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 Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6 (2017) 22–26

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jarmac

Radical Cognitivism? Distinguishing Behavior from Thought夽

Colin M. MacLeod ∗ and Evan F. Risko

University of Waterloo, Canada

Keywords: Functional explanation, Cognitive explanation, Applied psychology

De Houwer, Hughes, and Barnes-Holmes offer up what
appears to be a simple recommendation for the field: that
we should distinguish—and even separate—our descriptions
of the phenomena that we investigate from our theoretical
accounts of those phenomena. They characterize this as a distinc-
tion between functional explanation and cognitive explanation,
respectively. And they maintain that more assiduous applica-
tion of this distinction would be of value not only for basic
research but also for applied research, the focus of this arti-
cle. In this commentary, we consider several aspects of this
proposal, including its emphasis on the stimulus-environment-
response level of description, the implications for the labeling of
phenomena, the rationale for separating description from expla-
nation, and the potential consequences for the application to
basic research. On some of these, we find ourselves in agree-
ment; on others, we respectfully disagree.
The Functional Level of Explanation
De Houwer et al. (p. 2) hold that “Within the functional level
of explanation, behavior is explained in terms of the (current or
past) environment and the way organisms interact with the envi-
ronment.” This echoes an earlier characterization by De Houwer
(2011, p. 204), that “A cornerstone of the functional approach
in psychology is the practice of defining behavioral effects
exclusively in terms of elements in the environment.” Interest-
ingly, there is also a more distant echo: “The psychology which
I should attempt to build up would take as a starting point, first,
the observable fact that organisms, man and animal alike, do
adjust themselves to their environment” (Watson, 1913/1994, p.
250). In this sense, the functional approach that De Houwer et al.
champion is more aligned with behaviorism than with classical
functionalism. As Watson (p. 25) puts it “behaviorism is the
only consistent and logical functionalism.” In contrast, classical
functionalism was a reaction to structuralism, which defined
the proper domain of psychology as the study of consciousness
and the mental structures that composed conscious experience,
and which rested heavily on the method of introspection
(Titchener, 1929, p. 43). Functionalism sought to discard the
method—introspection—and instead emphasized dynamic (and
physiological) adaptation to the environment for both behavior
and “mental life,” but still held the study of consciousness to
be central to the mission. It thus appears that the functionalism
of De Houwer et al. is more akin to the behaviorism of Watson,
keeping in mind, of course, that the cognitive level of explana-
tion is superimposed on the functional explanation. De Houwer
et al., of course, are clear on this commitment noting that the
“functional approach. . .can be linked to behaviorism, at least
certain forms of behaviorism such as radical behaviorism” (p. 1).
This commitment is important as it suggests a deeper incompat-
ibility between the functional and cognitive perspectives than is
maybe reflected in De Houwer et al.’s characterization of it as an
“illusory barrier” (p. 9). This particular issue with the functional-
cognitive approach has been cogently argued in a separate
comment on the approach (see Proctor & Urcuioli, 2016).
We are entirely in agreement with De Houwer et al. that our
first job as psychologists should be to carefully and thoroughly
analyze and describe the phenomena that we study. Indeed,
without doing so, we would argue that we would have nothing
to explain. And there is no question that it is misguided to
equate behavioral effects with mental processes in a kind of
one-to-one mapping, a point that has been made in the past
(e.g., Jacoby, 1991). It is a virtual certainty that phenomena, or
tasks, can never be process-pure: “problems interpreting task

Author Note
Preparation of this commentary was supported by discovery grants from the ∗ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Colin M.

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to each of the MacLeod, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario
authors. N2L 3G1, Canada. Contact: cmacleod@uwaterloo.ca
夽 Please note that this paper was handled by the current editorial team of

