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(GR No. 217012 | March 01, 2016)
In October 2012, Wigberto filed twin petitions in the COMELEC to seek the cancellation of
Alvin John's CoC (docketed as SPA No. 13-056), and to declare Alvin John a nuisance candidate.
On January 29, 2013, the COMELEC 1ST Division dismissed the consolidated petitions for their
lack of merit. Then Wigberto duly filed his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petitioners. On April 25, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied Wigberto's motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 13-057, but granted his motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 13-056.

After the canvass of the votes, Tan was declared as the winner with 84, 782 votes, followed
by Tañada, Wigberto with 80,698 votes and Tañada, Alvin John 7,038 votes. On May 16, 2013,
Wigberto filed with the Quezon PBOC another petition. The Quezon PBOC denied Wigberto's
motion to have the votes garnered by Alvin John credited in his favor on the same date, holding that
the votes of Alvin John could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the
former's CoC had been on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code.
The Quezon PBOC then proclaimed Tan as the winning candidate.

On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a SUPPLEMENT TO THE PETITION WITH

his prayer to be declared as the winning candidate for the position of Representative of the 4 th
District of Quezon by consolidating the votes received by Alvin John with the votes he garnered.

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division favorably acted on the
motion to annul the proclamation of Tan, and annulled the proclamation, and directed the Quezon
PBOC to credit the 7,038 votes of Alvin John to Wigberto, and to declare the winner after the re-
computation of the votes. While Wigberto's petition for certiorari was still pending in the Supreme
Court, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the action of the COMELEC Second Division annulling
Tan's proclamation. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of
June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot.

The HRET promulgated the assailed Resolution on 25 September 2014.The HRET held that
Wigberto did not commit forum-shopping. Wigberto sought exclusive relief from the HRET for his
electoral protest in the belief that it was the proper forum for his predicament. He did not go to the
HRET to look for a friendly forum to obtain a favorable result.

The HRET held that Wigberto's election protest was insufficient in form and substance. The
HRET found that Wigberto's election protest failed to allege the facts to support a valid election
protest as required by Rule 16 of the 2011 HRET Rules.

Finally, the HRET ruled that it has no jurisdiction to declare that Alvin John was a nuisance

ISSUES: Whether or not the HRET has the jurisdiction to declare a candidate a nuisance.

RULING: HRET has no jurisdiction to declare a candidate a nuisance candidate because the
COMELEC En Banc Ruling has already become final and executory. Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
“Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days. -Decisions in preproclamation cases and
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme
The proper remedy is a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the COMELEC En Banc within 5 days from promulgation.
The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it has no
jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If Wigberto timely filed a
petition before this Court within the period allotted for special actions and questioned Alvin John's
nuisance candidacy, then it is proper for this Court to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter. As
things stand, the COMELEC En Banc's ruling on Alvin John's nuisance candidacy had long become
final and executory.


Rene A.V. Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
(G.R. No. 212426 | January 12, 2016)

FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement

that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases and
allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the
backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with China over the West Philippine Sea.

The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President
Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not submitted to Congress on the
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.

Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of the
agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it is
not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong
sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for
deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional.

RULING: YES. It has been established in the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (3
SCRA 351 [1961]), the President can enter into an Executive Agreement without the necessity of
concurrence by the Senate. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing
laws and treaties that it purports to implement.

Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by
Senate. They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
 Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the Senate.”
 Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate xxx ”

The President, however, may enter into an “executive agreement” on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or

In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements

are defined as international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed
the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting
the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not at
all unusual in this jurisdiction. In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the
same time against the destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who they are,
and what form the friendships will take, are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what
the Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.

Petition is DISMISSED.


City of Manila vs. Cuerdo
GR No. 175723 | Feb.14, 2014


Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for
the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents. In addition to
the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes.
Private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint
denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction”

The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Petitioners
then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act
No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence,
this petition.

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the
Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court
has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Petition is DENIED for being moot and academic.