can well characterize the emancipatory endeavors of critical theory by this
statement.
18 See Chapter Two, Section G.
affect her other roles (Luhmann 1983: 47–48). The independence of the
voter’s role from other roles is ensured by the legal norms referring to the
election, i.e., the universal and equal suffrage and the secret ballots. Accord-
ing to the principles of universality and equality, there is no difference—for
instance, difference in ranks—that could substantiate that some do not have
any suffrage or their suffrage is not equal with the others. The principle of
the secret ballots ensures that the voting does not affect the person’s other
roles (Luhmann 1983: 159–160).19
To sum up, the legitimating functions of a procedure are as follows (cf.
Lange 2003: 128–133):
 It makes possible to take decisions in a highly complex environment.

 People, by participating in the procedures or by observing them,20 inter-
nalize the norms needed for the stability of society, and so they accept
the decisions resulting from the procedures.
 It helps work off the discontents by channeling them towards a legal ac-
tion or a vote against the government.
 It marginalizes the oppositions because those who refuse the institution-
alized procedures cannot rely on wide societal support.
The most important finding of Luhmann’s theory of legitimation is that le-

gitimacy stems from a mere compliance with legal norms; in other words, le-
gitimacy stems from legality (Bayer 1997: 120–121). But does Luhmann really
think that compliance with legal norms is enough to ensure legitimacy? Or
are there other prerequisites for legitimacy as well? In his book on legitima-
tion, he mentions certain conditions that are necessary for the procedure to
be able to fulfill its functions: the different societal cleavages—Catholics and
Protestants, employers and employees, Afro-Americans and Caucasians,
etc.—must not coincide, but they have to intersect one another. Otherwise,
the danger of a civil war would arise (Luhmann 1983: 162). The high
19 The way Luhmann interprets these three principles shows that he does not deduce their
validity from philosophical principles, for example, from the equality of all people, but he
states that they have been stabilized because they contribute to the maintenance of the
complexity of society. We discuss this question in Chapter Seven, Section C.
20 For example, legal procedure has relevance not only for the defendant and the claimant but
for non-participants as well because they, as observers, can also internalize the norms of the
procedure (Luhmann 1983: 122–123).
complexity of modern society decreases the probability of this coincidence,

but we cannot exclude the possibility that one or some cleavages become
dominant within society, undermining the electoral procedure’s function of
ensuring legitimacy.
In his book on legitimation, Luhmann also mentions a further prerequi-
site for legitimacy. He writes that the trust in society makes it easier to en-
sure the legitimacy of the political system. The trust—which he examines in a
separate book (Luhmann 1979)—is a social phenomenon of crucial impor-
tance because without trust in others and in societal systems, we would
hardly be capable of any social acts. In the course of our ordinary activities,
we trust in the fulfillment of many expectations that are, however, contin-
gent and do not happen necessarily (Luhmann 1979: 4). It is impossible to
consider every alternative in every situation—that’s why we have to trust.
Trust is a form of complexity reduction. We trust that our expectations will
be fulfilled although there are other alternatives as well. If we trust in their
fulfillment, the number of our possibilities for action increases because now
we can rely on co-operative actions as well (Luhmann 1979: 24). We can trust
not only in persons but also in social systems. The trust in social systems was
ensured in premodern societies by the religion, while in modernity it is pri-
marily related to the symbolically generalized communication media. For ex-
ample, when using money, we trust not only in persons but also in the proper
functioning of the money as a medium (Luhmann 1979: 48–60). Trust is the
basis of legitimacy because without it we cannot speak of social systems to
which the procedure belongs. We can say that procedures cannot ensure le-
gitimacy in themselves,21 and a general trust in the societal systems is also
necessary, but without the latter, in fact, we could not speak of society at
all.22
This reconstruction of Luhmann’s theory of legitimation is based on his
early works. In his posthumous book on politics, he also emphasizes the im-
portance of procedures in the process of legitimation (Luhmann 2002a: 123–
124) but without discussing the question in detail. Considering the central
relevance of this topic for political science, and regarding the heated debates
Luhmann’s views have provoked, one could expect that he analyzes it again
21 Manfred Kopp and Hans-Peter Müller also mention, besides trust, ideology as a factor that
contributes to ensuring legitimacy (Kopp and Müller 1980: 96–98).
22 In his later works Luhmann did not discuss the concept of trust. The question of double con-
tingency (see Chapter Three, Section D) can be regarded as another formulation of this topic.
in the second period of his career by his new conceptual and theoretical
framework, even if his main massage has not changed in the meanwhile.23
This, however, has not happened: he has not written any books or even any
separate papers on this topic. The reason why the re-elaboration is lacking is
perhaps that in the last years of his life, he had to carefully manage his time
and energy because of his fatal disease, so he rather turned to topics that
were popular in the 1980s and 1990s—such as welfare state, ecological crisis,
risk, or mass media—and he published books on these and not on legitima-
tion theory, which was a quite discussed topics in the 1960s and 1970s but
lost its popularity in the 1980s (Luhmann 1990a4: 219, 226–227).
D) Democracy
Luhmann’s position on the concept of democracy is very similar to that on

legitimacy. In this case he also holds that the usual theories of democracy
endeavor to describe democracy with concepts that do not stand the proof in
sociological terms. Luhmann therefore discusses first what democracy is not.
On the one hand, democracy is not the rule of people, as the meaning of the
term would suggest. On the other hand, democracy is not a principle that all
decisions must be based on participation. These definitions do not corre-
spond to the empirical reality of modern society (Luhmann 1990a5: 232).
As opposed to these usual definitions, democracy is, for Luhmann, the bi-
furcation of the top of the political system by the distinction of government
and opposition. In other words, democracy is the binary coding of politics by
the difference of government/opposition, which means the re-coding of the
power/powerlessness duality (Luhmann 1990a5: 232).
This re-coding of the political system can be explained on the basis of the
transition to functionally differentiated society. In stratified society, the exis-
tence of a political opposition was impossible because this societal order did
not permit differing opinions. With the transition to modernity, however,
this monopoly ceased to exist. Differing opinions have become possible, and
they wanted to penetrate into the politics as well; that is, there has emerged
a competition for political power. But the political system can properly func-
tion only if one of the parties has a relatively continuous and stable power,
23 This has happened, for example, in the case of his organization theory (Karácsony 2002a:
154).
and if the others are excluded from it. This was ensured by the original code
of politics, that is, by the difference of power/powerlessness. This code, as it
made possible the concentration and distinguishability of power, promoted
the differentiation of the political system, but it completely excluded from
politics those who had no power. The parties having opinions different from
those in power could only use such extra-political means as revolts or coup
d’états. Thus, the conflicts threatened the stability of the whole society.
There was a need for a solution that gave free play to conflicts and ensured
stability at the same time. The solution was the bifurcation of the top, that is,
the differentiation of government and opposition. By this means, the conflict
does not exist between politics and those excluded from politics but within
politics in a form regulated by parliamentary elections. The greatest
achievement of the government/opposition code is that in a certain sense it
gives power to the parties that have no power; that is, it does not exclude
them completely from the power. At the same time, however, it ensures the
concentration of power and the possibility of government. Thus, this new
code is symmetrical and asymmetrical at the same time. It is asymmetrical
because to be in power is preferred, but it is symmetrical as well because it
ensures not only the government’s but also the opposition’s continuous pres-
ence in and influence on politics. Government and opposition have to watch
and react upon each other, while the public—because it has to choose be-
tween them sooner or later—watches both of them. The opposition cannot be
regarded merely as subjected to power because it has the opportunity to take
over the government at the next elections (Luhmann 1990a5: 233, 2005d3:
146).
The reason why this symmetrical character of the political system—that
is, democracy—is of special importance for Luhmann is not that it realizes
the idea of equality, but because it helps to maintain the complexity of soci-
ety. In the decision making process, we have to choose one of the alternatives
and to reject all others. To preserve complexity, however, excluded possibili-
ties have to be maintained in a form ensuring that they can serve as possible
alternatives of future decisions. Democracy ensures exactly this because the
alternative that has lost the election can compete next time again; further-
more, an alternative can be an important orientation factor of politics in op-
position as well (Luhmann 1971a2: 40).
Thus, according to Luhmann, the re-coding of politics by the difference
of government/opposition is an evolutionary achievement, which is a solu-
tion for the problem emerging with the dissolution of stratified society and
consisting in the fact that conflicts and divergence of opinions are unavoid-
able in modern society, while the stability of power has to be ensured in a
highly complex environment. “The respective structural invention has, for
accidental historical reasons, been given the name of democracy.” (Luhmann
1990a5: 234)24
Luhmann takes so seriously the elimination of all normative components
from the concept of democracy that he separates democracy from multi-
party system as well. In his view, one-party system can also be called democ-
racy if it is capable of maintaining the complexity in the way described
above. In a one-party system the maintenance of the defeated alternatives,
that is, competition, can be realized by differentiated and competing factions
or groups within the ruling party. Thus, a one-party system that gives free
play to competition within the party and a multi-party system, that is,
one-party democracy and multi-party democracy, are functional equivalents
to each other—states Luhmann in one of his early works (Luhmann 1971a2:
42–43). Later, however, he does not represent this quite avant-garde view,
and he formulates that even if there can be an opposition in one-party sys-
tem, this opposition functions as a kind of puffer, and it does not mean the
other side of the binary code (Luhmann 2002a: 101).
As we can see, Luhmann reinterprets the concept of democracy very radi-
cally, but it also holds that the naïve definitions of democracy—for example,
the rule of people or decision making based on everyone’s participation—
were not regarded as satisfying in the scientific literature before Luhmann
either, and almost every theory endeavored to correct these definitions.25
The sharpest one among the criticisms of the classical or naïve interpreta-
tions of democracy is perhaps that of Joseph Alois Schumpeter, who stated
that democracy is an institutionalized process of decision making, in which
politicians compete for the people’s votes (Schumpeter 1992: 269–273).
Thus, Schumpeter compared democracy to market competition, and this
idea is more sharply represented by Anthony Downs, who claimed that the
candidates’ competition for the elector’s vote is similar to the companies’
24 I have modified the English translation.

25 Hans-Joachim Giegel also emphasizes that it is hard to find a social theory that does not
criticize the standard model of democracy. In his view, the peculiarity of Luhmann’s posi-
tion consists in the fact that he does not accept the criticisms, and he attacks the standard
model on more fundamental points; thus, his attack often refers to the criticisms of the na-
ïve democracy theories as well (Giegel 2002: 196–200).
competition for the consumers’ favors, and political programs are similar to
the products offered on the market (Downs 1957).
So Luhmann’s sharp criticism of the classical concept of democracy is by
no means a novelty in the literature on democracy. On the contrary, it can
be regarded as a main trend. In a certain respect, however, Luhmann has
enlarged the debate on democracy with new elements. Both the classical
views and the criticisms mentioned above lack the aspect referring to the so-
cietal structures; that is, they lack a sociological point of view. They equally
endeavored to explain democracy on the basis of the people’s actions: ac-
cording to the classical view, democracy is the manifestation of the rule of
the people voting in compliance with their own interests or perhaps with the
common good; according to the theories criticizing this idea, democracy can
be described as a competition of elites or certain groups. Luhmann rejects
both approaches. In his view, not only the ideas of the rule or participation of
people but also the conceptions of the competition of elites or groups are
oversimplifying. Elites or groups that could significantly control society are
not to be found in Luhmann’s theory (Luhmann 2005d4: 153; Wimmer 2003:
224–225). His concept of democracy provides a further example of re-
creating the classical concepts of political science by sociological means that
he calls the program of sociological enlightenment.
E) Public Opinion and Public Sphere
Public sphere usually plays an important role in the theories of modernity. It

also does in Luhmann’s theory, but—as we have seen it in other cases—he
holds that the concept has to be radically reinterpreted. In what follows, I
first examine why the usual views on public sphere are wrong in Luhmann’s
opinion, and then I explore what kind of new interpretation he proposes.
In the literature on the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas’s theory is un-
doubtedly the most prominent one. So, when criticizing the theoretical in-
terpretations of public sphere or public opinion, Luhmann attacks primarily
Habermas’s views. Habermas’s conception of public sphere has become well
known through his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pub-
lished in 1961. In this work, Habermas described public sphere as an assem-
bly of people who are equal, independently of their origin and societal status,
and who reason publicly, that is, endeavor to convince one another through a
debate where they can only use arguments and cannot refer to the differ-
ences in rank.26 According to Habermas, these debating assemblies have
played a central role in the emergence and functioning of democracy because
these people gradually laid claim to discuss the decisions concerning them
(Habermas 1991: 27). Thus, public sphere fulfilled an intermediate function
between state and private sphere;27 its function was to mediate between the
citizens’ private interests and the executive power, or in other words, to
discuss and criticize the decisions of the political power and to claim the
right to participate in it (Habermas 1991: 29–31). This process has lead to par-
liamentarism and to the gradual extension of suffrage (Habermas 1991: 57).
Thus, in Habermas’s theory public sphere is constituted by interactions of
equal people, who, keeping their interests in view, want to convince the oth-
ers with arguments, and these debates—conducted in the beginning only in
saloons and cafés—have lead, as a result of a long process, to the emergence
of democratic parliamentary elections.28
As we can see, the question of public sphere is closely related to that of
democracy. So it is no wonder that Luhmann’s criticism is also very similar.
Accordingly, this concept of public sphere is sociologically indefensible. The
concept presented above generalizes—in a methodologically incorrect way—
the findings on a confinable group of people onto the level of the whole soci-
ety. In saloons and cafés people can represent their views and can endeavor
to convince the others, but this is impossible on the level of the whole soci-
ety. Here we cannot explain the concepts of public sphere or public opinion29
26 To be more precise, the definition of public sphere requires further qualification. Using
Habermas’s terminology, we need to add that public sphere is bourgeois and not representa-
tive, also that it is political and not literary.
27 In his work, Habermas uses the terms state and society as contrasted with each other. Con-
sidering that I use Luhmann’s terminology, which regards politics and state as parts of the
society, to avoid any conceptual confusion, I do not use the contrast of state and society—
which is used, nevertheless, not only by Habermas—and I apply the term private sphere in-
stead of society.
28 Habermas did not regard the public sphere described in this way as a formation that has
been realized in history. He, however, claimed that this model, as a kind of ideal, has got into
the thought of the people, and as an operatively effective fiction, it has really contributed to
political processes (Felkai 1993: 34–35).
29 Luhmann primarily used the concept of public opinion and spoke of public sphere only in
relation to it (Marcinkowski 2002: 85). The two concepts are obviously not identical, but it
also holds that they are very close to each other and refer to very similar phenomena. So I
proceeding from the individuals, their interests, and their debates. If the
function of public sphere or public opinion were really to articulate the peo-
ple’s opinions and to ensure a place where they can be discussed, we should
say that this function is hardly fulfilled in our society (Luhmann 1971a1:
10–12).
Thus, Luhmann does not define the function of public opinion with the
help of the individuals but proceeding from the structural features of mod-
ern society, that is, by sociological means. The task of public opinion is to
remedy a problem of modern society that stems from the fact that there are
no pre-given limitations for the content of the political communication. In
principle, whatever topic can become a political issue as there are no exter-
nal criteria that could limit the range of possible themes. Discussing all pos-
sible topics, however, would overburden politics. Thus, for the effective
functioning of politics, it is necessary to limit the range of possible political
communication. The task of public opinion is to fulfill this function. The se-
lection of the communicative possibilities happens with the help of themes.
The public chooses certain themes, which constitute the subjects of political
communication, and the themes not chosen are irrelevant for politics. Opin-
ions are closely related to themes: they presuppose each other. Opinions
never exist in themselves but always as opinions on a given theme. The
themes, in fact, constitute the structure of communication, and through the
concepts of theme and opinion, we can describe the double selection mecha-
nism that is characteristic of the structures.30 The themes limit and select the
range of possible communication; however, they do not completely deter-
mine communication but only create the possibility of secondary selection,
that is, of formulating opinions. By this double selection we limit the range of
possible political communication, and at the same time, we give free play to
the opinions. The disjunction of themes and opinions serves to increase com-
plexity. Their disjunction is not self-evident but an evolutionary achieve-
ment, which has only become possible in modern society. As long as there
existed a society-wide morality, the themes mostly determined the obliga-
tory opinions and did not permit any deviations from them (Luhmann
1971a1: 12–15).
use them not as synonyms but to refer to the same subject, and at the end of this section I
touch upon the question of their difference in Luhmann’s theory.
30 See Chapter Two, Section D.
In the later period of his œuvre, Luhmann has partly reformulated the
concept of public opinion with the help of a new terminology integrated
into his theory and partly supplemented it with new aspects. The new
terminology is, first of all, a theory of medium and form. In terms of this the-
ory, public opinion is a medium. The medium, that is, the loosely coupled ele-
ments are constituted by the possible ways of communication, and the forms,
that is, the closely coupled elements, are constituted by the definite state-
ments (Luhmann 2002a: 287–288, 2005e2: 166–167).
By analyzing the relation of the autopoietic systems to their environ-
ments, we can get further contributions to the definition and function of
public opinion. According to the autopoietic systems theory, politics as
an autopoietic societal subsystem cannot directly connect to its environ-
ment but only take into account its own elements, that is, the communica-
tive operations characteristics of politics, and it has to produce all of its
further elements from them. At the same time, politics—similarly to other
subsystems—is dependent on its environment and on the other systems, and
it has to obtain information on them. It has to take into account its environ-
ment and the other systems solely by using its own operations, which cannot
extend over the boundaries of the political system. The task of public opinion
is to support this. Public opinion is a sensor of the political system for map-
ping its environment. Since politics cannot directly reach its environment, it
needs the opinions appearing in the press, on the radio, on television, or
somewhere else. The task of public opinion is similar to that of the prices in
the economy, namely to obtain information on the environment. It is a fur-
ther similarity between them that both render possible the observations on
observations, that is, the second-order observations. Through the prices, we
can observe the willingness of the economic actors to buy or sell; through
public opinion, we can observe what opinions the electors have on certain
issues. Thus, public opinion renders the autopoietic closure of political sys-
tem possible (Luhmann 2002a: 290, 2005e2: 171–172).
In his latest works Luhmann has given another definition of public opin-
ion. He formulated that public opinion was a structural coupling between two
functional subsystems, politics and mass media. By that time, Luhmann re-
garded mass media as an independent functional subsystem. The function of
mass media is to represent the world for the society and for its subsystems.
The structural coupling between politics and mass media means that both
systems need the other for building their own structures. Politics obtains
information on the world with help of mass media; the latter need the news
provided by politics (Luhmann 2002a: 311).31
Luhmann relates these findings to public opinion and not to public
sphere. The latter concept—which was in the focus of Habermas’s examina-
tions—appears rarely in Luhmann’s writings. When he uses it, he takes over
Dirk Baecker’s concept of public sphere. According to Baecker, public sphere
is a reflection on the intra-societal system boundaries. Systems cannot cross
their boundaries by their operations; they can function only within these
boundaries; only the irritations within these boundaries exist for them. At
the same time, however, boundaries suppose another side. Systems identify
and presuppose other systems outside their boundaries, and they attribute
the irritations inside their boundaries to them. In Baecker’s view, public
sphere is the generalized other side of all social systems (Luhmann 2002a:
284–285). This definition of public sphere can be specified for the subsystems,
and by this means, we get the concept of public opinion that we have just
created on the basis of the autopoietic closure of the political system and its
connection to its environment. In his book on mass media, Luhmann de-
scribes public opinion as that part of public sphere which refers to the politi-
cal system, that is, as the generalized environment of all organizations and
interactions of political system (Luhmann 2000c: 104).
Thus, according to this definition, public sphere and public opinion fulfill
similar roles. Their difference consists in the fact that while the former can
be interpreted on the level of the whole society, the latter only refers to poli-
tics. Luhmann also asserts that public opinion can be defined as that form of
public sphere which is relevant for politics (Luhmann 2002a: 284). In his writ-
ings, however, we can also find formulations suggesting that public opinion
can be interpreted not only relating to politics.32
Finally, let us sum up the main difference between Luhmann’s inter-
pretation of public opinion and the individualistic approaches. The differ-
ence primarily consists in the fact that while the latter emphasize individual
31 The definition of public opinion as a structural coupling between politics and mass media
only appears in Luhmann’s posthumous book on politics. In his work on mass media, al-
though he discusses the structural couplings of mass media to other functional subsystems,
thus, to the politics as well, he does not mention public opinion in this context (Luhmann
2000c: 67–68).
32 For example: “The political system depends on public opinion much more than the other
subsystems.” (Luhmann 2005e2: 171; my translation)
opinions, their articulation, their competition, and consensus, all this is sec-
ondary for Luhmann, and for him the question whether public opinion is able
to fulfill its function does not depend on these factors. In Luhmann’s theory,
themes play a more important role than opinions, and the function of public
opinion—that is, to limit the range of communicative possibilities—is accom-
plished through themes. Themes are structures of communication; thus, the
function of public opinion cannot be understood by examining the individu-
als but only by analyzing society.33
F) Welfare State
The question of the functionability of welfare state and the possibility of

planning and steering it are recurring topics in Luhmann’s œuvre. He has re-
formulated his thoughts with the help of the new concepts integrated into
his theory, but the essential message remained the same: he thought all the
time that the claims of the welfare state are unrealizable, and he emphasized
the limited possibilities of political planning and steering.
According to Luhmann, the welfare state is not only a reaction to the so-
cial challenges of the 19th and 20th centuries, but it is inseparable from mod-
ernity: it is a consequence of the emergence of modern society. Of course,
Luhmann does not claim that we can speak of welfare state at the beginning
of modernity in the same sense as today, but he emphasizes that the main
reason for the emergence of welfare state is to be found in the functionally
differentiated structure of society (Luhmann 2005d2: 111).
One of the important aspects of the emergence of functionally differenti-
ated society can be described as the change of societal inclusion. By inclusion
Luhmann means the person’s being taken into account in society. In strati-
fied societies the hierarchy of ranks determined this: everyone belonged to a
stratum, which determined her place in society. With the dissolution of the
33 In this book I do not aim to examine Habermas’s theory, but it is worth mentioning that
later he has modified his views on public sphere in several points. One of these points can be
interpreted as if Habermas accepted some of Luhmann’s objections. Habermas writes in the
foreword of the new edition of his book on public sphere that “But the presumption that so-
ciety as a whole can be conceived as an association writ large, directing itself via the media
of law and political power, has become entirely implausible in view of the high level of com-
plexity of functionally differentiated society.” (Habermas 1992: 443)
hierarchic order of society, the differences between ranks ceased to exist. No

one can be excluded from any field of the society on the basis of his origin or
societal status anymore. In the modern society, the access to the perform-
ances of the functional subsystems has become possible for everyone: every-
body can participate in the political or economic life, everybody can receive
an education, etc. This also means that in the functional subsystems we can-
not speak of the inclusion of the whole person—as in a stratified society the
fact of belonging to a stratum influenced every aspect of life—but only the
roles relevant for the functional subsystems count. For the political system,
for example, people only count as electors, and it does not matter what their
jobs are, how rich they are, or what qualifications they have. In modern soci-
ety, inclusion means that the whole population counts in every functional
system, but only in functionally relevant aspects (Luhmann 1990a1: 34–35).
All this is, however, only a theoretical equality; that is, there are no dif-
ferences that could exclude people from the functional systems in advance
and definitely. This is, however, no real equality. In the reality some people
have more and others less possibility to reach the performances of the func-
tional systems. Some are much richer or receive an education of higher qual-
ity, etc. Furthermore, the inequalities can spread from one subsystem to the
other. If someone receives an education of lower quality, he will have worse
chances in the labor market, so he will be badly off, and this will reduce his
chances in almost every other field.
The opposition between theoretical and real equality is what has called
into being the welfare state. Everyone lays claim to access to the perform-
ances of the functional subsystems, or in other words, everyone wants equal
possibilities and chances in all fields of social life, while the possibilities and
chances are distributed unequally among them. People expect the state to
remedy this opposition; that is, in modern society, it is the task of the state to
ensure the real inclusion of the population. Of course, these claims were not
born overnight, but they are the results of a long process. The first target was
participation in politics, then, after the extension of suffrage, almost any
kinds of claims on the state could be put on the political agenda (Luhmann
1990a1: 35–36).
Let us shortly discuss what other conceptions are rejected by this defi-
nition of welfare state. In Luhmann’s view, welfare state does not merely
endeavor to remedy the negative societal consequences of industrialization
(Luhmann 1990a1: 22). Luhmann calls this idea the concept of social
state. The difference between the concepts of social and welfare state is in
Luhmann’s view that while the former endeavors to stop or prevent societal
exclusion, the aim of the latter is to further inclusion (Luhmann 2002a: 423,
n. 23).34 Therefore, according to the conception of social state, state interven-
tions are necessary in the case of divergence from the normality, while in
welfare state the invention is the normality. According to Luhmann, the
transformation of the terminology also shows that our political system can
be characterized by the latter: nowadays people do not speak of “aids” or
“subventions” received from the state but rather “claims” on the state
(Luhmann 1990a1: 37).
Luhmann emphasizes that welfare state is under the necessity of expan-
sion. If the state succeeds in satisfying a claim, immediately new ones will be
put on the political agenda. This is due to the operation mode of modern de-
mocracy, that is, to the fact that political communication operates according
to the binary code of government/opposition. If a political party wants to
take over the government or to keep the power, it has to provide always-new
promises for the electors, it has to espouse always-new claims of society; oth-
erwise, its opponents will do this. The essence of welfare state is not only
improving the social conditions but continuously finding and thematizing
new problems and taking real or sham actions to remedy them (Luhmann
1990a1: 36). In the language of cybernetics, this can be called positive feed-
back, which—as opposed to the negative feedback—does not result in mini-
mizing the divergence from the existing state but in its continuous increase
(Luhmann 2005d2: 112).
In modern society there come into being always new expectations for
politics. These expectations, however, refer to other subsystems, for exam-
ple, to economy or education, and what is more, due to the growing impor-
tance of ecological problems, they also refer to terrains outside the society,
that is, to the ecosystem. And in this consists the main problem of welfare
state. According to the theory of autopoietic systems, no system can control
the others and fully influence their functioning. As we have seen, every
system is a closed unit constituted exclusively by the operations characteris-
tic of it; every system follows its own logic, and a transition on operational
level is impossible between them. There are some possibilities to influence a
34 We can usually find a difference between social and welfare state in the scientific literature
as well. Welfare state mostly means a more expanded form of social state, which has been
realized after World War II. Nevertheless, the use of these concepts partly depends on the
language areas (Bayer 1998: 372–373).
subsystem—through organizations, for example—but this can only happen to

a limited extent. Furthermore, in the case of interventions into a system, one
has to face several unexpected and unforeseeable side effects. The problem is
not only that the interventions do not completely achieve their aims, but it
can also happen that they result in outputs exactly contrary to the original
purposes. If, for example, politics wants to stimulate the creation of jobs, the
success of this endeavor will depend on the performance of the economic
system. Politics can intervene in economy by certain means, but it cannot
control the whole economic system. In the economy—as in other subsys-
tems—there is no center through which politics could control the whole sub-
system. Consequently, the number of workplaces will be a result of the
uncoordinated activities of many economic actors, whose aim is not job crea-
tion but profit making (Luhmann 1990a1: 75).
The question of political steering (Steuerung) is closely related to the topic
of welfare state. The theories of political steering examined the possibility of
forming society by means of political reform programs (Lange 2002: 172–173,
2003: 114–115). The concept of political steering played an important role in
the first, cybernetic versions of systems theories. The main criticism of steer-
ing theories, however, also comes from systems theories, namely in the form
of concepts of autopoietic closure and self-regulation, represented by
Luhmann as well (Beyme 1995: 197; Mai 1994: 447).35
A further topic relating to welfare state and political steering is bureauc-
racy. The aim of welfare state—that is, to control the societal subsystems by
politics—can be realized primarily by organizations. When discussing organi-
zations,36 we have seen that they can realize an operational level connection
between different systems, where there is some possibility for a system to
influence the other. The endeavor to realize welfare programs involves the
increasing role of organizations, the expanding bureaucracy. This, however,
cannot mean a complete control over the systems because organizations can
never cover a whole functional system. According to Luhmann, the problem
35 A topic closely relating to political steering is the question of planning, which is narrower
than the former (Lange 2003: 110). In the case of political planning, one also has to reckon
with the difficulty of transmission between different systems. In the process of planning,
one has to produce administrative programs from political aims; that is, one should create a
transmission between the two subsystems of the political system, politics and administra-
tion, which follow different logics, and because of the difficulties of transmission between
different subsystems, this can only be limited (Luhmann 1971a3: 81–83).
36 See Chapter Four, Section E, Subsection iii.
of bureaucratization is, on the one hand, that bureaucracy—which is mainly

based on the media of law and money—does not have any inherent limits of
growth, and it can easily result in overexpansion. On the other hand, people
expect from bureaucracy to remedy problems that cannot be solved by these
two media (Luhmann 1990a1: 88–93).
To sum up, in Luhmann’s view, welfare state is an unavoidable conse-
quence of the functionally differentiated structure of modern society, but at
the same time, the expectations on welfare state are unrealizable. All this
does not tend towards an optimum but generates always-new problems and
endangers the autonomy of the functional subsystems, which Luhmann re-
gards as the fundamental achievement of modernity.
G) Summary
We can sum up the main characteristics of Luhmann’s views on politics in the

following points:
 Luhmann regards politics as a functional subsystem, which does not have

any outstanding position compared to the other subsystems of society.
By this thesis Luhmann opposes the conceptions that attribute central
place to politics and that characterize it as a field that can control the
other spheres of society.
 Luhmann endeavors to reformulate the key concepts of political science
with the help of his autopoietic systems theory. He strives to show that
these key concepts—i.e., state, legitimacy, democracy, public opinion,
and welfare state—are not well founded, and the meanings ascribed to
them do not correspond to the empirical reality of modern society.
Luhmann aims to redefine these concepts in compliance with the reality
of modern society. Nevertheless, his conceptual proposals also have
some problems because he modified them several times, and it is by no
means certain that he has found the satisfying solutions before the end
of his work.
 In reinterpreting the key concepts of political science, Luhmann’s most
important innovation consists in reconstructing these concepts on the
basis of sociological findings. In other words, he sociologizes the con-
cepts that had been mainly defined as based on philosophical or legal,
that is, normative ideas. Sociologization means primarily that Luhmann
proceeds from the structure of modern society and not from the indi-
viduals, as the other approaches did.
 In consequence of the fact that the key concepts of political science are
defined on the basis of the structural features of modern society, these
concepts take on a complex character. This means that concepts like le-
gitimation, democracy, public opinion, or welfare state cannot be picked
out from the context of modern society and cannot be interpreted inde-
pendently of the functionally differentiated structure of society. Taking
an actual example, this finding brings into question the endeavor of the
international politics to export democracy in countries that obviously
have not reached as high degree of the differentiation of the structure of
society as the developed world has.
 The most remarkable and at the same time the most controversial con-
sequence of the sociologization of the key concepts is that the phenom-
ena characterized by other theories as imperfections of modernity, as
deficiencies compared to a reachable optimal state, thus as problems
that can and must be remedied, appear in Luhmann’s theory as logical
consequences of the structure of modern society, thus as mostly irreme-
diable symptoms, so to say, as normality. For Luhmann there are, for
example, structural—that is, effectively unchangeable—reasons for the
fact that the so-called democracy of our times is far from the self-
government by the people, or that the parliamentary session we can
watch on TV is rather similar to a theatrical show than to a real competi-
tion of arguments, and that politicians bid over one another with unreal-
izable welfare promises. These are the features of Luhmann’s theory that
have most sharply opposed him to the left-wing thinkers, who regarded
these deficiencies as emancipative challenges that can and must be
solved.37
37 Ingolfur Blühdorn also holds that one of the most important and at the same time the most
disillusioning character of Luhmann’s theory is that according to it the project of Enlight-
enment is not realizable (Blühdorn 2000: 352).
CHAPTER SEVEN
Luhmann’s Theory in the Context of Social and

