G.R. No.

L-19521 October 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.
ESTEBAN R. CHAVES

FACTS

Esteban Chaves, has been found by the Court of First Instance and by the Court of Appeals guilty of a violation, of
Republic Act No. 145, in that he had collected, in January, 1948, a claim of Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits in
the sum of $4,252.20 due her for the demise of her son, USAFFE veteran Santos Echaure; the corresponding check
was cashed by Chaves, who later delivered only P3,202.20 to the claimant, and retained P5,362.20 for himself.
Chaves was sentenced to undergo one year imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P5,362.20 and to pay the costs. The conviction and sentence became final on April 16, 1961.

The indemnity not having been paid, the offended party obtained a writ of execution in May, 1961, and the Sheriff
accordingly levied on a residential lot and building of the accused, but desisted from proceeding further when the
accused exhibit proof that the property had been extrajudicially constituted and recorded as a family home, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. On December 5, 1953, after the filing of the information but
before conviction. Upon petition by the complainant, the Court issued the contested order declaring that the
family home was not exempt from the levy made by the Sheriff because the accused's obligation to pay the
amount wrongfully retained by him was anterior to the constitution of the family home. The motion of accused
Chaves for reconsideration of the order having been denied, he resorted to this Court on appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to exemption from the execution levy
issued at the instance of the offended party.

HELD

No, Article 243, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides that debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in
Registry of Property shall be exempted. However, the Supreme Court ruled that it is of no merit that the appellant
considered his unpaid indemnity due as a debt, and that, the word debt shall be treated in its generic sense. The
appellant takes the position that the indemnity due to the complainant became a debt within the purview of this
Article only from the date of the judgment ordering indemnification, years after family home in question was
established.

The duty of Chaves to reimburse the amount of the veteran's benefits improperly retained by him certainly arose
and came into existence from the date of his misappropriation on January, 1948, and the judgment of 1961 merely
established the fact of the misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951

1
 MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS
VS.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG

FACTS

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in
the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano
Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having
acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in
favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis
Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in
his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about
September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10,
1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the
middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and
wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On
June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal

It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue
of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the
son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then
the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not, Mario Andal is a legitimate son of Emiliano Andal.

HELD

Yes, Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943
and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was
born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial
period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man
other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

2
 MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and
JUANA C. BAUTISTA
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO
SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON

FACTS

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro
married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel, their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,
together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as
they are titled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation because
of Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter.

ISSUE

Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.

HELD

YES, Art. 970 of the Civil Code provides, representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former
shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

As to Doribel, for she was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela. She has
right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to
the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents’ other children.

As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, cannot inherit by representation.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relative of either party.

G.R. No. L-35241 February 28, 1983

3
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
SERVILLANO VELASQUEZ

FACTS

Under an information charging defendant-appellant Servillano Velasquez with the crime of rape, the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija convicted the said defendant-appellant of the offense of qualified
seduction and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to one year, eight months and twenty days of prision correccional as maximum, to
indemnify Remedios Domingo in the sum of P2,000.00, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, to acknowledge and support the offspring of Remedios Domingo in the sum of P100.00 every
month, and to pay the costs.

Remedios Domingo was a housemaid of Cecilia Velasquez in the latter's house in Licab Nueva Ecija.
Cecilia, a sister of the appellant, is a public school teacher married to a dentist. The appellant, who was
unmarried, was staying in the house of said spouses in the ground floor of which he had a radio repair
shop. Remedios, at the time of the alleged rape committed on February 9, 1966, was 15 years, 2 months
and 27 days old, she having been born on November 12, 1950.

There is no dispute that appellant had performed sexual intercourses with complainant Remedios
Domingo in the house where they were both staying. It is also undenied that Remedios, Domingo
delivered a child on December 22, 1966. The parties are, however, in disagreement as to when and
under what circumstances the sexual intercourses between the appellant and the complainant had
taken place. The appellant further disputes his paternity of the child begotten by the complainant.

