Sie sind auf Seite 1von 7

20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute


Home (/)  “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization

“Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures

and Social and Political Mobilization
October 19, 2016
Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle (/experts/rikke-hostrup-haugbolle)




This essay is part of a series that examines the genesis, evolution, mobilization tools and processes, impacts and limitations of informal civil society in
political transitions, that is, loose groupings of like-minded individuals—those that are unofficial, unregistered, or unregulated—in the MENA and Southeast
Asia. Read more ... (

Ten hands holding each other around the wrist form a circle around the crescent and star of the Tunisian flag. At critical moments
since the popular uprising in 2011 and the ousting of President Ben Ali this picture was often accompanied by the slogan ”Together for
Tunisia.” The message of the circle of hands and the slogan is clear: Tunisia is one nation of one people standing together. This
narrative was enforced and reproduced in 2014 when the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize[1] for
their effort to bring the work on a new constitution back on the track. The Quartet consisted of four large organizations,[2] often
referred to as “civil society actors,” representing all segments of Tunisian society.[3] 1/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute

The Quartet seemed to support a view of the importance of ‘civil society’ in Tunisia and who and what ‘civil society’ in Tunisia is that
dates back to the takeover of power by President Ben Ali in 1987 and the so-called ‘National Pact’ signed in 1989.[4] The Pact reflected
a narrative of national unity articulated in speeches delivered by President Ben Ali that encouraged Tunisian civil society to take an
active part in what he called “The New Era.” This led scholars such as Eva Bellin to note that “associational life has indeed blossomed.
Recent official counts put the number of associations in Tunisia at over 5,100, with 3,300 formed since 1988.”[5] Today we know that
many of these civil society organizations were launched and funded by the authoritarian regime. But Ben Ali’s New Era seemed in
many ways to confirm the expectations of the scholars of modernization theory, and of neo-liberal assumptions focusing on civil
society as a precondition for and hallmark of democratization. As Yom has noticed: “Drawing upon such work, Arab specialists
generated exciting studies that dissected civil society―defined as the organizational sector of public life distinctive from the family,
market, and state.”[6]

This essay challenges these ideas and concepts. It demonstrates that national unity was constructed and utilized as a tool by the
Tunisian state for the purpose of consolidating power, and that traditional kin-based and family ties have existed parallel to the formal
structures of both the state and civil society as frames for social and political activity. As will be shown, these historical frames for
organization were revitalized after the popular uprising in 2011.

Narrating National Unity: The Tunisian Family

In many ways, the circle of hands and the slogan “Together for Tunisia” is a reproduction of the Tunisian nation-state created by
President Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) and continued by President Ben Ali (1987-2011), depicting the country as a homogenous,
harmonious country composed of a population 98 percent of which is Arab Sunni Muslims and with no significant regional differences
in culture, ways of life, or worldviews. The narrative of national unity was launched by President Bourguiba in the wake of Tunisian
independence in 1956. As Charrad has noticed: “To establish the hegemony of the state, the groups in power must transfer social
control at least in part from its prior basis in local, ethnical, or kin-based communities to national institutions. Only then is the state in a
position to make binding decisions for all.”[7] In an effort to solidify his own power and to establish the “hegemony of the state,”
Bourguiba devised measures to delimit the role of Islam and instituted family law reforms.

The family law reforms gained Bourguiba and Tunisia a very positive reputation in the Arab world as well as in the West. There is no
doubt that the reforms accorded Tunisian women a wide range of legal rights that moved the country towards gender equality.
However, the family law reforms, in particular, also aimed to weaken, if not dismantle historically-based kinship ties, which until then
had “served as a major anchor for social solidarity, social control, and collective political action.”[8]  The aim of seeking to dismantle
these kinship ties stemmed from the concern that they constituted a basis for contenders for power.

The contenders were found within the Tunisian independence movement, Neo-Destour. Although Bourguiba was the titular head of the
movement, Neo-Destour was split between a Bourguiba faction, which aspired to replicate the French governance model in Tunisia
with its separation of governance and religion, and a faction led by Salah Ben Youssef who wanted Arab-Muslim values to be much
more central. Salah Ben Youssef originated from the southern part of Tunisia, where, historically, kin-based and tribal ties and the
consciousness of these ties has been particularly strong. Islam, which was also strong in these areas, constituted the frame for legal
and societal organization as well as the marker of identity. Ben Youssef considered these values as crucial for the newly independent
Tunisia, and placed himself in opposition to Bourguiba’s French-inspired promotion of laïcité. It is in this context—of a struggle for
power to define the identity of a future independent Tunisia—that Islam and kinship-based groupings posed a challenge to Bourguiba’s
consolidation of the “hegemony of the state.”

