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LEGAL ETHICS CASES

(FULL TEXT 1 – 17)
Table of Contents
Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 ......................................................................................................................... 2
Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173 .................................................................................. 10
In Re: Al Argosino, 246 SCRA 14 ............................................................................................................................... 15
In Re: Al Argosino, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997....................................................................................... 19
In Re: Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 ................................................................................................................................ 20
A. CIVIL CASES ........................................................................................................................................................... 21
B. CRIMINAL CASES .................................................................................................................................................. 32
Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310 .................................................................................................................... 47
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378 ................................................................................................................ 48
Bar Matter No. 850 ......................................................................................................................................................... 67
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 ........................................................................................................................................ 73
Hueysuwan vs. Florido, A.C. No. 5624...................................................................................................................... 75
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. CA, GR No. 123698 ...................................................................................... 77
In Re: Almacen, GR No. L-27654 ................................................................................................................................ 80
Wicker vs. Arcangel, GR No. 112869 ......................................................................................................................... 98
Nunez vs. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054 ............................................................................................................................ 101
Santiago vs. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252 ....................................................................................................................... 103
The Case and the Facts ............................................................................................................................................ 103
The Courts Ruling ...................................................................................................................................................... 105
Lantoria vs. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769 ............................................................................................................................ 108
Santiago vs. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103 ............................................................................................................................ 112

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Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel
for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-
C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l),
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence
as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
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The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
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attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning
of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
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characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed
to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must
be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from
the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge
or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least
ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission
on Audit?
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MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers
are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in
Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p.
15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there
are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance
Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626
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[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such
a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a
case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors
much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public
mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are
still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen
such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t]
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can
be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some
legal services outside their specialty. And even within a
narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
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client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new
skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the
salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major
emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the
use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action
in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
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Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration
or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such
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matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes
be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available
to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small
number of companies and law firms. Because working in
a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer
in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the
subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance
to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
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resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
— often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such
as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel,
three factors are apropos:
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First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics
has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-
based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of
such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of
the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal
rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for
key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved
7
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the
law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991,
p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench)
is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit
to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
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1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which
Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts
as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
8
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers
for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for
the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World
Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (
Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of
both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that
bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
8

Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central
Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where
it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the
case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.
9
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice
it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited
the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of
the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the
law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who
has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
9

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the
action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered
by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee
by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once,
the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
10
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured,
the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
.
Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil
173
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's
Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of
the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to
take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one who has passed the bar
10

examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat
of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of
his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor
General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from
requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office
which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires
more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law;
. . . that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known
as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the
United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar
examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law
of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to
determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do
so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the
past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a
required qualification to practice before the Patent Office,
to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards
members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional
power with respect to admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar
in good standing may practice law anywhere and before
any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
11
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question
arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent
Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice
of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists
in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
11

ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.
I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in
patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of
business in the Patent Office involves the use and
application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but
practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law
provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by
others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by
the inventor named in any printed publication in the
Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had
been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more
than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent
belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that
although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to
petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30
mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation.
Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of
Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under
Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years
from the day the patent was granted, any person patent
on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is
not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for
the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to
an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason
of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable
terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the
license, purchase or use of the patented article or working
of the patented process or machine of production, the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines
12
is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member
of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business
and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and
correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic
Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the
registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory
license, and any party to any other proceeding in
the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from
any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the
transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge
and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the
case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration
of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the
Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding
patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions.
Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to
any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original
initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to
decide whether the patent is new and whether it
is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial
function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions
of law, but also questions of fact, as whether
there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
12

member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification.
Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable
or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description
of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the
same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is
required to submit a plan and technical description of said
land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly
authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an
examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165,
is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has
prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A
register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the
names of all persons recognized as entitled to
represent applicants before the Patent Office in
the preparation and prosecution of applicants for
patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
person registered to practice before the Patent
Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good
standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before
the Patent Office and have his name entered on
the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will
be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in
writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to
the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of
good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and
13
technical qualifications necessary to enable him
to render applicants for patent valuable service,
and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that
the Commissioner may determine whether a
person seeking to have his name placed upon
either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic
training in scientific and technical matters must be
submitted and an examination which is held from
time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three
years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of
Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law
itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of
good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of
Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or
in any particular case from further practice before
his office any person, agent or attorney shown to
be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the
said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead,
or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the
office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising.
The reasons for any such suspension or
exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of
the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the
petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United
13

States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the
said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law
just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the
rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act
No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far,
are different from the provisions of the United States
Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to
determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice
before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service
to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases,
which showing may take the form of a test or examination
to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section
78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications of
persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with
law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration
of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the
laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his
bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that
the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said
code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
14
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and
regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for
other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an
express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no
reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same
area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may
not also require that any lawyer practising before them or
otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law,
members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal
to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that
much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable,
as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from
his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is
granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited
from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being
permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
14
 15

In Re: Al Argosino, 246 SCRA 14 has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited
AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR to citizens of good moral character, with special
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
RESOLUTION those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we
FELICIANO, J.: regard as having persuasive effect:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with In Re Farmer: 3

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other xxx xxx xxx
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. This "upright character" prescribed by the
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction statute, as a condition precedent to the
of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of applicant's right to receive a license to
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation practice law in North Carolina, and of
rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into which he must, in addition to other
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of the elements necessary to make up such
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was a character. It is something more than an
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 absence of bad character. It is the good
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused name which the applicant has acquired,
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a or should have acquired, through
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and association with his fellows. It means that
one (1) day to four (4) years. he must have conducted himself as a
man of upright character ordinarily would,
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues or should, or does. Such character
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
application for probation was granted in an Order dated following the line of least resistance, but
18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro quite often, in the will to do the
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
probation officer assigned to supervise him. wrong. . . .

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino xxx xxx xxx
filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his And we may pause to say that this
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was requirement of the statute is eminently
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this proper. Consider for a moment the duties
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, and his advice comes home, in its
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and trust and confidence; he deals with is
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge client's property, reputation, his life, his
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his of the Court, whose chief concern, as
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months such, is to aid the administration of
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him justice. . . .
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino

15

xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re
Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there
exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of profession.
For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for admission to
the bar to possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and
the board of bar examiners as an arm of
the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral
standard of each candidate for admission
to practice. . . . It needs no further
argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of
scrutiny must be exercised as to the
moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself
therein, a far more difficult situation is
presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the
inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted
and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All
may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain
the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
16
Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one
of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him
for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their
learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection
to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to
be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of
the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to
appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E.
635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our
state has always been to
admit no person to the
practice of the law
unless he covered an
upright moral
character. The
possession of this by the
attorney is more
important, if anything, to
the public and to the
proper administration of
justice than legal
learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after
years, but if the
applicant passes the
16

threshold of the bar with
a bad moral character
the chances are that his
character will remain
bad, and that he will
become a disgrace
instead of an ornament
to his great calling — a
curse instead of a
benefit to his
community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings
for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of
an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that
upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless
it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment
or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied
by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a
very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
17
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to
the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding
that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the
trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application
for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period
of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and
to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this
Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution
17
 18

be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any,

of Raul Camaligan

18

In Re: Al Argosino, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction,
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner
and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered
judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of
the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving
a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from
probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a
petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on
the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
19
foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan
states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical
injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only
homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of
the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant
wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally
on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of
the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-
accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of
an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now
morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits
the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective
and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty
of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but,
also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking
the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
19

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing
and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical behavior, [which]
makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then
possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares
the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience.
The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a
struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court-
manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for
a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find
room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a
position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.
In Re: Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
20
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according
to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice
will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue
with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of
Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that
he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.
There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these
aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not
a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness
of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of
20

learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years
now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and
prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly
committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In
the picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of
ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various
adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-
known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to
tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with
the law had given him competence to undertake litigation,
he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original
and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have
been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his
interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial
proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate
many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and
their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he
is now being called to account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into
lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions
with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous
consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to
comply with his contractual commitments and his
stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and
conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders
Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo
obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to
secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables
belonging to him or members of his family, or third
persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and when
demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own
terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent
with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by
law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let him
have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively
if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers,
and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the
actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well, the
public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
who at one time or another, rendered a judgment,
resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks
of Court and other Court employees signing the notices
thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in
different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty
(50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to
repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts
with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish
complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)
21
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have
dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,
1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This
he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-
Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On
June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from
TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the
Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-
7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested
in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their
respective owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a
Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in
consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No.
595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980.2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite
demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure
them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on
September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land
were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to
the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their
auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made
clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80
(P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this
disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and
counsel, as aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-
22506; CA G.R.
CV
No. 07015; G.R. No. 83
306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the
Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance
and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas
Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint
sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the
foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with
stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying
the obligation secured by the trust receipt above
mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC;
but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals —
21

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was
reversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court
of Appeals held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his
right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant
to allow redemption of the properties in question."
Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal
was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated
August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his
petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing
on the contrary that the said decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and
applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by
Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion
for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated
January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by
Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also
directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to
the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry
of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution
dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of
Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated
December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without
action his manifestation and motion praying that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and
declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be
entertained . . . ."
2. RTC Case No. CEB
8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned
before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same
Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to
litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the
action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order
dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res judicata, the
only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's
right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank)
(supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants
therein.
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-
9485;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
22
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case
No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of
consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo
filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These
complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short
shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu
City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers
Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against
City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants,
Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB
lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The
complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the
criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its
manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating
the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank
despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action
also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on
February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground
of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-
22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in
favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to
defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA
G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th
Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the
proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-
10368;
CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided,
Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action
for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto
Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the
HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for
"Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with
Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It
was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9,
1991 by the RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis
pendentia.
The RTC ruled that —
Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily
show that the defendants therein, namely
the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja,
Enriqueta Belarmino
22

, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz
and HERSINLAW are the same persons
or nearly all of them who are impleaded
as defendants in the present Civil Case
No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders
Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz
and HERSINLAW. The only difference is
that more defendants were impleaded in
Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva
Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor
and his two assistants in Civil Case No.
CEB-9485 was however merely
incidental as apparently they had nothing
to do with the questioned transaction in
said case. . . .
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were
the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485,
and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially
the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and
consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years
earlier by Borromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was
set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on
November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who previously heard
the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of
Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on
March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal
Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of
Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-
6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed
for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event
the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald
Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato
Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW
firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with
Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again
involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables
above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged
malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles
in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No.
22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed
the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t
this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of
defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if
23
and when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case
No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-
8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate
to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and its
officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack
by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely
to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-
8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties
he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and
lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the
Chairman and Members of the First Division of the
Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in
G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as
the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the
Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions
unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989,
aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices
for —
. . . maliciously and deliberately stating
blatant falsehoods and disregarding
evidence and pertinent laws, rendering
manifestly unjust and biased resolutions
and decisions bereft of signatures, facts
or laws in support thereof, depriving
plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due
process and against deprivation of
property without said process, tolerating,
approving and legitimizing the patently
illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous
acts of defendants TRB, (which)
constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF
DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER
emanating from the people, b)
FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32,
CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL
CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which
defendants must be held liable under
said laws.
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake
titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and
recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00
exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses."
This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise.
On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial
court, by Order dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the
case.
23

7. RTC Case No. CEB-
13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate
the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted
by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB
and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated
October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the
subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-
22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court
in G.R. No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject
matter being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-
8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case
No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP
No. 28275; G.R. No. 11
2928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed
an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against
Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust
Receipts Law.13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a
speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge
Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same
order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's
arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial
system on the dates as may be agreed by the defense
and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration.
When his motion was again found without merit, by Order
dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of
Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify
these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals
declared that the facts did not show that there had been
unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and
denied his petition for being without merit. 14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court
(G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31,
1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to
comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88
and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23,
1994.
a. Clarificatory
Communications to
24
Borromeo Re "Minute
Resolutions"
He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling
the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional,
Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'"
because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was
not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere
clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution,
promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience
drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own
previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals
and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186
SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said
Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the
notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or
any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the
resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation
on a particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo
"knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed
by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
Quoted hereunder, for your information,
is a resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated. _________,
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of
Court who prepared or signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had
been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that on
July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court
Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing
with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The
same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by
him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April
4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the
same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this
Court, notice of which was in due course served on him,
to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt —
with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil,
but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and
lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause
criminal prosecution of those he considered his
adversaries, will now be dealt with here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187
and 90-1188
24