Political Philosophy
Until now I have in general applied a textual analysis in discussing

Luhmann’s theory. My objective was to reveal the relationships between the
elements of his theory, also to illustrate how the concrete findings of social
theory and political science follow from his abstract theoretical decisions. In
the meantime, of course, it was sometimes necessary to briefly refer to the
theoretical context as well and to outline alternative and competing theories
to which Luhmann opposes his own. However, contextual analysis has played
a supplementary role until now.
In this chapter I turn to the contextual examination of Luhmann’s theory.
I will proceed by analyzing the following four questions: 1) the debate be-
tween realism and constructivism in the field of epistemology and philoso-
phy of science; 2) the opposition between methodological individualism and
methodological collectivism; 3) the contrast between universal human rights
and cultural relativism; 4) the relation of Luhmann’s theory to prevailing
ideologies.
I consider these four topics to be of special importance for social and po-
litical philosophy, and perhaps they serve as the best tools to determine the
context of a theory and to compare it with other approaches. Another reason
for choosing these questions is that, as we will see, they highlight the pecu-
liar features of Luhmann’s findings, which in some respects always unsettle
standard patterns of thought. Moreover, through these analyses I also want
to point out that in spite of its strange terminology and eccentric findings,
Luhmann’s theory deals with the most important questions of social and po-
litical philosophy and as such can productively contribute to these questions.
In the following sections I will first briefly outline these four topics of so-
cial and political philosophy as the background of my analysis, and then I ex-
plore how Luhmann’s views can be placed in this context. These four
questions have a considerable theoretical tradition and a wide-ranging litera-
ture. Their reconstruction in the framework of the present analysis will thus
be inevitably sketchy and selective. I will endeavor to present those aspects

of these debates that can be important for examining Luhmann’s theory.
A) Realism versus Constructivism
In this section I examine the perhaps most fundamental question of episte-

mology or philosophy of science: To what extent are we able to obtain a reli-
able and precise knowledge of the world? To put it differently: Is there one
single description of the world that can be regarded as true? This can be dis-
cussed with recourse to the dichotomy of realism and constructivism. Al-
though their respective standpoints could be described with other concepts
as well, for example, objectivism on the one hand, and relativism or post-
modernism on the other, my impression is that theorists most often charac-
terize the two opposites of this dichotomy by using the concepts of realism
and constructivism.
By realism we mean scientific realism; that is, we refer the findings on the
cognizability of the world to science.1 Although I do not claim that this defi-
nition is valid for every version of realism, I believe that the realist stance
can be aptly summarized in the following points:
1. The world exists independently of our consciousness; in other words, the

subject and object of cognition can be clearly separated from each other.
This statement can also be called the separation thesis.
2. The representation theory of cognition, which holds that cognition is a
representation of the object in the consciousness of the subject.
3. The subject of cognition is an individual entity; that is, the social sphere
does not play a constitutive role in the process of cognition.
4. The question of truth can be raised in relation to scientific theories; that
is, these consist either of true or of false statements. A statement is true
if it provides a proper representation of the world. This can be called the
correspondence theory of truth.
5. The principle of uniqueness; that is, there exists only one proper or true
representation of the world.
1 As distinguished from the so-called ordinary realism, which refers to the everyday use of
cognition as well. See Moser 1999: 71, who also uses the term of minimal realism and classi-
fies his own views as moderate realism.
Luhmann’s Theory in the Context of Social and Political Philosophy 177
6. The successful scientific theories are true; that is, they contain state-
ments that correspond to reality; in other words, they provide an objec-
tive description of the world.2
This list does not aim to provide a definition that fully avoids redundancy.3
Some of the points overlap each other, and some of the findings are deduci-
ble from the others. In spite of this, I deemed it advisable to give this wider
and to some extent redundant definition because it more clearly highlights
the opposition between realism and constructivism.
Thus, the most important thesis of scientific realism is that there is an ex-
clusive, objective description of the world, and this description is provided by
science. And the most important argument realists use in support of this the-
sis refers to the success of science. Science—in comparison to other, non-
scientific explanations of the world—is surpassingly successful in producing
empirically verifiable explanations and predictions. What else could be a
most obvious explanation for this—the adherents of realism ask—if not that
the concepts, findings, and theories provided by science are really the proper
representations of the world; that is, they are true and objective statements?
(Moser 1999: 78; Psillos 2003: 69)
The realist standpoint is, in fact, the same age as modernity and Enlight-
enment. In other words, realism is the sometimes reflected, sometimes non-
reflected “official” epistemology of the approaches exalting modernity,
Enlightenment, and progress. The fundamental tenets of realism are inher-
ently related to the narratives of modernity, which regard rationality and
scientific-technical progress as the most important and most beneficial fea-
tures of modern society.
Let us now examine the approach opposed to realism, that is, constructiv-
ism. Besides the term constructivism, this school—if we can speak of a ho-
mogenous school at all— is also called postmodernism or relativism. A
2 Including unobservable phenomena as well (Boyd 2002: 1).

3 Márta Fehér characterizes modern Western scientism by using five principles: objectivity,
representation, individuality, uniqueness, and rationality (Fehér 2002: 302), which corre-
spond to points 1–5. By the principle of rationality, Fehér approximately means what I de-
scribe in point 4. Sathis Psillos, in turn, characterizes this approach using three theorems,
the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemological theorems of realism (Psillos 2003: 60),
which correspond to points 1, 4, and 6 in the above list.
further difficulty is that constructivism has more than one meaning.4 It must
be emphasized that when speaking of constructivist school, we are dealing
with an artificial, “constructed” concept, and sometimes the authors who
would otherwise object to this definition are also classified as constructivists.
The most effective way of clearing the constructivist standpoint is to ex-
amine what this approach says about each of the six points listed above. It is
the more reasonable to proceed like this, as the adherents of constructivism
most often define their own standpoints as a reaction and opposition to real-
ist epistemology or philosophy of science.
1. Constructivists do not deny the existence of the world; that is, they are
not solipsists. But they contest that we can speak of a distinct subject and
object. They oppose the idea that the world or the objects exist inde-
pendently of the subject.
2. Constructivists reject the representation theory of cognition. In their
view, the subject of cognition not only represents or mirrors the objects
of the world in her mind, but she also contributes to constructing the ob-
jects that appear in the cognition. That is, cognition is construction.
3. The result of cognition depends not only on the subject of cognition, but
the social environment also plays a constitutive role in its creation.
4. Although we can speak of truth regarding the description of the world,
this truth is not absolute. The truth of the description of the world is not
ensured by the fact that it corresponds to the reality, that is, by the fact
that it provides the proper representation of the world. Instead, truth is
determined by what is regarded as criteria of truth in a given social con-
text or culture. Truth is relative.
5. There exists not only one description of the world; there is not only one
truth, but these are different in each culture. There is no common refer-
ence point by which one could decide which of them is true, or whether
one of them could be regarded as “truer” than the others. This common
reference point could only stem from a definite culture, and so it could
not serve as an independent judge.
6. Modern science does not provide the only proper, objective description
of the world. Instead, it represents the western civilization’s peculiar in-
terpretation of the world, and its methods and theories correspond to
4 The term constructivism is used, on the one hand, to denote the whole school opposed to
realism, but on the other hand, it also has a narrower sense.
the aims of this civilization. Moreover, some theories also state that the
scientific exploration of the world is a manifestation of the interests of
certain societal groups, for example, capitalists, technocrats, and males.
Similarly to the characterization of realism, I do not claim that this list offers
an exact definition. There are overlaps among the points, and some state-
ments can be derived from the others. Furthermore, since the camp of con-
structivism is a “constructed” camp, that is, some of them would probably
object to this name, it also holds that the above features cannot be consid-
ered equally true of all the proponents of this school. 5
Since constructivism is a very complex and inhomogeneous school, the
arguments used for supporting this approach are also very manifold. Never-
theless, I think we can distinguish two main groups of constructivist argu-
ments: the arguments belonging to the field of epistemology or philosophy of
science on the one hand, and the arguments of cultural or political kind on
the other.
Let us begin with the first group, with the arguments from the field of
epistemology or philosophy of science. The ideas of this group can be classi-
fied, on the one hand, according to the radicalism of the arguments, and on
the other, according to the disciplines they belong to.
The least radical version, which is called—to be distinguished from other
kinds of constructivism—constructionism, relates to Peter L. Berger’s and
Thomas Luckmann’s works. The reason why this version is regarded as less
radical is, among other things, that their primary focus is not scientific but
everyday knowledge, or in other words, the social construction of reality, and
they did not raise epistemological questions (Berger and Luckmann 1966:
26–27).
We obtain a much more radical and at the same time a much more con-
troversial idea if we extend the examination to scientific knowledge as well,
as the so-called social constructivism does. The label of the sociology of sci-
entific knowledge is usually used more or less in the same sense. The sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge is a comprehensive approach determined
5 André Kukla characterizes constructivists as claiming that things are constructed, that is,
they are results of intentional human activity. He distinguishes this thesis, which he calls
metaphysical, from the epistemological and semantic versions of constructivism. By episte-
mological constructivism he means relativism, and by semantic constructivism he means the
idea that the statements do not have any empirical contents (Kukla 2000: 3–6).
mainly by the strong program of the sociology of knowledge.6 An important

character of these ideas is that they do not regard scientific knowledge as an
objective representation of the world but as a social construction; that is,
they interpret it as a thing in whose formation social factors play an impor-
tant role. In other words, they aim to sociologize epistemology (Kutrovátz
2005: 10–11).7
Besides sociological arguments, constructivism also relies on arguments
coming from the sphere of “hard” sciences, for example, neurobiology or
cognitive science. Humberto Maturana’s and Fransisco Varela’s neurobiologi-
cal theory is an example for this. The best-known element of their theory is
the concept of autopoiesis, which underlies Luhmann’s theory as well. Ac-
cording to this theory, our brain is a completely closed system, and the
transmission between the brain and the external world is impossible. In the
process of seeing, for example, the photons do not penetrate into our brain.
6 The strong program of the sociology of knowledge is usually characterized by David Bloor’s
four points. According to Bloor, the sociology of scientific knowledge has to comply with
four principles, that is:
1. “It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or
states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social ones,
which will cooperate in bringing about belief.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, suc-
cess or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would ex-
plain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable
to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need of
seeking for general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because oth-
erwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own theories.” (Bloor 1991: 7)
7 One of the forerunners of these ideas was the classical sociology of knowledge. The main
difference between the strong program of sociology of knowledge and the classical sociology
of knowledge is that the former expands the thesis of the relativity of knowledge to the
natural sciences as well. In this respect, Karl Popper has an interesting position: on the one
hand, he vehemently attacked the sociology of knowledge for questioning and relativizing
rationalism (Popper 2001: 212–223), but his anti-foundationalism, that is, the rejection of the
idea that knowledge can be substantiated and verified, and his decisionism, that is, the idea
that our scientific theories and methods are based on decisions (cf. Hacohen 2002: 224–235),
fit into the constructivist system of arguments. Thomas Kuhn’s thoughts can also be well
used for supporting constructivism. He denied those ideas of science that stated science’s
being objective, milieu-independent, and proceeding linearly. In his view, scientific theories
can be considered true only in a given epoch, in the light of a given paradigm (Kuhn 1996:
1–9).
The brain constructs what we perceive as reality exclusively from its own
elements. These findings oppose the fundamental tenets of realism, such as
the representation theory of cognition or the correspondence theory of
truth. The constructivism based on neurobiology or cognitive science is also
called cognition theoretical constructivism (Balogh and Karácsony 2000:
282–283).
Besides social and cognition theoretical constructivism, there is empirical
constructivism, too,8 as well as certain attempts to unify these approaches.9
The adherents of these schools usually characterize their standpoints as
radical constructivism.
Not only the cognition theoretical constructivism uses the results of em-
pirical sciences to criticize the fundamental tenets of realism. George Lakoff’s
and Mark Johnson’s philosophical theory can also be classified into this cate-
gory. One of the important tenets of their approach is the embodiment of the
mind, that is, the thesis that the structure of our brain influences our con-
cepts and our reasoning. Another important component of their approach is
metaphor theory, which states that metaphors play a constitutive role in
conceptualization and thinking (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 16–73). Although
they call their standpoint realism (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 89–92), and they
criticize the relativists and constructivist approaches (Lakoff and Johnson
1999: 463–467), their attacks are primarily directed towards the tenets of the
Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy—such as objectivism, the correspondence
theory of truth, or the representation theory of cognition (Lakoff and John-
son 1999: 443–444)—thus exactly towards the ideas by which we have just
characterized realism. Furthermore, from the theorem that conceptualiza-
tion and thinking are impossible without metaphors, it follows—since meta-
phors depend on language and culture—that our concepts and reason are
also culture-dependent. Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory belongs to the so-
called cognitive linguistics, which endeavors to solve epistemological prob-
lems with the help of the empirical tools of linguistics and cognitive science
(Kertész 2000: 210–213). Cognitive linguistics criticizes the epistemological
tenets that we have just defined as the fundamental principles of realism.
It is necessary to mention here naturalism although it is hard to place this
approach in the realism–constructivism debate. One of the reasons is that
8 The most prominent adherent of this school is Karin Knorr-Cetina.

9 For example, the so-called “Dolphin-group.”
naturalism is a compound and changing approach.10 Nevertheless, we can say

that one of the most important fundamental principles of naturalism is the
rejection of a priori knowledge (Giere 2000: 308). By this, naturalism refuses a
classical tenet of philosophy of science, that is, epistemology as the funda-
ment of science. Naturalism aims to psychologize epistemology (Quine 1969);
thus, it replaces the foundations of theories by circularity.11 In spite of the
fact that some tenets of realism mentioned above can fall victim to this criti-
cism, we cannot unambiguously affirm that naturalism can be classified
among the constructivist approaches. The program of psychologizing epis-
temology and explaining all phenomena by natural principles are, for exam-
ple, partly directed against relativism. Nevertheless, constructivists can take
arguments from the naturalist ideas. For example, according to the Duhem–
Quine thesis of underdetermination, evidences do not clearly determine the
theories; that is, to a given set of evidences, more than one theory can be at-
tributed, which contradict to each other. The thesis of holism, which also
stems from these two scholars, is closely related to this theorem (Quine 1998:
353). According to this thesis, we have to examine the truths of the state-
ments in relation to one another as a system; that is, a given statement can-
not be falsified by the evidences contradicting it. We can maintain the
statement contradicting the experience as true if we reinterpret some other
components of the theory. Neither is it determined which components we
have to change. If empirical data do not clearly determine the theories, there
remain two possibilities: either psychological or sociological factors play a
key role in accepting them (Laki 1998: 20). We can actually distinguish natu-
ralism from social constructivism by stating that while the former empha-
sizes the psychological factors, the latter does the sociological ones; that is,
the former psychologizes, while the latter sociologizes epistemology (Fehér
1986: 48). But due to cognitive science, the boundary between these two
fields seems to become dim, and a convergence of the two approaches can be
observed (Kampis 2002b: 318).12
10 According to the general definition of naturalism, this school aims to explain every phe-
nomenon of the world by the principles of nature (Kampis 2002a: 118).
11 The circularity consists in the fact that by psychologizing epistemology, we explain cogni-
tion by knowledge about nature, but we have obtained this knowledge by cognition (Kampis
2002b: 312).
12 Ron Mallon also argues for the connections between naturalism and constructivism (Mallon
2008).
The reason why these arguments for constructivism—that is, the argu-
ments of cognition theoretical constructivism, cognitive linguistics, and
naturalism—are remarkable is that they oppose the fundamental tenets of
realism on the basis of the empirical results of the researches on human
cognition, that is, on the basis of “hard” sciences. In the light of these find-
ings of natural sciences, some of the tenets of realism—such as the principle
of objectivity, the representation theory of cognition, or the correspondence
theory of truth—appear as a priori, metaphysical suppositions conflicting re-
ality. In other words, the epistemological approach called realism contradicts
reality; thus, if the science really wants to be realist, it has to question some
fundamental tenets of realism. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, I use
the term realism although we can see that its justification may be questioned.
Until now we have discussed those arguments of constructivism that
come from the field of epistemology or philosophy of science. Now we turn to
the second group mentioned above, that is, to the arguments of cultural or
political kind. One of their most important features is that they question the
superiority of modern Western civilization. Examples of these kinds of argu-
ments are the multicultural ideas that endeavor to protect cultures differing
from the West and to defend them from the homogenizing attempts of the
West. Further examples are the theories—for example, critical or feminist
theories—claiming that the Western rationalist, scientific world view serves
the interests of certain groups, for example, that of capitalists or males.
We can also mention environmentalist theories criticizing the lifestyle of
Western civilization that destroys the environment and exhaust its own con-
ditions of existence. A common feature of all of them is that they attack
Western civilization based on rationality, science, and technology, and they
criticize the idea that the world view of Western society is superior to other
cultures, or it is universally valid. Of course, although these arguments can
be called cultural or political, usually an epistemological tenet is needed to
underpin them. They, however, differ from the epistemological arguments
discussed above in that their primary endeavors are cultural or political
aims, and the task of their criticism of epistemology is, in fact, only to sup-
port these aims. According to some feminist theories, for example, the politi-
cal demand for equal treatment is not enough in itself: we also need a
feminist epistemology for its really successful realization (Lovell 1996: 335–
337; Delanty 2005: 123–126). Or according to some environmentalist theories,
environment protection measures are not enough in themselves, but we
should rethink the fundamental values of Western civilization based on sci-

ence and technology (Gross and Levitt 1998: 3–4).
A further reason for distinguishing between these two groups of argu-
ments was the so-called science wars in the 1990s, the hitherto sharpest con-
frontation between realist and constructivist standpoints.13 Science wars had
two aspects: the epistemological debate was supplemented by a political or
cultural discussion, which contributed to the fact that the confrontation was
so vehement that it deserved to be called a war. Constructivists attacked the
idea of the superiority of modernity based on science and technology. Real-
ists accused constructivist of irrationalism, relativism, and of degrading sci-
ence to myth, and they regarded them as a threat to rationality (Fuchs 1996:
312–313). This opposition had political colors: the constructivists were called
“the academic Left;” the realists were characterized as conservatives.14
Having outlined the main front lines of the realist–constructivist opposi-
tion, let us examine how Luhmann’s views are to be placed in this context.
First of all, we can conclude that he can definitely be classified among the
constructivists because, on the one hand, he himself calls his theory con-
structivist,15 and on the other, he is usually mentioned as a prominent—
though peculiar—adherent of this approach.16 His theory was mainly influ-
enced by Maturana’s and Varela’s cognition theoretical constructivism and
by Heinz von Foerster’s cybernetic approach, which can also be regarded as a
peculiar kind of constructivism. At the same time, however, his theory can-
not be considered as a mere adoption of these thoughts. Luhmann slightly
modifies the applied concepts, and the other components of his theory shed
13 For an overview of science wars, see Kutrovátz 2005: 6–9.

14 The term “academic Left” was introduced by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt (Gross and
Levitt 1998).
15 Luhmann also characterizes his theoretical program as the sociological application of
Quine’s naturalized epistemology (Luhmann 1999a: 32).
16 At least in the works analyzing the German aspects of constructivism. Luhmann is also at-
tributed an important role in some English works discussing constructivism (e.g., Delanty
2005: 136–152), but his name is often omitted. The reason may be that, on the one hand, in
the English-speaking world Luhmann’s reception has not reached every field where his the-
ory could be relevant; on the other hand, he has not participated in the “science wars,”
which developed in the last years of his life.
new light on them. This justifies that we can speak of a new version of con-
structivism in Luhmann’s case.17
It is thus clear that Luhmann is a constructivist and, likewise, that he
represents one of the most radical forms of constructivism. In his theory
operational connections between consciousness and the world are com-
pletely impossible. Consciousness is a fully closed, autopoietic system that
can produce its elements and structures exclusively by itself, from its former
elements, that is, from perceptions. But if so, in what does perception con-
sist? How can the consciousness obtain information on the world? It cannot
happen in such a way that something “enters” the consciousness from the
external world. The process of perception contains two boundaries that do
not permit us to speak of transmission: the boundary between the external
world and the nervous system on the one hand, and the boundary between
the nervous system and the consciousness on the other. In the case of seeing,
for example, the photons do not enter the organs of sense. The photons irri-
tate the organ of sight without entering it. In consequence of this irritation,
certain changes happen in the organ of sight, and such changes are transmit-
ted to the nervous system. The nervous system is a closed, autopoietic sys-
tem, which is structurally coupled with the consciousness, and this latter is
also a closed, autopoietic system. The former is a biological system, the latter
a psychic one. They have completely different types of operation, and so it is
obvious that any transmission between them is impossible. The blood does
not enter the consciousness, and the thoughts do not enter the circulation of
blood. The information that the irritations of the external world trigger in
the biological systems—that is, in the organs of sense and in the nervous sys-
tem—is exclusively produced by the operations of these systems. This infor-
mation, however, cannot be regarded as a perception on the external world
because the nervous system can observe only the biological organism. It per-
ceives that the photons have triggered certain changes in the organ of sight.
However, this is not “seeing” for the nervous system, but only a change of
the state of this biological system. What we can call perception only emerges
in the consciousness. The consciousness, however, produces its perceptions
exclusively by its own former operations; an idea of the external world
17 To distinguish Luhmann’s theory from other versions of constructivism, András Karácsony

calls it operational constructivism (Balogh and Karácsony 2000: 295), which can be justified
by the central role of the operationalist standpoint in Luhmann’s theory (see Chapter Two,
Section B). In addition, Luhmann himself uses this term occasionally (Luhmann 2000c: 5).
emerging in the consciousness is its own product (Luhmann 1992: 19–10,

1993d3: 68–69). Thus, Luhmann rejects the representation theory of cogni-
tion on the basis of the results of neurobiology; in this respect, his theory is
similar to the cognition theoretical constructivism mentioned above.
Speaking of constructivist epistemology, Luhmann only occasionally dis-
cusses the questions of the consciousness, the nervous system, and the ex-
ternal world. The reason is not only that neurobiology and cognitive science
are not Luhmann’s professional fields, but he also claims that the epistemo-
logical questions cannot be answered by examining human cognition but
only by analyzing communication. He does not define the key concepts of
epistemology—such as cognition, knowledge, or truth—in relation to the psy-
chic or biological systems but referring to the social systems (Luhmann 1992:
19–20, 2005e4: 35). This, of course, does not mean that cognition is com-
pletely independent of the psychic systems because communication is impos-
sible without consciousnesses. Furthermore, communication systems do not
have any direct connections with the external world. This connection is only
possible through the perception of the consciousnesses. Thus, in Luhmann’s
theory, there are three, for the operations completely impermeable, system
boundaries between the external world and the knowledge about it: the
boundaries between the external world and the biological systems, between
the biological and the psychic systems, and between the psychic and the
communication systems.
The reason why we have to relate epistemological questions to social sys-
tems is, according to Luhmann, supported by the developments in philoso-
phy of science, for example, the sociology of knowledge, sociology of science,
or Kuhn’s philosophy of science. However, he holds that these approaches
are not radical enough, and a complete sociologization of epistemology has
hitherto failed (Luhmann 1992: 68–72). In Luhmann’s view, the radical soci-
ologization of epistemology can be accomplished by applying the concept
of observation—by which he actually replaces the concept of cognition
(Luhmann 2004b: 222)—not only to the psychic systems but also to the social
ones.
Let us now examine the epistemological findings stemming from
Luhmann’s theory of observation. First, observation is always drawing a dis-
tinction. However, in the world there are no distinctions. Things, for exam-
ple, cannot exist differently from how they actually exist; everything is such
as it is. Every distinction is produced by an observer. In the external world
there is thus nothing that corresponds to the knowledge because knowledge
is always based on a distinction, that is, on the fact that we have marked
something as such and not as another thing (Luhmann 2004b: 223).
According to Luhmann, all knowledge is constructed by the observers. In
spite of this, he does not deem it right to oppose this kind of epistemology to
realism. Every observation is a real operation, which belongs to a real system
in a real environment (Luhmann 1992: 78, 2004b: 221).18 This is, however, not
identical with the objectivity of observations or with the statement that ob-
servations represent the world. In contrast to “classical” realism, Luhmann
does not relate realism to the object of cognition but to the accomplishment
of cognition or observation, and in this sense he might as well be called
realist.
As I have mentioned, Luhmann uses the terms of cognition and observa-
tion in a synonymous sense. Cognition is an event without duration in time.
Furthermore, cognition is always real: it is as it is, and the question of
true/false cannot be raised in connection with it (Luhmann 1992: 87). There-
fore, we need a further concept to which truth and falsity can be applied, and
for Luhmann this concept is knowledge. Luhmann defines knowledge as a
condensation of observations. Knowledge is a reduction of cognition to an
identity that makes its repetition possible (Luhmann 1992: 107, 123). As we
have often seen, Luhmann’s theory does not allow attributing permanent ex-
istence to something. Everything is only real by the operations that have no
duration, and knowledge is no exception either. Knowledge is only real by
the momentary operations; it can only gain duration in time by an observer,
who observers that it was also known before (Luhmann 1992: 129–130).
According to this definition—that is, if we regard knowledge as perma-
nence actualized by momentary operations—knowledge is a structure, the
structure of communication, and it is indispensable for the autopoiesis of
communication. As we have seen, the structures of the social systems are ex-
pectations for communication. We have also seen that Luhmann distin-
guishes between two peculiar kinds of expectations: cognitive and normative
expectations.19 Knowledge is an expectation of cognitive type, which means
that if an expectation is not fulfilled, it can learn; that is, we can modify or
abandon it, as opposed to the expectations of normative type, which are
18 These findings can be supported by the first sentence of Social Systems: “The following con-
siderations assume that there are systems.” (Luhmann 1995a: 12)
counterfactually maintained in the case of disappointment as well (Luhmann

1992: 134–138).
Luhmann holds that we can describe the difference between explicit and
implicit knowledge—proposed by Michael Polanyi—by his theory of autopoi-
etic systems. The autopoiesis of communication systems is dependent on
structural couplings with psychic systems. Psychic systems are, however,
completely inaccessible and nontransparent for communications. Never-
theless, an observer can observe both of them at the same time and can
distinguish between two kinds of knowledge. For the observer, the knowl-
edge reproduced in the autopoiesis of the communication seems to be ex-
plicit, and the part of the knowledge that does not depend on communication
but on structural couplings with psychic systems constitutes implicit knowl-
edge (Luhmann 1992: 41–42).
Let us now turn to analyzing what Luhmann says about one of the cardi-
nal questions of epistemology, truth. In his view, the fact that we are able to
regard certain knowledge as true or false is by no means self-evident, but it is
an evolutionary achievement. He mentions writing and second-order obser-
vations as prerequisites for the separation of knowledge and truth (Luhmann
1992: 167). To be able to speak of true knowledge, it is necessary to observe
first-order observations, that is, to observe someone who states that some-
thing holds true. We can speak of truth if we observe a first-order observa-
tion with the help of a peculiar observation scheme, that is, using the
distinction of true/false. This distinction is the binary code of the scientific
system; thus, truth is a symbolically generalized communication medium. In
Luhmann’s view, the concept of truth can only be applied to science as a
functional subsystem of modern society (Luhmann 1992: 173). Besides the
code, there is a need for programs, which determine what the criteria of
truth and falsity are. In the case of science, the role of programs is fulfilled by
the theories and methods (Luhmann 1992: 184, 197).
Thus, according to Luhmann, a statement is true if science states that it is
true. By this means—since science is a social system and thus cannot have
any direct connection with the world—he rejects all definitions of truth
that state the correspondence between knowledge and the facts of the
world. Nevertheless, there is a kind of link between truth and the world in
Luhmann’s theory as well, namely trough the perceptions. Perceptions are
the operations of psychic systems; they mediate between communication sys-
tems and the world. This does not mean that truth can be substantiated, de-
duced, or decided by perceptions because truth belongs exclusively to
science as a communication system, which cannot have direct connections

with the consciousnesses. According to Luhmann, the Duhem-Quine theses
of underdetermination and holism express this resistance of scientific theo-
ries to perceptions. Nevertheless, Luhmann attributes a kind of coordinating
role to the perceptions of psychic systems. In his view, perceptions can serve
as a common source of certainty. This is also reinforced by the fact that truth
as a symbolically generalized communication medium—like all media of
this kind—has a symbiotic mechanism, by which Luhmann denotes the
connection between the medium and human body.20 And in the case of truth,
this symbiotic mechanism is perception (Luhmann 1992: 228–230).
In Luhmann’s theory knowledge is a product of evolution. Luhmann joins
the so-called evolutionary epistemology, but at the same time he criticizes
and reformulates the conceptions of the evolution of knowledge with the
help of his theory of evolution.21 As we have seen, in Luhmann’s view, evolu-
tion does not mean a better adaptation to the environment because it is not
the environment that selects but the system itself. This also holds for the
evolution of knowledge. In the course of the evolution of knowledge or sci-
ence, the mechanism of selection consists in attributing truth or falsity to an
old or a new knowledge. In Luhmann’s view, this is not accomplished by the
environment but by the scientific system. At the same time, however, the en-
vironment, and especially the consciousnesses, play an important role in the
variation. The imagination of consciousness is the source of the innovations
in science. But according to the autopoietic systems theory, an operative
connection between consciousnesses and social systems—in this case, be-
tween consciousnesses and science—is impossible. The new ideas emerging in
the consciousnesses are variations for the evolution of science only if they
also emerge as communication. The occasional innovations coming from the
consciousnesses are, however, not sufficient for the evolution of modern sci-
ence. Therefore, supplementary mechanisms have to ensure the systematic
variations, for example, the scientists’ socialization for innovation, or the lo-
gics of science directed towards finding and solving new problems (Luhmann
1992: 566–578). This functioning of science that stimulates permanent varia-
tions is a good example of Luhmann’s thesis in terms of which restabilization
and variations are inseparable in the functionally differentiated society.
20 See Chapter Four, Section C, Subsection iii.

