Rule 128

1. REYES v. CA G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

“The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings except as otherwise provided by law”

2. IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. v. NLRC G.R. No. 101527 January 19, 1993

Rule 129

1. SERMONIA v. CA G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

2. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. DESIERTO G.R. No. 130817.
August 22, 2001

3. CITY OF MANILA v. GARCIA G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

“For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken – because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that
the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila”

4. TABUENA v. CA and TABERNILLA G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991

“It applied the exception that “in the absence of objection,” “with the knowledge
of the opposing party,” or “at the request or with the consent of the parties,” the
case is clearly referred to or “the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives” and admitted as part of the record of the
case then pending”

Rule 130

1. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS v. CA G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987

2. PEOPLE v. TANDOY G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990

“The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was
actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.”
3. DE VERA v. AGUILAR G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993

“Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually

lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents,
although this order may be changed in the discretion of the court. “

4. AGUSTIN v. CA G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005

“DNA evidence Rule shall apply in all criminal actions, civil actions and
special proceedings”

5. RAMIREZ v. CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

“Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The phrase “private
communication” are put to rest by the fact that Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill used “communication” and “conversation”
interchangeably”

6. BAGUIO v. VDA DE JALAGAT G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

“Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or
not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not the previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration”

7. RODELAS v. ARANZA G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

8. VILLA REY TRANSIT v. FERRER G.R. No. L-23893 October 29, 1968

The requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the
custody of the adverse party are:
1. opponent’s possession of the original;
2. Reasonable notice to opponent’s possession of the original;
3. satisfactory proof of existence,
4. failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.

Best Evidence Rule

1. HUTCHISON v. BUSCAS G.R. No. 158554. May 26, 2005

2. EBREO v. EBREO G.R. No. 160065 February 28, 2006

“Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration
is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of
inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in
evidence the original or a copy of the deed.”

Parol Evidence Rule

1. CRUZ v. CA G.R. No. 79962 : December 10, 1990

“The parole evidence is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the

terms of an agreement. A receipt is not and could have not been intended by the
parties to the sole memorial of their agreement.”

2. PIONEER SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. CA G.R. No. 105419 September 27, 1993

3. INCIONG v. CA G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996

“The parole evidence rule does not specify that the written agreement needs to be
a public document. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since
written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary
the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them.”

Additional Cases

(1) Torres v. CA, G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984

“Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission of which as evidence, required its formal offer”
(2) Sison VS. People, G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

“The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony
of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can
admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy”

(3) G.R. No. L-5791, December 17, 1910, US v. Gregorio

“In the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a
copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document
which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence
of such original may be doubted.”

(4) Engr. Magdayao v. People, G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004

"As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in
evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court. To warrant the admissibility of secondary
evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse
party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court.

(5) Compañia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, G.R. No. L-28999 May 24, 1977

“What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like"

(6) Gan v. Yap, G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

Additional Cases

1. People v. Tan
 “When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so
that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the
party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the
surface or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
without accounting for the non-production of the others.”

2. Robles v. Lizarraga Ermanos

“The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral

agreement constituting an inducement or the making of the sale, or part of the
consideration therefore.”

3. PNB v. Seeto

“Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its

indorsement may be proved by parol evidence.”

4. Woodhouse v. Halili

“The purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the
agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract.”

5. Yu Tek v. Gonzales

“While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of

written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.”

6. Lechugas v. CA

“The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
 does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.”

7. Land Settlement Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation

“When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an
event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by
parol evidence.”

8. Maulini v. Serrano

“The prohibition against parol evidence is to prevent alteration, change,

modification, or contradiction of the term of a written instrument, admittedly
existing, by the use of some parol evidence except in cases specifically named in
the action. The purpose was to show that the contract of indorsement ever
existed;; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract that
they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract and that there never existed
a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded.”

9. Canuto v. Mariano

“The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary,
or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered
into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing,
modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced
by the writing.”

