THIRD DIVISION "With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No.
2000-261 on July 10, 2000, and the
[G.R. No. 146886. April 30, 2003.]
DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, Petitioner, v. BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of
regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the January
10, 2001 Decision and the February 5, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
61088. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit." 3
The assailed Resolution 4 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"At the root of this present [P]etition is the controversy surrounding the two (2) [C]omplaints for
eminent domain which were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a ONE HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay
Masili, Calamba, Laguna and owned by herein petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383605 of
the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit
Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by and between the
former and the latter on October 7, 1996.
"The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 3648 and entitled ‘Brgy. Masili,
Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A. Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E. Bardillon,’ was filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (’MTC’) on February 23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay
Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay
Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.
"On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 ‘for lack of interest’ for
failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in its Order dated May 3,
1999, denied [respondent’s] [M]otion for [R]econsideration thereof.
"The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 2845-99-C and entitled ‘Brgy.
Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Devorah E. Bardillon’ was filed before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna (’RTC’) on October 18, 1999. This [C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the
said Lot 4381-D for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a
Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule
16 in that [respondent’s] cause of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res
judicata.
"On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, holding that
the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said
expropriation proceeding.
submission thereof in compliance with [the] Judge’s Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring herein
respondent to produce the authority for the expropriation through the Municipal Council of Calamba,
Laguna, the assailed Order dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili . . . and, on
August 16, 2000, the corresponding order for the issuance of the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381-
D." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna (Branch
37) 6 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second
Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No. 2845-99-C) was not barred by res judicata. The reason is
that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case
No. 3648), had no jurisdiction over the action.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Hence, this Petition. 7
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"A. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it denied and dismissed petitioner’s appeal;
"B. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did
not pass upon and consider the pending Motion for Reconsideration which was not resolved by the
Regional Trial Court before issuing the questioned Orders of 4 and 16 August 2000;
"C. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in taking the
total amount of the assessed value of the land and building to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo;
"D. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring
the fact that there is an existing multi-purpose hall erected in the land owned by Eugenia Almazan which
should be subject of expropriation; and
"E. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
consider the issue of forum shopping committed by Respondent Masili." 8
Simply put, the issues are as follows: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
(2) whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata; (3) whether the CA erred
when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises; and (4) whether respondent is guilty of forum
shopping.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:\
Jurisdiction Over Expropriation
Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the
case. 9
On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960. 10
Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount
involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise
by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. 11 As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts. 12
This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor: 13
"It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government
or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence,
the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
"True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-
bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation."
"Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that ‘condemnation proceedings are
within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance,’ the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said
case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to
RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation.’ The 1997 amendments to the Rules of
Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents. 14
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land,
because the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of eminent domain — a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Second Issue:
Res Judicata
Petitioner claims that the MTC’s dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice,
since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the
second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment.
15 It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. 16
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court
that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action. 17
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.
Third Issue:
Legality of Entry Into Premises
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC’s Writ of Possession over her property,
issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint. We are not
persuaded.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 On the part of local
government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. 19
Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its
current tax declaration. 20
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied
with the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she
should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. 21 The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of
the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioner claims that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, because it scouted for another forum after
obtaining an unfavorable Decision from the MTC.
The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present in two or more pending cases, such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. 23
Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been dismissed when the Complaint
was filed before the RTC. Even granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a final judgment in
the MTC case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the former had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003.]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO, COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ISAIAS DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu
City, and PASCUAL Y. ABORDO, Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu
City,Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu,
Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23386. Petitioner
alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the claimant/owner of Lot 108-C located in the
Banilad Estate, Cebu City; that defendant Engracia Urot was the claimant/owner of Lots Nos. 108-F,
108-I, 108-G, 6019-A and 6013-A, all of the Banilad Estate; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo
were the claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that
the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing
project. 1
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating
that they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. Hence, the
trial court issued an Order as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate the properties
of the defendants who are heirs of Isidro Guivelondo.
The appointment of commissioners who would ascertain and report to the Court the just compensation
for said properties will be done as soon as the parties shall have submitted to the Court the names of
persons desired by them to be appointed as such commissioners.
SO ORDERED. 2
Thereafter, the trial court appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the correct and just compensation
of the properties of respondents. On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein
they recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per
square meter. 3 On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs
of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court in this case
fixing the just compensation for the lands of the defendants who are the heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,
more particularly Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 6016-F, 6016-H,
6016-E and 6016-D of Csd-10219, which were sought to be expropriated by the plaintiff at P11,200.00
per square meter and ordering the plaintiff to pay to the said defendants the just compensation for the
said lands computed at P11,200.00 per square meter.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner NHA filed two motions for reconsideration dated August 30, 2000 and August 31, 2000,
assailing the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation, respectively.
Respondent Heirs also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Partial Judgment. On October 11, 2000,
the trial court issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent Heirs and
the August 31, 2000 motion of petitioner, on the ground that the fixing of the just compensation had
adequate basis and support. On the other hand, the trial court granted petitioner’s August 30, 2000
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Commissioner’s Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and
19 within its coverage. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court hereby denies the motion of the heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo (with the exception of Carlota Mercado and Juanita Suemith) for reconsideration of the
partial judgment rendered in this case on August 7, 2000 and plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of
said judgment, dated August 31, 2000.cralawred
However, the Court hereby grants the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of said judgment, dated
August 30, 2000. Accordingly, the judgment rendered in this case on August 7, 2000 is hereby set aside
insofar as it has fixed just compensations for Lots Nos. 12, 13 and 19 of Csd-10219 because the fixing of
said just compensations appears to lack adequate basis.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
61746. 6 Meanwhile, on October 31, 2000, the trial court issued an Entry of Judgment over the Partial
Judgment dated August 7, 2000 as modified by the Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2000. 7
Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on November 22, 2000.
On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the
same. 8
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Clarificatory Ruling were denied
in a Resolution dated March 18, 2001. 9 A petition for review was filed by petitioner with this Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 147527. However, the same was denied in a Minute Resolution dated
May 9, 2001 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. 10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was however denied with finality on August 20, 2001.
Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner, on July 16, 2001, filed with the
trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that
the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable
value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford. 12 The
Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment had already
become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the
case. 13 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated November 20,
2001. 14
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 68670, praying for the annulment of the Order of the trial court denying its Motion to Dismiss and its
Motion for Reconsideration. 15
On February 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition. Immediately thereafter,
respondent Sheriff Pascual Y. Abordo of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, served on
petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court to enforce the
Partial Judgment of August 7, 2000 and the Omnibus Order of October 11, 2000. 16
On February 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of the petition and reinstated the
same. 17 Thereafter, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve
the status quo. 18
On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third
Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. 19 Subsequently,
respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of petitioner. 20
On July 16, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition
forcertiorari. 21
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review, raising the following issues:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR
CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2) WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES
APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
3) WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE
IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT
SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE {APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
10-2000}. 22
Respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed their Comment, arguing as follows:
I in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
AS EARLIER UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT, THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS ALREADY
FINAL AND EXECUTORY, HENCE, COULD NO LONGER BE DISTURBED NOR SET ASIDE
II
THE FUNDS AND ASSETS OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM LEVY AND GARNISHMENT
III
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS SECOND PETITION FOR REVIEW WERE ALREADY RESOLVED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT 23
In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann, 24 the Court was confronted with the question: May the
petitioner, in an action for expropriation, after he has been placed in possession of the property and
before the termination of the action, dismiss the petition? It resolved the issue in the affirmative and
held:
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with
certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was
brought for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later
discovers no longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from what he had intended,
then he should be permitted to withdraw his action, subject to the approval of the court. The plaintiff
should not be required to continue the action, subject to some well-defined exceptions, when it is not to
his advantage to do so. Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged. Courts should not require
parties to litigate when they no longer desire to do so. Courts, in granting permission to dismiss an
action, of course, should always take into consideration the effect which said dismissal would have upon
the rights of the defendant.
Subsequently, in Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, 26 the Court had occasion to apply the
above-quoted ruling when the petitioner, during the pendency of the expropriation case, resolved that
the land sought to be condemned was no longer necessary in the maintenance and operation of its
system of waterworks. It was held:
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for a public use. The
fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent
domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings
that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed,
for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some
public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal of at any other stage of the
proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it
should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for
public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it. 27
Notably, the foregoing cases refer to the dismissal of an action for eminent domain at the instance of the
plaintiff during the pendency of the case. The rule is different where the case had been decided and the
judgment had already become final and executory.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination
of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners. 28 Thus:
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemn,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the compensation to be determined as of
the date of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filled or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the
evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of
the order by taking an appeal therefrom. 29
The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or
an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase
ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. 30
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has
properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. 31 Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. 32
The above rule is based on Rule 67, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to
be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10, 1999, which
declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo.
Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. 33 A
final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through
appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. 34
Petitioner anchors its arguments on the last paragraph of the above-quoted Rule 67, Section 4. In
essence, it contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings. More specifically, petitioner alleges that the intended public use was rendered
nugatory by the unreasonable just compensation fixed by the court, which is beyond the means of the
intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing project. The argument is tenuous.
Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent
domain.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The
character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by
all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not
possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
x x x.
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls with the confines of
"public use." . . .. Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or
slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the
project. 35
The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban poor dwellers in
the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost more than petitioner had expected. It is
worthy to note that petitioner pursued its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the
amount of just compensation and its petition for review with this Court which eloquently indicates that
there still exists a public use for the housing project. It was only after its appeal and petitions for review
were dismissed that petitioner made a compete turn-around and decided it did not want the property
anymore.
Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be
permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it
finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable. Indeed, our reprobation in the case of Cosculluela
v. Court of Appeals 36 is apropos:
It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a
person’s property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay
on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We
condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a
despotic and irresponsible stance.
In order to resolve the issue of the propriety of the garnishment against petitioner’s funds and personal
properties, there is a need to first determine its true character as a government entity. Generally, funds
and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent
to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. 37
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general
or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public Funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 38
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation
which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then
its funds are not exempt from garnishment. 39 This is so because when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from
garnishment has already been resolved squarely against its predecessor, the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC), to wit:
The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was premised on the funds of the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation deposited with petitioner being "public in character." There was not even a
categorical assertion to that effect. It is only the possibility of its being "public in character." The tone
was thus irresolute, the approach diffident. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in
character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. 41
This was reiterated in the subsequent case of Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators: 42
Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-
owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character,
are not exempt from garnishment. This doctrine was applied to suits filed against the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PNB v. Pabalan, Et Al., 83 SCRA 695); the National Shipyard & Steel
Corporation (NASSCO v. CIR, 118 Phil. 782); the Manila Hotel Company (Manila Hotel Employees Asso.
v. Manila Hotel Co., 73 Phil. 374); and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PNB v. CIR, 81
SCRA 314). [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution.
Petitioner’s prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent Sheriff Pascual Abordo from enforcing the
Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties must, therefore, be denied.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68670, affirming the trial court’s Order denying petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss the expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. CEB-23386, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s prayer for
injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties is DENIED. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated January 22, 2003 is LIFTED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 59791. February 13, 1992.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXI, PASIG, METRO
MANILA, TEOFILO ARAYON, SR., GIL DE GUZMAN, LUCITO SANTIAGO AND TERESA
BAUTISTA,Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; EMINENT DOMAIN; STAGES IN AN ACTION THEREOF. — We
already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260, December 22,
1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit: "There are two (2) stages in every
action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.’ An order
of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and
leaves, nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’ "The second phase of
the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of ‘the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of , the
commissioners would be final. too It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the
order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONER; INDISPENSABLE FOR THE DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per
square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint
Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A. Homes and private respondents
on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner’s deposit.
Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of
evidence before the Board of Commissioners Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent
evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing Likewise, petitioner has not been given the
opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation
case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.
Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement
in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court
may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the
Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is
a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such
instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own
estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture
agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said
properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUST COMPENSATION; RIGHT OF PROPERTY OWNER THERETO; RULE. — Prior to the
determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit
made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the
property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled
to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders
dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain
sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final
adjudication of the case, it committed no error.
4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES IN AN ACTION; SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. —
Records, specifically Meralco 8 deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter
agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over
those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant
of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp 341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its
rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract
reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and
proceedings against Meralco. (see Rollo, pp. 342-343) Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable.
It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the
very least implead the former as party plaintiff.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari on pure question of law seeking the nullification of the orders
issued by the respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, in his capacity as the presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 21, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No.
20269, entitled "Manila Electric Company v. Teofilo Arayon, Et. Al." The aforesaid orders are as follows:
(1) the order dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents; (2) the
order dated December 21, 1981 granting the private respondents’ omnibus motion; and (3) the order
dated February 9, 1982 adjudging in favor of private respondents the fair market value of their property
at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter for a total of P369,720.00 and denying the motions for
contempt for being moot and academic and the motion for reconsideration of the orders dated December
4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his
official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito
Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya,
Pililla, Rizal.
On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-
two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII,
Pasig, Metro Manila.
The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio
Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents
consisting of an aggregate area o 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner’s offers to pay
compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents’, the parties failed to reach an agreement.
Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27, 1974 the petitioner’s legal
existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive.
On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion for contempt of
court alleging, among other things that petitioner’s corporate existence had expired in 1969 and
therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.
But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order dated January 13, 1975
authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated.