21 See Chapter Four, Section D, Subsection i.
In fact, when speaking about evolutionary epistemology, scholars usually

think about two different trends. One of them refers to the evolution of
epistemological mechanisms; that is, it examines the biological aspects of
cognition; the other explores the societal evolution of knowledge; that is, it
examines cognition in a sociological context (Bradie and Harms 2008). The
first is closely related to the naturalist epistemology mentioned above, while
the main representatives of the second are Karl Popper and Donald T.
Campbell. Luhmann refers to both schools without distinguishing between
them (Luhmann 1992: 549–550). His findings discussed above can be related
to the second type of evolutionary epistemology, which explores the socio-
logical aspects of cognition. Luhmann does not discuss the biological evolu-
tion of cognition although his theory presupposes it as well. If there is no
transmission between the external world, the biological, and the psychic sys-
tems, perception can be explained only by the idea that biological and psy-
chic systems, in the course of their co-evolution, have built structures that
make it possible.
Until now we have explored Luhmann’s thoughts in the light of the epis-
temological aspects of the realism–constructivism debate, and we can con-
clude that his theory can be clearly classified as a constructivist one. Let us
now examine what can be said about his theory in the light of the cultural or
political aspects of the debate. We begin with the question whether modern
scientific world view can be regarded as objective. Is the exclusive aim of sci-
entific research to find the truth, or—as the constructivists often states—are
certain interests or other factors external to science to influence and deform
the results provided by science? Although the idea of objectivity is in
Luhmann’s view no less untenable than according to the constructivists, his
theory is closer to the view that exclusively scientific criteria and no external
interests etc. prevail in science. This follows from one of the most important
theses of his theory of modernity, from the principle of functional differen-
tiation. Functional differentiation, in fact, means that every subsystem has
exclusive competence in the field of its function, and none of the subsystems
can influence the others. If something is economically profitable or serves
the politician’s interest, it will not become automatically true. Of course, the
scientific subsystem—similarly to all other subsystems—depends on other
systems, and it requires their performance. For example, there is no scien-
tific research without financing and legal regulations. This does not mean,
however, that through financing or regulations one could influence what
is true. Nowadays we can obviously find many examples of cases when
economic or political actors order or finance certain researches whose objec-

tivity is fairly doubtful. But what decides truth is the scientific system func-
tioning on the level of world society, and it seems to be impossible to
influence this whole system. Furthermore, the results of researches that may
be related to certain lobbies are usually received with suspicion.
Luhmann also rejects the idea that cultural differences can influence what
science holds true. This can be illustrated with the help of his findings on
scientific evolution. Although the cultural milieu can influence the evolution
of science through consciousnesses, it affects only the mechanism of varia-
tion; that is, in different cultural environments different questions and ideas
will emerge. But the selection of them, that is, the question whether they are
true, is decided exclusively by science, which is a functional system operating
on the level of world society (Luhmann 1992: 592).
A further constructivist criticism of modern science refers to the expan-
sion of technology, that is, technologization. According to some views, tech-
nology deforms our relation to the world, and it destroys our human and
ecological environment. By technology or technologization Luhmann means
a reduction of the complexity of the world, a formalization of the world, or a
functioning simplification. In other words, technology is a construction that
is less complex than reality, but because of this reduction, it is controllable. If
we define technology in this way, it includes not only the technical or tech-
nological equipments but also all the mechanisms constructing a reality of its
own by taking into account only some aspects of reality. Bookkeeping, for
example, does this by reducing every process of production to money. Hu-
man work only appears as expenditure on wages. Obviously, this does not
represent all human aspects of the work; people are “alienated” from their
work—as would Marx say. But exactly this simplification, this reduction of
the unmanageable complexity of the world renders it possible for the com-
plex production systems to emerge. Similarly to the technologized, formal-
ized simplification of the environment in science, this is the basis of building
complexity in economy (Luhmann 1998c1: 6, 1992: 713). Technology is an in-
dispensable pillar of the high complexity of modern society. Nevertheless,
Luhmann does not state that one cannot examine the negative consequences
of this reduction; he only claims that any previous attempts at this—such as
Marx’s criticism of political economy, Husserl’s views on the crisis of the
European sciences, or technology and science as ideology in Habermas’s
works—were not able to adequately grasp this phenomenon (Luhmann 1992:
715).
A further important topic of the realism–constructivism debate is how

the Western societies based on science and technology can be compared to
other cultures. Can we say that the former is superior to the latter in some
respects, or is the Western scientific world view just one of the possible in-
terpretations of the world, without any absolute value? On the one hand—
since in Luhmann’s theory we cannot speak of an exclusively true description
of the world—we cannot regard the modern scientific world view as absolute,
but on the other, in a certain sense, we can say that modern science is supe-
rior to any other interpretation of the world. Modern science and the func-
tionally differentiated structure of society are inseparable from each other.
Modern science cannot emerge in other types of society—for example, in
stratified society, where the question of truth was subordinated to the reli-
gious-moral world view—and any other types of science are impossible in a
functionally differentiated society, for example, it is unimaginable that scien-
tific truth would be determined by morality. The modern scientific world
view is superior to other interpretations of the world in so far as modern so-
ciety is superior to other types of society. And modern society exceeds every
other societal formation in complexity. For Luhmann, complexity is a con-
cept suitable for comparing different types of societies. And if we compare
the modern scientific world view with other interpretations of the world in
this respect, the former clearly exceeds the latter, and we can speak of its su-
periority in this sense.
When comparing western society to other cultures, there often comes up
the question of rationality, which is usually regarded as one of the most im-
portant distinguishing features of modernity. This also holds for Luhmann’s
theory; he also considers the concept of rationality one of the best tools to
grasp the peculiarities of western society (Luhmann 1998c2: 22). He thinks,
however, that a satisfying definition of rationality has hitherto failed, and
that this lack can be remedied by his systems theory. As we have already seen
it in many cases, the main problem, according to Luhmann, is that the earlier
theories attempted to define the concept of rationality as proceeding from
man or reason. Instead, Luhmann takes the more abstract difference of sys-
tem/environment as his point of departure. We can call a system rational if it
observes its relationship to its environment and reflects on the difference of
system/environment; that is, the unity of this difference has information
value and fulfills an orienting function within the system. In other words, a
system is rational if it endeavors to control its effects on the environment on
the basis of the reactions received from the environment (Luhmann 1995a:
473–475, 1998c2: 35–36).
By defining rationality in this way, it is easy to see that its complete
realization is impossible because a system cannot fully observe the difference
between itself and its environment. This would only possible if the sys-
tem/environment distinction were accomplished outside the system. This
distinction, however, is the system’s own operation, and so it can happen
only inside the system. Consequently, by speaking about the concept of
rationality, we never use it in an absolute, accomplished sense. Instead, we
examine to what extent the systems are able to approach it (Luhmann 1999a:
184).
The fact that a system uses the distinction between itself and its envi-
ronment as an orienting factor is not self-evident, but it presupposes
self-referential and second-order observations. Observations have to be self-
referential because the system has to reflect on itself, and they have to be
second-order observations because the system observes what reactions its
first-order observations trigger in its environment. According to Luhmann,
self-reference and second-order observations have become the primary ori-
entation factors of societal subsystems only in the course of the transition to
modernity. Rationality, in fact, describes the phenomenon characterized ear-
lier as the orientation of functional subsystems with the help of second-order
observations.22 In science, for example, scientists observe how their publica-
tions are observed by others; that is, they plan their researches according to
the answers they can expect to them. Economic actors behave according to
the answers and demands to be expected for their supplies. And politicians,
when planning their campaigns and programs, consider what reactions can
be expected in the public (Luhmann 1998c2: 38).
While subsystems can be rational to a certain extent, we cannot speak of
this on the level of the whole society. One of the most important features of a
functionally differentiated society is that it has no center or a superior sub-
system that could represent or control the whole society. Consequently,
there cannot emerge any reflections on the relationship between society
and its environment, which could ensure the control of the whole society.
According to Luhmann, it is impossible for the modern society to properly
22 See Chapter Four, Section E, Subsection ii.

reflect on its relationship with its ecological and human environment

(Luhmann 1989: 133–138, 1999a: 185–186).
Rationality makes it possible for the systems to have much more complex
connections with their environments and thus to build much more complex
own structures. According to Luhmann, rationality interpreted in this way is
a peculiarity of Western society. Oriental cultures have actually remained on
the level of first-order observations, which hinders the emergence of ration-
ality (Luhmann 1998c2: 36–37). In Luhmann’s view, modern Western cultures
can be distinguished from other cultures with the help of rationality. Due to
rationality, Western society can have much more complex relations to its en-
vironment and can build much higher complexity than the other types of so-
ciety; thus, rationality explains their superiority in performance.
The superiority in rationality of Western civilization, however, does
not mean for Luhmann that modern society tends towards an optimal state
regarding either its relation to its environment or intra-societal relation-
ships. It is by no means sure that rational planning, that is, the endeavor to
control the system/environment relationship, does not trigger non-intended
negative effects that can exceed the positive consequences. Furthermore, in
spite of respecting all the achievements of Western science, Luhmann does
not claim that science has only positive effects. Functional differentiation, a
prerequisite for the extraordinary performance of science, also involves that
we cannot control the relationship between science and its environment.
There is no guarantee that science does not have damaging effects either on
society or on the ecological and human environments of society (Luhmann
1992: 595).
To sum up what has been said, we can conclude that Luhmann’s stand-
point has ambivalent features in the light of the realism–constructivism de-
bate. On the one hand, regarding the epistemological aspects of the debate,
his views can be clearly classified as constructivist. He uses the results and
concepts of several constructivist approaches, but at the same time, his the-
ory has peculiar features. His constructivism belongs to the most radical
ones, and its radicalism stems from the denial of the possibility of any kind of
operational connection between cognition and the external world. Further-
more, his theory is also particular in the respect that he reinterprets the
epistemological questions on the most fundamental level, which consists in
attributing the most important epistemological concepts to social systems.
By this means, he also rejects the difference of subject/object as a point of

departure.23
Regarding the cultural or political aspects of the debate, however,
Luhmann’s views are rather closer to the realist approach. He rejects, for
example, the constructivist idea that science serves certain interests or
represents the world view of certain groups. Furthermore, he thinks that the
scientific and rational Western world view is not just one possible way of de-
scribing the world, but it is an evolutionary achievement that exceeds every
existing or ever existed alternative in performance, and one cannot imagine
any alternative that could surpass or substitute it.24
An explanation for this ambivalence25 can be provided by functional
differentiation. Although the scientific description of the world is a construc-
tion—in so far Luhmann agrees with the constructivists—because of func-
tional differentiation, this construction concerns exclusively science. And
science can best succeed if it applies principles that basically coincide with
the epistemological tenets of realism. For a successful functioning of
science, there is a need for suppositions such as cognizability of reality,
objectivity, or absolute truth, which, however, are fictions in Luhmann’s
epistemology.
The ambivalent feature of Luhmann’s theory can also be explained by dis-
tinguishing between first and second-order observations. The difference be-
tween realism and constructivism can be conceived in such a way that the
former refers to first-order while the latter to second-order observations.
Scientific observation, as it is pursued in scientific practice, is a first-order
observation. That is, science observers something, but it does not reflect on
how and by what distinctions it does this; it is naively realist. A second-order
observation, however, explores the “how” of the first-order observations. In
this case, first-order observations are relative because they could use other
23 Another social scientist in the constructivist camp to reject the difference of subject/object
is Bruno Latour (Kutrovátz 2005: 33–35).
24 Klaus Taschwer, having pointed out the similarities between the views of Luhmann and of
the constructivists, emphasizes that regarding the relation of science and society, Luhmann
is rather an adherent of the conservative conception of science, opposed to the constructiv-
ists’ standpoint (Taschwer 1996: 227).
25 In William Rasch’s words, Luhmann is involved in a two-front war against dogmatic realism
and skeptical idealism. In his view, this double challenge holds for constructivism in general
(Rasch 2000: 70–83). Jan Christis also positions Luhmann between realists and constructivists
(Christis 2001).
distinctions as well. Thus, from the point of view of second-order observa-

tion, reality is constructed by first-order observations. This relativism and
constructivism, however, is invisible for a first-order observation. Conse-
quently, scientific observation as a subject of epistemological analysis, that
is, as observed by a second-order observation, constructs the world, but sci-
ence itself as a subsystem functioning on the level of first-order observations
works in a realist way (Luhmann 1992: 100). According to this interpretation,
realism and constructivism do not exclude each other, and the opposing
camps of the realist–constructivist debate do not deal with the same
problem.26
Finally, there is a third way to reveal the reason for this ambivalent fea-
ture of Luhmann’s theory. This reason refers to the most abstract level of the
theory. As we have seen, in Luhmann’s theory difference always precedes
identity. That is, to observe the world, first we always have to draw a distinc-
tion. This distinction is produced by an observer, and there is no prescription
how it must be drawn; there always exist other possibilities as well. In so far
we can say the distinction, that is, the observation on the world, is arbitrary.
But we have also seen that according to Luhmann’s systems theory, observa-
tions as operations have to connect to one another; that is, they have to be
connectable. This strongly limits the range of possible distinctions because
we have to use distinctions that are recognizable and repeatable for the next
operations. Following the example in Chapter Two, if we want to observe a
table, first we have to distinguish it. Theoretically, there are many possibili-
ties for this: we can delimit only the surface of table, we can include the
drawer, perhaps the lamp as well, or the whole room. But if we want others
to know what we are talking about—that is, we want our observing operation
to be connectable—it is practical to mean by the table the “table itself.” Thus,
difference theory represents the constructivist, relativist side of Luhmann’s
theory, while the requirement of connectibility, which stems from the opera-
tionalist approach, means the limitation of arbitrariness.
It is worth to briefly touch upon the relationship between Luhmann’s
theory and postmodern. On the one hand, we can find certain similarities be-
tween them because Luhmann speaks of a polycontextual society, which is
very similar to the radical pluralism of the postmodern theories.27 There are,
26 Gábor Kutrovátz has arrived at very similar results in characterizing the opposing sides of
the science wars, see Kutrovátz 2005: 12–15.
27 For defining postmodern as radical pluralism, see Welsch 2002: 4–5.
however, very essential differences as well. First, in Luhmann’s theory we

can by no means speak of relativism or arbitrariness. Although nothing is
fixed and everything can be different, all societal subsystems have to comply
with several requirements. This can be described by the structural couplings
or by the requirement of connectibility just mentioned. The other difference
consists in the fact that Luhmann refuses the idea that in the second half of
the 20th century, there emerged a new type of society, as postmodern theo-
ries claim it. Today we live in a society whose basic structures emerged at the
dawn of modernity. This also means that Luhmann, in fact, attributes to
modern society postmodern characteristics, such as polycontextuality. And
the reason why our society is described today as postmodern is in Luhmann’s
view—among other things—that Leftist thinkers have misinterpreted mo-
dernity and have raised exaggerated emancipatory expectations, and when
realizing that these expectations cannot be fulfilled, they have, instead of ac-
knowledging their theoretical mistake, declared the birth of a new society
(Luhmann 1990a4: 219, 2000b: 44).28
B) Methodological Individualism versus Methodological Collectivism
The second social philosophical topic serving as a context for the analysis of
Luhmann’s theory is the debate between methodological individualism and
methodological collectivism. To demarcate the two standpoints, as a first ap-
proximation, we can say that by methodological individualism we mean an
approach stating that every social phenomenon can be explained by refer-
ring exclusively to individuals; thus, if an explanation contains a collective
concept, it can be reduced to statements on individuals.29 On the other hand,
methodological collectivism—which can also be called methodological ho-
lism—claims that the use of collective concepts is unavoidable in the explana-
tions of social phenomena, and these collective concepts cannot be reduced
to statements on individuals. In other words, social phenomena—although
28 Endre Kiss also explains the emergence of postmodern with a philosophical vacuum pro-
duced by the ceasing of neo-Marxism and structuralism (Kiss E. 2006b: 82).
29 Jon Elster, Karl Popper, and J. W. N. Watkins give approximately the same definition of
methodological individualism (Elster 1986: 5; Popper 1971b: 98; Watkins 1994: 442; cf.
Orthmayr 1997: 4–5). These definitions, in fact, contain the definition of methodological col-
lectivism as well.
they are produced by individuals—have characteristics that cannot be re-

duced to individuals and are therefore emergent. We can illustrate the oppo-
sition of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism by
the contrast between the concepts of reduction and emergence.
Methodological individualism claims the priority of micro-level over
macro-level, and this priority usually refers to explanations. Besides, we
can speak of other kinds of priorities, such as priority in an ontological or
logical sense (Danto 1986: 266–267). Ontological priority means that solely
the individuals are real, while social entities are only constructions. The the-
sis of logical priority claims that statements on collective concepts are logi-
cally dependent on statements on individuals; that is, the former can be
translated theoretically into the latter. Although we have to distinguish these
theses from the priority of micro-level explanations, they can often be inter-
twined or mixed with one another in one approach. Methodological indi-
vidualism as a guiding principle of explanations is in itself only a normative
requirement, and it has to be justified why we cannot use collective concepts
in the explanations. A possible reason is that collective concepts are not real,
and in this case we apply the ontological argument. Or we can say that collec-
tive concepts can be reduced to statements on individuals, and in this case
we use the logical argument.30
However, we can also find arguments for methodological individualism
that are not logical or methodological but refer to explanations. Holist theo-
ries are often associated with functional explanations,31 which explain ac-
tions by saying that they fulfill certain functions in a more comprehensive
unity. In this case, however, we face the problem that the explanandum or ef-
fect precedes the explanans or cause because the fulfillment of the function
happens after the action. In the case of manifest functions, this problem can
be solved by saying that the fulfillment of the function is present as an aim or
intention in the actor’s consciousness, and so the cause gets to its place, be-
fore the effect. Functionalist theories, however, usually emphasize the latent
functions, and the essence of such kinds of functions is exactly that they do
not appear as intentions (Giesen and Schmid 1976: 233–235). If functionalists
seek to explain the actions fulfilling functions beyond the actors’ intention,
30 Steven Lukes, for instance, argues that the different types of argument are mixed in
Watkins’s definition (Lukes 1994: 453).
31 Alexander Rosenberg believes that holism and functionalism necessarily go hand in hand
(Rosenberg 1988: 132).
and if they do not content themselves with saying that a supernatural power
has arranged the things in this way, there remains no other choice but to
have recourse to evolution theory (Rosenberg 1988: 135). Evolution theory is
also often criticized by methodological individualists,32 but in spite of this, we
cannot say that the theory of evolution and methodological collectivism are
necessarily associated. For example, Friedrich August von Hayek, one of the
main advocates of methodological individualism, also takes a stand in favor
of evolution theory.33
A further individualist argument against methodological collectivism is
that collectivist concepts—which, according to the collectivists, cannot be
reduced to individual decisions, and so the individuals cannot influence
them—result in a kind of determinism. That is, societal processes happen by
necessity and are independent of the individuals’ will; we can only recognize
them but cannot change them (Watkins 1994: 442).34
Now we turn to the methodological collectivists’ arguments.35 One of their
arguments reads that the statements referring to the individuals and trying
to explain societal phenomena—for example, someone cashes a check or
votes—involve collective state of affairs, such as the bank system or the insti-
tution of election (Lukes 1994: 454–457). Furthermore, methodological indi-
vidualists often accept that their explanations contain not only individuals
but also relations among them.36 In this case, however, the question arises
why we call this method “methodological individualism.”37
32 As, for example, Jon Elster does it, see Elster 1999: 71–81.
33 Nevertheless, there arises the question of how consequently Hayek applied methodological
individualism (Orthmayr 1997: 12). In his later works, he did not emphasize this methodo-
logical principle, a fact that is sometimes ascribed to the assumption that he has given it up
(Heath 2005).
34 Popper meant this kind of determinism by historicism criticized by him (Popper 2002: 3).
35 Nevertheless, the adherents of this camp usually do not call themselves methodological col-
lectivists or holists.
36 Like James Coleman, who defines his methodology as a version of methodological individual-
ism, but at the same time, he regards interactions as emergent phenomena (Coleman
1990: 5).
37 We can also find approaches saying that we cannot speak only about two levels—individual
and collective—but there is a third one between them, namely the level of interactions, and
when scientist speak of methodological individualism, they usually think of this one (Heintz
2004: 3). Lars Udehn distinguishes between strong and weak versions of methodological in-
dividualism. While in the strong version explanations can contain exclusively individuals,
the weak methodological individualism uses concepts like institutions or relations as well,
Another argument is that by referring to individuals, we cannot reach the

final explanations because we have not yet answered the question of why
someone pursues an aim or why someone has a given quality. The individual
ways of thinking and people’s characters are not formed independently of
the others but in a societal context, through socialization. Consequently, to
explain the behavior of individuals, we need social norms or other collective
phenomena. According to this view, it is not methodological collectiv-
ists to give half-way explanations—as the individualists state it—but the
methodological individualists by taking individuals with their aims and
qualities as given.38
Finally, let us close the presentation of the opposition between methodo-
logical individualism and methodological collectivism with a brief remark on
anther aspect of this debate. This far I have reconstructed the standpoints of
the two camps from a methodological point of view. However, the above-
mentioned arguments sometimes also touch the field of morality or politics.
The best example is Karl Popper, who accuses collectivist methodology of re-
sulting—through historicism—in totalitarianism (Popper 2001: 1–2).
After briefly outlining the two standpoints, now I examine how
Luhmann’s theory can be placed in the context of this debate. A common
point of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism is
that they both proceed from the concepts of individuals and of collective en-
tities and explore their relation. A further common feature is that both ap-
proaches regard individuals as parts of society. Their debate consists in
whether society is a mere aggregate of individuals, or it has emergent char-
acteristics. Luhmann rejects both presuppositions: he does not accept either
the concepts of individual and collective, or of individual and society as a
point of departure, and in his theory individuals are not parts of social
systems or society. As we have seen, Luhmann’s theory distinguishes be-
tween social, psychic, and biological systems, and these three types do not
coincide with the concepts of individual and collective. Social systems may be
which cannot be reduced to individuals. In his view, the term of methodological individual-
ism is used nowadays rather in this latter sense. Udehn also concludes from this that the in-
dividualist–holist opposition has significantly weakened (Udehn 2002: 500).
38 This argument stems, among others, from the communitarians (Karácsony 2002b: 127–128,
Reese-Schäfer 2000: 35–36). System theoretical and neo-institutionalist approaches also em-
phasize that the individual or the actor is a result of social construction (Stichweh 1995:
398).
identified with the entities characterized above as collective entities or social

phenomena, but the individuals do not have equivalents in Luhmann’s classi-
fication of systems. Psychic systems are forms of consciousness that cannot
communicate or act, so they obviously cannot be regarded as individuals.
Biological systems only consider man as a biological organism; neither is this
what we usually mean by the concept of individual.
Luhmann often claims that man is situated in the environment of society
(Luhmann 2004c: 256), but it is more exact to say that man as a unity does not
exist in Luhmann’s theory. That is, man is not a system. An observer can ob-
serve itself or others as a man, but this is only a unity constructed by the ob-
server, and it does not have an equivalent among the autopoietic systems.
Both consciousness and the nervous system are autopoietic systems, and al-
though they are structurally coupled with each other, they do not constitute
one autopoietic system (Luhmann 1995a: 39–40, 1990b3: 117, 2005f8: 257–
258). Furthermore, even by putting together consciousness and the organic
systems constituting the biological structure of man, we would not reach
what we usually mean by the concept of man. In Luhmann’s theory a number
of concepts that we otherwise attribute to man—such as cognition or knowl-
edge—belong to the social systems. Thus, the most adequate answer to the
question of the place of man in Luhmann’s theory is that man has been di-
vided up into biological, psychic, and social components, which cannot be
unified.
All this, however, does not mean that we cannot speak of concepts refer-
ring to man, such as the concept of individual. What Luhmann claims is only
that the concept of individual is not a suitable point of departure for con-
structing the theory of society, but the concept itself is obviously used; it ful-
fills certain function as a semantic formula. In Luhmann’s view: “A man is an
individual simply by the claim to be it. And this is enough.” (Luhmann 2005f5:
130; my translation) To be an individual is to have claims to acknowledge-
ment, to participate in societal subsystems, or simply to have claims to be
able to have claims (Luhmann 2005f5: 128–133).
Apart from some studies or comments on the role the concept of individ-
ual played in the social theoretical tradition, Luhmann does not use this con-
cept when expounding his theory of society. When man somehow appears in
his theory—since, in spite of the fact that Luhmann does not regard man as a
fundamental concept, it is unavoidable to refer to it in discussing the societal
phenomena—he prefers to use the concept of person.
When discussing the problem of double contingency, we have already

dealt with the concept of person.39 Luhmann’s solution of the problem of
double contingency consists in the fact that ego and alter narrow the range
of the expectable behaviors. To call someone a person means exactly this
kind of narrowing individual behaviors. The concept of person is an indi-
vidually attributed narrowing of the possibilities of behavior (Luhmann
2005f6: 143–144). In another place Luhmann says that we can speak of a per-
son if a psychic system is observed by another psychic system or by a social
system (Luhmann 1995a: 109). The psychic system and the person, however,
cannot be considered as identical because the former is an autopoietic sys-
tem outside the social systems, while the latter is an indication of the former
inside the social systems.
Although the key concepts of Luhmann’s theory do not coincide with the
concepts used in the debate between methodological individualism and
methodological collectivism, it is worth examining his theory in the context
of the arguments of both sides. In my view, we can state in general that his
standpoint is closer to the views of methodological collectivists since the op-
position of action theory and systems theory is sometimes characterized as a
version of the debate between methodological individualism and methodo-
logical holism (Schimank 1988: 619). Nevertheless, as we will see, Luhmann’s
arguments are often directed against the collectivist or holist ideas.
One of the most important debating points between the two camps con-
sists in the question whether collective concepts can be reduced to state-
ments on individuals, or they have emergent qualities. In this question,
Luhmann can be clearly classified among methodological collectivists. Al-
though consciousness is an indispensable prerequisite for social systems, the
latter appear in his theory as emergent orders, which evolve as solutions for
the problem of double contingency (Luhmann 1995a: 110).40 The emergent
quality of social systems also follows from the concept of autopoiesis because
operations are operations only for the system, and communication—that is,
the unity of information, utterance, and understanding—is a unity only for
the social system (Luhmann 1995a: 22).
Regarding the question whether we can speak of any kind of priority be-
tween psychic and social systems, Luhmann’s answer is no. It is clear that so-
cial systems cannot exist without psychic systems. Perhaps we could speak of

40 See also Chapter Three, Section D.
consciousness without social systems but certainly only in a very primitive

form. The formation of the complexity of psychic systems is impossible with-
out social systems. Thus, we cannot say either that first the psychic systems
are given, and society is built from them, or that society or social norms are
prior, that is, exist independently of the psychic systems, and they form the
consciousnesses. The relationship between them can be best characterized by
the concept of parallel co-evolution (Luhmann 1995a: 271).
Thus, in Luhmann’s theory, social systems have emergent qualities; that
is, they cannot be reduced to psychic systems. The question of emergence
and reduction, however, can be raised not only between psychic and social
systems, but between the different types of social systems as well, namely be-
tween interactions and society (Heintz 2004: 23). The idea that societal phe-
nomena are to be reduced to interactions can be regarded as a version of
methodological individualism.41 Luhmann accepts that society cannot exist
without interactions and that interactions are parts of the society, but he re-
fuses the view that society is a mere aggregate of interactions. Interactions
consist of communication, and, as we have seen, communication is only pos-
sible as a part of a system, that is, connected with other sorts of communica-
tion. Communication must exist both before and after the interactions.
According to Luhmann, this is why society is a prerequisite for the interac-
tions. Luhmann characterizes the relationship between interactions and so-
ciety—besides the statement that they presuppose each other—in such a way
that interactions “accomplish” society, and they do it in a societal environ-
ment (Luhmann 1999a: 816–817). Society cannot be reduced to interactions,
and neither can it exist without them. None of them has priority over the
other (Greshoff 1992: 467).
One of the methodological individualists’ arguments refers to the onto-
logical problems of collective concepts. What kind of existence do norms, so-
cietal strata, classes, or society have beyond the individuals and their actions,
thoughts, and the like? In this respect, Luhmann agrees with the methodo-
logical individualists’ criticism. In the course of elaborating the theory of so-
cial systems, one of his most important aims was to eliminate the ontological
problems of collective concepts. His main criticism against Parsons or other
structuralist theories was that they use a problematic concept of structure.
They take structure as given and do not give an account of its emergence
41 George Casper Homans’s approach can be regarded as this kind of theory. He states that all
societal phenomena can be described by exchanges (Homans 1962).
(Luhmann 2004c: 13–14). As we have seen, in Luhmann’s theory structures

do not have any existence beyond the momentary operations.42 The struc-
tures of a society are nothing but expectations limiting the connectibility of
operations, and they have real existence only in so far as they are used by
operations. The systems also exist only inasmuch as the operations draw the
system/environment distinction characteristic of the given system. Thus,
Luhmann’s concepts of structure and system cannot be criticized for using
ontologically problematic presuppositions.
The next topic of the debate between methodological individualism and
collectivism is the question of determination, that is, the question whether
societal factors determine the individuals’ decisions. In this respect,
Luhmann’s theory also copes with the methodological individualists’ criti-
cism stating that methodological collectivists deprive the individuals of every
opportunity to decide because their actions are completely determined by
societal factors. For Luhmann, societal structures are nothing but expecta-
tions; that is, they increase the possibility of certain behaviors but never
determine them completely. Furthermore, psychic systems are closed auto-
poietic systems, whose functioning can be determined exclusively by them
(Luhmann 1996a: 265).43
The topic of socialization is also related to this question. Luhmann rejects
the idea of socialization that implies a transmission or inheritance of cultural
patterns. In Luhmann’s theory this is impossible: there is no operative con-
nection between consciousnesses and social systems because they are com-
pletely closed systems with different types of operations. He holds that
instead of the transmission model, socialization can be described by the con-
cept of interpenetration.44 Since interpenetration is not transmission, sociali-
zation can only be self-socialization. The norms and patterns of behavior
necessary for participating in society have to be formed exclusively by psy-
chic systems, on the basis of their own operations. According to Luhmann,
only a socialization conceived in this way can explain the immense differ-
ences and variations to be found among the people receiving the same
42 See Chapter Two, Section D.

