20190604-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR Peter Kidd CJ CCV-Re - Re Pell and CONTEMPT of COURT Issues

Page 1
Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria 4-6-2019

feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au
20190604-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Peter Kidd CJ CCV-Re -Re Pell and CONTEMPT OF COURT issues
Sir,
as I refer to you I hold it appropriate to provide you with copies of my writings.
I from onset do however highlight that criticism upon the court is part of the administration of
justice.
Ambard v Att Gen for Trinidad and Tabaco (1939) AC 322 at 335
QUOTE
The basic of the right to fair comment is the Right of Freedom of speech and the
inalienable right of everyone to comment fairly upon matters of public importance.
END QUOTE
No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:

LORD ATKIN in AMBARD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL for TRINIDAD and TABAGO (1936)
A.C. 332, at 335
QUOTE
But whether the authority and position or an individual judge, or the due administration of
justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the
ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat
of justice. The path of criticism is a public way, the wrong headed are permitted to err
therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to
those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of
criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they
are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and
respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary man
END QUOTE
.
The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER “THE EVENING
NEWS” (1880) N.S.W. LR 211 AT 239.:
QUOTE
The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be
disputed. Our practice of sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions
as we do, always in the broad light of day, would be shown of some of its value if the public
opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be rigidly suppressed. We claim no
immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism.
END QUOTE
.
As to value of criticism, keeping judge subject to rules and principles of honour and justice;
p1 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
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(a) R v FOSTER (1937) St. E Qd 368
(b) Re WASEMAN (1969) N.Z.L.R. 55, 58-59
(c) Re BOROVSKI (1971) 19 D.L.R. (34) 537
(d) SOLICITOR-GENERAL v RADIO AVON LTD (1978) 1 N.Z.L.R. 225, at 230-31
.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
LEWIS v. JUDGE OGDEN [1984] HCA 28; (1984) 153 CLR 682
Contempt of Court (Vict.)

QUOTE
11. However, mere discourtesy falls well short of insulting conduct, let alone wilfully insulting
conduct which is the hallmark of contempt
END QUOTE

QUOTE
16. The appellant's address continued with three examples in which it was suggested
that the judge had intervened to diminish the effect of points sought to be made by the
appellant in his cross-examination of Crown witnesses - his Honour had described one
point as "pedantic" - and that he had attempted to rescue witnesses from
predicaments presented by their evidence. The evidence on which these criticisms of
the judge were based was not before us. Consequently we are unable to determine
whether the criticisms were well or ill-founded. (at p691)
20...namely that his Honour's attitude to Paul's case was adverse and unfair in the
sense of being "one-sided", we do not consider that the learned judge could have been
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's comments amounted to an
insult. The appellant's conduct was extremely discourteous, perhaps offensive, and
deserving of rebuke by his Honour, but in our view it could not be said to constitute
contempt.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
21. In conclusion three comments should be made.
The first is to recall that the contempt power is exercised to vindicate the integrity of the
court and of its proceedings; it is rarely, if ever, exercised to vindicate the personal dignity

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of a judge (Ex parte Fernandez (1861) 30 LJCP 321, at p 332 ; Reg. v. Castro; Skipworth's
Case (1873) LR 9 QB 219, at p 232 ; Bellanto (1962) 63 SR (NSW), at pp 200, 202 ).
The second is that the summary power of punishing for contempt should be used sparingly
and only in serious cases (Shamdasani (1945) AC, at p 270 ; Izuora v. The Queen (1953) AC
327, at p 336 ).
The final comment is that the charge of contempt should specify the nature of the contempt,
i.e., that it consists of a wilful insult to the judge, and identify the alleged insult. (at p693)
22. In the result we would allow the appeal. (at p693)
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
END QUOTE
When then I became aware from Internet publications that the Herald Sun had published a front
page stating CENSORED it to me is precisely the kind of criticism that I view fell within the
principles stated in the quotations above.
I do not know about other publications as I was not really interested in checking them out but
gained the understanding that you somehow had demanded for explanations why there should
not be a charge of CONTEMPT OF COURT.
.
As I understand it a judge is not the court but is an officer of the Court, and the Court consist of a
judicial officer sitting as a judge.
In Pervakis v Schorel-Hlavka (20122) Her Honour Gaynor claimed that the constitution didn’t
apply to her. That to me is not then a court because a court is under the provisions of the
constitution, not above it. In my view this was CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT
by Her Honour Gaynor.
In Buloke Shire Council v Schorel-Hlavka His Honour Carmody J erred in law in my view to
ignore my comprehensive set out of list of failures by the alleged Prosecutor and so blatantly
defy the orders of His Honour Mullaly J of 30 October 2016.
In my view His Honour CarmodyJ committed CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT by
failing to uphold the orders of Mullaly J
Yet despite this when I wrote to you on 29 June 2016this was also ignored.
.
But it get worse.
.
In 2017 I was requested to investigate the vicious murder of Mr Carl Williams. I contacted
Roberta Williams and she provided me with a box of documents, albeit afterwards I discovered a
lot more details were never provided to me. However, from going through the material it
appeared to me that one or more lawyers involved in the various Williams cases were in my view
properly representing their client’s interest. Moreover it didn’t make sense to me for Mr Carl
Williams to have pleaded GUILTY before Her Honour King J. From the details it appeared to
me that the murder of Mr Carl Williams may have been a setup by the Victorian Police and one
or more lawyers involved in the cases.
While it was claimed that the Victorian Ombudsman investigated matters it appeared to me that
the Victorian Police had concealed from the Victorian Ombudsman who had actually provided a
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CD with Carl Williams Statements (to the Victorian Police) to Carl Williams and others.,
including other prisoner(s).
The Coroner relied upon this Victorian Ombudsman investigative reports and on the Victorian
Police report. The now missing Governor of the Prison also had allegedly a copy of the CD in the
motor vehicle left behind.
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/gangland-info-missing-with-vanished-jail-chief-david-prideaux/news-
story/8cad6b93e7c102954eca96afa7c69b2c?sv=35c4e0436797efaf80a32ca125ed9658
QUOTE
Gangland info missing with vanished jail chief David Prideaux

Exclusive: Adam Shand, TheAustralian
March 1, 2013 8:37am
MISSING jail boss David Prideaux had copies of statements made by gangland serial killer
Carl Williams and his father, George, including sensational allegations of police
involvement in corruption and murder, when he disappeared in Victoria's high country
during a hunting trip in June 2011.
END QUOTE
It appeared to me that the ATO (Australian Taxation Office) deceived the courts in regard of a
claimed debt to the Commonwealth, etc.
I did indicate some of my concerns to the Legal Service Commission but to no avail. The same to
the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria.
The Coroner Court refused to reopen the case, where it never in the first place held a hearing but
merely relied on purported investigations by the Victorian Ombudsman and then Victorian
Police.
Then the Lawyer X scandal (Nicola Gobbo) broke in the news and it became clear to me that this
appeared to be an almighty cover up by the courts and others. After all Nicola Gobo was as
afterwards was discovered a police informer even before she was admitted to the Victorian Bar.
Her oath to be admitted to the Bar in my view was therefore a falsehood. The same when she had
a story published that she became a police informer because of a client she had who was
eventually apprehended in Greece. This was I understand actually about 10 years after she
already was a police informer. As such her claim was in my view false.
I understand there are more lawyers betraying their clients where they are police informers.
.
I understand from recent comments by the Victorian Police that the times demanded them to act
in the way they did. In my view that is not for the Victorian Police to make.
.
Nicola Gobbo and others like her are/were at the time Officers of the Court and in my view
should have been and still should be held legally accountable for PERVERTING THE COURSE
OF JUSTICE, CONTEMPT OF COURT, CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT, etc.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST and now retired Professional Advocate I hold it important that the
Courts will deal with those who pervert the course of justice but it appears to me that far too
often judges will ignore to act appropriately.
In my view every judge who was aware from the evidence before the Court that Nicola Gobbo
was betraying her oath of being an Officer of the Court had a legal obligation to pursue her to be
charged for this.

