[No. L-4941.

July 25, 1952]

A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION Co., INC., petitioner vs. BICOL TRANSPORTATION
EMPLOYEES MUTUAL ASSOCIATION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.

1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; CHECK-OFF; AUTHORITY OF COURT TO

COMPEL EMPLOYERS TO OBSERVE SYSTEM.—There is nothing so peculiar in
check-off that it cannot be taken cognizance of by the Court of Industrial Relations.
On the contrary, the practice of deducting does from wages and payment of the
amounts deducted over to the union appears to be more germane to wage fixing
than are vacation leave or the defraying of hospitalization expenses by the
management, which matters have been regarded without dissent as proper subjects
of award by that Court.

2.ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 602.—Republic Act No. 602 otherwise known as the
Minimum Wage Law confirms imn a more explicit fashion the idea that check-off is a
legitimate dispute for arbitration. Under this Act, check-off may be enforced with the
consent of the employer of by authority in writting by the employees. When the
union and the employer agree, the attitude of the employees is immaterial. When
the employees duly authorize the check-off in writting, the employer's consent is
unnecessary and its recognition of the right is obligatory.

3.ID.; ID.; MUST BE OBSERVED THOUGH A BURDEN ON EMPLOEYR.—The fact that

the practice of check -off imposees an extra burden on the employer is no reason for
opposing its arrangement. Wage increases, reduction of working hours, sick leave,
hospitalization and other privileges granted to the employee entail diminution of
profits and additional duties and obligation to an extent much greater than the
inconvinience and additional expense involved in the adoption of the check-off
system. In the adjustment of industrial conflicts, concessions have to be made and
some rights have to be surrendered or enforced if necessary in the interest of
conciliation and peace.
 No. L-19017. December 27, 1963.
NATIONAL BREWERY AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES LABOR
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PAFLU), plaintiff-appellant, vs.
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC, defendant-appellee.
Parties to civil actions; Representative Parties; When labor union may sue
for wages of its members.—Where the right of the members of the union
to the wages in question was only recognized when the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the company was
concluded, the action for said wages may be brought in the name of the
union that has obliged itself to secure those wages for its members,
without need of joining said members.

Pleading and Practice; Complaints; Jurisdictional amount; When action by

labor union on behalf of its members fall within jurisdiction of Court of
First Instance.—In an action filed by a labor union in the Court of First
Instance for unpaid wages of its members against their employer, the
company contended that since the employees are the real parties in
interest, and none of their individual claims are within the jurisdictional
amount of said court, said court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action. However, it appearing- that said complaint is based
upon the collective bargaining agreement concluded between said
union and the employer and the right of the employee to the wages in
question was recognized only when that agreement was concluded, it is,
held that the basis of the right which is sought to be enforced is the
agreement itself and not the wages to be collected, and that the lower
court erred in ordering the dismissal of said complaint on the grounds
invoked by the company.

G.R. No. 211145. October 14, 2015.*

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD, rep. by its President, ALFIE

ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES
AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PHIL.), respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Right to Self-organization; Workers can also form and join
a workers’ association as well as labor-management councils (LMC).—More often
than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers, however, can
also form and join a workers’ association as well as labor-management councils
(LMC). Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all workers to self-
organization. Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 3. The
State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. x x x [Emphasis supplied] And Section 8,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states: Section 8. The right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. In
relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides: Article 3. Declaration of basic
policy.—The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations
between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.

Same; Same; Same; As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right
to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual
aid and protection.—As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right
to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual
aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and
voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement as well as to make
sure that workers participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare. The right to form a union or association or to self-
organization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the
absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee
may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.

Same; Same; Same; In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization,
the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor
organizations.—In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization,
the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor organizations.
A labor organization is defined as “any union or association or employees which
exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” A labor organization
has two broad rights: (1) to bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer
concerning terms and conditions of employment. To bargain collectively is a right
given to a union once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on
the other hand, is a generic description of interaction between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and other terms and
conditions of employment, even if the employees’ group is not registered with the
DOLE.

Same; Same; Same; “Union” and “Workers’ Association,” Distinguished.—A union

refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective
bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers’ association is an
organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or
for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining. Many associations or
groups of employees, or even combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a
labor organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While every labor
union is a labor organization, not every labor organization is a labor union. The
difference is one of organization, composition and operation.
Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to say that it is the device and no other, which
secures industrial democracy.—Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of
employee participation. Despite so much interest in and the promotion of collective
bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device and no other, which secures
industrial democracy. It is equally misleading to say that collective bargaining is the
end-goal of employee representation. Rather, the real aim is employee participation
in whatever form it may appear, bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union. Any
labor organization which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer.
This explains why a workers’ association or organization does not always have to be
a labor union and why employer-employee collective interactions are not always
collective bargaining.

Same; Same; Same; The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right.—The right to
form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain
from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied
the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to
exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent in the right to self-organization is the
right to choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a
workers’ association for purposes of providing mutual aid and protection. The right
to self-organi-zation, however, is subject to certain limitations as provided by law.
For instance, the Labor Code specifically disallows managerial employees from
joining, assisting or forming any labor union. Meanwhile, supervisory employees,
while eligible for membership in labor organizations, are proscribed from joining
the collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees. Even government
employees have the right to self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as
existing or available for purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for the
furtherance and protection of their interests.
Same; Same; Same; Misrepresentation; Misrepresentation, as a ground for the
cancellation of registration of a labor organization, is committed in connection with
the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto,
the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of
the constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto, and those in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters.—
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of registration of a labor
organization, is committed “in connection with the adoption, or ratification of the
constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list
of members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and bylaws or
amendments thereto, and those in connection with the election of officers, minutes
of the election of officers, and the list of voters, x x x.”

KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION (TUPAS Local

Chapter No. 1027), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE BLR
DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA, MEAT AND CANNING
DIVISION UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION and MEAT AND
CANNING DIVISION NEW EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
UNITED LABOR ORGANIZATION, respondents.

Labor; Labor Union; Right to self-organization; The right of members of

the Iglesia ni Kristo sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to
their religious beliefs does not bar the members of that sect from forming
their own union; Reason.—After deliberating on the petition and the
documents annexed thereto, We find no merit in the petition. The public
respondent did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal in BLR Case
No. A-12-389-87. This Court’s decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54, upholding the right of members of the
IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to
their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that
the “recognition of the tenets of the sect x x x should not infringe on the
basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affilia-tion.”

Same; Same; Same; Fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA
with ROBINA does not foreclose the right of the rival union NEW ULO to
challenge TUPAS’ claim to majority status.—The fact that TUPAS was
able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom
period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival
union, NEW ULO, to challege TUPAS’ claim to majority status, by filing a
timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before
TUPAS’ old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a
new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As pointed out by
Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a “certification election is the best forum in
ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the
workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative
thru secret ballot.” Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted
with unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification
election.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT

EMPLOYEES UNION AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN
HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, respondents.

Labor Law; Labor Unions; Criteria to Determine who are Confidential

Employees.—Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two
criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee—that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and
the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to
labor relations.

Same; Same; Reason behind the confidential employee rule.—The

exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
“confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict
of interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union
with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the
company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition
of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”

Same; Same; Same; In determining the confidentiality of certain

employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee’s
necessary access to confidential labor relations information.—An
important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s
need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determin-ing the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor
relations information.

Same; Same; Same; An employee may not be excluded from appropriate

bargaining unit merely because he has access to confidential information
concerning employer’s internal business operations and which is not
related to the field of labor relations.—It is evident that whatever
confidential data the questioned employees may handle will have to
relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions, it can be gleaned
that the confidential information said employees have access to concern
the employer’s internal business operations. As held in Westinghouse
Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, “an employee
may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because
he has access to confidential information concerning employer’s
internal business operations and which is not related to the field of
labor relations.”

Same; Same; Same; Confidential employees who may be excluded from

bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive
many employees of their right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their choosing.—It must be borne in mind that Section
3 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
guarantee to “all” workers the right to self-organization. Hence,
confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must
be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of
their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing.
Same; Same; Appropriate Bargaining Unit Defined.—An appropriate
bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.”

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-

REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER,
petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK,
respondents.

Labor Law; Certification Election; An employer has no standing to

question the process since this is the sole concern of the workers.—
Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the dismissal of
the petition for certification election on the ground that its supervisory
employees are in reality managerial employees. An employer has no
standing to question the process since this is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to
bargain collectively.

Same; Employees; Definition of Managerial Employee and Supervisory

Employee.—A managerial employee is (a) one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies,
or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; or (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives.
A supervisory employee is different from a managerial employee in the
sense that the supervisory employee, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommends such managerial actions, if the exercise of such
managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of

respondent Bank are not managerial employees but supervisory
employees.—Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough
examination of the evidence submitted by both parties, we arrive at a
contrary conclusion. Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of
respondent Bank are not managerial employees but supervisory
employees. The finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid
down and/or executed through the collective action of these employees
is simply erroneous. His discussion on the division of their duties and
responsibilities does not logically lead to the conclusion that they are
managerial employees, as the term is defined in Art. 212, par.(m).

Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of the employee’s functions, and not
the nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether he
has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial status.—The job description
of a Cashier does not mention any authority on his part to lay down
policies, either. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that
subject employees do not participate in policy-making but are given
approved and established policies to execute and standard practices to
observe, leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said
policies or not. It is the nature of the employee’s functions, and not the
nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether he has
rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial status.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

(SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Right to Self-Organization; The rights of all workers

to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful
concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law
guaranteed.—The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights, provides that the State “shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law.”
Same; Same; Right to strike; While there is no question employees to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right
to strike.—By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of
all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it
provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as “all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters,” that “[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)]. Parenthetically,
the Bill of Rights also provides that “[t]he right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged” [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize,
it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Framers of the organic law intended to limit
the right to the formation of unions or associations only without including
the right to strike.—Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law
becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A
reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Same; Same; Same; Strikes by employees of the government exercising

propriety functions recognized under the Industrial Peace Act.—It will be
recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by
employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with
proprietary functions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; No similar provision is found in the Labor

Code.—No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one
time it recognized the right of employees of government corporations
established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain
collectively and those in the civil service to “form organizations for
purposes not contrary to law” [Art. 224, before its amendment by B.P.
Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that “[t]he terms and
conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; At present, in the absence of any

legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their
right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited
from striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as
implied in E.O. No. 180.—On June 1, 1987, to implement the
constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines
for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In
Section 14 thereof, it is provided that “[t]he Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress.” The President was apparently referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April
21, 1987 which, “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees. . . enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service.” The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in
the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right,
they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.

Same; Same; Same; Employees of the SSS are part of the civil service and
are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s Memorandum prohibiting
strikes.—The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering
that under the 1987 Constitution “[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters” [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees”] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO
v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered
by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was
illegal.

