G.R. No.

L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.

J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will
and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause
and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of
each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix
and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the
full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from
the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and
spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any
kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico,
married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal
parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of
First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite
publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically
and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was
executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene
as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her
opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene
Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass
to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated
by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the
oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion
for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his
favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and
oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the
legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance
both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be
boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this
proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court
commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining
who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-
17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this
Court said:

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has been defined in this
connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G.
1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No.
L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will,
and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied
probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir
of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot
give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the
estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because
being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the
philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives
and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not
recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the
presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin,
a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
(7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted
is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the
adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption,
except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither
are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
 created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the
relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the
adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes
and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law
1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in
this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not
properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix
affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this
respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will
for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above
the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence
of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who
asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign
and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she
gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on
the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to
the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all
the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses
and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly
executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:

The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene
Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper
pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the
oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix,
 attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years
after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight
to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that
nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary
dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often
seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one.
In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had
the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that
she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to
disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and
with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and
must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her
free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G.
596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time
of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is
insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may
be cited:

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios,
58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious
or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein
contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the
effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of
wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the
interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the
law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a
 will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been
made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is
that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not
allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the
same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS

SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO
CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves
to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26,
1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to
wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by
right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the
same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson
by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed
decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision
is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the
the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from
adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the
decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the
issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about
the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners
could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although
the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission
of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the
plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot
be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents
were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether
erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption
arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350,
pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
 An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to
the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not
make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact
be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with
the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot
be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be
the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different
effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one
court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been
of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by
the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such
evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier
statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that
it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate
must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary
nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

issue in another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code:
 Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs
and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the
inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL
CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-
appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will
dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding
No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs.
Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother,
Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose
A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at
Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of
Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with
Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty.
Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita
Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.

Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will
because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically
partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus
bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y que same un
dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los
herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that
in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of
disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen
malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual
prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents".
it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R.
Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of
the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of
Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's
resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay
P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of
Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole
heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A
the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4,
1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947
wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding
with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).

On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical
partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the
1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the
Yangco's estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in
his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation
rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and,
therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata
and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated
December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the
testator's estate.

Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in
CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at
more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R.
Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is
barred by res judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly
legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The
appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a
legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed
intestate share in Yangco's estate?

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that
Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos
naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's
conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child
was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro
and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:

Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro,
Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate
Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio
Gonzales Diez

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1
herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg
in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture
with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of
Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced
in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R.
Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be
legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and
"that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his
mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of
Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a
suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni
ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...

Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus)
would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's
brief).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.

The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).

Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated
child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are
alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the
rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of
intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be
her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs.
Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of
her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125485. September 13, 2004]

RESTITUTA LEONARDO, assisted by JOSE T. RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