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Now we have this Royal Commission as to investigate the Victorian Police handling of
informers. It appears to me that it is not the task of the Royal Commission to investigate the
Officers of Court who betrayed their oath and their clients.
When I assisted/represented parties (including lawyers) I always held that even so I was not an
Officer of the Court the Foster legal principle was to be followed.
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot
pick or choose his clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on
behalf of his client. I say 'All he honourably can' because his duty is not only to his
client. He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that
he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his tool to do what he
directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is the
cause of truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not
knowingly conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is,
without evidence to support it. He must produce all relevant authorities, even those
that are against him. He must see that his client discloses, if ordered, all relevant
documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the specific
instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
Now we have lawyers who purportedly are representing their clients but betray them and well
judges who are made aware of this simply ignore to hold those lawyers legally accountable.
.
So what is then CONTEMPT OF COURT and CONTEMPT IN FACE OF THE COURT
standing for?
.
What is PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE STANDING for when lawyers who
engage in this seem to me to be protected by the judges from being held legally accountable?
I have experienced this over decades and it appear to me that because of judges failing to act
appropriately the lawyers have a field day to continue their disaster conduct.
.
Let me refer to the case of Abbott v Abbott where the Full Court on 25 October 1994 held that
the Registrar had wrongly sold the property but there was nothing the court could do. Moment
you have a Registrar (not an Officer of the Court) who acted in violation of court orders selling a
property and the Court instead of ordering the Registrar to be investigated for CONTEMPT OF
COURT and where appropriate e charged the court merely ignores this. If however Mr Abbott
had sold the property in violation of court orders he would beyond doubt be held liable for
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
.
I was at a court registry and well lawyers were writing on court file documents. Nothing strange
to me as I exposed over decades how lawyers would amend their clients Affidavit on court file
without the client even knowing about it and neither the client having re-sworn the Affidavit.
When I highlighted this to a judge his comment (after I exposed this in regard of aa purported
Affidavit on court file having been altered numerous times but not the same alterations showing
on the Affidavit that was served the trial judge comment was: Well now you know it.
Never mind what the lawyers did to pervert the course of justice and so CONTEMPT OF
COURT and CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT.
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.
A clear example was where the Prosecutor (reportedly then the wife of Attorney-General R
Hulls) concealed relevant evidence from trial causing an innocent man to be convicted. It was
about 18 months later when this man engaged a new lawyer that it was discovered that the
Prosecutor concealed evidence proving the man to be innocent. I am not aware this Prosecutor
was charged for concealing evidence and by this perverting the course of justice! Why not?
.
Recently I did not renew the business registration of MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®
aa special lifeline service since 1982 where I was dealing with people contemplating suicide,
murder and even mass murder. When Mr Jeff Kennett was Premier I urged him to install metal
detectors as I understood that there were people contemplating mass murder of lawyers/judges.
Mr Jeff Kennett to his credit didn’t take too long to roll out metal detectors.
In July 2016 I then wrote to all federal and state politicians specifically referring to Bourke Street
Mall that it should be secured in the tram-tracks to avoid a vehicle to plough into pedestrians to
commit mass murder. I referred to this again in December 2016 but nothing was done. On 20
January 2017 we had 6 people killed, that I view could have been prevented. .
Because of my work with the special lifeline service I learned to UNDERSTAND why people
desire to commit suicide, murder and even mass murder. While I personally oppose violence I
nevertheless held that by seeking to understand people motives then one may more likely be able
to avoid such disaster.
With the revelation of Nicola Gobbo and other lawyers betraying their clients I just held that I
was wasting my time and no longer needed to continue my registration.
.
It is very clear to me that where judges who heard litigation with evidence of Nicola Gobbo
betrayal to her oath as an Officer of the Court and towards her clients cannot bother to have her
charged accordingly then we have a cancerous growth within the legal system that is beyond
repair.
The following notes “Letters Patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom.” And this
Letters Patent was because of the federation. If therefore one has to hypothetically accept the
High Court of Australia ruling in Sue v Hill that we are under the Queen of Australia and an
independent nation, then we do not have any courts operating as such, because the courts are
created to be “impartial administration of justice” but under the British Crown.
http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/other/vic_gazette/1901/2.html
QUOTE
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1900.
Published by Authority.
No. 2.] WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2. [1901.

Page 7
THE Lieutenant-Governor of Victoria directs the publication of the following Letters Patent under the Great Seal of
the United Kingdom.
ISAAC A. ISAACS.
Government Offices, Melbourne, 2nd January, 1901.
VICTORIA.
LETTERS PATENT PASSEDUNDER THE GREAT SEAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSTITUTING
THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR OF TIlE STATE OF VICTORIA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, IN TILE
COMMONWEALTIL OF AUSTRALIA. 1900.
VICTORIA, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith,
Empress of India To, all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.
END QUOTE
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1900.
Published by Authority
No. 2.] WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2. [1901.
QUOTE
follows :—
IV. Every person appointed to fill the Office of Governor shall with, all due solemnity, before entering
on any of the duties of his Office, cause’ the Commission appointing to be Governor to be read and
published at, the seat of Government, in the presence of the Chief .Justice, or some other Judge of the
Supreme Court of the State, and of she Members of the Executive Council thereof, which being done, he
shall then and there take before them the Oath of Allegiance, in the form provided by an Act passed in the
Session holden in tile Thirty-first and Thirty-second years of Our Reign, intituled an Act to amend the
Law relating to Promissory Oaths ; ,and likewise the usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of
Governor, and for the due and impartial administration of justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or
Judge is hereby required to administer.
END QUOTE
The Office of the Governor (Victoria) as per 2-1-1901 PROCLAMATION, that was Gazetted
requires that the Governor appoints independent judges! As such, any notion that there being
no separation of powers in the states utter and sheer nonsense.
Therefore, judges who violate this requirement of “impartial administration of justice in my view are
worse than the ordinary criminal, this as they misuse/abuse the legal processes for ulterior purposes when
they know or should know it is unlawful.
From The Age

http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
The corporatising of our courts
Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
QUOTE
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms
what they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with