Same; Same; Same; Rationale for distinguishing between workers in the

private sector and government employees with regard to the right to
strike.—The general rule in the past and up to the present is that “the
terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law”
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and
Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms
and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis.
Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this
is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

Same; Same; Same; The terms and conditions of employment in the

government including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
and government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for
the purpose of securing changes thereof.—Government employees may,
therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute
may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government-
Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, “[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or intrumentality
thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.”

Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations; NLRC clearly has no
jurisdiction over the dispute at bar.—It is futile for the petitioners to
assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No.
180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction
over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec.
16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Court not precluded from assuming
jurisdition over the SSS’s complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive
writ prayed for.—This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not
precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS’s complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the
NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC,
that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general
courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike
is appropriate.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, HON. HENRY
PABEL, Director of the Department of Labor and Employment
Regional Office No. XI and/or the Representation Officer of the
Industrial Relations Division who will act for and in his behalf,
PCOP-BISLIG SUPERVISORY AND TECHNICAL STAFF
EMPLOYEES UNION, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, respondents.

Labor Law; Certification Elections; Managerial Employees; Words and

Phrases; Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle
Managers and First Line Managers; The mere fact that an employee is
designated “manager” does not ipso facto make him one—designation
should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it
is the job description that determines the nature of employment.—In
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, we had
occasion to elucidate on the term “managerial employees.” Managerial
employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line
Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task
of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried
out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization. Under this
distinction, “managerial employees” therefore fall in two (2) categories,
namely, the “managers” per se composed of Top and Middle Managers,
and the “supervisors” composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere
fact that an employee is designated “manager” does not ipso facto make
him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job
description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines
the nature of employment.

Same; Same; Same; Authority to Hire and Fire; Where the power to hire
and fire is subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department
heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although
present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as
required by law.—In the petition before us, a thorough dissection of the
job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section
heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only
supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies.
PICOP’s contention that the subject section heads and unit managers
exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite
misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not
supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final
determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by
them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and
termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval
by their respective superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect
recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review and final
action by the department heads and other higher executives of the
company, the same, although present, is not effective and not an
exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

Same; Administrative Law; Due Process; No denial of due process can be

ascribed to quasi-judicial official when he refuses to allow a party to
present additional evidence where said party, in the appeal before the said
official, even then had already submitted voluminous supporting
documents.—No denial of due process can be ascribed to public
respondent Undersecretary Laguesma for the latter’s denial to allow
PICOP to present additional evidence on the implementation of its
program inasmuch as in the appeal before the said public respondent,
PICOP even then had already submitted voluminous supporting
documents. The record of the case is replete with position papers and
exhibits that dealt with the main thesis it relied upon. What the law
prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard. PICOP has long harped
on its contentions and these were dealt upon and resolved in detail by
public respondent Laguesma. We see no reason or justification to
deviate from his assailed resolutions for the reason that law and
jurisprudence aptly support them.

Same; Certification Elections; No obstacle must be placed to the holding of

certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.—Considering all the foregoing, the fact that PICOP voiced
out its objection to the holding of certification election, despite
numerous opportunities to ventilate the same, only after respondent
Undersecretary of Labor affirmed the holding thereof, simply bolstered
the public respondents’ conclusion that PICOP raised the issue merely to
prevent and thwart the concerned section heads and supervisory
employees from exercising a right granted them by law. Needless to
stress,, no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification
elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. BPI

EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF
UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, respondent.

Labor Law; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Words and Phrases;
“Union Security,” “Closed Shop,” “Union Shop,” and “Maintenance of
Membership,” Explained.—“Union security” is a generic term which is
applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance
of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new
regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period
for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership
shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date
of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain
union membership as a condition for continued employment until they
are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement
is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his
employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any
or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is,
becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in
good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the
employees in interest are a part.

Same; Same; Same; It is the policy of the State to promote unionism

to enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level
and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and
independently bargain for the improvement of their respective
conditions—the purpose of a union shop or other union security
arrangement is to guarantee the continued existence of the union through
enforced membership for the benefit of the workers.—In the case of
Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA 668
(1989), we ruled that: It is the policy of the State to promote unionism
to enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level
and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and
independently bargain for the improvement of their respective
conditions. To this end, the Constitution guarantees to them the rights
“to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and
peaceful concerted actions including the right to strike in accordance
with law.” There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if
every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of
joining his co-employees in planning collective action and presenting a
united front when they sit down to bargain with their employers. It is
for this reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union
shop and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join
and support the labor union of their own choice as their representative
in the negotiation of their demands and the protection of their interest
vis-à-vis the employer. (Emphasis ours.) In other words, the purpose of a
union shop or other union security arrangement is to guarantee the
continued existence of the union through enforced membership for the
benefit of the workers.

Same; Same; Same; All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a

Union Shop Clause in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with
management are subject to its terms; Exceptions.—All employees in the
bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with
management are subject to its terms. However, under law and
jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its
coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement
takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which
prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds;
employees already in the service and already members of a union other
than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect;
confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file
bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by
express terms of the agreement.
 Same; Same; Same; Right of Association; When certain employees are
obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment,
as in the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction
of the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in
favor of unionism.—When certain employees are obliged to join a
particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case
of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the
freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in favor
of unionism. This Court, on occasion, has even held that a union security
clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association
guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreover, a closed shop agreement is
an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members
of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good
standing to keep their jobs. It is “the most prized achievement of
unionism.” It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to
loyal members a promise of employment in the closed shop, it wields
group solidarity.