Bourguiba emerged as the winner of this internal power struggle when he succeeded in signing an agreement securing Tunisia’s
partial independence from France in 1956. He sentenced Salah Ben Youssef to death, though the latter fled to Tripoli and then to Zürich,
where he was assassinated in 1961.[9] Shortly after taking power Bourguiba, initiated a comprehensive reform program, including
steps towards state-led socialism, education and family law reforms, and the granting a wide range of legal rights for women.

Bourguiba's reform policies were intended not simply to create an independent Tunisia by dissolving the traditional structures but to
replace them. His aim was to imbue society with a sense of collective “national” identity. Thus, he embarked on a project of
constructing the “nation” by shifting primary identity and loyalty from the family unit to the “Tunisian family.” This message was
disseminated through Bourguiba’s many and famous speeches. In one such speech, delivered in 1962, he said that “the consciousness
of the solidarity and the brotherhood which link the members of the Tunisian family associated in the same effort, within a cooperative
or a society, within a village, the government or the homeland […] constitute the cement of a united nation.” Thus Bourguiba managed to
move loyalty and identity from the smallest unit—the village—to the abstract level of the nation. Family, tribal, and village loyalty was
thus transferred to the “Tunisian family” and its father, Bourghiba.

Upon taking power in 1987, Ben Ali continued the practice of the iconization of the president as the Father of the Nation. Photos
featured Ben Ali embracing old “uncles and aunts” while the “Tunisian family” in the villages applauded him. Billboards in villages and
towns throughout the country were emblazoned with the text “Together with Ben Ali for Tunisia’s sake.” However, the reform policies
and the articulation of a transcendant Tunisian nation-family as a replacement of the small, close family based on kinship were only
partially successful. As will be shown, kinship ties proved remarkably resilient and available to contenders who would employ them,
especially after the popular uprising in 2011, for the purpose of social mobilization. In addition, the name of Salah Ben Youssef 2/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute

reappeared as a reference in instances where people in marginalized areas in the interior and southern part of Tunisia argued that the
time had come for their inclusion in building Tunisia’s future. Thus, the struggle for identity and power underlying all other
organizational structures for social and political activism continued in the decades after independence. 

Narratives of Kin-Based Unity

Over the years, despite the comprehensive reform programs of both president Bourguiba and Ben Ali, there was clear and growing
evidence of the state’s indifference and inability to satisfy the basic material needs of the population in the northwest, interior and
southern parts of Tunisia—strongholds of the contenders for power. Perhaps less clear is that, in the context of these failures and
deficiencies, which sapped the legitimacy of the state and ultimately led to the popular uprising, traditional kinship ties remained
intact, as illustrated in the area of Nefzaoua in southern Tunisia, nearby the Sahara.

The Tunisian population living in Nefzaoua area is composed mainly of five major tribes.[10] The Marazig—a tribe that only two-three
generations ago was semi-nomadic—now resides in the town of Douz.[11] Other tribes also inhabit Douz, such as the Jleila, who are
distant cousins of the Marazig. There is a keen awareness among the residents of Douz of who is a “real” Marazig and who is not. From
the very first settlement in this area, the Marazig were seen as superior to the other tribes and had the obligation of protecting and
leading the inhabitants of what later became the town of Douz. This hierarchy manifests itself in the physical division of Douz into
quarters, as well as in local politics and business. Some members of the Marazig lineage see themselves as essentially different from
the Jleila in terms of their mentality, profession, and economic standing. As a result, “real” Marazig and Jleila generally do not mingle
with each other. The sharpest distinction or barrier is that between the Marazig and the people of Aouina. The latter are not directly
related to Marazig and thus many Marazig do not consider their holding any public position in the town to be legitimate.

Kin-based Ties and Post-Uprising Social Mobilization

While such relationships between tribes and families building on historical descent were not part of the official story before the
popular uprising in 2011, the relevance of a division of towns along family and kinship lines became visible to the wider public after the
uprising. One example is the mining town of Metlaoui, which is situated in southwestern Tunisia near the mountainous border with
Algeria. In May 2011 riots erupted in Metlaoui. Rumors circulated by the Tunisian media would tell that the local phosphate company—
by far the biggest and most important employer in the area—recruited mine workers from a specific tribe instead of offering the
positions in open calls and on the basis of merit. Clashes broke out between those families favored by the phosphate company and
those which were not.

