State Functions and The Future of The State

State Functions and the Future of the State
Author(s): Karl W. Deutsch

Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 7,
No. 2, The State and the Public Sphere (1986), pp. 209-222
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STATE FUNCTIONS
AND THE FUTURE OF THE STATE
KARL W. DEUTSCH
A typologyof statesclassifiedas eitherenforcement or servicestatesleads to further

distinctions
amongregulation, laissez-faire,
planning,welfare,revolutionary
and adaptive
states. The typologyprovidesa base for speculationsabout the long termfutureof
the State.
STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE STATE
It is usefulto distinguish
thestateand thepoliticalsystem.The state
can be seen as a combinationof two basic functions,each of which
mustrelyon threestructural elements.The firstof thetwo basic func-
tionsis theenforcement state,whichI shall call StateA. Its threema-
jor structuralelementsare, first,its enforcement machinery,thatis,
the armedforcesand thepolice withmaterialappendages,buildings,
and equipment,which were the well known apparatus of forceof
interestto Marxistwriters.The second,or decision-making part,con-
sistsof the high-leveldecisionmakers,legislatorsand rulersin full-
timeroles,becausea machinery thatis capable of enforcingmustknow
whatto enforce,and this,of course,willchangewithdiffering situa-
tions. The thirdor implementing part of thisenforcement statecon-
sistsof the middle-levelcivilianmanagersand decisionmakersin the
serviceof directly enforceablelegislation,administrationand coordina-
tion. State A is the enforcementstate/decisionstate that produces
enforceabledecisions,or those decisions which are expectedto be
enforceable.Talcott Parsons used to call them"binding" decisions.
The second basic functioncharacterizeswhat I shall call State B,
theservicestate,producingdesiredgoods and services.These include
the manymillionsof public employeesworkingin the modernstates
today. In manycountriesthesepersonsare involvedin the building
and managementof roads and railroads,runpostal services,conduct
InternationalPoliticalScience Review,Vol. 7 No. 2, April1986209-222
* 1986by International PoliticalScience Association.
209
210 THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
or supportscientific research,and operatesystemsof publichealth,

educationand pensionsand otherformsof incomemaintenance. State
B also could be called theproductionstate.
The notionthatthe statemainlylivesas a kindof parasiteupon
theproduction of theprivatesectoris dearto theheartsof manyapolo-
gistsforprivateinterestswho wouldliketo keeptaxesdown. But this
view is one-sided.It omitsthe factthat State B, the public sector,
todayproducesa substantialbodyof goods and services.If a private
firmbuilds a road, and chargesforits use, it may be neithermore
nor less productivethan if a publicagencybuiltthe road. In most
cases, theroads wouldbe verysimilar.The publicsectoris notneces-
evenin a marketsystem.The verylargepublicsectors
sarilyparasitical,
we now have-up to more than60fo of the workforcesin Sweden
and theNetherlands-arelargelydue to theperformance of services
by thosepublic sectors.In any case, it turnsout thatthe budgetof
theservicestatein highlyindustrialized countriesnowis usuallyabout
twiceas highas the budgetof the enforcement state. In the United
States,Mr. Reagan is tryingto increasetheenforcement budgetand
to decreasethe health,educationand servicebudget.However,the
changeshe willproducethroughthesemeasuresare likelyto be mar-
ginal.Unfortunately, one can now buymorekillingpowerat reason-
able prices,thereforetheamountof damagetheenforcement statecan
inflict,
particularlythrough itsarmiesand air forces,is increasingfaster
thanthebudgetthatcorresponds to it. Even so, manyarmamentbud-
gets increasein verydisquietingways.
ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The politicalsystem includesthecounterparts of thedecision-making