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints
with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against
Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John
Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints
(docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the
respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public
Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and
its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold
properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and
false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the
purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his
(Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of
legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only
P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market
prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu
City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing
that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank
and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the
foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a
stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or
prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's
ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond
question as the matter had been raised and passed upon
in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of
the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its
falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and
89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless
filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to
two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo
— involving the same foreclosed properties and directed
against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including
the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of
which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:
a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ
and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit
and False Pretenses." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January
19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office
because based on nothing more than a
letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank
Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a
portion of the foreclosed immovables,
advising the latter to remit all rentals to
the bank as new owner thereof, as shown
by the consolidated title; and there was
no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz
was motivated by fraud in notarizing the
25
deed of sale in TRB's favor after the
lapse of the period of redemption, or that
Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the
transaction to the prejudice of
complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.)
for "Estafa Through False Pretenses and
Falsification of Public Documents." —
This case was dismissed by Resolution
dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-
207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was
still pending before the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was
executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in
connection with the former's fire insurance claim over
property registered in its name — one of two immovables
formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin
Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In that
affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated
that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real
property together with the improvements thereon which
property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by
TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was
notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious"
because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed lots
was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that,
among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal
and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante)
and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of
public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September
28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It
found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any
malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's
statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title
in TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso
notarized was legally in order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment
of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27,
1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the
subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office
of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-
00136. His complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice
(First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" —
was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on
25

February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as
follows:
It should be noted and emphasized that
complainant has remedies available
under the Rules of Court, particularly on
civil procedure and existing laws. It is not
the prerogative of this Office to make a
review of Decisions and Resolutions of
judicial courts, rendered within their
competence. The records do not warrant
this Office to take further proceedings
against the respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the
Ombudsman Act states that the Office of
the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that (1) the
complainant had adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body;"
and Sec. 21 the same law provides that
the Office of the Ombudsman does not
have disciplinary authority over members
of the Judiciary.
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain
Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate
mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage
was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot
covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This
same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by
Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a
stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him
(Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without
the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans
and credit accommodations he had obtained from the
Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of
his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously
to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's
delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for
a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing
with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of
which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the
26
property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for
consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009.
However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed
the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled
Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced
proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by
Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by
Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB
and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo)
fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders
Royal Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-
21009; AC-G.R.
No. CV-
07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just
stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-
21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-
square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in
accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit
Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was
later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo
contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC
(Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the
parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de
retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however,
Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of
P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the
sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains
and other taxes in connection with the transaction
(P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file
brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-
07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's
judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by
this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution dated
September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 —
an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a
motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of
which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was
unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII
of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the
Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices
26

had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any
concurrence of at least three of the members." Since the
motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same
was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated
November 27, 1989.
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance
with established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over
the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of
Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo
MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-
8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial
campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
attempted to vent his resentment even against the
Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him
notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third
Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu
City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys.
Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk
of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division,
and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office."
He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for
allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of
Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch
18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These processes
were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division.
The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on
April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No.
82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En
Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to
dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue
summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature
which may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly,
Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing
the summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil
Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo
in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent by
the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the
Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
This is not the first time that Mr.
Borromeo has filed charges/complaints
against officials of the Court. In several
letter complaints filed with the courts and
27
the Ombudsman, Borromeo had
repeatedly alleged that he "suffered
injustices," because of the disposition of
the four (4) cases he separately
appealed to this Court which were
resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly
in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His
invariable complaint is that the
resolutions which disposed of his cases
do not bear the signatures of the Justices
who participated in the deliberations and
resolutions and do not show that they
voted therein. He likewise complained
that the resolutions bear no certification
of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they
were based and were signed only by the
Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts,
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory,
as were a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed
from is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear
from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due
course always gives the legal basis. As
emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao
Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987],
"[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render
signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases filed
before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating
on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or
motions decides to deny due course to
the petition and states that the questions
raised are factual, or no reversible error
in the respondent court's decision is
shown, or for some other legal basis
27

stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional
requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution "that no petition for
review or motion for reconsideration shall
be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the
Court, minute resolutions are
promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of
sending copies thereof to the parties
concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It
is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the
parties of the action taken on their cases
quoting the resolution adopted by the
Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case.
All decisions and resolutions are actions
of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was
explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280,
"Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix
Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution
dated July 6, 1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions like the petition in the case at
bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this
Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to
counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and
legal conclusions.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by
the members of the Court who took part
in the deliberations of a case nor do they
require the certification of the Chief
Justice. For to require members of the
Court to sign all resolutions issued would
not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their
time would be spent on functions more
properly performed by the Clerk of Court
and which time could be more profitably
used in the analysis of cases and the
formulation of decisions and orders of
important nature and character. Even
with the use of this procedure, the Court
28
is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the
ever increasing number of cases coming
to it. . . .
b. RTC CIVIL CASE
NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054
It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions
which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or
SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for
other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the
Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987,
Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certain
Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state
a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance
with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same
complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This
time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and
assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by
Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants'
motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order
dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a
petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non.
Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required
petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified
statement of material dates and paying the docket and
legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His
petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the
Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on
his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's
judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with
finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court
of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more
remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not
been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact or
law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty.
Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that
"the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing
petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was
denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to
28

sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 17, had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21,
1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied
or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and
legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the
extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.
82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the
same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that
minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product
of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or
resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists
merely in the ministerial and routinary function of
communicating the Court's action to the parties
concerned.
c. RTC Case No. CEB-
9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this
latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series,
was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second
Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant
Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who
had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in
G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990,
was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon.
Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained
essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all
along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in which the
Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical
reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error
in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of
the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February 19,
1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been
signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by
the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written
letters to defendants demanding an explanation for said
"patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which
they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions
by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any
Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis
thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently
abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish,
severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights
and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral
damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of
P5,000.00.
29
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the
records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court
conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in
G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing
that all complaints against officers of that Court be
forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27,
1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices" committed
against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and
84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record
(Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-
21880; CA-G.R.
CV
No. 10951; G.R. No. 87
897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the
mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed
a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.).
Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique
Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and Samson
K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty.
Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato
Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of
ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The
Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr.
presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right
to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral
damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees
amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of
P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That
Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente,
with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his
appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme
Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for
insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely
unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was
denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution,
the Court (First Division) said:
29

The Court considered the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed
by petitioner himself and Resolved to
DENY the same for lack of merit, the
motion having been filed without
"express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule
52, Rules of Court) apart from being a
reiteration merely of the averments of the
Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989
and the Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 25, 1989. It should be noted that
petitioner's claims have already been
twice rejected as without merit, first by
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then
by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner
desires obviously is to have a third ruling
on the merits of his claims, this time by
this Court. Petitioner is advised that a
review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion and will be
granted only when there is a special and
important reason therefor (Section 4,
Rule 45); and a petition for review may be
dismissed summarily on the ground that
"the appeal is without merit, or is
prosecuted manifestly for delay or the
question raised is too unsubstantial to
require consideration" (Section 3, Rule
45), or that only questions of fact are
raised in the petition, or the petition
otherwise fails to comply with the formal
requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1
and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88).
Petitioner is further advised that the first
sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution refers to a decision,
and has no application to a resolution as
to which said section pertinently provides
that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal
basis therefor; and that the resolution of
June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first
Motion for Reconsideration dated May
25, 1989 does indeed state the legal
reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set
out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is
that the petitioner's arguments — aimed
at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and
consequently bringing about a review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals —
had failed to persuade the Court that the
errors imputed to the Court of Appeals
had indeed been committed and
therefore, there was no cause to modify
the conclusions set forth in that
30
judgment; and in such a case, there is
obviously no point in reproducing and
restating the conclusions and reasons
therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further
Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT.
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C.
Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First
Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as
"a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and
drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from
the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and
facts and law: . . . and characterizing the conclusions
therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and
ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN
GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . .
CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the letter
Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the
Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the
Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and
BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open
Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a
communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News
Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989.
His letter was ordered expunged from the record because
containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter
(Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter
of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply
"NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on
December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-
4852; CA G.R.
SP
No. 14519; G.R. No. 84
999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice,
Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure
effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had
unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880.
This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC
(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of
Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by
Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty.
Deen.
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon.
Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to
30

pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of
Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519);
but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on
June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that
Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of
certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of
December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988,
and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said)
decision and . . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal
being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated
October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment
on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents
therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the
services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L.
Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due
proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by
Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division
for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4,
1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no
findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-
8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178,
was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City,
this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered
judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres
Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella
G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively,
Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First
Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15
of said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused
issuance of summonses which were in due course served
on September 22, 1989, among others, on said
defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No.
84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of
Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as
already stated, had for a time represented Borromeo in
G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of
appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility"
between him and his client, Borromeo — because
"Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without
31
. . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he
had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of
(said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his
"Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to the
Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an
order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of
the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge
Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and
Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its
Resolution dated November 29, 1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-
374; CA-G.R.
CV
No. 04097; G.R. No. 77
248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between
Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another
action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The
transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known
as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo
sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the
Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract
with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-
374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial
Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the
purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the
subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment,
by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.
Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review
petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution
of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his
petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as
well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed
and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the
findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He
moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution
dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought
reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through
various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One
of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent
to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of
any Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta
Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July
10, 1987, reading as follows:
Dear Mr. Borromeo:
31

This refers to your letter dated June 9,
1987 requesting for a copy of the actual
resolution with the signatures of all the
Justices of the Second Division in Case
G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite
for your guidance, Resolution dated July
6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine
Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et
al., wherein the Supreme Court declared
that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions like the petition in the case at
bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this
Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to
counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and
legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of
Court's duty to notify the parties of the
action taken on their case by quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the
Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation,
Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases
concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No; OMB-VIS-
89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals
and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
complaint against the Chairman and Members of the
Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre
Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
32
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining
that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried
and their merits determined by different courts including
the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No.
87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we
find it unreasonable for complainant to dispute and
defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the
decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this
case. . . ."
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-
90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,
against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third
Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with
a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules
of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions
in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually,
notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273
which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a
Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit"
declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of
the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it
cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents
really were the ones rendering them," and "it is not the
prerogative of this office to review the correctness of
judicial resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY
BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case
No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. N
o. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo
engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank
& Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had
obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of
P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on
May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa
Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond
which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder.
Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal
Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his
contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action
in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for
collection.
32

