Literature review the collapse of the Sella Zerbino gravity dam: review

The construction of large started dams at the end of XIX century in Italy, when the second
industrial revolution was just starting (Anidel 1961). The Gleno dam collapse occurred 1923
was considered as the first dam failure happened in Italy, it is believed to have been caused by
weak foundation and combined with changes in the construction stages (Pilotti et al. 2011).
The primary driver of gravity dams are foundations deficiencies and inadequacy to
discharge excess water through spillways and outlet works. Poorly designed spillways are often
causing dams failures (ICOLD 1991).
The lessons gained from the catastrophic events happened over the past 150 years were
responsible to somehow into the new guidelines. A significant viewpoint that is currently
completely perceived is the need to properly recognize from the beginning of the design
procedure that hydrological, hydraulic, geological, geotechnical and seismic processes are
carefully analysed.
After a few alteration Sella Zerbino dam. On August 13, 1935, the final shape of Sella
Zerbino Dam was as per the following: height 14.5m, length 109m, shoulders made as strong
dividers 3.5m wide. The slope of the faces of three central block of the dam were 10% upstream
and changing from 75% to 55% downstream (Figure 1). Unfortunately, the secondary dam had
no spillways at all. A soon as the reservoir was filled due to excess rainfall, Initial signs of dam
failures had been seen, water spillages of about 0.06 m3/s were recognized, so that grout
injection in the bedrock were carried out. The grout curtain did not stop the leakage; in fact,
the final inspection noticed a desirable water spillage for a reservoir level of 321.80m a.s.l.
approximate leakage of 0.017 and 0.005 m3/s from the both of abutment of the dam was
accounted for (Petaccia, Milazzo, 2016).
The fundamental drivers of the dam fail, which was identified with Sella Zerbino, was
reported as follows, after a long dry period, 13th August 1935 an unexpected severe rainfall
storm hit the Orba basin (Natale and Petaccia 2013).the rain intensity increased and kept
continuous without any interruptions about seven consecutive hours. The rain reached his
highest intensity between due to long period of continuous raining. The siphon outlets worked
to their full limit (Petaccia and Fenocchi). After several hours, the water began to enter the side
spillway and soon afterwards, the flood inflow exceeded the maximum capacity of the
spillways. After 15 minutes, the bell valve was clogged up with sediments and debris and there
was no way to re-open it. After some time the dam was overtopped and the Sella Zerbino dam
abruptly collapsed (Alfieri 1936).
 Historical witnesses confirm that the collapse started from the left side of the dam. The
remaining parts of the dam failed sequentially. On August 15, 1935 a new flood wave swept
down the wreckage of the left abutment. The dam failure flooded an area of almost 70 km2 and
caused 111 casualties, 97 of which in Ovada town (Natale et al. 2008, Petaccia et al. 2016).
All the possible causes related to the dam failure were summarized as reported
(Accusani 1936; De Marchi 1937; Mangiagalli 1937), Failure of the internal body of the
barrage due to inadequate concrete resistance ere also blamed, Instability due to the uplift force.
The design did not consider this force, even though it was required by the technical Standard
of that time (Ministry Rule No. 1309 of April 2, 1921), Instability due to the scour caused by
the plunging of the water overtopping the dam were mentioned.

Figure1: Downstream view of Sella Zerbino-Dam 13/8/1935

REFERENCES:
ANIDEL (1961) Le Dighe di Ritenuta degli Impianti idroelettrici italiani, Eds Anidel, Rome,
Italy (in Italian).
Pilotti M, Maranzoni A, Tomirotti M, Valerio G (2011) 1923 Gleno Dam Break: Case Study
and Numerical Modeling. Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, 137(4): 480–492.

ICOLD (1991) The identification of the possible causes and modalities of the failure of
masonry dams, Idrotecnica, 2: 69-75, Italy.

Petaccia, G., Lai, C.G., Milazzo, C., Natale, L., The collapse of the Sella Zerbino gravity dam,
Engineering Geology (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.enggeo.2016.06.024.

Natale L, Petaccia G, Savi F (2008) Simulation of the Sella Zerbino catastrophic dam break,
Proc. Int. Conf. on FluvialHydraulics Riverflow 2008, 1: 601-607.

Petaccia G, Fenocchi A (2015) Experimental assessment of the stage-discharge relationship of

the Heyn siphons of Bric Zerbino Dam. Flow Measurements and Instrumentation, 41:36-40.

Alfieri S (1936) Indagini idrogeologiche sul nubifragio dell’agosto 1935 nel bacino del torrente
Orba. Annali dei lavori pubblici, 9, 675 683, Technical Report, Turin, Italy (in Italian).