On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are
entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and
prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner’s deposit-account with
the Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents’ motion was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1976.
In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis
retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with Branch XXII.
Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power
Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines
traversing private respondents’ property.
On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of
Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.
On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its
interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the
Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended.
On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment But despite the opposition of the
petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of the questioned Orders dated December 4, 1981
granting the motion for payment of private respondents, to wit:
"As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, thru
counsel Gil de Guzman, in their Motion For Payment, for reasons therein stated, this Court hereby orders
the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of 6,800 square
meters, at P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the
final adjudication of this case.
"The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by plaintiff in the Philippine National Bank
(Pasig Branch) under Savings Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff of this Branch Mr. Sofronio
Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil
de Guzman, the said amount to be delivered to the defendants’ counsel Atty. Gil de Guzman who shall
sign for the receipt thereof.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 108).
On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to
withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner’s deposit-account with the Philippine National
Bank.
By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus Motion hereunder
quoted as follows:
"Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by Atty. Gil de Guzman, counsel for
Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and for himself, and it appearing that there is
deposited in the bank in trust for them the amount of P90,125.50 to guarantee just compensation of
P272,000.00, thereby leaving a balance of F161,475.00 still payable to them, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
"Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the Manager and Cashier, Philippine National
Bank, Pasig Branch, Pasig, Metro Manila are hereby ordered to allow Sheriff Sofronio Villarin to withdraw
and collect from the bank the amount of P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver the
same to Atty. Gil de Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final determination of just compensation.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 120).
Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that petitioner be ordered to
pay the sum of P169,200.00.
On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated December 4, 1981
and December 21, 1981 and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing
to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner’s counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the
signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion.
In response to private respondents’ motion for payment dated January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an
opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this
stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property.
On February 9, 1982, the respondent court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and motion
for contempt, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
"Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in favor of defendants Teofilo Arayon,
Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their property
taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a total of P369.720.00, this amount to bear legal
interest from February 24, 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney’s fees
in the sum of P10,000.00, all these sums to be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit,
minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by defendants.
"For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are DENIED, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration of the orders of December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 is also DENIED.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 211-212).
Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint
commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a
credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his
own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must
base it upon competent evidence." (Rollo, p. 211).
Hence, this petition.
Subsequently, the respondent court issued an Order dated March 22, 1982 granting the private
respondents motion for execution pending appeal, thus requiring petitioner to deposit P52,600,000.00
representing the consideration paid by Napocor for the property it bought from petitioner which includes
the subject matter of this case, computed at P200.55 per square meter and to render an accounting.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for preliminary injunction with this Court seeking to enjoin
respondent judge and all persons acting under him from enforcing the Order dated March 22, 1982.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order addressed to respondent judge. A motion to lift the
restraining order was filed by the respondents. Despite a series of oppositions and motions to lift the
said order, this Court reiterated its stand and noted that the restraining order is still effective.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court’s act of determining and ordering the
payment of just compensation to Private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the
parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by
the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of
the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of
evidence.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and contend that the
petitioner was not deprived of due process. They agreed with respondent court’s ruling dispensing the
need for the appointment of a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation, thus concluding
that the respondent court did not err in determining just compensation.
Furthermore, petitioner argues that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and consequently denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Respondent judge should have ordered that Napocor be impleaded in substitution of petitioner or could
have at least impleaded both the Napocor and the petitioner as party plaintiffs.
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court can dispense with
the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the
just compensation.
The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
said sections particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the court’s action upon
commissioners’ report, to wit:
"Section 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time
and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within
which their report is to be filed with the court.
x x x
"Section 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or
even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to
the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners,
or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken."
We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260,
December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit:
"There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if this
be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves, nothing
more to be done by the Court on the merits So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of
‘the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the
basis of the evidence before, and findings of , the commissioners would be final. too It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation
of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek
reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom."
Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property
declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on
Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A. Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972.
This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner’s deposit. Respondent
judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence
before the Board of Commissioners Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent
evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing Likewise, petitioner has not been
given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In
an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence
on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment
of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad
Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right
that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where
the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value
from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement
relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is
incompetent to determine just compensation.
Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw
from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller
amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of
a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the
respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of
private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to
the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.
Records, specifically Meralco 8 deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the
latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and
easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil
Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, as well as those parcels of land occupied
by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp 341-342). Thus, Meralco had
already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of
Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually
has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco. (see Rollo, pp. 342-343)
Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to
either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as
party plaintiff.
All premises considered, this Court-is convinced that the respondent judge’s act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a
flagrant violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the
mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the respondent
judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case is hereby
ordered remanded to the lower court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Further,
the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein. SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-59603. April 29, 1987.]
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City,
and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUST COMPENSATION; PROVISIONS OF P.D. NOS. 76, 464, 794 AND 1533
CONSTITUTES IMPERMISSIBLE ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES. — The method of
ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either
by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause
in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding
was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional
just compensation is concerned.
2. ID.; ID.; VALUATION IN THE DECREE MAY ONLY SERVE AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN THE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BUT MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE THE COURT’S OWN JUDGMENT
AS TO WHAT AMOUNT SHOULD BE AWARDED AND HOW TO ARRIVE AT SUCH AMOUNT; DOCTRINE
ENUNCIATED IN THE CASE OF NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. REYES (123 SCRA 245)
ABANDONED. — We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in
the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping
with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes,
supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court’s role as the guardian of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final
arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFINITION OF JUST COMPENSATION; WHAT CONSTITUTES ARBITRARY AND
CONFISCATORY VALUATION. — Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular
case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the
Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper
but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true
market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents
which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and
confiscatory.
4. ID.; ID.; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THE VALUATION OF PROPERTIES FOR EXPROPRIATION. —
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios
or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn,
coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations.
Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas
are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation.
5. ID.; ID.; DENIAL TO THE OWNER OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION
THE VALUATION IN THE TAX DOCUMENTS IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. — To say that the owners
are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax
declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much
less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a
case filed by an agency authorized to do so. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to
basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have
actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after
all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The
determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness"
of the decreed compensation.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1533; DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID. — We, hold
that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very
purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and
1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that
in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its
market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain
parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and
covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4)
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of
the private Respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the
respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464,
as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which
empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan
Export Processing Zone.