and TEODORO SEBASTIAN, VICENTE SEBASTIAN, CORAZON SEBASTIAN, assisted
by ANDRES MARCELO; PEDAD SEBASTIAN, HEIRS OF EDUVIGIS SEBASTIAN,
namely: EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, ABELARDO J. TENORLAS, ADELA S. and
SOLEDAD S. TENORLAS, represented by EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, and HEIRS OF
DOMINADOR, namely: NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN, RUPERTO SEBASTIAN, ADORACION
SEBASTIAN, PRISCILLA SEBASTIAN, LITA SEBASTIAN, TITA SEBASTIAN and
GLORIA SEBASTIAN, represented by NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN; EVELYN SEBASTIAN;
AURORA SEBASTIAN; and JULIETA SEBASTIAN, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the judgment[2] of Branch 57, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint filed by
petitioner against private respondents for declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul.
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late spouses Tomasina Paul and
Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, as well as the late
Eduvigis and Dominador, all surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with
Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.
In an action to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina Paul
and Jose Sebastian before Branch 57, RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, petitioner alleged that,
on June 24, 1988, at around 5:00 p.m., private respondent Corazon Sebastian and her niece Julieta
Sebastian, and a certain Bitang, came to petitioners house to persuade her to sign a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the
document, petitioner allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could
translate the document which was written in English. Petitioner, however, proceeded to sign the
document even without her husband and without reading the document, on the assurance of private
respondent Corazon Sebastian that petitioners share as a legitimate daughter of Tomasina Paul
was provided for in the extrajudicial partition. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and
her companions to wait for her husband so he could read the document. When petitioners husband
arrived, however, private respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy
of the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure a copy and
read the contents thereof.
 Petitioner refuted[3] private respondents claim that they were the legitimate children and sole
heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul. Despite the (de facto) separation of petitioners father
Balbino Leonardo and Tomasina Paul, the latter remained the lawful wife of Balbino. Petitioner
maintained that no joint settlement of the estate of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul could be
effected since what existed between them was co-ownership, not conjugal partnership. They were
never married to each other. The extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal.
Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated because she was deceived into signing the
extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having appeared before Judge Juan Austria of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on July 27, 1988 to acknowledge the
execution of the extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim, [4] raised the defense of lack of cause of
action. They insisted that the document in question was valid and binding between the parties.
According to them, on July 27, 1988, they personally appeared before Judge Austria of the MTC of
Urbiztondo, who read and explained the contents of the document which all of them, including
petitioner, voluntarily signed.
Private respondents contended that their declaration that they were legitimate children of Jose
Sebastian and Tomasina Paul did not affect the validity of the extrajudicial partition. Petitioners act
of signing the document estopped her to deny or question its validity. They moreover averred that
the action filed by petitioner was incompatible with her complaint. Considering that petitioner claimed
vitiation of consent, the proper action was annulment and not declaration of nullity of the instrument.
On July 27, 1989, petitioner filed an amended complaint [5] to include parties to the extrajudicial
partition who were not named as defendants in the original complaint.
During the August 23, 1990 pre-trial conference,[6] no amicable settlement was reached and the
parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether petitioners consent to the extrajudicial
partition was voluntarily given.
In a decision dated February 22, 1993, the RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan rendered a
decision[7] dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. The court a quo ruled that the
element of duress or fraud that vitiates consent was not established and that the proper action was
the reformation of the instrument, not the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of
estate. By way of obiter dictum, the trial court stated that, being a legitimate child, petitioner was
entitled to one-half (or 19,282.5 sq.m.) of Tomasina Pauls estate as her legitime. The 7,671.75
square meters allotted to her in the assailed extrajudicial partition was therefore less than her correct
share as provided by law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in its May 23, 1996
decision.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was given voluntarily.
We hold that it was not.
The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties
on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract.[9] The area of agreement must extend to
all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all. [10]
 To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous.
Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and
spontaneity by fraud.[11]
In determining the effect of an alleged error, the courts must consider both the objective and
subjective aspects of the case which is the intellectual capacity of the person who committed the
mistake.[12]
Mistake, on the other hand, in order to invalidate consent should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or
both parties to enter into the contract.[13]
According to the late civil law authority, Arturo M. Tolentino, the (old) rule that a party is
presumed to know the import of a document to which he affixes his signature and is bound thereby,
has been altered by Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. The provision states that [w]hen one of the parties
is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is
alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully
explained to the former.
Article 1332 was a provision taken from american law, necessitated by the fact that there
continues to be a fair number of people in this country without the benefit of a good education or
documents have been written in English or Spanish.[14] The provision was intended to protect a party
to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or some other handicap. It
contemplates a situation wherein a contract is entered into but the consent of one of the contracting
parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other.[15]
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the
former.[16] Where a party is unable to read, and he expressly pleads in his reply that he signed the
voucher in question without knowing (its) contents which have not been explained to him, this plea
is tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the execution of the voucher or receipt in question and
the burden is shifted to the other party to show that the former fully understood the contents of the
document; and if he fails to prove this, the presumption of mistake (if not fraud) stands unrebutted
and controlling.[17]
Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud are voidable.[18] These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of which
impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the
agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiated by any of the circumstances mentioned in Art.
1330 of the Civil Code, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in a
given case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually occurred, considering the age,
physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the
contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private
writing.[19]
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistake or error accorded by the law to
those who have not had the benefit of a good education, one who alleges any defect or the lack of
a valid consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by preponderance of evidence.[20] Hence, even as the burden of proof shifts to the
defendants to rebut the presumption of mistake, the plaintiff who alleges such mistake (or fraud)
must show that his personal circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
 In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of petitioner was not sufficiently
rebutted by private respondents. Private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the
Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her
free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in English,
explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect. She stated in open court that she did not understand
English. Her testimony, translated into English, was as follows:
Q: While you were there is your house at barangay Angatel, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, what
happened?
A: On June 24, 1988, I was in our house because I got sick, sir.
Q: What happened?
A: When the time was about 5:00 oclock, I was awaken by my daughter-in-law, Rita
Ramos, and told me that my half sister Corazon would like to tell us something, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I let them come in, sir.
Q: Did they come in?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was the companion of your half sister Corazon Sebastian when she arrived in
your house?
A: Julita Sebastian and her daughter Bitang, sir.
Q: And who is this Julita Sebastian to you?
A: She is my niece, sir.
Q: And then when they got inside the house, what happened?
A: I asked them their purpose, sir.
Q: Did they tell you their purpose?
A: I asked their purpose in coming to our house and they told me, I came here because I
have a partition executed so that the share of each one of us will be given, she said
sir.
Q: Did you see that document?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN
Q: Did you read the document?
A: No, sir because I was waiting for my husband to have that document read or translated
to me because I could not understand, sir.
Q: What could you not understand?
A: I can not understand English, sir.
 Q: But anyway, can you read?
A: Yes, sir in Pangasinan.
Q: Now, that document which according to you was brought by your half sister Corazon
Sebastian, what happened to that document?
A: Corazon Sebastian request(ed) me to sign, sir.
Q: Did you sign immediately?
A: Yes, sir, because according to her, all my shares were embodied in that document as a
legal daughter.[21]
Petitioners wish to wait for her husband, Jose T. Ramos, to explain to her the contents of the
document in the Pangasinan dialect was a reasonable and prudent act that showed her uncertainty
over what was written. Due to her limited educational attainment, she could not understand the
document in English. She wanted to seek assistance from her husband who was then out of the
house. However, due to the misrepresentation, deception and undue pressure of her half-sister
Corazon Sebastian, petitioner signed the document. Corazon assured petitioner that she would
receive her legitimate share in the estate of their late mother.
Later on, when petitioners husband examined the extrajudicial partition agreement, he found out
that petitioner was deprived of her full legitime. Under the law, petitioners share should have been
one-half of her mothers estate, comprising a total area of 19,282.50 square meters. Under the
defective extrajudicial settlement of estate, however, petitioner was to receive only 7,671.75 square
meters. This was a substantial mistake clearly prejudicial to the substantive interests of petitioner in
her mothers estate. There is no doubt that, given her lack of education, petitioner is protected by
Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. There is reason to believe that, had the provisions of the extrajudicial
agreement been explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect, she would not have consented to the
significant and unreasonable diminution of her rights.
MTC Judge Austria, the officer who notarized the extrajudicial settlement, stated that he
explained the contents to all the parties concerned. Granting arguendo, however, that Judge Austria
did indeed explain the provisions of the agreement to them, the records do not reflect that he
explained it to petitioner in a language or dialect known to her. Judge Austria never stated in his
testimony before the court a quo what language or dialect he used in explaining the contents of the
document to the parties.[22] Significantly, he was not even certain if the parties to the agreement
were present during the notarization of the document:
ATTY. TULAGAN
Q: Reflected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures, two of whom
belongs (sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian Tenorlas.
ATTY. D. TULAGAN
(continuing)
The Philippines on July, 1989, will you please educate us now Judge Austria on this
document?
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN
That will be improper, your Honor.
 COURT
What is the question, you repeat the question.
INTERPRETER:
Reflected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures, two of whom belongs
(sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian Tenorlas, in your just concluded
testimony, you said that everyone of them appeared with you, we have here a
documented evidence coming from the Department of Justice, Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, Manila, certifying that Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian
Tenorlas did not arrive in the Philippines or departed from the Philippines on July, 1998,
will you please educate us now Judge Austria on this document?
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
Your Honor please, before the witness answer, may we examine the certification first and
may we state for the record that the month of July, 1998 does not specify any date.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
July.
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
But not a particular date, for the record.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
For the whole month of July, no departure and no arrival. This is a certificate from the
Bureau of Immigration, Manila. I do not know about this, as a matter of fact, I do not
even know this person personally
WITNESS:
Somebody that kind of name appeared before me.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
Q: Since you do not know everybody from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan it is possible that
another person appeared and signed for that name?
A: Yes, possible.[23]
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having remained
unrebutted by private respondents. The evidence proving that the document was not fully explained
to petitioner in a language known to her, given her low educational attainment, remained
uncontradicted by private respondents. We find that, in the light of the circumstances presented by
the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties, the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a
substantial mistake or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The extrajudicial partition between
private respondents and petitioner should therefore be annulled and set aside on the ground of
mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[24] we ruled that a contract may be annulled
on the ground of vitiated consent, even if the act complained of is committed by a third party without
the connivance or complicity of one of the contracting parties. We found that a substantial mistake
arose from the employment of fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiff in that case was a 70-year-
old unschooled and unlettered woman who signed an unauthorized loan obtained by a third party
on her behalf. The Court annulled the contract due to a substantial mistake which invalidated her
consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who commits the fraud or
misrepresentation, such contract may all the more be annulled due to substantial mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe,[25] this Court ruled that misrepresentation to an illiterate woman who did
not know how to read and write, nor understand English, is fraudulent. Thus, the deed of sale was
considered vitiated with substantial error and fraud. This Court further held: [26]