Same; Corporation Law; Corporate Mergers; Words and Phrases; In

legal parlance, human beings are never embraced in the term “assets and
liabilities”; The Corporation Code does not mandate the absorption of the
employees of the non-surviving corporation by the surviving corporation
in the case of a merger.—In legal parlance, however, human beings are
never embraced in the term “assets and liabilities.” Moreover, BPI’s
absorption of former FEBTC employees was neither by operation of law
nor by legal consequence of contract. There was no government
regulation or law that compelled the merger of the two banks or the
absorption of the employees of the dissolved corporation by the
surviving corporation. Had there been such law or regulation, the
absorption of employees of the non-surviving entities of the merger
would have been mandatory on the surviving corporation. In the
present case, the merger was voluntarily entered into by both banks
presumably for some mutually acceptable consideration. In fact, the
Corporation Code does not also mandate the absorption of the
employees of the non-surviving corporation by the surviving
corporation in the case of a merger.

Same; Same; Same; The rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor
contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise,
labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the
parties.—The Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger dated April 7, 2000
did not contain any specific stipulation with respect to the employment
contracts of existing personnel of the non-surviving entity which is
FEBTC. Unlike the Voluntary Arbitrator, this Court cannot uphold the
reasoning that the general stipulation regarding transfer of FEBTC
assets and liabilities to BPI as set forth in the Articles of Merger
necessarily includes the transfer of all FEBTC employees into the
employ of BPI and neither BPI nor the FEBTC employees allegedly could
do anything about it. Even if it is so, it does not follow that the absorbed
employees should not be subject to the terms and conditions of
employment obtaining in the surviving corporation. The rule is that
unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment
contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable
against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam,
thus binding only between the parties. A labor contract merely creates
an action in personam and does not create any real right which should
be respected by third parties. This conclusion draws its force from the
right of an employer to select his employees and to decide when to
engage them as protected under our Constitution, and the same can only
be restricted by law through the exercise of the police power.

Same; Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; The Court believes that it

is contrary to public policy to declare the former employees of the
absorbed bank as forming part of the assets or liabilities that were
transferred and absorbed by the other bank in the Articles of Merger—
assets and liabilities, in this instance, should be deemed to refer only to
property rights and obligations of the absorbed bank and do not include
the employment contracts of its personnel; The employees of the absorbed
bank retained the prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed or not,
otherwise, that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.—This
Court believes that it is contrary to public policy to declare the former
FEBTC employees as forming part of the assets or liabilities of FEBTC
that were transferred and absorbed by BPI in the Articles of Merger.
Assets and liabilities, in this instance, should be deemed to refer only to
property rights and obligations of FEBTC and do not include the
employment contracts of its personnel. A corporation cannot
unilaterally transfer its employees to another employer like chattel.
Certainly, if BPI as an employer had the right to choose who to retain
among FEBTC’s employees, FEBTC employees had the concomitant right
to choose not to be absorbed by BPI. Even though FEBTC employees had
no choice or control over the merger of their employer with BPI, they
had a choice whether or not they would allow themselves to be
absorbed by BPI. Certainly nothing prevented the FEBTC’s employees
from resigning or retiring and seeking employment elsewhere instead
of going along with the proposed absorption. Employment is a personal
consensual contract and absorption by BPI of a former FEBTC employee
without the consent of the employee is in violation of an individual’s
freedom to contract. It would have been a different matter if there was
an express provision in the articles of merger that as a condition for the
merger, BPI was being required to assume all the employment contracts
of all existing FEBTC employees with the conformity of the employees.
In the absence of such a provision in the articles of merger, then BPI
clearly had the business management decision as to whether or not
employ FEBTC’s employees. FEBTC employees likewise retained the
prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed or not; otherwise, that
would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.

Same; Same; Same; From the tenor of local and foreign authorities, in
voluntary mergers, absorption of the dissolved corporation’s employees or
the recognition of the absorbed employees’ service with their previous
employer may be demanded from the surviving corporation if required by
provision of law or contract.—From the tenor of local and foreign
authorities, in voluntary mergers, absorption of the dissolved
corporation’s employees or the recognition of the absorbed employees’
service with their previous employer may be demanded from the
surviving corporation if required by provision of law or contract. The
dissent of Justice Arturo D. Brion tries to make a distinction as to the
terms and conditions of employment of the absorbed employees in the
case of a corporate merger or consolidation which will, in effect, take
away from corporate management the prerogative to make purely
business decisions on the hiring of employees or will give it an excuse
not to apply the CBA in force to the prejudice of its own employees and
their recognized collective bargaining agent. In this regard, we disagree
with Justice Brion.

Same; Same; Same; Although in a merger it is as if there is no change

in the personality of the employer, there is in reality a change in the
situation of the employee—once an employee is absorbed, there are
presumably changes in his condition of employment even if his previous
tenure and salary rate is recognized by the absorbing company.—That
BPI is the same entity as FEBTC after the merger is but a legal fiction
intended as a tool to adjudicate rights and obligations between and
among the merged corporations and the persons that deal with them.
Although in a merger it is as if there is no change in the personality of
the employer, there is in reality a change in the situation of the
employee. Once an FEBTC employee is absorbed, there are presumably
changes in his condition of employment even if his previous tenure and
salary rate is recognized by BPI. It is reasonable to assume that BPI
would have different rules and regulations and company practices than
FEBTC and it is incumbent upon the former FEBTC employees to obey
these new rules and adapt to their new environment. Not the least of the
changes in employment condition that the absorbed FEBTC employees
must face is the fact that prior to the merger they were employees of an
unorganized establishment and after the merger they became
employees of a unionized company that had an existing collective
bargaining agreement with the certified union. This presupposes that
the union who is party to the collective bargaining agreement is the
certified union that has, in the appropriate certification election, been
shown to represent a majority of the members of the bargaining unit.

