Triumph and Collapse

Russia and the USSR

1941 – 1991
Revision Guide
Exam Questions
‘Stalin’s leadership was the most significant reason for the Soviet victory over Germany in
the 1941–1945 war.’ Assess the validity of this view. (Specimen)

To what extent was Destalinisation responsible for Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964?
(Specimen)

How far was the failure to achieve effective economic reform between 1941 and 1991
responsible for the break-up of the USSR? (Specimen)

To what extent had the USSR recovered from the impact of the Great Patriotic War
(1941–1945) by the time of Stalin’s death in 1953? (June 2010)

‘Despite the policy of Destalinisation, the main features of Stalinism were still intact in the
USSR at the time of Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964.’
Assess the validity of this view. (June 2010)

To what extent was the failure to maintain economic growth after Stalin’s death
responsible for the break-up of the USSR in 1991? (June 2010)

‘The USSR remained politically and socially stable in the years 1964 to 1982 despite the
policies of the Brezhnev regime.’ Assess the validity of this view. (June 2011)

‘Gorbachev’s reluctance to commit himself fully to radical reform caused the break-up of
the USSR.’ Assess the validity of this view. (June 2011)

‘Agriculture was always the fundamental weakness of the Soviet economy.’

Assess the validity of this view of the Soviet economy in the years between 1945 and
Brezhnev’s death in 1982. (June 2011)

To what extent was Stalin’s leadership responsible for the Soviet victory in the
Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945? (June 2012)

To what extent did the USSR achieve economic growth under the regimes of
Khrushchev and Brezhnev? (June 2012)

How far was political stagnation in the USSR, in the years 1956 to 1991, due to
the Soviet regime’s fear of change? (June 2012)
What do I need to know?
The Great Patriotic War and its Outcomes, 1941–1953
• The impact on the USSR of German invasion and Nazi ideology from 1941
• Stalin’s role in the management of the war effort
• The nature of the wartime Soviet economy
• The actions of the Communist regime to enlist mass patriotism for the war effort, including
propaganda and religious concessions
• The extent of wartime opposition within the USSR and the Stalinist regime’s treatment of
opposition
• The relationship between the Soviet people and Stalin’s regime by the time victory was
achieved in 1945
• Stalin’s dictatorship, 1945–1953
• The cult of personality
• Economic recovery after 1945
• The impact of Cold War politics on the USSR

Destalinistation, 1953–1968
• The emergence of new leaders after the death of Stalin, and Khrushchev’s victory in the
power struggle
• The 1956 Party Congress and reaction to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’
• Khrushchev’s leadership
• Khrushchev’s motives for industrial and agrarian reforms and their impact
• The reasons for the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964
• The impact of Destalinisation within the USSR and on Soviet relations with the satellite
states

The Brezhnev Era, 1968–1982

• The leadership of Brezhnev
• Brezhnev’s political, economic and social policies: the era of conservatism
• Attitudes towards the Brezhnev regime: the repression of dissidents and opposition to the
war in Afghanistan
• Economic stagnation and the costs of the arms race

The End of the Soviet Union, 1982–1991

• Leadership changes from 1982: the leadership of Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev
• Problems facing the USSR by the 1980s
• The motives for, and impact of, Gorbachev’s reforms
• Ideas of glasnost and perestroika and their effects; opposition to glasnost and perestroika
• Economic and political problems
• The growing threat of nationalism from republics within the USSR
• The impact on the USSR of the collapse of Communist regimes in the satellite states at the
end of 1989
• The August coup of 1991 and the overthrow of Gorbachev
• The end of the USSR
 The Great Patriotic War

WW2 Narrative & Key battles General WW2 facts

-June 1941 - Nazi -September 1941 –

• 28 million Soviet citizen
Germany’s Blitzkrieg ‘Operation Barbarossa’ deaths, roughly 1/7 of pre
tactics rip through starts with the Siege of – war population
Eastern Europe attack Leningrad which ended in
on all fronts, 1944 lasting 872 days! • By 1945, 6 million Soviet
overrunning Poland, There were an estimated soldiers taken captive, of
much of the Ukraine 632,000 deaths. these 75% murdered,
and the Baltic states. worked to death or to
starve/freeze to death

-Spring 1942 – Nazi’s launch

-October 1941 – • German invaders
Stalingrad offensive, major
Battle of Moscow,
turning point, Soviet counter- during the War
Soviets hugely destroyed, 2/3 of pre-
offensive tactics led by
outnumbered and war Soviet property,
General Zhukov encircle and destroyed 60% of
struggling, turned city
deplete Nazi army, pivotal steel, 65,000
into a fortress, kilometres of railway
Soviet triumph in 1943, and
launched counter lines and rendered 25
estimated 750,000 killed,
offensive aided by the million people
missing or wounded Nazi
harsh winter which homeless
soldiers, Soviets by
crippled the Nazi’s.
comparison just 478,741!