Since it has been established by uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff is practically unschooled
and illiterate, not knowing how to read, write and understand the English language in which Exhibit
22 was drafted, it would have been incumbent upon the defendant to show that the terms there of
have been fully explained to the plaintiff. The evidence is entirely lacking at this point, and the lack
of it is fatal to the cause of the defendant for his failure to discharge the burden of proof.

Generally, the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates
only questions of law and not issues of fact. [27] This rule, however, is inapplicable in cases such as
the one at bar where the factual findings complained of are absolutely devoid of support in the
records or the assailed judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of
facts.[28] Thus, this case is an exception to the general rule on the conclusiveness of facts, the
evidence pointing to no other conclusion but the existence of vitiated consent, given the diminished
intellectual capacity of the petitioner and the misrepresentation of private respondent Corazon
Sebastian on the contents of the extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents also maintain that petitioner has no cause of action since the remedy that
should be pursued is an action for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Private respondents
therefore pray for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Before ruling on this procedural matter, a distinction between an action for annulment and one
for declaration of nullity of an agreement is called for.
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by lack of legal capacity
of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.[29] By
its very nature, annulment contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid until annulled.
Such contract is binding on all the contracting parties until annulled and set aside by a court of law.
It may be ratified. An action for annulment of contract has a four-year prescriptive period.[30]
On the other hand, an action for declaration of nullity of contract presupposes a void contract or
one where all of the requisites prescribed by law for contracts are present but the cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by law or
declared by law to be void.[31] Such contract as a rule produces no legal and binding effect even if it
is not set aside by direct legal action. Neither may it be ratified. An action for the declaration of nullity
of contract is imprescriptible.[32]
The petitioners pleading was for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate.
However, this did not necessarily mean the automatic dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
cause of action.
Granting that the action filed by petitioner was incompatible with her allegations, it is not the
caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. [33] The court
should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed
for.[34] In this case, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence adduced point to no other remedy
but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate because of vitiated consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 1996 is hereby REVERSED.
The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et
al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.

RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:

The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27,
1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en
banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the
term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.

include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss
as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor
Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children
of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon
Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in
1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)

Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo Santero)?

The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of
Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a
substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional
rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children
successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code.
They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as
compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate
succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by
the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code
provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred
illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate
grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.

Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
 Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and
the latter by right of representation. (940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
Emphasis supplied).

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights
are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance
of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982,
which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's
Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG
(First S) No. 3, p. 196).

According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles
939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the
case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the
cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao
vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof.
Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the
legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already
abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to
the instant case.

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes
in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of
Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a
reproduction •f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least
modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New
Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in
conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the
person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an
illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him;
however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot
represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the
right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries
of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much
applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of
giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate
succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three
aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.

Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find
support from other civilists. We quote:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate
issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases
the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution
would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7,
Decision; p. 196, Rollo)

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo
citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals
that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of
the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a
distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de
la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y
ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales.
(cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further
states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not
so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back
very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our
legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on
exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished
the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away
with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be
correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or
clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973
ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended
to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We
hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir
to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,

Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-
known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice
Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable
Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the
Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the
usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change
effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated
the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on
illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as
before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the
Congress to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the
Filipino people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have
resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early
glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of
absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation
in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and
995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code
which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the
illegitimate child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the
majority view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an
illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not have under the old
Code. But in retaining without change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it
created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the illegitimate
descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been
preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various
provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren
— legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents
of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the
law include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to
collateral relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-
known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice
Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable
Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the
Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the
usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change
effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated
the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on
illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as
before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the
Congress to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the
Filipino people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have
resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early
glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of
absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation
in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and
995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code
which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the
illegitimate child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the
majority view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an
illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not have under the old
Code. But in retaining without change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it
created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the illegitimate
descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been
preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various
provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren
— legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents
of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the
law include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to
collateral relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO

SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-
appellees.

Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.

BENGZON, C.J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the
respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.

On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired
several parcels of land located in that province.

About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U.
Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the
petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive
properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her
undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and
Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition
pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not
the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of
partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him.
Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in

the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta
Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for
 the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-
owner of the conjugal properties. ... .

From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are
involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower
court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall
the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and
one legitimate child?

The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to
this Court.

Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of
First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled."

The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New
Civil Code which provides that:

If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower
shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .

As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996
which provides:

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse
has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it
grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in
testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless
of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving
spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children"
includes the singular "child."

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art.
996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious
that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely
fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate
succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child
and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens,
the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his
objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the
widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator
Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since
they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the
surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory
construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this
case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art.
892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art.
996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth
only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So
Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a
legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we
refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the
consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following
articles:

ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants ...
.

ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate ... .

ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when
they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and
the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-
half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes
"child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession,
where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or
widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only
one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it
to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than
his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon to
discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 77, Malolos,
Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by the Government. 2

David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon
Guzman,3 a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In
1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels
of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839
(M), T-146840 (M), T-146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).

On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate
of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact,
Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in
the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.

On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to
her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared
not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another
document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well
as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines.4

On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he
became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9
August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1
February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the
registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.

On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General
and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate
of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest
in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey
Guzman responded with a prayer that the petition be dismissed.

On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the
property subject thereof remained with her.5

The Government appealed6 the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed the court a
quo.

Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution which provides —

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.

Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines. The only
instances when a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner therefore contends that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall under
any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an American citizen could not validly acquire
one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It also reasons out that the elements of
donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in favor of David: first, Helen consented to
the execution of the documents; second, the dispositions were made in public documents; third,
David manifested his acceptance of the donation in the Special Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with the intention of benefiting
David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of Helen, being the
donor. Petitioner further argues that the payment of donor's taxes on the property proved that
Helen intended the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.

David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not by
way of donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's intention to renounce her
share in the property and not an intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there was
indeed a donation, it never took effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed does not
indicate acceptance of the alleged donation.

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality
or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires
that the donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof
made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. 7 In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified
thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. 8

Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The
transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the
reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as
donee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
sufficiently established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to
convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the
quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights
over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a
donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her deposition which
indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not possible since
Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement.9 She reasoned that if she really intended to
donate something to David it would have been more convenient if she sold the property and gave
him the proceeds therefrom.10 It appears that foremost in Helen's mind was the preservation of the
Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where they originated, over and above the
benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her renunciation. 11 The element of animus
donandi therefore was missing.

Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a
public document but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by
law to make the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's argument that the Special Power of
Attorney executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied acceptance of his
mother's alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the absence thereof. The
Special Power of Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that
he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation, expressly or
impliedly, that David's acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's possible donation to
him and we cannot look beyond the language of the document to make a contrary construction as
this would be inconsistent with the parol evidence rule. 12

Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of
the acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the
deed of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 13 came
Manresa said: "If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . . it is
necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been
given must be noted in both instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected. 14

Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the
registry of property the document that evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in
the deed of gift — should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be,
the notification of the acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set
forth.15 Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the
deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. 16

These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of
compliance appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the
parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the
deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that
evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-
settled that if the notification and notation are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore,
the provisions of the law not having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the
parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.17

However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of
David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share
of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two
(2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the
parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven
(11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code
provides —

The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be

impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when
an unknown will appears.

Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made
through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an
unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half
(1/2) share of the subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which
she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and
effect.

Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of
land into res nullius18 to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no
effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although
being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32344 March 31, 1930

VIVENCIO LEGASTO, special administrator of the Intestate estate of Sabina

Almadin, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA VERZOSA, ET AL, defendants-appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.

Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the defendants, Maria Verzosa et al., from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, the dispositive part whereof is as follows:

Wherefore, the court hereby orders the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, as administrator
of the estate of Sabina Almadin, the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 of this
amended complaints (reply) dated January 5, 1929, as said paragraph is amended on
pages, excluding the lots described in certificates to title Nos. 6557, 6558 and 6559 of the
Laguna registry of deeds, which are hereby declared to be the absolute property of Victoria
Verzosa, wife to Jose Carasco. Without express pronouncement as to costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the
court below in its decision, to wit:

1. he court below erred in ordering the defendants to make delivery of the property in
litigation to the plaintiff as special administrator of the decedent Sabina Almadin's intestate
estate.

2. The court below erred in holding that public instruments 2, 31, 42, and 73, are deeds of
gift of the property in litigation made by Sabina Almadin to the defendants.

3. The court below erred in holding that said donation is void per se, inasmuch as it does
not appear upon said documents that the defendants accepted and acknowledged it
acceptance to the donor, Sabina Almadin.

4. The court below erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.

5. The court below erred in failing to hold that the defendants are the sole and lawful owners
of the property in litigation.
The relevant facts proved at the trial which are essential to the solution of the questions raised by
the instant appeal are as follows:

On May 13, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a will (Exhibit A-2), devising certain parcels of land
belonging to her, to her four nieces, Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, and Ruperta
Palma, daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.

On August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and
nieces, executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three
parcels of her land therein described (Exhibit 2). On September 23, 1925, Maria Verzosa and
Sabina Almadin appeared before the deputy provincial assessor and municipal secretary of Biñan,
Laguna, and made two sworn statements, Exhibits 3 and 5, wherein the former stated that she had
purchased the parcels of land described in the assignment Exhibit 2, from Sabina Almadim, and
the latter in turn declared that she had sold them to Maria Verzosa, and that said vendee had
already claimed them as her property for the payment of the land tax.

On the same day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed (Exhibit 31) in favor of her
niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument, and on
October 14, 1925, assignor and assignee appeared before the aforesaid deputy provincial
assessor and municipality secretary of Biñan, Laguna, and subscribed two sworn statements
(Exhibits 32 and 34), the former stating that she had sold the two parcels of land described in the
deed of assignment, Exhibit 31, to the latter, and the latter in turn stating that she had purchased
of the former the same parcels of land, the ownership of which has already been claimed by Oliva
Verzosa by a tax declaration in her own name on September 25, and October 13, 1925,
respectively.

On the said day August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed, Exhibit 45, in favor of her niece
Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land therein described; and September 23,
1923, assignor and assignee appeared before the aforesaid deputy provincial assessor and
municipal secretary of Biñan, Laguna, and subscribed a sworn statement, Exhibit 48, the former
stating that she has sold to Toribia Verzosa the parcel of land described therein (Exhibit 45),
bearing tax registry No. 9765, and the latter stating that she had purchased said parcel of the
former and declared it to be her own property for the payment of the land tax.

Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed (Exhibit 73) to her niece
Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land described therein; and on September 23,
1925, assignor and assignee appeared before the deputy provincial assessor and municipal
secretary of Biñan, Laguna, and subscribed two sworn statements (Exhibit 74 and 76) wherein the
former stated that she had sold to the latter the parcels of land described in the deed of
assignment (Exhibit 73) and the latter stated that she had purchased said parcels of the former,
and had declared them to be her own property for the payment of the land tax (Exhibits 75 and
77).

The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took
possession of their respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been
cultivating them as exclusive owners thereof.
Sabina Almadin passed away on February 22, 1926 and on March 12th the same year, her sister,
Catalina Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will, Exhibit A-2,
mentioned above, for probate. By virtue of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna on December 22, 1926 (Exhibit A-4), affirmed by this court on appeal (Exhibit D), said will
was not admitted to probate.1 Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator appointed by said
Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's estate, filed the complaint
which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 of
this aforesaid complaint as amended. The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether
the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and
appellants herein, was valid enforceable.

Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:

ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs.