Page 8
politicians, but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of
this court's independence.
END QUOTE
Phillips J when retiring made clear that the Courts are registered with the government as
“Business Unit 19”, and this clearly violated the separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary.
Clearly, the wording “As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our
constitutional system” indicates that this justice held there was a “separation of powers” within
state level.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
QUOTE
The corporatising of our courts
Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
In his parting words from the Supreme Court bench, John D. Phillips warns of a dangerous erosion of the
court's independence.
For more than 14 years I have been sitting here, and it has been hard and unremitting, but exciting and
rewarding - emotionally, I hasten to add, before I am misunderstood. But for much of that time I have had
to bite my tongue.
I refer to policy matters rather than the debate within a particular case. For, during my time on the bench,
and especially as I grew more senior, I have watched with some concern a change emerge in the
perception of this court by others and some blurring of essential distinctions. I want to speak briefly of
that now because I have been unable to say much about it until now and when my resignation becomes
effective, I fear that nobody will listen.
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what
they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians,
but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's
independence.
One of the most public examples recently was the refusal of the executive to accept the decision on
remuneration handed down by the tribunal established by the Parliament for the very purpose of freeing
both Parliament and the executive from the invidiousness of the decision-making process over judicial
salaries and so ensuring the independence of which I am speaking.
Less well known was the refusal of earlier governments to allow that the court's own chief executive
officer be appointed by the Governor-in-Council and its insistence that that officer be appointed by and be
ultimately answerable to the Department of Justice, which is what happened.
That appears now, if I may say so, to have been but part of a movement towards this court's becoming
absorbed into that department, and it is that to which I want to draw attention in particular; for such a
movement must be reversed if this court is to have, and to keep, its proper role under the constitution.
This court is not some part of the public service and it must never be seen as such. Established as a court
of plenary jurisdiction and with supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals, this court is
Page 9
the third arm of government, co-equal in concept with Parliament and the executive. Its role, inter alia, is
to control and to limit those other arms according to law and to that end to stand between those other arms
and the citizen. Hence the emphasis on the court's independence, especially from the executive.
Yet within the Department of Justice this court is now identified and dealt with - would you believe
- as "Business Unit 19" within a section labelled "courts and tribunals", a section which
indiscriminately includes all three tiers of the court structure and VCAT.
This court is subject to direction on the raising of taxes in the form of court fees - in that these are
prescribed by departmental regulation, even if a part of those fees is redirected to the court by the
department at its discretion. The other day the department used a regulation to prescribe a procedure in
this court, apparently in disregard, if not in defiance, of the convention that such matters are for rules of
court.
And perhaps most troubling of all: the judges' computers, which were provided by and through the
department, are but part of the departmental network. I do not say that departmental officers ordinarily
avail themselves of the access that that affords; one hopes the department has some controls in place. But
access is possible, and that seems to me altogether inappropriate when the state, in one form or another, is
the major litigant in this court, and sometimes on matters of critical import to the wider community.
Nobody is suggesting that the executive would ever seek to influence a judge's decision directly,
otherwise than by argument in open court, but what has been happening is more insidious. What is
evolving is a perception of the court as some sort of unit or functionary within the Department of Justice,
a perception which is inconsistent with this court's fundamental role and underlying independence.
Indeed I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, despite its dominant role within the court structure
and its constitutional role vis-a-vis the other arms of government, is now seen by some in authority as no
different from a tribunal, nowadays the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in particular. That is
simply not the case; yet the distinction between a court and a tribunal has been steadily undermined over
the years, and it must be restored if the proper constitutional position is not 2to be subverted.
The basic distinction is easy enough. A court exercises judicial power and must be, and be seen to be,
impartial and so must be independent of all else. Accordingly, its judges are appointed once and for all,
and ideally, without hope of additional gain or reward from anyone, including any other arm of
government. Hence Parliament's creation of the specialist remuneration tribunal. In contrast to a court, a
tribunal, properly so called, exercises administrative functions but not judicial power, and many things
flow from that. Such a tribunal may be an arm of the executive; its members may be appointed for fixed
terms, with the possibility of renewal at the discretion of the executive; and the need is not so great, to see
that their remuneration is fixed independently of the executive.
You will see, now, how far the distinction between court and tribunal has become blurred. While the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is staffed by a few judges, it consists mainly of members
appointed for fixed terms, capable of renewal at the discretion of the executive - and hence my alarm
when, in addition to its administrative work, that tribunal was given some judicial power to exercise, for
the latter is altogether inconsistent with such a form of tenure.
There is talk now of acting judges for this court, and again, because this is a court which is exercising
judicial power, such would be anathema. It is one thing to tolerate the occasional acting appointment to
this court for a limited time or purpose; it is altogether different to institutionalise such temporary
appointments at the discretion of the executive. Judges of a court properly so called must have security of
tenure or, in a relatively small community like this in Victoria, the whole system is put at risk. Our courts
have been remarkably free from any taint of bias or corruption; let it remain that way. A judge must be,
and be seen to be, impartial and so must eschew all other interests which might one day give rise to
conflict or the appearance of bias.
In my book, the judge must forgo the current cult of the individual: to adapt Edmund Burke, "individuals
pass like shadows, but the (institution) is fixed and stable". The judge is sometimes accused of remoteness
but in one sense that is no more than the reverse side of the commitment, the total commitment, which is
demanded of the appointee.

Page 10
John D. Phillips is retiring as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This is part of his farewell
address to the court.
END QUOTE
Constitutionally there is a division between the Judiciary and the legislators and executives.
.
It should be noted that the wording “and for the due and impartial administration of
justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is hereby required to administer”
leaves it beyond doubt that the Chief Justice or Judge must “for the due and impartial
administration of justice” make an oath. As such the “separation of powers” in the State of
Victoria is enshrined in this Proclamation as the Governor cannot act otherwise nor so any
judge.
In regard of fire danger issue:

But with the unconstitutional Infringement Court they generally get away with it that some
innocent person will end up having Infringement Court orders against them while the real fire
danger is left unaddressed. This is how I view this government sponsored terrorism operates and
we lack any judicial integrity to stop this rot.
To be very honest I find it sickening how judges ignore the rule of law and even make clear the
constitution doesn’t apply to them
Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. BARTON.-
Providing, as this Constitution does, for a free people to elect a free Parliament-giving that people
through their Parliament the power of the purse-laying at their mercy from day to day the existence of
any Ministry which dares by corruption, or drifts through ignorance into, the commission of any act
which is unfavorable to the people having this security, it must in its very essence be a free
Constitution. Whatever any one may say to the contrary that is secured in the very way in which the
freedom of the British Constitution is secured. It is secured by vesting in the people, through their
representatives, the power of the purse, and I venture [start page 2477] to say there is no other way of
securing absolute freedom to a people than that, unless you make a different kind of Executive than
that which we contemplate, and then overload your Constitution with legislative provisions to protect
the citizen from interference. Under this Constitution he is saved from every kind of interference.
Under this Constitution he has his voice not only in the, daily government of the country, but in the
daily determination of the question of whom is the Government to consist. There is the guarantee of
freedom in this Constitution. There is the guarantee which none of us have sought to remove, but every
one has sought to strengthen. How we or our work can be accused of not providing for the popular
liberty is something which I hope the critics will now venture to explain, and I think I have made their
work difficult for them. Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people. We have provided for a Judiciary, which will
determine questions arising under this Constitution, and with all other questions which should be dealt
with by a Federal Judiciary and it will also be a High Court of Appeal for all courts in the states that
choose to resort to it. In doing these things, have we not provided, first, that our Constitution shall be free:
next, that its government shall be by the will of the people, which is the just result of their freedom: thirdly,
that the Constitution shall not, nor shall any of its provisions, be twisted or perverted, inasmuch as a
court appointed by their own Executive, but acting independently, is to decide what is a perversion of its
provisions? We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
Constitution. It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but
it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense,
the court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a
Page 11
tribunal as will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the
sphere of the Commonwealth. Having provided for all these things, I think this Convention has done
well.
END QUOTE
Yet we seem to have judges who are willing to pursue persons or others for CONTEMPT OF
COURT where they in my view miserably fail to do so against the lawyers/judges who are
Officers of the Court.
I will now quote some comments I published including the article I responded upon.
QUOTE This week’s Court of Appeal hearing won’t necessarily be the last word
Posted 4-6-2019 Time 19.21
I am a person who didn’t have any interest in following the Pell’s case. This as I view that it
should be left to the court (jury or otherwise) to consider upon the relevant evidence if a
person is guilty or innocent.
.
I do not accept that the High Court of Australia should set standards that may foreign to the
legal principles embedded in our federal constitution:
HANSARD 12-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
And then there is this proviso:
Provided that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in the High Court than according
to the rules of the common law.
END QUOTE
There are however other issues which have not been canvassed in this article.
When I was about 15 years ago requested to attend to be a juror I and so all others present was
shown a video and after viewing this I attended to the court coordinator making known that in
my view the video was deceptive and misleading. This as it didn’t show to the potential jurors
that they are entitled to use NULLIFICATION.
HANSARD 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-The only class of cases contemplated by this section are offences
committed against the criminal law of the Federal Parliament, [start page 354] and the only cases to
which Mr. Higgins' amendment would apply are those in which the criminal law of the state was in
conflict with the criminal law of the Commonwealth; in any other cases there would be no necessity to
change the venue, and select a jury of citizens of another state. Now, I do not know any power, whether in
modern or in ancient times, which has given more just offence to the community than the power possessed by
an Executive, always under Act of Parliament, to change the venue for the trial of criminal offences, and I do
not at all view with the same apprehension that possesses the mind of the honorable member a state of affairs
in which a jury of one state would refuse to convict a person indicted at the instance-of the Federal Executive.
It might be that a law passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to the popular feeling of a particular
state, and so calculated to injure the interests of that state, that it would become the duty of every citizen to
exercise his practical power of nullification of that law by refusing to convict persons of offences
against it. That is a means by which the public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its
condemnation of a law, and a method which has never been known to fail, if the law itself was
originally unjust. I think it is a measure of protection to the states and to the citizens of the states which
Page 12
should be preserved, and that the Federal Government should not have the power to interfere and prevent the
citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or innocence of one of their fellow citizens conferred upon it by
this Constitution.
END QUOTE
The States are created within Section 106 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act1900 (UK) “subject to this constitution” and hence the embedded legal principle that a jury
can nullify a law, etc, is critical to a jury right to be informed about this. The jury may not
desire to apply it but nevertheless it is an important part of the juries power in its decision
making process.
As for the video that was declined I see absolutely nothing wrong with this decision. In
Buloke Shire Council v Schorel-Hlavka the prosecutor without having provided any brief
about this notably in violation to an earlier Court order produced a GPS chart to which its
witness claimed showed the location where each photo had been made. This to counteract my
claim that there was trespassing. Clearly no time was given in advance for me to check the
GPS coordinates. I did not object to the usage of the GPS chart because I immediately realized
I could use this against the Prosecutor. When I commenced cross-examination I drew the
witness attention to his earlier evidence, etc, and then asked him about the photos he had
identified being all relating to the GPS chart shown positions. I then stated to him: I put it to
you that you are not telling the truth, are you? The witness insisted he was telling the truth. I
then drew his attention to 2 photos each showing a totally different building but which the
witness had claimed were the same building. He then admitted that one of the photos was not
of the property and he didn’t know where that photo was taken. His Honour commented that
some photos did have a GPS coordination on them and others didn’t. The witness claimed that
the original GPS records had been wiped out by the second GPS recording.
Whereas one of the photos taken was showing the nearly entire front of the residence this
even so if one were standing in front of the property then one couldn’t see it because of the
bushes and large plants in front of it hiding most of the residence. Hence, the photo could only
have been taken from having entered the property and passing the bushes and plants. Hence
the trespassing.
The brief actually purported to have been dated 18 months prior to the Infringement Notice
was issued. That too appears to be an absurdity.
What I never needed to do at that time was to present photos taken by a hidden motion camera
that recorded persons in the midst of the property to prove trespassing, this because the fake
GPS in my view was more than sufficient to prove the GPS claims were sheer and utter
nonsense, and best not to reveal about the hidden motion camera in case they ever again try
the same rot.
In my view a competent barrister would have detected the conflicting pictures and never
would have relied on a GPS chart that was false and misleading. In my view this conduct
ought to have been dealtwit6h as CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT as to
pervert the course of justice and undermine the administration of justice to fabricate evidence
and have not one but two wit nesses giving evidence that the evidence was correct. Neither
Carmody J or upon my complaint Peter Kidd CJ upon my complaint (including other issues)
bothered to hold the lawyers and/or the witnesses accountable.
Whatever the jury decided in the Pell case is beyond me to determine as I didn’t have the
benefit of hearing the witness and/or the accused and in my view any appellate court would be
on very dangerous grounds to retry a case without having the opportunity to witness the
conduct of either one of them. In my view second guessing cannot replace what each juror
was considering during the deliberation between jurors. Sometimes one may hear a person
stating something but another person stating the same could present it in a different manner
and one may then be more likely able to consider what was stated. This is clearly when a
Page 13
person talks on a very same sound level that one is about to fall asleep whereas another person
may present the details in a manner that you are drawn to hearing the details carefully.
I for one have concern that Peter Kidd CJ made aa gagging order because of the further
charges then to be heard whereas it is not uncommon that a person convicted of crimes and
the general community is well aware of this then the jury involved in fresh charges may very
well know of past convictions but are wise enough to consider the new charges based upon
the evidence presented to the court then and not upon past convictions.
Obviously Pell made as I view it a fool of himself to make such an issue to be too ill to travel
to attend a Royal Commission while then being allegedly recorded to sit in Rome drinking
alcohol and chips. The same with his conduct to be a character witness for Risedale. The same
with him having created the Melbourne Response where he might be perceived to control who
made what complaint against who, including himself and then ale to silence accusers.
When Carmody refused to allow me to file photos as evidence, during cross examination, I
simply then asked the witn4essif he had received a certain correspondence from me and
showed him the relevant letter. The witness confirmed he had received it. I filed it as an exit
and it included the very images of the photos Carmody J had earlier refused to be allowed to
be filed as exhibits.
As such had the Defense (Pell) provided the video to the Prosecutor prior to the trial then I
assume Peter Kidd CJ would unlikely have opposed the video to be submitted as evidence. It
is not that the barrister Richter was new to conducting a criminal trial and I view should have
been well aware that you cannot dump a video during a trial upon the Prosecutor having
denied prior knowledge and more over to check the details.
We should avoid the so called Salem witch-hunt to hold anyone who is accused to guilty. We
must leave it up to the courts to make its decision based upon the evidence that was
considered. Again, I view that it was correct that Peter Kidd CJ to refuse the introduction of a
video that might or might not be accurate. If it was that critical to use as an appeal ground
then why was it not provided to the Prosecutor well before the trail commenced? Was it
perhaps having similar problems as the GPS I referred to above?
I recall cross-examining 3 doctors each had a glowing Affidavit about the opposing party, but
when I commenced to cross-examine each doctor then made known that the Affidavit was to
be considered to what they knew of the matters and if there was more than 1 one doctor
involved then this would dramatically alter their views. Well there were 3! That is why cross
examination can be very vital to succeed or not. A jury who can observe the accuser and
witness the accuser being subjected to rigorous cross-examination and held to so to say pass
with flying colours may convince the jury that with no evidence by the accused to counter the
allegations then it is essentially a one sided issue. Anh accused doesn’t have to prove to be
innocent but if the accused fails to counter act any allegations then the jury is entitled to hold
that the accusers version not rebutted is correct and find against the accused.
In my view it would be very dangerous for the Appeals court to second guess a verdict when
the accused didn’t bother to counter act allegations put to the jury. Again the accused doesn’t
have to prove to be innocent but surely cannot allow allegations to be made against him/her
without challenging the allegations for being incorrect.
https://insidestory.org.au/pells-judges/