On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer.
At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the
parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and
that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner
as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a
second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the
amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the
properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of February 19, 1981 and
Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and
that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and gave the
latter ten (10) days within which to file its objection to the Commissioner’s Report.
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner filed this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981
and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of
commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive
and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and in setting the
commissioner’s report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to
determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the
assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the
properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the
assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in expropriation
proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and
constitutional.
Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this Court has interpreted the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution and established the meaning, under the fundamental law, of just
compensation and who has the power to determine it. Thus, in the following cases, wherein the filing of
the expropriation proceedings were all commenced prior to the promulgation of the aforementioned
decrees, we laid down the doctrine on just compensation:
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),
x x x
". . . And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court,
speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando, reiterated the ‘well-settled (rule) that just compensation
means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity.’"
Garcia v. Court of Appeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
x x x
". . . Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which
it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the
time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its
value."
Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
"According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners’ report. It may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise
of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This
Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad
Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set aside the above and many
other precedents hammered out in the course of evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously
deliberated, and judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees categorically and peremptorily
limited the definition of just compensation thus:
P.D. No. 76:
x x x
"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public
use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such
market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In determining just
compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 794:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In determining just
compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not
exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain
proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to
the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the
appropriate Government office to acquire the property."
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and
void and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of
private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had
before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be
nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of
the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school
pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is
concerned.
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245), this Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as
further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing
Authority contended that the owner’s declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be lower than the
assessor’s assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent’s property under section 92 of P.D.
No. 464. On the other hand, the private respondent stressed that while there may be basis for the
allegation that the respondent judge did not follow the decree, the matter is still subject to his final
disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his judicial
discretion in the light of the constitutional clauses on due process and equal protection.
To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled that under the conceded facts, there should be a
recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and
unequivocably calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain
language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that "the courts
should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not
upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for,
precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of absolute law-making power, its
members, nonetheless, remained uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and
unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President himself did not seem assured or
confident with his own enactment. It was not enough to lay down the law on determination of just
compensation in P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. The
provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313. Inspite of its effectivity as general law
and the wide publicity given to it, the questioned provision or an even stricter version had to be
embodied in cases of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the Tambunting
Estate and P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in Tondo, Manila.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts
under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees,
still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the
decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
In overruling the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and objection to the commissioner’s report, the
trial court said:
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just
compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling that
‘the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair and full
value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the province, plus
consequential damages — including attorney’s fees — from which the consequential benefits, if any
should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and
after the date of actual taking.’ (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60).
In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation which the Court
may consider as one of the factors in arriving at ‘just compensation,’ as envisage in the Constitution. In
the words of Justice Barredo, ‘Respondent court’s invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21,
1972 is nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly imbued
with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of
doing.’ (Lina v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344, 361; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of Pangasinan, Br.
VIII, 80 SCRA 117) Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination
of just compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner’s right of due process to
enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57
SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of
taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional
rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra,
therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court’s role as the guardian of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter
over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation
were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not
only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a
fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at
the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of
documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be
arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios
or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn,
coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations.
Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas
are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the
opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is
found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even
look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR 2d, 733, 742):