-July 1943 – Battle of -January – 1945

Kursk, WW2 largest tank
battle ensues, Soviets
tactics gain momentum,
Nazi’s defeated estimated
500,000 soldiers killed,
missing or wounded. Last
major Nazi offensive.
Soviets invade
Germany and head
for Berlin, May –
German surrender,
victory in Europe.
 Stalin’s role in war leadership

What he did…

• Centralised power with creation of State Defence Committee (GKO, which ensured decisions regarding foreign
policy, economic policy, armaments production could be made quickly by bypassing Soviet bureaucracy) and
Stavka (the same except with only military affairs)
• Enforced very harsh punishment upon both troops and generals
• Allowed highly skilled individuals (Marshall Zhukov) more control of army
• Re-opened churches
• Was initially very slow to react to Operation Barabossa
• Reintroduced Leninist system of Commissars attached to army officers
• Relocated factories in East across Yural mountains

Good Leader? Bad Leader?

1. Creation on GKO + Stavka 1. Made big mistakes: refusal to

meant political/ military retreat at Kharkov, 1943 cost
decisions could be made over 85,000 Soviet casualties.
quickly, which was crucial to Also allowed Kiev and
organisation of army and Leningrad to be encircled by
country. German forces).
2. Stalin listened: (David 2. Harsh treatment (generals
Reynolds) “Stalin learned from who lost battles were
his mistakes, whereas Hitler executed/ soldiers were
only grew more unwielding tortured + Commissars) often
with each failure”. lowered morale. (DR) “Stalin
3. Control of Beria + NKVD intended to terrorize his army
ensured there was continued into fighting”.
public support for war effort. 3. He sometimes played key
4. Sacked incompetent generals figures (Beria/ Malenkov/
(Voroshilov) Molotov) off against each
5. Re-opening of churches meant other.
he had support from religious 4. Ignored build up of German
pop. forces on USSR border so
6. Army was being led by skilled there was no military
individuals (Marshall Zhukov): response when Hitler invaded.
(DR) “He gave his top generals (DR) “Stalin wouldn’t let his
the freedom to fight”. troops fire back”.
7. Relocation of factories 5. Slow reaction to German
allowed for continued heavy invasion meant large parts of
industry production Eastern USSR were overrun
Enlisting mass patriotism

Propaganda

• Withheld any bad news that might be damaging to morale.

• Exaggerated claims of German losses.
• Stricter censorship was introduced.
• A lot of focus on national pride and patriotism.
• Adopted the term ‘The Great Patriotic War’
• Applauded previous Russian heroes, who had fought and
succeeded in previous wars.
• Mass hatred toward the Germans generally, not just the
Nazi regime.
• Stalin’s name was constantly held up as a patriotic symbol.
• Emphasis of propaganda was mostly Russian, despite the
whole of the Soviet Union being involved in the war.

People’s Militias

• Made up of volunteers to back up the red army.

• They had inadequate training and weapons, but were
formed spontaneously from citizens committed to the
NKVD
war.
• The government was worried
of traitors who might try to
Religious Concessions destabilise the USSR from
within.
• Restored the Russian Orthodox Church to favour. • The NKVD rounded up anyone
• Stalin met the head of the church and was given the church’s who had a previous record of
blessing in the war effort. opposition.
• This in turn meant that the Soviet Unions persecuted • Drastic action was taken
Christians would begin to show support. against ‘defeatists’ and
• The church began putting out propaganda leaflets against the ‘rumour mongers’
Germans and raising money for the war effort. • Thousands of suspects were
• The church also campaigned to open up a second front, shot by the NKVD, as were
something that Stalin was also keen for. soldiers who retreated on the
• In return the Church was able to preserve its traditional battlefield.
structure and by the end of 1943 there were over 15000
Orthodox churches.
• Soviet historians, rarely acknowledge the value of the church
during the war, and instead put it down entirely to the state.
• “The influence of the Orthodox Christian and other religions
on the population was a far cry from what bourgeois
historians claim it was and could not serve as a source of
inspiration in the struggle against the enemy” Rzeheshevsky
World War 2: Myths and the realities, 1984
 Soviet wartime economy
Pre War preparation
• Provision for a massive increase in war production had been
made during the mid-1930’s
• Factories had been given extra capacity to produce more
weapons and munitions if required.
• The majority of its workforce was vulnerable to any attack
that came from the west.
Initial impact of War on the economy
• Over half of its industrial capital was taken over by
November 1941.
• Two fifths of grain production was also taken over.
• Had no pre-determined plan to evacuate equipment.
• Not enough transport available.
• Production of coal, steel and oil were down by 1942.
• Capacity shrunk to 68% of its pre-war rate.
• The workload was stretched to capacity before the war,
when the war came and people began to enlist, the
economy had to shrink
The people and the economy
• Compulsory overtime of 3 hours was introduced.
• Holidays were banished.
• If workers were thought to be slacking they would
be fined or sent to labour camps.
• The government had no plan to keep the valuable
people in the country and send the dispensable to
war. Many of the most important people in keeping
the economy afloat were sent to war.
• Labour Workforce was set up, to ensure the right
people were in the right areas.
• Labour workforce acquired the sufficient amount of
power to prevent agencies taking workers for the
own needs elsewhere
Summary
Economy succeeded because the USSR massively out
produced Germany. However it was relatively inefficient
and relied on its massive workforce rather than its
productivity
Superiority of economy
• Out produced Germany in all key
areas.
• Huge investments in Steel, machine
tools and chemicals.
• This enabled the production of
many modern weapons and
munitions.
• Managed to relocate some
industrial equipment.
• Built 3500 new factories during the
war, mainly in the Urals and Siberia.
• Output doubled in munitions
factories during the war.
• “The heroic feat of evacuation and
restoration of industrial capacities
during the war meant as much for
the country’s destiny as the
greatest battles of the war2”
General Zhukov 1971
Historiography of Wartime economy
• On the movement of the Soviet economy
from the west to the east “The most massive
and most effective evacuation ever
undertaken in history… a whole industrial
country was moved thousands of kilometres
east.” ( Rzeheshevsky, O, World War 2:
Myths and realities)
• “One of the most stupendous and successful
of such operations ever witnessed.” ( Chris
Ward Stalin’s Russia, 1999)
• “There were too many soldiers and munitions
workers compared to the few left in the
supporting civilian infrastructure.” Barber J.
Harrison M., The soviet Home Front 1941-45
1991.
•
Extent of wartime opposition in the USSR