and servicesectionsin quasi-governmental agencies.This can be seen
in westernmarketeconomies,forinstancein the case of the central
bank,whichoftenis nota directgovernment agencybutan organiza-
tionthatrespondsto a financialcommunity of privatebankersand in-
vestors.In socialistcountries,
thecentralbankis a government agency,
butthemainpoliticalpartymaylargelyruntheciviland military gov-
ernment,ratherthanbeingrunby it. In earliercenturies,thechurch
could havetremendous influenceon thestatebutwas nota stateagen-
cy. Even in Franco's Spain, or todayin Poland, thechurchis in some
ways a quasi-state organizationthat fulfillssome public-sector
functions,but it is a non-stateorganizationwithinterests of its own.
Deutsch/ FUTUREOF THE STATE 211
In politicalsystems,we findnot onlythe stateand quasi-stateor-

ganizations,but also elitesand interest
groups,includingsocial classes
and strata,and we find-importantly-themass populationwithits
compliancehabits.This populationmayor may not complywiththe
laws and commandsof thegovernment; it maybe willingto workfast
or slowly.Thereis an East Germanproverb:"Work is veryvaluable,
thereforeit has to be rationedcarefully."One findssimilarexpres-
sions in other places. On the other hand, the willingnessof the
populationto supportthe government and to increaseits effortsin
an emergency is somethingHitlerdiscoveredwhenhe invadedRussia.
This is a major variable of the political system. Consider how
Guatemala defendedits revolutionin 1954-practicallynot at all-
and how Vietnamfoughtduringthe Vietnamwar, and one can see
the differencebetweenthe two politicalsystemsand the habits and
politicalcultureof theirpopulations.
MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE
The firstmainfunction of thestate,historically,

and formoststates,
has been patternmaintenance,includingthe preservationof social
patternssuch as inequalities,class rule or strata(privilegesas they
existedat any particulartime). Here it is usefulto distinguishclasses
fromstrata.A class is hereditary, it has an observablesub-culture,
and is sharplydistinctfromotherclasses. A stratum,however,could
be definedby observablecriteriaas in theSovietUnion's nomenclature,
whichcreatesa certaindegreeor rank but usuallyis not hereditary,
and in many ways is not a class. Accordingto the views of many
scholarsin the socialistcountries,stratadifferences are real but.not
irreconcilable.
That remainsto be seen-but in myopinionitmaywell
be correct.
The secondfunction of thestateispower,bothoveritsown popula-
tion and vis-a-visotherstates,used forwhateverleadersof the state,
or evenpublicopinion,maywishto bringabout. A powerstatecould
be orientedtowardconquestin theshortterm,or slowerand prolonged
conquestin thelongerterm.The thirdfunction is thepursuitof wealth.
Here thestateis mainlyorganizedtowardmakingthepopulationricher,
not necessarilyin equal measures.Some stratamay get more wealth
thanothersbut,on thewhole,thecountrygetsricher.This mightbe
broughtabout bythreedifferent methodsthatproducefiveessential-
ly differenttypesof state.
212 THE STATEAND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
STATE TYPES AS COMBINATIONS OF FUNCTIONS
Combinationsof functionsproducefivedifferent kindsof state.