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and
was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares,
presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar
Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law
firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through
Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January
5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC,
solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as
attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of
execution issued in due course pursuant to which an
immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually
sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the
highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside
the judgment by default, but the same was denied on
March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having
likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of
Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter
dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for
reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court
on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No.
94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his
petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion
for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on
December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have
been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance and
bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of
litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of
another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and
criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by
Borromeo.
2. RTC Case No. CEB-
9267
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme
Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the
Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it
in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried
and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He
denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with
Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in
"conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused
him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights,
33
worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for
which he sought payment of moral and exemplary
damages as well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed
the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action
asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require
defendants to present their own evidence as there is
nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-
10458;
CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed
on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties
— SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now
including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered
the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo,
one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders,
Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo
faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they
decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267),"
and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud
plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due
process," on account of which he had been "caused
untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless
nights, and embarrassment for which the former are liable
under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated
August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge
German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint
on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and
lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo
F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The
motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13,
1993. 35 Said the Court:
Stripped of their disparaging and
intemperate innuendoes, the subject
motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a
stark difference in opinion as to what can,
33

or cannot, be considered res
judicata under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
By their distinct disdainful tenor towards
the appellees, and his apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the
contrary the appellant who precariously
treads the acceptable limits of
argumentation and personal advocacy.
The Court, moreover, takes particular
note of the irresponsible leaflets he
admits to have authored and finds them
highly reprehensible and needlessly
derogatory to the dignity, honor and
reputation of the Courts. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the
only reason that his otherwise
contumacious behavior is presently
accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering
the temperament he has, by far,
exhibited, the appellant is, however,
sufficiently warned that similar displays in
the future shall accordingly be dealt with
with commensurate severity.
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,
CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of
Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case
No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It
appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a
loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot
belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered
by TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of
credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters
Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to
pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay
Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and
Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was
executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of
land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as
above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as
security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its
personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial
Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to
deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered
against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the
34
case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990,
said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's
decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution
denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His
appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was
given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First
Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition
for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed
any reversible error in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted
the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures
of the Justices who had taken part in approving the
resolution therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions
rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this
Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-
11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch
18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo
outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment
promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as
defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time
in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon.
Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter
alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the
following pertinent observations:
. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered
view and so holds that this Court has
indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret
or reverse the judgment or order of the
Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or
omissions complained of by the plaintiff
against the herein defendant and the
other personnel of the highest Court of
the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12
of plaintiff's complaint are certainly
beyond the sphere of this humble court to
consider and pass upon to determine
their propriety and legality. To try to
review, interpret or reverse the judgment
or order of the Honorable Supreme Court
would appear not only presumptuous but
also contemptuous. As argued by the
lawyer for the defendant, a careful
perusal of the allegations in the complaint
clearly shows that all material allegations
thereof are directed against a resolution
34

of the Supreme Court which was
allegedly issued by the Third Division
composed of five (5) justices. No
allegation is made directly against
defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his
personal capacity. That being the case,
how could this Court question the
wisdom of the final order or judgment of
the Supreme Court (Third Division) which
according to the plaintiff himself had
issued a resolution denying plaintiffs
petition and affirming the Lower Court's
decision as reflected in the "Entry of
Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such
violation of the Rules of Court, due
process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the
Constitution by the defendant herein, the
appropriate remedy should not have
been obtained before this Court. For an
inferior court to reverse, interpret or
review the acts of a superior court might
be construed to a certain degree as a
show of an uncommon common sense.
Lower courts are without supervising
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the
judgment of the higher courts.
Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September
20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and
legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
A. Complaint Against Lawyers
of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for
his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the
actions above mentioned, and others. As already
mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence
Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio
Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for
their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent
lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously
misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a
genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable
mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his
proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3)
defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their
lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez
and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his
property in favor of Lao.
35
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment
complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure
harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled
"Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin
Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter,
signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri
(Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer);
Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia
(Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina
(Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G.
Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin
(Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal
profession regard members of the
Judiciary with deferential awe and
respect sometimes to the extent of
cowering before the might of the courts,
here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful
abandon and unmitigated insolence, has
cast aspersions and shown utter
disregard to the authority and name of
the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is
very unfortunate that here is a non-
lawyer who uses the instruments of
justice to harass lawyers and courts who
crosses his path more especially if their
actuations do not conform with his whims
and caprices.
Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter
alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with
supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc.,
the lawyers went on to say the following:
The conduct and statement of Borromeo
against this Honorable Court, and other
members of the Judiciary are clearly and
grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring
dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the
public confidence on the courts. If
unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will
undermine the dignity of the courts and
will result in the loss of confidence in the
country's judicial system and
administration of justice.
. . . (S)omething should be done to
protect the integrity of the courts and the
legal profession. So many baseless
35

badmouthing have been made by
Borromeo against this Honorable Court
and other courts that for him to go scot-
free would certainly be demoralizing to
members of the profession who afforded
the court with all the respect and esteem
due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed
another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the
Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP
(Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the
notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after
due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in
seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted
the Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu
City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as
against all the respondents and the issuance of a
"warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be
precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court
are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars,"
flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly
derogatory of the many court judgments or directives
against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their
lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court
employees involved in the said adverse dispositions —
some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the
respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The
writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were
apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity
to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had
occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant
for argumentum ad hominen" and of the "irresponsible
leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which were found
to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to
the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and
lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the
Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the
editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported
conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an
36
"Award from the University of Texas for his contributions
in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that
Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering
rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process
and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called
Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or
SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the
Supreme Court.
He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices,
Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after
INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE
JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous,
nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the
irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he
specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible
injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that
"3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled.
Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents
of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of
the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to
minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of
last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the
trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not
comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to
uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his,
dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to
Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres
Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of
many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction
the theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all
without stating any FACT or LAW to support your
dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your firm assurances
(Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws
(during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and
that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply
want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a
wrongful party. . . ."
In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That
Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what he
regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the
Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by
Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer
has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a
throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such
statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at
nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another
"circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme
Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures
violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition:
36
 37

"Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE rule of law and rules of court and DUE
CHARTER." 38 PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

One other "circular" reads: TYRANTS will never admit that they are
tyrants. But their acts speak for
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!! themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC:
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS! ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO IMPEACH NARVASA

NARVASA's SC has denied being a • ISSUING UNSIGNED,

DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in SWEEPING,
the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC UNCLEAR,
Reports) will attest to this continuing UNCONSTITUTIONAL
vigilance Of the supreme Court." These "MINUTE
are lame, cowardly and self-serving RESOLUTIONS"
denials and another "self-exoneration" VIOLATIVE OF SECS.
belied by evidence which speak for 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — Constitution
the SCRA itself.
• VIOLATING RULES
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when OF COURT AND DUE
Narvasa and associates issued PROCESS IN
UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING ORDERING CASE
"Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR AGAINST SC CLERKS
FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of (CEB-8679)
Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. DISMISSED DESPITE
It is precisely through said THE LATTER'S
TYRANNICAL, and FAILURE TO FILE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that PLEADINGS; HENCE
Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED IN DEFAULT
CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB,
and SBTC, and through said fake • CORRUPTION
resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or AND/OR GROSS
shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling IGNORANCE OF THE
that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY LAW IN RULING, THAT
IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR CONSIGNATION IS
83306). Through said despotic NECESSARY IN
resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have RIGHT OF
sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of REDEMPTION,
court orders and naked land grabbing — CONTRADICTING LAW
What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR AND SC'S OWN
84999). RULINGS — TO
ALLOW CRONY BANK
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an TRB TO STEALS LOTS
Entry of Judgment without first resolving WORTH P3 MILLION
the motion for reconsideration (G.R No.
82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of • CONDONING CRONY
power for the SC to order a case BANK UCPB'S
dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV- DEFIANCE OF TWO
8679) and declare justices and said LAWFUL COURT
clerks "immune from suit" — despite their ORDERS AND
failure to file any pleading? Were STEALING OF TITLE
Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the OF PROPERTY
WORTH P4 MILLION

37
 38

• BEING JUDGE AND xxx xxx xxx

ACCUSED AT THE
SAME TIME AND The records of the Court disclose inter
PREDICTABLY alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the
EXONERATING Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D.
HIMSELF AND Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr.
FELLOW CORRUPT Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306
JUSTICES (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal
Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the
• DECLARING "circular" adverted to by the relator
HIMSELF, JUSTICES, herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and
and even MERE two (2) other cases also filed with the
CLERKS TO BE Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248
IMMUNE FROM SUIT (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao
AND UN- and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No.
ACCOUNTABLE TO 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon.
THE PEOPLE and Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all
REFUSING TO resolved adversely to him by different
ANSWER AND Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty.
REFUTE CHARGES Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly
AGAINST HIMSELF the legal principles applicable to his
cases and dealt with the matters
JOAQUIN T. mentioned in his circular.
BORROMEO
The records further disclose subsequent
Mabolo, Cebu City adverse rulings by the Court in other
cases instituted by Borromeo in this
Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T.
Te. 7-56-49.
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and
No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR the existence of other communications
made public by Borromeo reiterating the
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter arguments already passed upon by the
IBP, dated June 21, 1992 court in his cases and condemning the
court's rejection of those arguments.
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the
hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu City Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its of the Cebu City Chapter of the
President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its
dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of above named, President, and taking
them — that last quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP account of the related facts on record, the
Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Court Resolved:
Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and
defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the 1) to REQUIRE:
whole justice system"— and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's
"officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the
impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his
matter at bar as a proceeding for
condemnable act."
contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo
instituted at the relation of said Cebu City
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993 Chapter, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City
Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this
July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the resolution and copies of the Chapter's
letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the letter dated June 21, 1993 together with
Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows: its annexes; and

38

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to
CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said
notice of resolution and a copy of the
Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993,
together with its annexes, on Joaquin T.
Borromeo at his address at Mabolo,
Cebu City; and
2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo,
within ten (10) days from receipt of such
notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of
June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a
comment on the letter and its annexes as
well as on the other matters set forth in
this resolution, serving copy thereof on
the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace
of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's Letter of
April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989,
referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just
mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the
second time, precisely the principles and established
practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices
thereof, treated of in several other communications and
resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the
letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of
Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in
relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of
Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of
which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated
July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1,
1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and that dated
June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo
filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he
alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993
(requiring comment) violates the
Constitution which requires "signatures
and concurrence of majority of members
of the High Court;" hence, "a certified
copy duly signed by Justices is
respectfully requested;"
39
2) the Chief Justice and other Members
of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and
Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and
independent body;"
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not
verified nor signed by members of said
(IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague,
unspecific, and sweeping" because
failing to point out "what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly
libelous and condemnable;" and does not
appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to
speak or file a complaint "in behalf of
those accused in the "libelous circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo)
"was exercising his rights of freedom of
speech, of expression, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances as
guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4,
Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials;" the
circular merely states the truth and asks
for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful
but rather to be commended and
encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should
specify under oath which statements are
false and lies;
5) he "stands by the charges in his
circular and is prepared to support them
with pertinent facts, evidence and law;"
and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief
Justice and members of the High Court
to either refute said charges or dispense
the justice that they are duty bound to
dispense.
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993
After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord
Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and
be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the
following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of
which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk
of Court.
. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff
Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk
of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, dated August 26, 1993, and the
Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated
39

August 27, 1993, on the letter of
President Manuel P. Legaspi of the
relator dated June 21, 1993, are both
NOTED. After deliberating on the
allegations of said Comment, the Court
Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T.
Borromeo an additional period of fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof within which
to engage the services or otherwise seek
the assistance of a lawyer and submit
such further arguments in addition to or
in amplification of those set out in his
Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be
so minded.
SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated
October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and
allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and
setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . .
. (said) Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed
"to specify and state under oath the
alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in
the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered
to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . .
.(failing in which, they should) be cited in
contempt of court for making false
charges and wasting the precious time of
this Highest Court by filing a baseless
complaint;
2) the allegations in their circular are not
libelous nor disrespectful but "are based
on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely:
a) "minute resolutions"
bereft of signatures and
clear facts and laws are
patent violations of
Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art.
VIII of the Constitution;
b) there is no basis nor
thruth to this Hon.
Court's affirmation to
the Appelate Court's
ruling that the
undersigned "lost" his
right of redemption
price, since no less than
40
this Hon. Court has
ruled in many rulings
that CONSIGNATION
IS UNNECESSARY in
right of redemption;
c) this Hon. Court has deplorably
condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's
frauds and defiance of court orders in
G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of
November 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP
and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath
and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing
these as "and admission of the thruth in said circular,"
theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to
rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's
baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely
be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse
of and interference with judicial rules and processes,
gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper
conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.44 He has stubbornly litigated
issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately
closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely
to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had
become final and executory, obdurately and
unreasonably insisting on the application of his own
individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more
than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the
Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and
court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his
adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and
sorely tried the patience of the judges and court
employees who have had to act on his repetitious and
largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He
has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of
the judges and court employees who have had the bad
luck of having to act in one way or another on his
unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his
attention having been called many times to the egregious
error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions"
of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by
40

the Justices promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly
persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various
proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and
vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties
involved.
1. Untenability of
Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice
and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same
time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an
entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible
assumption of a competence in the field of the law: he
again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking
an argument long since declared and adjudged to be
untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the
court to institute a charge for contempt against itself,
without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer,
is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the
respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were
the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and
judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against
them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the
guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting
officers and impotent to perform their functions with
dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of
charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold
persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to
trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires
is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and
an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal,
by the judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified
nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter)
Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because
failing to point out what particular statements in the
circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it
does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak
or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the
'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but
superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious
treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other
contention that in making the allegations claimed to be
contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of
speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity
of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him
afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court
41
employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes
and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing
them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing
the Judicial Function
The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench
make necessary a restatement of the principles governing
finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an
end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite
postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing
predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like
Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or
institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for
courts; Judicial
Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of
controversies. In every country there is a more or less
established hierarchical organization of courts, and a
more or less comprehensive system of review of
judgments and final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several
levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well
as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation
of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and
is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
2. Paramount Need to
end
Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at
some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the
same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be,
on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied.
This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is
not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to
repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time,
the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions
thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed by this
Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967
decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual
41

endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right."
3. Judgments of
Supreme Court
Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing
in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the
highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any
other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there
the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot
be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less
reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by
error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in
its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some
other respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable
foundation of public policy, and constitutional and
traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12,
1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt
by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan
"members of the First Division of this Court collectively
with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an
'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad
faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised penal Code
". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to
respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust
Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act . . . — the following
pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of
established doctrine: 50
. . . As aptly declared in the Chief
Justice's Statement of December 24,
1986, which the Court hereby adopts in
toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme
Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." It is
elementary that "(A)s has ever been
stressed since the early case of Arnedo
vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911])
"controlling and irresistible reasons of
public policy and of sound practice in the
courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts
42
determining controversies submitted to
them should become final at some
definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be
thereafter beyond the control even of the
court which rendered them for the
purpose of correcting errors of fact or of
law, into which, in the opinion of the court
it may have fallen. The very purpose for
which the courts are organized is to put
an end to controversy, to decide the
questions submitted to the litigants, and
to determine the respective rights of the
parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305,
316-317)
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court
as a collegiate court, whether an en
banc or division, speak for themselves
and are entitled to full faith and credence
and are beyond investigation or inquiry
under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729;
Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61
Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's
pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is
well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is
conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake
in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive [as claimed
by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin
fees] — on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our
democractic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally
applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis
mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co.,
Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350.
(Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
42

The Court has consistently stressed that
the "doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the executive, legislative
and judicial departments being left alone
to discharge their duties as they see fit"
(Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It
has thus maintained in the same way that
the judiciary has a right to expect that
neither the President nor Congress
would cast doubt on the mainspring of its
orders or decisions, it should refrain from
speculating as to alleged hidden forces at
work that could have impelled either
coordinate branch into acting the way it
did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and
between the three departments of the
government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34
SCRA 275, 286-287).
4. Final and Executory
Judgments of
Lower Courts Not
Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the
ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is
adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a
motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37,
and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both
fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with
fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the
hierarchy of courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or
act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, may be had through the special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals —
become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion
of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be
reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less
by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52
C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action
against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic
43
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there
has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to
administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or
criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these
remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to
coerce judges into timorous surrender of their
prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising
frequency, administrative complaints are being presented
to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal
complaints are being filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions
for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial
Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court of
Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of
Complaints
Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment:
that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered
manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly
not in accord with the evidence, or with law or
jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion
— thereby causing injustice, and actionable and
compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing
litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite
obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the
Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision
or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine
its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a
pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific
Procedures for
Correction of Judgments
and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are
proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses
for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a
party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or,
having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously
seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested
by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts established by law, the question submits to only
one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.
43

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear,
and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have
only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who
feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final
and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step,
confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the
courts: the determination of whether the questioned
disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or
conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite
that impediment, whatever determination he makes could
well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal
litigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is
not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly
or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review
— by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be
exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long
established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise
litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao
Laureta, supra. 54
Respondents should know that the
provisions of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly
unjust judgment," refer to an individual
judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even
then, it is not the prosecutor who would
pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the
decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review
the same, either the Court of Appeals
and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal
article has no application to the members
of a collegiate court such as this Court or
its Divisions who reach their conclusions
in consultation and accordingly render
their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act on the ground that such a collective
decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
xxx xxx xxx
44
To subject to the threat and ordeal of
investigation and prosecution, a judge,
more so a member of the Supreme Court
for official acts done by him in good faith
and in the regular exercise of official duty
and judicial functions is to subvert and
undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to
the executive. "For it is a general
principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences
to himself. Liability to answer to everyone
who might feel himself aggrieved by the
action of the judge would be inconsistent
with the possession of this freedom, and
would destroy that independence without
which no judiciary can be either
respectable or useful." (Bradley vs.
Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the
Court's resolution and claim that the
members acted "with deliberate bad
faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution"
in disregard or violation of the duty of
their high office to act upon their own
independent consideration and judgment
of the matter at hand would be to destroy
the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts
and resolutions and to disregard utterly
the presumption of regular performance
of official duty. To allow such collateral
attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all
justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their
counsels cannot without violating the
separation of powers mandated by the
Constitution relitigate in another forum
the final judgment of this Court on legal
issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for final determination to and
by the Supreme Court and which fall
within the judicial power to determine
and adjudicate exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
44

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise
appealable, which have become final and executory.
Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher
tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body
or authority.
3. Only Courts
Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare
Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or
not a judgement or order is unjust — or was (or was not)
rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority,
or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers
or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an
essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and
immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and
ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no
other entity or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service or any other branch;
nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision — whether final and executory
or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an
unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.
4. Contrary Rule Results
in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd
Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for
supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders of the type above described, which, at bottom,
consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or
interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their
conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse
of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of
corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow
institution of such proceedings would not only be legally
improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous
exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of
review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is
rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and
affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's
judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the
Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's
decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge
who rendered the original decision (for knowingly
rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to
45
be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to
find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the
judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary
implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional
Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court who affirmed the original
judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly
an act of supreme arrogance and very evident
supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further,
assuming that the public prosecutor or Ombudsman
should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the
decision in question — despite its having been affirmed at
all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing
with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in
the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court
Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly
predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge
is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial
Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside
and the correctness of the judgment in question, already
passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate
courts, would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the
Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal
action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the
Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the
offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or
against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of
the case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is
a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed
of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly
rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites
for Administrative
Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute
judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all
the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites
are that there be a final declaration by a competent court
in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and there
be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
45

rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration
is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the
appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial
court in the civil or criminal action in question is
challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a
decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to
which — the same being unappealable — it would be
unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime
(or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to
the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to
press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by
deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or
negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite
is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of
the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in
question. Such a pronouncement may result from either
(a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court
impugning the validity of the; judgment, as having been
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due
process to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an
administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against
the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment
or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order
in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against
the judge concerned is legally possible or should be
entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from
Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors. They should not
be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and
dispositions they may make in the performance of their
duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must
be recognized independently of statute, that judges are
not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their
jurisdiction and in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge
may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold
otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate
and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is
only in these cases that administrative sanctions are
called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.
46
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing
doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction
are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for
what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions
when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction."58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the
doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any
subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge,
justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil
action for the recovery of damages by reason of any
judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith,
and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the
Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee,
or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of
another person — which rights are the same as those
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the
Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages.
However, such liability is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent
that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment
or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it
need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any
of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: that
such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less
maintained, unless there be a final judicial
pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or
order in issue.
E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing
doctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less than
sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded
cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take
the present administrative measure. The imposition on
the time of the courts and the unnecessary work
occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-
evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court,
however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the
hope that the repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the
attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from
further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has
repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is
exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no
effect on him.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to
him were read as signs of weakness and impotence.
Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to
46

have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and
insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected
bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even
involving the legislative and executive departments, the
Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the
Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things,
good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the
Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude,
between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense.
The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the
same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with
them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and
resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as may be
appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of
the judicial institutions of the country.
Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M.
MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995,
addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged
Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the
Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme
to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55,
for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She
also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934,
where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property
situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty.
Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the
aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
47
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and
declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly
committed over time, despite warnings and instructions
given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his
serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due
respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby
sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10)
DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that
a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein
found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts,
judges or court employees, will merit further and more
serious sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin
filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case
Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija.
In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for
their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by
a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio
Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and
the same property previously attached by complainant
was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these
three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and
Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same
PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent
Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City,
PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-
12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650
filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme
of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case
No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it
Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits
submitted by Bongalonta and attached to
the records is a xerox copy of TCT No.
47

38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of
Encumbrances on aid TCT that the
Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and
her husband was registered and
annotated in said title of February 7,
1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio
Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to
state, the notice of levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband is a
superior lien on the said registered
property of the Abuel spouses over that
of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the
two respondents (i.e. representing
conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which
Bongalonta and her husband might
obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no
leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the
two respondents placed in their
appearances and in their pleadings the
same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for
using, apparently thru his negligence, the
IBP official receipt number of respondent
Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the
records of the IBP National Office, Atty.
Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent
and current membership dues, on
February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her
complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's
Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester
Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit
dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her
fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija in the appearance and pleadings
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
48
Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due
time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration,
for it is the bounded duty and obligation
of every lawyer to see to it that he pays
his IBP membership dues on time,
especially when he practices before the
courts, as required by the Supreme
Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for using the IBP Official Receipt
No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
(pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and
recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental
duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
48

R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to
or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner
are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL
5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30
am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE
BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
49
confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services,
the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5)
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy
and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits
of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position
papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by
which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially
49

without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-
government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business
registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it
to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising
the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies
that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have
on the reading public.
The impression created by the
advertisements in question can be
50
traced, first of all, to the very name being
used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a
medical clinic connotes medical services
for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers,
as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
published in the advertisements subject
of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that
it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt
may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether
respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are
meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the
respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that
under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
50

Where a marriage
between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have
capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the
Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage
is special contract of
permanent
union between a man
and woman entered into
accordance with law for
the establishment of
conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation
of the family and an
inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and
incidents are governed
by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that
marriage settlements
may fix the property
relation during the
marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain
defects in Philippine laws are exploited
for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer
shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at
51
defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to
point out that advertisements such as
that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on
its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to
be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal
acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or
Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does
not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that)
the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of
the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of
the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
51

It is respectfully submitted that
respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be
prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators
for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice
but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved
in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and
effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern
technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however,
should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not
only for the protection of members of the
Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public.
Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are
made available exclusively to members
of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not
52
legal services. Alternatively, the more
difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to
the public in general and which should be
made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that
some of respondent's services ought to
be prohibited outright, such as acts which
tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous
or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not
be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the
information given, a disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise,
advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by
paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform
to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
52

xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not
engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services
to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers
of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal
work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural
persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device
by which respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been
duly admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who
53
act for it are subject to court discipline.
The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor
can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's
position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are
not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the
power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged
in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services"
to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice,
albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public
its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments
53

Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably
require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court
in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and
are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of
law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged
in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires
one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of
arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned
in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in
those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the
fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public
from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public
should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it
54
appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should
be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned
advertisements of Respondent, however,
seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence,
legal matters , will be given to them if they
avail of its services. The Respondent's
name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does
not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them.
Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it
also gives the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further
belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are
clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided
for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal
in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
54
 55

could work out/cause the celebration of a 1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged
secret marriage which is not only illegal in the practice of law, such as
but immoral in this country. While it is management consultancy firms or travel
advertised that one has to go to said agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage perform the services rendered by
it is certainly fooling the public for valid Respondent does not necessarily lead to
marriages in the Philippines are the conclusion that Respondent is not
solemnized only by officers authorized to unlawfully practicing law. In the same
do so under the law. And to employ an vein, however, the fact that the business
agency for said purpose of contracting of respondent (assuming it can be
marriage is not necessary. engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, does not necessarily make respondent
Canada and other countries the trend is guilty of unlawful practice of law.
towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to . . . . Of necessity, no
obtain from qualified practitioners legal one . . . . acting as a
services for their particular needs can consultant can render
justify the use of advertisements such as effective service unless
are the subject matter of the petition, for he is familiar with such
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by statutes and
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. regulations. He must be
The law has yet to be amended so that careful not to suggest a
such act could become justifiable. course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems
We submit further that these . . . .clear that (the
advertisements that seem to project that consultant's) knowledge
secret marriages and divorce are of the law, and his use
possible in this country for a fee, when in of that knowledge as a
fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible. factor in determining
what measures he shall
It would encourage people to consult this recommend, do not
constitute the practice
clinic about how they could go about
of law . . . . It is not only
having a secret marriage here, when it
presumed that all men
cannot nor should ever be attempted,
know the law, but it is a
and seek advice on divorce, where in this
fact that most men have
country there is none, except under the
considerable
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals acquaintance with
broad features of the
and is deceitful because it falsely
law . . . . Our knowledge
represents to the public to be able to do
of the law — accurate
that which by our laws cannot be done
or inaccurate — moulds
(and) by our Code of Morals should not
our conduct not only
be done.
when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, are serving others.
the Supreme Court held that solicitation Bankers, liquor dealers
for clients by an attorney by circulars of and laymen generally
advertisements, is unprofessional, and possess rather precise
offenses of this character justify knowledge of the laws
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10 touching their particular
business or profession.
6. Federacion Internacional de A good example is the
Abogados: architect, who must be
familiar with zoning,
xxx xxx xxx building and fire