Nationalities

• areas such as Ukraine saw the invading Nazi’s as liberators or allies

• possibly one million people from various national groups defected and
fought on the side of the Germans against the Soviets
• Vlasov’s ‘Russian Liberation Army’ – Vlasov was a Red Army Commander,
captured by the German’s in 1942, which he then fought alongside
Germany with ex-Russian forces who defected to the German side. Vlasov
was then was captured by the Americans in 1945.
• He was then returned to the USSR, where they hung him for treason on
August 1st 1946 along with other soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army.

Reaction to opposition groups by the Soviet Regime

• The regime saw many nationalities as traitors - “guilty by

association”
• Crimean Tartars were deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia –
1943-1944
• Volga Germans were deported to Siberia and Central Asia in 1941
• Many Soviets were exiled from the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine
• Stalin was obsessed with the threat to national unity
• In early years of the war, one million people were deported from
western Belorussia and western Ukraine
• June 1941 – 134,000 people were deported from the Baltic States into convict camps
• Around 3.3 million Soviet citizens were deported between 1941 and 1948

Treatment of Jewish Soviets

• Lived mainly in Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia, which were occupied by the Germans in 1941
to 1942.
• By 1945 about 5 million Jews had disappeared – they were either killed by the Germans, or
by local nationalists

The NKVD (Secret Police)

• Displayed its massive authority under Beria during the war, ensured compliance from the
population.
• Punished the people for failure, incompetence, arrested those suspected of treason or
disloyalty.
• Monitored those who lived under German occupation, they were investigated on a regular
basis for loyalty.
• Used convict labour (prisoners, etc.) during the war economy.
Impact of the war in the USSR

Political

• Women membership of the Communist Party rose – 18.3%

• Party became more educated and less ‘working class’
• 75% of the Party joined the war effort, Party numbers grew after as it
seemed ‘more patriotic’ to join
• The Communist Party had younger, more professional members during
the war, Stalin therefore trusted it more.
• After the war, Stalin took back all power – he had delegated power to
his generals during the war
• The GKO was set up – consisted of Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Voroshilov, ensured
that Stalin had ‘all the power and authority of the State’ behind him, whilst giving power to
politicians that Stalin favoured most.
• Stalin became more of a dictator after the war, ruling with an iron fist

Economy

• Loss of men in the war reduced the number of workers, agriculture suffered as a result.
• Farms were destroyed following the Scorched Earth policy – the burning of farms that could
have benefited the Germans, damaged the fertile land
• USSR spent 38.7 billion roubles on the defence industry by 1944, 17.9 billion roubles on the
military services, showing the military expenses were high
• Soviet war economy meant that the economy after the war was very imbalanced, with heavy
industry being strong, yet agriculture and light industry were weak

Social

• Mass patriotism following the Soviet victory of the war

• Huge loss of soldiers – 1/5 of the pre-war population had been lost
• Soviet casualties made up half of the overall loss of life in the war
• About 20 million Soviet men died, creating an imbalance of men and women
• The people became more supressed than before, free public opinion was non-existent
• Returning soldier were sent to gulags, Stalin feared they would spread Western ideas to the
Soviet people

Historiography

• Peter Kenez – “For the Soviet people, the post-war period was even more difficult than the
war period.”
• Christopher Reid – “Was all the more disappointing for a society expecting some reward for
wartime sacrifices and victories.
Economic recovery after 1945

Industry Impact of the Fourth Five-year plan.