Same; Same; Same; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Words and
Phrases; The Court should not uphold an interpretation of the term “new
employee” based on the general and extraneous provisions of the
Corporation Code on merger that would defeat, rather than fulfill, the
purpose of the union shop clause—the provision of the Article 248(e) of
the Labor Code in point mandates that nothing in the said Code or any
other law should stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition of employment.—
Justice Brion himself points out that there is no clear, categorical
definition of “new employee” in the CBA. In other words, the term “new
employee” as used in the union shop clause is used broadly without any
qualification or distinction. However, the Court should not uphold an
interpretation of the term “new employee” based on the general and
extraneous provisions of the Corporation Code on merger that would
defeat, rather than fulfill, the purpose of the union shop clause. To
reiterate, the provision of the Article 248(e) of the Labor Code in point
mandates that nothing in the said Code or any other law should stop the
parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective
bargaining agent as a condition of employment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; By law and jurisprudence, a merger only

becomes effective upon approval by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger.—By law and jurisprudence, a
merger only becomes effective upon approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger. In Associated
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 511 (1998), we held: The procedure
to be followed is prescribed under the Corporation Code. Section 79 of
said Code requires the approval by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger which, in turn, must have
been duly approved by a majority of the respective stockholders of the
constituent corporations. The same provision further states that the
merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a
certificate of merger. The effectivity date of the merger is crucial for
determining when the merged or absorbed corporation ceases to exist;
and when its rights, privileges, properties as well as liabilities pass on to
the surviving corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Union Shop Clause; Words and Phrases; In
law or even under the express terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), there is no special class of employees called “absorbed
employees”—in order for the Court to apply or not apply the Union Shop
Clause, it can only classify the employees of the absorbed bank as either
“old” or “new.”—Petitioner limited itself to the argument that its
absorbed employees do not fall within the term “new employees”
contemplated under the Union Shop Clause with the apparent objective
of excluding all, and not just some, of the former FEBTC employees from
the application of the Union Shop Clause. However, in law or even under
the express terms of the CBA, there is no special class of employees
called “absorbed employees.” In order for the Court to apply or not
apply the Union Shop Clause, we can only classify the former FEBTC
employees as either “old” or “new.” If they are not “old” employees, they
are necessarily “new” employees. If they are new employees, the Union
Shop Clause did not distinguish between new employees who are non-
regular at their hiring but who subsequently become regular and new
employees who are “absorbed” as regular and permanent from the
beginning of their employment. The Union Shop Clause did not so
distinguish, and so neither must we.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The effect or consequence of BPI’s

so-called “absorption” of former Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) employees should be limited to what they actually agreed to, i.e.
recognition of the FEBTC employees’ years of service, salary rate and
other benefits with their previous employer—the effect should not be
stretched so far as to exempt former FEBTC employees from the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) terms, company policies and rules
which apply to employees similarly situated.—We agree with the Court of
Appeals that there are no substantial differences between a newly hired
non-regular employee who was regularized weeks or months after his
hiring and a new employee who was absorbed from another bank as a
regular employee pursuant to a merger, for purposes of applying the
Union Shop Clause. Both employees were hired/employed only after the
CBA was signed. At the time they are being required to join the Union,
they are both already regular rank and file employees of BPI. They
belong to the same bargaining unit being represented by the Union.
They both enjoy benefits that the Union was able to secure for them
under the CBA. When they both entered the employ of BPI, the CBA and
the Union Shop Clause therein were already in effect and neither of
them had the opportunity to express their preference for unionism or
not. We see no cogent reason why the Union Shop Clause should not be
applied equally to these two types of new employees, for they are
undeniably similarly situated. The effect or consequence of BPI’s so-
called “absorption” of former FEBTC employees should be limited to
what they actually agreed to, i.e. recognition of the FEBTC employees’
years of service, salary rate and other benefits with their previous
employer. The effect should not be stretched so far as to exempt former
FEBTC employees from the existing CBA terms, company policies and
rules which apply to employees similarly situated. If the Union Shop
Clause is valid as to other new regular BPI employees, there is no reason
why the same clause would be a violation of the “absorbed” employees’
freedom of association.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is but fair that similarly situated
employees who enjoy the same privileges of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) should be likewise subject to the same obligations the
CBA imposes upon them—a contrary interpretation of the Union Shop
Clause will be inimical to industrial peace and workers’ solidarity.—It is
but fair that similarly situated employees who enjoy the same privileges
of a CBA should be likewise subject to the same obligations the CBA
imposes upon them. A contrary interpretation of the Union Shop Clause
will be inimical to industrial peace and workers’ solidarity. This
unfavorable situation will not be sufficiently addressed by asking the
former FEBTC employees to simply pay agency fees to the Union in lieu
of union membership, as the dissent of Justice Carpio suggests. The fact
remains that other new regular employees, to whom the “absorbed
employees” should be compared, do not have the option to simply pay
the agency fees and they must join the Union or face termination.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A certified union whose membership