43 Dirk Baecker writes that systems theory has a bad reputation among social scientists be-
cause it is usually related to the idea of control (Baecker 2001: 59), but he endeavors to show
that the charge of determinism is not substantiated in the case of Luhmann’s theory.
44 See Chapter Three, Section B.
cultural heritage (Luhmann 2004c: 135–138). Thus, the principle of autopoi-

esis helps to avoid determinism in the field of socialization.
A cardinal point of the debate between methodological individualism and
collectivism is the question of explanation. Individualists criticize collectiv-
ists by saying that if they use functional explanations, the effect precedes
the cause. Luhmann directly refers to this debate by defending functional
method45 from criticism. According to Luhmann, such criticism supposes a
wrong relationship between causal and functional methods. The criticism
affirming that the effect precedes the cause supposes that the functional
method is a type of causal explanation. Luhmann rejects this supposition and
claims that the situation is exactly reversed: causal explanation can be re-
garded as a special type of functional method. In Luhmann’s view, because of
the high complexity of the world, infinite effects can be attributed to every
cause, and infinite causes can be attributed to every effect. Functional
method consists either in fixing an effect and examining the causes that can
lead to it, or in fixing a cause and analyzing the effects that can be attributed
to it. Explanations are never complete; we always deal with the simplification
of the world because we have to ignore an infinite number of causes and ef-
fects (Luhmann 2005a1: 12, 20–21). The aim of functional method is not to
find necessary relationships between a cause and an effect but to examine
the interchangeability and the equivalence of the causes or the effects; that
is, to find functional equivalents (Luhmann 2005a1: 29). And causality is an
extreme case of this method, namely the case when we reduce the sets of
causes and effects to such an extent that there remains only one cause and
only one effect (Luhmann 2005a1: 22).46
In summary, according to Luhmann, the initial problem of the debate be-
tween methodological individualism and collectivism, that is, the distinction
of individual/collective is wrong because it does not coincide with his sys-
tems theoretical point of departure, with the sharp separation of social, psy-
chic, and biological systems, and thus it leads to methodological difficulties.
Nevertheless, Luhmann’s theory can be examined in the context of this de-
bate. He can be regarded as a methodological collectivist or a holist in as
45 Instead of functional explanation, Luhmann uses the concept of functional method.

46 In the later period of his œuvre, Luhmann provided another definition of causality with the
help of medium/form theory. Accordingly, the form of causality emerges from the loosely
coupled elements, from the possible causal factors, by a close coupling, that is, by coupling a
cause with an effect (Luhmann 1995b).
much as he emphasizes the emergent quality of social systems; at the same

time, however, he endeavors to reformulate the collective concepts in such
a way that they can withstand the individualists’ criticisms, such as the
criticisms of the ontological problems of structures, of determinism, or of
functional explanation.47
C) Universal Human Rights versus Cultural Relativism
The opposition between universal human rights and cultural relativism can
be briefly formulated in a way that in terms of the former, human rights are
equally valid for everyone without exception, while the latter claims that
they are only valid in certain cultural or political context, that is, their valid-
ity is restricted to a certain community, which is usually the western liberal
democracy. This opposition is not new. In fact, it is the same age as the
Enlightenment because the idea of universal human rights is a product of the
Enlightenment,48 and the criticism of it has also emerged with it.
The debate between the two standpoints can be led back to both specula-
tive and practical reasons. The claim that certain rights are universal is a
very problematic statement from a theoretical point of view, and as such it
has always been a target of criticism. The criticism can come from thinkers
who are committed to the validity of human rights and consider problematic
only their theoretical foundations. This aspect of the debate—which accom-
panies the history of the idea of human rights—can be considered as a merely
speculative problem because practical reasons are not necessary to arouse a
debate. There were, however, periods in history when the practical validity
of human rights was problematic, and theoretical debate was a consequence
of this. The most obvious example is the period when human rights have
not been realized yet, but the claim to them has already been formulated. In
47 Andreas Reckwitz positions Luhmann’s theory half-way between methodological individual-

ism and holism (Reckwitz 1997: 331). According to Anne Friederike Müller, Luhmann can be
regarded as individualist and holist at the same time, but it is more exact to say that he has
exceeded this dichotomy (Müller 2006: 173).
48 One could argue that the roots of human rights go back to the times before the Enlighten-
ment because the idea of natural rights played an important role in the Middle Ages as well,
but it can also be traced back to the Sophists (Noll 2006: 151–153). In my view, however, to
avoid the difficulties of interpretation, it is more practical to limit the examination to the
human rights in modern sense.
fact, every country faced this situation during the formation of the democ-
ratic state. Furthermore, human rights were sometimes violated so harshly
that it made it unavoidable to confirm these rights both theoretically and
practically, for example, in the case of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights after World War II. But the question of human rights can be actualized
without such despotic systems and enormities as well. There can emerge con-
tested situations in the course of the codification of human rights (Kis 2003:
27–28). A frequent question is, for example, that of the priority in the case of
a possible conflict between these rights. Finally, an intensification of the de-
bates on the universality of human rights can also be observed today, mainly
in consequence of globalization and of the September 11 attacks. In this case,
however, as opposed to the former cases, the debate was not motivated by
the problem that human rights were not realized, but quite the contrary,
their realization was regarded as the imperialism of the West.
Let us now examine the views and arguments of the two sides. A certain
right can be called human right if the reason of possessing it is the subject’s
being a human (Kis 2003: 87); that is, everyone has human rights equally and
universally.49 This does not mean that there are no human rights that can in-
volve certain groups only, for example, minorities (Freeden 1991: 37, Kis
2003: 87–88).50 The most important question regarding human rights con-
cerns their foundations. The method of foundation having the largest tradi-
tion is the theory of natural rights. The rights attributed to people by natural
right theories are prior to the positive law of the state, and the latter must
not violate the former. Modern natural right theories have significantly lost
their convincing power since the 17th century although they enjoyed a ren-
aissance after the enormities of the Second World War. The change in the ar-
guments for the universality of human rights consists in the fact that
transcendental arguments have fallen into the background, and they have
been replaced by those based on human rationality (Noll 2006: 172–174).51
49 According to this definition, it is superfluous to call human rights universal because it is al-
ready included in the definition. And the statement that human rights are not universal is a
self-contradiction. Nevertheless, to emphasize the features of the opposing standpoints, this
kind of redundancy and inconsistency is perhaps allowable.
50 These special kinds of human rights—such as the rights of minorities, adults, or women—can
be called potentially universal rights (Freeman 2002: 101–102).
51 Habermas’s discourse theory can also be regarded as an attempt to find universal founda-
tions for rights (Habermas 1996: 118–131; Weiss 2005a: 59–62).
The criticisms of universal human rights are usually directed towards

the methodically problematic character of these rights. It is not clear how
we could substantiate the universal validity of these rights without transcen-
dental arguments. It is, for example, not enough to refer to the success of
societies that have declared human rights, and we can also find arguments
against the rational foundation of these rights (Brown 1999: 108–109). The
standpoint denying the moral foundations of the rights and claiming that the
validity of the rights is ensured exclusively by the declaration of the state is
called legal positivism. The roots of legal positivism can be traced back to the
beginning of modernity, and this approach has been continually criticizing
the modern natural right theories since their emergence.52 Legal positivist
theories—since they cannot ensure the universal validity of the rights—result
in the thesis that human rights are valid only in a given culture, and other
cultures need other kinds of legal order. One of the strongest arguments of
cultural relativists is built on this cultural dependence. They regard the idea
of human rights—as opposed to the universalist approach—as a peculiarity of
the modern Western civilization, that is, a result of the societal, economic,
and political development of this culture. And it is really hard to separate
human rights from liberal democracy because both suppose each other (Mu-
tua 2002: 44). According to these arguments, when the West demands the ac-
knowledgement of human rights from other cultures, it is but a form of
cultural imperialism (Jones 2001: 29). At the same time, the connection be-
tween liberalism and universal human rights is ambivalent because the
tolerance—which is a fundamental value of liberalism—has a postmodern
interpretation that emphasizes the self-determination of the cultures,
which can be opposed to human rights.53 Universalist liberals regard this
52 One of the key topics of the debates of political and moral philosophy in the 17th and 18th
century was the question whether rights and morality are universally valid, or they are de-
pendent on the culture. In the 17th century the most renowned representatives of the two
standpoints in Britain were Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The former can be classified
among the legal positivists while the latter among the adherents of the natural rights theory
(Ludassy 2007). In France of the 18th century, the proponents of universal human rights
were Diderot, Condorcet, and—after some hesitation and with reservations—Voltaire, while
Rousseau can be regarded as a legal positivist (Ludassy 1991, 1999).
53 This ambivalence of the liberal tradition was chiefly emphasized by John Gray. In his view,
liberalism is based on two mutually exclusive philosophical foundations, on two different
conceptions of tolerance. On the one hand, tolerance can mean the modus vivendi, that is,
the coexistence of different life-styles or beliefs; on the other hand, it can mean the way to
radi-calized version of multiculturalism as a misinterpretation because it re-

lates tolerance to the community instead of the individuals; thus, it subordi-
nates the latter to the former (Kis 2007: 27).
In summary, we can conclude that there is an inconsistency between the
practical validity of human rights and their theoretical foundations. In think
the standpoints denying the validity of human rights can be regarded today
as marginal. The unsettled questions rather follow from the clash of these
rights, like, for example, the question of where the limits of property rights
are, and whether they can be restricted by referring to equality.54 In these
cases, however, both sides refer to universal rights. And, moreover, if the ad-
herents of cultural relativism criticize human rights for being products of the
Western culture and political system, and if they claim the rights of other
cultures to have their own legal systems differing form the Western one, they
usually endeavor to support these claims by referring to a universal right, for
example, to the culture’s right of self-determination. One may argue either
for or against human rights, but it seems very difficult to avoid the claim to
universality. In spite of this, if we analyze the universality of human rights
theoretically, it is hard to formulate arguments that do not refer to some
kind of transcendence and do not originate these rights from their practical
validity and utility at the same time.
Now we turn to the examination of what we can say about Luhmann’s
theory in the context of this debate. There can be no question about what
Luhmann’s standpoint regarding the existence of universal human rights is.
It is clear that he rejects all kinds of universal foundations of rights. Accord-
ing to Luhmann, modern legal system only acknowledges positive law. Of
course he does not deny that there are debates on the foundations and le-
gitimacy of rights, and that we can speak of moral judgments on positive law,
but he deems it impossible that the modern legal system would acknowledge
any kinds of rights beyond positive law, and that one could resist the positive
law by referring to these rights. Nevertheless, he considers that the theories
the truth or rational consensus, which results in the elimination of the differences of opin-
ions (Gray 2000: 1–33). The universalizing and absolute moral and political principles of lib-
eralism—which are vehemently criticized by Gray (Gray 1997)—stem from the latter.
54 Walter Reese-Schäfer mentions five unsolved problems of human rights: the question of
foundations; which rights belong to human rights and which do not; whether the rights of
groups belong here; whether there is a principle that can serve as a ground for the decision
in the case of the clash of human rights; and the possible negative effects of these rights, for
example, strengthening the conflicts (Resse-Schäfer 2000: 348–349).
of legal positivism have not succeeded in properly describing the modern le-
gal system. According to him, the positivity of the law does not explain eve-
rything (Luhmann 2004a: 76). The peculiarities of modern legal system can
only be understood by analyzing modern society and functional differentia-
tion. Thus, Luhmann differs from the “classical” legal positivism in that he
thinks that law—as it is a societal subsystem, which has many structural pre-
requisites—cannot be described separately but only in the context of modern
society. In other words, his legal positivism is not based on the philosophy of
law—as other legal positivist theories—but on the theory of society.55
Thus, law is one of the functional subsystems of modern society. Its func-
tion is to stabilize the normative expectations; that is, the task of the law is to
ensure that we might distinguish the expectations on whose fulfillment we
can rely (Luhmann 2004a: 147–148). Legal system is an autopoietic, opera-
tionally closed system; that is, it produces its operations exclusively from its
own operations. Thus, the communicative operations characteristic of law
can only be produced from the operations of the same kind, or in other
words, only the law can produce law; that is, something is legal only if the
legal system states it is legal (Luhmann 2004a: 90). The communicative opera-
tion characteristic of law is—as in the cases of all subsystems—defined by a
binary code, which is here the difference of legal/illegal.
According to Luhmann, law contains a paradox: the code legal/illegal can
be applied to the legal system itself, and we can ask whether what we call le-
gal is legal (Luhmann 2004a: 102). To use the distinction of legal/illegal pre-
supposes that we know what is legal and illegal, but we cannot show an initial
distinction; we cannot substantiate the law because we can refer only to the
legal again. This paradoxical or tautological functioning of law is not prob-
lematic in the daily practice because in this case we are dealing with an exist-
ing law (Luhmann 2004a: 90–91). The problem only arises for second-order
observations, especially if a wide-ranging structural change happens in soci-
ety, which fundamentally influences the functioning of law. According to
Luhmann, the transition to modernity, that is, the emergence of functionally
differentiated society, was this kind of change. He interprets modern human
55 Because of the wider, social theoretical framework of the analyses, Michael King and Chris
Thornhill holds that Luhmann can be regarded as a legal positivist only with restrictions
(King and Thornhill 2002: 37–40). András Karácsony also emphasizes that because of this dif-
ference, it is misleading to classify Luhmann among the legal positivists because this term
usually refers to an approach of philosophy of law (Karácsony 2000a: 154–155, 168–169).
rights theories as semantic answers to this structural transformation. Be-

cause of the dissolution of the stratified structure of society, the medieval
natural rights theory has lost its plausibility, and modern human rights theo-
ries endeavored to fill the gap that had emerged (Luhmann 2005f7: 218–219).
According to Luhmann, the theories of human rights are actually at-
tempts to hide the paradox of law mentioned above or to break the circular-
ity of seeking foundations (Luhmann 2004a: 426). Social contract theories can
be regarded as such attempts in the 17th century. Later, in the second half of
the 18th century, after social contract theories had lost their convincing
power, the way to dissolve the paradox was found in the act of making the
law positive. The American and the French declarations of human rights, for
example, simply declared the existence of universal rights. The problem with
this solution is, however, that it is connected with certain states and does not
provide sufficient grounds for the global validity of human rights. Nowadays,
according to Luhmann, human rights are usually thematized or actualized—
now on the level of world society—when they are violated (Luhmann 2005f7:
220–222).
Thus, in Luhmann’s view, human rights are, on the one hand, semantic
constructions or attempts to hide the paradox of law. On the other hand,
however, the institutions described by human rights theories fulfill indispen-
sable functions in modern society. At the beginning of his career, in his book
Basic Rights as Institutions (Grundrechte als Institution), Luhmann attempted to
describe these functions. To explain the role of human rights, he has chosen
a way that is understandable in the light of his views discussed earlier but is
quite strange against the background of legal theories: in compliance with
his program of sociological enlightenment, he holds that the functions of
human rights cannot be explained by examining the man but by analyzing
the structure of society.56
According to Luhmann, in modern society the political system tends to af-
fect against functional differentiation (Entdifferenzierung) and to politicize
the whole society. A reason for these tendencies is the centralization and
generalization of power. Another cause is that any topic can become a politi-
cal issue, and due to the democratic elections, there is a continuous demand
for putting always-newer issues on the political agenda. However, the
56 Gert Verschraegen points out that the exploration of the sociological aspects of human
rights was blocked before Luhmann by the fact that the research on this topic was not ac-
cepted among the sociologists (Verschraegen 2006: 101).
preservation of the autonomy of the societal subsystems is of key importance

because their efficiency can only be ensured in this way. This is the reason of
the evolution of certain institutions for saving functional differentiation
from politics. An important part of these institutions is constituted by human
rights, or to be more exact, by the basic rights because they can by no means
be called “eternal human rights” (Luhmann 1974: 23–24).57
Luhmann mentions four points that have to be ensured so that the differ-
entiation of society can be maintained. These are as follows: to maintain the
person’s freedom and dignity, which Luhmann calls the person’s self-
presentation (Selbstdarstellung); to form reliable expectations on the behav-
ior; to satisfy economic needs; and to produce collectively binding decisions.
Thus, the basic rights can be attributed to these four fields (Luhmann 1974:
37).
The task of the first group of basic rights is to ensure the person’s self-
presentation, which means man’s individual autonomy. The concept of per-
son or personal system fulfilled in Luhmann’s early writings approximately
the same function as the psychic system after his autopoietic turn. Of course,
because of the different theoretical grounds, we cannot completely identify
them with each other.58 This group of basic rights, in fact, does not refer to
the relations between the functional subsystems of society but rather to the
connections between these subsystems and personal systems. For the suffi-
cient efficiency of functional subsystems, personal systems have to comply
with certain requirements. Functional subsystems require different roles.
Each of these roles relates to only one aspect of personality and never to man
as a whole. As to the role of a voter, for example, it is indifferent what the
man’s job, marital status, etc. are. None of the functional subsystems inte-
grate the whole man; none of them can build a whole structure of personal-
ity. At the same time, however, people need stable personality as without
it they could not fulfill the roles that are important for the functional
57 Thus, Luhmann endeavors to emphasize his theoretical opposition to universal human

rights theories by the terminology as well. When reconstructing Luhmann’s thoughts, I use
the term basic rights although by this term Luhmann means the institutions that are usually
called human rights. At the same time, when using this concept, we have to keep in mind
that basic rights are not fundamental rights serving as a basis of the whole legal system
(Weiss 2005a: 54).
58 As we have seen, the concept of person is maintained after the autopoietic turn as well, but
in contrast to the first period, it is not an independent type of system but a kind of derived
category.
subsystems. Since none of the societal subsystems can produce this, people
themselves have to build it. For a proper functioning of societal subsystems,
it is indispensable to ensure the sufficient freedom for people to build their
stable personality independently.
Not only are stable personal systems necessary for the functioning of so-
cietal subsystems, but a suitable variety in these systems is also needed. For
the functioning of a complex society, manifold functions have to be fulfilled,
and these functions may be opposed to one another. This would be impossi-
ble by means of uniform personality structures. Personal systems, besides
stability, have to display a sufficient degree of variety in capabilities, behav-
iors, or motivations as well. Because of these requirements, it is necessary for
the person to be able to present itself in societal communication as an
autonomous, individual personality (Luhmann 1974: 48). According to
Luhmann, two requirements have to be fulfilled for this: personal freedom
and human dignity have to be ensured. He calls the former the external pre-
requisite and the latter the internal one for individual self-presentation. All
this is ensured by the first group of basic rights (Luhmann 1974: 70).
The task of the second group of basic rights is to ensure reliable behavior
expectations, which are necessary for the functioning of the subsystems. In
modern society very complex behavior expectations have to be fulfilled. To
fill a role, complementary roles have to be filled by others: we can be cus-
tomers only if there are sellers as well; we can be voters only if there is
someone to vote, etc. There is a need for coordinating behaviors: the cus-
tomer and the buyer have to agree upon what kind of behavior can be ex-
pected from the other; that is, it is necessary to narrow the range of the
other’s behavioral possibilities. This, however, does not imply the coordina-
tion of actions but only the coordination of expectations relating to actions
(Luhmann 1974: 84). This coordination has a chance to be realized in a com-
plex society if the requirement of consensus is limited to a narrow field: we
do not expect that everyone agrees upon every question, but it is enough that
consensus only emerges between some people in a circumscribed field. This
is ensured by functional differentiation because in this case cooperation and
consensus are only necessary in the field that is relevant for the given func-
tional subsystem (Luhmann 1974: 88). However, there is another task to be
solved: communication partners who can potentially agree upon a given
topic have to find each other. According to Luhmann, this can be solved by
ensuring that everyone can freely choose her communication partners and
communication topics. By this means, through self-organization, people who
agree upon the expectations that are important for a given functional subsys-
tem will find each other. Thus, Luhmann’s answer to the initial problem of
how complementary expectations can be produced in a complex society is
the free choice of communication partners and topics, and by this means, the
structures of communication or action are formed in a self-organizing
manner. Thus, the task of basic freedoms—such as the freedom of opinion,
speech, assembly, press, etc.—is not only to save the person’s freedom and
dignity, but they have to ensure the emergence of complementary expecta-
tions (Luhmann 1974: 98).
The next function of basic rights is to ensure the satisfaction of economic
needs. The efficiency of economy is ensured by the institutionalization and
the independent functioning of money as a communication medium
(Luhmann 1974: 110). According to Luhmann, the role of basic rights is here
to ensure the independent functioning of money as a medium, that is, to save
the independence of economic system, which is mainly threatened by the bu-
reaucratizing tendencies of political system (Luhmann 1974: 116–117). The
autonomy of the central bank is also meant to ensure this; it is not a basic
right, but it is equivalent to them regarding its function. As opposed to the
liberal tradition, the freedom of property is in Luhmann’s theory not de-
duced from the freedom of man, but is guaranteed by the right to take part in
the economic system; that is, it is necessary for the functioning of economy.
Besides the freedom of property, other liberties are also important for the
economy, for example, the freedom of communication and assembly, or the
right to the free choice of job. Luhmann does not explain these by the indi-
vidual’s freedom, but by their roles in the economic system (Luhmann 1974:
116–135).
The fourth requirement that can explain the existence of basic rights is
the need to make collectively binding decisions. Democratic political rights
stem from this requirement. While the function of the basic rights belonging
to the other three groups was to save the independence of the societal sub-
systems or personal systems from the politics, the fourth type of basic rights
has to save the autonomy of the political subsystem (Luhmann 1974: 138).
The function of political system is to produce collectively binding decisions.
In modern society, however, it is not self-evident that people accept the deci-
sions because the binding character of the decisions cannot be based on relig-
ion, morality, or societal status. As a consequence of this, there is a need for
institutions that ensure the legitimacy of the power. This is the task of the
right to vote, which is a channeling of societal claims. This right makes
it possible for politics and administration to work, that is, to produce col-
lectively binding decisions (Luhmann 1974: 148). Voting right ensures the
political system’s independence of other subsystems by separating the role of
the voter from other societal roles. This function is fulfilled by the universal
and equal suffrage and by the secret ballots (Luhmann 1974: 158–160). Here,
in fact, Luhmann discusses the same problem that we have examined in rela-
tion to legitimacy: how the acceptance of collectively binding decisions can
be secured without relying upon any moral or religious authority if it is im-
possible for everybody to participate in the real decision-making process.
Luhmann calls the four rights discussed above the rights to liberty. He
explores a fifth right as well: the equality before the law. Luhmann, however,
regards this one as a special right that cannot be classified in the four groups;
neither constitutes it a fifth group but refers to all the four at the same time
(Luhmann 1974: 163). The function of the right to equality before the law is to
stabilize the separation of the roles when the public meets administration,
that is, to neutralize the societal differences when people contact the state
(Luhmann 1974: 179).59
Luhmann emphasizes that the task of these basic rights is not to realize
the functionally differentiated society but only to maintain it. They presup-
pose that society has reached such a stage of development that this differen-
tiation has already evolved (Luhmann 1974: 37). Not only affirms Luhmann
that the existence of the basic rights can be explained by the functionally dif-
ferentiated structure of society, but also that there are mutual interdepend-
ences between these rights: the maintenance of societal order presupposes
their common institutionalization. Basic rights constitute a complex system,
and the rejection of one of them can endanger the functioning of the com-
plete, functionally differentiated society (Luhmann 1974: 200).
Thus, Luhmann does not regard basic rights as inalienable and universal
rights but as concomitants of the functionally differentiated society; that is,
similarly to the relativist views discussed in this section, these rights are, in
his view, inseparable from the features of modern western society. At the
same time, however, he does not admit any relativism regarding modern so-
ciety because he does not see any chance for functionally differentiated soci-
ety to change, and this societal structure requires the institutionalization of
basic rights. To bind basic rights to the structure of society is, in a sense, a
59 For the basic rights, see also Cohen and Arato 1992: 327–332, Noll 2006: 241–280.
stronger argument against relativism than deducing these rights from hu-
man rationality. Human reason can work imperfectly, or it can be deceived,
while societal structure can rather be regarded as constant and stable. At the
same time, this also means that in societies that have not achieved a suffi-
cient degree of functional differentiation, basic rights cannot be stabilized.
The considerations discussed here stem form Luhmann’s early work cited
above. In the second period of his œuvre, the question of human rights only
appears in the semantic context mentioned, that is, as attempts to hide the
paradox of law, while the discussion of their relationship to societal structure
is lacking. It is also remarkable that the question of the relationship between
the semantics of human rights and societal structure is not emphasized in his
comprehensive book on legal system, The Law of Society (Das Recht der Gesell-
schaft); moreover, he does not use the expression “basic rights” there. It
might be that in the second period of his work, he deemed it more important
to discuss other questions. However, it is also possible that later he thought
that the views presented in his early work were not satisfying, but he could
not provide a better solution.
D) Ideologies
In what follows, I examine Luhmann’s views in the context of the main ide-
ologies. One could argue against the justification of this examination by say-
ing that Luhmann has elaborated a scientific theory and not an ideology or a
political program. This is true, but, as we will see, ideologies always relate to
social scientific or philosophical questions, including those three that we
have discussed in this chapter. In other words, to find an author’s ideological
profile means—among other things—the positioning of his views in the con-
text of questions such as the objectivity or relativity of knowledge, the rela-
tion between individual and collective, and the universality of certain rights.
Thus, the exploration of Luhmann’s ideological profile is partly a summariza-
tion of the findings of the three preceding sections.
Before entering upon the examination of the question of the relation be-
tween Luhmann’ theory and the main ideologies and its possible classifica-
tion into one of them, it is worth to touch upon the question of what we
usually mean by ideology in political science and what the role of ideologies
in Luhmann’s theory is.
To understand the characteristics and roles of ideologies, it is worth ex-

amining the circumstances of their birth. Perhaps the most important rea-
sons for the emergence of ideologies are the societal, economic, and political
transformations in early modernity. Among these transformations, usually
the industrial revolution, the dissolution of the feudal order, the urbaniza-
tion, and the strengthening of social mobility are emphasized (Baradat 1994:
2–5). These processes have produced new conflict situations; the interests of
groups were separated from each other, and new societal cleavages have
emerged. Ideologies, on the one hand, can be interpreted as answers to these
new conflict situations and cleavages. Of course, conflicts in themselves do
not explain the emergence of ideologies because in the Middle Ages there
were conflicts as well. It was also needed that these clashes of interests could
be articulated and listened to; that is, the emergence of a public sphere and a
politics competing for the votes was also necessary. The emergence of ide-
ologies presupposes the achievement of certain rights to liberty and the de-
mocratization of politics to some extent (Bayer 1998: 176–177). As a first
approximation, we can define ideologies as aggregates of beliefs and views
that represent the interests of certain social groups, and their role is to help
these groups to take over the political power.
A further characteristic of ideologies can be defined with the help of the
ambiguity or contested meaning of political concepts. The majority of our
political concepts have several different senses that cannot be reduced to one
single, common meaning. The meanings of these contested concepts depend
primarily on what their relationships to other concepts are. Ideologies pick
out one of the meanings of these concepts and fix it by connecting it to other
concepts. Accordingly, a concept can be part of the vocabularies of different
ideologies, but its meaning is different because it obtains it in the constella-
tion of other concepts (Freeden 2003: 53–55).60 The concept of freedom, for
example, can be used in a negative and in a positive sense. The former means
the lack of constraints, while the latter is an ability to achieve aims. From the
first, the program of minimal state can be derived; from the second, étatist
views follows although they are the same concept. Ideologies thus compete
on two levels: the strife for political leadership happens primarily by the
competition for the control over political language.
60 Using Walter Bryce Gallie’s terminology, Michael Freeden speaks of the essential contesta-
bility of political concepts, and within the framework of ideologies, there emerge the uncon-
tested meanings of these concepts.
Ideologies are often opposed to philosophical and scientific theories.

Regarding the relationship between ideologies and philosophy, ideologies
usually have their roots in philosophy, but they endeavor to reach a wider
public than philosophy. In the interest of this, they must be formulated in a
simpler, more ordinary manner (Macridis 1992: 3). Concerning the relation-
ship between ideologies and science, one of the approaches claims that if
something is ideological, it is not based on scientific theories or on empirical
exploration of the world, but it rather tries to secure the acceptance of a view
with the help of emotions. Sometimes it is also held that we might as well
eliminate ideologies, were we successful enough in the empirical exploration
of the world. As opposed to this idea, there is a view claiming that every in-
terpretation of the world—including the scientific one—is ideological and
serves the interests of certain groups (McLellan 1986: 80–83), as we have seen
in the discussion of the realism–constructivism debate.
Let us now examine the function of ideologies according to Luhmann. To
understand the role of ideologies, we have to recall what Luhmann said about
functional method. As we have seen,61 in Luhmann’s view an infinite number
of effects can be attributed to every cause, and an infinite number of causes
can be attributed to every effect. In the practice, however, it is necessary to
be able to attribute only a limited number of effects to our actions. In
Luhmann’s view, the function of ideologies is precisely to promote this re-
duction; that is, ideologies present some consequences of the action as im-
portant and eliminate the rest. In his view, ideologies are by no means
irrational or emotional; on the contrary, because of their complexity reduc-
ing function, they are essential for the rationalization of action and for the
functioning of the modern, technologized society (Luhmann 2005a8: 74–76).
Furthermore, in Luhmann’s view, the false opposition of ideology and truth is
due to an improper concept of truth based on ontological premises, that is, to
the idea that a true statement can completely describe causal relations
(Luhmann 2005a8: 80). Luhmann’s concept of ideology coincides with the
concept as used in political science in that the ideologies do not provide a
scientific and true interpretation of the world because they emphasize
only certain aspects of the world and hide the rest. Nevertheless, he adds
that there is no description that could show all aspects of the world. The
61 See Chapter Seven, Section B.

ideological way of thinking is not a kind of deficit compared to scientific

knowledge, but it is a necessary reduction of complexity.
In what follows, I examine how Luhmann’s views relate to ideologies. I
analyze only ideologies that played a significant role in Western societies
in the last few decades, including conservatism, liberalism, and social
democracy.62
i) Conservatism
First we examine conservatism. The most characteristic feature of conserva-

tism is the respect for tradition, that is, the sympathy for the established or-
der and institutions, and the distrust of change (Quinton 1997: 244–245). This
does not mean, however, that conservatives oppose every kind of change.
They refuse it only if it does not correspond to the organic development of
society. What they oppose is the planning that ignores practical experience,
the endeavor to achieve aims formulated solely by theoretical constructions.
Conservatives can be characterized by a kind of aversion to the theoretical
and overly abstract reasoning on social and political questions. We can for-
mulate the first fundamental doctrine of conservatism like this: respect for
the established order and for the organic development, and refusal of any
kind of artificial, planned, and radical change, whcih do not derive from the
organic development. This principle closely relates to the view that societal
order is a result of factors independent of people’s will and deliberate ac-
tions. Conservative views on the source of order changes all the time: it can
be God, nature, the psychological principles of man, or even economic regu-
larities (Freeden 1996: 333–334). The point is that if we let these factors work,
they will lead to the equilibrium or harmony of society. Finally, the third
characteristic is that conservative standpoints are usually formulated against
or as a reaction to progressive ideas.63 This reactive character is accompanied
by a considerable flexibility: by adjusting themselves to the historical con-
text, conservatives always formulate their standpoints against various views,
so conservatism can have different forms from time to time (Freeden 1996:
345).
62 In characterizing the ideologies, I rely primarily on Michael Freeden’s examinations.