1945 Planned 1950 Actual 1950

Industry was essential in order for the
target results
economy to recover. This is highlighted in Coal (million 149 250 261
the Fourth Five-year plan. The plan aimed tons)
to improve the economy by focusing Oil (million tons) 19 35 40
entirely on quantity and ignoring the
Steel (million 12 25 27
quality of the goods created. Consumer
tons)
demand was ignored and focus was on Cement (million 2 10 10
heavy industry goods such as Coal and tons)
Steel. Electricity 43 82 91
(million tons)
Problems with the economy: Tractors 15 112 242
(thousands)
Soviet industry was inefficient and Number of 27 33 39
workers
involved intense heavy labour. This
(millions)
reduced productivity and after the losses Index of 112 - 205
of workers during the war the productivity producers’
decreased even more. goods
(1940=100)
The USSR had also lost economic support
from USA and Britain. This is why there
was even more focus upon quantity.

‘Even if we take into consideration the exaggerations built into soviet statistics, it is still indisputable that the Stalinist
methods worked, and that the speed of reconstruction was impressive’ Peter Kenez.

Agriculture in 1945 was in a poor condition due to focus on heavy industry and scorched earth. In
order to improve the economy the state took 60-70% of harvested grain and exported it in order to
fund heavy industry.

1945 Planned Actual

However targets of production within 1950 1950
agriculture were rarely met due to loss and target results
workers and land from the war. Agricultural 60 127 99
production (1940
index=100)
Grain harvest (million 47 - 81
Collectivisation meant peasants were starving
tons)
because their grain was being exported. This
reduced the production of grain. Soviet agriculture in Stalin’s final years was characterised by ‘ill-
judged interventions of authority, excessive centralisation of
decisions, extremely low prices, insufficient investment and a lack
Agriculture was the weakest part of the soviet of adequate incentives.’ Alex Nove.
economy and would not improve with Stalin’s
quick fix approach.
 Stalin’s cultStalin’s
of personality
cult of personality

• Stalin had always been

portrayed as a god like figure
and this status was reinforced
by the Soviet victory in 1945.

• In private Stalin claimed he

disapproved of the excesses of
the Stalin cult that appeared
throughout the media.
• In practice he showed no sign
of wanting to stop it.

• He was presented as the

leader who cared for his
people and was ruthless in
protecting their interests.
• Some argue that he
recognised the political
advantages of allowing his
subordinates to promote his
god like image.
• Stalin did not like the emphasis put on him
as being the leading interpreter of Marxism.
• He claimed, “We already have the teaching
of Marx and Lenin. No additional teachings
are required.”

• Stalin was given titles such as
“Coryphaeus of Science,”
“Father of Nations,” “Brilliant
Genius of Humanity,” and
“Great Architect of
Communism”.
• The cult of Stalin was at its height at the
celebrations held for his 70th birthday in
December 1949.
• There were parties, festivals and processions
held throughout the USSR.
 Social policies under
Social Stalin
policies under Stalin

• Zhadanov was one of

Stalin’s most trusted and
favourite subordinates.
• He had similar views to
Stalin.

• Zhadanov ensured that all

intellectuals – writers,
artists, scientists, musicians
or economists - followed the
Party line.

• During the war, religion had

been harnessed by Stalin to
boost support for the
regime.
• After 1945, religious
practice was tolerated as
long as it presented no
threat to the State’s control
of ‘public opinion’.

• Stalin introduced the campaign against ‘cosmopolitanism’, which was largely associated with
Zhadanov.
• ‘Cosmopolitanism’ was associated with increased anti-Semitism, which was evident in increased
discrimination and violence against Jews.
• Cosmopolitanism was also reflected in a campaign to eliminate virtually any contact with the
outside world.
• Only high-ranking Party officials could travel abroad.
• Marriage with foreigners was forbidden.
• Foreign films, books and arts were denounced.

• There was an upsurge in Russian
nationalism, which took the
form of praising all things
Russian.
• The official Soviet line was that
anything Russian was greatly
superior to anything in the
West.
• All great achievements of
previous generations were
attributed to the Russians.
• Some historians have suggested that while there
were limitations to Stalin’s power, it was not due to
lack of will but simply inefficiency, because decisions
were sometimes made haphazardly or because
Stalin become more isolated himself.
• On the other side, some historians believe that
Stalin’s power was less supreme than is popularly
imagined.
• Chris Ward described Stalin as ‘no self-confident
tyrant in charge of a smoothly functioning
totalitarian machine, but a sickly old man.’
 Stalin’s dictatorship
Stalin’s dictatorship 1945
1945-1951 toStalinism
- High 1951

Zhdanov promoted Stalinist themes emphasizing strict

conformity to the Party line. Shostakovich was exiled.