Page 14
Pell’s judges
JEREMY GANS
3 JUNE 2019
This week’s Court of Appeal hearing won’t necessarily be the last word
Right:
XXX: George Pell arriving at the County Court in February this year. Andy Brownbill/AP
Photo
(Image not included)
XXX: George Pell arriving at the County Court in February this year. Andy Brownbill/AP
Photo
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Meet the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh people assigned to judge whether
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that Cardinal George Pell raped two children in 1996.
They are all high-flyers. Chris Maxwell won a Rhodes scholarship for philosophy and
football, eventually returning from England to study law. Anne Ferguson and Mark Weinberg
both topped their classes at Monash law school and went on to England, where Ferguson
obtained a doctorate and Weinberg again topped his class, this time at Oxford. These
successes prompted the career choices — barrister, solicitor, prosecutor — that allowed them
to be appointed to Victoria’s top court.
By contrast, although the first twenty-four people to judge Pell’s guilt or innocence have
never been named, we know they weren’t lawyers. Or politicians, cops, public servants,
criminals, bankrupts, mentally ill or otherwise barred from sitting on a jury of Pell’s peers.
That aside, the first twenty-four owe their right to sit in judgement over Pell entirely to luck.
As one of more than four million or so voters on Victoria’s jury list, each was assigned to a
pool of thousands slated to do jury service in Melbourne in the last third of 2018. Each was
one of the hundreds drawn from those thousands to make up two panels, members of which
were told that they may be selected to serve on Pell’s jury. Having neither opted out nor been
successfully challenged by Pell or his prosecutor, each was chosen as one of the thirty people
who sat in the jury box for Pell’s two trials. At the end of those trials, each was part of a jury
of twelve sent to the jury room to deliberate after excess members were balloted off.
Beating these one-in-170,000-or-so odds is not so lucky. Pell’s first twelve judges bear the
burden of being unable to agree on his guilt or innocence, forcing a second trial. We know
that at least two of the twelve would have convicted him and two would have acquitted him.
Reporters at the trial say that several were in tears when their jury “hung.” Reporters who
weren’t there claim that the split was ten to two in favour of acquittal, but don’t explain how
they know. The twelve jurors risk up to five years in prison if they tell anyone other than their
therapists what the vote was.
Pell’s second jury bears the heavier burden of being able to agree. We know that all twelve
found him guilty. They can’t speak about their experiences either. Jurors in trials outside
Victoria who have spoken publicly about reaching a guilty verdict describe many different
feelings: pride, excitement, frustration, doubt, regrets. The responsibility of putting someone
Page 15
in jail can be very distressing. I quote one juror in my book, The Ouija Board Jurors, who
described his jury’s emotional state as they convicted an insurance broker on a double murder
in this way:
At that point every juror was crying. Every juror. There’s tears coming out of their faces.
They just… this was it. This was the bit they didn’t want to do. This was the bit they couldn’t
cope with and they knew you can’t change your mind.
And after:
We went into the jurors’ room again and everyone’s sitting there sobbing. It was… for five
weeks nobody had had any physical contact but there was people cuddling, there was holding
hands, there was people saying goodbye and we were actually in that room for an hour before
we could compose ourselves enough to actually leave the court.
Those jurors were blessed with judging a defendant who nearly everyone believes is guilty.
Pell’s jurors were not so lucky.
“Everything is overshadowed by the forthcoming appeal,” wrote George Pell’s anonymous