JARMAC.
 RADICAL COGNITIVISM
dissociations have arisen from equating particular processes
with particular tasks and then treating those tasks as if they
provide pure measures of those processes” (Jacoby, 1991, p.
513). It is not surprising, therefore, that a great deal of the
creativity and effort in research on cognitive phenomena is
leveled at trying to “clean up” tasks to eliminate as many
processes as possible other than the one that is the target of
primary interest. Still, we know that we never reach the “holy
grail” of isolating one and only one process. Thus, De Houwer
et al.’s reminder that we need to remain vigilant against equating
behavioral effects with mental processes is certainly welcome.
One of the two illustrations that De Houwer (2011) uses to
show why functional and cognitive levels should be separated is
the case of negative priming. Negative priming is the situation
where a target item on a current trial was an ignored item on
a prior trial (e.g., Fox, 1995; Tipper, 2001) and the result is
slowed processing on the current trial, relative to an unrepeated
control. The cost evident in the phenomenon has predominantly
been explained by inhibition—that to be ignored, the prior trial
item must have been suppressed, with that suppression carrying
over to slow the processing on the current trial. This was an
appealing and intuitive account, such that negative priming
came to be treated as a measure of inhibition: The theory
became grafted to the phenomenon. But over time, another
theory—the episodic retrieval account—gained in currency,
explaining the same cost as due to the response appropriate for
the current trial conflicting with that retrieved from the prior
trial. It was not easy for the retrieval account to gain traction
given the prevalence of the inhibition account, although the
inhibition account is probably the less-supported account now
(see MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003; Mayr &
Buchner, 2015). Not keeping the phenomenon and the theory
distinct from each other may well have hampered progress,
consistent with the argument of De Houwer et al.
The Nominal Fallacy
Philosophers refer to the nominal fallacy as the belief that
something has been explained when it has been given a name.
This, certainly, is a seductive error, one that likely is invited
by integrating the description (functional) with the explanation
(cognitive). Negative priming borders on this, with “negative”
suggesting “below-zero suppression,” but there are better
examples. A perfect illustration is the phenomenon know as
“inhibition of return,” in which, after a short delay, people are
slower to return to a recently cued item or location even though
the cue has no validity (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner, Rafal,
Choate, & Vaughan, 1985; see Lupiáñez, Klein, & Bartolomeo,
2006). Why? The longstanding answer is because when nothing
was initially found at the cued location, attention prefers not to
go back there, inhibiting the location, much as a well-adapted
bird would not return to a cache site that has already been emp-
tied. This inhibition account may eventually be proven correct,
but that is not a given and there are certainly alternative accounts
(see, e.g., Berlucchi, 2006; Martín-Arévalo, Kingstone, &
Lupiáñez, 2013). Thus, Martín-Arévalo et al. argue that instead
of “inhibition of return” the phenomenon should be referred to
23
by its (more functional) description, that is, a detection cost at
the location of the previous cue. Such a characterization leaves
potential deeper cognitive accounts more open; of course, it is
also more a description than a name. Yet, as Berlucchi laments,
the theory-driven name of the phenomenon lives on.
Carefully considering the organism–environment interaction
in the De Houwer et al. version of a functional approach would,
we believe, help to preclude naming a phenomenon using the
initial cognitive theoretical explanation for that phenomenon.
Others have made this same argument which led MacLeod et al.
(2003) to suggest that we adopt the language of cost and benefit
to avoid slipping from the outset into more cognitively loaded
terms such as inhibition and facilitation. Clearly, separate termi-
nology for phenomena and their cognitive explanations would,
as De Houwer et al. maintain, help to avoid this trap. We cer-
tainly agree that “different researchers use the same concepts at
multiple levels of explanation” (p. 9), and that this can be very
confusing and can lead subsequent researchers astray.
Separating Description from Explanation
“Defining behavioral effects in purely functional terms not
only maximizes theoretical freedom but also promotes cumu-
lative science” (De Houwer et al., p. 4). This sounds like an
unassailable truth . . . but is it? Most scientists would quickly note
that research should test theories, not just explore phenomena,
so if phenomena must take precedence, that represents a prob-
lem. We are of the view that the stringent testing of theory
should most often directly motivate empirical research. But there
must also be room for discovery, in the sense of finding a new
phenomenon and pursuing it empirically for a while until its
boundaries provide a basis for theorizing. Relatedly, there should
be room in psychological science for rich descriptions of human
behavior, particularly as it occurs in relatively natural condi-
tions (Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008; Neisser, 1978;
Risko, Richardson, & Kingstone, 2016; Tunnell, 1977). This is