Government under High Stalinism

A New Terror?
• Stalin an alcoholic
• Maneuvering created fear and uncertainty ( e.g.
demoting the war hero Marshal Zhukov)
• Leningrad Affair- 200 leading Leningrad Party
officials were arrested some shot. Loyalty of
Leningrad party was in doubt, ‘window to the
West’
- Simply the prelude to an extension of terror
across the USSR
• New outburst of Anti-Semitism, 1948, even
Molotov’s Jewish wife arrested
• The Georgian purge seen as an attack on Beria
• Bizarre ‘Doctors Plot’; leading Kremlin doctors,
many Jewish, accused of plotting the deaths of
Stalin
- Stalin was ill at this time which added to his
paranoia
Stalin uses the war success to abuse the system;
The communist party structure was now
dictated solely by Stalin gaining more power.
Soviet One Party State – The Nomenklatura and
politburo most privileged
Stalin the very hub of government, his orders
was obeyed without question. Party leaders
were terrified of getting it ‘wrong’, as he was
unpredictable and had a temper
According to Molotov ‘gov. ceased to function’,
Stalin dealing directly with individual officials
rather than leading party colleagues as a group
Constantly jealous or suspicious of those around
him
Interpretations of Stalin’s rule

Stalin’s Death Kenez- emphasized the deliberate nature of Stalin’s

In 1952 Stalin begun to criticise leading subordinates
such as Molotov and Mikoyan. Likely on a verge of
massive new purge. If so, in March 1953 his sudden
death stopped this in its tracks, possibly saving some
of his successors from liquidation (Khrushchev)
Left his subordinates in a state of relief they’d
survived but uncertainty because there was no clear
line of succession and each saw others as potential
rivals
method of ruling- he always retained full power
Hahn- Stalin’s power was less supreme than is popularly
imagined
Ward- “no self-confident tyrant in charge of a smoothly
functioning totalitarian machine, bur a sickly old man-
unpredictable, dangerous, lied to by terrified
subordinates, presiding over a ramshackle bureaucracy
and ranging… against failure and mortality”
 Impact of Cold War politics
The Impact of Coldon
Warthe USSR
politics of the USSR

Origins of the Cold War pre-World War 2:

-From 1917 revolution great mistrust between USSR and West

especially after West backed anti-Bolsheviks in Russian civil
war

-Based on opposing economic and political systems;

democratic capitalism and dictatorial communism. Both sides
had already started propaganda war (Red Scare in 1920s USA
and anti-western imperialist propaganda in USSR)

Post-World War 2:

-USSR and USA opposing superpowers

-Defeat of Germany led to Yalta and Potsdam agreements

whereby Europe was split into two (after much disagreement)

-With mutual enemy gone previous mistrust returned. USSR

imposed communism into occupied territory and US provided
Marshall Aid. Escalated into Cold War with both sides fearing
the other would try to assert dominance over them

Effects on USSR:

-Economically the USSR kept levels of military spending high and geared the economy towards rapid
military development to counter America. Acquired atomic bomb in 1949

-Increased paranoia of Western influence and subversion. Zhdanov’s cultural reforms, Doctors plot
and Hysterical isolationism

-Increased upsurge in Russian nationalist propaganda to counter image of superior West. Past
inventions falsely attributed to Russians (Radio) and past Russian leaders like Peter the Great praised
despite being previously labelled tyrannical imperialist by the Bolsheviks

-The development of the Cold War 1945-53 had two general effects one it threatened Stalin’s grip
on power and so the totalitarianism of High Stalinism was needed to counter the threat. Second it
was exploited by Stalin to increase his power through fear.
 The Power
The PowerStruggle, 1953-1956
Struggle 1953-1956

On the 5th of March 1953, Stalin died and his 31 year reign over the Soviet Union came to an end. No
clear line of succession had been established during Stalin’s rule; therefore there was much uncertainty
over who would be the next leader of the Soviet Union. A collective leadership took over the running of
the USSR and nobody succeeded Stalin on their own for the first few years following his death. There was
considerable competition and rivalry amongst the contenders for power. The most prominent contenders
were Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin.

Nikita Khrushchev Georgi Malenkov Nicolai Bulganin Laverenti Beria

Born 1894, Khrushchev Born 1902, descended Born 1895. Joined the Born 1899, was
emerged from a from a long line of Cheka (Lenin’s secret Georgian. Wormed his
working class tsarist civil servants. police) in 1918. Was way into Stain’s favour
background in Ukraine. Served as a political active in the Moscow and became his agent
Joined the Communist officer in the red army soviet in the 1930s, in the Caucasus in the
party in 1918 and during the civil war. working closely with 1930s. Achieved great
fought for the red Was a prominent Khrushchev, and rose power when Stalin
army during civil war. Party official in the to become deputy appointed him as
Worked his way up the 1920s and 30s. He was prime minister in head of the NKVD.
Party and joined the very friendly with 1938. Helped Between 1941 and
Politburo in 1939. Beria and Stalin and organise the defence 1953, he was in
Entrusted with became a member of of Moscow during charge of Soviet
important tasks during Stalin’s inner circle. WW2 and became security, and was
the war years. His big Was made deputy minister of defence in briefly minister of
break came in 1949 prime minister and a 1947. He was part of internal affairs after
when Stalin appointed member of the Stalin’s inner circle Stalin’s death. Beria
him as a secretary of Politburo in 1946. and joined the even controlled
the central committee. Politburo, then later Moscow Dynamo,
became head of state. Russia’s most famous
football team.