Thefirstis thegovernment regulation state.We maythinkofmercantil-
ismand Jean-Baptiste Colbert.It is stillbased,however,on a market
economy.
The second is the laissez-fairestate that relies on market
automatisms,forexample,theEnglandof Queen Victoria.This type
of statedefendsproperty relationships and contracts butgivesfreerein
to themarketeconomy,subjectonlyto relatively minorcontrolsin
matterssuch as public health.
The thirdis theplanningstate,usuallyorganizedon the lines of
centralizedplanning,as in thecase of theSovietUnion's transforma-
tionfroman agricultural to an industrial statefromthe1920sonward,
reducingthemarketeconomyto a moreor lessmarginalrole. (On the
proportionsof plannedversusmarketsectors,see Pigou, 1934, and
Von Beyme,1983.)
The fourthtypeof stateaims not so much at increasedwealth,
but at more widelydistributedwelfare,withinthe framework of a
marketeconomy,usuallywitha public sectorof 300/oto 6007oof
thegrossnationalproduct.A low mortality rate forchildrenwould
be a more characteristic measurethan an increasein wealth. (Its
oppositemightbe a non-welfare statesuchas Brazil,whichincreased
per capita incomein thelast 20 yearsbut has had a verypoor record
in public welfare.)
The fifthis a statethatfollowsa specificmajorgoal, usuallya revo-
lutionary stateaimingeitherat nationalindependence or at a newsocial
order,or a combinationof both.
These fivetypesof statesare all observablein history.
I suggest,forthepurposesof discussion,two othertypesof state
thatare largelyspeculative, althoughhistorical literatureexistsconcern-
ing them.One typeis the adaptivestate,thatis, a stateor political
systemthatseesas a primary taskadaptationto somemajorproblemin
itsenvironment. Thismaymanifest itselfas a problemin thephysical,
economic,social,military or politicallyinternational environment. An
exampleof a tremendous adaptiveperformance wouldbe thatof im-
perialJapanaround1868.Duringthisperiod,Japanwas emphatically
a non-industrial country withno Westerntechnology andwasindanger
of becominga colonialor semi-colonial country, perhapsliketheChina
of thattime.But bytremendous effortat adaptation,Japanmodern-
ized withinabout 30 years.This effortincludedsubstantialchanges
in thatcountry'spoliticaland economicstructure butpreserveditsmain

culturaland nationalidentity.Untilthe presenttime,however,such
cases have been rare.
It is probablethatin thefuturemoststateswillhave to movetoward
much more adaptive learning.They may have to learn how not to
destroytheirenvironment. Theywillhave to learnhow to avoid inter-
nationalwars and civilwarswithweapons of mass destruction.They
may also have to learn how to break throughthe vicious cycle of
povertywherebyincreasesin the birthrate put strainson already
strainedresourcesand the resultingpovertyincreasesthe mortality
ratein children.Theseare learningtasksagainstsituationsnotinvented
or created by the state or its population, but which already exist
as more or less objectiveor quasi-objectivechangingconditions,or
existingconditions.
The prominentrole of adaptive learning,what I would call the
adaptive learningstate, mightbecome a major type of state from
about the mid-1980suntilthe middleof the nextcenturyas a direct
resultof the many problemsconcerningpopulation growth,scarce
resources-such as raw materials,energy,food, capital-and their
effectiveinvestment.
There is a second futuretypeof state. Its primaryconcernwill be
initiativelearning,throughwhicha state mobilizesmajor resources
to startsomethingnot forcedupon it by theenvironment and not an
adaptationto conditionsin whichone has no choice, but something
whichthestatehas chosento do. An examplewould be thatof Spain
financingChristopherColumbus. The rulersof Spain did nothave to
do it, but theydid, and theirdecisionchangedthe course of history
for Spain and for the whole world. The Portuguese,for theirpart,
backed Vasco da Gama and profitedfromhis discoveryof the sea
route to India, as well as fromBrazil.
A more recent example of initiativelearning concerns space
transportationand navigationinitiativestaken by both the United
States and the SovietUnion. The firstspace walk was performedby
citizensof the SovietUnion, and Americansfirstwalked on the sur-
face of the moon. Neitherstate had to make thiseffortat that par-
ticulartime; each mighthave waited 30 to 50 years,but theyfound
it prudentto takeinitiatives sooner.Competitionplayeda major role.
When one of the two countriesembarkedon thisproject,the other
countryfeltobligedto followsuit.The factremainsthatbetweenthem
these countriestook an initiative.
Chances are thatafterthe year 2050, and perhapsfor 100 years

thereafter,statesmay take major initiativessuch as conscious and
deliberategeneticengineering,
a moveexpectedby scientists in many
countries.
STATE TYPES AS COMBINATIONS