not, however, coincident with simply exploring a phenomenon
for its own sake and never stopping to link its explanation to
broader theory. So yes, theoretical freedom is greater if not
pinned down from the outset, but science ultimately hinges on
the development of good theories.
There is another side to this claim, that of promoting
cumulative science, and it is here that a problem can arise. A
scientist can become too enmeshed in a phenomenon, leading
to the “what hasn’t been done yet?” mentality. Dustbowl
empiricism—collecting data for their own sake without regard
to theory—will not in the end advance science to the same
extent as theory-driven research will (although mining the same
strip repeatedly may advance a prolific scientist’s career). Too
much focus on the functional side would seem to enhance the
likelihood of this problem, as has certainly happened in the
history of psychology. An example might be the verbal learning
tradition (see Hall, 1971) that predated the modern study
of memory, wherein simply relating stimulus and response
conditions seemed like the goal in itself, but there was a serious
shortcoming in the development of understanding. We would
 RADICAL COGNITIVISM
not want to see this problem exacerbated by separation of the
functional and cognitive approaches.
On Analytic Abstractive General Functional Principles
An important contribution of the paper was the description
of and argument for the utility of what De Houwer et al. refer
to as analytic abstractive functional research. This approach
consists of attempts to discover general principles that cut across
particular environment–behavior relations (e.g., reinforcement).
In cognitive psychology, these general principles would be tied
to specific mediating mental mechanisms. But this apparently
clean distinction seemed to us to break down at times. Perhaps
the signal violation of the separation occurred for us on p. 10,
where we are told that “from a functional perspective, implicit
memory effects are behavioral effects of past events that occur
under conditions of automaticity.” Surely automaticity is not a
functional idea! In addition, we are presented with an example
of a novel contribution of such an analytic abstractive approach
on p. 5 where the Stroop effect and Simon effect are claimed
to be instances of the general functional principle of stimulus
control. The notion of “stimulus driven” (versus goal-driven),
“bottom-up” (versus top-down) control has a long history in
cognitive psychology: How are these constructs meaningfully
different? Furthermore, whereas Stroop and Simon effects
certainly share surface features, there is disagreement over
whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying them are the
same (e.g., Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Kornblum, 1994;
Simon & Berbaum, 1990).
At times, then, the specifics of the current argument for adopt-
ing an analytic abstractive functional approach escaped us. This
may be our own failing as De Houwer et al. point out after provid-
ing a description of dot-probe effects using the general functional
principle of stimulus control: “We realize that for a cognitive
researcher, this analysis is likely to be perceived as an awk-
ward redescription. . .It is awkward because it is coined in terms
unfamiliar to many cognitively-inspired researchers” (p. 8).
Although we are happy to take some of the responsibility, in
the spirit of genuinely trying to understand the proposal in front
of us, we hope that the future holds less awkward explanations.
Implications for Applied Research
The primary impetus for the De Houwer et al. article would
seem to be with respect to applied psychology, given that the
basic functional–cognitive separation argument has previously
been made elsewhere (De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, Barnes-
Holmes, & Moor, 2013; De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013). The argument here is that applied researchers
will benefit from a shared language that is functionally based.
Despite the extended discussion, we did not see how the 2 × 2
taxonomy dividing applied researchers into four types would
yield such a benefit—beyond serving as a ready reminder to be
cautious in using phenomena as mental proxies—nor did we see
how this taxonomy was beneficial in itself. One feature of this
taxonomy that did strike a chord with us was the concerns raised
about a psychological science that becomes too “effect-centric.”
24
This argument reminded us of the Alan Newell’s famous admon-
itory paper “You Can’t Play Twenty Questions with Nature and
Win. . .” and his encouragement to build more integrative, uni-
fied theories of cognition (Newell, 1973, 1994). There is wisdom
in that sentiment (see Meiser, 2011, for recent discussion). This
was not, we think, the kind of wisdom that De Houwer et al.
had in mind, but we do believe that applied psychology benefits
from the search for general principles of human cognition (and
also that the latter search can benefit from applied research).
While allowing that cognitive research can be too “effect-
centric,” it is also important to point out that there exist numerous
examples to the contrary (e.g., research on working memory
and attentional control; Engle, 2002; conflict monitoring and
cognitive control; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; executive
functions; Miyake et al., 2000; dual processing theory; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013). In addition, whereas De Houwer et al. suggest