The fall of Beria Khruschev vs. Malenkov

Beria was a very powerful man. He was feared
by everyone because of his powerful position
and his brutality. He was the biggest threat to
the other contenders and seemed the most
likely to take over. However, Beria
underestimated his rivals and had no power
base within the Party. Khrushchev and the
other leaders moved swiftly to oust Beria and
took their opportunity when he was away in
East Berlin. Khrushchev led colleagues in a plot,
and Beria was arrested in 1953. The way was
now clear for Khrushchev and Malenkov to
fight for supremacy.
Malenkov and Khrushchev both had different
policies and stregnths. Malenkov wanted power to
be concentrated in the government and wanted
the government to control the Presidium
descisions. Whereas Khrushchev wanted the party
to dominate the government. Both favoured
economic reform, however Malenkov wanted
more effort to be put ino light indusrty while
Krushchev wanted to focus on heavy indusrty and
defence sectors. Khruschev mobilised support
within the party and proved himself to be stronger
and more ambitious than Malenkov. In February
1955, Malenkov admitted to some mistakes in
policy and resigned. Khrushchev was victorious.
 Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech

After emerging victorious in the power struggle following Stalin’s

death, Khrushchev was in a very strong position, but not yet an
unchallengeable leader. Khrushchev wanted to move away from the
Stalinist era and was aware that there was a desire for change in the
USSR. He had accepted some of the fundamentals of Stalinism, such as
the dominance of the party, however he wanted to shift to blame for
past errors onto Stalin. Khrushchev believed that economic reform was
necessary and wanted to encourage initiative. He also wanted to avoid
opposition and not give his rivals the opportunity to strike against him.
Khrushchev was an ambitious politician, and aimed convince the
Soviet people that they no longer had to fear arbitrary terror, while
preserving the basic structure and ideology of a socialist state. This
was the background to his speech at the 20th Party Congress in
February 1956.

The Speech Highlights of the speech

Khrushchev’s secret speech lasted four hours and
basically just denounced Stalin. He condemned Stalin’s
policies during the great terror and his cult of
personality, destroyed Stalin’s reputation as an
infallible war leader, criticised Stalin’s behaviour and
said that it went against the essence of Marxism-
Leninism. Delegates strongly applauded parts of the
speech, but were shocked at some of the content.
Nothing like it had been heard before in Soviet history.
• “It is foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to
elevate one person, to transform him into a
superman possessing supernatural characteristics
akin to those of a god.”
• “Stalin originated the concept ‘enemy of the
people’.”
• “We are absolutely certain that our Party will
lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to
new success, to new victories.”

Reactions to the ‘secret speech’

An edited version of the speech was sent out to local Party

committees to be discussed by Party members. Although it
wasn’t officially published in the USSR, it was read to several
million Soviet citizens. Some welcomed the denunciation of
Stalin, but felt that the blame should have been spread more
widely. Others were angry at the denunciation of Stalin and
by implication much of Soviet policy during the previous
generation. The speech was also seen by some as an attack
Historiography
on those like Malenkov and Molotov who had been in Stalin’s
inner circle. After the speech, Khrushchev succeeded in “Khrushchev had grasped the nettle. He also
getting several new supporters added to the Politburo. By exhibited a characteristic recklessness. The road
1956, half of the Central Committee members of 1952 had ahead would be rockier than he expected, for he
been replaced. Khrushchev had also gained more support overestimated ordinary people’s gullibility. In a
from intellectuals and those wanting more freedom in the sense the whole of later Soviet history may be
arts. seen as a reaction to his revelations.” J. Keep.
 Khrushchev’s motives for industrial and agrarian reforms
ECONOMIC MOTIVES
- Despite economic growth since 1950’s, still major
weaknesses in Soviet economy
- Consumer goods such as refrigerators in high supply
but expensive and poor quality
- Military expenditure was draining the economy, much
weaker than that of their main rival, USA (Khrushchev
had publicly stated he wanted to catch up with West)
- Lagged behind more sophisticated capitalist
economies which were less labour intensive and more
productive
- Agriculture poor, lacked sufficient innovation and
investment. Production low and inefficient, with few
incentives for peasants. Weakest sector of economy
OVERALL IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS
POSITIVE
- Foreign trade considerably increased (2/3 with
European Communist states)
- Working conditions improved (shorter days, more
holidays, longer maternity leave, better pensions,
minimum wage decreed 1956) >>> better living
standards
- 1956 education decree, increase in student numbers
- Improved medical care infant mortality significantly
decreased 1950-1956
- 1957, Women banned from manual labour in mines
- Scientific and technical education prioritised, first
satellite and man in space soviet space. Technology
appeared superior to that of the west
Khrushchev failed because "he pushed through his policies
bureaucratically and often with little foresight or
planning" and "he could not solve the essential problems:
improving peasant morale and incentives, and giving them
better equipment and investment resources with which to
work" – DONALD FILTZER
Impressive industrial growth "despite appalling
inefficiencies and irrationalities" – PETER KENEZ
POLITICAL MOTIVES
- New regime wanted to rely on popular consent
- To gain this popular consent, people needed to see
results of hard work e.g. more supplies in shops and
better housing
- Communist ideology must mean something more
than wishful thinking: socialism needed to deliver.
Communists saw the Stalinist system as essential if
country was to progress to communism
- This created a dilemma for Khrushchev, as he was
unsure how to reform within Stalin’s planned economy
NEGATIVE
- Living conditions still backwards compared with West,
by 1964, only 5/1000 citizens owned a car
- 1963, USSR had to import grain from capitalist West
to compensate shortages
- 15 million poor quality prefab flats built and still
housing shortages
HISTORIOGRAPHY – INTERPRETATIONS OF
ECONOMIC REFORM
Khrushchev "had kept peasant affairs at the centre of
attention for an entire decade. No other Russian ruler
had ever done this, or would do so" – JOHN KEEP
Agriculture "was insufficient to meet Russia's rural
needs...by subsidising socialised agriculture the state
was ensuring that it remained inefficient" – JOHN KEEP
Industrial problems "were the consequence of the very
nature of the highly Marxist ideology" although
Khrushchev "sometimes made it worse by creating
confusion" – PETER KENEZ
 Khrushchev’s political reforms