55

prevention codes,
factory and tenement
house statutes, and
who draws plans and
specification in harmony
with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the
architect, asked by his
client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is
required by the statute.
Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in
support of some
measure that he
recommends, a
decision of the National
Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law?
In my opinion, they are
not, provided no
separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or
information, and the
legal question is
subordinate and
incidental to a major
non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of
degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one
intending to erect a
building on his land to
engage a lawyer to
advise him and the
architect in respect to
the building code and
the like, then an
architect who performed
this function would
probably be considered
to be trespassing on
territory reserved for
licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the
industrial relations field
had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this
is not the case. The
most important body of
56
the industrial relations
experts are the officers
and business agents of
the labor unions and
few of them are
lawyers. Among the
larger corporate
employers, it has been
the practice for some
years to delegate
special responsibility in
employee matters to a
management group
chosen for their
practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it.
More recently,
consultants like the
defendants have the
same service that the
larger employers get
from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of
industrial relations is
growing into a
recognized profession
for which appropriate
courses are offered by
our leading universities.
The court should be
very cautious about
declaring [that] a
widespread, well-
established method of
conducting business is
unlawful, or that the
considerable class of
men who customarily
perform a certain
function have no right to
do so, or that the
technical education
given by our schools
cannot be used by the
graduates in their
business.
In determining whether
a man is practicing law,
we should consider his
work for any particular
client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine
56

defendant being
engaged primarily to
advise as to the law
defining his client's
obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client along the path
charted by law. This, of
course, would be the
practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in
the case before me.
Defendant's primarily
efforts are along
economic and
psychological lines. The
law only provides the
frame within which he
must work, just as the
zoning code limits the
kind of building the
limits the kind of
building the architect
may plan. The
incidental legal advice
or information
defendant may give,
does not transform his
activities into the
practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a
minor feature of his
work, he performed
services which are
customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he
would be practicing
law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare
program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of
defendant's work is the
representations of the
employer in the
adjustment of
grievances and in
collective bargaining,
with or without a
mediator. This is not per
se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations
and may select an
57
agent particularly skilled
in the subject under
discussion, and the
person appointed is free
to accept the
employment whether or
not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however,
there may be an
exception where the
business turns on a
question of law. Most
real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the
land depends on a
disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of
the negotiator is to
assess the probable
outcome of the dispute
and persuade the
opposite party to the
same opinion, then it
may be that only a
lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a
controversy between an
employer and his men
grows from differing
interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute,
it is quite likely that
defendant should not
handle it. But I need not
reach a definite
conclusion here, since
the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears
to represent the
employer before
administrative agencies
of the federal
government, especially
before trial examiners of
the National Labor
Relations Board. An
agency of the federal
government, acting by
virtue of an authority
granted by the
Congress, may regulate
the representation of
parties before such
57
 58

agency. The State of Responsibility succintly states the rule of

New Jersey is without conduct:
power to interfere with
such determination or to Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged
forbid representation in another profession or occupation
before the agency by concurrently with the practice of law shall
one whom the agency make clear to his client whether he is
admits. The rules of the acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
National Labor
Relations Board give to 1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic
a party the right to appears to render wedding services (See
appear in person, or by Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
counsel, or by other straightforward marriages, like securing a
representative. Rules marriage license, and making
and Regulations, arrangements with a priest or a judge,
September 11th, 1946, may not constitute practice of law.
S. 203.31. 'Counsel' However, if the problem is as
here means a licensed complicated as that described in "Rx for
attorney, and ther Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
representative' one not
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
a lawyer. In this phase
case, then what may be involved is
of his work, defendant actually the practice of law. If a non-
may lawfully do lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders
whatever the Labor such services then it is engaged in the
Board allows, even unauthorized practice of law.
arguing questions
purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to
53 A. 2d 800, cited in give information on divorce, absence,
Statsky, Introduction to annulment of marriage and visas (See
Paralegalism [1974], at Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
pp. 154-156.). giving informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that
buys materials on the subject and
a person engaged in a lawful calling determines on the subject and
(which may involve knowledge of the law) determines by himself what courses of
is not engaged in the practice of law action to take.
provided that:
It is not entirely improbable, however,
(a) The legal question is subordinate and that aside from purely giving information,
incidental to a major non-legal problem;. the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply
the law to the particular problem of the
(b) The services performed are not client, and give legal advice. Such would
customarily reserved to members of the constitute unauthorized practice of law.
bar; .
It cannot be claimed
(c) No separate fee is charged for the that the publication of a
legal advice or information. legal text which
publication of a legal
All these must be considered in relation text which purports to
to the work for any particular client as a say what the law is
whole. amount to legal
practice. And the mere
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer fact that the principles
and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional or rules stated in the
text may be accepted

58

by a particular reader as
a solution to his
problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it
is urged that the
conjoining of these two,
that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to
how the forms should
be filled out, constitutes
the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the
situation with many
approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at
large. There is no
personal contact or
relationship with a
particular individual. Nor
does there exist that
relation of confidence
and trust so necessary
to the status of attorney
and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION
AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to
offer general advice on
common problems, and
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem
peculiar to a designated
or readily identified
person. Similarly the
defendant's publication
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem
peculiar to a designated
or readily identified
person in a particular
situation — in their
publication and sale of
the kits, such
publication and sale did
not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law
. . . . There being no
legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of
59
the kit, there was no
proper basis for the
injunction against
defendant maintaining
an office for the purpose
of selling to persons
seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment
or separation
agreement any printed
material or writings
relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of
modification of the
judgment against
defendant having an
interest in any
publishing house
publishing his
manuscript on divorce
and against his having
any personal contact
with any prospective
purchaser. The record
does fully support,
however, the finding
that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave
legal advice in the
course of personal
contacts concerning
particular problems
which might arise in the
preparation and
presentation of the
purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and
assistance in the
preparation of
necessary documents
(The injunction
therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct
constituting the practice
of law, particularly with
reference to the giving
of advice and counsel
by the defendant
relating to specific
problems of particular
individuals in
connection with a
divorce, separation,
annulment of separation
59

agreement sought and
should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in
Statsky, supra at p.
101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that
its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may
be necessary for the judicious disposition
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and
other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related
to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?"
or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar.
On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
60
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks
the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing
the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of
law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
60

. . . . for valuable consideration engages
in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their
right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions
consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
61
on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that
part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions
be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In
Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists
of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in
the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as
61

computerized legal research; encoding
and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses
to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the
efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
62
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an
article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is
transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in
1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in
clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how
we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to
one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical
terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We
can take care of these matters on a while
you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang
ma-confine. It's just like a common cold
or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
62

Those cases which requires more
extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative
who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos
of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative
is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that
it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature
of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only
a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers
is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal
if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
63
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of
law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not
a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and
the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to
practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those
not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public
from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the
judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's
position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One
of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals
in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
63

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice
cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights
and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or
64
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services
or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple
of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as
to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
64

their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement
of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents
of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously
not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that
the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether
in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that
the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority
in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
65
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on
the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to
14%
Professional from 71%
to 14%
Honest from 65% to
14%
Dignified from 45% to
14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation
of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication
of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to
exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly
accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering
that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the
legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing
into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit
in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law
in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
65

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.
66
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office
of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
66

Bar Matter No. 850
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP,
endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and
reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court
Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves
to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised
Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal
education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their
career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within
two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the
Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be
constituted and shall commence the implementation of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE.
Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall
complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36)
hours of continuing legal education activities approved by
the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to
legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
67
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to
trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4)
credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to
alternative dispute resolution equivalent to
five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to
updates on substantive and procedural laws,
and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9)
credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to
legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent
to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to
international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit
units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted
to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6)
credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial
compliance period shall begin not later than three (3)
months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the
initial compliance period for members admitted or
readmitted after the establishment of the program, all
compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and
shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP
not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided
into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the
National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro
Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon
outside NCR are assigned to Compliance
Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas
and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance
Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any
legal education activity wherever it may be available
67
 68

to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE 1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR
requirement. OF CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or
readmitted after establishment of the program. Members U
admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment M
of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate B
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership E
on the date of admission or readmission. R
The initial compliance period after admission or O
readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of F
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day H
as that of all other members in the same Compliance O
Group. U
R
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the S
initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to 1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
comply with the program requirement for the RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
initial compliance. SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of E

the initial compliance period after admission R
or readmission, the member shall be T
required to complete a number of hours of I
approved continuing legal education F
activities equal to the number of months I
remaining in the compliance period in which C
the member is admitted or readmitted. Such A
member shall be required to complete a T
number of hours of education in legal ethics I
in proportion to the number of months O
remaining in the compliance period. N
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the
next whole number. 1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR
THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU) MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE
PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS FACILITATOR
ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT
UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
requirement under the Rules, based on the category
of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The 2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR
following are the guidelines for computing credit THE PUBLISHED BOOK
units and the supporting documents required LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
therefor: COMPLIANCE
PERIOD
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS 2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU
OF PUBLISHED BOOK
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, AUTHORSHIP
SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, CATEGORY WITH
WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE PROOF AS
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER
RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES

68

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE
PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR
THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER
ISSUE PUBLISHED
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR
THE CERTIFICATION OF
BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN
OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR
REVIEW
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit
units are either participatory or non-participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. --
Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
69
(a)
T Attending approved education activities like
O seminars, conferences, conventions,
R symposia, in-house education programs,
workshops, dialogues or round table
discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned
panelist, reactor, commentator, resource
speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator
in approved education activities.
R
E (c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar
P review class.
O
R SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units.
Non-participatory
T credit units may be claimed per
compliance
/ period for:
P (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written
A materials published or accepted for
P publication, e.g., in the form of an article,
E chapter, book, or book review which
R contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in
the ordinary course of the members practice
or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal
newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit
hours are computed based on actual time spent in an
education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour
reported in decimals.
D
I Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
R
E
C SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. --
T following members of the Bar are exempt from the
The
O
MCLE requirement:
R
(a) The President and the Vice President of the
Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent
members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the
69