Three years earlier, Metlaoui had also been the site of a popular uprising; however, this earlier unrest was led by Union Générale
Tunisienne du Travail (The Tunisian General Labour Union, or UGTT), and not by families and tribes vying for jobs. This phenomenon led
the editor of the Tunisian magazine Kapitalis to observe that: “At difficult moments and in the absence of a socio-political frame of
reference (a strong government, legitimate parties, representative organizations) people take refuge in what they consider as the
primary unit of social organization: the family, the clan, the tribe. The feelings of national belonging and civism—if this has ever existed
in these regions unfairly marginalized and neglected by the state—leave room for solidarity based on clans and tribes.”[12] As
discussed above, the existence and relevance of tribes, clans, and kinship is coupled to the state project of creating a “nation” where
the state’s role as provider of social security is crucial.

In the case of Metlaoui, kinship divided the local population. However, kinship ties have also served as the basis for alliances and as a
frame for social mobilization. While Tunisia and Libya has been separated by the official border since 1910,[13] the populations in the
border area have all along maintained close ties. These trans-border linkages were visible to the outside world in the years prior to the
uprising primarily in the form of unofficial, or ‘illegal’, commerce whereby marketplaces in southern and western Tunisia traded goods
from Libya at much lower prices than similar products available in official Tunisian markets.

Trans-border ties played an important role in the 2011 humanitarian response, when more than 40,000 Libyan refugees arrived in
south Tunisia in February as a consequence of the confrontations between protesters and state security forces. Little, if any, official
emergency assistance was available to cope with the initial mass influx of refugees. The local population stepped in to fill the vacuum.
Ties between families, relatives, and friends became the framework for social mobilization. Many Libyans in the first waves of refugees
were accommodated by families, friends, and kin in the southern Tunisian towns of Medenine and Tataouine and on the isle of Jerba.
Informal volunteer groups emerged, setting up primitive offices and organizing the collection of cash donations to cover the expenses
for packages of fruit, vegetables, pasta, and milk distributed to the Libyan refugees, as well as gathering of blankets, clothes, and other
basic needs. These informal groups continued their work for many months, even after the arrival of international aid organizations
such as the Red Cross/Crescent and the World Food Program. By May 2011, Tunisia had officially received more than 400,000 refugees
from Libya. Half of them—guest workers from China, Egypt, Sudan, and elsewhere—were repatriated through the intervention of the
Tunisian state and international organizations. However, the rest were accommodated and assisted through informal networks based
on generations of family relations and other kin-based ties.

Does a Socio-political Frame Exist? 3/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute

The two examples above demonstrate how family and kin-based ties were activated, and how they formed an important framework for
social and political mobilization in the months following the popular uprising in 2011. Since then, Tunisia has seen the creation of more
than 2,800 new, formal civil society organizations.[14] Nevertheless, family and kinship-based activism continues to exist. At the
beginning of 2016, there was a fresh outbreak of unrest in the cities of Kesserine, Le Kef, and Medenine. Historically, these cities have
been among the most deprived areas of the country, not least because they were strongholds of tribal- and religious-based challenges
to the power of presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The 2016 unrest was a reaction to the continued high rates of unemployment and
economic deprivation in these regions. The unrest indicates that the population in the periphery still feels excluded from the “nation”
and from political processes which they regard as still dominated by a Tunis-based elite.

The question which arises is whether the current relevance of kin-based groupings reflects the absence of a strong state, political
parties, and representative organizations or constitutes a fundamental, historically rooted base for social and political mobilization and
as such is an integral part of Tunisian civil society. The American political scientist Lisa Anderson has criticized Middle East scholars
for focusing their research only on issues, actors and events “where the light shines.”[15] Anderson calls on researchers to be more
discerning: “We may have to search a bit more in the shadows, in the arenas of political life less well illuminated by conventional
political science.”[16] If we set aside conventional notions of civil society and search instead in the shadows—as, for instance, in the
informal sector—we might discover, as this article has sought to demonstrate, that socio-political activism and mobilization can be
based on kinship, tribal, and family belonging; and that such frames were never really dismantled and are indeed still very much alive
in Tunisia.

[1] Sewell Chan, “Nobel Prize is Awarded to a National Dialogue Quartet in Tunisia,” The New York Times, October 15, 2015, accessed
October 14, 2016,…

[2] The four organizations were: The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), The Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and
Handicrafts (UTICA), The Tunisian Human Rights League and The Tunisian Order of Lawyers.