"In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts
Court, when faced with the contention that ‘one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel’
must be furnished counsel by the State,’ conceded that ‘[E]xpressions in the opinions of this court lend
color to the argument . . .’ 316 U.S., at 462, 463, 86 L ed. 1602, 62 S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in
deciding as it did - that ‘appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial’ — the
Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt brake with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to
these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice. . . .’.

We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness"
of the decreed compensation.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners
pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE
INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the
HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION
SANTOS IMPERIAL, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed as Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M,
covering a total of 544,980 -square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway,
Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter
facilities for the "Voice of the Philippines" project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency
("PIA"), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had ceased its
operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of
the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M located at KM 43,
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer certificates of title appearing in
the Commissioners’ Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated
in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix ‘A’ attached
to the Commissioners’ Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint;
"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair
market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with
legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; and
"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of commissioners, Atty.
Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. Pablo Domingo." 1
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned
by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated
area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation
pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984,
respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07
June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of
P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed
a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the
amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July
1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, 2 transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities
and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The
remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order,
the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when
petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of
P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject
to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the
manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per
square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00
per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01
March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription —
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:
"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer enforceable, execution
of the same by either a motion or an independent action having already prescribed in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
"2) denies the plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court Payment for
Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding
paragraph hereof; and
"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs
conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. De Villaroya, 153
SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute in relation
with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said
realty to the Bulacan State University pursuant to Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph
Ejercito." 3
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would
appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or
resolution interrupted the running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari, and
that if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the
remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of
such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later modified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now
reading thusly:
"Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion."
The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all cases still pending
with the courts at the time of its effectivity.
In Narzoles v. NLRC, 4 the Court has said:
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the
dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before
the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments
brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits.
Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. . . .
"The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila
Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of
general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be described as
curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. (Erectors. Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which
they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some
statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment
of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. v. Dela
Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
(Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)" 5
At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated
property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course
and to decide the case on its merits.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which
respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made
within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to
enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial
compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of
petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court. 6
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five
years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for
payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of
P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the
five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing
party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the
provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit
made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so
regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of
a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs
had yet to be finally settled.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. 7 Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are
taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise
of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation,
even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs
for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. 8
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense for the condemning authority is
not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor
in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant
asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking. 9
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and
second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. 10 These twin
proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the
State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the
former and affording protection to the latter. 11 In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized
— the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit. 12 It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that
as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted. 13
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant
portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,
pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969
expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character
upon its expropriation. Surely, Petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement
in Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya 14 where the unpaid landowners were allowed
the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the
case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not
inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to
local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 15 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-
encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to
wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then,
this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of
inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. 16
Thus, in Valdehueza v. Republic 17 where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after
the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled —
"The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots
have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said
proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the
government. . . It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as
well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of
their expropriated lots — which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated —
but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs’ prayer for: ‘such other remedies, which may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises’." 18
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso v. Pasay City 19 where the recovery of
possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while
no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of
recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only
for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property
condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. 20 Petitioner has
occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to
the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at
least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-
payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. 21 After condemnation, the paramount title is in the
public under a new and independent title; 22 thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than
may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. 23

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument
could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against
petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long
delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them.
Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have
commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent
deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. 24

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. 25
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. 26 In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred. 27

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the
property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum 28
should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time. 29 Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the
value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the
payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations. 30 In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary
inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. 31