OF THESE BASIC FUNCTIONS
I proposethatwe thinkof statetypesas combinationsof major

functions. One can characterizemanystatetypesbytherankordering
of at least threeof the functions.Everystatetriesto followall the
functions as outlinedpreviously,butnot withthesame intensity, nor
withthesame priorities, norwiththesame proportionsof itsbudget,
its manpowerand the attentionof its leaders.The traditionalstate,
beginningin the thirteenth century,afteror even duringfeudalism,
aims at patternmaintenancefirstand foremostand onlysecondarily
at power.A modernversionof thepattern-maintaining statemayarise
whenat leastsomemajorpatterns of societyare so seriously
challenged
thattheirmaintenancebecomesan overriding priorityforthe ruling
elitesinterestedin self-preservation.
An extremepriority on maintain-
ing some patternsmaylead to drasticchangesin otherpracticesand
institutions,and thosechangesmayproducethegarrison-police state,
in whichall otherpublic functionsare subordinatedto thisone all-
important task.In smallcountries,thistypemayremainrelatively pure
but,in largeones, it maybe combinedwiththetask of foreigncon-
quest and the promisesassociatedwithit.
The conquest-and-power state thatemergedaround the fifteenth
century in Europeaimedprimarily at power.Machiavelliwrotea hand-
book, so to speak, forsuch a powerstate.An earlierconqueststate
was theNormanstatethatconqueredEngland.Hitler'sGermanywas
an effortto build a modernconqueststate.
The thirdtypeof statewould be mercantilist. It aims primarily
at
thedevelopment of wealththroughregulation, thenat power,and then
at patternmaintenance.This was typicalfortheperiodbetween1650
and 1850 in manycountries.
The laissez-fairestatebeganwiththegrowthof emphasison pattern
maintenance,protectionof propertyand class privilege,withpower
in thirdplace. It predominated from1850to 1900in manycountries.
All of theseoutlines,of course,are onlyveryapproximatesketches.
The modernwelfarestatetriesto distribute welfaremorebroadly,

and to treatpeople as more nearlyequal withregardto theirbasic
needs,health,protectionfromstarvation,and homelessness.It began
about 1900 and quicklybecame predominant.It aimed foremostat
welfareand maintaineda marketsystemin mostcases, but also aimed
at patternmaintenance,althoughwithsome modificationintendedto
reduceextremesocial inequality.Even so, it maintaineda good deal
of inequality,particularlyin the westernwelfarestates. In the third
place only, it aimed at power.
But therealso arose anothertype of state, the mobilizingstate.
Such a statetriesto mobilizeall theresourcesof the population,that
is, to disengagethemfromprevioushabitsand commitments and to
makethemavailablefornewcommitments to a specificgoal. This goal
may be nationalindependence,or moretypically,theconstruction of
a new social order. The mobilizingstate oftenoperatesin a climate
of emergency,racingagainsttimeand againstexternaland internal
threats,and it is oftenquite unscrupulousin itschoice of means. The
Frenchrevolutionin 1793,theRussianrevolutionof 1917,theChinese
revolutionof 1949,theYugoslav revolution,theCuban revolutionof
1959 and othershave typicallygivenriseto mobilizingstates.These
revolutionswerenot importedfromthe outside,but grewout of the
forceswithinthe societies.Each of thesemobilizingstates,however,
was only a passingphase. Its verysuccess led to its replacementby
anothertypeof state."Permanentrevolution"and permanentmobil-
ization were impractical.
The post-revolutionary state aims at consolidatingthe systemthat
therevolutionists created.It is increasingly
interested in patternmain-
tenance,attemptsto develop wealththroughplanning,oftencentral
planning,and finallyit builds up power. But initially,planninghas
priorityover power. The unscrupulousnessand lack of inhibitionin
thechoiceof meansmaycarryoverfromthemobilizingor revolution-
aryphase to theelitesof thepost-revolutionary stateforone or more
generations, even when they become increasingly incompatiblewith
long-termpolitical stability.
From 1950 to the present,and probablybeyond the year 2000,
theremay be a good many of thesepost-revolutionary statesin the
world,and in some countriesmobilizingstatesof one kindor another
may also temporarily arise. The mobilization,by the way, may not
always be for somethingfeasible.The Russian and Chinese revolu-
tions had feasiblegoals. We do not know whethera perfectIslamic
society,as theAyatollahKhomeinihas envisagedit,is feasibleor not.

