Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2/12/18
Law and Ethics
Paper 2
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), L.B. Sullivan, one of the elected
commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama prosecuted the New York Times Company
for a civil libel exploit losses. It went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which alleged Alabama law
was unconstitutional because it unsuccessfully afforded the newspaper protected free speech and
press in libel action by a public official. The Court demanded newspaper’s constitutional rights
made it essential to have a statute that forbid a public official from gaining misrepresented
slandering compensations related to the official’s demeanor unless the official can offer evidence
that the report was made with ‘actual malice’. ‘Actual malice’ was described by the Supreme
Court as “knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or made with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” The Court also alleged under the correct protection, confirmation
accessible against the newspaper was unsatisfactory in supporting the judgement and overturned
It relates to the libel/slander issue Olive’s constitutional rights also include the necessity
official’s demeanor unless the official can offer evidence that the report was made with cruelty.
Since Barkfield’s testimonial was an opinion made with actual malice rather than facts, I do not
Time Inc. v. Hill (1966) looks at a publisher from Time Inc. magazine claiming denial of
free speech and press under First Amendment toward compensations of dishonest information of
a play revealing an experience that the publisher and his family grieved from. The Supreme
Court held that First Amendment Protected speech and press in matters of public interest with
evidence the report was distributed with awareness of misrepresentation or neglect for the truth.
The jury’s order to the lesser court of law unsuccessfully restricted a verdict of liability. (Time
Inc. v. Hill)
It relates because it focuses on the public’s best interest and similar to this instance,
Barkfield wrote an opinion piece in the newspaper based on an experience he suffered from in
the past. I concur that this needs to be considered in the public’s best interest because a child was
injured due to Olive’s actions. Being threatened can affect your decisions and actions, but Olive
should have calmly considered all of her options before taking action instead of panicking and
trying to follow the gunman’s instructions while being concerned for her own safety.
In Curtis Publishing v. Butts (1967), Wally Butts, former Athletic Director of the
University of Georgia, prosecuted the Curtis Publishing Company for libel in publishing an
article in the Saturday Evening Post with offensive language. The Supreme Court considered the
decision whether or not free speech and press involves a law prohibiting a public official from
recuperating compensations for slanderous untruths related to demeanor unless there was
evidence the report was made in “actual malice” established by a public figure involved in the
public interest. The Court concluded a “public figure” that is not a public official could also
recover damages, with a damaged reputation, on irrational manners leading to dangerous leave
from inquiry criteria and information by rational publishers. (Curtis Publishing Company v.
Butts)
Since Olive was considered a public figure and not a public official, I think that Olive
should not receive compensation for damages because the information against her was the truth
and the language in the article was opinion that did not damage her reputation. What damaged
her reputation was that she omitted information from her job application.
Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974) focuses on the issue of libel. After Nuccio, a Chicago
police officer, shot and killed a youth in addition to being convicted of second-degree murder,
the youth’s family hired Elmer Gertz, a dependable attorney, to signify them in civil lawsuit
against Nuccio. Robert Welch Inc. distributed an article about Gertz that categorized him as
"Communist" and member of a Marxist organization during the trial. The statements contained
serious inaccuracies, thus Gertz prosecuted for libel. The district court alleged that the New York
Times standard applied, meaning Gertz avoided liability unless Robert Welch Inc. substantiated
a slanderous misrepresentation was issued with actual malice. The Supreme Court said Gertz was
a nonpublic figure and the states could outline the suitable norm of legal responsibility for a
Welch)
It relates to the case of libel/slander issue because it argues the First Amendment protects
free speech and deliberates a publisher’s statutory opportunity against accountability or offense
of a private citizen. As a newspaper reporter, the custom applies to Barkfield in his reporting and
Barkfield has the right to freedom of speech and press as protected by the First Amendment, but
there is criteria. In addition, due to recent events, Olive has become a public figure so she might
piece in an Ohio newspaper indicating that Michael Milkovich, a local high school wrestling
coach, lied under oath in a trial ensuing over an occasion involving Diadiun and his team during
a wrestling match. Milkovich charged Diadiun for libel and the Supreme Court affirmed a lesser
court of law admittance against Diadiun. The First Amendment established ruling on the article
asserting an “opinion” secure from state slander law. It held that the First Amendment does not
exclude the claim of Ohio’s libel laws to the suspected offenses confirmed in the article.