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its
execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property,
deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final
judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September
1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET
ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper
execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2929. February 28, 1950.]
THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC., Defendant-
Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; POWER OF CITIES TO EXPROPRIATE; REPUBLIC ACT No. 267
CONSTRUED. — Republic Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriator as well as to purchase lands for
homesites. The word "priopriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this
power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the cases of Guido
v. Rural Progress Administration (G.R. No. L-2089), and commonwealth of the Philippines v. Borja (G.R.
No. L-1496). The national Government may not confer upon its instrumentalities authority which it itself
may not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source.
2. EMINENT DOMAIN, POWER OF; EXISTENCE OF NECESSITY FOR USES AND PURPOSES FOR ITS
EXERCISE. — To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent
domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.
3. ID.; WORDS AND PHRASES: "NECESSITY." — Necessity within the rule that the particular property to
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefit.
4. ID.; LIMITATIONS OF ITS EXERCISE; PREFERENCE TO PREPARATION OF YOUTHS FOR USEFUL
CITIZENSHIP. — Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to ,a few families fades
into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young men and women for useful citizenship
and for service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not a
position to undertake.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:
"Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other entity or person at a rate of interest not exceeding eight
per cent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective
territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities."
The court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for
the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn, for
the purpose just stated, several parcels of land having a combined area of 7,270 square meters and
situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.
In the cases of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration (G.R. No. L-2089) 1 and Commonwealth of the
Philippines v. De Borja (G.R. No. L-1496), 2 we discussed at great length the extent of the Philippine
Government’s power to condemn private property for resale. Among other things, we said:
"It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of
one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not
promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and
fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)
"In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole
town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform
secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts
between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and
public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in
determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as
to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to
authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially
where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude. (29 C. J. S.; 823, 824; see also People of
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates Et. Al., 156 Fed [2d], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have
been acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York State has ruled that slum clearance and
erection of houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing
authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed by similar ones in
other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and
insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste, prevents the spread of
crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding
communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray Et. Al. v. La
Guardia, 52 N. E. [2d], 884; General Development Coop. v. City of Detroit, 33 N. W. [2d], 919; Weizner
v. Stichman, 64 N.Y. S. [2d], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these cases and others of similar nature
extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action
taken.
"The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not
insure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The
expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of
any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed
to be done is to take plaintiff property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifices for
her and her family’s security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or
leave the premises.
"No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each
case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this
decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our
system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case
would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see
no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold
to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural
Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing and area of 1,000 or
2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build
thereon."
We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands
for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only one
meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in
the decisions above cited. The National Government may not confer upon its instrumentalities authority
which it itself may not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source.
Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor. In the first place, the land that
is the subject of the present expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido
case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. In the second place,
the Arellano Colleges’ land is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by
persons who are not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a university
site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.

To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a
necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. (29 C.J.S., 884-885.) In
City of Manila v. Manila Chinese Community (40 Phil., 349), this Court, citing American decisions, laid
down this rule:

"The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison v. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns v. Barre, 73
Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R.R. Co. v. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)"

And this passage in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the English Law is cited in that decision: "So great is
the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the
public good, unless there exists a very great necessity thereof."

Perhaps modern decisions are not so exigent. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefit. (29 C.J.S., 386.) But
measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of the intended use,
necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000.
The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to
meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property
later for a profit. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the
occupants’ needs and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are aplenty elsewhere.
On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had
the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been
stopped by the city authorities. And again, while a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation,
the development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed.
Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance
in comparison with the preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service
to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to
undertake. As the Rural Progress Administration, the national agency created by the Government to
purchase or expropriate lands for resale as homesites, and to which the petition to purchase the land in
question on behalf of the occupants was referred by the President, turning down the occupants’ request
after proper investigation, commented that "the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a
permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the
objectives of that educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for
public benefit." The Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled
to keep this land.