We do know,however,thathe has mobilizedmanyIraniansin sup-
portof his goal, at least fora time. Israel is also, in some ways, a
mobilizingstate.
The adaptive-learning stateis a speculativeconstruction. One may
expectthatit willsee its foremosttask in some specificact of adap-
tivelearning,and thatit thenwillneed powerto applytheresultsof
adaptivelearningand put theminto effective operation.Then, and
onlythen,will such a stateattemptto maintaincontinuity of many
otherbasic patternsso thatas thesocietylearns,it also maintainsits
identity.
The sameholdsfortheinitiative-learning state.In thistypeof state,
whichone would expectto evolveand growby about theyear2050,
initiativelearningwillbecomemoreimportantand adaptivelearning
willcontinueto be important.For instance,adaptationto the grow-
ing side effectsof otherprocessesand powerwillstillbe important.
Such large-scaleinitiativesmayinvolvetangiblecommonenterprises
such as interplanetary transportation and settlement, geneticengi-
neering,controlof theclimate,conquestof thedeep ocean floors,or
thingswe cannot even conceivenow. But therecould also be com-
mon enterprises of culture,thoughtand feeling,such as large-scale
effortsto abolishbrutality and unbearablelonelinessforchildrenand
theold, or themajorcausesof thecurrently prevailing formsof mental
and emotionaldisease,or to raisesocietyand theindividualsin it to
newlevelsof sensitivityand awareness,newlevelsof mutualconsider-
ation, as well as of individualspontaneity and imagination.
THE FUTURE OF THE STATE

What does all thissuggestforthe futureof the stateand forthe
problemof the "withering away of thestate"? A numberof Western
writershave describedvisionsof a statelessfuture.One can findit in
RudyardKipling'sstory,TheNightMail, and in H. G. Wells'snovel,
Men Are Like Gods.
Marx,Engels,and Lenintriedto laydowna morescientific pattern.
This is how theysaw it in 1847: The vast majorityof thepopulation
of any highlyindustrializedcountrywould becomeproletarianswith
commoninterestsbut withno major antagonisticones. Revolution
would maketheseproletarians therulingclass; thestatewould be re-
quired only to coerce the remnantsof the old capitalistor feudal
classes, and thenbecome superfluous.Anarchismwould followafter

socialism, not before. On the way to this state of affairs,the state
would become smallerand simpler.Lenin said in 1917 thatthe state
would become so simplethat any scullerymaid could run it. As in
thecase of the youngMarx and Engels in 1847, thiswas largelya vi-
sion of sociology,not economics.It was an analysisof classes rather
than an analysisof economic resources.
In 1875, towardthe end of his life, Marx, in his Critiqueof the
Gotha Program,drewa different picture.This critiqueis a piece of
writingthatwillbecomeincreasingly importantforunderstanding the
problemsof thepresentand futureas thesecan be seenfromtheMarx-
ist tradition.Marx wroteof a firststage of socialism,based on the
principleof "each accordingto hisability,each accordingto hiswork."
This concept,in Germany,is called Leistungsprinzip, thatis, theprin-
ciple of performance.It involvesinequalityand materialincentives,
and as Marx said, it involvesinjustice.The vigorousyoungbachelor
can produce moreunitsof productionthanthe harassedfatherwho
has giventhe bottleto his baby in themiddleof the night.Thereare
manyotherwaysin whichinjusticewill be perceived,because every-
one's needswillnot be servedto the same extent.If the wealthof so-
cietyis to grow quickly,one must offerincentivesand rewardsto
people forstudy,learningand qualifications,otherwisetoo fewwould
take thetroubleto acquirethem.This meansinequalitywhichin turn
means the need to defendunequal distribution.
Inequalityin theproperty of consumergoods, bothperishablesand
durables, is intrinsicto this "first stage of socialism." This stage
cannotgetalongwithoutthestateand itspowersof enforcement. Marx
knew it, and he said so.
The second "higherstageof socialism" thatMarx imaginedwas to
come "when thespringsof wealthwillflowmoreabundantly."Then
the main principlewould be "from each accordingto his ability,to
each accordingto his needs." And it was assumedthatpeople would
voluntarily workaccordingto theirability.Whethereveryonehas the
abilityand motivationto be diligenthas been an old and anthropo-
logical argumentand is increasingly a questionof empiricalobserva-
tion. It seemsplausiblethatpeople who don't workmaygetso bored
thattheywantto startworkingagain. It is doubtfulwhetherwe have
reachedthissituationyetin any countryand underany social system.
The "new typeof person" thatwas expectedhas not yetappeared in
sufficient numbersto changethemajoroperatingpatternsof anyecon-
218 THE STATEAND THE PUBLICSPHERE
omy in any country.The emergenceof new typesof persons may easily