63 Michael Freeden calls this feature mirror-image characteristic, see Freeden 1996: 336.
When examining Luhmann’s political classification, usually conservatism

comes up. The reason is, on the one hand, that the positioning of Luhmann’s
views was significantly influenced from the beginning of his career by his
confrontation with Habermas, and since Habermas was clearly a leftist, it fol-
lowed that Luhmann is a conservative. He himself did not protest against this
view (Grundmann 1990: 31–32). Luhmann’s classification among the conser-
vatives was further supported in the eyes of the scientific and political com-
munity by the fact that regarding both his theory and his career, he owed his
success to a conservative thinker, Helmut Schelsky. At the beginning of his
career, Luhmann also relied on Hans Freyer’s, Arnold Gehlen’s, and Ernst
Forsthoff’s thoughts, that is, on clearly conservative theorists (King and
Thornhill 2003: 163–172; Rehberg 2005: 299–301), who, moreover, were ac-
cused of collaborating with the Nazis (Karácsony 1995b: 25, Rehberg 2005:
301). And finally, we have to keep in mind that Luhmann’s writings often
have a kind of anti-leftist, sarcastic tone (Østerberg 2000: 15).64
It is, however, a more important question how the findings of Luhmann’s
theory relate to the fundamental tenets of conservatism presented above. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the main argument for Luhmann’s conservatism was
that his systems theory served the justification of the established order
(Habermas 1971: 144–145). The primary objective of Luhmann’s program of
sociological enlightenment was to provide explanations of social phenomena
by analyzing society and its functional subsystems, and by these explanations
he endeavored to surpass and replace the humanistic ideas that stemmed
from the “conventional” Enlightenment and were based on human rea-
son. For example, as we have seen, Luhmann endeavored to explain the
characteristics of legitimacy, democracy, or human rights not by people’s
64 Here are some examples: By analyzing Habermas’s discourse theory and the social effects of
a debate based on his theory, Luhmann writes that “the wife may be frightened if her hus-
band comes back from the debate with a new religion or with new antiauthoritarian princi-
ples on the education of children.” (Luhmann 1971b: 331; my translation) When arguing that
political interventions cannot produce the economic effects expected, he uses the following
comparison: “The situation is similar to the case when Hopi Indians face drought. Only the
rain dance and the faith in it can help. In this case, we are not dealing with drought but with
work. Instead of rain, politicians have to promise pleasant workplaces with good salaries.”
(Luhmann 1995c: 579; my translation) Finally, he characterizes the generation of ’68 as fol-
lows: “If they meet, they come together like the veteran artillery horses, which want to hear
the trumpet blast once again, but today, of course, it is impossible to live in this past time.”
(Luhmann 2004c: 200; my translation)
considerations and decisions but by the functions needed for the operability
of modern society. The aim of these institutions is, in Luhmann’s view, not
people’s emancipation but the maintenance of the stability and functionabil-
ity of the society. It is therefore no wonder that he was classified among the
conservatives.
On a closer inspection of this question, we can conclude that Luhmann’s
endeavor to base the explanations of societal phenomena on societal systems
instead of individuals really corresponds to the characteristics of conserva-
tism as above presented. Furthermore, the stressing of societal processes,
which are uncontrollable by the individuals’ decisions, results in another
theorem, which can also be classified among the fundamental principles of
conservatism: the impossibility of a society-wide planning or control, or at
least, its very limited practicability.
Luhmann’s theory, however, also has some aspects that do not fit the con-
servative tenets. First, it is worth examining what kinds of institutions are in
Luhmann’s view necessary for the functioning of modern society, that is,
what kinds of institutions his (real or hypothetical) conservatism aims to
maintain. In discussing his views on legitimacy, democracy, or basic rights,
we have seen that these are but institutions that prevail in present-day mod-
ern society. Luhmann is a conservative in claiming that neither representa-
tive democracy nor capitalist economic system can be replaced or
significantly modified. In the light of the radical leftist views of the 1960s, de-
claring the inalterability of capitalism or the impracticability of decision-
making based on real participation certainly seemed to be conservative, but I
think these are not sufficient criteria anymore for calling a theory conserva-
tive. Although contemporary conservatives take a stand for democracy and
capitalism, the same holds true for the liberals and, in fact, for the social de-
mocrats; this question in itself does not provide enough reason for ideologi-
cal classification.
It is an important difference between Luhmann’s theory and conserva-
tism that Luhmann rejects the idea that society is directed by a factor work-
ing independently of people’s wills and decisions, and if we let this factor
work freely, it will result in the harmony of the society. Although Luhmann
shares the conservatives’ opinion that the planning of and the control over
society are impossible, he does not state that if we forbear from this and let
social evolution work, something will guarantee the harmonious develop-
ment of society. In Luhmann’s theory, society consists of autonomous func-
tional subsystems, which are not subordinated to a center that could ensure
their harmonious relationship. Although these subsystems are dependent on

each other’s performance, and although in the course of societal evolution
there come into existence structural couplings that contribute to the accom-
plishment of these mutual demands, nothing guarantees that the societal
evolution does not proceed towards the intensification of conflicts or the
self-destruction of society. By this means, Luhmann, in fact, rejects one of the
fundamental tenets of conservatism, that is, the societal harmony ensured by
the organic development, although neither holds he its alternative—the plan-
ning of and the control over society—workable.
A further difference between Luhmann’s theory and the conservative
views is that Luhmann clearly refuses the idea that societal order could be
ensured by a common morality or by the religion. The reason why modern
society can reach its extraordinary complexity is precisely that functional
subsystems have become independent of these kinds of bonds. If morality or
religion controlled all fields of societal life, it would only render possible a
degree of complexity that is substantially lower than the present one. And
since societal evolution is directed towards the increase in complexity, a so-
ciety based on a unified moral order—whose dissolution is often complained
of by the conservatives—is, according to Luhmann, over once and for all.
Luhmann’s views on the role of the theory of society also contradict the
conservative ideas. Conservatives usually hold that the endeavors to grasp
society by theories are superfluous and unrealizable. For Luhmann, in con-
trast, the description of society is not only a theoretical aim, but in his view
there is a need for a suitable theory of society for the efficient functioning of
the subsystems, especially for that of politics.65
ii) Liberalism
The second ideology to be explored is liberalism. Its most characteristic fea-

ture is the defense of freedom, where freedom is used in a negative sense,
that is, as freedom from restrictions. And since the freedom of individuals
can collide with one another, and social life requires certain obligations from
everyone, the central topic of liberalism is when and to what extent these ba-
sic freedoms can be restricted. We can define the most important doctrine of
65 This question will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight, Section C.

liberalism as follows: freedom is the people’s unalienable quality, and any

kinds of restrictions on it by the state require justification (Gaus 1996).
To get a more exact notion of liberalism, we have to supplement the
defense of freedom with further principles. First, the liberals’ common fea-
ture is individualism, that is, the idea that the individuals or their freedoms
always have priority, and the collective rights or obligations can only be de-
rived from them. At the same time, however, liberal individualism does not
imply an atomized society. On the contrary, the sociable attributes of people
are integral part of liberal theories. If people can decide without restrictions,
they will act rationally; that is, a further important feature of liberalism is
that it attributes a rational nature to people. Furthermore, most liberals have
a kind of faith in progress, that is, in the idea that if people’s freedom is en-
sured, it will result in the development of society (Freeden 1996: 144–154).
The difference between liberalism and conservatism does not consist in
the fact that the former argues for the development or progress while the
latter for the immutability. As we have seen, what the conservatives refuse
is not the change itself. The difference is that while according to the conser-
vatives, the development of society will be ideal if we let the established in-
stitutions develop organically, the liberal standpoint states that this is not
enough, and we have to create—by radical inventions if necessary—
institutions that ensure the defense of individual freedom. But if the estab-
lished institutions are based on liberal principles—as they are, in fact, in
Western societies today—the two conceptions of development may be very
close to each other, which we can observe in the present political practice.
A further characteristic distinguishing liberalism from conservatism is
the search for foundations. The reason why practical principles need founda-
tions is that liberalism claims the validity of its principles not only in the case
of a particular society but universally (Gray 1986: 45–46).66 This also follows
from the fact that liberals do not derive their principles for the political prac-
tice from the given community or epoch but from man. This endows liberal-
ism with a kind of temporal or historical rigidity as opposed to conservatism,
which is a very flexible ideology to the effect that it always forms its stand-
point on political institutions in accordance with the given circumstances.
Exploring Luhmann’s relation to liberalism, we find that regarding meth-
odology or the theoretical aims, Luhmann’s theory is in flat opposition to it.
66 By foundations not only the universalist principles—for example, natural rights theories—
are meant here, but utilitarianism can also be regarded as a foundationalist approach.
The aim of the sociological enlightenment determining Luhmann’s whole

work is to radically break with the anthropocentric theoretical considera-
tions prevailing since the age of Enlightenment and to replace them by socio-
logical explanations. The theoretical tenets attacked by Luhmann, in fact,
coincide with the methodological principles of liberalism. The targets of
Luhmann’s criticism are usually those explanations of social phenomena that
proceed from the individual. He also blames the theories for expecting too
much from human rationality in the functioning of political institutions. A
further important difference is the question of the foundations of theories.
As opposed to liberalism, one of the most important tenets of Luhmann’s
theory is the contingency of all description of the world. Contingency is a
necessary concomitant of every observation and every statement; that is,
every observation is an observation of a concrete observer, and we can never
speak of a universal standpoint. The other cause of contingency is the com-
plexity of the world, which renders reduction and selection unavoidable.
That is, we can never reach the absolute truth or the final ground. The same
holds true for Luhmann’s views on politics. The justification of the political
institutions does not originate from universal principles but is always de-
pendent on certain societal conditions. Of course, the success of the institu-
tions in a given society is by no means arbitrary because the structure of
society creates inevitable requirements for them. In a certain respect, politi-
cal institutions have foundations, but these foundations originate from the
structure of society and not from universal principles as liberals claim it.
In spite of the fact that Luhmann rejects the most important methodo-
logical tenets of liberalism, moreover, he usually defines his own standpoint
against them, his views on the desirable political institutions coincide with
those of the liberals. For example, the basic rights whose validity Luhmann
considers to be necessary for the functioning of the functionally differenti-
ated society coincides with the liberal rights to liberty. A further similarity is
the question of state intervention because Luhmann—similarly to most of the
contemporary liberals67—argues against the state control over economy.
At the same time, it is an important difference between Luhmann’s and
the liberals’ views that for Luhmann, ensuring the individual and economic
freedom does not result in the development of society, as the liberals claim
it. The liberals argue that free competition is not only beneficial for the
67 Using the term liberal in the European and not in the American sense.
economy, but it has advantageous effects on the whole society, and this is the
most effective way to solve social problems. In Luhmann’s view, however, the
free functioning of economy results in an increase in efficiency exclusively in
the economic sense, and there is no societal mechanism that would guaran-
tee that it produces positive effects for other fields of society as well, for
example, by solving social problems. According to Luhmann, the logics of the
functional systems increase the differences: who has more money gets more
credit; who has advantage at the beginning of the education can multiply it
later (Luhmann 1999a: 167).
Summarizing Luhmann’s relation to liberalism, his theory supports the
necessity of political institutions corresponding to the liberal principles, but
at the same time, all is based on methodological principles opposed to the
core tenets of liberalism. Because of the differing methodological grounds,
the liberal democratic institutions lose their universal character in
Luhmann’s theory and do not guarantee the solution of every social problem
or the development beneficial for every member of society.
iii) Social Democracy
Socialism usually is mentioned among the most important ideologies to-

gether with conservatism and liberalism. Compared to the other two ideolo-
gies, socialism is a much more diverging collection of ideas: it refers to
radically different versions of ideologies, such as communism or the New
Labour in the United Kingdom. Since the aim of this section is to explore how
Luhmann’s views relate to the main contemporary ideologies, I think it is
more practical to examine, instead of socialism in a wide sense, rather one of
its essentially modified versions, social democracy. However, socialism and
social democracy cannot be handled as completely separate ideologies, and
this especially holds true if we are dealing with the methodological or social
theoretical foundations of the ideologies. Thus, first I outline the common
fundamental principles underlying the different versions of socialism, and
then I define the main features of social democracy.
In my opinion, the five fundamental principles identified by Michael
Freeden as the core of socialism are suitable for this aim because they do not
exclude any versions of this ideology. The first is the idea that we cannot un-
derstand society on the basis of the individuals existing independently of one
another, but we have to analyze the relationship between them, the groups
or classes constituted by them, or the structure of society. These societal fac-

tors have priority over individuals because they determine or influence the
persons’ thought. According to the second principle, the institutions have
to be constructed in such a way that they must serve the welfare of people
as opposed to the liberals’ view that the main task of these institutions is to
defend individual freedom. The third principle states that human nature
needs activity and perfection, which can be achieved by creative work and
self-realization. Creative work is much more than production conceived as a
mere value creation. The fourth principle is equality, which does not only
mean that all people are equal by nature—for liberalism also accepts this
tenet—but that the institutions of society have to further the real material
equality of the people. Finally, the fifth principle states that the history of
society is conducted by certain regularities. In other words, far-reaching and
long-term processes that are independent of people’s will play the key role in
the formation of society (Freeden 1996: 425–438).
Regarding the implementation of these fundamental principles in the
practice, socialists endeavor to remedy the social inequalities caused by eco-
nomic processes with the help of political means. This effort can be embodied
by different political programs. Social democracy can be regarded as the less
radical version of these possibilities because it has actually given up the anti-
capitalism and the abolishment of private ownership, which are characteris-
tic of most socialists. Instead, social democracy endeavors to remedy social
problems within the framework of capitalist economy by state intervention;
that is, it strives to operate the institutions of welfare state. Thus, the five
fundamental principles only hold true for social democracy with restrictions.
Social democrats have, in fact, given up the realization of real equality; they
deem it inevitable that there are rich and poor. Of course, politics cannot be
insensible of inequalities; its task is to mitigate poverty, to prevent its repro-
duction, and to ensure the equality of the chances. Regarding the historical
trajectory, by now they have given up the possibility of exceeding the pre-
sent societal and economic order.68
68 When social democracy was born in the 19th century, the proponents of this ideology re-
garded the reform of capitalist society by democratic means only as a temporary compro-
mise, and they believed in the efficiency of socialist society (Berman 2003: 120–125). In the
1970s and 1980s social democratic parties pursued the aim of realizing a socialist society (for
Germany, see Huster 2000: 148–149), but when coming into power, they took steps for the
nationalization of economy only to a very restricted extent (Self 1997: 337). I accept that
Considering Luhmann’s relation to social democracy, one of the most im-

portant features of his œuvre is the criticism of social democratic political
practice, that is, of welfare state. The basis of this criticism is neither the in-
dividuals’ inalienable rights to ownership and self-determination—like in the
case of the liberals—nor the rejection of artificial interventions in the organic
development of society—which is characteristic of the conservatives—but
it is based exclusively on pragmatic arguments. Economy, since it is an
autonomous and closed system, cannot be directed by politics. Every attempt
to impel economy to produce outputs favorable for politics can only reach
the intended result to a very restricted extent, while we have to face many
unintended consequences. Moreover, since it endeavors to create a center
responsible for society as a whole, Luhmann considers political intervention
in economy an attempt against the fundamental principle of modern society,
that is, the autonomy of subsystems (Luhmann 1990a1: 100–101).69
At the same time, Luhmann’s standpoint opposed to the welfare state is
less categorical than those of the liberals and conservatives. This consists not
only in the fact that Luhmann formulates only pragmatic and not moral ar-
guments, but he also regards the appearance and the continuous widening of
the demands for welfare state provisions as a necessary consequence of the
structure of modern society. In other words, according to his theory, modern
society inevitably strives to realize welfare state. In functionally differenti-
ated society, everyone lays claim to inclusion in all the functional subsys-
tems, and no one can be denied this.70 Thus, an interesting situation arises
where Luhmann considers welfare state both inevitable and dangerous at the
same time.
some present-day social democrats do regard the emergence of an economic system, which
is different from capitalism, as a real chance, but I think that the current social democratic
stance can be much better characterized as an acceptance of capitalism. The acceptance of
capitalism by the social democrats appeared most clearly in the politics of the British New
Labour movement, lead by Tony Blair (for the theoretical declaration of this acceptance, see
Giddens 1998: 1–26; for its critical reception, see Kiss E. 2003a). At the same time, however,
we must not exclude that this capitalist turn of social democracy—accompanied by the con-
tinuation or intensification of the social problems—will result in the strengthening of the
traditional socialist parties, as we can already observe it in the case of the German socialist
party, The Left.
69 Luhmann calls the concept of “social market economy” a utopia, which promises that capi-
talism and socialism are realizable within the same system (Luhmann 1995c: 194).
70 See Chapter Six, Section F.
Besides the practical arguments against welfare state, there is a quite

fundamental opposition between Luhmann and the leftist theories: while the
leftist thinkers’ main aim is to criticize the established order and to emanci-
pate people, in Luhmann’s view all this is unrealizable. The main reason for
the impracticability of these endeavors is complexity: the reason why we
cannot speak of real democratic decision making process based on participa-
tion or of a public dispute with rational arguments is not that the established
power hinders it but that the complexity does not render it possible.
In spite of the sharp opposition, we can find some similarities between
Luhmann’s theory and the socialist or social democratic arguments. These
similarities mostly regard the methodological and theoretical standpoints.
One of the common points is, for example, that both Luhmann and social-
ists emphasize the macro-level factors rather than the individual in the
explanation of societal phenomena. Furthermore, Luhmann regards some of
Marx’s findings as important steps toward constructivism; for example, he
mentions that Marx did not base his economic theory on objective facts out-
side the society, but he treated it as a social construction (Luhmann 1998c1:
7–8). Marx’s insistence on the existential determination or ideological char-
acter of the knowledge can also be regarded as an important step in the
formation of sociology of knowledge. There are, of course, significant differ-
ences between Luhmann’s and Marx’s sociology of knowledge. Luhmann, for
example, criticizes Marx for overestimating the role of economy (Luhmann
1998c1: 8–9) or for founding sociology of knowledge on the classes (Luhmann
1999a: 1058–1059). A further connection between Luhmann’s theory and the
leftist views is that the constructivism Luhmann also represents—as I have
mentioned it when discussing the science wars71—is beloved chiefly by the
leftist thinkers72 although, as we have also seen, the constructivist concept of
science is not accompanied in Luhmann’s theory by a criticism of culture and
science, like in leftist approaches. Finally, there are some similarities be-
tween Luhmann’s and the socialists’ views regarding the process of history.
Although Luhmann rejects historical determinism and characterizes the
structures and institutions of modern society as extraordinarily improbable
evolutionary achievements, he divides history into periods, where the transi-
tion between the periods is not a result of people’s intended actions, but
71 See Chapter Seven, Section A.

72 As a consequence of this, Luhmann’s theory had a kind of attractiveness for the leftist think-
ers (Neckel and Wolf 1994: 93–95), even if its refusal is more common on the Left.
macro-level societal processes play the key role in it. This bears some resem-
blance to the socialist conception of history, but it is, of course, not a negligi-
ble difference that in Luhmann’s theory the last stage is lacking.
iv) Summary
If we want to position Luhmann’s theory in the context of the main ideolo-

gies, it is worth distinguishing between the theoretical foundations of the
ideologies and the practical principles following from them. Let us start with
the latter because it is easier. Regarding the principles for political practice,
Luhmann’s standpoint is usually close to the liberal position. It has some
similarity to conservatism as well, but this only holds true for the economic
issues. If we examine Luhmann’s views along the two axes representing the
political attitudes (one of them represents the economic dimension while the
other the relation to authority),73 he will get to the field of the liberals. The
reason is that the respect of authority, which is characteristic of the conser-
vatives, has no significant place in Luhmann’s theory.74 The situation, how-
ever, will change if we attempt to position him on the basis of the theoretical
and methodological questions. In this respect, the situation is quite the con-
trary: his standpoint is mostly opposed to liberalism. His views have some
resemblances to those of conservatives and socialists, but it can be clearly
classified among neither of these camps. Especially the lack of positive guid-
ance is what makes it more difficult to classify his theory. According to
Luhmann, neither is tradition a guarantee for solving the problems of soci-
ety, nor will freedom result in a development advantageous for everyone,
and the possibilities of forming and controlling society are very restricted.
In Luhmann’s writings we cannot find real prescriptive expressions that
could manifest his ideological position, but exactly Luhmann’s interpretation
of ideology shows that a theory can be regarded as an ideology without con-
taining explicit value judgments. According to Luhmann, the function of ide-
ologies is to present some of the infinite consequences of the decisions as
important and to decrease the significance of the rest. A main feature of the
73 See, for example, the online political compass: http: //www.politicalcompass.org/index.

74 Uwe Schimank also argues that in spite of his methodological antihumanism, Luhmann takes
a stand for the separation of man and society, that is, for a liberal basic value (Schimank
2005: 278–282).
political efforts to operate the welfare state is exactly that they have a lot of
consequences. The welfare state decreases the efficiency of economy, but at
the same time—even if not to the extent intended—it helps the inclusion of
the indigents into the societal subsystems. The fact that Luhmann empha-
sizes the decreasing efficiency of the economy and he speaks of the welfare
state mostly in a negative context can be regarded exactly as an ideological
character in the Luhmannian sense.75
75 Barbara Kuchler comes to similar conclusion in the analysis of Luhmann’s views on welfare
state. Luhmann criticizes welfare state for endangering the autonomy of the economic sys-
tem. At the same time, however, the theory of functional differentiation could also be inter-
preted differently, stating that economy endangers the autonomy of the other systems, and
the task of welfare state is to preserve the independence of these systems. Thus, Luhmann
can choose between two alternatives that are both possible theoretically, and he opts for the
one corresponding to the right-wing political practice (Kuchler 2006: 11–21). Chris Thornhill
calls Luhmann’s method of taking a stand on political issues without prescriptive expres-
sions a non-normative normativity (Thornhill 2006: 89–93).
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Criticism of Luhmann’s Theory
Not many theories were criticized as vehemently as Luhmann’s. There are

hardly any points or components in his theory that have been left intact by
criticism, which has not abated even after his death. Not only is the number
of the critical remarks on his theory remarkable, but also their vehemence is
uncommon in scientific life.1 Thus, before surveying the criticism against
Luhmann, it is worth examining the reason for the volume and intensity of
this criticism. Without striving for completeness, we can mention the follow-
ing seven points:
1) Although the elaboration of a comprehensive theory of society can be
an attractive scientific aim, there are only a few productions that reach a
level of complexity and plausibility that can arouse the interest of the wider
scientific community. But if a scholar’s endeavors of this kind seem to be
promising—as Luhmann’s work was considered remarkable already at the
beginning if his career2—it will hold the spotlight. This attention will proba-
bly be accompanied by an intensive criticism. The reason is that if someone
aims to elaborate a comprehensive theory—as opposed to narrower subject
matters that can be clearly circumscribed—he enters a vague and obscure
field and can easily become a target for criticism.
2) As has been already mentioned,3 in the Germany of the 1960s, the en-
deavor to construct a comprehensive theory of society was the prerogative of
the leftist thinkers. Consequently, when Luhmann—who, regarding both his
intellectual predecessors and his theoretical findings, was linked up with
right-wing or conservative theorists and topics—appeared with his ambitious
1 Sometimes his critics consider him as the devil’s disciple (Éber 2006: 341), while he has be-
come a cult in the eyes of his admirers (Bangó 2002: 213). Nevertheless, nowadays the more
objective and more balanced commentaries are perhaps coming into prominence. Uwe
Schimank characterizes the authors of the book edited by him as critical sympathizers and
sympathizing critics (Schimank 2003a: 8).
2 One of his main opponents, Habermas, has also acknowledged his results very early
(Habermas 1971: 142).
3 See Chapter One, Section A.
endeavors on a terrain that was regarded as a peculiarity of the Left, the left-
ist thinkers saw in him a more dangerous competitor than in other conserva-
tive theorists, and this has increased the intensity of their criticism against
him.
3) The confrontation with Habermas, who already in the 1960s had a good
reputation, has given an impetus both to Luhmann’s notoriety and to the
criticism against him. This confrontation was chiefly manifested in their
common book published in 1971. This work was followed in the next four
years by three volumes of studies, in which many scholars reflected on the
theoretical endeavors of the two authors. A resonance to this extent is very
rare in the scientific life.
4) Several concepts and findings of Luhmann’s theory imply a radical
break with the philosophical, sociological, or political scientific tradition, and
these innovations often find shape in strange definitions and statements. In
the light of this, it is no wonder that a lot of scientists are averse to these new
concepts and findings.
5) The opposition to his theory was further increased by the fact that
Luhmann imported new elements into his theory mainly from disciplines
that were far from sociology and philosophy, such as neurobiology, cybernet-
ics, or mathematics. It is obvious that sociologists are averse to a theory
whose references include names largely unknown for sociologist, such as
Humberto Maturana, Heinz von Foerster, George Spencer Brown, Gotthard
Günther, or Fritz Heider (Éber 2006: 335–336). Systems theory itself has a
quite bad reputation in social sciences as it is usually accompanied by ideas
such as rigidity, restriction of freedom, or technocratic power (Schwanitz
1995: 137). Thus, Luhmann’s ambitious systems theoretical endeavor has
given rise to distrust from the beginning although it differed from the former
systems theories in very important points, concerning primarily the above-
mentioned stigmas.
6) In spite of his very abstract aims, Luhmann has touched a number of
actual political questions, and regarding these topics he was very critical to-
wards leftist views. His criticism meant a special challenge for his opponents
as it was seemingly not a manifestation of certain interests but was based on
an exceedingly comprehensive theory of society.
7) Finally, I think Luhmann’s pretty sarcastic style—which I have men-
tioned in discussing his relation to socialism—also contributed to the fact
that he was often quite vehemently criticized.
The Criticism of Luhmann’s Theory 233
In what follows, first I endeavor to systematize the criticism against

Luhmann. Of course, there is no way to take all criticism into account; thus,
I concentrate on those referring to the aspects of Luhmann’s theory I have
discussed in this book, that is, the structure of Luhmann’s whole theory and
his main theoretical decisions on the one hand, and his findings on politics
on the other. Neither is there room to examine whether Luhmann or his crit-
ics were right. What prevents us from doing so is not only the limited size of
this book, but in many cases it also seems questionable whether the ques-
tions arising can be answered at all. After discussing criticism, I present two
of my own critical remarks on Luhmann’s theory.
A) Criticisms of Luhmann’s Theory
In this section I present a possible typology of the criticism of Luhmann’s

theory. I bundle up those critics that either criticize the same theoretical de-
cision in Luhmann’s theory, or aim at different points but reveal a contradic-
tion of the same type. In specifying the types, I endeavor to follow the course
of the reconstruction of the theory; that is, I proceed from the most abstract
level to the more concrete findings.
1) The most abstract aim of Luhmann’s theory is to eliminate every pre-
supposition from his theory; that is, in the course of building his theory, he
wants to introduce every concept and to construct every statement in such a
way that he does not rely on anything pre-given. On the most abstract level
this means the rejection of the way of thinking based on identity, which he
replaces with the theory of difference. The first group of criticism states that
Luhmann has not succeeded in realizing this aim; that is, he has not succeed
in the de-ontologization because he has not eliminated all presuppositions or
all elements based on identity.4 Nevertheless, most of these criticisms agree
4 According to Gerhard Wagner, the difference of system/environment is based on an identity