The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed without costs.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106528. December 21, 1993.]
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS,
as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, THE HONORABLE RICARDO DIAZ, as
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES,
JR., KARLO BUTIONG, LEONARDO AQUINO, EDILBERTO LOPEZ, ANTILANO FERRER, LOENCIA
DAVILLO JAMERO, LUIS FERNANDEZ, PATRICIO DE GUZMAN, RICARDO DE LEON, VIRGILIO
TORNERO, FAUSTO FERNANDEZ, DOMINGO MEREN, EDUARDA JACINTO, MAGDALENA VELEZ,
LUSITO ALMADRONES, MYRNA BARREDO EBREO, FULGENCIO CORSINO, PEDRO VELASQUEZ,
JUAN INOBAYA, NENITA ARCE, MAGNO ORTINEZ, ARMANDO PARAGAS, HIPOLITO ESTABILLO,
FELICIANO FAUSTINO, VIRGILIO EDIC, JOSE TINGZON, JOSUE MARIANO, MARIA YERO, MA.
DOLORES QUIZON, ISIDERO TAGUILIG, CIRIACO MENDOZA, JUAN ROMERO, JOSE LAGATA,
FRUCTUSO PUSING, TEOFILO TERSOL, ANTONIO LACHICA, PIO RAJALES, REGINA VIERNES,
JUAN ROMERO, DOMINGO EDIC, EDUARDA GONZALES, PABLO QUIRANTE, LEONORA SANTIA,
MARIA RIVERA, ELENA ARCE, LAZARO GOMEZ, PEDRO MENDOZA, DOMINADOR ADAO, JUAN
PANTERA, FRISCA MANOOT, SOCORRO SANTOS and GLORIA JEBUNAN, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND AUTHORITY TO UNDERTAKE URBAN LAND
REFORM VESTED IN CITY OF MANILA; CASE AT BAR. — The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90
square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the Fabie
Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square meters of the
estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed the portions to the actual
occupants thereof. The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its
owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by
private respondents. On May 23, 1989, the City of Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor,
passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot. Petitioner claims that
expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because: (1) the City of Manila has no specific power to
expropriate private property under the 1987 Constitution; and (2) assuming that it has such power, this
was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the public use requirement and petitioner’s right to
due process. Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law expressly
authorizing local governments to undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9). Petitioner forgot that
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to
"condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the
same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100). The Revised Charter of the City
of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the
power of eminent domain, thus: "General powers. — The city may have a common seal and alter the
same at pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and
personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution,
and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred" (R.A. 409, Sec. 3) Section 100 of said Revised Charter
authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform, thus: Sec. 100. The City of Manila is
authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy
terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and
second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of this section, the city may
raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and,
if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the
approval of the President . . ." The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express
power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low salaried employees of the city.
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT IN EMINENT DOMAIN COMPLIED WITH BY CITY OF MANILA;
CASE AT BAR. — That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all
who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]) Corollary to the expanded notion of
public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of
Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be
expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63
[1983]). Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible
concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing
Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban
land reform and housing. This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which provides
that: . . . "The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable
cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners" (Article
XIII, Sec. 9).
3. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT IN EMINENT DOMAIN LIKEWISE COMPLIED WITH BY CITY OF
MANILA; CASE AT BAR. — The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise
been complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the
court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never
questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that
petitioner raises the issue of due process. Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, denying its motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals,
in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent courts, passed upon the
very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner
therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court. The amount of P2 million representing the
provisional value of the land is an amount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The
fact remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped from
assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional. The parties still
have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to determine specifically the amount
of just compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 [1992]).
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
23338, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner, assailing the orders of (a)
respondent Judge Domingo D. Panis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-
53531, and (b) respondent Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil
Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation and
is engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner’s
office and facilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land
consisting of 4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while respondents Antonio
Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila.
In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to
vacate the lot and pay reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a
motion for execution of judgment, which was granted on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later
prayed for and likewise issued by the same court on May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, a petition
for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila and petitioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and
the demolition of their houses on the premises in question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53531 against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90
square meter lot subject of the ejectment proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to
expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the expropriation
is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million of the City of Manila representing the
provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss and entered an order of condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly
instituted in accordance with law. The court also ordered the parties to submit, within five days, the
names of their respective nominees as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the land in
question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss, and later a
motion to defer compliance with the order directing the submission of the names of nominees to be
appointed commissioners. The City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession over the subject lot, mentioning the P2 million deposit with the Philippine National
Bank, representing the provisional value of the land.
In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued the writ of possession, and at the
same time, denied petitioner’s motion to defer compliance and motion for reconsideration.
On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346 issued an order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by private respondents. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders dated September 14, 1990,
and October 5 and 8, 1990 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court, and the Order dated September 21,
1990 of Branch 27 of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338). The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution on July 31, 1992, denying reconsideration
thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the Fabie
Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No.
5971, seeking to expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a
total of 18,017.10 square meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and
distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores
Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by private
respondents.
On May 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704
for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot.
Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because: (1) the City of Manila has no
specific power to expropriate private property under the 1987 Constitution; and (2) assuming that it has
such power, this was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the public use requirement and
petitioner’s right to due process.
Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law expressly authorizing local
governments to undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the
City of Manila to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and
subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its
territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, thus:
"General powers. — The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take,
purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general interest
of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued,
and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinafter
conferred" (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied).
Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform, thus:
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same
into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or
occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of
this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans
or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in
accordance with law, with the approval of the President . . ."
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands
in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof,
and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public
use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them
(Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of
land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17,
1993; J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of
no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido v.
Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept,
influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing
Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban
land reform and housing.
This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
x x x
"The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement
areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation
of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners" (Art. XIII, Sec. 9; Emphasis
supplied).
x x x

The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been complied with.
Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the court is required to do
(National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of
hearing before the trial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of
due process.

Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order, denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we
uphold. Petitioner therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.