be on a time scale that is much longer than was firstanticipated.
What is meant by the word "needs," in Marx's time and in ours?
Here is a possible definition.A need is an input to preventobservable
damage. A person needs to eat. If he does not, the damage of mal-
nutrition will become visible. The same holds true for many other
things. The damage a social systeminflictson people in the form of
child mortalityis one of the most revealing facts about its limitations
and failures. In this respect, socialist countrieshave given high priori-
ty to the reduction of mortality,particularlyamong children.
What is "abundance"? I would propose this definition:Abundance
occurs when the average marginal utility(a termMarx neverused, but
I thinkhe would not have objected to it in this context)of the material
goods one can buy for the earnings of one hour is less useful to a per-
son than the leisure of that hour, so that free time becomes more im-
portantthan materialgoods. For thatto happen, one musthave a good
many material goods, and that is the whole idea of marginal utility.
A person who is verythirstywould walk a long distance for a glass of
water. But someone who has drunk plentyof water is likelyto prefer
to stay where he or she is.
The degree to which workers preferleisure time to more material
goods is only partlyobservable today but to some extentit has already
happened. Unions and workersin many countries may prefershorter
working weeks, and earlier retirement.Many workers in boring and
repetitiveemploymentwould like to retireat the age of 55 years. On
the other hand, some people involved in interestingand rewarding
work are happy to work until 65 years or even later. Of course, these
wishes also depend on the type of labor performed. In many coun-
tries,we are now approaching discussions suggestingthat people want
more leisure and less work. In differentforms,this desire plays a part
in socialist countries.
Another way in which people preferleisure to work is by slowing
down the tempo of work. In a modern, highlytechnological society,
the worker has to make more decisions per minute or per hour than
did the craftsman of the eighteenthor nineteenthcentury. We also
have new kinds of popular illnesses, high-tensiondiseases, such as
circulatory diseases, heart attacks, and nervous breakdowns, just as
tuberculosis,malnutritionand ricketswere popular diseases 100 or 150
years ago.
A vague foreshadowing of thischangeis a relatedratio. Is themar-

ginal utilityof a humanlife greateror less than the marginalutility
of a wage increase?One can answerthisby askinghow long ago it
was thatstrikingworkerswerekilledby the police, and acceptedthe
risk of being killed. For most countries,this watershedwas crossed
in the 1930s. In the United States, the last spectacularkillingof
picketingstrikerswas at the Republic Steel Company near Chicago
in 1936. If one comparestheway in whichtheBritishact towardcoal
miners,and theproteststhatensue whentheykillsomeone,even un-
intentionally, witha hard rubberbulletin NorthernIreland,one can
see thathumanliveshave becomemorevaluable. The politicalculture
has changed. The inequalitiesthat are stillat stake formost people
and formostof publicopinionno longerexcuseor justifythetaking
of human life in highlyindustrializedcountries.An example of the
earlierpracticesoccurredon thestreetsof RadotinnearPrague in the
early1930s,when10 unemployedworkerswereshotdown,and again
at Freiwaldauin CzechoslovakianSilesia and at Adalen in Sweden.
In the early 1930s people were killedbecause the police forceswere
accustomedto shootinginto crowds.
In colonialareas thiswas evenworse,forinstancein 1920at Amrit-
sar in India. It is an interesting
measureof whathappensto the state
whenpeople beginto realizethatthesequarrelsare no longerworth
beingkilledfor.Underexceptionalconditionstherecould be a sliding
back to more bloody-mindedperiods. But on the whole, the value,
or the marginalutility,of liveshas gone up and the readinessto kill
foreconomicor politicalreasonshas gone down, not everywhere, of
course,but in manyadvanced countries.Usually thiseffectis corre-
lated witha degreeof industrialdevelopmentand informationalde-
velopment.Perhaps this shiftin marginalutilitieswill be completed
only in the nextcenturies.
SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