accuser on the day in February when the cardinal was sentenced to six years in prison. He
wasn’t wrong. In Australia, criminal appeals are no mere footnotes to the jury verdict but a
fundamental part of the criminal justice system. Watchers of American television might think
that the sole role of appeal courts is to judge the trial judge, but only two of Pell’s appeal
grounds fit that picture.
Like all trials, Pell’s two hearings began with a ritual. Chief judge Peter Kidd confirmed the
defendant’s name, read out each of the charges against him and asked for his plea. There were
no surprises in what Pell said — his name and “not guilty,” four times over. But none of his
jurors were in the courtroom to hear what turned out to be the only words he said at either
trial. They were still part of a panel of hundreds, too many to fit in the courtroom. Kidd
sensibly arranged for them to watch Pell’s plea on a screen in a different room.
Unfortunately, in 2009 Victoria’s parliament devised a much less sensible way to deal with
the problem of oversized jury panels: bring one part of the panel into the jury room to observe
the defendant’s plea. Pell’s argument that Kidd breached the statute by not doing so is strong,
but it’s a classic technical point. No one seriously thinks he was done an injustice.
The opposite applies to Pell’s second appeal ground, which also concerns a video. Both of
Pell’s juries toured the scene of the crime, St Patrick’s Cathedral, but not — for obvious
reasons — right after Sunday mass, when the crimes were alleged to have occurred. In his
closing argument at Pell’s second trial, Robert Richter asked to show the jury a video
animation detailing where church staff were likely walking while Pell allegedly raped two
boys in the sacristy. After prosecutor Mark Gibson objected, though, Kidd stopped Richter
from showing it.
Here, the law is with Kidd. The video probably counted as new evidence that should have
been shown before the defence rested its case. Nevertheless, it was a bad look for justice: the
prosecutor’s stance seemed designed more to disadvantage the defence than ensure justice
was done. I suspect that Pell has raised this appeal ground not because he expects it to succeed
but instead to cast doubt on the claim that he was given every chance to put his defence.
Pell’s third ground, and his real argument, is that the jury’s verdict was unsafe. It is here that
Australia’s law on criminal appeals — as well as Canada’s, England’s and New Zealand’s —
dramatically parts company with that of the United States. Anyone convicted of a crime in
Australia can ask an appeal court to determine for itself whether it agrees with the jury’s
guilty verdict. Victoria’s appeals statute says that an appeal court must allow the defendant’s
appeal if it is satisfied that “the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported
having regard to the evidence.” In other words, it judges the jury’s verdict.
How this appeal ground works in Australia was once a contentious question that repeatedly
returned to the High Court. The two approaches were on display when Lindy Chamberlain
Page 16
appealed against her conviction for murdering her baby, Azaria, on which the justices of the
High Court divided. On one side was future chief justice Gerard Brennan, who said that
appeal courts must not take on “the impossible burden of retrying every appeal case on the
papers.” Instead, he said, they should exercise their “extraordinary power” only in special
cases. On the other side was future governor-general William Deane, who said that Brennan’s
test “could sap and undermine the institution of trial by jury” by making jurors bear the
responsibility for every injustice. Deane believed the appeal judges should perform for
themselves the jury’s own task of deciding the verdict, allowing for the fact that the jurors had
the advantage of seeing the witnesses testify.
The outcome of the case starkly illustrated the difference in approach. Brennan, part of the
three-judge majority dismissing Lindy Chamberlain’s appeal, thought the task for appeal
judges was so easy that it didn’t even merit further scrutiny by the national court. By contrast,
Deane, one of two dissenting judges, candidly described his task as “difficult.” In an agonised
decision — voicing considerable doubts about the defence’s dingo theory — he concluded
that “doing the best that I can, I have finally come to a firm view” that there was reasonable
doubt about Lindy Chamberlain’s guilt.
History vindicated Deane on both the facts and the law. A decade later, and six years after the
Chamberlains were belatedly acquitted of murdering their daughter, the nation’s top court
settled the test for unsafe verdicts in Deane’s favour, with only Brennan objecting. “A
reasonable doubt experienced by the court,” the High Court wrote in 1994 when allowing a
child sexual abuse appeal, “is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced,”
adding that if “there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted,
then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence.” This test,
stated just sixteen months before Pell’s alleged crimes at St Patrick’s, will decide if the
cardinal spends his eightieth birthday inside a prison cell.
Once again, this appeal ground centres on a video, this time one recorded at Pell’s first trial.
In it, Pell’s anonymous accuser testified from another location via closed-circuit television.
Instead of having him testify at the second trial, the video was simply shown to the new jury.
And that means the appeal judges can, if they choose, see exactly what led Pell’s second jury
to convict him of all four offences, leaving them free to decide his appeal without any
deference to the jury’s advantages.
To date, no one but the judge, the jurors, the lawyers and Pell himself has seen the video, but
it is clear that the accuser’s testimony was compelling, even in the face of hostile questioning.
We also know that its subject matter concerns horrible events that occurred in the space of
minutes, decades ago, out of sight of nearly everyone. The three judges will be well aware that
cross-examination can only go so far in questioning such an account. The same is true for a
second video the jury saw, in which Pell angrily denied the accuser’s claims put to him by
police in Rome.
Pell will argue that neither video is enough to support a safe verdict. This is a make-or-break
issue for Pell’s prosecutors, because Pell’s trial is a rare one where there is no other evidence
of guilt. Unlike many child sexual abuse trials, there was no evidence of the accuser’s earlier
complaints before he went to the police, of the defendant admitting that anything untoward
happened, of other similar complaints against the defendant or of any other interactions with
the alleged victims. Unlike nearly all such trials, there is no evidence placing accuser and
accused even in the same room. The most the prosecution could offer was (disputed) evidence
that the accuser’s account was at least logistically possible.
What makes Pell’s trial almost unique is the absence of the other person the jury concluded
Pell raped that day in the sacristy at St Patrick’s. That man told no one at all that Pell abused
him and even denied it outright when asked. Such denials are entirely consistent with abuse,
but also with not being a victim at all. The man’s death, just one year before Pell’s accuser
Page 17
went to the police, means that we can never know what he would have said about the
accusations against Pell.
Neither the accuser’s testimony nor the other man’s (and other evidence’s) absence are likely
to be enough to decide Pell’s appeal. Rather, the case will likely turn on each judge’s
individual view of what is plausible or possible within those parameters. Is it plausible that
Pell would rape two boys in an unlocked room after Sunday mass during his first year as a
Melbourne archbishop? Is it possible that Pell’s accuser, who has no history of dishonesty,
wrongdoing or fantasy, would lie not only to the police but in days of convincing court
testimony?
These are questions on which reasonable minds can differ. Pell’s fate will be decided by
whichever pair of Anne Ferguson, Chris Maxwell and Mark Weinberg reach similar answers.
Victoria’s Court of Appeal hears around 250 criminal appeals each year, but two-thirds
concern whether a sentence is too high or too low and most of the rest concern whether a trial
judge made a mistake. Barely a dozen convicted criminals a year argue that the jury’s verdict
against them was simply unsafe. Since 2016, ten such appeals have succeeded in Victoria, a
success rate of around one-in-four. But Pell’s appeal doesn’t turn on two tosses of a coin: the
outcome will be no more random than the choice of which judges would hear his case.
Ferguson, Maxwell and Weinberg may sound like a mid-tier law firm, but the trio sit at the
pinnacle of Victoria’s judiciary. Anne Ferguson and Chris Maxwell are the state’s two most
senior judges, respectively its twelfth chief justice and its second president of the Court of
Appeal. At his retirement in the middle of last year, Mark Weinberg was the state’s most
respected sitting judge, unlucky to have missed out on a seat on the High Court. As both a
former criminal law academic who rose to be dean of Melbourne Law School and a former
criminal barrister who became the federal director of public prosecutions, he is arguably
Australia’s most experienced criminal law jurist. He can sit in this case despite his mandatory
retirement at age seventy, thanks to a provision in Victoria’s constitution allowing former
judges to be appointed as “reserve judges” until they turn seventy-eight.
Placing Pell’s case in solid hands will be good for Victoria’s courts in what is arguably the
most high-profile appeal ever to be heard in the state. But Pell himself would probably have
preferred to be judged by someone else. The state’s one-in-four success rate for unsafe verdict
appeals seems to be mainly due to other judges on the state court.
In the last three years, Weinberg ruled three jury verdicts unsafe, but rejected a further fifteen
such arguments, a success rate of just one-in-six. More disturbingly for Pell, the other two
judges ruled unsafe none of the jury verdicts they considered. For the chief justice, that simply
reflects how few criminal appeals she hears, given the demands of administration and her
commercial law background. But for Maxwell, the rate seems to reflect his own scepticism
when it comes to reasonable doubts of guilt. He has been left unmoved by all nine unsafe
verdict appeals he has heard since 2016, including two in which both of his fellow judges
upheld the defendant’s appeal.
Past judgement counts are even worse than federal opinion polls as predictors of future
decisions, because criminal appeals are just too varied and unsafe verdict appeals are a very
select group. More troubling for Pell is that Chris Maxwell has long expressed the test for
unsafe verdicts without any reference to doubts held by the appeal judges themselves, instead
asking whether the jury “must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt.” By contrast,
Mark Weinberg was recently part of a unanimous panel that pointedly rejected any more
“stringent” test than the High Court’s 1994 decision, emphasising that the appeal court should
“conduct its own independent assessment of the evidence that was before the jury.”
The Court of Appeal would surely be loath to make a high-profile appeal like Pell’s the
occasion to choose between these two arguably different approaches. Rather, the three judges
are likely to strive to reach a unanimous decision that emphasises the particular facts in Pell’s
Page 18
trial. As David Marr recently observed, Pell will surely take heart from the fact that
Weinberg’s reaffirmation of the High Court’s 1994 decision came in a case of institutional
child sexual abuse, indeed one that, like Pell’s, involved a police complaint first made in
2015.
There is little comfort for Pell in the ruling’s specifics: the Court of Appeal (including
Weinberg) excoriated the prosecution, citing many inconsistencies in the accuser’s testimony,
multiple implausibilities in his allegations, and doubts due to the death of numerous possible
witnesses before the accuser complained to the police. Pell is not blessed with anything like
these flaws in the case against him, which involves much simpler and less ancient allegations.
Rather, the decision’s significance lies in the Court of Appeal’s acknowledgement — in a case
heard the same day Pell’s guilty verdict was publicly revealed — that Victoria’s police,
prosecutors and jurors can all fail — and fail badly — to find justice in a contemporary trial of
historical institutional child sexual abuse.
Much like Pell’s jurors, Anne Ferguson, Chris Maxwell and Mark Weinberg would surely
rather not be his judges. But performing that role is not only their duty but their job, which
includes providing detailed reasons for their decision, ones that will permanently stand next to
their names. While by no means certain, Pell’s chances of a ruling that his jury’s verdict was
unsafe are good.
But, as is presently the case for his accuser, any victory for Pell will “be overshadowed by the
forthcoming appeal,” this time to the High Court of Australia. That court, alone among Pell’s
potential judges, has the freedom to choose whether to decide at all. Whoever wins in the
Court of Appeal, Pell, his accuser and the rest of us will learn whether the national court will
take on the case by the end of the year. If it does, then all bets are off.
Unlike the Court of Appeal, the High Court only rarely hears arguments about the safety of
jury verdicts, and does so disproportionately in high-profile cases: Colin Ross, Leith Ratten,
Lindy Chamberlain, Gerard Baden-Clay. Nor is it bound to follow its earlier rulings. In these
ways, Pell’s potential twenty-eighth through to thirty-fourth judges bear a closer resemblance
to his first twenty-four than to his next three. We would hear any verdict of Pell’s final jury of
five or seven in the middle of next year. •
Jeremy Gans
Jeremy Gans is a Professor in Melbourne Law School, where he researches and teaches across
all aspects of the criminal justice system.
END QUOTE This week’s Court of Appeal hearing won’t necessarily be the last word
I also wrote about the legal system as follows:
QUOTE 20190603-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Sisters Inside - Debbie Kilroy