ISSUE

Whether or not Servillano Velasquez is the father of the child bore by Remedios Domingo.

HELD

No, the court said that if Remedios Domingo’s last intercourse with Servillano Velasquez was on
February 11, 1966, it would mean that her child was born at least ten months and eleven days after
conception. While we are not certain as to whether such circumstance is not a medical impossibility, it is
undeniably contrary to ordinary and normal experience and, as such, sufficient to cast a reasonable
doubt as to its credibility. Under our laws, a child born after three hundred days from possible
conception is not accorded any presumption either of legitimacy or illegitimacy. Whoever alleges the
paternity of the child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, must prove such allegation. Art. 261, Civil
Code; Section 6, Rule 131, Rules of Court. It is accordingly believed that the sexual intercourses between
the complainant and the appellant did not terminate on February 11, 1966, as averred by the
complainant, but continued for several times thereafter as asserted by the appellant.

G.R. Nos. 106314-15 October 8, 1999

4
 HEIRS OF PEDRO CABAIS, NAMELY: MAGDALENA BONTO CABAIS, ANTONIO CABAIS, PABLO CABAIS,
ANDREA CABAIS, EFREN CABAIS, AGAPITA CABAIS, and ANDRES CABAIS, represented by AVELINA
CABAIS

VS.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONSTANCIA PAGLINAWAN, PAULINO LORIA, AUREA NICOLAS,
ANTONIO LO, SANTOS WANTON, ZENAIDA BATALLER, ISABEL LORIA, ADELAIDA DAUS AND EMMA
CARALI

FACTS

Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died on April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel of land situated
in Basud, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of 1,638 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-55640 in the name of Pedro Cabais. The said property was inherited by Pedro Cabais from his
grandmother Eustaquia Caeta by right of representation. His mother, Felipa Caeta Buesa, who was the
only daughter of Eustaquia Caeta, predeceased the latter, leaving him as the only legal heir of
Eustaquia. Thus, Pedro Cabais executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication, adjudicating in his favor subject
property. By virtue thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899) was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, the aforementioned transfer certificate of title issued in his name.

On October 15, 1979, shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated to himself the property in question, a
complaint for partition and accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of Victoria Caeta and
Heirs of Anastacio Caeta against Pedro Cabais, docketed as Civil Case No. T-567 before the Regional Trial
Court but the plaintiffs were declared non-suited, resulting to the dismissal of the case.

On April 21, 1987, the respondents, Heirs of Victoria Caeta, Paulino Loria, Jose Loria, Constancia Loria
Vda. de Paglinawan, Emeterio Loria, and spouses Rufino Nicolas and Aurea Goyal, instituted before the
same lower court Civil Case No. T-1284, for annulment of title and damages, claiming to be co-owners of
subject property. The respondent spouses, Rufino Nicolas and Aurea Goyal, asserted that they bought
806.5 square meters of Lot No. 2119 from Simplicia Casaul. The latter was said to have acquired the said
portion of the lot from Benigno Bonaobra, who, in turn, acquired the same from Victoria Caeta and
Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan.

The respondent heirs of Victoria Caeta averred that they purchased the remaining portion of Lot No.
2119 from their deceased grandmother, Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan, the first wife of Antonio
Buesa. According to them, the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899) and
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 55640 were tainted by fraud.

In due time, the two cases were jointly tried and on September 28, 1989, the lower court came out with
a Joint Decision upholding the view of petitioners, quieting their title over the contested lot; ordering
the respondents to vacate the same, to pay the rents thereon to petitioners until they leave the place,
apart from litigation expenses. The trial court ruled that res judicata barred the institution of Civil Case
No. T-1284 by reason of the prior dismissal of Civil Case No. T-567.