[3] Julian Borger, “Who are the Tunisian national dialogue quartet?” The Guardian, October 9, 2015, accessed October 14, 2016,…

[4] In September 1988, Ben Ali invited the leaders of 16 opposition parties and civil society organisations to discussions of a new
national agreement, The National Pact. The agreement was approved on November 7, the first anniversary of Ben Ali’s takeover. The
National Pact was signed by the four associations, which 15 years later, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: Union Générale
Tunisienne du Travail (The Tunisian General Labour Union, or UGTT), Union Tunisienne de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat
(Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, or UTICA), The Tunisian Human Rights League, and The Tunisian Order of Lawyers.
See Lisa Anderson, “Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy: The Tunisian National Pact of 1988,” Government & Opposition 26, 2
(1991): 24–260.

[5] Eva Bellin, “Civil Society in Tunisia,” in Richard Augustus Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East Vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995),

[6] Sean Yom, “Arab Civil Society after the Arab Spring: Weaker but Deeper,” Middle East Institute, October 22, 2015, accessed October
14, 2016,

[7] Mounira M. Charrad, Women’s Rights. The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 2001), 20.

[8] Ibid, 6.

[9] Omar Khlifi, L’Assassinat de Salah Ben Youssef (Tunis: MC Editions, 2005).

[10] Field work conducted from 1996 to 2001.

[11] The Marazig trace their origin to Hamad Ghoudh Marazug, who led a caravan from the Arabian Peninsula in the 13th century. Other
tribes in Douz are descendants of relatives of the Marazig, such as the Jleilas. 4/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute

[12] Editorial, Kapitalis, April 26, 2011, accessed October 14, 2016, Assiste-t-on à la resurgence du clanisme et du tribalisme en

[13] Convention de délimitation des frontières entre la Tunisie et la Tripolitaine (Treaty Demarcating the Borders between Tunisia and
Libya), Wikisource, accessed October 14, 2016,

[14] Foundation for the Future: Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia, January 2013.

[15] Anderson, Lisa (2006) “Searching where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East,” Annual Review of Political
Science, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 189-214.

[16] Ibid., 210.

Related By Region

Nadia el-Fani: a soldier of secularism fights on

(/publications/nadia- Feb 15, 2018
Hadani Ditmars (/experts/hadani-ditmars)

Indonesia and Tunisia: Democracy as a Distinctive Link

Jan 30, 2018
and-tunisia- Giora Eliraz (/experts/giora-eliraz)

Tunisia's protests are a wake-up call for leaders

Jan 23, 2018
Wafa Ben-Hassine (/experts/wafa-ben-hassine)

Related By Issue

Islam, Migrants and Multiculturalism: A Glance at Germany, Korea

and Beyond (/publications/islam-migrants-and-multiculturalism-
(/publications/islam- glance-germany-korea-and-beyond)
migrants-and- May 22, 2018
Julius Maximilian Rogenhofer (/experts/julius-maximilian-rogenhofer), Hacer Z. Gonul
korea-and-beyond) 5/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute

Hezbollah after Lebanon’s elections (/publications/hezbollah-

May 03, 2018
Bilal Y. Saab (/experts/bilal-y-saab)

The way forward for Palestine: Fatah, Hamas and Dahlan

(/publications/way- Mar 09, 2018
Geoffrey Aronson (/experts/geoffrey-aronson)

Newsletter Signup
Sign up to receive the latest publications, event invitations, and our weekly newsletter delivered to your inbox.



Policy Analysis (/policy-analysis)

Events (/events)
Education (/education)
Experts (/experts)
Arts & Culture (/arts-culture-center)
Get Involved (/get-involved)
Search (/search)


General Information (
202-785-1141 (tel:202-785-1141)

Classes (
202-785-2710 (tel:202-785-2710)

Media Inquiries (
202-785-1141 x236 (tel:202-785-1141)

Middle East Journal ( 6/7
20/11/2018 “Together for Tunisia”: Tribal Structures and Social and Political Mobilization | Middle East Institute
202-785-1141 x205 (tel:202-785-1141)

Events (
202-785-1141 x243 (tel:202-785-1141)

Development (
202-785-1141 x209 (tel:202-785-1141)



( (

( (

Middle East Institute

1319 18th St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036

© 2018 Middle East Institute All Rights Reserved | Accessibility Policy ( | Built by Social Driver
( 7/7