Since Barkfield’s articles were both opinion pieces instead of facts, state slander law
protects the articles, but the Court might have a different opinion. I think that either state slander
law or the First Amendment should not protect opinion pieces because it cannot be supported by
evidence and it is considered offensive. I think it is also impossible to know the outcome of the
situation regardless of what could have occurred if the school had done a proper background on
Olive or if the child would still be alive whether Olive was the driver or not.
The case of City of San Diego, California v. Roe (2004) focuses on the dismissal of a
police officer for the creation and distribution of sextapes. The officer argued protection of free
speech, stating, “off-duty behavior was not associated with his main occupation and he was
protected by public employee speech.” The U.S. Supreme Court held that the city had every right
in the officer’s dismissal for dishonorable and obnoxious mannerisms. While his speech did not
communicate the purpose of the police department, the speech was still destructive. The officer’s
engagements did not affect public concern and the employer had permission to limit the officer’s
speech, thus the verdict was overturned. (City of San Diego, California v. Roe)
This relates to the case in that Olive can argue that any actions taken off-duty such as
consuming alcohol or drug use does not associate with her main occupation of driving children
to school. However, while threatened, Olive’s actions led to the death of a minor, thus Olive’s
photographer, shot truthful photographs of people walking through Times Square and none were
attentive his actions. In 2001, diCorcia exhibited an art gallery owned by himself and
Erno Nussenzweig was in one of those images, but remained ignorant of the use and retail of his
picture as part of the exhibition in public until four years later in 2005. Later in 2007,
Nussenzweig appealed to the New York Supreme Court and claimed diCorcias’ use of the
photograph was entitled to First Amendment protection, and diCorcia’s action violated
Nussenzweig’s statutory right of privacy. The Court held because it was not supposed to decide a
not review Nussenzweig’s First Amendment claim The Court approved rapid decision to
It relates to invasion of privacy because diCorcia took photos without consent similar to
Olive’s case. However, Barkfield posted the photo with a news article while diCorcia showed his
photos as art. Barkfield could argue, “Any claim of a civil rights violation had to be within one
year of the display of the photograph” would begin when the image was placed in the article and
Foster v. Svenson (2015) draws attention to Svenson for photographing the Fosters and
their children through the Foster’s apartment windows and selling the photographs. It went to the
New York Supreme Court, sharing that Svenson’s engagements were not criminal by way of an
invasion of privacy and his usage of the portraits as established representation was not
considered for “advertising or trade purposes”. Any revenue from transactions of the creations
did not moderate statutory dwindling by “newsworthy and public concern”. The First
Amendment secured the portraits, sanctioning for promotion of the art. The character in which
the photographs were created was therefore not “outrageous” since it did not depict anything
beyond decency and secure under the “newsworthy and public concern” exemption. (Foster v.
Svenson)
This case relates to the situation because like Svenson, Barkfield took photos of Olive
through her window and without consent. However, Barkfield took the photos with a specific
purpose of exposing her and because it was part of his job as a reporter to have evidence with his
story. I conclude that Barkfield’s actions were not considered criminal by invasion of privacy,
but any profit from transactions of the images would moderate for ‘newsworthy and public
Work Cited
City of San Diego, California v. Roe. No. 03-1669. U.S. Supreme Court. 6 December 2004.
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts. No. 37. U.S. Supreme. 23 February 1967.
Foster v. Svenson. No. 651826. New York Supreme Court. 9 April 2015.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal. No. 89-645. U.S. Supreme Court. 24 April 1990.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. No. 39. U.S. Supreme Court. 6 January 1964.
Nussenzweig v. diCorcia. No. 8887. New York Supreme Court. 20 March 2007.
Time Inc. v. Hill. No. 22. U.S. Supreme Court. 27 April 1966.