The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an amount not only fixed by
the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to
said valuation and is therefore estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the
valuation is merely provisional. The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper
court below to determine specifically the amount of just compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100626. November 29, 1991.]
CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT; DISTINGUISHED. — A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of
law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and
issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS; EFFECT ON THE
JUDGMENT. — Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its appellate
capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both laws recognize
that such judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the
rights of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final and executory" pending the
expiration of the reglementary period for appeal. During that period, execution of the judgment cannot
yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of right.
3. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED; REASON THEREFOR. —
While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court,
this provision must be strictly construed , being an exception to the general rule. The reason allowing
this kind of execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party
should it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of
execution must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND; NECESSARY TO STAY EXECUTION; EXCEPTION. — To
stay the execution, a supersedeas bond is necessary except where one has already filed in the lower
court. This bond continues to be effective if the judgment of the regional trial court is appealed. But
during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant-appellant must continue depositing with the appellate
court the payments required in the appealed judgment. The rentals accruing during the pendency of the
appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated, if there is one, and in the absence thereof,
on or before the dates provided for in Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to make such deposits or payments is
ground for execution of the judgment.
5. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; NOTICE TO DEFENDANT, REQUIRED. — Cacpal and Cordero are
hereby sternly reprimanded and warned that a repetition of similar arbitrariness will be dealt with more
severely. Their conduct was a clear violation of the requirement that: Under the Rules of Court the
immediate enforcement of a writ of ejectment execution is carried out by giving the defendant notice of
such writ, and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a reasonable period, normally
from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the
bodily removal of the defendant and his personal belongings. (Reformina v. Adriano, 189 SCRA 723)
6. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY; MAY BE ISSUED
BY COURT OF ORIGIN; EXCEPTION. — Assuming that the decision of the regional trial court had already
become "final and executory," could the said court order its execution? The rule is that if the judgment
of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself
elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the case should be remanded
through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execution. The only exception is the
execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.
7. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — On the issue of the propriety
of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order of execution pending appeal, this Court has held
that — . . . Although Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action
of certiorarimay only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain; speedy and adequate remedy
in the (ordinary) course of law" this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course
of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient. It is the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this action for certiorari for having set aside the order of
execution dated June 10, 1991, and the writ of execution issued by Judge Wilfredo Reyes of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 91-56335.
This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila against private respondent Army
and Navy Club for violation of the lease agreement between them over a parcel of land on Roxas
Boulevard in the said city. A summary judgment in favor of the petitioner was rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila 1 and seasonably elevated to the Regional Trial Court. To stay its
execution, ANC filed a supersedes bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00, which was approved by Judge
Reyes. 2 He subsequently affirmed the appealed judgment on June 7, 1991. 3
On June 10, 1991, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground that the judgment
had already become final and executory under RA 6031. Judge Reyes granted the motion the same day
4 and at 4:00 o’clock that afternoon the writ of execution was served on ANC.
ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, but hours later, sensing that the motion could not be
acted upon, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
On July 3, 1991, that court issued the questioned decision, 5 prompting the filing of the present petition
for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and contends that decisions of the regional trial
court in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts are final and executory under RA 6031. Thus:
SECTION 1. . . .
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts which are appealed
to the courts of first instance, the decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions
are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of
the municipal and city courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the
Court of Appeals whose decision shall be final: Provided, however, that the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the
decision and under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be
certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129, decisions of the regional trial court in cases
originating from and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts are not
final but subject to appeal in a petition for review to the Court of Appeals. Such decisions cannot be
executed where the period of time for the defendant to perfect his appeal has not yet expired. Thus:
SECTION 22. (BP 129) — Appellate jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the RTC in such
cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it
due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact
or law that will warrant a reversal or modifications of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is useful at this point to review the distinction between a "final" judgment and one which has become
"final and executory."
In PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Free Telephone Workers Union, 6 the Court observed:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
. . . (A)n order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing
more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the
litigation . . . when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something
to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory.
The case of Antonio v. Samonte 7 elaborated on this matter thus:
A final order of judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or
rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof,
and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside . . . Where no issue is left for future consideration,
except the fact of compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the judgment or order, such
judgment or order is final and appealable.
By contrast, in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 8 we declared:
Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final "upon expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected" or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are returned to the
Court of origin. The "final" judgment is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in
respect to which, as the law explicitly provides, "execution shall issue as a matter of right." It bears
stressing that only a final judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action
or proceeding" can become final and executory.
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact
upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the
prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of the court.
Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its appellate capacity may
be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both laws recognize that such
judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or determine the rights of the
parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final and executory" pending the expiration of the
reglementary period for appeal. During that period, execution of the judgment cannot yet be demanded
by the winning party as a matter of right.
In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25, 1991, to appeal the decision of the
regional trial court. The motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June 10, 1991, before the
expiration of the said reglementary period. As the decision had not yet become final and executory on
that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not have been granted. Contrary to the
petitioner’s contention, what the trial court authorized was an execution pending appeal.
While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court,
this provision must be strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule. The reason allowing this
kind of execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party
should it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of
execution must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion. 9
We see no such justification in the case before us.
It is worth remarking that as the case was not tried under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the writ of
execution did not even fall under the following Section 18 thereof:
SECTION 18. Appeal. — The judgment or final order, including that rendered under Section 6 hereof,
shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same on the basis of the
records, in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial
court in such civil cases shall be immediately executory.
To stay the execution, a supersedes bond is necessary except where one has already been filed in the
lower court. This bond continues to be effective if the judgment of the regional trial court is appealed.
But during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant-appellant must continue depositing with the
appellate court the payments required in the appealed judgment. The rentals accruing during the
pendency of the appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated, if there is one, and in the
absence thereof, on or before the dates provided for in Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to make such deposits
or payments is ground for execution of the judgment. 10
Since the private respondent in the case at bar has filed a supersedes bond and the stipulated rental is
yearly, 11 execution may issue only when it fails to make the yearly deposit of the rental, and after
notice and hearing. Such default has not yet been established.
The Court notes with disapproval the arbitrary manner in which Sheriff Dominador Cacpal and Deputy
Sheriff Reynaldo Cordero acted in delivering possession of the leased premises to the petitioner. The
evidence shows that they enforced the writ of execution on the same date they received it, forcibly
taking out movables from the said premises, including chandeliers, furniture and furnishings, music
organs, stereo components, lighting fixtures and computers. They turned off the water, cut off the
electricity and disconnected the telephones. They also unreasonably prevented ANC members from
entering the premises to get their personal belongings.
Cacpal and Cordero are hereby sternly reprimanded and warned that a repetition of similar arbitrariness
will be dealt with more severely. Their conduct was a clear violation of the requirement that:
Under the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement of a writ of ejectment execution is carried out by
giving the defendant notice of such writ, and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within
a reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after such period that the
sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant and his personal belongings. 12
On the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order of execution pending
appeal, this Court has held that —
. . . Although Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the (ordinary)
course of law" this role is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does
not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorariwhere the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is
the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the merit that usually determines the propriety of certiorari. 13
While appeal is normally employed to question an order or writ which varies the terms of the decision
being executed, it is nevertheless not the sole and exclusive remedy. The special civil action
of certiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 was available to the private respondent on the allegation that
the regional trial court, in issuing the writ of execution, committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond its jurisdiction and that the ordinary remedy of appeal was inadequate.
The last question to be resolved is, Assuming that the decision of the regional trial court had already
become "final and executory," could the said court order its execution?

The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial court and
the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became
final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for
execution. 14 The only exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the regional
trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the
same Rule.

As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty justification for the application of the
exception. Hence, the respondent court committed no error in reversing the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and annulling the writ of execution issued by it on June 10, 1991, pending appeal of its decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.