1.

Extensively Discuss Substitution, Representation, Accretion

2. Memorize/Familiarize Article 992

3. Three lines of reserva troncal

lastly 2 cases na iya gi hatag which is *

Aranas v. Mercado (G.R. No. 156407) and

G.R. No. 156407.January 15, 2014.*THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V.MERCADO,
FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L.MERCADO, respondents

.Civil Law; Succession;

The approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at any time during the
course of the administration proceedings.—The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s
motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for
reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was
not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at any time during the course of the administration proceedings.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;

The final judgmentrule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules ofCourt, which also
governs appeals in special proceedings,stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions)
ofa court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of aparticular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to beappealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course.—Anappeal would not be
the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to takeagainst the assailed orders. The final judgment
ruleembodied inthe first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, whichalso governs appeals in
special proceedings, stipulates that onlythe judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of
law“that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular mattertherein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable” may bethe subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states thatan
interlocutory order or resolution (interlocu-_______________* FIRST DIVISION.

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195tory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial onthe merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) isexpressly made non-appealable.

*Mendoza v. Policarpio

Mendoza v. de Los Santos G.R. No. 176422 |March 20, 2013

CASE DIGEST

Mendoza v. de Los Santos

G.R. No. 176422 |March 20, 2013

Topic: Applicability of Reserva Troncal; First cousins of the descendant/ prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and cannot be considered reservees/ reservatarios

Facts:

The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga)
alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went to Gregoria when Leonor died after. Gregoria
died intestate, and thereafter, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria.

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. The RTC
granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance but on appeal to the CA, however, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
the complaint filed by petitioners and also denied their motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
1. Won the CA grievously erred in holding that the subject properties are not reservable properties,
coming as they do from the family line of the petitioners Mendozas. - NO

2. Won CA grievously erred in holding that the petitioners Mendozas do not have a right to the subject
properties by virtue of the law on reserva troncal. - NO

Held:

1. The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on Reserva Troncal is
not applicable. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: (1) The ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title; (2) The descendant
or prepositus (propositus) who received the property; (3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s
as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining
the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that
Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally
came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant
or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant).
After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.

2. Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered reservees/ reservatarios as they are not relatives
within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus
are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants
a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus,
who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of
the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the
reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property
came.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by gratuitous title.Based on the circumstances of the present case,
Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.

What is the iron-curtain rule?

Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children cannot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his mother or father. Legitimate children and relatives cannot inherit
in the same way from the illegitimate child.

Note: The iron curtain rule only applies in intestate succession. There is a barrier recognized by law
between the legitimate relatives and the illegitimate child so that one cannot inherit from the other and
vice-versa.

According to the New Civil Code of the Philippines, an illegitimate child cannot inherit from the intestate
estate of the legitimate children or relatives of his/her father or mother and vice versa. This is according
to Article 992 of the code, which provides:
“Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.”

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The Supreme Court in the case of Olivia S. Pascual vs. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista (G.R. No. 84240,
March 25, 1992), expounded on the reason behind the prohibition mentioned in Article 992 of the code,
to wit:

“Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between an illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of the legitimate child. They may have natural blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family, there is presumed to be
an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon
by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.”

Also, the word “relatives” shall be construed in its general sense, which includes ascendants, among
others. (Anselma Diaz vs Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987)

That being the case, an illegitimate child cannot inherit from the legitimate parents of his/her father or
mother, except through a will, duly executed by the latter in accordance with the form and solemnities
prescribed by law, expressly bequeathing property to the former.

Rationale: The law presumes the existence of antagonism between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate relatives of his parents.