(Wagner 1994: 286–288, 2003: 214–216), and Luhmann’s theory, in fact, relates to Hegel’s lo-
gics; thus, it uses absolutized concepts of unity and differentiation (Wagner 1996: 100).
Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz holds that Luhmann’s system conception is the point where
Luhmann cannot break with transcendental philosophy (Merz-Benz 2003: 70). Marcus Otto
states that Luhmann represents a kind of functionalist fundamentalism and identity-based
logic when he defines the unity of the system with function-specific system/environment
distinctions (Otto 2003: 379–380). Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian hold that the concept
of self-reference in the sense as Luhmann uses it presupposes an identity-based logic
in the necessity of changing over from identity-based thinking to difference

theory. Others, however, consider difference theory as being problematic,
and they point out that it leads to relativism and arbitrariness.5
2) The second group of oppositions refers to Luhmann’s best-known key
concept, that of autopoiesis. This concept stems from two neurobiologists,
Humberto Maturana and Fransisco Varela, who intended it for a biological
theory. Luhmann, however, considered that the concept could be adapted to
sociology as well. In his view, this does not mean an analogical way of
thought but the generalization of the concept of autopoiesis and thus allow-
ing the construction of a general systems theory based on the principle of
autopoiesis, of which the theory of social systems is one subtype. By doing so,
he has reinterpreted to some extent Maturana’s and Varela’s theory.6 Never-
theless, this theoretical decision is the most criticized point of Luhmann’s
theory. According to the most frequent criticism, even if the principle of
autopoiesis or self-organization can be successfully applied in biology, the
way Luhmann uses it in sociology is methodologically incorrect.7 The prob-
lem with autopoiesis is not only that it has implications holding true only for
(Wagner and Zipprian 1992: 401). Walter L. Bühl calls Luhmann’s theory ontological because
of the paradoxes and circularities (Bühl 2003: 246). According to Danilo Zolo, Luhmann has
returned to an ontological-metaphysical standpoint by adopting the concept of autopoiesis
(Zolo 1985: 531). Armin Nassehi also holds that the autopoiesis presupposes ontology al-
though not an a priori but an a posteriori one (Nassehi 1992: 67). According to Sigrid Brandt,
ontological presumptions referring to time are to be found in Luhmann’s theory (Brandt
1992: 177). Günther Thomas considers that Luhmann’s concept of the world has not broken
with the ontological way of thinking (Thomas 1992: 329). According to Boris Hennig,
Luhmann has modified Spencer Brown’s form theory arbitrarily; therefore, he could not re-
fer to it when expounding his own theory (Hennig 2003: 193–195). And according to
Habermas, Luhmann is, in fact, the heir of subject philosophy (Habermas 1990: 368–385).
5 See Martens 2003a: 290–290, and for a general criticism of difference theory, see Kiss E. 2002.
6 For example, according to Luhmann, the components of autopoietic systems in Maturana’s
theory can be durable operations, whereas in his own they are momentary (Luhmann 2004c:
109–110).
7 According to Wolfgang Lipp, the sociological application of the concept of autopoiesis leads
to a teleological theory of society (Lipp 1987: 464). Ulrich Druwe also holds that the theory of
self-organizing systems is problematic because it involves the concept of self-sustaining,
which can be empirically defined in biology, but it is impossible to point it out in the case of
social systems (Druwe 1988: 774).
biology, but also that it suggests a notion of modern society that can hardly
be reconciled with the everyday experiences.8
3) Perhaps the most surprising theoretical decision in Luhmann’s theory
is his claim that society does not consist of people or actions but of commu-
nications, also that people are placed outside the society, or to be more pre-
cise, they are divided up into biological, psychic, and social components.
These are two different theses: society does not consist of people on the one
hand, and the criterion or basic unit of sociality is not action but communica-
tion on the other. Of course, it is possible to accept one of them and reject the
other, but the two standpoints are often connected, so it is worth discussing
these criticisms in one group. Luhmann emphasizes that his decision had
theoretical precedents, and that he does not want to eliminate the concepts
of people and action or to assert that they are not important, but he only
states that they are not suitable to be initial concepts. Nevertheless,
Luhmann so radically opposes the established sociological tradition with this
decision that this has become one of the most intensively attacked points of
his work. Those criticizing Luhmann, of course, do not think that we should
maintain people or action as fundamental concepts solely because of the tra-
dition, but they endeavor to demonstrate that without them Luhmann fails to
explain a number of social phenomena.9 Some also say that action theory and
8 According to Walter Bühl, the theory of autopoiesis lacks any ideas about leading and direc-
tion, without which no theory of society can be considered complete (Bühl 1987: 245–246).
Johannes Berger also holds that the theory of autopoietic systems cannot suitably handle the
problems of control and coordination, and that one needs forced conceptual maneuvers to
use it for the description of everyday phenomena (Berger 2003: 222–228). According to Klaus
von Beyme, the concept of autopoiesis can be used by several political approaches. The al-
ternative stating the impossibility of political steering and represented by Luhmann is only
one of the possibilities, and Beyme states this standpoint contradicts to the empirical ex-
periences (Beyme 1991a: 21). According to Bernard R. Hornung, the theory of autopoietic
systems cannot describe some important empirical features of modern society. He, for ex-
ample, does not deem it satisfying to replace the integration through values by the co-
evolution of autopoietic systems, as Luhmann did it (Hornung 2006: 211–212). Richard
Münch can also be classified in this group. He has elaborated a systems theory of his own,
whose main difference from Luhmann’s theory is that he lays more emphasis on interpen-
etration between societal systems. Consequently, he heavily criticizes the idea of the closed,
autopoietic systems (for politics, see Münch 1994: 11–52; for reconstructing the debate be-
tween Münch and Luhmann, see Balogh 2001).
9 According to Michael Welker, the main problem is that Luhmann endeavors to explain the
emergence of social systems with the help of the concept of double contingency taken over
from Parsons, but in Welker’s view this only works in the framework of action theory
communication theory do not necessarily have to be opposed,10 but their in-

tegration is possible as well, and the theoretical developments of the past few
years—including Luhmann’s work—head in this direction.11
4) The next group of criticisms consists of arguments stating that
Luhmann’s theory—although it claims to be general, that is, it aims to de-
scribe all fields of society—cannot give an account of several important social
scientific concepts. Luhmann himself also considers that theories can de-
scribe the world solely from a specific point of view and never in its whole
totality. To construct a theory, we have to make theoretical decisions, and
these decisions determine and limit our possibilities of constructing concepts
and formulating findings. Nevertheless, Luhmann does not hold that systems
theory is only one of the theoretical descriptions of sociality or society, but
(Welker 1992: 356–365). Uwe Schimank holds that action and actors are necessary for the
explanation of functional differentiation (Schimank 1995b: 34). Gerhard Hauck also deems
that Luhmann’s attempt to describe functional differentiation exclusively with communica-
tion fails (Hauck 1999: 259–262). According to Gunther Teubner, it is not a problem in itself
that people are not parts of society, and he regards Luhmann’s theory as the most plausible
description of society, but he holds that Luhmann’s solution for the connection between
communication systems and consciousnesses is not satisfying (Teubner 2001: 39–40). Ac-
cording to Ilja Srubar, a language concept related to action is needed to fulfill the functions
Luhmann ascribes to it (Srubar 2005: 619–621). Reiner Greshoff holds that the way Luhmann
handles double contingency or communication theory is, in fact, an actor or action theory
(Greshoff 2006: 171). Furthermore, he claims that Luhmann had to reject the thesis that so-
ciety consists of people because he did not have a suitable concept of society (Greshoff 2003:
98). Alfred Bohnen criticizes Luhmann’s thesis that social phenomena cannot be reduced to
individual ones. According to him, emergence is not identical with irreducibility, and the
emergence of the social order can only be understood if it is traced back to individual ac-
tions (Bohnen 1994: 304–305). Wolf-Dieter Narr holds that we cannot avoid the subject in
constructing a theory of society (Narr 2001: 58). Lajos András Kiss also misses the concept of
subject in Luhmann’s theory, and he claims that because of the lack of it, Luhmann has to
describe social systems by attributes usually ascribed to the subject (Kiss L. A. 2006: 119–
125). According to Michael Greven, Luhmann cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of
political phenomena without an action theoretical approach (Greven 2001: 207). Michael
Weingarten holds that we need an action theory in order to describe the development of so-
ciety (Weingarten 2001: 307–310). Furthermore, we can find commentaries stating that by
accepting the theory of autopoietic systems, we do not have to give up the concept of man as
a unity (Dziewas 1992: 124–125).
10 Hartmut Esser explains the opposition between Luhmann’s communication theory and
Habermas’s action theory by stating that they use the concept of action in completely differ-
ent meanings (Handlung and Handeln) (Esser 1993: 540–542).
11 See Nolte 1999.
he continuously endeavors to demonstrate that this theory provides the best

way to describe social phenomena. However, his critics regard this differ-
ently. They strive to point out what has been disregarded by Luhmann’s
theory.12 One of the most frequent criticisms of Luhmann’s theory is that it
does not lay enough emphasis on the problem of space or spatiality,13 or the
material aspect of the world is lacking in general.14 It is also mentioned as a
defect of his theory that it cannot adequately grasp some phenomena, such
as norms,15 ethnical and cultural conflicts,16 social inequalities,17 power,18 the
features of the societal subsystems,19 the influences or struggles of actors or
groups,20 everyday semantics,21 and he is criticized for laying not enough em-
phasis on organizations when constructing the theory of society.22 Further-
more, we can also find opinions criticizing Luhmann because of the selective
and superficial analysis of the classics of sociology.23 According to some au-
thors, Luhmann’s theory lacks the most important thing, namely the theory
of society.24
12 According to Hartmut Hentig, the main problem with Luhmann’s theory is not what it says
but what it leaves unsaid (Hentig 1973: 142).
13 See Bangó 2004: 109–112; Filippov 2003; Kössler 1998: 177–178. According to Bernard Willms,
the lack of spatiality makes Luhmann’s political theory deficient because the territorial state
as a constructive momentum is omitted from it (Willms 1973: 74).
14 See Lindemann 1999: 179.
15 Werner Krawietz criticizes Luhmann for reducing norms to expectations (Krawietz 1992a:
29–32), and that in his theory of society norms are only deduced and not fundamental con-
cepts (Krawietz 1992b: 248–249).
16 See Hüttermann 1999: 237–238.
17 See Schwimm 1998: 12–13.
18 Hannelore Bublitz, by comparing Luhmann’s and Foucault’s theories, finds several similari-
ties between them, but she emphasizes that Luhmann, in contrast to Foucault, eludes the
analysis of power (Bublitz 2001: 73).
19 According to Volker Schmidt, it is impossible to grasp all the characteristics of economy,
politics, law, or other fields by means of communicative operations (Schmidt 2005: 413–414).
20 See Pokol 2005: 12–31.
21 Wil Martens criticizes Luhmann for limiting the semantic analyses to the so-called culti-
vated (gepflegt) semantics and thus disregarding everyday semantics, which is no less impor-
tant for the theory of society (Martens 2003b: 181–182).
22 See Werner 1992: 206–207.
23 See Seyfahrt 1986: 24.
24 See Hondrich 1973: 110; Schwinn 1995a: 196.
5) It is also a frequent objection to Luhmann’s theory that a connection

between his theory and the reality is lacking;25 that is, his statements cannot
be verified empirically, and his theory does not provide new knowledge or
explanations.26 Instead, his theoretical tools are only “conceptual build-
ings from linguistic constructions,”27 or “conceptual-categorical finger-
exercises,”28 and this is nothing but a “program of a useless science.”29 If we
succeed in comparing his statements to reality, we find that the facts do not
confirm his theory.30
6) One of Luhmann’s most important findings on modern society is its
unmanageability or the uncontrollability and autonomy of its subsystems.
This statement primarily implies the impossibility or the limitedness of
political planning and intervention. It is indisputable that by this thesis
Luhmann grasps one of the most important problems of our society.
Nevertheless, his critics consider that Luhmann describes this question
25 See Misgeld 1994: 154.

26 Jeremias Blaser mentions two reasons for this. On the one hand, the theory is constructed on
a too high abstraction level; on the other, Luhmann rejects the distinction between theory
and facts (Blaser 2003: 95). According to Dierk Starnitzke, the reason for the groundlessness
of the theory is that Luhmann endeavors to construct the theory of sociality by proceeding
from the most abstract level (Starnitzke 1992: 83–84). According to Alex Viskovatoff, it is a
mistake to regard autopoiesis as the ground of the theory because it does not have any ex-
planatory power (Viskovatoff 1999). Jörn Lamla states that Luhmann’s analysis of the emer-
gence of modern society is to be regarded as a one-sided interpretation (Lamla 2003: 268–
269). According to Alex Demirovic, Luhmann’s theory is hermetically closed and does not
lead to a better understanding of societal processes (Demirovic 2002: 297). At the same time,
Harmut Esser emphasizes that in spite of its radically different theoretical endeavors and
standpoints, explanatory sociology and especially the rational choice theory can learn a lot
from Luhmann’s theory (Esser 2005). Michael Hutter holds that although Luhmann’s theory
of economy provides better explanations for the historical or evolutionary changes than
other theories, in the case of the micro-level economic phenomena, which presuppose the
actors’ decisions, its explanatory power falls behind them (Hutter 1990: 493). Thomas
Luckmann and Bernard Giesen think that Luhmann’s sociology of knowledge is problematic
because his theory does not explain anything and handles the historical material too selec-
tively and adjusted to his aims (Luckmann and Giesen 1982).
27 See Esser 1991: 10. According to Esser, this objection also holds true for Habermas. Karl
Hermann Tjaden has the same opinion; at the beginning of the Habermas–Luhmann debate,
he criticized them that their theories cannot be translated into practice (Tjaden 1973: 79).
28 See Weyer 1994: 145.
29 See Kastl 1998: 416.
30 According to Karin Knorr-Cetina, Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation is not com-
plex enough to be able to describe modern society (Knorr-Cetina 1992).
one-sidedly.31 In spite of all problems of planning and steering, it would be an

absurdity to give them up and to wait for the evolution.32 Furthermore, it
would be a mistake to deny every possibility of coordinating the functional
subsystems33 or that there are some developments in increasing the effi-
ciency of steering.34
7) The next group of criticism states that although Luhmann endeavors to
present his theory as aiming at a value-free description of society, in the re-
ality it contains normative elements and serves definite political aims. By
these—usually conservative—political aims he endeavors to maintain the
status quo,35 but Luhmann’s neo-liberalism is also included among the accu-
sations.36 In terms of frequent criticism, Luhmann introduces normativity in
his theory by stealth, that is, by handling functional differentiation as a
norm. In this way the endeavors opposed to the autonomous functioning of
the subsystems—such as the welfare state or the protest movements—appear
as factors endangering the stability of the whole society.37
31 According to Axel Görlitz and Silke Adam, the theorem of structural couplings between the
subsystems could not only result in Luhmann’s pessimism but in the optimism for the possi-
bility of steering as well (Görlitz and Adam 2003: 271).
32 See Miller 2003: 154. According to Hauke Brunkhorst, the opposition between planning and
evolution is a misinterpretation (Brunkhorst 2003: 327).
33 See Bendel 1993: 272–277; Miller 1994: 119.
34 See Demirovic 2001b: 223. According to Christoph Görg, there are important attempts to
describe the whole society’s reaction to ecological challenges, but Luhmann’s theory com-
pletely excludes them (Görg 2001: 281–281).
35 One of the most important points of the Habermas–Luhmann debate was the question to
what extent the systems theoretical description of society serves ideological aims. According
to Habermas, Luhmann’s views on legitimation imply ideological endeavors (Habermas 1971:
260–269). Klaus Eder states that the difference between Luhmann’s and Habermas’s theory is
that while the status quo plays a too central role in the former, the ideal speech situation is
overemphasized in the latter (Eder 1973: 37). Hans-Joachim Giegel also holds that because
Luhmann’s theory of society is based on the existing social conditions, the theories deriving
from it have to support the premise of stability (Giegel 1975: 144).
36 See Wolfe 1994: 122–126.
37 See Ashenden 2006: 144; Barben 2001: 106; Hellmann 2002: 30–31; Hellmann and Fischer
2003: 12–13; Oberdorfer 1992: 325–326. According to Hans-Jürgen Bieling, the “functional
idealization of the societal status quo” hides the critical potential of organization theory
(Bieling 2001: 163). Dirk Martin sees the hidden normativity of Luhmann’s theory in the fact
that Luhmann deduces basic rights from functional differentiation as a “super norm”
(Martin 2001: 191).
8) In the final group I have classified the receptions of Luhmann that can-
not be regarded as a veritable criticism but rather modifications and im-
provements of his theory, or specifications of the points where further
examinations are needed. The reason why these kinds of efforts are justified
is that Luhmann’s theory claims to be valid for all social phenomena, but the
detailed investigation of all topics could not be completed even in Luhmann’s
immense œuvre. The points to be expounded and improved are, for example,
the features of the subsystems38 or the relations between them,39 the con-
cepts of inclusion40 and exclusion,41 the questions of the political parties42 and
political evolution,43 and the topic of information society.44 There are en-
deavors to elaborate a theory of social work on the basis of Luhmann’s the-
ory.45 We can also find attempts to operationalize Luhmann’s theory.46 And
finally, there are ideas that Luhmann’s theory can be further developed by a
38 Rudolf Stichweh improves the idea of the global scientific system (Stichweh 1996).
Luhmann’s theory has triggered the greatest resonance in the field of legal theory (King
2006).
39 See Schimank 1998: 179, 2003b: 283–284; Simsa 2002: 161–165. According to Andreas
Schemann, structural couplings between subsystems should be described with a stronger
emphasis on the role of the legal system and normativity (Schemann 1992: 224–229). Stefan
Jensen holds that the relationship between the political subsystem and psychic systems is a
point to be improved for a better understanding of obedience (Jensen 2003: 30–31). Using
Béla Pokol’s findings, Péter Gedeon states that Luhmann’s theory can be improved by the
thesis of the central role of economic subsystem. Accordingly, a double rationality works in
the other subsystems—except politics—because they are also dependent on the medium of
money (Gedeon 2002).
40 According to Alfons Bora, the concept of inclusion should include modal and gradual aspects
(Bora 2002: 66–78). Georg Kneer holds that the concept of inclusion should be extended be-
yond natural persons to legal persons (Kneer 2003: 154–155). Jost Halfmann emphasizes the
role of the nation state in the inclusion (Halfmann 2002). Rudolf Stichweh improves the con-
cept of political inclusion in the light of the present challenges that world society faces
(Stichweh 1998).
41 According to Klaus Kuhm, social inequalities can be examined with the help of the concept
of exclusion (Kuhm 2000).
42 See Reese-Schäfer 2002.
43 See Helmann 2003.
44 See Baecker 2006.
45 See Baecker 1994; Bangó 2001a, 2001b; Bardmann 2000; Kleve 2001.
46 See Leydesdorff 1996.
certain shifting of accent: for example, professional institutions should play a

more important role in it.47
B) The Essentially Distinct Character of Politics
In this and the next sections, I formulate two critical remarks on Luhmann’s
theory. The first reads that regarding the degree of its regulation, organiza-
tion, and centralization, and considering the importance of the actors, poli-
tics has so important differences from other functional subsystems that,
in my view, it cannot be handled in the same way. I do not claim that
Luhmann’s findings completely hold true for the other subsystems. To an-
swer this question, a longer examination would be necessary, and I think it is
questionable whether we could ever decide it clearly. I could also put it like
this: the characteristics of the functional subsystems, in my view, describe
the most important features of politics less plausibly than they do it in the
case of other subsystems.
I think the different character of politics is due to its higher degree of
regulation, organization, and centralization. But first let us examine another
special feature of politics because we can derive arguments from it as well.
This special feature consists in the fact that as opposed to the other func-
tional subsystems, politics—together with the legal system—is characterized
by segmentary differentiation; that is, it is divided up into states, and it does
not function on the level of world society. Of course, Luhmann does not deny
this feature of the political system, but he insists on his statement that poli-
tics has to be conceived as a subsystem of world society. Luhmann explains
the segmentary differentiation of politics by the fact that its function—that
is, producing collectively binding decisions—cannot be fulfilled on the level
of world society. It can only be solved within definite territorial borders, and
this is why the political system is divided up into territorial segments, that
is, into states. Thus, according to Luhmann, functional differentiation is
the primary form, and segmentary differentiation into states only emerges
after it as a kind of secondary differentiation. Nevertheless, the latter is a
47 This idea stems from Béla Pokol, who disagrees with Luhmann’s statement that the differen-
tiation of functional subsystems is primarily ensured by binary codes. According to Pokol,
this is more likely due to the structures, with the proviso that enduring structures can only
emerge in professional institutions (Pokol 1991: 6, 2004: 94–95).
prerequisite for the former. That is, for the emergence of a political system
functioning on the level of world society, its internal segmentary differentia-
tion is necessary (Luhmann 2002a: 222). The two kinds of differentiation have
to happen together.
To support the thesis of the primacy of functional differentiation, that is,
the thesis of the emergence of a political system on the level of world society,
Luhmann offers, among other things, the argument that in the course of the
formation of the states, theorists did not endeavor to legitimate the existence
of the state by referring to internal factors—for example, they did not refer
to the claim that the ruler has obtained the crown rightfully—but they laid
the emphasis on the international acknowledgement, that is, on proving
that the state can enforce the monopoly of violence on a definite terrain
(Luhmann 2002a: 225). And the fact that state borders usually coincide with
the geographical boundaries of the nationalities can be explained by the the-
sis that certain geographical, cultural, or other factors can facilitate the ac-
ceptance of the collectively binding decisions, and national status is one of
the most important factors of this kind.48
I think Luhmann is right that the emergence of the states cannot be ex-
plained separately from one another and from their environment but only
with the help of wider geopolitical factors. In my view, however, this does
not prove that we have to proceed from a political system on the level of
world society. Following Klaus Holz (Holz 2003: 40), we can simply say that
the differentiation of the political function happened in the different territo-
rial segments in a parallel way without the emergence of a worldwide func-
tional system. The fact that this process happened simultaneously in the
segments is, of course, by no means an accident; it is a result of events on the
level of world society. We would not explain the emergence of the states
separately in this case either but by analyzing world society. But this expla-
nation would differ from Luhmann’s one in that we do not suppose the emer-
gence of a global political system but only ones limited to states.
48 Rudolf Stichweh has examined the role of nations in the global political system’s differentia-
tion into states in detail. He defined the functions of the nation with three points: it creates
the equality in terms of national status; it renders plausible the fixation of state borders; and
it ensures cultural homogeneity to a certain extent (Stichweh 2000b: 51–54).
Due to world society as a point of departure, Luhmann’s views also have

found responses in the theory of international relations49 although he him-
self dealt with this topic only marginally (Albert 2004: 22). The interest in
Luhmann’s theory can be ascribed to the fact that in the second half of the
20th century, there was a change of paradigm in the analysis of international
relations. This change consisted in the fact that the theories interpreting in-
ternational relations exclusively as relationships between states were con-
sidered no more suitable. Instead, transnational non-governmental actors
have become more and more important, international institutions were in
the growth and getting stronger, international integration was growing,
and international functional relationships were intensifying. The state is one
of the actors on the international scene full of mutual dependences.50
Luhmann’s idea that society has to be conceived as world society fits well this
theoretical shift of accent. In my view, however, this does not mean that the
level of world society has primacy in the case of the political system as well,
and that we should derive the existence of the state from it. As opposed to
economy or science, where it seems to be plausible to say that they function
on the level of world society, in the case of politics, the point of departure is
the state today as well, and international politics primarily means politics
between states. In the case of politics the global level seems to be derived or
to be secondary.
A further argument against the political system conceived on the level of
world society is that in relation to it we cannot interpret the characteristics
of the functional subsystems, such as symbolically generalized communica-
tion medium, that is, power, or the binary code, which Luhmann defines as
the distinction of government/opposition. We can only speak of them on the
level of states and not on the level of world society (Stichweh 2002: 290), so
why should we regard politics as a system on the level of world society?
Nevertheless, I think the main characteristics of the theory will not be
significantly changed by the question whether we regard politics as a world
society level system, or we proceed from the states. Politics is inevitably di-
vided up into states, and if we consider states as primary, the dependences
on the level of world society will also be unavoidable. My reason to deem it
49 To link Luhmann’s systems theory with the theory of international relations is a hallmark of
the World Society Institute (Institut für Weltgesellschaft) at the University of Bielefeld.
50 Among the new approaches, we can find interdependence theories, functionalism, or world
system theories (Bayer 1999: 302–304; Galló 1999: 405–425).
important to bring up this question is that it points to a peculiarity of poli-

tics, namely to the fact that organization has a central role in the functioning
of politics. The world society level political system has to be divided into
states in Luhmann’s theory because the function of politics—that is, produc-
ing collectively binding decisions—can only be fulfilled or organized this way.
Thus, effectively organizing and controlling politics is a prerequisite for the
functioning of this subsystem.
Of course, organization and control are also indispensable in the cases of
other subsystems to a certain degree, but they cannot be accomplished on
the level of the entire subsystem. In economy, for example, the business or
strategic planning is essential, but the whole system of economy—according
to recent economic theories—cannot be planned or controlled. One of the
most important features of functional subsystems is in Luhmann’s theory
precisely that their functioning cannot be completely planned and con-
trolled. Functional subsystems owe their extraordinary performance exactly
to their autonomy and spontaneity. My thesis is that this statement does not
hold true for politics. I do not claim that political processes could be organ-
ized and controlled to a complete extent but to a significantly higher degree
than the other fields.
The special importance of organization and control in the functioning of
politics also follows from its function, which consists in producing collec-
tively binding decisions. The prerequisite for the performances of other sub-
systems is exactly the lack of their obligatory character; that is, they need
enough freedom or uncontrolled terrain to be able to produce variations. In
economy or in science, for example, there is a need for free competition or
free research. In politics, however, exactly the opposite holds true: the aim is
to prevent every possible deviation, that is, every refusal of the decisions.
Thus, an essential attribute of politics is the consideration for and the man-
aging of the deviant behaviors, that is, the planning and the control, and all
of this has to be managed on the level of the whole system.
A further difference between politics and the other subsystems is that the
former has a center, while the latter does not. According to Luhmann, in the
case of political organizations, we can speak of the differentiation of cen-
ter/periphery, and the center consists of the state conceived as an organiza-
tion.51 I think the center of politics can be further narrowed down. We can
51 See Chapter Six, Section B.

regard government as a center in a narrow sense. In this way the center of

politics is constituted by some identifiable actors or groups. The reason why
the existence of a center is important is that the controllability of the system
depends on it. When, for example, speaking of the problems of welfare state,
Luhmann argues that in economy there is no center through which politics
could control the whole economic system (Luhmann 1990a1: 75). Similarly,
neither can we speak of a center in other functional subsystems. Politics,
however, has a center; thus, the control is possible here to a certain degree.
The control, of course, cannot extend to every field of politics; for example,
the government cannot control the opposition. The fulfillment of the func-
tion of politics, that is, producing collectively binding decisions, can be nev-
ertheless regarded as a controlled process.
A further reason for the importance of the center is that by this means
there are addressees to whom the claims or discontents can be directed. In
economy or science we cannot find anyone who could be blamed for the
problematic functioning of these systems. Thus, as opposed to other systems,
the actors play an important role regarding the whole political system as
well.
Actors fill a determinant role not only in the center of politics, but we can
say that the decisions of certain people or groups are of great importance in
almost every event of politics. Political processes influencing the functioning
of the whole system can usually be ascribed to a charismatic person, to a
campaign staff, to the determinant personalities of the media, to intellectual
groups, or to other actors. Of course, in other functional systems we can also
speak of important actors, for example, of multinational companies or
prominent scientists, but their effects on the whole economic or scientific
system are significantly lesser. They can influence only a segment of econ-
omy or only one discipline, and even this influence is limited.
One could argue against the actor’s decisive role by saying that the most
important feature of politics is the competition for the electors’ votes, and
the public is too complex for the actors to be able to influence it. But exactly
Luhmann’s interpretation of public opinion is what gives free play to the ac-
tors’ role. As we have seen,52 the function of public opinion in Luhmann’s
theory is not to articulate individual opinions and to reach consensus but
to limit communicative possibilities, that is, to choose relevant themes.
52 See Chapter Six, Section E.

Luhmann mentions that the number of potential themes and political tactics
has been radically increasing, but the influence on them, that is, the capabil-
ity to determine themes and tactics is limited to some people. He also formu-
lates that instead of the principle of “management by participation,” the
principle of “participation by management” prevails in the political practice
(Luhmann 1971a1: 26). A significant effect can be produced on the whole po-
litical system by defining the political themes and by framing the tactics re-
lating to them. And these capabilities are, in fact, in the hands of some
confinable groups. Of course, it also holds that these groups cannot shape
themes and tactics at their pleasure because the societal, cultural, economic,
or other factors constitute certain limits. Nevertheless, I think we can state
that it follows from Luhmann’s interpretation of public opinion that political
decisions cannot be regarded as results of impersonal processes, but they are
intensively determined by the actor’s intentions.
Neither do I deem the binary code of politics to be free of problems.
Luhmann defines this code as the duality of government/opposition. It is
true that this is the most important or perhaps the exclusive selection crite-
rion during the parliamentary elections; that is, those issues can become po-
litical ones of which the parties think that they can help them to take over
the government. It also holds that, in a certain sense, there is a campaign
during the whole period; that is, the parties endeavor to thematize the issues
in such a way that these issues can increase their chances for victory. But the
competition for governance—even if this struggle lasts through the whole
parliamentary period—does not cover the whole of politics. Politics also has
an aspect that does not deal with the campaign but rather with elaborating
policy programs and with making decisions. I think the definition of politics
would be incomplete, were this aspect omitted. But if we take it into account,
it cannot be described by the code of government/opposition. Luhmann dis-
tinguishes between the components or aspects of politics, and the competi-
tion for governance is only one these. According to him, the political system
has a threefold differentiation; that is, we can distinguish between public,
politics in a narrow sense, and administration.53 The binary code of govern-
ment/opposition seems to be applicable only to politics in a narrow sense
but not to the other two actors. Taking another example: when discussing
the procedure of legitimation, we have seen that Luhmann distinguished
53 See Chapter Six, Section A, Subsection iii.

between symbolic and operative aspects of the procedures.54 The symbolic

aspect—that is, presenting political struggle for the voters—can be described
by the binary code of politics, but the operative one cannot. Thus, if we
define politics as a totality of communication using the code of govern-
ment/opposition, we ignore its operative aspect, which consists of elaborat-
ing programs and making decisions.55
In summary, I think politics significantly differs from other subsystems
regarding the degree of organization, control, and centralization, and con-
sidering the role of actors. The other subsystems can be characterized as
aggregates of uncontrollable, spontaneous, and impersonal processes,
organized by a binary code, but these findings are not plausible in the case of
politics. Consequently, politics cannot be handled analogously with the other
functional subsystems of society. If politics differs from them, there arises
the question of how we can find its place in Luhmann’s theory. In what fol-
lows, I briefly outline a possible way of solution.
First, we have to introduce three concepts that are not present in
Luhmann’s theory, but I think they are reconcilable with it. They are the
three levels of the social phenomena: the macro-, the meso-, and the micro-
levels. Although Luhmann does not use these concepts, I think most elements
of his theory can be placed at one of these levels. First, the types of social sys-
tems match these levels. Societal systems can be placed on the macro-level,
interaction systems on the micro-level, and organizations on the meso-level.
On the meso-level is to be placed also the fourth type of systems—which
Luhmann has only distinguished later and not completely clearly—namely
protest movements. Furthermore, some societal phenomena discussed by
Luhmann—such as the institutionalized basic rights or the legitimation pro-
cedure—can also be placed on the meso-level, even if Luhmann considers the
latter to be interaction.
My proposal reads as follows: as distinguished from other functional sub-
systems, politics should not be regarded as a macro-level system but as a
meso-level one. To support this thesis, first I invoke the characteristics of
politics discussed above: the higher degree of organization and control in
politics and the determinant role of the actors. In the cases of other subsys-
tems, the reason why it is plausible to speak of macro-level is exactly that
54 See Chapter Six, Section C.

55 Klaus von Beyme also argues that the binary code of politics cannot cover the whole political
system (Beyme 1991b: 239–241).
there are certain societal regularities or processes above the actors in the
sense that they cannot be planned and controlled by them. Meso-level factors
can play an important role in other functional subsystems as well—for exam-
ple, the multinational companies in economy or the prominent universities
and research institutes in science—but none of them can determine the func-
tioning of the whole systems to a significant degree. There is something
above them, which defines a framework for their functioning, and which can
be called the laws of markets or the logic of scientific research. The binary
codes in Luhmann’s theory can be regarded as descriptions of these regulari-
ties. But it seems to me that in the case of politics we cannot find a peculiar
macro-level logic or regularity beyond the reach of the actors. The binary
code of politics, the government/opposition difference, has some similarities
with the macro-level regularities, but it does not seem to be above the actors’
intentions to such an extent as the codes of other systems are. It is, for
example, no complete absurdity that the government and the opposition
contract an alliance with each other to achieve certain strategic aims, while
in economy or science a compromise on the level of the whole system seems
to be impossible.
A further argument for placing politics on the meso-level is that organiza-
tions play a much more important role in the functioning of this system than
in the cases of other subsystems, and politics itself has some similarities with
the organizations. Of course, one cannot regard the whole politics as an or-
ganization, even if Luhmann itself defines state—besides other definitions—
as an organization.56 The state does not cover the whole of politics, but it can
be conceived as the center of it; thus, state as an organization significantly
determines the functioning of the whole political system. Furthermore, it
is remarkable that both the most important peculiarity of organizations
and the function of politics are the production of decisions.57 Consequently,
there are many similarities between them. Both of them need leadership,
which has exclusivity in decision-making, and decisions are binding for the

57 For the characteristics of organizations, see Chapter Four, Section A, and Chapter Four, Sec-
tion E, Subsection iii. Michael Beetz criticizes Luhmann for examining these two topics sepa-
rately (Beetz 2003: 109). Daniel Barben also emphasizes the connection between politics and
organizations. He regards the functioning of organizations as a form of politics; thus, in his
view, politics permeates all fields of society through the organizations and through the deci-
sions to be made in other functional subsystems (Barben 1996: 262–263).
members of the organization or for the political community. Furthermore,

the behaviors of the members are quite regulated in both types of systems.
For example, labor contracts or rules of organization and conduct on the one
hand, and constitutions or laws on the other clearly define the rights and ob-
ligations of the people. Probably it is partly due to these analogies that the
relationship between politics and citizens was often described as a contract.
Of course, even if this holds true, we cannot regard politics as a special kind
of organizations, but all this can serve as good arguments for placing politics
on the meso-level.
Finally, let us briefly touch upon the question of Luhmann’s motivation in
interpreting politics analogously with other functional subsystems. This can
be explained—of course, besides the pure theoretical considerations—by the
fact that Luhmann endeavored to emphasize the break with the earlier con-
ceptions of politics. Earlier theories of society defined the role of politics as
steering society; thus, they placed politics on the top of society, above the
other fields. According to Luhmann, however, politics cannot control other
societal subsystems or the whole society, so he has deprived it of its status
above the other subsystems, and he has placed it on the same level. Politics
has become only one of the subsystems. To handle politics analogously with
the other subsystems partly serves the aim of emphasizing that politics can-
not control the whole society. If we place politics on the meso-level—as I
propose it—we do not come back to the idea of political control over the
whole society. The importance of control, organization, centralization, or the
actors’ role only holds true inside the politics and not for the relationship be-
tween politics and other systems.
To regard politics as a meso-level system does not imply that it is inde-
pendent of the macro-level functional systems. The functioning of these sub-
systems raises many requirements for politics, and this relationship also
holds true in the opposite direction: the functioning of the macro-level sys-
tems needs certain performances of politics.
C) The Unworkability of Luhmann’s Political Theory
My second critical remark refers to Luhmann’s ideas on political theory.