Respondents seasonably presented a motion for reconsideration of the said disposition, which the trial
court granted on November 26, 1989, upon the reasoning that res judicata as alluded to in the decision
did not apply and that the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa does not show her to be the daughter
of Eustaquia Caeta. From such adverse action against them, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed decision on November 13, 1991, affirming the decision of the lower
court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Resolution dated
July 9, 1992.

In due time, the two cases were jointly tried and on September 28, 1989, the lower court came out with
a Joint Decision upholding the view of petitioners, quieting their title over the contested lot; ordering
the respondents to vacate the same, to pay the rents thereon to petitioners until they leave the place,

5
apart from litigation expenses. The trial court ruled that res judicata barred the institution of Civil Case
No. T-1284 by reason of the prior dismissal of Civil Case No. T-567.

Respondents seasonably presented a motion for reconsideration of the said disposition, which the trial
court granted on November 26, 1989, upon the reasoning that res judicata as alluded to in the decision
did not apply and that the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa does not show her to be the daughter
of Eustaquia Caeta. From such adverse action against them, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed decision on November 13, 1991, affirming the decision of the lower
court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Resolution dated
July 9, 1992.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Order of the lower court reconsidering its Joint Decision was proper.

HELD

Yes, firstly, petitioners maintain that the lower court erred in relying on the Baptismal Certificate of
Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. They contend that the grant of
the motion for reconsideration and reversal of its own decision were without legal basis. It is also
petitioners submission that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 567 constituted a bar to Civil Case No. T-1284
on the ground of res judicata.The Order under attack disregarded the limited evidentiary value of a
baptismal certificate in this jurisdiction vis--vis a birth certificate.

A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of
proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is
pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document
must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.

The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under
consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of the means recognized by law weigh heavily
against respondents. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court declared that a baptismal
certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified,
but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk. The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest
who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. It is indispensable that
such declarations and statements are shown by proof recognized by law.

There is thus no reason to further sustain respondent’s stance in the face of the aforecited rulings
explaining the significance of baptismal certificates. The lower court erred in giving too much credence
on the baptismal certificate of Felipa Caeta Buesa to prove that Felipa was the daughter of one Gregoria
Caeta and not of Eustaquia Caeta, the original registered owner of the property under controversy.

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

EUTIQUIO MARQUINO and MARIA TERENAL-MARQUINO Survived by: LUZ. T. MARQUINO, ANA T. MARQUINO
and EVA T. MARQUINO

6
 VS.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION, BIBIANA ROMANO-PAGADORA,
Survived By: PEDRO PAGADORA, EMY R. PAGADORA, JUNE R. PAGADORA, EDGAR R. PAGADORA, MAY R.
PAGADORA, MAGO R. PAGADORA, ARDEN R. PAGADORA, and MARS R. PAGADORA

FACTS

Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time
was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in
their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed
continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father
and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since
she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs
were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of
respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action
already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and
can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.Our law providing for the intransmissibility of
an action for recognition, however, has been superseded by the New Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now provided, the action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.The
action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

ISSUE

Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and Article 173
can be given retroactive effect.

HELD

No, Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted
because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a
personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child
cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the
putative parent himself.

Be that as it may, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at
bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of
their father, Eutiquio Marquino. Vested right is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason
and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will
prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.

G.R. Nos. 77737-38 August 15, 1988

7
CHRISTINA MARIE DEMPSEY, a minor and represented by her mother, Janalita Rapada, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXV, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City, and JOEL DEMPSEY

FACTS

On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel Dempsey before the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City. On or about and during the period from December 1985 to the present, in the
City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously leave their conjugal dwelling at No. 15 Ohio Street, Upper
Kalaklan, Olongapo City and abandon his child Christina R. Dempsey and deprive him (sic) of his love, care and
protection she from the accused (sic) since then, by continuously failing and refusing to give adequate support to
the said minor child and despite pleas, the accused without lawful justification, failed, disregarded and still
continues to fail and disregard to perform his obligations to his said minor child Christina R. Dempsey,

Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the
offense charged in the Information. On August 26, 1986, the Trial Court rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him, considering the mitigating circumstances of his
voluntary plea of guilty.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Trial Court’s decision correct.