The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the following
doctrine:

Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person
may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article
is found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the
authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will
in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments,
and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal consequences
of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their
children the whole or a part of their property;

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the
aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate
in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the
conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testemantary or legal
succession and should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the
order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given
a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during
the lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the
testator in order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.

Manresa comments on the same article as follows:

A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and the
provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter
vivos or by last will, must be understood in accordance with this distinction. The idea is to
divide the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This designation constitutes
the disposition of the properties to take effect after his death, and said act must necessarily
appear in the testament because it is the expression of the testator's last will and must be
 surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part, to wit, the division in
conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make this division in the same will or
in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words the law, in article 1056 as well as
in article 1057, which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of
making the partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for the purposes of
partition the formal solemnities which must accompany every testament or last will are not
necessary. Neither is it necessary to observe the special formalities required in case of
donations, because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing
those which already have been legally disposed of.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not
be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the
partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which
he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a
testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish
between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take
effect his death.

Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the
partition of her property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving to
each of them the same parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.

Now, then, section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 625. Allowance necessary, and conclusive as to execution. — No will shall pass either
the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or
by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

As Sabina Almadin's will was disallowed for the reason that it did not contain all the essential
requisites provided by law for its validity, can the aforesaid partition of her estate made by said
testatrix among her nieces be deemed valid? Certainly not; for it is an indispensable condition
precedent to a testator partitioning his estate inter vivos that he have made a valid will disposing of
said estate among his heirs; and if this will be declared null and void, the partition made by the
testator in pursuance of its provisions is likewise null and void, for where these provisions cease to
exist, the partition made in conformity therewith also becomes null and void, as the cessation of
the cause implies the cessation of the effect.

And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the
partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during
her lifetime is likewise null and void.

The second question to be decided is whether or not the conveyances made by Sabina Almadin of
the parcels of land in litigation, in favor of her nieces, respectively, by virtue of the instruments
Exhibits 2, 31, 47 and 73 can be considered valid and enforceable.
Article 633 of the Civil Code provides that in order that a donation of real property be valid, it must
be made by public instrument, in which the property donated must be specifically described, and
that the acceptance may be made in the same deed of gift or in a separate instrument, but in the
latter case notice thereof should be given the donor in due form, and a note to that effect inserted
in both instruments.

There is no question that the documents Exhibits 2, 31, 42, and 73 contain all the requisites for
public instruments. However, they do not show the acceptance of the respective donees.

It is contended that the sworn statements Exhibits 3, 5, 32, 34, 48, 74 and 76 signed by Sabina
Almadin in which it appears that she has assigned to each of her nieces, respectively, the parcels
of land in litigation, and wherein each of said nieces states that she has purchased the same
parcels of land from her aunt Sabina Almadin, constitute a gift and an acceptance at the same
time.

But it appears that said sworn statements before a sale and not to a gift and cannot, therefore, be
considered as public instruments of gifts showing the acceptance of the donees.

It is also contended that said sworn statements constitute separate deeds of acceptance; but even
if that were so, there is still lacking the legal requisite of notification in due form to the donor of the
donee's acceptance, and the annotation thereof in the deed of gift and in the instrument of
acceptance. The formal notice calls for the agency of the same notary who authenticated the
acceptance and he should under his authority make the annotation of said notice, as indicated (5
Manresa, pp. 120, 121).

Furthermore, the aforesaid sworn statements are not deeds transferring title but mere
acknowledgments made under oath of the fact of the transfer, required by the law in order that the
provincial assessor may make the proper transfer of the tax declarations of the vendor to the
vendee, where the transfer has not been recorded in the registry of deeds.

In view of all the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the partition made by a testator
inter vivos in pursuance of a will which has been disallowed is null and void; and (2) that the gift of
realty made in a public instrument which fails to show the acceptance, or wherein the formal notice
of the acceptance is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of gift and in the
separate acceptance, is null and void.

Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in its
entirety, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J. Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Third
Division, respondents.

Jose Gaton for petitioners.

Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
22179-R, promulgated on August 31, 1966, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo ** in Civil Case No. 3489, and rendering a new one dismissing the complaint of petitioner
herein, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another entered,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint. No pronouncement as to costs. (p. 29 Rollo)

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land
about 372 sq. meters, situated in the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo (Exhibits, p. 19).
On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the
descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos (TSN, Sept. 6,1956,
p. 3).

On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro
Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia
signed a document entitled, "Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale" (Exhibits, p. 19). The parcel
of land subject of the document was described as follows:

A parcel of residential land, about 372 square meters, lst class, Identified as
Assessor's Lot No. 107, Block No. 8, bounded on the north by Paz and Federal
Streets; on the south by Tabaosares and Antonia Tacalinar; on the East by Piedad
Street; and on the West by Paz Street. This parcel of land has no concrete
monuments to indicate its boundaries but there are dikes, stones and temporary
fences used as landmarks and boundary signals. This parcel of land is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 1149, S. of 1947, in the name of Gelacio Garcia, and its
assessed value of P110.00. (p. 19, Exhibits)

The last paragraph of the same document states:

 That for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00),
Philippine Currency, to us in hand paid by the spouses, JOSE CALALIMAN, and
PACIENCIA TRABADILLO, all of legal age, Filipinos and residents of the municipality
of Tubungan, province of Iloilo, Philippines, receipt of which we hereby
acknowledged and confessed to our entire satisfaction, do by these presents, cede,
sell, convey and transfer the above-described parcel of land unto the said spouses,
Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, their heirs, successors and assigns free
from all liens and encumbrances whatever. (p. 19, Exhibits)

The document was inscribed in the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 24,1955, Inscription No.
20814, Page 270, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 20).