- To cope with industrial reforms, Khrushchev initially tried decentralisation. Existing ministries in Moscow abolished
and replaced by 105 regional ministries.
- Each region jealously guarded its own resources
- Gosplan’s (state planning agency) functions were divided
- 1963, some regional ministries were merged and there were new planning regions
- Party split into industrial and agricultural wings but industrial sectors of party did not match geographic divisions of
the ministries i.e. poorly organised
- These changes caused opposition within the party, there was anger about decentralisation of power in particular>>>
contributed to the anti party conspiracy

ANTI – PARTY
CONSPIRACY

- Conspiracy led to Khrushchev implementing major changes within Party

- October 1957, sacked Zhukov
- 1958, further sackings (such as Bulganin), Khrushchev assumed position of ‘commander-in-chief of all soviet forces’
(same post as Stalin had done)
- Disliked the idea of 'jobs for life' which created culture of privilege and complacency
- Resultantly, in 1961, 22nd party congress Khrushchev passed rule whereby - depending on level of organisation-
there must be substantial amount of new people elected, for example:
- At Presidium level- 25% members must be new
- At Republican level- 1/3 members must be new

CONCLUSION TO KHRUSHCHEV’S POLITICAL REFORM

>>>KHRUSHCHEV NEVER EXERTED UNCHALLENGED AUTHORITY AS STALIN HAD DONE<<<

>>>KHRUSHCHEV WAS RADICAL IN THAT HE DID NOT IMPRISON OR LIQUIDATE RIVALS; HE ONLY DEMOTED THEM TO
MINOR POSITIONS AWAY FROM CENTRAL POWER<<<

HE WAS “Notoriously suspicious, indeed paranoid” – MARTIN MCAULEY

 DeStalinisation – Impact within USSR and satellite states

Comments on Destalinisation

McCauley: “if he had a fault it was

his optimism which led to hasty
reforms... his denunciation of Stalin
weakened his position at home and
abroad and destroyed forever the
infallibility of soviet leadership”
“Stalinism Remained BUT with a
different figurehead and manifestations“ John Keep Interpretation of Secret
Speech that initiated programme:
“[the speech] substituted old myths
LIMITATIONS, STILL FUNDAMENTALLY STALINIST... for new ones as a way of
Thaw wasn’t coherent policy, liberal reforms quickly modified legitimising the Party’s continuing
- Only literature that served purpose to regime allowed e.g. Doctor monopoly of power... Even so for all
Zhivago banned, yet those criticising Stalin accepted its faults the ‘secret’ speech was an
- Stalinist zeal in persecution of Jews continued, church discouraged act of considerable political courage.
- Dissident writers imprisoned and harassed despite no declaration Khrushchev has grasped the nettle.
of political prisoners He also exhibited a characteristic
- Party determined acceptable expression, standard arbitrary e.g. recklessness”
Khrushchev close abstract art exhibition
- KGB active and popular surveillance persisted (Stalinist)

