1. LASAM VS.

SMITH45 PHIL 657

FACTS:
The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La
Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to
another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces.

Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos
Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by
a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur
allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license, but had
some experience in driving.

The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when,
according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the
steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a
distance of about half kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep
embankment.

The automobile was over turned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam
escaped with a few contusions and a dislocate drib, but his wife, Joaquina, received
serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left
wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she has not fully recovered at
the time of trial.

The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was
due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence of the
chauffeur.

The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the defendant’s breach of
the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code,
and not article1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of contact
was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in
damages

ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to
a fortuitous event?

RULING: Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability
is the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry
the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is
liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to
causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if
foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly
provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.”

As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances

independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a
caso fortuito.

In the present case, this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in
question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have
been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in
the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito

2. PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)

FACTS:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver
lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son
sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of
PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions,
holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle,
and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the
diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)

HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of
the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of
the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has.
We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the
steering knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious person”
as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and therefore the knuckle’s failure
cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.
 3. Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
G.R. No. L-23733, 31 October 1969, 30 SCRA 69

FACTS:
Nocum, plaintiff, was a passenger of the defendant’s Bus No. 120, then making a trip
within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, who got injured as a consequence
of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to
its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Plaintiff sued Laguna Tayabas for Breach of Contract of Carriage.

The Trial Court held Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable since it did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the Civil
Code. It further states that the defense of fortuitous event is unavailing.

The Trial Court’s decision is based on the witness, Severino Andaya, who states that a
man with box went up the baggage compartment of the bus and the box was place
under the seat. They left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the
explosion occurred, the plaintiff was thrown out. There were 37 other passengers who
got injured.

The bus conductor said that such box belongs to a passenger whom he didn’t know and
states that it contained miscellaneous items and clothes. From its appearance there
was no indication that the contents of the box were explosives and firecrackers.

The dispatcher said that they were not authorized to open the baggage of passengers
because the instruction from the management is to call the police if there were
packages containing articles which were against regulations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is liable for breach of contract of
carriage?

RULING:
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is not liable for damages. In overland transportation, the
common carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the contents
of packages or bags, particularly those hand carried by passengers.

No doubt, the views of the trial court do seem to be in line with the reasons that the
Code Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft of the
Civil Code. Indeed, in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with the
Commission that by requiring the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in
the safe transport of their passengers and by creating a presumption of negligence
against them.
It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be
loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the
same as to what was in it and according to the trial court “if proper and rigid inspection
were observed by the defendant, the contents of the box could have been discovered
and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger to have the package opened was
no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees should call the police
if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.”

However, the Supreme Court considered the opinion that the law does not require as
much. Article 1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably
qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the
passengers transported by them to be “according to all the circumstances of each
case.” In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: “A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.”

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be
presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and
limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must
be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to
any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be
verbally made as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being
transgressed.

Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial
judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the
passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the
fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant
threat any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all
common carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for
mischief and abuse.
 4. La Mallorca et. al. v. De Jesus
G.R. No. L-21486 May 14, 1966

[Makalintal, J.:]

Facts: The daughter of respondent died in a head-on collision between petitioner’s bus
of which she was a passenger and a truck. The immediate cause of the collision was
the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly
exploded.

Issue: W/n the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event

HELD: No. The accident was caused by a mechanical defect which could have been
corrected if the bus has been subjected to a more thorough check up before it took the
road. Therefore the owner of the vehicle is liable. Moral damages are recoverable by
reason of the death of the passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common
carrier as provided in Art 2206 of the New Civil Code.

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros,
13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at
San Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and
operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the
plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since
both were below the height which fare is charged in accordance with plaintiff’s rules and
regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get
off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the bus,
followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his companion to a shaded spot on the
left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left
behind, but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said
Mariano Beltran was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand
him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume
its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the baggage left
behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete
stop, it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running
board without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road
almost board in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on
the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her
parent.

For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to
recover from the latter damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the
incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he
returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger
and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier
and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car
aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when
they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although
the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand
him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from
the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be near the bus,
was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s
agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the
conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
 5. Calalas v. CA

Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave
Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu
truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney.
As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of
contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for
quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract
of carriage.

Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and
Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case

(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of
carriage

(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue
in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-
delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this
case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is
a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's
driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The
fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable
to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin
to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by
boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney
being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is
an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art.
2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in
which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis
for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court
that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

6. Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing
Corp.
G.R. No. 128607 January 31, 2000
Bellossillo, J.

FACTS:
 The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the
delivery van of Bulletin along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan,
Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a
Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the
van of Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles.
The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the
highway. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting
in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to
thegravity of his injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari
Sr. and Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V.
Netherlands Insurance Co. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the
death of Israel was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger
jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

ISSUE:
WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel

HELD:
Yes.
The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec.
41,pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. A driver abandoning his proper lane for
the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to
it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor
vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the
right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side
relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the
opposite direction comes into view.

Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the oppositedirecti
on and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the
morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve
in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death
of Israel was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., who
recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed
by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallari’s failed to present satisfactory
evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding
against Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged
as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on contract
of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by
the passenger. (See Arts. 1755,1756 and 1759 for the rationale of common carrier’s
liability

7. La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros,
13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at
San Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and
operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the
plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since
both were below the height which fare is charged in accordance with plaintiff’s rules and
regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get
off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the bus,
followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his companion to a shaded spot on the
left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left
behind, but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said
Mariano Beltran was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand
him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume
its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the baggage left
behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete
stop, it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running
board without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road
almost board in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on
the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her
parent.

For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to
recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the
incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he
returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger
and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier
and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car
aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when
they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although
the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand
him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from
the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be near the bus,
was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s
agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the
conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

8. Aboitiz Shipping vs CA, GR 84458, Nov. 6, 1989

Facts:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping
Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter
to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. An hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel, the
crane operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated,
Viana who had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes
were still loaded there. He went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his
cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was filed against petitioner for
breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a passenger
when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no
longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after
his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not
terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his
baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify
the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists
such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As
earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still
deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death

9. QUISUMBING, SR. V. CA
G.R. No. L-50076, September 14, 1990

FACTS:
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the passengers of PAL’s
plane from Mactan City to Manila.

Florencio Villarin, a Senior NBI agent who was also a passenger of the plane, noticed a
certain Zaldy, a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez. Soon thereafter, Zaldy
announced to the passengers and the pilots that it was a hold-up and ordered the pilot
not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested passengers of their belongings
including Quisumbing who was divested of jewelries and cash; and Leoffler who was
divested of a wrist watch, cash and wallet. Upon landing at Manila, Zaldy and his
3companions succeeded in escaping.
Quisumbing and Leoffler made demands to PAL to indemnify them but PAL refused
averring that it is not liable to them.

Plaintiffs filed a suit against PAL contending that the loss is a result of breach of PAL’s
contractual obligation to carry them and their belongings and effects to Manila without
loss or damage, and constitutes a serious dereliction of PAL’s legal duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence.

PAL denied liability alleging that the robbery constitute force majeure, and neither of the
plaintiffs had notified PAL that they were in possession of cash and valuable jewelries
and watches or surrendered said items to the crew on board the aircraft.

Trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint because they did not notify defendant that they
were in possession of the cash, jewelries and wallet they are claiming; and that the
robbery is a force majeure for which the defendant is not liable because robbers were
able to gain entrance to the plane with the guns they used already in their possession,
which fact could not have been prevented nor avoided by the defendant since it was not
authorized to search its passengers for firearms and deadly weapons.

CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. PAL could not be faulted for want of diligence for
failing to take positive measures to implement regulations prohibiting civilians from
carrying firearms on board aircrafts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is negligence of the part of the PAL crew occurring before and
exposing them to hijacking.

HELD:
No. Hijackers do not board an airplane through blatant display of firepower. Firearms
and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. The use of the most sophisticated
electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against
truly determined hijackers. The evidence fail to prove any want of diligence on the part
of PAL or it had failed to comply with the applicable regulations or universally accepted
and observed procedures to preclude high jacking; and the particular act singled out by
the petitioners is not negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature
of armed robbery