On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino,
Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon
Garcia, all residents of Isabela, Negros Occidental, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact, Juanito Bertomo, their shares, rights, interest
and participation in the same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo also on December 22, 1954, Inscription No. 20640, p. 88, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p.
2122).

On May 7, 1955 the heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed
against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents herein, Civil
Case No. 3489 with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of
the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by
their co-heirs to the defendants. In the complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 4) plaintiffs alleged, among
others:

5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered for sale their interest and shares over
the said land to the plaintiffs prior to the sale in favor of the defendants, nor given
notice of such intention on their part; and that, no notice in writing has been given by
said co-owners to the plaintiffs of the said sale, such that, plaintiffs came to learn of it
only from other source;

6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the interest and shares of their co-owners
had the latter offered the same to them prior to the sale thereof to the defendants;
and that, within 30 days after learning of the sale made to the defendants under
annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l', plaintiffs made repeated offer to the defendants to allow
them to redeem said interest and shares acquired by the defendants in accordance
with the right granted to the plaintiffs by law in such a case, offering a reasonable
price thereof of P300 taking into consideration the fact that the defendants had
acquired only 3/4 of the land of 372 square meters more or less, in area with
assessed value of P110 and a fair market value of 372 at Pl per square meter, the
price actually obtaining in the locality at the time of the sale thereof under Annexes
'A', 'B' and 'B-l'; however, the defendants refused and have until the present refused
to grant redemption thereof giving no reason why other than challenging the plaintiffs
to bring their case in court:

7. That, the circumstances surrounding the transaction between the defendants and
plaintiffs' co-owners, the vendors, were such that defendants could not have actually
 paid nor the vendors actually received the total price of P800 as stipulated in the
deeds Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l' while the said price fixed is grossly excessive and
highly exaggerated and prohibitive for evidently ulterior motive:

8. That, the land herein described is an ancestral property and plaintiffs have actually
a house standing thereon and having lived thereon ever since, such that, the
defendants' refusal to allow redemption thereof has caused the plaintiffs mental
torture, worry and anxiety, forcing them to litigate and retain services of counsel,
therefore, plaintiffs demand against the defendants P500 for moral damage, P500 for
exemplary damage, P300 for attorney's fees, aside from actual expenses incurred;
and, furthermore, P5 monthly as reasonable value of defendants' occupation of a
portion of the premises counting from the filing of this complaint.

They prayed that the trial court render judgment:

1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to redeem from the defendants for the price of
P300 or for such reasonable price as may be determined by this Honorable Court the
interest and shares over the land described in this complaint of plaintiffs' co-owners,
Joaquin, Porfirio, Flora, Dioscoro, Consolacion, Remedios, Trinidad, Baltazar,
Rosario, Margarita, Dolores, Fortunata and Simon, all surnamed Garcia, and
Resurreccion, Serafin and Buenaventura, all surnamed Tagarao, sold by them to the
defendants under the deeds of sale Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l' of this complaint; and
ordering the defendants to execute the proper instrument of reconveyance or
redemption thereof in favor of the plaintiffs; and, ordering them to vacate the
premises;

2. Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs P500 for moral damage; P500
for exemplary damage; P300 for attorney's fees and actual expenses incurred; P5
monthly from the filing of this complaint as reasonable value of defendants'
occupation of a portion of the land; the costs of this action; and, for such other relief
and remedy as may be legal, just and equitable."

On the other hand, the defendants, private respondents herein, alleged in their answer the
following special affirmative defenses (Record on Appeal, p. 14):

1. That plaintiffs have no cause of action against the herein defendants;

2. That due notices in writing have been sent to plaintiff Francisco Garcia at his
residence at 2875 Felix Huertas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, sometime last June 1953, in
which plaintiff Francisco Garcia was informed of his co-owners signified intention to
sell their shares, and likewise, the other plaintiffs Paz and Maria Garcia were
personally notified of the same hence, for that reason, they are now barred to claim
legal redemption of the land in question, having filed their belated claim too late."

The trial court rendered judgment on September 12, 1957 in favor of the plaintiffs (Record on
Appeal, p. 15), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

 (a) Sentencing the defendants to resell the property to the plaintiffs for P800.00
which is the total consideration of the two deeds of sale Exhibits A and B;

(b) In the event that the defendants fail to execute the deed of resale within ten days
from the date this decision becomes final, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
execute the corresponding deed pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court;

(c) Without pronouncement as to costs.

On October 14, 1957 plaintiffs filed their notice of Appeal predicated on "(a) failure of the Court to
adjudge the real or reasonable price of the sale or otherwise the redemption value thereof; (b)
failure of the Court to adjudge damages including attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiffs and the
costs." (Record on Appeal, p. 18).

