ged to be beautiful.

Gracyk (1986) argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction,

that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not
objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being
legitimately found beautiful. However, approaches along these lines have not figured
prominently in the literature on the Deduction.

A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be

fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity:
see for example Meerbote (1982, cited above) and Guyer (1979), pp. 319–324 (although
Guyer offers a more positive assessment in his (200

ction and Truth

The traditional idea that art is a special vehicle for the expression of important truths is the
basis for the work of the philosopher who established the framework for German thought
for much of the 18th century, namely, Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff never devoted a
whole work to aesthetics, but many of the ideas that would influence subsequent aesthetic
theory are contained in his Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man, his
“German Metaphysics,” first published in 1719.

Originally appointed to teach mathematics at the Pietist-dominated university of Halle,

Wolff was inspired by both the mathematical and philosophical genius of Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), but published a vast systematic statement of a philosophy
that was constructed partly although by no means wholly on Leibnizian lines in a way that
Leibniz himself never did. Wolff's collected works (over thirty volumes in German and
forty in Latin) include German versions of his logic, metaphysics, ethics, political
philosophy, and teleology as well as a four-volume encyclopedia of mathematical subjects.
In addition, there are expanded Latin versions of the logic, the components of metaphysics
including ontology, rational cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, and
natural psychology, as well as another four-volume mathematical compendium, seven
volumes on ethics, and no fewer than twelve volumes on political philosophy and
economics. In all of this vast output, the only thing that might look like a work specifically
in aesthetics is a treatise on architecture included in his encyclopedia of mathematics. That
very placement indicates that Wolff regarded the discussion of architecture as part of the
theory of science; and in the Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General that prefaces
his Latin restatement of his system, Wolff states more generally that a “philosophy of the
arts” is possible, but as part of “technics or technology,” “the science of the arts and of the
works of art” (Wolff, Preliminary Discourse, §71, p. 38). Here Wolff uses the term “art”
(ars) in the ancient sense of techne, which means any form of craft requiring both aptitude
and training, rather than in the specifically modern sense of “fine art.” In his German
works, Wolff uses the word Kunst in the same broad way. Even with regard to something
closer to the fine arts, however, he says that “There could also be a philosophy of the liberal
arts, if they were reduced to the form of a science….one might talk about rhetorical
philosophy, poetical philosophy, etc.” (ibid., §72, p. 39). Wolff certainly does not have the
idea of the fine arts as a domain of human production and response that differs in some
essential way from all other forms of human production and response, thus he does not
have the idea of aesthetics as a discipline that will focus on what distinguishes the fine arts
and our response to them from everything else. Nevertheless, in the course of his works he
introduces some ideas about both the fine arts and our response to them that will be seminal
for the next half-century of German thought.

1.1 Leibniz

The two key ideas that Wolff takes from Leibniz are, first, the characterization of sensory
perception as a clear but confused rather than distinct perception of things that could, at
least in principle, be known both clearly and distinctly by the intellect; and, second, the
characterization of pleasure as the sensory, and thus clear but confused, perception of the
perfection of things. Leibniz's conception of sensory perception was presented in a 1684
paper entitled “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” Here Leibniz stated that
“Knowledge is clear…when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented,”
but that it is “confused when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient
to distinguish the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth have such marks
and constituents into which its concept can be resolved.” Conversely, knowledge is both
clear and distinct when one can not only clearly distinguish its object from other obje

3a), p. 60n15). Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on
considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below
(Section 2.8), Kant draws a close connection between our capacity for aesthetic judgment
and our nature as moral beings, and even though Kant himself does not appeal to this
connection in the deduction of taste, some commentators, including Elliott (1968),
Crawford (1974), Kemal (1986) and Savile (1987), have taken moral considerations to
constitute the ultimate ground of the legitimacy of judgments of beauty. Another strategy
drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of
aesthetic ideas (see Section 2.6), which is ostensibly part of his theory of art, rather than his
core theory of taste. This strategy is adopted in Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007);
Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to mora

ged to be beautiful. Gracyk (1986) argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction,
that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not
objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being
legitimately found beautiful. However, approaches along these lines have not figured
prominently in the literature on the Deduction.