10. Madrigal v. CA

“Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may
prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that
the document does not express the true intent of the parties.”

11. Enriquez v. Ramos

“When the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to be

considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence
other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This rule,
 however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties.”

Testimonial Evidence

1) Lezama v. Rodriguez

“When the interest of the husband and wife are necessarily interrelated, the wife
or husband may invoke the marital disqualification rule.”

2) Razon v. IAC

“The dead man’s statute does not apply where the case is filed by the estate.
Besides, cross-examination of the witness is a waiver of the privilege. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."

3) Reyes v. Wells

4) Guerrero v. St. Clare Realty

“Dead Man’s Rule inapplicable when there is no claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero”

5) Abraham v. Intestate Estate of Ysmael, Recto-Kasten

“There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratix
extensively crosse-examined the witnesson the matters subject of the prohibition.”

6) Lim v. CA

The Court held that in order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1.Privilege claimed is in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine;
3.Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; and
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity.
7) Krohn v. CA

“The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony
be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.”

8) People v. Castañeda

“In this case, the same principle should be applied because the person who stands
to be prejudiced by the forgery is not a third person but his wife. Also, it directly
and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. By reason of public policy, the wife
should not be disqualified because to do otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent where the husband may conjure as many falsifications as possible with
impunity.”

9) People v. Francisco

“Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal

prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other
spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner.”

10) Testate Estate of Fitzsimmons v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila

“Officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from

testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person”

11) Goñi v. CA

“A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the

estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to
matters occurring during deceased's lifetime.”
12) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board [RULING ONLY]

“Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential
should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged.”

Additional cases on Testimonial Evidence:

1) People v. Tena, GR 100909, 21 October 1992

2) Ormachea Tin-Congco v. Trillana, GR 4776, 18 March 1909

3) Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, GR 21639, 25 September 1924

4) People v. Cabrera, GR L-37398, 28 June 1974

“In the absence of any other evidence to prove the existence of an alleged
conspiracy, extra-judicial statements and admissions of an individual cannot be
taken as evidence against an alleged co-conspirator”

“An extrajudicial statement made by a co-accused is, by itself, insufficient to

convict an accused of a crime charged because said statement is inadmissible
since they were made not during the existence of the conspiracy but after the said
conspiracy had already ceased and when the co-accused was already in the
custody of the police.”

5) People v. Paragsa, GR L-44060, 20 July 1978

“The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the

truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
They must however comply with the following requisites: 1. That one heard and
understood the statement, 2. That he was at liberty to interpose a denial, 3. That
the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was
then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer, 4. The facts were within his
knowledge, and 5. That the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
silence would be material to the issue.”

6) People v. Marra, GR 108494, 20 September 1994

7) People v. Sumayo, GR L-30713, 30 April 1976

8) US v. Evangelista, GR 8132, 25 March 1913

9) US v. Pineda, GR L-12858, 22 January 1918

“Although the testimony in substance relates to similar acts of negligence of the

accused at other times. It is admissible where the purpose is to ascertain
defendant’s knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has
more than one occasion, performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be
established.”

10) People v. Abulencia, GR 138403, 22 August 2001

11) People v. Alegre, GR L-30423, 7 November 1979

“The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody,
or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially
when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or
accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the
commission of the crime.”
“As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his
co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.”

12) People v. Raquel, GR 119005, 2 December 1996

“Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the

assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver
must be made with the assistance of counsel. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.”

13) People v. Serrano, GR L-7973, 27 April 1959

“The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only
to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the
trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And
while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to
grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be
received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible
and competent.”
14) People v. Yatco, GR L-9181, 28 November 1955

“The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements

made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in
furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end.”

“Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co--

accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may
nevertheless be admissible against the declarant’s own guilt.”

“The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence.”

15) People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, GR L-19590, 25 April 1968

“The Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the

confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in
the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of
its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must
be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession.”