Now we come to an importantproblemthatMarx did not stress.
For Marx, the fate of the world was determinedby a few highly
industrializedcountriessuch as France, Germany,Britain,and the
United States.
The wholenon-western world,theThirdWorld,was not in Marx's
focus.But theThirdWorldconsistsof threequartersof mankindliving
220 THE STATE AND THE PUBLICSPHERE
farbelowthestandardof theindustrialized world,bothEast and West.

The populationsof thesecountriesare growing,and thedoublingof
worldpopulationwilloccurlargelywithintheThirdWorld.Thisprob-
lem also existsamong the socialistcountries.China is a collectivist
countryruledbya CommunistPartyand is farpoorerthantheWar-
saw Pact countries, althoughitspopulationis muchlarger.According-
ly,thepercapitaincomesin thehighlyindustrialized Communist-ruled
countriesare muchhigherthan in the less industrialized ones, such
as China, NorthKorea, Vietnamand Cuba, and thestatemachinery
of the varioussocialistcountriesis also defendingand maintaining
thesedifferences.
Thereseemsto be no clearidea amongsocialisttheorists as to what
shouldbe done about theseproblems.The second,abundantstageof
societywill be unattainableformost of the ThirdWorld,even if it
becomessocialistbeforethesecondhalfof thetwenty-second century.
If in the socialistworldas a whole-what our Sovietcolleaguescall
the socialistcamp-the firstphase of socialismshould prevail,each
socialistcountry,accordingto currentMarxisttheory,shouldexport
accordingto its capacitiesto a kind of socialistworld marketand
receivefromit accordingto itscontribution in thatmarket,plus such
economicaid as thepublicopinionand leadership of thesocialistcoun-
trieswill be preparedto give.
The experienceof westernEurope and of the democraticsocial-
istsshowsthat107oof GNP is themaximumthattheSwedishworking
classes, includingpublic opinionand intellectuals, are willingto let
theirgovernment distributeas economicaid. The figuresfor Ger-
manyare lower,four-tenths of 107o.On thewhole,it does not appear
realisticthatpublicand workingclass opinion,in the presentperiod
of scarcity,willgivemuchmorethan 1 o, eitherin industrialcoun-
triesruledby democraticsocialistsor in Communist-ruled ones.
To be sure,whenwealthincreasesin the industrialcountriesthe
marginalutilityof economicaid will declineand generosity may in-
crease.One could imaginea futurein whichChristianity in the West
and socialistsolidarityin theEast wouldincreaseto contributea nickel
on the dollar and five kopeks on the ruble. But that is hardlyin
the near future.
The worldwilltherefore continueto needcoercivestatemachineries
fornationaldefense,and forimmigration control.Also withinnear-
richsocialistcountriesand thepoor countries,such machineries will
be needed to defendthe unequal distributionof income that is still

needed to create materialincentivesfor more work.
HOW TO SHORTEN THIS PERIOD
We will thereforehave stateswithsome enforcement characteris-