Debbie Kilroy Sisters Inside 3-6-2019
Brisbane Office POSTAL ADDRESS PO Box 3407 South Brisbane QLD 4101
PHYSICAL ADDRESS 326 Montague Road West End QLD 4101
( 07) 3844 5066
admin@sistersinside.com.au
Debbie,
I briefly read about you and you became a lawyer seeking to assist people (I assume
regardless of their gender) being imprisoned and their human and other rights. Perhaps what I
write below may assist you in it all.
If you read this letter carefully you may find this likely to be very helpful for the work you are
doing to instead of having fine paid off have them nullified on basis of law! This would then
assist numerous persons!
Firstly some background explanation;
Page 19
In AEC v Schorel-Hlavka I was charged with FAILING TO VOTE in the 2001 federal election
in which I was actually an INDEPENDENT candidate. I also refused to vote in the 2004 federal
election. As a self-educated constitutionalist I was horrified how lawyers were telling me that I
had no case. Surely there was to be some lawyer who knew better? So I decided to represent
myself (I am now retired Professional Advocate).
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I know that the Commonwealth of Australia actually has no
constitutional powers to have a Commonwealth electoral roll, this as Section 41 of the
constitution relies upon the States. The Framers of the Constitution made this also very clear.
To keep this letter as short as possible I will quote only some of the numerous Hansards recorded
statements, however they can be downloaded from my blog www.scribd.com/inspectorrikati.
As such the AEC marking off an unconstitutional electoral roll has no legal value.
I also filed a Section 78 NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAAL MATTERS in which I also
challenged the validity of the 1948 Citizenship Act. As you are aware when you challenge I
litigation the validity of legislation then it is ULTRA VIRES Ab Initio.
The Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg (exercising federal jurisdiction) by consent of
the parties then ordered on 4 December 2002 that this matter of numerous constitutional issues
was to be heard and determined by the High Court of Australia. To this day the High Court of
Australia has not heard let alone determined this and as such did declare it INTRA VIRES. This
means that the legislative provisions I challenged remains ULTRA VIRES.
On 4 August + 2004) as I opposed the usage of AVERMENT as I submitted that the
Commonwealth cannot interfere with the legal processes of a State Court exercising federal
jurisdiction as it must accept the State Court as it finds it. 2005 the Magistrates Court of Victoria
at Heidelberg (exercising federal jurisdiction) ordered the Commonwealth to file and serve all
documentation it sought to rely upon in support of the charges (2001 = 2004). The Court
accepted I was correct in this.
The AEC (Commonwealth lawyers) refused to file the documents and a Magistrate on 17
November 2005 ignored the 4 August 2005 orders and held me to be guilty of both charges. I
successfully appealed filing a 409 pages written submissions ADDRESS TO THE COURT in the
County Court of Victoria exercising federal jurisdiction. The court noted that the Commonwealth
had not filed any evidence. As such underlining that AVERMENT did not apply. What this
proved was that if you do your own research one can succeed where lawyers may claim it would
be hopeless to do so.
.
I understood from an article that there were people convicted of speeding, etc.
I am not a lawyer but have as a CONSTITUTIONALIST and Professional Advocate
assisted/represented parties including barristers very successfully, this because of my knowledge
about the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
I will now ask you to do a self-test as to how you may likely as with most lawyers/
judges/politicians never really have been aware what are the pillars of our federal constitution!
About anyone will say there are 3 pillars being:
 Legislators (Parliament)
 Executives (Government of the Day)
 Judicature (Judiciary)
However there is a fourth pillar and that is the Section 101 Inter-State Commission. The ACCC
actually is in violation to the Inter-State Commission and so the pork barreling by federal
politicians. Gain to keep it concise I will not delve into details or there than that as the
constitution demands “There shall be an Inter-State Commission” which is MANDATORY then it is
a creation of the Constitution itself!

Page 20
The constitution provided for a list of legislative powers for the Commonwealth such as “(xv)
weights and measures;” and the Framers of the Constitution made numerous statements such as:
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?
Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
My only desire is to give power to the Federal Parliament to achieve a scheme for old-age pensions if it be
practicable, and if the people require it. No power would be taken away from the states. The sub-section
would not interfere with the right of any state to act in the meantime until the Federal Parliament took
the matter in hand.
END QUOTE
As such the “concurrent” legislative powers that was provided to the States only exist until the
Commonwealth commences to legislate upon a certain subject matter.
Meaning that when the Commonwealth commenced to legislate in regard of weight & measures
the States had to retire from this. It means that police radar speed detection units unless they are
certified by the Commonwealth have no legal validity. States do not have legislative powers in
that regard whatsoever where it became an exclusive legislative powers of the Commonwealth.
We also have what is in Victoria called Infringement Court. This too is unconstitutional as the
legal principle embedded in the Constitution is:
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the
point. All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be
heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything
the state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person
accused will have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a
first principle in criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
Page 21
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
In Victoria we had the Lawyer X (Nicola Gobbo) scandal and we found that not aa single judge
(being aa Officer of the Court) even bothered to have her charged for perverting the course of
justice, placing the administration of justice in disrepute, etc.
Hansard 1-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).-
Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
I proved in Court on 19 July 2006 that compulsory voting was unconstitutional but nevertheless
the courts are still handing down judgements against hundreds of thousands of accused ignoring
what is constitutionally appropriate. As such they are the villains against a person’s constitutional
rights.
The following will also make clear that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have CIVIL
RIGHTS and LIBERTIES principles embedded in the Constitution;
QUOTE Mr. CLARK.-
for the protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to
claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him.
END QUOTE
.
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-Our civil rights are not in the hands of any Government, but the rights of the Crown
in prosecuting criminals are.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.-
What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the
liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of
liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good
government for the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
And

Page 22
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the
people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta
for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole
history of the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of
Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This
new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of
the Constitution. . It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under
it; but it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-
the Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense, the
court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a tribunal as
will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the sphere
of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
I until recently I under the motto MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® conducted a\ special
lifeline service since 1982. As Dixon CJ reportedly made clear if lawyers do not keep abreast
with legal issues then an alien from outer space might do better. I was not an alien from outer
space but from The Netherlands and underlined this. Lawyers, as an example, use DOUBLE
SPACING where the court rules requires 6 mm between the lines however decades ago when an
opposing barrister took me on (for too close typing) the court held that double spacing is like a
6mm lined paper in to what I submitted to the court.
One of my daughters who reside in Queensland growing up with me as a single father (now
married and mother of 4 children) gave me the understanding she is enrolled with a university
doing a law course. Hopefully others will also accept that no one is above the constitution and
will embrace the legal principles embedded in the constitution. If judicial officers did act
appropriately many a person now convicted never would have been where the legislation or the
detection cameras lack any legal validity. I tried to keep this letter as brief as possible.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all issues.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL ®
(Our name is our motto!)