Defendants filed their own notice of appeal on October 15, 1957 (Record on Appeal, p. 19).

On appeal the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1966 reversed the
decision of the trial court and rendered another one dismissing plaintiff's complaint with no
pronouncement as to costs (Rollo, p. 22).

The instant petition for review by certiorari was filed with the Court on December 12, 1966 (Rollo,
p. 11). The Court at first dismissed the petition in a resolution dated December 22, 1966, for
insufficient supporting papers (Rollo, p. 35) but reconsidered the said Resolution of Dismissal later
in a Resolution dated February 8, 1967 (Rollo, p. 97) as prayed for in a motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners on February 1, 1967 (Rollo, p. 38). The same Resolution of February 8, 1967
gave due course to the petition.

The Brief for the Petitioners was filed on June 9,1967 (Rollo, p. 106); the Brief for the Respondents
was received in the Court on August 31, 1967 (Rollo, p. 119).

Petitioners having manifested they would not file reply brief on September 14,1967 (Rollo, p. 122)
the Court considered the case submitted for decision, in a Resolution dated September 21, 1967
(Rollo, p. 124).

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

30-DAY PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 1088 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE FOR
A CO-HEIR TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION, HAD ALREADY
ELAPSED WHEN THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS FILED THE ACTION ON MAY 7,1955.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT

THERE WAS NO OFFER TO REIMBURSE THE DEFENDANTS FOR THE
PORTION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION SOLD TO THEM BY THE CO-HEIRS OF
THE PLAINTIFFS.
 III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT, AND IN NOT ADJUDGING DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS.

(Brief for the Petitioners, p. 1)

There is no question that the provision of law applicable in the instant case is Art. 1088 of the New
Civil Code (Art. 1067, Old Civil Code) as the matter concerns heirs and inheritance not yet
distributed (Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906 [1923]). Art. 1088 states:

Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

The main issue is whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to effectuate their
exercise of the right of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.

It is undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received by petitioners about the sale of the
hereditary interest of some of their co-heirs in the parcel of land they inherited from the late
Gelacio Garcia, although in a letter dated June 23, 1953 petitioner Francisco Garcia wrote one of
his co- heirs, Joaquin Garcia, who is an uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy the hereditary
interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned inheritance, (Exhibit, p. 3). Although said petitioner
asked that his letter be answered "in order that I will know the results of what I have requested
you," (Exhibit, p. 14) there is no proof that he was favored with one.

Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property on December 3, 1954 when
one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz Garcia to sign a document prepared in the
Municipality of Tubungan because the land they inherited was going to be sold to private
respondent, Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6, 1957, p. 60). The document mentioned by
petitioner Paz Garcia could be no other than the one entitled "Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
Sale" dated December 3, 1954 as it is in this document that the name of Paz Garcia, Maria Garcia
and Amado Garcia appear unsigned by them (Exhibits, p. 19).

It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in the document had already signed
the document at the time Paz Garcia was approached by Juanito Bertomo. Paz Garcia, however,
testified that she immediately informed her brother Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to sell
the land to Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6,1957, p. 62). On December 26, 1954 he wrote
respondents giving them notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal redemption and that he
will resort to court action if denied the right (Exhibits, p. 8). The respondents received the letter on
January 13, 1955 but petitioner Francisco Garcia did not get any answer from them. Neither did
respondents show him a copy of the document of sale nor inform him about the price they paid for
the sale when he went home to Tubungan from Manila sometime in March 1955 and went to see
the respondent spouse about the matter on March 24,1955 (TSN, September 6,1957, p. 18).

Because of the refusal of respondent Jose Calaliman to show him the document of sale or reveal
to him the price paid for the parcel of land, petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds on the same date, March 24,1955 and there found two documents of sale
regarding the same parcel of land (TSN, Ibid, p. 19).

Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with the trial court on May 7, 1955. Respondents
claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code for petitioners to
exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed at that time and that the requirement of
Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that notice would be in writing is deemed satisfied because
written notice would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served when
petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and saw for himself, read
and understood the contents of the deeds of sale (Brief for respondents, p. 6).

The issue has been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, where this Court observed:

Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen
the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of
notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of the law had been to
include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect
of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in
Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under
the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient (106 Phil. 1023 [1960]).

In the above-quoted decision the Court did not consider the registration of the deed of sale with the
Register of Deeds sufficient notice, most specially because the property involved was unregistered
land, as in the instant case. The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale
as sufficient notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496 applies only to
registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a case where the property involved is,
admittedly, unregistered land.

Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New
Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still
entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms
and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having
provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does
not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification
of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April 15,1988).

Petitioners fault the appellate court in not awarding them damages, attorney's fees and costs. After
finding in favor of respondent spouses and against petitioners herein it is untenable for petitioners
to expect that the appellate court would award damages and attorney's fees and costs. However
as already discussed, petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written
notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run. Petitioners
clearly can claim attorney's fees for bad faith on the part of respondents, first, for refusing
redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire land as theirs, although they knew some heirs
had not sold their shares.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the decision
of the trial court is REINSTATED with the modification that petitioners be awarded damages,
attorney's fees and costs in the amount prayed for.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.