A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be

fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity:
see for example Meerbote (1982, cited above) and Guyer (1979), pp. 319–324 (although
Guyer offers a more positive assessment in his (200

ction and Truth

The traditional idea that art is a special vehicle for the expression of important truths is the
basis for the work of the philosopher who established the framework for German thought
for much of the 18th century, namely, Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff never devoted a
whole work to aesthetics, but many of the ideas that would influence subsequent aesthetic
theory are contained in his Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man, his
“German Metaphysics,” first published in 1719.

Originally appointed to teach mathematics at the Pietist-dominated university of Halle,

Wolff was inspired by both the mathematical and philosophical genius of Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), but published a vast systematic statement of a philosophy
that was constructed partly although by no means wholly on Leibnizian lines in a way that
Leibniz himself never did. Wolff's collected works (over thirty volumes in German and
forty in Latin) include German versions of his logic, metaphysics, ethics, political
philosophy, and teleology as well as a four-volume encyclopedia of mathematical subjects.
In addition, there are expanded Latin versions of the logic, the components of metaphysics
including ontology, rational cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, and
natural psychology, as well as another four-volume mathematical compendium, seven
volumes on ethics, and no fewer than twelve volumes on political philosophy and
economics. In all of this vast output, the only thing that might look like a work specifically
in aesthetics is a treatise on architecture included in his encyclopedia of mathematics. That
very placement indicates that Wolff regarded the discussion of architecture as part of the
theory of science; and in the Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General that prefaces
his Latin restatement of his system, Wolff states more generally that a “philosophy of the
arts” is possible, but as part of “technics or technology,” “the science of the arts and of the
works of art” (Wolff, Preliminary Discourse, §71, p. 38). Here Wolff uses the term “art”
(ars) in the ancient sense of techne, which means any form of craft requiring both aptitude
and training, rather than in the specifically modern sense of “fine art.” In his German
works, Wolff uses the word Kunst in the same broad way. Even with regard to something
closer to the fine arts, however, he says that “There could also be a philosophy of the liberal
arts, if they were reduced to the form of a science….one might talk about rhetorical
philosophy, poetical philosophy, etc.” (ibid., §72, p. 39). Wolff certainly does not have the
idea of the fine arts as a domain of human production and response that differs in some
essential way from all other forms of human production and response, thus he does not
have the idea of aesthetics as a discipline that will focus on what distinguishes the fine arts
and our response to them from everything else. Nevertheless, in the course of his works he
introduces some ideas about both the fine arts and our response to them that will be seminal
for the next half-century of German thought.

1.1 Leibniz

The two key ideas that Wolff takes from Leibniz are, first, the characterization of sensory
perception as a clear but confused rather than distinct perception of things that could, at
least in principle, be known both clearly and distinctly by the intellect; and, second, the
characterization of pleasure as the sensory, and thus clear but confused, perception of the
perfection of things. Leibniz's conception of sensory perception was presented in a 1684
paper entitled “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” Here Leibniz stated that
“Knowledge is clear…when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented,”
but that it is “confused when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient
to distinguish the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth have such marks
and constituents into which its concept can be resolved.” Conversely, knowledge is both
clear and distinct when one can not only clearly distinguish its object from other obje

3a), p. 60n15). Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on
considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below
(Section 2.8), Kant draws a close connection between our capacity for aesthetic judgment
and our nature as moral beings, and even though Kant himself does not appeal to this
connection in the deduction of taste, some commentators, including Elliott (1968),
Crawford (1974), Kemal (1986) and Savile (1987), have taken moral considerations to
constitute the ultimate ground of the legitimacy of judgments of beauty. Another strategy
drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of
aesthetic ideas (see Section 2.6), which is ostensibly part of his theory of art, rather than his
core theory of taste. This strategy is adopted in Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007);
Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to mora

ged to be beautiful. Gracyk (1986) argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction,
that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not
objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being
legitimately found beautiful. However, approaches along these lines have not figured
prominently in the literature on the Deduction.