END QUOTE 20190603-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Sisters Inside - Debbie Kilroy
And let me quote from another case (I representing my self was successful in both appeals):
ADDRESS TO THE COURT
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
For example, checking the transcript of the hearing, it is noted that Mr Peter Hanks QC in his
argument in point 22 and 22.1 of the OUTLINE stated the following;
QUOTE

Page 23
22 In Foster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445, Gibbs J referred
to the general rule that “not less than” so many days refers to clear days – “unless the
context or the statutory intention reveals a contrary intention”.
END QUOTE
His quotation is again false and misleading!
Mr Peter Hanks QC quoted of the judgment the following;

QUOTE
“unless the context or the statutory intention reveals a contrary intention”
END QUOTE
This ought to be;
QUOTE
“unless the context or the subject matter reveals a contrary intention”
END QUOTE
Clearly, that is a gross deception. In legal terms there can be a significant difference in a case for
the Court to deal with a “statutory intention” versus “subject matter”.
Mr Peter Hanks QC stated to the Court (7 November 2001);
The researches of counsel have been unable to find provisions using simular language (“not
less that” or “at least” a number of days) where the language is as clear and specific as
found in ss156(1) and 157.
Thousands upon thousands of Internet references can be found upon a search “shall not be less
than” or “shall not be less that”. As such this statement by Mr. Peter Hanks QC for the
Australian Electoral Commission was a fraudulent statement. Likewise other statement were
found by the defendant to be deceptive and/or misleading.
We also have the fact that Counsel Mr peter Hanks QC argued the authority of the
ASSOCIATED DOMINIONS ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY. LTD. v. BALMFORD

(1950) 81 CLR 161
What counsel did however was to make a false and misleading presentation of what the case
really was on about.
As the authority stated:
The notice actually served did not "specify" such a period: it "specified" a period which
was too short by one day, and the Acts Interpretation Act does not affect this position.
Mr Peter Hank QC didn’t argue that the authority wasn’t relevant, to the contrary he argued its
relevance only by misrepresenting how it applied and what the authority really was on about. As
such, it had nothing to do with “within” as Mr Peter Hanks QC argued as clearly the usage
“within” was in a different context and not at all as Mr Hanks sought to imply and did imply.
It ought to be considered a serious matter that a barrister employs these kind of tactics, indeed
deceptive tactics, but it seems the Australian Electoral Commissioner does not seem to worry
about the means as long as it achieves his end results.

Page 24
Because I expect the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to come up with any
nonsense and unable to verify the correctness of any claims they may make about any
AUTHORITY they may refer to I am left no alternative but to present my own research.
Lawyers are “OFFICERS OF THE COURT” but I experienced that when it comes to the
Australian Electoral Commissioner being the instructing party then it seems to me from
experiences their “oath of alliance” is worthless and they cannot be trusted, as set out also further
in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT.
It is my view, that had Mr Peter Hanks QC not concealed matters and not presented fraudulent
Authorities and how they applied then the Federal Court of Australia would not have ruled that it
had no legal jurisdiction, and would in fact have granted the orders I sought. And in the end this
case would never have eventuated before this Court as then matters could have been addressed
appropriately before any federal election had been held!
END QUOTE County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
For decades I have come across deceptive conduct by lawyers and judges letting this unchecked.
Also judges issuing final orders days before the trial is completed and 5 different versions of
court orders of the one judgment.
We shouldn’t have a court system that essentially is run by the State Government. When the
Government has access to court computers then what stop the Government from altering the
wording of aa contemplated judgment to be handed down and by the time the judge discover it
was altered then it might be too late. After all when I questioned the 5 different versions some
conflicting to each other I was give n the understanding that staff merely amended it to be in a
better English for grammatical reasons. Well when “each weekend” is later amended to “each
alternative weekend” then to me it basically comes down as I refer to for the (opposing) lawyer
to sleep with the Registrar and well orders are inappropriately amended.
I became aware how aa duty solicitor (Legal Aid) was seeking to get a party to plea guilty but
she insisted not to do so and to the credit of the magistrate who was informed about this ordered
that the prosecutor had to amend the charge naming the husband and not the wife. She as a
business women didn’t want some conviction about something not relevant to her and could
harm her in business matters.
When one consider the lawyers failures to even check the
20100202 (-img-170901215722-003=036-) VicPol McRae to Robert Stary R v Moti QSC[2009] 407
The Ethical Standards Department misleading what the case was about.
20110803-FWR to GLW Re AGS now acting for ATO
Yet the AGS knew from proceedings in AEC v Schorel-Hlavka on 4 August 2005 that it
couldn’t rely upon AVER (AVERMENT) and despite this I view PERVERTED THE COURSE
OF JUSTICE time and time again in litigation.
20101116- Wayne Newman VicPolice to T.ToshRe Ivanovic disk

This disk and others could have shown when the disk was created (burned) and so show who
really setup the murder of Carl Williams.

Page 25
20090127-img-170901221009-006=061-GLW questions-p1-Stev e Smith Lie.jpg
This document predating the murder of Carl Williams indicates that Steve Smith was alleged to
have lied. I understand that this Steve Smith was the person who concealed from the Victorian
Ombudsman about delivering the CD to the prison.
Ione has to ask why is it that the judges are hell bend to pursue ordinary persons, etc, for
CONTEMPT OF COURT but when the Authorities had a man murdered in prison not a single
judge held the Secretary (Minister) legally accountable. The same with children dying in custody
of the Department of Human Services. Hence real criminal offences are left unchecked.
What is badly needed is a total overhaul of the legal processes and ensure courts are operating
impartially and will not allow any access to its computers by Government paid employees.
.
Currently to me at least we do not have proper impartial courts but rather KANGAROO
COURTS and STAR CHAMBER COURTS pretending to be courts of law.
There is a lot more to it all but quite frankly I doubt it will be addressed. Then again you can
prove me wrong and have a proper investigation to address all relevant matters and pursue that
lawyers/judges who betray their oath/affirmation as an Officer of the Court will be held legally
accountable.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® (Our name is our motto!)


20190604-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR Peter Kidd CJ CCV-Re - Re Pell and CONTEMPT of COURT Issues

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Page 1

Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria 4-6-2019

No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Contempt of Court (Vict.)

Contempt of Court (Vict.)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Contempt of Court (Vict.)

21. In conclusion three comments should be made.

p2 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

22. In the result we would allow the appeal. (at p693)

Gangland info missing with vanished jail chief David Prideaux

p4 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1900.

No. 2.] WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2. [1901.

p6 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Government Offices, Melbourne, 2nd January, 1901.

From The Age

p7 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

The corporatising of our courts

Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria

March 24, 2005

p9 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

In regard of fire danger issue:

Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

And then there is this proviso:

HANSARD 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p13 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

“Everything is overshadowed by the forthcoming appeal,” wrote George Pell’s anonymous

I also wrote about the legal system as follows:

QUOTE 20190603-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Sisters Inside - Debbie Kilroy

p19 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Hansard 27-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

Hansard 7-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.

Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p21 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL ®

(Our name is our motto!)

p22 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Mr Peter Hanks QC quoted of the judgment the following;

Mr Peter Hanks QC stated to the Court (7 November 2001);

ASSOCIATED DOMINIONS ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY. LTD. v. BALMFORD

p23 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

When one consider the lawyers failures to even check the

20100202 (-img-170901215722-003=036-) VicPol McRae to Robert Stary R v Moti QSC[2009] 407

20110803-FWR to GLW Re AGS now acting for ATO

20101116- Wayne Newman VicPolice to T.ToshRe Ivanovic disk

p24 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

p25 4-6-2019 G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

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