Philippine Judicial Academy program of
continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State
Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant
Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy
and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and
professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least ten (10) years in
accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and
members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine
Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The
following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or
public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice
with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or
modification of requirement A member may file a verified
request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as
physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad,
proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or
modification of any of the requirements, including an
extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period
shall begin on the first day of the month in which a
member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of
this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
70
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for
exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement
shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to
the implementing regulations that may be adopted by
the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education
program may be granted approval in either of two (2)
ways: (1) the provider of the activity is
an accredited provider and certifies that the activity
meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the
provider is specifically mandated by law to provide
continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All
continuing legal education activities must meet the
following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current
intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized
program of learning related to legal subjects
and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or
the ability to practice law, as well as subjects
in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider
with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour
in length, substantive written materials must
be distributed to all participants. Such
materials must be distributed at or before the
time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be
scheduled at a time and location so as to be
free from interruption like telephone calls
and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -
- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE
Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of
providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a
provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
70

renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house
providers, are eligible to be accredited providers.
Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the
MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the
form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate
approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All
approved accredited providers shall agree to the
following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at
the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include
the member on the official record of
attendance only if the members signature
was obtained at the time of attendance at the
activity. The official record of attendance
shall contain the members name and
number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall
identify the time, date, location, subject
matter, and length of the education activity.
A copy of such record shall be furnished the
MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which
______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as
appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to
all participants identifying the time, date,
location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of
all approved continuing legal education activity
by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the
IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the
Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of
monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional
materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each topic and identity of the
71
instructors. The provider shall make available to
each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity
Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed
Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period
of not less than one (1) year after the activity,
copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an
unauthorized activity under this program or
issues a spurious certificate in violation of these
Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of
provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider
may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if
the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements
of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education
activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. --
the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9
may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE
Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for
approval of an education activity or accreditation as a
provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as
provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall
secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall
complete the card by attesting under oath that he has
complied with the education requirement or that he is
exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee
not later than the day after the end of the members
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -
- Each member shall maintain sufficient record of
compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record required to be provided to the
members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9
should be a sufficient record of attendance at a
71

participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity
shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in
Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The
following shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education
requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance
or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of
compliance (including evidence of exempt
status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement
and furnish evidence of such compliance
within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-
compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the
prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any
of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to
attain compliance. -Members failing to comply will receive
a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency
and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or
otherwise showing compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall contain the following language near the
beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS
FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE
LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND
SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-
Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the
adequate number of credit units for compliance.
Credit units earned during this period may only be
counted toward compliance with the prior
compliance period requirement unless units in
72
excess of the requirement are earned, in which
case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who,
for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of
the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member
who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty
(60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed
as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as
a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership
fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a
member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent
member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a
delinquent member shall be terminated when the member
provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement,
including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may
attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement
for the period of non-compliance during the period the
member is on inactive status. These credit units may not
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to
satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an
administrative process. The termination of listing as a
delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall
be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY
CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee
shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4)
72

members respectively nominated by the IBP, the
Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by
the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven
probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall
receive such compensation as may be determined by the
Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee
shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as
may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of
Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to
approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee
shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its
competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar
admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the
specific case, public interest, the integrity of the
profession and the welfare of the recreant who had
purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August
3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had
repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute
resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer.
It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to
issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led
to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set
forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice
Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors,
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
73
the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and
other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual
budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the
Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a
subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE
Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of
September 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended
on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On
January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which.
reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including
a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal
of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the
Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case
was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
73

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP
Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court
the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-
payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in
the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be
a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised
on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition
for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration
of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and
is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous.
From the time the decision was rendered, there were
various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement
starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August
19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his
adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the
Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he
continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical
concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require
great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be
said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were
quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there
was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and
74
sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of
disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to
this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and
circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the
state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise
spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him
for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished.
For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times
unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement
could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October
23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance
on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal
profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues
were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two
years had elapsed during which he war. barred from
exercising his profession was likewise taken into account.
It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent
power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting
to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there
is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership.
What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in
the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss
of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic
move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and
after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition
on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence,
our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A.
Edillon.
Footnotes: 2 The minute resolution reads in full:- "Acting on the
petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to the Roll of
Attorneys and it appearing that he had fully paid his delinquant
membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a verified application
for reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide by all By-
laws and resolutions by said Board in the event of reinstatement,
the Court Resolved to GRANT the petition of Mr. Marcial A.
Edillon for as member of the Philippine Bar. He is hereby allowed
to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
after payment of the required fees. This resolution is without
prejudice to is an extended opinion.
74

Hueysuwan vs. Florido, A.C. No. 5624
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the
disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido
and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for
allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-
Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they
are estranged and living separately from each other. They
have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years
old both of whom are in complainants custody.
Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her
marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to
the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending
before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon.
Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001,
respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay
City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of
their two minor children be surrendered to him. He
showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child
custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter
informed her that he had not received any motion for
temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy
of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then
examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of
their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while
complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning
Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by
armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she
surrender to him the custody of their children. He
75
threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of
his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the
assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station
where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully.
At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents
of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate
courts resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with
respondent for one night on condition that he would not
take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was
entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police
Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco,
among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002,
complainant received information that a van arrived at the
hotel where respondent and the children were staying to
take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the
hotel and took the children to another room, where they
stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the
basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the
meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the
Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18,
2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of
their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on
January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint
alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of
Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the
privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter
was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years with a warning
that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
75

recommendation of the Commission with the modification
that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the
respondent can be held administratively liable for his
reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims
that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic.
This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case
No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the
assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the
spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated
in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.
The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.
The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a
clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the
truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood;
nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument
of an opposing counsel, or the text
of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision
76
already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should
be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether
written or oral should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. [10] By
calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree
with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of
law. However, we find that the period of six years is too
harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period
of two years, which we deem commensurate to the
offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar
and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
76

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. CA, GR No. 123698
[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE
SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court
assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24,
1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs
eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in
this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of
previously settled issues which have already attained
finality. We now write finis to this controversy which has
dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in
Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:[1]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence,
courts must guard themselves against any scheme to
bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put
an end to controversies, they should frown upon any
attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private
respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin
filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of
title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered
judgment,[2] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
77
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942
null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without
pronouncement as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed [3] by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989
on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in
G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said
dismissal became final on March 5, 1992.[4]
The RTC decision, having become final and
executory, private respondents moved for execution
which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ
of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed
by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the
jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware
of the suit between private respondents and Central
Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot
having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it
was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private
respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August
18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was
binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of
defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition
for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition,
excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no
compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation,
defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound
by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued
for or against the original party or the transferor and still
be binding on the transferee[5]
77

The motion for reconsideration was also denied by
the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. [6]
On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. [7] Upon
finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of
Judgment dated October 21, 1993.[8]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion
for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the
trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a
reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially
granted[9] on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge
Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered on
December 19, 1994[10] by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.,
who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of
execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment,
petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for
certiorari[11] with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the
judgment cannot be executed against it because it was
not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of
the trial court in said case never
mandatedCentral Dyeing to deliver possession of the
property to the private respondents; that certain facts and
circumstances which occurred after the finality of the
judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal
and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of
execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents title is being
questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court
rendered judgment[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari
on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case
No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled,
thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the
respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had
long become final and executory. The respondent court's
writs of execution and possession could have been
implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal
maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x
x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop
the execution of a final judgment by raising issues
which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in
its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To
Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of
petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although
prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final
judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is
obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the
78
assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner
Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein
private respondents, the instant petition has already
become moot and academic as the property in
question was already turned over by the Deputy
Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution
and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully,
putting the legal battle of this case to rest."
(Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
on January 30, 1996.[13]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention
reiterating in essence the same line of arguments
espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of
Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions
with respect to any matter related to the controversy
litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order
it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to
surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in
dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the
case between private respondents and Central Dyeing,
has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation,
defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound
by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued
for or against the original party or the transferor and still
be binding on the transferee.[14]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21,
1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the
same issue here.
Further, petitioners contention that a determination
of the issue of possession should first be resolved before
the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the
land in question is the necessary and logical effect or
78

consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297
declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property. As correctly argued by the private respondents,
they do not have to institute another action for the purpose
of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in
Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of
the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the
pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against private respondents for nullification of
22 titles which include the title to the subject property.
Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case
provides a reasonable justification why execution of the
aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the
subject property should be permanently stayed or at least
held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for
annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This
is so because the petitioners title which originated from
Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled
in the judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility,
the trial court will nullify the said private respondents title
in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No.
205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the
subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted
merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be
disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution
of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A
perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the
execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said
burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial
court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how
their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated
February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L.
Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not
completely without recourse or remedy because they
can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor
of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and
Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay
impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in
possession of the subject property, due to defendant-
petitioners' arguments that the same have already been
sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for
79
the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-
respondents for payment in cash of the property subject
of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration
since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots." [15]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following
directive was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give
access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs,
they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the
fence so that they can have access to the property. But
as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could
be made by the defendant with the former owner so that
cash payment or cash settlement be made." [16]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero,
in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following
limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large
areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so
many persons who now have buried their beloved ones
in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is
therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break open
order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to
the parcel of land in question where the factory of the
defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the
peace of the resting souls over the graves spread over
the parcels of land within the said memorial park."[17]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen
that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has
been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered
moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned
Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and
the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994
have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown
by the Sheriffs Return,[18] dated March 31, 1995, with the
attached Turn Over Premises[19]indicating therein that
private respondents took possession of the subject
property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the
execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to
the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime
that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the
disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time
this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have
already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This
is a mockery of justice.
79

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers
of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.[20] In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al.,[21] we
ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
In Re: Almacen, GR No. L-27654
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein
asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client
by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own
phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused
to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath
that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules
the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then
vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that
80
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only
add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when
a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed
to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.
They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not
deserve the attention of the courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of
Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-
law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of
the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26,
1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed
to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut
justice," Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law
practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
80

xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive
to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed
of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the
issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty.
Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so
serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The
trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5,
1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify
the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service,"
the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did
serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached
the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the
trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966,
had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and
appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's
decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
81
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed
the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated
March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed,
and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that
the motion for reconsideration dated July
5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on
appeal) does not contain a notice of time
and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper
(Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging
that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of
the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs.
Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court
on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the
motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed
by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some
important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution
of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states
that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary
to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction
between this case and that of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co.
81

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza,
the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was much
earlier than the date of promulgation of
the decision in the Manila Surety Case,
which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed
upon the issue sub silencio presumably
because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962, one
of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter
in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari.
We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and for
extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a
pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with
the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this
Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is
as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September
28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came
from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so
that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested "that he has no pending petition in
connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that
this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since
his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the
negative act."
82
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a
member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in
the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to
give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing."
This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty.
Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his
reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall
be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision."
To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is
"the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to
be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an
open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a
written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to
hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for
his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation
and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of
lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant
sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from
the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
—
"Do not judge, that you
may not be judged. For
with what judgment you
judge, you shall be
judged, and with what
measure you measure, it
shall be measured to
you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the
beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye";
and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye?
Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou
wilt see clearly to cast
out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
82

"Therefore all that you
wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of
disavowing the statements mentioned in
his petition. On the contrary, he refirms
the truth of what he stated, compatible
with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court. But he vigorously DENY
under oath that the underscored
statements contained in the CHARGE
are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that
they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his
statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but
mainly motivated with the highest interest
of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown
callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on
this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications,
words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility.
That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to
tell the members of the Court that
83
notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished,
this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts
he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our
pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to
justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that
your respondent is given the opportunity
to face you, he reiterates the same
statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir.
Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said:
— "the story is current, though nebulous
,is to its truth, it is still being circulated
that justice in the Philippines today is not
what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly
and brutally that justice is a commodity, a
marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER.
We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not
the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity.
We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until
this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution
has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to
claim his God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have
attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is
impliedly shared by our President. ... .
83

xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very
things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may
dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed
in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free
from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering
that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated
so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize
in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added
only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our
cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for justice;
dumb in the sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to
give us reasons why our appeal has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or
given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith
and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-
imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court
but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this
84
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold
the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff
which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to
this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for
review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by
minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with
it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the
reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very
careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many
weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only
to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial.
Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court
are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged
at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but
fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court
has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a
full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us
by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court,
as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court
has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L.
ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie
denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to
the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has
been suggested from time to time that the
Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits.
For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
84

petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases.
The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated
its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short
resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within
the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has —
as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court
is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over
the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing
party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
85
Review of Court of Appeals' decision
discretionary.—A review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found,
upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly
considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the
law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched
by this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far
back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule
was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity
vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is
prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26),
which provides that such notice shall
state the time, and place of hearing and
shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of
the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such
85

notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb.
28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa
v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866;
and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the
movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects,
to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period
within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the
remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and,
in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took
the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous
and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know
that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not
only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is
not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then
the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions,"
said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public
property, and the press and the people have the
undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction
to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
86
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is
the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those
who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer
who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and
officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose
the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like
the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as
an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in
assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions
of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the
bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts.
(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part
of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written
for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all
to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill
v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep.
641:
No class of the community ought to be
allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that
86

an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty
to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for
a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar
have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less
likely to abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright
bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law
v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles
of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty
to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places
upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting
and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself
"with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of
Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
87
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys
impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain
at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
— even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not
be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think
highly of his intellectual endowment That
is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack
of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he
may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June
26, 1967)
87