falls below twenty percent (20%) of the total members of the collective
bargaining unit may lose its status as a legitimate labor organization
altogether, even in a situation where there is no competing union, in
which case, an interested party may file for the cancellation of the union’s
certificate of registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations.—Without
the union shop clause or with the restrictive interpretation thereof as
proposed in the dissenting opinions, the company can jeopardize the
majority status of the certified union by excluding from union
membership all new regular employees whom the Company will
“absorb” in future mergers and all new regular employees whom the
Company hires as regular from the beginning of their employment
without undergoing a probationary period. In this manner, the
Company can increase the number of members of the collective
bargaining unit and if this increase is not accompanied by a
corresponding increase in union membership, the certified union may
lose its majority status and render it vulnerable to attack by another
union who wishes to represent the same bargaining unit. Or worse, a
certified union whose membership falls below twenty percent (20%) of
the total members of the collective bargaining unit may lose its status as
a legitimate labor organization altogether, even in a situation where
there is no competing union. In such a case, an interested party may file
for the cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration with the
Bureau of Labor Relations. Plainly, the restrictive interpretation of the
union shop clause would place the certified union’s very existence at the
mercy and control of the employer. Relevantly, only BPI, the employer
appears to be interested in pursuing this case. The former FEBTC
employees have not joined BPI in this appeal.

Same; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Social Justice; The

constitutional guarantee given the right to form unions and the State
policy to promote unionism have social justice considerations.—It is
unsurprising that significant provisions on labor protection of the 1987
Constitution are found in Article XIII on Social Justice. The constitutional
guarantee given the right to form unions and the State policy to promote
unionism have social justice considerations. In People’s Industrial and
Commercial Employees and Workers Organization v. People’s Industrial
and Commercial Corporation, 112 SCRA 440 (1982), we recognized that
“[l]abor, being the weaker in economic power and resources than
capital, deserve protection that is actually substantial and material.”

Same; Same; Same; Right of Association; The rationale for upholding

the validity of union shop clauses in a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), even if they impinge upon the individual employee’s right or
freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the union’s sake—a
strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the
bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to
demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer.—
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA,
even if they impinge upon the individual employee’s right or freedom of
association, is not to protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws and
jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the
certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and
effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit
since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved
benefits and conditions of work from the employer. This is the rationale
behind the State policy to promote unionism declared in the
Constitution, which was elucidated in the above-cited case of Liberty
Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA 668 (1989).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Hierarchy of Rights; In the hierarchy of

constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to
abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of
encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice.—In the case at
bar, since the former FEBTC employees are deemed covered by the
Union Shop Clause, they are required to join the certified bargaining
agent, which supposedly has gathered the support of the majority of
workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate certification
proceeding. Their joining the certified union would, in fact, be in the
best interests of the former FEBTC employees for it unites their
interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. It
encourages employee solidarity and affords sufficient protection to the
majority status of the union during the life of the CBA which are the
precisely the objectives of union security clauses, such as the Union
Shop Clause involved herein. We are indeed not being called to balance
the interests of individual employees as against the State policy of
promoting unionism, since the employees, who were parties in the court
below, no longer contested the adverse Court of Appeals’ decision.
Nonetheless, settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in
favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual
employee will be benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of
constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to
abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of
encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice.

T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN

CORPORATION, STINNES HUANG, BEN HUANG and ROGELIO
MADRIAGA, petitioners, vs. T & H SHOPFITTERS
CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, ELPIDIO
ZALDIVAR, DARIOS GONZALES, WILLIAM DOMINGO, BOBBY
CASTILLO, JIMMY M. PASCUA, GERMANO M. BAJO, RICO L.
MANZANO, ALLAN L. CALLORINA, ROMEO BLANCO, GILBERT
M. GARCIA, CARLOS F. GERILLO, EDUARDO A. GRANDE,
EDILBRANDO MARTICIO, VIVENCIO SUSANO, ROLANDO
GARCIA, JR., MICHAEL FABABIER, ROWELL MADRIAGA,
PRESNIL TOLENTINO, MARVIN VENTURA, FRANCISCO
RIVARES, PLACIDO TOLENTINO and ROLANDO ROMERO,
respondents.

Labor Law; Unfair Labor Practices; In essence, Unfair Labor Practice

(ULP) relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right
to organize.—In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that
transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified in Articles 248
[now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the
prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers’ right to self-
organization.

Same; Same; Right to Self-Organization; The questioned acts of

petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its
employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled
certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of
petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the
field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling
center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing
respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site
to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational
basis for union members, taken together, reasonably support an inference
that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free
exercise of their right to self-organization.—The questioned acts of
petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its
employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled
certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of
petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the
field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling
center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing
respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan
site to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a
rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part
of petitioners. Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken
together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all
orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-
organization. The Court is of the considered view that petitioners’
undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled
certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the
affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining
representative. In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas,
701 SCRA 589 (2013), the Court ruled that a certification election was
the sole concern of the workers, save when the employer itself had to
file the petition x x x, but even after such filing, its role in the
certification process ceased and became merely a bystander. Thus,
petitioners had no business persuading and/or assisting its employees
in their legally protected independent process of selecting their
exclusive bargaining representative. The fact and peculiar timing of the
field trip sponsored by petitioners for its employees not affiliated with
THS-GQ Union, although a positive enticement, was undoubtedly
extraneous influence designed to impede respondents in their quest to
be certified. This cannot be countenanced.

Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; In labor cases, the quantum of

proof necessary is substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.—In labor cases, the quantum of proof necessary is
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

No. L-33987. May 31, 1979. *

LIBERTY COTTON MILLS WORKERS UNION, RAFAEL

NEPOMUCENO, MARCIANO CASTILLO, NELLY ACEVEDO,
RIZALINO CASTILLO, and RAFAEL COM-BALICER, petitioners,
vs. LIBERTY COTTON MILLS, INC., PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
OF FREE LABOR UNION (PAFLU), and THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Labor Law; Company guilty of bad faith for having summarily

dismissed its employee is liable to pay back wages.—It is OUR considered
view that respondent company is equally liable for the payment of
backwages for having acted in bad faith in effecting the dismissal of the
individual petitioners. Bad faith on the part of the respondent company
may be gleaned from the fact that the petitioner workers were
dismissed hastily and summarily. At best, it was guilty of a tortious act,
for which it must assume solidary liability, since it apparently chose to
summarily dismiss the workers at the union’s instance secure in the
union’s contractual undertaking that the union would hold it “free from
any liability” arising from such dismissal.
 Same; Power to dismiss employee is not without any limitation.—The
power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this
is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in
terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made
upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, as in the instant case. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and
capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee
because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood.
Employers should therefore respect and protect the rights of their
employees, which includes the right to labor.

Same; Employer which unlawfully connives with a labor union to

dismiss some of its employees is held solidarity liable with the union for
damages.—These facts and circumstances on record further underscore
the existence of conspiracy or connivance between the company and
PAFLU in the dismissal of the petitioner workers. Respondent company
is therefore a party to the illegal dismissal of the petitioner workers.
Under such a situation, the respondent company should be jointly and
severally liable with the respondent PAFLU for the payment of
backwages to the petitioner workers.

Same; Backwages for 3 years without deduction a valid award.—The

amount of backwages fixed by the Court in the main decision, consisting
of three (3) years backwages without deduction or qualification,
following the formula of computing backwages enunciated in the case of
Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. (56
SCRA 694 [1974]), is just and reasonable under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the case.

LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS),

petitioner, vs. MARCELO ENTERPRISES and MARCELO TIRE &
RUBBER CORP., MARCELO RUBBER AND LATEX PRODUCTS,
MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL &
PIGMENT CORP., POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Labor Law; There is no evidence that the management of Marcelo group

of companies was guilty of ULP in asking the returning strikers to fill up
forms on when they are available for work.—Hence, anent the second
issue of whether or not the complaint for unfair labor practice can be
sustained, this Court rules in favor of the respondent Marcelo
Companies and consequently, the appealed Decision is reversed. This
reversal is inevitable after this Court has pored through the
voluminuous records of the case as well as after applying the
established jurisprudence and the law on the matters raised.We are not
unmindful of the plight of the employees in this case but We consider it
oppressive to grant their petition in G.R.No.L-38258, for not only is
there no evidence which shows that the respondent Marcelo Companies
were seeking for an opportunity to discharge these employees for union
activities, or to discriminate against them because of such activities, but
there is affirmative evidence to establish the contrary conclusion.

Same; Management’s suggestion that union file necessary complaint in

court in view of fact that there are several unions claiming to represent
employees does not constitute failure or refusal to bargain in good faith to
said union’s demands.—Contrary to the pretensions of complainant
LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo Companies did not ignore the demand
for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20, 1967. Neither
did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was to apprise
LAKAS of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the
bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, and
suggested the settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition
for certification election before the Court of Industrial Relations. This
was not only the legally approved procedure but was dictated by the
fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with
whom the existing CB As were entered into, was demanding of
respondent companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino
Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the
MFWU, and the complainant LAKAS for MULU which we understand is
the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On top of all of these,
Jose Roque of UNWU disauthorized the PSSLU from representing his
union; and similarly, Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU itself informed
management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand of LAKAS that
no group representing his Union “is not authorized and should not be
entertained.”

Same; Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of several unions is

the legitimate representative of employees, it is ULP for one of the unions
to stage a strike and demand that employer sit down with it for collective
bargaining.—The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated
indisputably show that a legitimate representation issue confronted the
respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts and in
conformity with the existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed
no duty to bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part
of said companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that all acts
instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of
Strike on June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the two strikes
of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were calculated, designed
and intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to
recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it was an uncertified
union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of
Paulino Lazaro was already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said
respondent company. These concerted activities executed and carried
into effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal and
violative of the employer’s basic right to bargain collectively only with
the representative supported by the majority of its employees in each of
the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present
predicament of the employees involved but much as We sympathize
with those who have been misled and so lost then-jobs through hasty,
ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither
substantiate nor support the finding that the respondent Marcelo
Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.

Same; Employer not guilty of bad faith where it not with union’s officers
and offered suggestions on how to resolve their dif-ferences.—It is also
evident from the records that the charge of bargaining in bad faith
imputed to the respondent companies, is hardly credible. In fact, such
charge is valid as only against the complainant LAKAS. The parties had a
total of five (5) conferences for purposes of collective bargaining. It is
worth considering that the first strike of September 4, 1967 was staged
less than a week after the fourth CBA conference and without any
benefit of any previous strike notice. In this connection, it must be
stated that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not have
been the strike notice for the first strike because it was already
withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these stated facts can be seen
that the first strike was held while the parties were in the process of
negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that the respondent Marcelo
Companies bargained in bad faith since there were proposals offered by
them, but the complainant LAKAS stood pat on its position that all of
their economic demands should be met and that all of these demands
should be granted in all of the respondent Marcelo Companies. The
companies’ refusal to accede to the demands of LAKAS appears to be
justified since there is no showing that these companies were in the
same state of financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe
that the first strike was staged only for the purpose of compelling the
respondent Marcelo Companies to accede to the inflexible demands of
the complainant LAKAS. The records further establish that after the
resumption of normal operations following the first strike and the
consequent Return-to-work Agreement, the striking unions led by
complainant LAKAS and the management of the respondent Marcelo
Companies resumed their bargaining negotiations. And that on October
13, 1967, complainant LAKAS sent the final drafts of the collective
bargaining proposals for MFWU and UNWU. The second strike of
November 7, 1967 was then staged immediately after which strike, as
before, was again lacking of a strike notice. All of these facts show that it
was complainant LAKAS, and not the respondent Marcelo Companies,
which refused to negotiate in the pending collective bargaining process.
All that the facts show is that the bargaining position of complainant
LAKAS was inflexible and that it was in tine with this uncompromising
attitude that the strikes were declared, significantly after notice that
management did not or could not meet all of their 17-points demand.