A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be

fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity:
see for example Meerbote (1982, cited above) and Guyer (1979), pp. 319–324 (although
Guyer offers a more positive assessment in his (200

ction and Truth

The traditional idea that art is a special vehicle for the expression of important truths is the
basis for the work of the philosopher who established the framework for German thought
for much of the 18th century, namely, Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff never devoted a
whole work to aesthetics, but many of the ideas that would influence subsequent aesthetic
theory are contained in his Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man, his
“German Metaphysics,” first published in 1719.

Originally appointed to teach mathematics at the Pietist-dominated university of Halle,

Wolff was inspired by both the mathematical and philosophical genius of Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), but published a vast systematic statement of a philosophy
that was constructed partly although by no means wholly on Leibnizian lines in a way that
Leibniz himself never did. Wolff's collected works (over thirty volumes in German and
forty in Latin) include German versions of his logic, metaphysics, ethics, political
philosophy, and teleology as well as a four-volume encyclopedia of mathematical subjects.
In addition, there are expanded Latin versions of the logic, the components of metaphysics
including ontology, rational cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, and
natural psychology, as well as another four-volume mathematical compendium, seven
volumes on ethics, and no fewer than twelve volumes on political philosophy and
economics. In all of this vast output, the only thing that might look like a work specifically
in aesthetics is a treatise on architecture included in his encyclopedia of mathematics. That
very placement indicates that Wolff regarded the discussion of architecture as part of the
theory of science; and in the Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General that prefaces
his Latin restatement of his system, Wolff states more generally that a “philosophy of the
arts” is possible, but as part of “technics or technology,” “the science of the arts and of the
works of art” (Wolff, Preliminary Discourse, §71, p. 38). Here Wolff uses the term “art”
(ars) in the ancient sense of techne, which means any form of craft requiring both aptitude
and training, rather than in the specifically modern sense of “fine art.” In his German
works, Wolff uses the word Kunst in the same broad way. Even with regard to something
closer to the fine arts, however, he says that “There could also be a philosophy of the liberal
arts, if they were reduced to the form of a science….one might talk about rhetorical
philosophy, poetical philosophy, etc.” (ibid., §72, p. 39). Wolff certainly does not have the
idea of the fine arts as a domain of human production and response that differs in some
essential way from all other forms of human production and response, thus he does not
have the idea of aesthetics as a discipline that will focus on what distinguishes the fine arts
and our response to them from everything else. Nevertheless, in the course of his works he
introduces some ideas about both the fine arts and our response to them that will be seminal
for the next half-century of German thought.

1.1 Leibniz

The two key ideas that Wolff takes from Leibniz are, first, the characterization of sensory
perception as a clear but confused rather than distinct perception of things that could, at
least in principle, be known both clearly and distinctly by the intellect; and, second, the
characterization of pleasure as the sensory, and thus clear but confused, perception of the
perfection of things. Leibniz's conception of sensory perception was presented in a 1684
paper entitled “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” Here Leibniz stated that
“Knowledge is clear…when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented,”
but that it is “confused when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient
to distinguish the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth have such marks
and constituents into which its concept can be resolved.” Conversely, knowledge is both
clear and distinct when one can not only clearly distinguish its object from other obje

3a), p. 60n15). Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on
considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below
(Section 2.8), Kant draws a close connection between our capacity for aesthetic judgment
and our nature as moral beings, and even though Kant himself does not appeal to this
connection in the deduction of taste, some commentators, including Elliott (1968),
Crawford (1974), Kemal (1986) and Savile (1987), have taken moral considerations to
constitute the ultimate ground of the legitimacy of judgments of beauty. Another strategy
drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of
aesthetic ideas (see Section 2.6), which is ostensibly part of his theory of art, rather than his
core theory of taste. This strategy is adopted in Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007);
Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to mora

ged to be beautiful. Gracyk (1986) argues, independently of the argument of the Deduction,
that this is Kant's view, and it might also be noted that, if judgments of beauty are not
objective, there can be no feature of an object which rules it out as a candidate for being
legitimately found beautiful. However, approaches along these lines have not figured
prominently in the literature on the Deduction.