tics, so far as we can now foresee,untilabout 2200 A.D., for inter-
national and global allegiance. How can this process be shortened?
Social changesalone willnot sufficeto shortenit. It can be shortened
throughscientificand technologicalbreakthroughs thatlead to major
changes in productionfunctions.Such major changes,however,do
not growon trees.Breakthroughs occursooneror laterin roughpro-
portionto the materialmeans put into searchoperationsthatwe call
science.Even thentheyare notcertain,butunderfavorableconditions
theybecomemoreprobable.Nuclearenergywas discoveredwithinless
than a decade, and was made practicalthroughprecedingadvances
in scientifictheoryand the allocation of vast amountsof resources,
firstin the United States and thenlater in othercountries.
Breakthroughs could becomemoreattainablethroughadaptiveand
initiativelearning.At thisstageof theinitiative learningstate,thepub-
lic sectorsharewhichamountsnow to an averageof 52%Vo of thegross
nationalproductin the memberstatesof the European Community,
may recedeto 300%and even to 100%by the timethe initiativelearn-
ing stateis fullydeveloped(people may not thinkit urgentto go to
anotherplanet,but 10%Mo may do so, particularlyif the social prob-
lems are smallerthan theyare today).
If successful,thesetechnicalbreakthroughs would advancethesub-
stantialreductionof the coercivestate.They may help to reducethe
coerciveside of thestatemachinery up to about theyear2100 or 2150,
essentiallyleavingonlythe provisionof servicesand the production
of goods underthe administration of the state. In regardto all these
questions,it is vital for social scientistsboth in the West and in the
East to tryto put, at long last, some explicittimevariablesinto the
visions of scholarsand thinkersof past generations.
REFERENCES
VON BEYME, KLAUS (1985) "The role of thestateand thegrowthof government."

Int. Pol. Sci. Rev. 6: 11-35.
222 THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
PIGOU, ARTHUR (1934) Economia del benesere.Torino: Unionetipografico

editrice
torinese.
KarlW. Deutschis Directorof theInternationalInstitute

of Comparative Social Research
at theScienceCenter,Berlin,and StanfieldProfessorof International Peace, Emeritus
at Harvard University.His currentresearchinterestsincludecomputer-basedworld
modelsand thetestingof politicaltheoriesbylarge-scalequantitative
data. He has been
coeditorand/orcoauthorof recentbooks on Decentralization (1980), Fear of Science
- Trustin Science(1980),Comparative Government (1981), and Advancesin theSocial
Sciences,1900-1980(1984).

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State Functions and The Future of The State - DeUTSCH

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Author(s): Karl W. Deutsch

A typologyof statesclassifiedas eitherenforcement or servicestatesleads to further

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE STATE

or supportscientific research,and operatesystemsof publichealth,

ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The politicalsystem includesthecounterparts of thedecision-making

In politicalsystems,we findnot onlythe stateand quasi-stateor-

MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

The firstmainfunction of thestate,historically,

STATE TYPES AS COMBINATIONS OF FUNCTIONS

Combinationsof functionsproducefivedifferent kindsof state.

in thatcountry'spoliticaland economicstructure butpreserveditsmain

Chances are thatafterthe year 2050, and perhapsfor 100 years

STATE TYPES AS COMBINATIONS

I proposethatwe thinkof statetypesas combinationsof major

The modernwelfarestatetriesto distribute welfaremorebroadly,

society,as theAyatollahKhomeinihas envisagedit,is feasibleor not.

THE FUTURE OF THE STATE

classes, and thenbecome superfluous.Anarchismwould followafter

omy in any country.The emergenceof new typesof persons may easily

A vague foreshadowing of thischangeis a relatedratio. Is themar-

SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

farbelowthestandardof theindustrialized world,bothEast and West.

be needed to defendthe unequal distributionof income that is still

HOW TO SHORTEN THIS PERIOD

We will thereforehave stateswithsome enforcement characteris-

VON BEYME, KLAUS (1985) "The role of thestateand thegrowthof government."

PIGOU, ARTHUR (1934) Economia del benesere.Torino: Unionetipografico

KarlW. Deutschis Directorof theInternationalInstitute

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