16) Alpuerto v. Pastor, GR 12794, 14 October 1918

“Concerning the meaning of the expression “privies”, Manresa has his tiny to say
“The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and
testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from
acts inter vivos and for special purposes;; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one
subrogated to it, et., will be privies;; in short, he, who, by succession is placed in
the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the
private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and
obligations, isa a privy.”

17) City of Manila v. Del Rosario, GR 1284, 10 November 1905

 “The act of a predecessor to a land is not binding on the successor if the
acts/declarations made by the predecessor acknowledging ownership or offering
to purchase the property from a third party were made before the predecessor held
title to the land”

18) People v. Encipido, GR 70091, 29 December 1986

19) People v. Endino, GR 133026, 20 February 2001

Section 36, Rule 130

1) People v. Damaso

Sec. 37, Rule 130

2) People v. Laquinon

• The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to
show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of
recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the
hearsay rule."

• It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestaesince the statement was made immediately
after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against
the accused.

3) People v. Sabio

• The dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused as the one slashed and robbed him
cannot be admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always
been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of death.
4) People v. Agripa

• The mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that it is also credible. The
testimony of a competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not for this reason alone
believable. According to Rule 128, Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the evidence by the
court in accordance with the guidelines provided in Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid
down by this Court. As the court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as part of the res gestae, is
not credible evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full possession of his
faculties when he made that statement, which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the
authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead wife and was rolled up
with her cadaver in a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man.
Moreover, Jose was himself suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had he
not been treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and body at the time the statement was
made, Jose could not be expected to think clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning
confession now imputed to him.

5) People v. De Joya

• It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in
itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the
subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that
he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.

• The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's
classic work: "The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered
must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far
it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement
includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by
an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person
wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there,
and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person
finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he
might have been able to tell." The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or
if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled
to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.

6) People v. Devaras

Sec. 38, Rule 130

7) Viacrusis v. CA

•The admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that, although the land in dispute was physically in
the possession of her now deceased husband, Pelagio Costelo, he and she recognized Orais as the owner
of said land — which was confirmed by the public document Exhibit G — constitutes a declaration of Mr.
and Mrs. Costelo adverse to their own interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of
said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of
said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before their (petitioner's)
predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Costelo were the
only parties who had any interest in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such
admission "may be received in evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in
interest," but, also, "against third persons.

Sec. 39, Rule 130

8) People v. Alegado

“Pedigree” under Section 39 has three requisites for its admissibility:

1. there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family;
2. the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed prior to
the controversy; and
3. the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition is a member of the family of the
said person.
 Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony
in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.

9) People v. De Ynchausti

Requisites for admissibility of acts or declarations about pedigree, family

reputation or tradition:
1. that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry;
3. that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
4. that the declaration be made ante litem moam

Sec. 42, Rule 130

10) People v. Putian

“Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant
under the expectation of a certain and impending death, and for this reason, is not
admissible as a dying declaration, such declaration can fall squarely in the rule
on res gestae.”

11) People v. Peralta

Sec. 44, Rule 130

12) Fortus v. Novero

Sec. 46, Rule 130

13) Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

“To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. She has failed to prove the Chinese laws on
marriage that would show the validity of her marriage to Sy”
Sec. 47, Rule 130

14) Tan v. CA

“Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial or hostility since

testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is
old and has lost the power of speech.”

15) People v. Liwanag

Opinion Rule

US v. Yuan 37

RULE 131

1) Industrial v. Tobias, 78 SCRA

2) People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA

3) People v. Bersola 80 SCRA

4) Molina v. CA

5) Figui v. CA (ruling only), 233 SCRA

6) People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA

7) People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA

RULE 132

Sec. 6: Cross Examination

1) Dela Paz v. IAC, 154 SCRA

“The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a

judicial litigation, is fundamental right which is part of due process. Until such
cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not be allowed to form part of the evidence to be
considered by the court in deciding the case. But the right to cross-examine is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting
to a renunciation of the said right.”