that “there are few if any examples of [Cognitive Inspired Ana-
lytic Abstractive] research in the applied literature” (p. 6), there
are numerous examples wherein researchers have taken general
cognitive principles (rather than general functional principles)
and used them successfully in applied settings (e.g., cogni-
tive load theories in multimedia learning; Mayer & Moreno,
2003; multiple resource theory in multi-tasking environments;
Wickens, 2008). Of course, this is not to imply that such trans-
lation is always smooth and that there is no room for change in
our standard operating procedure with the goal of increasing the
likelihood that this translation is successful (e.g., taking more
seriously concerns about ecological validity; Kingstone et al.,
2008; Neisser, 1978; Risko et al., 2016).
The translation from basic research in cognition (e.g., prin-
ciples of memory function) to specific applied contexts (e.g.,
eyewitness identification) seemingly requires that research be
conducted in De Houwer et al.’s Cognitively Inspired Effect
Centric research cell. This is arguably where the authors would
locate much of the research conducted under the banner of
applied cognitive psychology (and most of the work published
in this journal). But De Houwer et al.’s take on this cell seems
primarily critical. Again they note that such research is at risk
of using behavioral effects as proxies for mental processes but
add that such research also risks failing because the cognitive
model on which it might be based might not be “up for the job.”
This latter concern, however, seems as much a problem for De
Houwer et al.’s preferred Cognitively Inspired Analytic Abstrac-
tive research as it does for the Cognitively Inspired Effect Centric
research. Furthermore, while adopting a functional-cognitive
framework might help us avoid using behavioral effects as
proxies for mental processes, it is unclear how it would help
us get the cognitive model right, arguably the deeper prob-
lem to solve. Maybe we need a more radical cognitivism rather
than radical behaviorism? All that said, it is early days for the
functional-cognitive framework and its impact remains to be
seen. We certainly welcome the effort to increment the likeli-
hood that basic research in cognition can have a positive impact
on our day-to-day lives.
With respect to the functional–cognitive separation and its
relation to applied psychology, we are reminded of one of the
most famous statements in all of psychology—Lewin’s (1951,
 RADICAL COGNITIVISM
p. 169) “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.” As
Greenwald (2012) notes, a “good” theory in the Lewinian sense
will go beyond capturing a laboratory situation, extending to the
world beyond the lab where it then can lead to worthwhile appli-
cations. Cognitive theory certainly has done that, as applications
to education illustrate (see, e.g., Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh,
Nathan, & Willingham, 2013). Moreover, as Greenwald also
points out, titling his article “There is Nothing so Theoretical as
a Good Method” in tribute to Lewin, cognitive theory has often
brought about the development of new methods. Greenwald pro-
vides the examples of the additive factors method of Sternberg
(1969) and the process dissociation method of Jacoby (1991).
Methods are presumably at the functional level, so clearly the
field has benefitted from “cross-pollination” between the two
levels.
Finally, we see the introduction of the term “psychological
engineering” as more likely to be confusing than helpful, given
the quite longstanding existence of a field called engineering
psychology, which aims to use what we know about human
behavior to inform how technology and systems are designed
and controlled. Indeed, the authors note this potential confu-
sion in a footnote themselves, foreseeing the confusion the term
would likely create. Put simply, we see nothing wrong with the
existing term, applied psychology. Furthermore the 2 × 2 taxon-
omy offered for applied psychology by De Houwer et al. seems
unabashedly cognitive and, while this resonates with our own
biases, we wonder whether applied psychologists of different
stripes might be as enthusiastic.
In Conclusion
To summarize, we agree with De Houwer et al. that the field
would profit from more clearly describing phenomena in terms
of the environmental conditions under which they occur, cou-
pled with avoiding the use of theoretical terms in the naming of
phenomena. This sort of “call” is important to make every now
and then, so that generations of researchers are aware of the pit-
falls. That said, we believe that the lion’s share of the research in
cognition already does this, possibly a legacy from our behav-
iorist roots such as the verbal learning tradition’s continuing
influence on the cognitive study of memory. As such, we were
not convinced of the need to apply the functional-cognitive dis-
tinction to all of applied psychology. On the positive side, how-
ever, we do see considerable value in papers of this sort for their
potential to make us think hard about what is important in our
discipline and to consider the meta-questions that we might oth-
erwise neglect. Debate about core principles is good for science.
Conflict of Interest Statement
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Author Contributions
Order of authorship is alphabetical; the two authors con-
tributed equally to the writing of the manuscript.
25
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Received 31 October 2016;
accepted 8 November 2016