Luhmann uses the term “political theory” in a quite special sense; thus, be-
fore expounding why I deem his ideas problematic, I explore for what this
concept stands.
To understand the use of the term of political theory and its reasons in
Luhmann, we need to distinguish between two kinds of descriptions of the
political system. On the one hand, politics can be described by the scientific
system; this is the scientific examination of politics. Science accomplishes
this from a position outside politics; this means that this kind of observation
of politics has to be adapted to the logic or criteria of science. There is an-
other kind of describing political system, namely the self-description or self-
reflection of the political system. As opposed to the scientific one, the self-
description of politics does not aim to comply with scientific criteria but with
political ones; thus, the key of its success is not scientific truth but applicabil-
ity in political practice. Luhmann calls this self-reflection of political system
political theory (politische Theorie), distinguished from the former case, from
the theory of politic (Theorie der Politik) (Luhmann 1990a1: 24–25, 2005c6: 329–
330; cf. Arato 1994: 135–136; Karácsony 2000b: 107–110). Thus, in what fol-
lows, we deal with the description of political system based on not scientific
but political criteria, that is, with the self-reflection of the political system,
with political theory.
The distinction between the two types of description means first of all
that Luhmann draws a clear line between science and politics. Scientific re-
sults do not automatically and directly become part of political practice be-
cause the two systems deal with different criteria of success. This is also true
for applied research; moreover, it is true for the case when the possibilities of
practical applications of scientific research become a subject of research
themselves (Luhmann 1990a1: 107). By sharply separating the two systems,
Luhmann emphasizes, among other things, his opposition in particular to
critical theory and in general to theories that define the objective of scien-
tific research as a criticism and improvement of social conditions. In his
view, it is impossible to realize a direct connection between science and poli-
tics because they operate according to different criteria.
Another important message of these thoughts is that for the efficient
functioning of politics there is a need for a theory orienting the practice; that
is, there is a need for a relatively coherent idea of what constitutes politics. It
is not easy to say what is exactly meant by political theory. Political theory
cannot be an explicit theory, that is, expounded in detail and written in stud-
ies or books because in this case it would be a scientific theory. Therefore,
the name “theory” is a bit misleading because it suggests this kind of explicit
and systematized form. By political theory we rather mean ideas on politics
that are not put in a theoretical framework but provide a coherent notion of
the nature of politics and thus determine political processes. According to

Luhmann, all the most important constitutional achievements of modern
state—such as the principles of sovereignty and representation, the mecha-
nisms of controlling power, or the human rights—have been realized with
the help of such theories (Luhmann 2005c6: 330). At the beginning of moder-
nity, political theory meant ideas on the absolute state, then conceptions of
the constitutional, democratic state, and finally the notion of the welfare
state (Luhmann 1990a1: 25–27).
This already indicates that state plays an important role in political the-
ory (Luhmann 1990a2: 141–144, 2005d2: 114–116). One of Luhmann’s defini-
tions of state reads that state is a self-description of the political system,58
and we have defined political theory exactly in the same way. Thus, we can
mainly characterize political theories as reflections on the features and func-
tions of the state, reflections that determine political practice.
Luhmann examines political theory because he thinks that today we do
not have a theory that could suitably fill this role (Luhmann 2005c6: 332). He
claims that a proper self-reflection of the welfare state is lacking because the
recent ideas ignore the limits of political actions, which leads to the overbur-
dening of politics (Luhmann 1990a1: 105).59
From this definition and characterization of political theory it follows
that it has to comply with two requirements that can be opposed to each
other. The function of political theory is to orient political practice; that is,
this theory serves as a kind of framework for political programs. In democ-
racy, these programs have to compete for the electors’ votes. Consequently,
political theories, on the one hand, have to underlie programs that are at-
tractive for the voters. On the other hand, however, these programs have to
be realizable and workable; that is, they have to comply with several eco-
nomic, organizational, and other requirements. While the former require-
ment can be regarded as popular—both in the positive and the negative
senses of this word—the latter is a scientific one. The present situation of
welfare state shows the best that there is a great gap between popularity and
feasibility; thus, Luhmann’s statement that a proper political theory is lack-
ing seems to be plausible.
Political theory has a quite paradoxical relation to science. It needs sci-
ence in order to be able to provide workable programs, but at the same time,

it cannot listen to the advices of science completely because it has—even if

not directly but through political programs—to find favor with the electors,
who often do not vote in accordance with scientific criteria. Nevertheless,
politics has no choice but to look for “possible advice from science”
(Luhmann 1990a1: 107). However, what appears as a political theory in poli-
tics is never a scientific theory but at the very most—in Luhmann’s words—a
“scientifically subvented theory” (Luhmann 1990a1: 110). From the point of
view of science, we also face the problem of the impossibility of transition
between the two systems. The fact that a theory is scientifically prominent is
not a guarantee for its success as a political theory. Thus, scientists, however
respectable scientific theories they may provide, cannot determine the direc-
tion of the political processes. Even in the best possible case, they can only
hope that their scientific researches trigger resonances in the political sys-
tem and initiate or modify certain political processes. But the question of
when and how this happens is always decided by the criteria of politics,
which are incalculable for science (Luhmann 1990a1: 107).
Although Luhmann does not touch upon this topic, I think it is important
to distinguish political theory from another kind of meeting point of politics
and science. I mean the cases when politics uses scientific knowledge to
achieve certain political aims. For economic policy, one obviously needs the
branches of economics; for social policy, the social sciences are necessary; for
administration, the organization theory; and political campaigns are also
based on a number of psychological researches. In my opinion, all this does
not belong to what Luhmann calls political theory. In these cases, politics
uses scientific theories referring to other societal subsystems, to organiza-
tions, or to the people, while political theory means the self-reflection of
politics. The subject of political theory is the whole political system, its char-
acteristics and options; thus, political theory forms the aims of politics. Sci-
entific theories used for political aims, however, can rather be regarded as
tools to achieve these political aims.
It is also worth touching upon the question of the relationship between
political theory and ideologies because the kind of relation existing between
them may be unclear. Luhmann does not discuss this question, but we can
find some basis in his theory for reconstructing the relationship between the
two concepts. In my view, political theory is, in a certain sense, a category
wider than ideology. Political theory provides a conceptual framework in
which the opposing alternatives, the different party programs can be formu-
lated. Political theory in itself is not yet a program, a guidance for political
action, but it influences the range of possible political programs through cer-
tain conceptual arrangements and suggestions. With the help of political
theory, political alternatives can be shaped more clearly, and ideological
standpoints can be separated from one another. Without mentioning ideolo-
gies, Luhmann formulates that the politics’ “premises, options and their al-
ternatives appear more clearly” (Luhmann 1990a1: 109) with the help of
political theory. If there is no proper political theory, neither the ideological
alternatives are clearly distinguishable.
At the same time, Luhmann’s findings suggest a different kind of relation-
ship between political theory and ideologies as well. According to Luhmann,
the achievements of modern politics, such as democracy or human rights—
Luhmann has not mentioned them, but I think we can also classify the social
and welfare achievements among them—were able to be realized exclusively
with the help of political theories. These achievements, however, can be also
attributed to ideologies. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between
political theory and certain ideologies, which may be called progressive ones.
Their relationship could be conceived in such a way that political theories
have been introduced and stabilized in politics by means of certain ideolo-
gies. This formulation does not contradict what we have said above about the
relationship between political theory and ideologies. We can say that pro-
gressive ideologies have implemented a political theory in political practice,
and from then on this political theory has served as a framework not only for
the ideology that has produced it but for other ideologies as well.
Let us now examine the role assigned by Luhmann to his own theory in
this context. First, he makes clear—and I think it is obvious—that his own
theory observes society and politics from the scientific system, so his theory
cannot be regarded as a political theory (Luhmann 2005c6: 333). From the be-
ginning of his career, Luhmann emphasized that he only endeavored to de-
scribe society and not to change it. This served, on the one hand, as a
demarcation from critical theory, and on the other, for defending his theory
from criticisms stating that applying systems theory as a theory of society
serves conservative ideological aims.60 In his answer to Habermas’s criticism
of this kind Luhmann mentioned humorously that “systems theory can have
good chance to remain purely academic because it is beyond comprehension”
(Luhmann 1971b: 403; my translation).
60 I analyze the relationship between theory and practice and some differences between
Habermas’s and Luhmann’s views on this topic in the Conclusion.
At the same time, however, we cannot say that Luhmann intended his
theory exclusively for the scientific sphere. Although his theory is not a po-
litical theory, he expected the emersion of a political theory suitable for the
recent societal requirements with its help. He is a bit skeptical whether this
can succeed because anything he writes would remain a scientific theory,
while political theory has to be created by the politics (Luhmann 1990a1:
115). At the same time, he clearly holds that a political theory suitable for
present society has chance to emerge only if the wider scientific public, in-
spired by his findings on the theory of society, changes its views on politics,
and then, as a consequence of this change, the political system resonates and
creates a political theory complying with the present requirements of society
(Luhmann 1990a1: 112–114). In other words, the aim of Luhmann’s work is
not only to provide a proper description of society for the scientific public,
but he also holds that his theory of society is suitable to be a basis for an
emerging political theory that fits the recent challenges and fulfills an orien-
tation function in the political system.
In this light, the opposition between Luhmann’s aims and the endeavors
of the critical theory seems to be not so sharp. According to both the partici-
pants of the debate and the interpreters, one of the most important aspects
of this opposition was that while critical theory, through constructing a the-
ory of society, endeavored to change society, that is, strove to achieve aims
outside the science, Luhmann held that the exclusive objective of theory is to
describe society. Now, however, we can see that Luhmann, in fact, expected
his theory to change political practice and to channel it in the direction he
thought to be right. Although in his view this can only happen in an indirect
way and beyond the control of the science, this is rather a difference in de-
gree, and I think the adherents of critical theory would accept this uncer-
tainty of the practical applicability of the theories.
Thus, Luhmann’s criticism of researching the possibilities of application
of applied researches also loses its radicalism. Although in his theory we can
never acquire indisputable knowledge on the practical implementation of
scientific theories, his thoughts presented here can be regarded as researches
on this topic. The reason of his holding the theory of autopoietic systems to
be an important research program is that with its help we can obtain a more
exact notion of how scientific theories can be implemented into the practice
(Luhmann 2005c6: 333–335, 2005c7: 383).
Nevertheless, it is not these aspects that make me consider Luhmann’s
views on political theory as problematic. My critical remark refers to
Luhmann’s idea that his theory can stimulate the birth of a new political the-
ory. In my opinion, his theory is not suitable to be the basis of an emerging
new political theory adequate to the recent societal conditions.
Let us first examine what the main characteristics of a political theory
based on Luhmann’s theory of society would be. On the one hand, Luhmann
provides some instructions for this question; on the other, this can be de-
duced from his theory. According to Luhmann, a proper political theory
should take into account that modern society consists of autonomous, closed,
and uncontrollable functional subsystems. From the point of view of politics,
this means that it cannot steer the other subsystems. Political intervention
will never reach the effects intended because the results of the intervention
depend on the regularities of the other subsystems. The most important
characteristic of a political theory based on Luhmann’s theory of society
should be that it limits the range of politics to the issues in which politics is
competent, that is, to the production of collectively binding decisions.
Luhmann holds we need a political theory showing that politics cannot rem-
edy the problems whose solution depends on other subsystems. These prob-
lems include, in his view, that economy exhausts the natural resources, that
the education system does not produce suitably motivated people, or that
some people have problems with the way of living. He characterizes his own
standpoint as approximately coinciding with the liberal views on the roles of
the state (Luhmann 1990a1: 113–114). In what follows, I examine the question
whether this kind of political theory would be operable.
As we have seen above, political theory has to comply with two require-
ments: it has to render possible the elaboration of political programs that
are, on the one hand, technically realizable and workable, and on the other,
attractive for the public. In my opinion, Luhmann’s theory can only comply
with the first requirement. His systems theory thoroughly examines and ex-
plains what can and what cannot be realized in modern society. He, however,
does not discuss how a political program declaring that we have to renounce
most of our welfare, ecological, or other claims on the state could be pre-
sented as attractive.
In the discussion of his views on the welfare state,61 we have seen that
Luhmann regarded the formation of newer and newer claims on the state as a
necessary consequence of modernity and democracy. And now he expects to

give them up. How could these claims be silenced? In democracy the only
possibility is to convince people of the indefensibility of their claims, that is,
to expect people to become aware of certain regularities of modern society
and to vote in the elections accordingly. A faith like this in people’s rational-
ity, however, would be very contrasting to Luhmann’s ideas. As we have seen,
when reinterpreting the key concepts of politics, Luhmann endeavored to
replace the explanations based mostly on people’s rationality by sociological
conceptions.
An argument based on rationality is completely understandable on the
part of the liberals because this is one of their most important methodologi-
cal presuppositions.62 This argument can be supplemented by the liberals’
faith in progress, that is, by the idea that if people have enough freedom, it
will result in a development that is advantageous for the whole society. Lib-
erals can be considered consistent regarding the relation between these
presuppositions and their proposals for political practice. Luhmann, how-
ever, rejects not only the ideas on people’s rational capacities but also the
liberals’ faith in progress. He does not think that a free functioning of subsys-
tems would result in a development beneficial to the whole society; for ex-
ample, he does not hold that the free functioning of the economic system
would produce beneficial effects for everyone. Luhmann should reinforce his
liberal-style proposals for political practice in such a way that—as opposed to
the liberals—he cannot use arguments like people’s rationality or the gener-
ally advantageous effects of the free functioning of the economy or other
subsystems.
The fact that Luhmann’s theory is not suitable to be the basis of a proper
political theory follows, in my view, from its peculiarity that can be called the
“disenchantment” of societal phenomena.63 The disenchantment consists in
the fact that Luhmann endeavors to demonstrate that our most important
political institutions fulfill completely different functions than it is com-
monly—or even in the scientific discussions—thought. The supposed and the
real functions can be described by the two levels or two aspects mentioned in
connection with the legitimation process, that is, by distinguishing between
symbolic and operative levels. For example, in the case of the procedure of
62 See Chapter Seven, Section D, Subsection ii.

63 Habermas gave the title “The Sociological Disenchantment of Law” to the section of his book
Between Facts and Norms, in which he discusses, among others, Luhmann’s theory (Habermas
1992: 62–78).
election, the symbolic level is the declaration of the will of the people, but on
operative level, one of the functions of election is to ensure the separation of
the political system, that is, to ensure that politicians can govern undis-
turbed while the citizens’ discontents are channeled by filling out the ballots
in every four years. Or taking another example, on the symbolic level the ba-
sic rights embody our unalienable universal rights, while on the operative
level they fulfill the function of preventing the ceasing of the autonomy of
the functional subsystems. On the symbolic level we can find approximately
the same ideas by which the tradition of Enlightenment has described the
functioning of modern society, while the operative level consists of socio-
logical explanations complying with Luhmann’s program of sociological
enlightenment.
These two levels are not two separate entities but two aspects of one so-
cietal phenomenon. Furthermore, neither is the symbolic level less impor-
tant for the functioning of the society than the operative one. Although the
semantic descriptions fulfilling symbolic functions do not describe the real
societal mechanisms, the institutions could not work properly without them.
Although democracy is not the rule of the people, it would not work without
this belief. Thus, according to Luhmann, we are under illusions regarding
politics, but these illusions play an important role in the functioning of soci-
ety. By the disenchantment of societal phenomena, I mean that Luhmann de-
constructs the symbolic aspects of these phenomena, and—what is very
important—without creating new symbolic contents instead of them.
In the case of a scientific theory, there is no problem with this. Why
would it be objectionable for a scientist to prove that our concepts do not de-
scribe the reality, and they are only illusions? And why should we expect him
to build new meanings in place of the demolished ones? But if Luhmann in-
tends his theory to serve as a basis for political theory, the lack of these sym-
bolic elements will be all the more conspicuous. When Luhmann lists the
achievements that have been established with the help of political theories,
he, without exception, mentions examples that have very important sym-
bolic aspects. The institutionalization of sovereignty, democracy, or human
rights would have been impossible without their symbolic meanings describ-
ing not the real mechanisms. If these achievements—as Luhmann claims—
owe their institutionalization to the political theories, we can conclude
that according to the lessons drawn from history, those political theories
were successful that made possible the formation, acceptance, and stabiliza-
tion of ideas that, besides the fact that they complied with the operative
requirements of society, constituted attractive aims for people in virtue of

their symbolic meanings. Political theories, in fact, played the role of a con-
necting link between the operative and the symbolic levels of the functioning
of society.
In my opinion, this characteristic is missing from Luhmann’s theory. If he
intends his theory to be the basis of a political theory, he can be expected to
provide a description of society on the basis of which certain directions or
proposals can be formed for the solution of the actual social problems. Al-
though political theory is not yet an ideology or a party program, it defines
the framework in which these alternatives can be formulated. A political the-
ory that would emerge on the basis of Luhmann’s theory would not provide
too many possibilities for forming such alternatives. We can get to know
from Luhmann that the functioning of society is shaped by macro-level, im-
personal processes, which are beyond human control. We cannot effectively
intervene in the functioning of society; the negative effects of our attempts
can exceed the positive ones. The promise of a commonly accepted moral
order is finally over, and neither can our problems be solved by letting the
economy work freely. On the basis of these theoretical findings—even if they
are scientifically plausible—we can hardly formulate any alternatives that
could compete for the votes of people with a good chance of success.
Conclusion
The thoughts of Luhmann presented above—which are nevertheless only a

part of his theory—already suggest that it is very hard to summarize or
evaluate his work on a few pages. I deem it practical first to identify the
theoretical objectives Luhmann endeavored to achieve either directly or in a
less explicit form, and then, in the light of these objectives, to examine what
his theory can provide. As a point of departure to define Luhmann’s theoreti-
cal endeavor, we can take his well-known declaration that his objective is to
construct a theory of society.1 This can be widened by saying that his objec-
tive is to construct not only a theory of society but also that of sociality,
which is a more comprehensive category than the former. Even if he mostly
dealt with the societal systems, he did not regard his project as a fundamen-
tal theory only for these systems but also for interaction and organization
systems.
I think, however, that this objective does not cover Luhmann’s theoretical
endeavors completely. In my view, his objectives refer to three separate
fields. First—this is the most obvious interpretation, which has been men-
tioned above—he endeavors to construct a general theory of society or social-
ity, which is an aim inside the discipline of sociology.2 Second, the objectives
referring to other disciplines also play an important role in his theory.
Luhmann’s declared objective is to reconstruct the concepts that serve to
characterize modern society and have hitherto fallen within the competence
of other branches of science. This endeavor reaches beyond the field of soci-
ology and means the sociologization of other disciplines, which Luhmann
calls “sociological enlightenment.” Finally, we can interpret Luhmann’s ob-
jectives in such a way that he expects changes from his theory not only be-
yond the field of sociology but also beyond the scientific system, that is,
on other fields of society. Although this expectation seems to contradict
Luhmann’s views on the relationship between theory and practice—which
are usually interpreted as opposed to Habermas’s considerations—we have
1 See Chapter One, Section A.

2 This question, of course, has important epistemological aspects; thus, one could argue that it
cannot be squeezed into one discipline (see Chapter One, Section A).
260 Conclusion
seen in the previous chapter that we can find this kinds of endeavors in
Luhmann’s theory.
Before entering upon the discussion of these three questions, it is worth
recalling a characteristic of Luhmann’s theory, which fundamentally influ-
ences the evaluation of his findings. I mean the question to what extent
Luhmann holds his theory to be exclusive, that is, whether he expects his
theory to be able to describe all aspects of all social phenomena. Although he
intends his theory to be universal in that he holds it to be applicable to the
whole range of social phenomena, he emphasizes that because of the high
complexity of the world, its observation can never be complete, but we al-
ways have to reduce complexity, that is, to choose between possibilities. Con-
sequently, we can observe only some aspects of the world, and some other
aspects always remain hidden from our observation. To observe the aspects
omitted, we need another observing scheme, another theory, which again
hides certain characteristics. If so, Luhmann’s systems theory is also only one
of the possible observations on the world, and it does not manifest all of its
aspects. Other theories, such as action theory or the anthropocentric descrip-
tions of society, can manifest characteristics hidden by systems theory, but
these theories cannot completely present the aspects described by systems
theory. Luhmann does not claim that society has only features described by
his theory. Sometimes, however, we have the impression that this is the case,
and Luhmann is also to blame for this. While trying to prove the best per-
formance of his theory compared to the rivaling approaches, he does not suf-
ficiently emphasize the conditional character of his ideas, the fact that they
are “if-then” statements: if we describe society by systems theory, we will get
these results. Thus, in the course of evaluating Luhmann’s theory, it is worth
keeping in mind that it is—even in Luhmann’s view—only one possible de-
scription of society although a description that Luhmann holds to be the
most general and the most comprehensive one.
Now we turn to the examination of the first interpretation of Luhmann’s
objectives, the construction of a theory of sociality or society. It is worth
separating the two because they are not completely identical, and the reali-
zation of each of them is theoretically possible without the other as well. We
can construct a theory of sociality without a theory of society, for example,
if we say that beyond the individuals and the relations between them, there
is nothing that could be called society. On the other hand, we can also con-
struct a theory of society without a general theory of sociality if we do not
extend our theoretical findings to other social phenomena, for example, to
Conclusion 261
organizations or interactions. Luhmann aimed to construct a general theory

both of sociality and of society. Although they are intertwined in his work—
because society encompasses all social phenomena—I deem it practical to
discuss them separately.
By a general theory of sociality, Luhmann means a unified sociological
theory, a paradigm that can serve as an orientation basis for all sociological
researches (Luhmann 1995a: xlv). Sociologists agree that this kind of theory
does not exist. But some of them consider this as normal, while others speak
of a crisis of sociology. Luhmann belongs to the latter group, and he expects a
remedy for this crisis from a general theory of social systems, which is a sub-
type of the theory of autopoietic systems. The question whether his theory
really serves as a unified theory of sociology, that is, whether sociologists ac-
cept it as a general orientation basis, or whether there are at least tendencies
towards this, is easy to answer: no. It is a more interesting question whether
an expectation of this kind is justified or not. In this place I do not want to
analyze the debate of sociologists on this question; I rather confine myself to
the examination of the question whether Luhmann’s theory results exactly in
the impossibility of this objective.
Let us proceed from Luhmann’s consideration mentioned above, that the
observation of the world is necessarily selective and is never complete. The
question of what the best way of selection is depends on the problem exam-
ined. It is possible that one of the theories is suitable for an aim, while the
other is suitable to solve another problem. Let us take communication theory
as an example. The reason why Luhmann considers his theory to be better
than the transmission model is that his own theory has fewer presupposi-
tions. This implies that according to Luhmann, the main requirement for
theory construction is to use as few or as general presuppositions as it is pos-
sible. There can be, however, other expectations as well. The transmission
model criticized by Luhmann was developed by Claude Shannon and Warren
Weaver in 1949. When elaborating the model, Shannon and Weaver were re-
searchers at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. The Bell Telephone Company
needed a model of communication in order to enhance the effectiveness of
the communication channels. For this aim, however, it would probably have
been superfluous and disturbing to problematize all social presuppositions of
communication, as Luhmann did it. It was much more practical to use some
presuppositions, which in Luhmann’s theory would be illegitimate, but from
the point of view of the problem to be solved they were expedient. Although
Luhmann’s theory is more general than other sociological theories—that is, it
262 Conclusion
considers as contingent some statements which the other suppose as given—

this does not mean that this most general point of departure is the most
practical choice for every problem. As it may be supposed, this radical way of
posing the question is simply superfluous for most sociological researches.
From Luhmann’s statement that every theory is contingent and selective, we
can most likely deduce the theorem that there is no initial selection, that is,
there is no theory—it may as well be the most general—that could be the
most practical choice for all researches in a discipline, that is, could function
as a general theory or paradigm.
Even if we hold that Luhmann has failed in constructing a unified theory
underlying every sociological research, this does not necessarily imply the
failure of another undertaking, of constructing a theory of society. In the lat-
ter case, the requirements for the theory are, in a certain respect, less ambi-
tious: we do not expect the unification of a whole discipline but only the
adequate description of one—although a very important one—of its subjects.
In this respect, that is, in constructing a theory of modern society, Luhmann
has achieved some significant and perhaps unrivaled results. Although there
is by no means a consensus on the acceptance of his theory of society, more-
over, he has certainly more opponents than adherents, one has to accept that
some of his findings cannot be ignored in this field. We either accept his
views or reject them, but it is unlikely that we could present a better alter-
native regarding the complexity and coherence in the field of the theory of
society.
It is, however, questionable whether the notion of society presented by
Luhmann really fulfills the expectations that we usually raise for a theory of
society. The endeavors to construct a theory of society are usually opposed to
the views denying that beyond the individuals and the relations between
them, there is anything that could be called society. This idea has been for-
mulated in the most expressive way—although primarily not on theoretical
grounds but for political purposes—by Margaret Thatcher: “there is no such
thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are fami-
lies.”3 According to the opponents of this view, such thing does exist, and the
theories of society aim to define and analyze it. But if we ask what modern
society is according to Luhmann’s theory, the answer is but a social system
encompassing all communications. Society cannot be related to a nation or
3 In an interview published in Woman's Own magazine (31 October, 1987).