HELD

No, The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive Order No. 209, July 17,
1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate
children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date
of effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.

The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial court to the Department of
Social Services and Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD cannot take cognizance of and enforce the
criminal sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of
the word as she is still in the custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as
follows; abandoned child is one who has no parental care or guardianship or whose parents or guardians have
deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months .Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at
bar. Thus, it is not the Department of Social Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal
Trial Court.

The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a matter not within its competence and
authority. There is likewise no basis for its gratuitous finding that a parent cannot be held criminally liable under
P.D. 603 for withholding support from his minor child. There is absolutely no discussion on this ruling. The records
show, however, that Joel Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support from his minor daughter
was made without a full understanding of that particular charge. Janalita Rapada herself testified that she is
receiving $150.00 a month for the support of the minor Christina Marie Dempsey.

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

8
 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUANARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A.
TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES

VS.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO

FACTS

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was
filed before Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children
of Jose Aruego Jr.

In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous
relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this
relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3,
1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and
Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners
be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and
ordered delivered to them.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was
then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have
a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of
prescription.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines shall have a retroactive effect in this case.

HELD

No, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably
affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents,
both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore,
correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondents
cause of action has not yet prescribed. The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested
rights of respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled
perception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights.

G. R. No. 125329 September 10, 2003

9
 ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO as represented by her parents GLORIA LEONARDO and EDDIE FERNANDEZ,

VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TOMAS AFRICA, et al

FACTS

Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo is an illegitimate child of common-law-spouses Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C.
Leonardo. Wanting Brigitt to carry his surname, Eddie executed an affidavit and a letter which was submitted to
the Local Civil Registrar asking for the change of her surname. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied said
request on the ground that under the family code, illegitimate children should carry their mother‘s surname as
provided under Article 176 of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.Dacuan also cited Article 412 of
the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Petitioner’s parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioners surname to the Civil Registrar
General, they citing, among others, the following provision of New Civil Code Article
366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by
only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. It likewise held that it
does not have the authority to effect such change. Brigitt then appealed to the Civil Registrar General which also
denied the request on the ground the same ground.

Undaunted, Leonardo filed a Petition for Review upon the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals declared that an
illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the surname of the father but the power to
effect the change lies in the Court and not with Local and Civil Registrar.

ISSUE

Whether or not an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the surname of the
father.

HELD

No, since Brigitt was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use
her father's surname. Ubi jus, ibi remedium, when there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there
is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.

Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The rule applies even if petitioner‘s father admits paternity. The Court declared in Mossesgeld the
Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

10
 RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA
VS.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON
and IRMA L. VELOSO

FACTS

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that petitioner has
failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses
and prays for judgment of this Court declaring as established the fact of his adoption as a son of the deceased
spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such. Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow
petitioner who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis
and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate son, over the opposition of private
respondents, to introduce evidence that he had enjoyed the status of an adopted child of the without his first
producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which
resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.

On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de
Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and
respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso. One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de
Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted
illegitimate children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also
intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate child. Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow,
Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a and holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for
a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to
Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato
Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.

ISSUE

Whether or not Renato Lazatin established his status as an adopted child.

HELD

No, Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of
natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in
which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is
the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a
record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such
adoption may be established.

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

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 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C.
CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES
VS.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO

FACTS

This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes. It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's
sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who
took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. The appropriate
petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth
Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then
known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural
parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal
intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting
their estate. Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise,
they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.

As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child
from her yaya at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption
and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to
the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of
P150,000.00

ISSUE

Whether or not the adoptive parents have custody over Angeli Anne Cervantes.

HELD

Yes, the adoptive parents Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes have custody over Angeli Anne Cervantes.
Angeli has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of
adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and
responsibility. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this
criterion.

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