A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be

fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity:
see for example Meerbote (1982, cited above) and Guyer (1979), pp. 319–324 (although
Guyer offers a more positive assessment in his (200

ction and Truth

The traditional idea that art is a special vehicle for the expression of important truths is the
basis for the work of the philosopher who established the framework for German thought
for much of the 18th century, namely, Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff never devoted a
whole work to aesthetics, but many of the ideas that would influence subsequent aesthetic
theory are contained in his Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man, his
“German Metaphysics,” first published in 1719.

Originally appointed to teach mathematics at the Pietist-dominated university of Halle,

Wolff was inspired by both the mathematical and philosophical genius of Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), but published a vast systematic statement of a philosophy
that was constructed partly although by no means wholly on Leibnizian lines in a way that
Leibniz himself never did. Wolff's collected works (over thirty volumes in German and
forty in Latin) include German versions of his logic, metaphysics, ethics, political
philosophy, and teleology as well as a four-volume encyclopedia of mathematical subjects.
In addition, there are expanded Latin versions of the logic, the components of metaphysics
including ontology, rational cosmology, empirical psychology, rational psychology, and
natural psychology, as well as another four-volume mathematical compendium, seven
volumes on ethics, and no fewer than twelve volumes on political philosophy and
economics. In all of this vast output, the only thing that might look like a work specifically
in aesthetics is a treatise on architecture included in his encyclopedia of mathematics. That
very placement indicates that Wolff regarded the discussion of architecture as part of the
theory of science; and in the Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General that prefaces
his Latin restatement of his system, Wolff states more generally that a “philosophy of the
arts” is possible, but as part of “technics or technology,” “the science of the arts and of the
works of art” (Wolff, Preliminary Discourse, §71, p. 38). Here Wolff uses the term “art”
(ars) in the ancient sense of techne, which means any form of craft requiring both aptitude
and training, rather than in the specifically modern sense of “fine art.” In his German
works, Wolff uses the word Kunst in the same broad way. Even with regard to something
closer to the fine arts, however, he says that “There could also be a philosophy of the liberal
arts, if they were reduced to the form of a science….one might talk about rhetorical
philosophy, poetical philosophy, etc.” (ibid., §72, p. 39). Wolff certainly does not have the
idea of the fine arts as a domain of human production and response that differs in some
essential way from all other forms of human production and response, thus he does not
have the idea of aesthetics as a discipline that will focus on what distinguishes the fine arts
and our response to them from everything else. Nevertheless, in the course of his works he
introduces some ideas about both the fine arts and our response to them that will be seminal
for the next half-century of German thought.

1.1 Leibniz

The two key ideas that Wolff takes from Leibniz are, first, the characterization of sensory
perception as a clear but confused rather than distinct perception of things that could, at
least in principle, be known both clearly and distinctly by the intellect; and, second, the
characterization of pleasure as the sensory, and thus clear but confused, perception of the
perfection of things. Leibniz's conception of sensory perception was presented in a 1684
paper entitled “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” Here Leibniz stated that
“Knowledge is clear…when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented,”
but that it is “confused when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient
to distinguish the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth have such marks
and constituents into which its concept can be resolved.” Conversely, knowledge is both
clear and distinct when one can not only clearly distinguish its object from other obje

3a), p. 60n15). Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on
considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below
(Section 2.8), Kant draws a close connection between our capacity for aesthetic judgment
and our nature as moral beings, and even though Kant himself does not appeal to this
connection in the deduction of taste, some commentators, including Elliott (1968),
Crawford (1974), Kemal (1986) and Savile (1987), have taken moral considerations to
constitute the ultimate ground of the legitimacy of judgments of beauty. Another strategy
drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to Kant's theory of
aesthetic ideas (see Section 2.6), which is ostensibly part of his theory of art, rather than his
core theory of taste. This strategy is adopted in Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007);
Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to mora