Conclusion 263
state, and we cannot speak of groups, strata, or classes in society. Although

Luhmann rejects the view that only individuals exist—since social systems
are emergent entities in his theory—on the level of society, we can, in fact,
only speak of functional subsystems and cannot observe or describe society
as a unit; we cannot even really conceive it. Thus, “such thing as society”
does not exist in Luhmann’s theory either.
Now we turn to the second interpretation of Luhmann’s objectives, and
we examine how we can evaluate Luhmann’s endeavors overreaching sociol-
ogy, that is, his attempt to reinterpret the concepts and ideas characterizing
modern society and belonging to other branches of science, primarily to phi-
losophy, political science, and legal studies. This endeavor is not foreign to
sociology. In fact, this discipline has always been striving for encompassing
every question that refers to human community and for becoming a general
inter- or transdisciplinary science (Némedi 2008: 60–61).4 In the earlier chap-
ters, we could see the applications of this program—which Luhmann calls so-
ciological enlightenment—on many fields, such as the questions of state,
legitimation, democracy, public opinion, welfare state, or basic rights. It
is not to be questioned that by including sociological aspects, that is, by
defining these concepts with the help of the structure of modern society,
Luhmann has enriched their meanings with very important new components.
I think the most important result of these endeavors is that Luhmann, by
means of his extraordinarily comprehensive theory, connects numerous
fields that have hitherto been discussed by separate theories or concepts. As
a consequence of this, the problems analyzed by Luhmann—they may as well
be institutions of modern society or semantic constructions—appear as parts
of an embracing complex, and the most important explanatory principle of
this complex is the functionally differentiated structure of society and the
operational and semantic requirements following from it. Furthermore,
Luhmann’s theory not only reveals several new aspects and connections but
can also contribute to exceeding some important problems of social sciences.
For example, in the light of his theory, the oppositions such as realism–
constructivism or individual–collective are improperly formulated questions.
Even if we do not accept all his proposals, Luhmann’s thoughts can offer in-
spiration to solve or to improve these theoretical problems. Of course, we
4 Luhmann, who graduated in law and not in sociology, mentioned in an interview that the
reason why he has chosen the department of sociology was that so he could study any topic
(Luhmann 2002d: 24).
264 Conclusion
have to keep in mind in this case as well that Luhmann’s theory does not
provide a complete description of the world, but it is always selective; that is,
it hides certain aspects. When reading Luhmann’s sociologized reinter-
pretations of the key concepts, we can feel on good grounds that other
aspects—for example, the role of normative or symbolic elements—are
pushed into the background. Luhmann’s explanation on the institutionaliza-
tion of human rights, for example, seems very one-sided in as much as he in-
terprets them exclusively as mechanisms ensuring the autonomy of the
societal subsystems and disregards all of their normative or symbolic aspects.
Finally, let us examine what we can say about Luhmann’s expectations
concerning the effects of his theory outside the scientific system. This kind of
practical purpose can perhaps seem foreign in Luhmann’s work. This is be-
cause one of the most known characteristics of his theory is the criticism
of similar endeavors; a feature that can be traced back to his debate with
Habermas at the beginning of his career. Notwithstanding other points of
confrontation, one of the most important questions debated among them
concerned the relationship between theory and practice, which is usually in-
terpreted in the literature that Habermas’s objective was to criticize and
change society, while Luhmann’s purpose was only to describe it (Berghaus
2003: 21).
This opposition, of course, points to an important difference between the
endeavors of the two thinkers, but it slightly over-simplifies the question,
especially Luhmann’s views. It suggests that Luhmann considers theory and
practice as separable from each other, but one of his most important theo-
rems states that society cannot be observed from outside; that is, the forma-
tion of the theory of society happens inside the society; thus, theory is
practice as well (Luhmann 2005a6: 317). Luhmann and Habermas, in fact,
agree on the rejection of the opposition of theory and practice. The differ-
ence between their opinions consists rather in the question of how direct and
cognizable the relationship between theory and practice is. According to
Habermas, theory and practice are in a direct and clear connection because
cognition is always led by an interest; that is, by choosing a theory, we al-
ready take a stand on practical aims or interests (Habermas 1989: vii). If
someone endeavors to elaborate a theory of society based on systems the-
ory—as Luhmann does—he serves, according to Habermas, the legitimation
Conclusion 265
of the established order (Habermas 1971: 144).5 To this endeavor, he opposes

his critical theory, which serves to criticize the existing social conditions and
to change or emancipate society. Luhmann, however, deems that Habermas
over-simplifies the relationship between theory and practice, and that this
connection is much more complex and incalculable (Luhmann 1971: 398–
405). The question for what purposes a given theory is used by politics de-
pends on many factors that cannot be influenced by the theorist. Luhmann,
on the one hand, rejects the accusation that there is a necessary connection
between his systems theory and political endeavors to maintain status quo;
on the other hand, he doubts that critical theory could really achieve the
emancipatory aims it has envisaged.
It does not hold that Luhmann regards the description of society as an ac-
tivity free from any practical consequences, but he thinks that these conse-
quences are mostly incalculable and uncontrollable. In consequence, in the
course of the elaboration of his theory, the main criterion is not what effects
his theoretical decisions will have on the functioning of society, for example,
how politicians will use them. In Luhmann’s theory, however, there are some
efforts that—even if in a very indirect way—refer to practical aims, as we
have seen in the previous chapter in the case of his views on political theory.
Furthermore, I deem that the purpose to orientate practice pervades a num-
ber of Luhmann’s other ideas as well. In his œuvre he continuously criticized
the concepts that are used to describe modern society and that he considered
obsolete, and he replaced them by his own definitions, which, in his view, re-
sult in a more exact notion of society. And for what else could a more ade-
quate description of modern society serve if not to help the emergence of
more efficient practices based on this more exact notion? Enlightenment—it
may as well be meant both in the original sense of the word and in a socio-
logical sense as Luhmann used it—eventually means the same: the replace-
ment of the ideas that we consider false by those that better correspond to
the reality and thus can better orientate the functioning of society. And the
fact that someone does not do this as a direct criticism of society does not
mean that it works less effectively: “It had always been clear to me that a
thoroughly constructed conceptual theory of society would be much more
radical and much more discomforting in its effects than any narrowly
5 Although I do not wish to analyze Habermas’s views and their changes here, it is well worth
mentioning that later he softened his thesis concerning the direct connection between
knowledge and interest (Némedi 2006: 19; Weiss 2005b: 276–281).
266 Conclusion
focused criticism—the criticism of capitalism for instance—could ever imag-

ine.” (Luhmann 1996c: 200)6
An important feature of Luhmann’s views on the relationship between
theory and practice is that he thinks the practical endeavors have come to a
dead end in many respects, that is, they set unrealizable aims to themselves.
In his view, this holds true for the two problems that are currently perhaps
the most vital ones: the functionability of the welfare state and the ecological
challenges. According to Luhmann, the reason for the unsuccessful practices
is mainly the lack of an appropriate theory of society; thus, he expects his
theory of modern society to help these practices to find the way out of the
dead end. Let us now examine whether Luhmann’s theory shows a way for
the practices that endeavor to comply with the current challenges.
In the previous chapter we have already analyzed the chances whether
Luhmann’s theory can fulfill practical orientation functions, and we have
concluded that its suitability for this is quite questionable. The reason con-
sists in the fact that we cannot formulate positive action programs on the ba-
sis of Luhmann’s theory. His theory blocks every idea that could promise a
solution for the current challenges: planning and steering, because of the dif-
ferent logics of the functional subsystems and because of their uncontrolla-
bility stemming from this, can only achieve very limited results; the success
of the comprehensive social aims cannot be based on the people’s rationality;
and in modern society there is no chance for a society-wide morality to en-
sure the harmonious functioning of society. Luhmann holds that besides the
functional troubles of welfare state,7 the treatment of ecological challenges is
no less problematic. For example, for a sufficient solution of them, we would
need rationality on the level of the whole society, but this is unworkable
in modern society because of the lack of a top or a center (Luhmann 1989:
133–138).8
The impracticability of these programs is basically due to the peculiarities
of the functionally differentiated structure of society. A solution would be
6 English translation by Hans-Georg Moeller (Moeller 2006: v); see also Moeller 2006: 116–117.
8 For the problem of rationality, see Chapter Seven, Section A. István Balogh analyzes in criti-
cal detail Luhmann’s views on ecological crisis (Balogh 2008: 42–76). His conclusions rein-
force my above criticism of the lack of practical guidance: “there is a paradoxical
relationship between the ambitious theoretical aims and the outlining of the possibilities of
solving problems” (Balogh 2008: 45; my translation).
Conclusion 267
possible only if a societal structure other than the functionally differentiated

one emerged, but according to Luhmann, there is no chance for this. It is im-
possible to return to the former types of society because this would mean a
move towards a less complex societal order. Neither does a move forward
seem likely because for the moment we cannot imagine a societal structure
that would render possible a complexity higher than the functionally differ-
entiated one. Luhmann deduces the impracticability of the endeavors men-
tioned above from the most abstract level of his theory. The most successful
type of society is the one that makes the highest complexity possible, and we
cannot find any alternatives that could exceed the functionally differentiated
society in this respect. The most important evolutionary achievement of this
type of society is the autonomy of the functional subsystems, but this makes
impossible every kind of society-wide planning, control, rationality, or mo-
rality, that is, exactly those things that usually underlie the endeavors to an-
swer social or ecological challenges. According to Luhmann’s theory, there
remains no alternative but to reconcile ourselves to the autonomous func-
tioning of the subsystems. In his theory, however—as opposed to the liberals’
“laissez faire, laissez passer” principle—it is by no means sure that this will
solve our problems.
To sum up the results of Luhmann’s work in the light of the aims set by
himself, I deem it advisable to proceed from the finding that underlies his
theory and that I have already mentioned above: the ungraspable complexity
of the world. According to this thesis, we will never be able to completely de-
scribe the world; we always have to make selections. This selectivity holds
true for Luhmann’s theory as well. He, of course, also admits this, but some-
times we might have the impression that he does not carry out this thesis
consequently. But if we do this, it follows from it, on the one hand, that how-
ever much Luhmann strives for generality, his theory most likely cannot
reach the status he expects from it, that is, to be a general theory of sociality
or society. On the other hand, as his theory cannot grasp every aspect of so-
ciety, it cannot reveal all options and limits of the practice. His theory is, in a
certain sense, one-sided regarding both the description of society and the es-
timation of the effectiveness of practical options. Of course, we cannot ignore
that Luhmann’s description of the modern society has revealed several new
features, aspects, and relationships that are worth considering, developing,
and applying. But we have to keep in mind that all these findings are contin-
gent; that is, they reveal certain things and hide others. We should not
268 Conclusion
regard his thoughts as final results but only as new ways of posing questions
and as new challenges for theory construction and practice.
Bibliography
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Index
acceptance, 86, 89, 152, 154, 214 structure and, 50

evolution and, 98 welfare state and, 170
symbolically generalized autopoietic turn, 35, 69, 153, 212
communication media and, Baecker, Dirk, 167
90 basic rights, 212–215, 224, 239,
accident, 96 247, 256
action, 69, 153, 163, 203, 235 Bateson, Gregory, 41
as basic unit of sociality, 68 Berger, Peter L., 179
communication and, 70, 71 Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, 25
language and, 84 Blair, Tony, 226
action theory, 69, 71, 155, 202, 235, blind spot, 44, 45, 148
260 Bloor, David, 179
actor, 69, 237, 241, 244, 245, 246, bourgeoise, 106
247, 249 bureaucracy, 171
actuality/potentiality, 56, 118 Burke, Edmund, 93
adaptation, 97 Campbell, Donald T., 95, 190
alienation, 191 causality, 29, 31, 54, 58, 126, 141,
analytical philosophy, 181 204
anthropology of early modernity, ideology and, 218
130, 132 centralization, 143, 211, 241, 244,
Augustine, 127 246, 249
authority, 71, 87, 88, 89, 125, 215, circularity, 20–24, 22, 24, 28, 29,
229 32, 33, 34, 41, 46, 117, 233
autological theory, 19 naturalism and, 182
autopoiesis class, 106, 107, 123, 203, 225, 228,
constructivism and, 180 262
definition of, 47 cleavages, 157, 158, 216
determinism and, 204 code
evolution and, 96 binary, 91, 110, 145, 247
explicit/implicit knowledge binary, list of, 112
and, 188 primary/secondary, 145
of politics, 166 re-coding, 146, 160
of the subsystems, 110 co-evolution, 68, 190, 202
origins of, 47 cognition, 117
302 Index
as construction, 178 differentiation and, 58, 103

as event, 187 emancipation and, 227
as observation, 186 evolution and, 101
evolutionary epistemology and, evolutionary achievements
189 and, 101
in Luhmann's theory, 186 explanations and, 29
interest and, 264 ideology and, 218
knowledge and, 187 meaning and, 56
man and, 201 morality and, 115, 222
realism and, 187 of functionally differentiated
society and, 20, 118, 120, 121 society, 112, 128, 152, 192,
cognitive science, 33, 180, 181, 193, 267
182, 185 procedure and, 157
communication reduction of, 52, 53, 58
action and, 71 semantics and, 118, 122, 134
as action, 70 structural coupling and, 67
as operation type of social subsystems and, 110
systems, 62 technology and, 191
as transmission, 62 theme/opinion and, 165
components of, 64–65 trust and, 159
definition of, 63 conflict, 73, 81, 98, 143, 157, 161,
emergence and, 202 209, 216, 221, 237
environment and, 66 connectibility, 50, 91, 96, 122, 129,
improbablity of, 83 148, 196, 203
self/other-reference of, 65 consciousness, 46, 47, 48, 61, 63,
social systems and, 48 66, 67, 109, 176, 185, 186, 189,
society and, 79 190, 200, 201, 202, 204
communication media, 82–92, 102 consensus, 73, 75, 77, 132, 142,
communism, 225 151, 154, 155, 168, 213, 245
complexity conservatism, 184, 231, 239, 253
anthropology of early characterization of, 219
modernity and, 130 Luhmann and, 219–222
as key concept, 57 constitution, 109, 114, 153, 248
causality and, 31, 57, 205 constructivism, 194, 195
cleavages and, 158 arguments for, 179–184
contingency and, 224, 260 characterization of, 178
definition of, 58 cognition theoretical, 181, 184,
democracy and, 161 185
Index 303
constructionism, 179 as operation mode of

empirical, 181 organizations, 79, 114
Marx and, 228 collectively binding, 82, 140,
operational, 184 144, 212, 214, 241, 242, 243,
radical, 181 244, 254
social, 179 conflicts and, 157
sociology of scientific content of, 151, 154
knowledge, 179 democracy and, 161, 162
contingency, 30, 50, 51, 57, 59, 72, premise of, 155
126, 127, 130, 223 procedure and, 152, 154
control, 100, 107, 109, 111, 113, righteous, 152
127, 128, 170, 171, 172, 192, 193, decisionism, 180
221, 224, 229, 243, 244, 246, 247, democracy, 139, 146, 156, 160–163,
249, 267 164, 170, 173, 206, 208, 220, 221,
correspondence theory of truth, 251, 252, 255, 256, 257
176, 181, 183, 188 definition of, 160
critical theory, 18, 19, 157, 183, ideology and, 217
250, 253, 254, 264 Derrida, Jacques, 27, 41
criticism against Luhmann Descartes, René, 39, 71
autopoiesis, 234 determinism, 34, 199, 204, 205, 228
communication/action, 235 difference (or form) theory, 27, 36,
difference theory, 233 40, 61, 65, 84, 118, 135, 196, 234
generality, 236 differentiation, 102, 122, 123, 124
man, 235 center/periphery, 104, 106, 244
normativity, 239 complexity and, 58, 103
planning, steering, functional, 104, 107, 190, 195,
intervention, 238 211, 213, 263
reality, 237 of society, 102
cultural relativism segmentary, 103
arguments for, 207–209 stratificatory, 104, 106
definition of, 206 dignity, 213, 214
cybernetics, 25, 28, 170, 171, 184, disenchantment, 256
232 dissemination media,
Darwin, Charles, 93 effects of, 86–88
neo-Darwinian theory, 95 mass media and, 88
decision, 141, 143, 152, 156, 157, distinction, 40, 186
244, 246, 248 indication and, 40
Dolphin-group, 181
304 Index
double contingency, 72–74, 89, epistemology, 19, 24, 117, 118, 176,
159, 201, 202, 235 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183,
Downs, Anthony, 162 185, 186, 194, 195, 259
Duhem–Quine theses of evolutionary, 189
underdetermination and psychologization of, 182
holism, 182, 188 sociologization of, 182, 186
Durkheim, Émile, 70, 102 equality/inequality, 106, 158, 169,
Easton, David, 140 209, 215, 225, 226, 237
ecological challenges, 160, 170, essential contestability, 217
239, 266 evolution
economy, 110, 129, 131 complexity and, 101
basic rights and, 214 creation theory and, 94
economic freedom, 224, 256, environment and, 97
257 explanation and, 198
functional primacy of, 111 general theory of, 93, 95
intervention in, 224, 226, 227 of ideas, 123
Marx on, 228 of knowledge, 189
politics and, 141, 227, 244 of science, 190
positive sanction and, 141 phase theory and, 94
welfare state and, 170, 229 planning and, 95
ego/alter, 56, 72, 141, 142, 201 political, 240
election, 144, 152, 153, 155, 156, progress theory and, 94
157, 161, 164, 211, 246, 255, 256 restabilization, 96, 100, 124, 189
electronic media, 87, 88, 89 selection, 96, 98, 99, 100, 124,
element, 35, 43, 46 132, 189
relation and, 58 societal, 98, 111, 143, 221, 222
elite, 163 systems theory and, 96
embodiment of the mind, 181 variation, 96, 98, 99, 124, 132,
emergence, 74, 197, 202, 236, 262 189, 190
empirical research, 18, 217 evolutionary achievement, 114,
Enlightenment, 57, 132, 133, 151, 161, 165, 188, 228, 267
173, 177, 206, 220, 223, 256, 265 definition of, 101
modernity and, 133 expectation, 72, 73, 74, 83, 98, 159,
environment, 42, 54, 130, 166 203, 204, 213
communication and, 66 cognitive, 74, 187
evolution and, 97 complementary, 213
rationality and, 192, 193 normative, 74, 187, 210
environmentalism, 183
Index 305
explanation, 29–31, 94, 197, 199, Gray, John, 208

220, 238 Günther, Gotthard, 232
causal, 29, 57, 105, 205 Habermas, Jürgen, 18, 72, 163, 167,
functional, 198, 204, 205 168, 191, 207, 219, 220, 232, 234,
family, 105, 106, 108, 143, 157, 262 239, 253, 256, 259, 264
feminism, 183 Haider, Fritz, 82
Ferguson, Adam, 93 harmony, 219, 221
Foerster, Heinz von, 25, 45, 184, Hayek, Friedrich August von, 93,
232 198
form, two sided, 40 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,
Forsthoff, Ernst, 220 22, 233
Foucault, Michel, 237 Heidegger, Martin, 33
foundation, 72, 209, 223 Heider, Fritz, 232
anti-foundationalism, 20, 24, Herder, Johann Gottfried, 93
180 hierarchy, 22, 88, 106, 108, 125,
of human rights, 206, 207, 209, 127, 128, 168
210 Hobbes, Thomas, 71, 208
Freeden, Michael, 217, 218, 225 Holz, Klaus, 242
freedom, 212, 213, 214, 222, 224, Homans, George Casper, 203
225, 229, 232, 255 horizon, 56, 130
of property, 214 human rights, 210, 211, 212, 215,
Freyer, Hans, 220 220, 250, 252, 257, 264
function, 109, 110, 112 Hume, David, 72, 93
definition of, 110 Husserl, Edmund, 22, 191
functional equivalent, 90, 101, 162, identity, 40, 106, 109, 128, 129,
205 130, 135, 187, 196, 233, 234
functional method, 31, 204, 218 ideology, 159, 257
functional primacy, 111 definition and role of, 216–218
functional subsystems political theory and, 252
characterization of, 109 technology and science as, 191
list of, 112 inclusion/exclusion, 105, 106, 129,
Gallie, Walter Bryce, 217 131, 168, 169, 227, 229, 240
Gehlen, Arnold, 220 individual, 48, 106, 165, 168, 172,
generality, 267 197, 203, 204, 208, 221, 222, 225,
Girard, René, 41 260, 262
globalization, 69, 80, 81, 207 influence, 141
government/opposition, 146, 160, information, 53, 54, 64, 166, 185,
170, 243, 246, 247 202
306 Index
information society, 69, 88, 240 legal/illegal, 145, 210

integration, 104, 113 legislation, 153, 155, 156
interaction, 26, 27, 28, 86, 99, 105, legitimacy, legitimation, 72, 139,
153, 164, 199, 247, 259, 260 151–160, 172, 214, 220, 256, 264
definition of, 79 crisis of, 151
society and, 203 definition of, 154
international relations liberalism, 208, 225, 229, 255, 267
theory of, 242 characterization of, 222–223
interpenetration, 54, 67, 204 Luhmann and, 223–225
communication and, 66 neo-liberalism, 239
intervention, 170, 220, 224, 226, loose/close coupling, 82, 166, 205
227, 238, 254 Luckmann, Thomas, 179
irritation, 53, 167, 185 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 129
Johnson, Mark, 181 man, 49, 107, 133, 192, 211, 223,
Knorr-Cetina, Karin, 181 235
knowledge, 118, 120, 186, 189 in Luhmann’s theory, 200
and interest, 264 Mandeville, Bernard, 93, 129
as structure, 187 manifest/latent functions, 156,
evolution of, 189 157, 198
existential determination of, Marx, Karl, 191, 228
228 neo-Marxism, 197
Luhmann’s definition of, 187 mass media, 160, 166, 167
man and, 201 dissemination media and, 88
Koselleck, Reinhart, 21, 119, 123 Maturana, Humberto, 25, 47, 49,
Kuhn, Thomas S., 180, 186 54, 184, 232
Lakoff, George, 181 meaning
language, 51, 52, 68, 181 definition of, 55
as communication medium, 84 dimensions of, 78
understanding and, 85 factual dimension, 56, 78, 86
Latour, Bruno, 194 semantics and, 118
Left, 151, 227, 228, 232 social dimension, 56, 78, 86
academic, 184 temporal dimension, 56, 78, 86,
legal positivism, 207, 209 127
legal system medium/form theory, 37, 41, 82,
autopoiesis of, 210 84, 141
function of, 210 metaphor theory, 181
legal positivism and, 209 methodological collectivism
politics and, 145 arguments for, 199
Index 307
definition of, 197 ontology, 33, 127, 130, 134, 233

methodological individualism operation, 46, 48, 62, 153, 203
arguments for, 197–199 observation as, 42, 44, 121
definition of, 197 operational closure
mobility, 105, 106 definition of, 46
ideology and, 216 of the subsystems, 110
modernity, modern society, see operationalist standpoint, 42, 49,
society: functionally 50, 69, 184, 196
differentiated operative/symbolic level, 155, 246,
money, 90, 91, 92, 100, 108, 159, 256, 257
171, 214 organic development, 219, 221,
morality, 90, 107, 110, 112, 115, 227
127, 128, 130, 131, 134, 165, 192, organization, 26, 28, 110, 114, 115,
214, 222, 257, 266, 267 170, 171, 237, 244, 247, 248, 259,
multiculturalism, 183, 208 260
nation, 242, 262 definition of, 79
natural law, 90, 145 paradox, 23, 24, 41, 42, 43, 233
natural rights, 89, 206, 207, 210, of law, 210, 211, 216
223 parliament, 155, 156, 164, 173
natural selection, 97 Parsons, Talcott, 26, 50, 54, 68, 70,
naturalism, 181, 189 72, 73, 75, 77, 89, 90, 103, 140,
naturalized epistemology, 184 203, 235
neo-institutionalism, 200 part/whole distinction, 25, 103,
New Labour, 225, 226 128
normativity, 239 participation, 151, 155, 160, 162,
norms, 67, 73, 75, 103, 105, 106, 163, 169, 221, 227, 245
153, 154, 158, 202, 203, 204, 237 party, 144, 160, 162, 170, 240, 246,
object, 176, 178, 187 257
objectivism, 176, 181 perception, 42, 48, 62, 65, 66, 79,
objectivity, 177, 178, 183, 187, 190, 92, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190
195, 216 performance, 113, 169, 190, 221,
observation 244
as cognition, 186 definition of, 110
as operation, 42, 44, 121 person, 74, 104, 111, 129, 168, 201,
characterization of, 42 212
definition of, 41 personal system, 212
observer, 46, 135 planning, 168, 171, 219, 221, 238,
old European, 126 243, 244, 266, 267
308 Index
evolution and, 95 centralization and

Polanyi, Michael, 187 generalization of, 211
policy/politics/polity, 144 circulation of, 144
political theory definition of, 141
characterization of, 250–253 inflation of, 92
definition of, 249 practice, 228, 249, 250, 251, 253,
ideology and, 252 254, 255, 267
Luhmann's theory and, 253–257 theory and, 259, 264, 265
politics price, 92, 166
as functional system, 140, 144 printing, 87, 88, 102, 108, 124, 125
binary code of, 145–147, 246, procedure, 151, 247
247 process, 45
description of, 249 program, 92
differentiation of, 143–144 of politics, 147
function of, 140, 243, 244 of science, 188
in Luhmann's theory, 139 progress, 94, 177, 223, 255
science and, 251 progressive/conservative, 147
segmentary differentiation of, protest movement, 26, 239, 247
241 definition of, 79
self-description of, 148, 249 psychic system
symbolically generalized cognition and, 186
communication medium of, double contingency and, 73
141, 243 individual and, 200
politics/administration/public, language and, 84
144, 246 meaning and, 55
polycontextuality, 103, 134, 135, operation type of, 47, 62
196 person and, 74
Popper, Karl R., 120, 180, 189, 199, structural coupling and, 52, 66
200 truth and, 188
positive/negative sanctions, 141 public opinion, 139, 164–167, 245
positivism, 19, 22 as structural coupling, 166
positivism dispute, 19 public sphere, 163, 164, 167, 217
postmodern, 22, 107, 133, 176, 177, Quine, Willard Van Orman, 184
196, 197, 208 rationality, 177, 183, 184, 192, 193,
post-structuralism, 50 207, 215, 222, 223, 255, 266, 267
power, 91, 108, 141–143, 144, 145, Luhmann's defintion of, 192
149, 160, 161, 214, 217, 237, 243, of the subsystems, 193
250 of the whole society, 193
Index 309
realism, 194, 195 self-observation, self-description,

arguments for, 177 148
characterization of, 176 self-organization, 52, 234
Luhmann’s, 186 self-presentation
re-entry, 41 of the person, 212, 213
reflection, 46, 129 self-reference/other reference,
definition of, 110 45, 110, 129, 131
reflexivity, 45 of communication, 65
relativism, 176, 177, 184, 195, 196, of operations, processes,
215, 234 systems, 45
religion, 88, 99, 100, 101, 107, 109, rationality and, 193
112, 115, 127, 128, 130, 131, 134, semantics, 21, 22, 106, 118, 121,
135, 145, 152, 159, 214, 222 125
representation, 127, 128, 250 complexity and, 122
representation theory of cultivated, 119, 237
cognition, 121, 176, 178, 180, culture and, 119
181, 183, 185 definition of, 118
role, 143, 157, 169, 212, 213, 214, everyday, 119, 237
215 of functionally differentiated
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 208 society, 128–135
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 27, 41, 84 of stratified society, 126–128
Savigny, Friedrich Carl von, 93 September 11 attacks, 207
Schelsky, Helmut, 219 Shannon, Claude, 63, 261
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 162 sign, 84, 87, 90
science, 177, 178, 183, 184, 188, Simmel, Georg, 102
195, 228, 249, 254 Skinner, Quentin, 123
evolution of, 189 Smith, Adam, 93
ideology and, 217 social contract theory, 71, 89, 210
objectivity of, 190 social democracy
politics and, 250, 251 characterization of, 226
science wars, 184 Luhmann and, 226–228
second-order observation, 87, 92, social systems
111, 134, 166, 188, 195, 210 operation type of, 47
definition of, 45 theory of, 26, 28
rationality and, 193 types of, 78
selectivity, 30, 31, 57, 58, 59, 261, socialism, 107, 133, 227, 232
263 characterization of, 225
sociality, 25, 62
310 Index
basic unit, criterion of, 68 society and, 80

theory of, 27, 61, 259, 260, 261 world society and, 149, 241,
socialization, 199 242, 243
as interpenetration, 67, 204 steering, 168, 171, 238, 266
society Stichweh, Rudolf, 19, 69
definition of, 79 structural coupling
functionally differentiated, 22, definition of, 53
99, 100, 107–112, 123, 124, interpenetration and, 54
128, 144, 152, 160, 168, 169, of communication, 66
172, 215, 266 public opinion as, 166
interaction and, 99, 203 societal integration and, 113
segmented, 99, 105, 123, 143 structuralism, 49, 197, 203
sociality and, 25 structure
stratified, 99, 123, 124, 126, 143 definition of, 50
theory of, 17, 24, 77, 78, 132, determinism and, 204
231, 237, 259, 260, 262, 266 double selection, 51, 153, 165
sociological enlightenment, 33, expectations as, 74
133, 151, 163, 211, 220, 223, 256, information and, 64
259, 263 knowledge as, 187
sociology of knowledge, 21, 118, ontological problems of, 49, 203
120–126, 180, 186, 228 societal, 21, 117, 118, 121, 125,
Luhmann’s, 120 132, 211, 227
strong program of, 179 theme as, 165
systems theory and, 121 subject, 46, 55, 70, 135, 176, 178,
sovereignty, 250, 257 194, 236
space, 57, 237 substance, 43, 134
Spencer Brown, George, 27, 40, 41, symbiotic symbol, symbiotic
232, 234 mechanism, 92, 189
Spencer, Herbert, 93 symbolically generalized
stability, 100, 106, 107, 109, 158, communication media, 89–92,
161, 220, 239 99, 100
state, 139, 147–150 acceptance and, 90
as organization, 149, 244, 248 inflation/deflation of, 92
as self-description, 148 list of, 112
international relations and, 242 subsystems and, 92
political system and, 144 trust and, 159
political theory and, 250 system
politics and, 147 autopoiesis of, 47
Index 311
definition of, 42 ideology and, 218

operation and, 43 Luhmann's definition of, 188
operational closure of, 46 understanding, 64, 202
system/environment universal and equal suffrage, 153,
differentiation, 25 158, 214
system/environment distinction, universal human rights
28, 42, 46 arguments for, 207–209
paradox of, 43 definition of, 206
subsystems and, 102 universality, 260
systems theory, 25, 26, 27, 171 unmarked space, 40
action theory and, 68 unmarked state, 39, 40
definition of, 42 utilitarianism, 223
general, 28, 36, 47, 61 utterance, 64, 70, 202
sociology of knowledge and, Varela, Fransisco, 25, 47, 180, 184,
121 234
Tarde, Gabriel, 41 Voltaire, 208
technology, 183, 184, 191 Weaver, Warren, 63, 261
textual/contextual analysis, 34, Weber, Max, 39, 55, 68, 70, 102
175 welfare state, 139, 160, 168–172,
Thatcher, Margaret, 262 226, 229, 239, 244, 250, 251, 255,
theme/opinion, 165 266
thought functionally differentiated
as operation type, 48 society and, 168
tolerance, 208 social state and, 169
tradition, 219, 229 world society, 81, 88, 149, 190, 241,
transdisciplinarity, 20, 263 242, 243
transmission model, 62, 63, 261 society as, 81
true/false, 110, 187, 188 state and, 149
trust, 159 writing, 86, 98, 99, 102, 124, 188
truth, 91, 176, 178, 187, 195 impact of, 86
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Disillusioning

Balázs Brunczel is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science of

PART I: The Structure of Luhmann’s Theory

CHAPTER ONE: General Characterization of Luhmann’s

CHAPTER FOUR: Theory of Society 77

PART II: Politics in Luhmann’s Theory

CHAPTER SIX: Theory of Politics 139

Niklas Luhmann’s accomplishment in the field of social theory is outstanding

practical endeavors that aim at offering solutions to the challenges modern

components of Luhmann’s theory in the order chosen. To this end, I present

of methodological individualism to methodological collectivism, the contrast

The Structure of Luhmann’s Theory

General Characterization of Luhmann’s

Before entering into a detailed, systematic reconstruction of Luhmann’s the-

A) Luhmann’s Theoretical Objectives

When in 1969 Luhmann was appointed professor of sociology at the newly

theory of society: a sociological theory. He was convinced that sociology

theory of society plays a political role: it is necessary if we are to accomplish

direction because according to him epistemology is not complete without a

B) The Circular Structure of Luhmann’s Theory

As a consequence of this, we are facing a problem here: the theory can

distinction; in other words, the distinction between structure and semantics

Finally, the most detailed and systematized exposition of Luhmann’s own

C) The Levels of Abstraction in Luhmann’s Theory

Until now we characterized Luhmann’s theoretical endeavor as one applying

First, we need to distinguish between “society” and “sociality” (Gesell-

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish general systems theory from

Technical Biological Social Systems Psychic Systems

Interaction Organization Society

Figure 1: Levels and types of systems (reproduced, with modifications, from

According to Luhmann, the reason why it is important to clearly distinguish

and systems theory, or the system/environment difference,25 is one of such

D) The Explanatory Power of Luhmann’s Theory

Explanations of social phenomena and methodological problems related to

impossible for us to completely grasp the complexity of the world; therefore,

30 Functional method will be discussed in Chapter Seven, Section B.

E) The Relation of Luhmann’s Theory to Philosophy

should be embedded within the framework of a theory positing a circular re-

F) The Way to Reconstruct Luhmann’s Theory

way of reconstruction—inevitably fall into the background. By way of com-

change consisting in the shift of accent from autopoiesis to difference theory

General Systems Theory

I begin the detailed, systematic reconstruction of Luhmann’s theory with an

3 Medium/form theory will be discussed in Chapter Four, Section C.

Luhmann always applies this difference theoretical method; he always intro-

implies that every social and psychic phenomenon—including, among other

kind, more precisely, to operations applying the same system/environment

kind of self-reference accompanying (mitlaufende) self-reference (Luhmann

C) Operational Closure and Autopoiesis

Summarizing the foregoing, we can declare that there is a circular relation-

system/environment distinction, it cannot connect to the previous op-

To demonstrate the benefits of this decision for theory construction re-

One of the most interesting parts of Luhmann’s theory is the definition of

10 Luhmann often characterizes his theoretical decisions as rigorous enforcements of meth-

presuppositions (Luhmann 1995a: 278–282). He regards a priori structures as

fixing theoretically contingent decisions—consists in the fact that when us-

In the foregoing, an emphasis was put on the sharp separation of systems.

possible. Therefore, the task is to reconcile the autonomy of systems in

reformulates the concept of information. As opposed to the conventional

The concepts discussed thus far—operational closure, autopoiesis, structure,

it is “meaningless,” we simply use the word in another sense (Luhmann

In accordance with the method of reconstruction I outlined at the end of

demand for the reduction of complexity by means of differentiation. Subsys-

Theory of Social Systems

Brunczel, Balázs - Disillusioning Modernity. Niklas Luhmann's Social and Political Theory

Brunczel, Balázs - Disillusioning Modernity. Niklas Luhmann's Social and Political Theory