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney
in private conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct
in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that
"any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic
theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and
criticisms which do not exceed the
bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of public
confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of
the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and
of being subject to the control of a group of city officials.
As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice
is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that
it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused,
as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire
on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time
was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his
88
judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money."
Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of
authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by
the attorney capable of correct reasoning
of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95
Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we
do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by
an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer,
could be so vile and of
such a nature as to
justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an
attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege
of practicing law the strictest observance
at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the
public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and
the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E.
734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the
decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit
against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v.
Petersen is cleared up so that my name
is protected from the libel, lies, and
perjury committed in the cases involved,
I shall be compelled to resort to such
88

drastic action as the law allows and the
case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not
intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged,"
and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just
criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-
up in the Sunday papers, was intended
and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the
courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court.
The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and
was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The
Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed,
would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was
made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar
the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
89
decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair
and honest comment and criticism. It is
only when an attorney transcends the
limits of legitimate criticism that he will be
held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand
that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111
Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate
court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the
Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that
the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what
he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper
motives. Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power
to remove judicial officers for any conduct
or act of a judicial officer that tends to
show a violation of his duties, or would
justify an inference that he is false to his
trust, or has improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the
inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when
the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised,
tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in
89

the administration of justice; and when
such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement:
I accepted the decision in this case,
however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that,
as my clients were foreigners, it might
have been expecting too much to look for
a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only
transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by
insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who is
under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747,
an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members to
try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for
a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent
for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to
members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the
law itself, as well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...
The right of free speech and free
discussion as to judicial determination is
of prime importance under our system
90
and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying
this right of free speech to any individual.
But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are
sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where
justice is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their client
or the public good by designedly
misstating facts or carelessly asserting
the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is
none the less impaired by a polluted
water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar
of the confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of whose rights
he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct
on the part of the members of the bar the
law itself demands retribution — not the
court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac.
440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
"criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt
deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the
erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215,
the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated
than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter
to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the
said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to
one who has no better right to it than the
90

burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got
no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a
proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the
faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds
of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other person,
can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify
every right-minded citizen of the state to
read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the
suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its
opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the
accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other
justices of this court; and the insult was
so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him
and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney
and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten
the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have
any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his
position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent,
addressed secretly to the judge alone, he
can have no redress in any action triable
91
by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in
the accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every
way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced.
To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court.
When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official
acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to
be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal
insult for like cause by written or spoken
words addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home or elsewhere.
Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. It
was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in
that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise
rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a
91

commissioner of the court, for his rulings
in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant
restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge
to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
regard of the people by tame submission
to the indignity, or else set in his own
person the evil example of punishing the
insult by taking the law in his own hands?
... No high-minded, manly man would
hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this,
addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice,
is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin
(City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared
that the accused attorney had addressed
a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated,
in reference to his decision: "It is not law;
neither is it common sense. The result is
I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not
a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the
court, "counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the heads
of judges, to charge them with ignorance,
with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will
not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the
lot of a judge will be anything but a happy
one, and the administration of justice will
fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at
92
bar. The accused, an attorney at law,
wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge
in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held
that the attorney was rightly disbarred in
having "willfully failed to maintain respect
due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer,
and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same
principle, and in support of its application
to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.)
364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2
Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo
237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep.
351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl.
134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl.
481.
Our conclusion is that the charges
against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court
affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a
judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that
had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an
attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There,
the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the
judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his
general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect
for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute
with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period
of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross
92

moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the
bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute
grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian
of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers
in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases
of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to
attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances
may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel
branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of
the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney,
in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of
the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its
opinion, the statements made disclosed
93
... an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court
is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked
and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the
author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril
to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times
of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that
one of the first measures he would introduce in then
forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object
the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith
and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written
statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent
does not merely criticize or comment on
the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition
of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with
the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and
thus embarrass or obstruct the
93

administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court
has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing
that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently
to lower ,or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon,
and if the people lose their confidence in
the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is
under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the
courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
94
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly
fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language
(heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into
which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law
on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently inept
that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error
and continuously repeated that error to
the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the
line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of
this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect.
Those statements detract much from the
dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of
the members — and some former
members of this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a
tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled
as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in
other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the
aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So
that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
94

mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court
mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the
thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that
the remarks for which he is now called upon to account
were made only after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has
terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this
was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for
a modification thereof, however, came when, in People
vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-
adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which
asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted
in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the
said examinations had been resolved and the case
closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by
publication even after a case has been terminated. Said
Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which
tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the
all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them
into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second,
the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be
95
protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment in
his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much
be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not
he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as
it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the
noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved
himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to
the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who
are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record,
and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a
declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject
to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in
this state that power is vested in this
court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to
exclude them from practice. 23
95

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of
law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the
court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public
and of the courts, it becomes, not only the
right, but the duty, of the court which
made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted
to the bar and exercises his functions as
an attorney, not as a matter of right, but
as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or
suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express
mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of
course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands
in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition
bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also
deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually
makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices"
and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its
members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to
his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the
papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
96
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public
attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely
negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the
truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the
exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and
the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity
in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy,
and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court
are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled
up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not —
and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
96

allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as
a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against
the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate
and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties,
nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should
the administration of justice be threatened by the retention
in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of
law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not
and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that they., acting
as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end,
the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of
the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for
his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court,
these may range from mere suspension to total removal
or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
97
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment
should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not
perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some
future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and
that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room
for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor
leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants
us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person
from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the
fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine
for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
97

Wicker vs. Arcangel, GR No. 112869
[G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]
KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.
ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders
dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of
direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the
Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS
Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain
deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly
fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS
Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant
Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048,
was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers
counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking
the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration
of the case.[1] The motion alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over,
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver
the three (3) successive postponements for the
presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios
Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually,
she was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full
grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one
hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported
to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known
that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear
while other counsels were present;
98
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding
Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty.
Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council,
against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative
Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and
integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for
plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case
to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His
Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts
the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he
should immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be malicious,
derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered
both counsel and client to appear before him on
November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should
not be cited for contempt of court.[2]
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment
to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against
Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos
claimed that the allegations in the motion did not
necessarily express his views because he merely signed
the motion in a representative capacity, in other words,
just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him
that a young man possibly employed by the Court had
advised him to have the case reraffled, when the opposing
counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both
failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was
an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may
be and when he would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet
increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge
as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs.
Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other
counsels were present.[3]
Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory,
respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993,
held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to
suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order
of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent
judge directed petitioners to appear before him
98

on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their
sentence.
In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them
for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his
case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt.
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he
took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court
and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was
personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos and/or
his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed
his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding
sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all male
personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly
Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the
alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the
motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he
in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his
order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to
avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after
holding petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated
December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case
No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just
lawyering and acting as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his
client is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the
court are more important than those which he owes to his
client; and that by tendering their profuse apologies in
their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993
order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their
accusations against him; and that the petitioners have
taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil
Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition
dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be
reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in
their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed
with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked
that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the
case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge,
petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of
the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge
himself that they filed the petition with the Court
Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the
case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct
contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted
to the court or judge in which the proceedings are
pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another
case. The former has been held to be equivalent to
99
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the
same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of
Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in
case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor
may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard
by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt,
the respondent may be summarily adjudged in
contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect
contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct
contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs
and MeTCs are appealable.[7]
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for
respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if
petitioners are right about the nature of the case against
them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they
have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a
hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is
important to determine now is whether respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners
liable for direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the
power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail.[8] The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of
merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. [9]
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based
on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A
reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this
case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the
Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station
and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS
Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor
was not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding
Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty.
Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council,
against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative
Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;
99

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge
was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty.
Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge
owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which
necessitated easing out the former judge to make room
for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and
honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted
criticism of the administration of justice in this
country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well
connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of
Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court,
by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in
the interest of an efficient administration of justice and
pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.[10] This
is a matter of record which could have easily been verified
by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he deliberated for
two months whether or not to file the offending motion for
inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims
he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client
of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just
lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the
allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he
prepared and filed were false since it was his client who
verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty.
Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young
man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that
it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who
the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not
show up in court on the same days the new judge failed
to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other
allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been
personally recruited by the opposing counsel to replace
Judge Capulong who had been eased out were Atty.
Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating
his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility
for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just
an instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were
bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he
could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be
excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based
on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as
his client.
Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that
of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins him to observe and maintain the respect due to
100
the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar
conduct by others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have materiality to
the case.[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded
to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he
would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence,
petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their
instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former
station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where
more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike
in Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on the
judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in petitioners
motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good
faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v.
Masaquel:[14]
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and
even members of the Supreme Court, were asked to
inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants
punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which
they based their motions for disqualification are not
among those provided in the rules. It is only when there
was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn
insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious,
arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that
movants were held in contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies
to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent
with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle
we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In
the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason
for doing so considering that the particularly offending
allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to
have come from him but were additions made by Atty.
Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and
in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge
Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been
the recipient of such a remark although he could not point
a court employee who was the source of the same. At
least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the
source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy
Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of
the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon
petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a
judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati,
where complex cases are being filed. In response to this,
100

he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding
City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and
1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of
the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a
motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt,
the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt,
removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial
court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to
resist the conclusion, considering the background of this
occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-
Nunez vs. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054
[A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]
SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO,
Attorney-in-Fact for
Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO
RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April
1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian represented by
her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the
ground of grave misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant,
it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in
Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent
10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent
succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainants
repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the
proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file
against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of
money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was
declared in default and complainant was required to
present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993,
the court rendered its decision (Annex C of the Complaint)
ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum
of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at
the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the
101
day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting
standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not
indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the
authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the
Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed
should be increased to P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is
MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment
for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00
to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay
the costs of suit.
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision
to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within
the reglementary period despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case
No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995.
The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued
(Annex B of Complaint). It appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made,
leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the
latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn
against his account in China Banking Corporation,
Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were
dishonored because the account against which they were
drawn was closed (Annexes D and E of Complaint).
Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on
deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Annexes F, G, H
and I of the Complaint).
In the Joint Affidavit of respondent and his wife filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City,
respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four
postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly
believing in good faith that said checks had already been
encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his
checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi
City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not
notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been
101

notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.
We required respondent to comment on the
complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action
on his three motions for extension of time to file the
comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to
file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in
contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal
motions for extension of time to submit the comment
smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a
member of the bar and a law dean.
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the
motion for contempt; considered respondent to have
waived the filing of a comment; and referred this case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety days
from notice of the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12
September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no
intention to honor the money judgment against him in Civil
Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1)
issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account
against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued
failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then
recommends that respondent be declared guilty of
misconduct in his dealings with complainant and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year
and pay the amount of the checks issued to the
complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October
2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and
adopted Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo
Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents
grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive
at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely
abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him
and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the
proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable
bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for
the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the
process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then,
despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint
resulting in his having been declared in default, he
appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not
pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of
the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully
102
belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already
unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent
issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But,
remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in
continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay
complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the
account against which the checks were drawn. There was
deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of
paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay
the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross
misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his
account because he thought complainant has already
encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was
closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there
were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15
March 1996 which could not be encashed before their
maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort,
283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622
[2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of
the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694
[2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in
satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt
to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of
judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court,
was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the
courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the
temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We
granted his three motions for extension of time to file his
comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did
he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother
to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution
declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment.
To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly
showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to
willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem
Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-
102

Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June
2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated
Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide
that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
should not let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.
The penalty of suspension for at least one (1) year
imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both
vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be
indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the
circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is
plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate
violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
Santiago vs. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252
THIRD DIVISION
JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252
Complainant, Present: Panganiban, J., Chairman,
- versus –
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales,* JJ
Promulgated:
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004
x -- -- -- -- ------ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care
in the performance of their duties, which are impressed
with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully
with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial
Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate
sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance
thereof.
__________________
* On leave.
103
12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and
dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant,
respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver
penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent
Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to
pay complainant Soledad Nuez the amount of P13,800
within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies
thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to respondents personal record; the
Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the
Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also
furnish all lower courts with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar
Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison
V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged
Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of
the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and
1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint,
Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed
and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants;
b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and c)
make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the
documents he had notarized, all in
103

violation of the notarial provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged
that Respondent executed an Affidavit in
favor of his client and offered the same
as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain
date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant
after the hearing and after confronting the
latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and
veiled threats.[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001
Order of the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to
the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified
Complaint. He believed, however, that the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the
Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence
certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related
to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits,
which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did
not have to indicate the residence certificates of the
affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -
- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the
affiants residence certificates on the documents they
notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for
these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the
certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that
as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or
not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was
complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said
noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor
conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the
CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases
where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
104
justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with
attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they
were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his
testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who
had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing
of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4,
2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5,
2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his
clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and
the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had
assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been
initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because
he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos
in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and
the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD,
through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the
parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and
time of the hearing, only complainant
appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently
because he had received the Notice only on June 8,
2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed
his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The
latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13,
2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-
Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it
granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001,
issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which
the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on
September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation
104

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-
172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating
Commissioners Report that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution
of a certification, the entry of such certification in the
notarial register, and the indication of the affiants
residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found
his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified,
however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating
commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a
warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt
with a heavier penalty.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03,
12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and
duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that
the party to every document acknowledged before them
has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; and to give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a
number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to
state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on
which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these
duties would result in the revocation of their commission
as notaries public.[23]
105
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
simply neglected, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents. Notaries public entering into their
commissions are presumed to be aware of these
elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court
explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:
The importance attached to the
act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take
for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the
notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are
impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and
respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations
of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number
and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that
noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory
for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts
and government agencies. He points to similar practices
of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his
claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with
these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no
105

qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable
that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure
allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by
the bad example of others is not an acceptable
justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to
the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo,
as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal
Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by
complainants brother against the aforementioned
clients. These documents became the basis of the
present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating
commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as
notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to
certify that he has personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so
with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-
Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants --
he was not required to comply with the certification
requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles.Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver
responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old
practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their
failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case,
the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear
ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary
public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants
plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
106
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the
infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for
executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by
respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of
the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer
shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client,
except:
a) on formal matters,
such as the mailing,
authentication or
custody of an
instrument and the like;
b)on substantial
matters, in cases where
his testimony is
essential to the ends of
justice, in which event
he must, during his
testimony, entrust the
trial of the case to
another counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not
disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication
arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty
posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their
relation to their clients as witnesses from that as
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as
they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are
partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of
competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
106

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity
of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the
lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible
reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the
lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to
be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it
with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer
becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers
from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a
cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying
as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should
they do so, to withdraw from active management of the
case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the
Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients,
we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert
every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for
the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in
which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the
fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full
opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are
entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may
arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that
if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused,
respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to
spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and
honorable means -- every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his
clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was
clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of
the incident, his clients were at his residence and could
not have possibly committed the crime charged against
them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not
107
dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the
falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08
contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit
was submitted during the preliminary investigation which,
as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of
the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the
oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions;
protecting them from open and public accusations of
crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety
of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is advisedly
called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and
remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment
in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe
that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony
may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the
canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed
complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled
threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never
equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated
with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of
complainant but the version of respondent that is more
credible, considering that the latters allegations are
corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000
with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
107

Lantoria vs. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769
A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L.
Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent
Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the
ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of
"graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in
connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos.
81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of
Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal
Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was
the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M.
Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant
Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that
the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to
eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These
cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of
which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the
same time the regular judge of the municipal court of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the
mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in
default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of
the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a
letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which
reads as follows:
Butuan City
23 April 1974
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
108
Upon informing him of your willingness to
prepare the corresponding judgements
(sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he
has no objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said
decisions in due time thru me to be
delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to
time for any future development.
My best regards to you
and family and to Mrs.
Constancia Mascarinas
and all.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA
Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the
complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this
wise:
June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best
to respond to the call in your several
letters received, which is about the
preparation of the three (3) Decisions
awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is
that I have been too much occupied with
my cases and other professional
commitments here in Manila and nearby
provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I
would say that I am so sorry but also to
you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been
reminding me but I always find myself at
a loss to prepare these Decisions at an
early date sa (sic) possible. So also with
my calendar as to the dates for the next
hearing of the remaining cases over
there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the
three (3) Decisions against the (3)
108

defaulted defendants. I am not sure if
they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to
sign them at once. However, it is my
request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind
mediation, that if the preparation of these
Decisions do not suit his consideration,
then I am ready and willing to accept his
suggestions or correction to charge or
modify them for the better. And to this
effect, kindly relay at once what he is
going to say or thinks if he signs them
readily and please request for each copy
for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for
your kind assistance in attending to our
cases there. Regards to you and family
and prayer for your more vigor and
success.
Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI 6
Counsel
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier
letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the
contents of which read as follows:
928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly
personal and confidential. Inside the
envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C.
Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders,
which he told me to prepare and he is
going to sign them. If you please, deliver
the envelope to him as if you have no
knowledge and information and that you
have not opened it. Unless, of course, if
the information comes from him. But, you
can inquire from him if there is a need to
wait from his words about them, or copies
to be furnished me, after he signs them,
it could be made thru you personally, to
expedite receiving those copies for our
hold. According to him, this envelope
could be delivered to him at his residence
at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City,
during week end. or, at Bayugan if you
109
happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan
City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and
favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) L. BUNYI 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant
filed with this Court the present administrative case
against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the
above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April
and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that
respondent won the said three (3) cases because to
(respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the
decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by
respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action
against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a
motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint,
admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but
explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of
June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and
speaks for itself, that if ever the same
was written by the Respondent, it was
due to the insistence of the Complainant
thru his several letters received, that the
decisions in question be drafted or
prepared for Judge Galicia, who
considered such preparation as a big
help to him, because he was at that time
holding two (2) salas — one as being the
regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and
the other, as the acting Judge of
Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with
many pending cases and it was to the
benefit of the Complainant that the early
disposition of the cases involved would
not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the
intention to draft or prepare the decisions
in question was never spawned by the
Respondent. Instead, it came from the
under-standing between the Judge and
the complainant who, from his several
letters, had demonstrated so much
interest to eject at once the squatters
from the farm he was entrusted to
manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's
conclusion that the said decisions
109

were lutong macao is purely non-sense
as it is without any factual or legal basis.
He himself knew that Judge Galicia
asked for help in the drafting of said
decisions as at any rate they were
judgments by default, the defendants lost
their standing in court when they were
declared in default for failure to file their
answers and to appear at the place and
time set for hearing thereof (See first
paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the
decisions as prepared were in the form of
drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned
subject to suggestion or correction to
change or modify for the better by Judge
Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter,
Responding (sic) even apologized for the
delay in sending the same to the
Complainant and expressed his gratitude
for his assistance in attending to the
cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the
Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with
the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set
for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18,
1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent
Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979,
both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the
same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following
development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of
complainant dated January 16, 1979
sworn to before the investigating
Solicitor, praying that the complaint be
considered withdrawn, dropped or
dismissed on the ground that
complainant "could hardly substantiate"
his charges and that he is "no longer
interested to prosecute" the same. For
his part, respondent manifested that he
has no objection to the withdrawal of the
complaint against him. At the same time,
he presented complainant Lantoria as a
witness are elicited testimony to the
effect that complainant no longer has in
his possession the original of the letters
attached to his basic complaint, and
hence, he was not prepared to prove his
charges. 10(emphasis supplied)
110
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as
follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4,
March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant,
showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of
the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the
Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he
submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant;
b) that those letters indicated that respondent had
previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding
the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of
complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of
said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the
complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as
respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the
Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the
decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the
existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that
respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary
and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence
judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the
corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor
General, respondent manifested that in the future he
would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer,
and in upholding the provisions of the canons of
professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the
hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until
further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in
the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and
he requested that the next hearing be not set until after
six (6) months when be expected to return from the United
States of America where he would visit his children and at
the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing
in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General
appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum
on 16 November 1981. In said
memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he
prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he
did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to
influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft
decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for
all the improprieties which may have resulted from his
preparation of the draft decisions.
110

We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General
that the determination of the merits of the instant case
should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal
of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself
having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and
that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for
whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as
a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the
letters upon which the present administrative complaint is
based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of
the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action,
deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had
previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81,
83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although
nothing in the records would show that respondent got the
trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a
favor or consideration, the acts of respondent
nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which
provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence
on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality
on the part of a lawyer to a judge,
uncalled for by the personal relations of
the parties, subject both the judge and
the lawyer to misconstructions of motive
111
and should be avoided. A lawyer should
not communicate or argue privately with
the judge as to the merits of a pending
cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to
gain from a judge special personal
consideration or favor. A self-respecting
independence in the discharge of
professional duty, without denial or
diminution of the courtesy and respect
due the judge's station, is the only proper
foundation for cordial personal and
official relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a
lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon
the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence,
or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality to,
nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical
practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision
be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the
Court Administrator is directed to inform the different
courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
111

Santiago vs. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q.
HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and
TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants,
former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses
which may be discovered during the actual investigation
of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of
Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates
[sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No.
CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our
surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid
Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case
reveals the serious misconduct of our
attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas
tantamount to malpractice and
negligence in the performance of his duty
obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney
without informing us the reason why and
riding high on the trust and confidence we
repose on him either abandoned, failed
to act accordingly, or seriously neglected
to answer the civil complaint against us in
the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong
Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila
so that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas
assured us that everything was in order.
That he had already answered the
complaint so that in spite of the incessant
demand for him to give us a copy he
continued to deny same to us. Only to
disclose later that he never answered it
after all because according to him he was
a very busy man. Please refer to Court of
Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's
neglect and malpractice of law we lost the
Judge Capulong case and our appeal to
the Court of Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and
112
disbarred in the practice of his
profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in
failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of
a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-
V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because
it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from
the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA)
which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-
OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in
the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake
but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the
decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union
(FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He
further claims that the complainants filed this case to
harass him because he refused to share his attorney's
fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint
for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer
was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's
Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to
inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In
their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros,
Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from
the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his
expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter
Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion
and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate
Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution
was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
112

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, a complaint against the complainants herein for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since
what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by
the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong,
granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case,
and required the complainants herein to file their answer
within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion
having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court
of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did
not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-
V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was
authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order
of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence
before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff
Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective
damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of
suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent,
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which,
however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the
said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for
the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
113
The core issue that presents itself is whether the
respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for
which reason the latter were declared in default and
judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the
plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline
employment,1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.2 He must serve the client with
competence and diligence,3 and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied.5 This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure
to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the
Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he]
instead, thru honest mistake and
excusable neglect, filed a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R.
No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition,
he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer
"[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to
file an answer was not an honest mistake but was
"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the
113

legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as
admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of
default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and
pressure of legal work."9 In short, the complainants want
to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given
inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for
reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by
impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large
volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment
in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question
the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and
"volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two
distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first
presupposes the respondent's full and continuing
awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the
trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse
of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous
order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying
the motion to reconsider the said order. The second
ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his
other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact
remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty
to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that
the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of
discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that
he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial
court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his
motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had
a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the
judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the
errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order
of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no
excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
114
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which
provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim
that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause"
for the complainants since the claims therein for damages
were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from
the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was
so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he
should have seasonably informed the complainants
thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall
give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the client's
case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense,
we are unable to understand why he took all the
trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction
and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon
initially with this Court and then with the Court of
Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these
to simply delay the disposition of the civil case.
Finally, the complainants were not entirely
without any valid or justifiable defense. They
could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all
the damages sought by him or that if he were so,
they could ask for a reduction of the amounts
thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is
not free from any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby
REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
114