2) Fulgado v. CA, 182 SCRA

“The right to cross-examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure

of a party to avail of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain
cross-examination was imputable to the cross-examiner’s fault, the lack of cross--
examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general
principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.”

Sec. 9: Recalling witness

3) People v. Rivera, 200 SCRA

“The discretion of a judge to exercise discretion in recalling witnesses must rely

on something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional
questions is essential before the court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to
grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall.”

“A Judge cannot strike out testimony of a witness who did not show up under
recall especially when if the defense did not file a motion to strike such testimony
from the records and most importantly if the defense had already crossed
examined and re-cross examined such witness.”

4) Villalong v. IAC, 144 SCRA

 “The defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 is that witnesses
have given conflicting testimonies, which are inconsistent with their present
testimony and which would accordingly cast a doubt on their credibility.”

5) People v. Resobal, 50

“The apparent contradictions which may be noted in the declarations

made during preliminary investigation and the testimony before the court may not
be used to impeach the credibility of the witness because the witness was not
given ample opportunity, by reading to him of his declarations during the
preliminary investigation, to explain the discrepancies. The mere presentation of
the transcript showing the prior testimony, without said declaration having been
read to the witness while he testified in court, is no ground for impeaching his
testimony.”

Secs. 20 to 24

6) Chua v. CA, 206 SCRA

7) Bunyag v. CA, 158 SCRA

“The validity and authenticity of the execution of an unnotarized deed of absolute

sale must be proven, more so if such was signed by a mere thumbmark and that
there were no instrumental witnesses.”

RULE 132

1) Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
76595, [May 6, 1988]

“A copy of a decision of a foreign court sought to be enforced in the Philippines must

be attested of the legal custodian of the original with a certificate from the Philippine
embassy and authenticated by the seal of his office.”
2)
“Documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied by a translation
into English of Filipino made by an official court interpreter, an interpreter
competent in both languages whose identity is revealed, or a translator agreed upon
by the parties. The translation may also be one sworn to by translator as an accurate
 translation of the original or the translation may be agreed upon by the parties as a
true and faithful one.”

3) Spouses Zalamea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104235, [November 18, 1993]

“Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a

copy attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.”

4) Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119602, [October 6, 2000]

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office.

Sec. 33

5) People v. Monleon, G.R. No. L-36282, [December 10, 1976]

“Affidavits written entirely in local dialects must be accompanied by a translation for

it to be admitted in court.”

Sec. 34

6) People v. Franco y Tianson, G.R. No. 118607, [March 4, 1997]

7) Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85423, [May 6, 1991]

8) Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, [June 6, 1990]

“Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally

offered, and notwhen the particular document is marked is identified and marked as
an exhibit.”
9) People v. Java y Mercado, G.R. No. 104611, [November 10, 1993]

10) People v. Yap y Boca, G.R. No. 103517, [February 9, 1994]

11) Catuira v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105813, [September 12, 1994]

“The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to offer it at the time the
witness is called to testify. This is the best time to offer the testimony so that the
court's time will not be wasted. Since it can right away rule on whether the testimony
is not necessary because it is irrelevant or immaterial.”

12) Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92067, [March 22,
1991]

13) Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434,
[August 5, 1992]

“Judicial admissions, verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in the
court of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive no evidence
being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.”

RULE 133

14) People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA

1) Tongco v. Tiamson, GR 27498, 20 September 1927

DOCTRINE: The dead man statute is not applicable in a cadastral proceeding because the same is an in
rem action. It is an action not against the estate but against the whole world.

2)People v. Carlos, GR 22948, 17 March 1925

DOCTRINE: Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a
third party, without collusion or voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible in evidence.

NOTE: When the case was decided, no Miranda doctrine yet.

3)Barton v. Leyte Asphalt, GR 21237, 22 March 1924

DOCTRINE: The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does not extend
to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party.
Where the authenticity of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in
which it was obtained.

4)Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society, GR 9231, 6 January 1915

DOCTRINE: Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to
others are not privileged after they have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony
of the attorney. This rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the
authority and under the instructions of his client.