Same; Employer may be justified in requiring a reasonable scheduling of

working hours of returning striking employees and inquiring into their
time availabilities.—But We are more impressed and are persuaded to
accept as true the contention of the respondent Marcelo Companies that
the aforestated requirement was only for purposes of proper scheduling
of the start of work for each returning strikers. It must be noted that as
a consequence of the two strikes which were both attended by
widespread acts of violence and vandalism, the businesses of the
respondent companies were completely paralyzed. It would hardly be
justiciable to demand of the respondent companies to readmit all the
returning workers in one big force or as each demanded readmission.
There were machines that were not in operating condition because of
long disuse during the strikes. Some of the machines needed more than
one worker to operate them so that in the absence of the needed team of
workers, the start of work by one without his teammates would
necessarily be useless, and the company would be paying for his time
spent doing no work. Finally, We take judicial cognizance of the fact that
companies whose businesses were completely paralyzed by major
strikes cannot resume operations at once and in the same state or force
as before the strikes.

Same; Same.—But what strikes Us most in lending credence to

respondents’ allegation that Exhibit “49” was not meant to screen the
strikers, is the fact that all of the returning strikers who filled up the
form were scheduled for work and consequently started with their
jobs.It is only those strikers who refused or failed to fill-up the required
form, like the herein complaining employees, who were not scheduled
for work and consequently have not been re-employed by the
respondent Marcelo Companies. Even if there was a sincere belief on
their part that the requirement of Exhibit “49” was a ruse at “screening”
them, this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that
each and all of their co-strikers who filled up the required form were in
fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage of their work
was not, therefore, the direct consequence of the respondent
companies’ complained act. Hence, their economic loss should not be
shifted to the employer.

Same; Right to engage in concerted activities is not an absolute one.—It

was never the state policy nor Our judicial pronouncement that the
employees’ rights to self-organization and to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid and protection, are absolute or be upheld under
all circumstances.

Same; Action; A labor union cannot bring an action on behalf of

employees who are members of another union even if said employees
signed the complaint.—Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for and in
behalf of the employees who were members of MUEWA because, as
intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local union was never an
affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly from the records is that it was
Augusto Carreon and his followers who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto
Carreon was not the recognized president of MUEWA and neither he nor
his followers can claim any legitimate representation of MUEWA.
Apparently, it is this split faction of MUEWA, headed by Augusto
Carreon, who is being sought to be represented by LAKAS. However, it
cannot do so because the members constituting this split faction of
MUEWA were still members of MUEWA which was on its own right a
duly registered labor union. Hence, any suit to be brought for and in
behalf of them can be made only by MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It
appearing then that Augusto Carreon and his cohorts did not disaffiliate
from MUEWA nor signed any individual affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS
bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its members.

Same; Same.—Nor will the lower court’s opinion be availing with

respect to the complaining employees belonging to UNWU and MFWU.
Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when it filed the charge on
December 26, 1967, the officers of the movant unions were not yet then
the officers thereof, nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU
separated from and disaffiliated with LAKAS to again exercise its rights
as independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no
longer affiliates of LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally, there
would no longer be any reason or occasion for LAKAS to continue
representing them. Notable is the fact that the members purportedly
represented by LAKAS constitute the mere minority of the movant
unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of the movant unions as
well as the counter-allegations of LAKAS filed below. As such, they
cannot prevail or dictate upon the will of the greater majority of the
unions to which they still belong, it appearing that they never
disaffiliated from their unions; or stated in another way, they are bound
by the action of the greater majority.

Same; Same; Where a union brought suit in behalf of employees it was not
authorized to represent, the proper remedy is to drop the union as party
to the action and place the names of the employees instead.—This is not
to say that the complaining employees were without any venue for
redress. Under the aforestated considerations, the respondent court
should have directed the amendment of the complaint by dropping
LAKAS as the complainant and allowing the suit to be further
prosecuted in the individual names of those who had grievances. A class
suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court is authorized and
should suffice for the purpose.
Same; Same; Appeals; Supreme Court may cure defect of inclusion/non-
inclusion of proper parties even on appeal—In fairness to the
complaining employees, however, We treated their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision subject of appeal as curing the defect of
the complaint as the said motion expressly manifested their collective
desire to pursue the complaint for and in their own behalves and
disauthorizing LAKAS’ counsel from further representing them. And We
have also treated their petition before Us in the same manner,
disregarding the fact that LAKAS remained the petitioning party, as it
appears from the verification that the petition in L-38258 was for and in
behalf of the complaining employees. The merits of their petition,
however, fall short of substantiating the charge of unfair labor practice
against the respondent Marcelo Companies. On the other hand, the
appeal of the Marcelo Companies in L-38260 must be upheld and
sustained.