What is De-Stalinisation? IMPACT

Term coined in 70’s to describe Khrushchev
attempt to eradicate Stalin, refers to
either:
- Secret Speech, condemn S’s excesses
- Moderate reforms embarked upon and
concessions e.g. cultural freedoms
NOTE: no intention to destroy system, he
believed in fundamental aspects of
Stalinism, just wanted to stop repression
that characterised Stalin’s regime, resulted
to be contribution factor to his downfall.
- Destalinisation conveyed opportunity for satellite states to reform
own political systems, was not Khrushchev’s intention, led to brutal
treatment in Hungary Uprising to reinforce order =ineffective buffers
- Caused deterioration of relation with China as they saw K weak
- Weakened own position, growing criticism from dissidents;
prevailed until fall, and call for social reconstruction (unintended)
- Led to conservative opposition, angered they hindered reform
- Discouraged successors to reform, led to overcautious
conservatism

Actions of De-Stalinisation...
- Reform Communism, cultural reforms and the Thaw e.g. reduced censorship on literature e.g. one day in the life of
Ivan Denisovich and radio more accessible
- New civil liberties; couldn’t be convicted on own confessions (anti Stalinist method of torture) death penalty restricted
and comrade courts introduced
- Greater investment in light industry and agriculture e.g. Virgin Land Schemes
- Stalin’s ‘stamp’ removed Stalingrad renamed Volgograd and statutes pulled down, reburied
- Released political prisoners and rehabilitated Great Terror victims, showed liberal tendency and Leninist nature, not
unchallenged totalitarian control of Stalin.
Khrushchev’s ousting in 1964

“OFFICIAL” REASONS: Were his old age and health.

ojiuye
REAL REASONS: Hare brained unsuccessful schemes, hasty conclusions, rash decisions and actions based on wishful thinking.

• De-Stalinisation
• Economic Policy Failures
• Foreign Policy Failures (Cold War)
Political Failures is also a reason; these
were influenced and are addressed
under De-Stalinisation and Foreign
Policy Failures.
De-Stalinisation influenced Khrushchev’s attitudes and ideas, such as his political
ones. As well as this he appeared anti Stalin in the way he had handled foreign
country relationships, this made him highly unpopular.
• De-Centralisation
Existing ministries in Moscow were abolished and replaced by 105 regional
ministries corresponding to existing administrative regions.
The party influenced these ministries – central planning principle remained.

• 1954 Virgin Land Scheme • 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Arguably Most Significant!
Initially successful as total grain harvest had almost Khrushchev had looked undeniably weak; it was
doubled from 1953 – 1958, however from 1958 The humiliating how he had given in to America
VLS was a failure due to: unsuitable soil, hasty (especially as Stalin would not have). K had lost face
planning, inexperienced management and when he had removed his missiles publicly from
insufficient fertilisers to replenish the soil. Cuba. Whereas Kennedy was seen as though he
fought down Communism; this essentially forced K
• 1959-65 Seven-Year Plan to resign.
Were some impressive gains with gross output of • 1960s Split with Communist China
steel coal and oil increasing by 60%-80%, however it Mao Zedong didn’t agree with Khrushchev’s De-
didn’t meet Plan targets as well as this; Stalinisation policy, he saw Khrushchev as weak and
- Resources got diverted to the wrong places,
non-aggressive. International relations were one of
they even ended up stranded in railway sidings. Khrushchev’s pivotal downfalls.
- Managers were afraid to innovate with new
methods, due to fear of disrupting production.
- Was replaced by the 7th 5 Year Plan in 1961.
• May 1957: Presidium members; Malenkov, Molotov,
“Call it what you will, • Situation by 1964 Bulganin and Kaganovich plotted against Khrushchev
incentives are what
Only 5 in 1,000 citizens as they were opposing his party influence.
get people to work
harder!” owned a car, 82 in 1,000 • The fact his own party had detested him
owned a television and demonstrates how unpopular he was as a leader,
only 40 in 1,000 owned a especially as his reforms had not succeeded. His
refrigerator; were falling populist brusque style was disliked; his personality
well behind the West. had also contributed to his downfall.
• Khrushchev even insulted his party members:

Khrushchev on Malenkov, “Your hands are covered with blood, Malenkov; your conscience isn’t
clean; you’re a vile person” & Khrushchev described Bulganin as ending up “on a pile of manure”.

JOHN KEEP: “Was insufficient to meet rural Russia’s needs… by subsiding socialised
HISTORIOGRAPHY

agriculture the state was ensuring it remained insufficient.”

PETER KENEZ: “There was contradiction between the interests of the state and
those of procedures and consumers.”
JOHN LAVER: “Foreign policy failure provided the final straw for many colleagues.”
Brezhnev’s political changes
The ‘grey’ leader
A moderate man of the centre. He was
expected to avoid both the excesses of
Stalin and the unpredictability of
Khrush. ‘Safe’ image- was he too safe?
The Nomenklatura
-Policy of maintaining STABILITY of
personnel at most levels, ensuring that
changes at the top weren’t
accompanied by purges. (‘Stability of
cadres’)
-Long list or reliable personnel made up
of 2-5 million people (less than 2% of
population).
-Promotions within the party were
based on the individual’s ‘political
maturity’ and reliability not to rock the
boat.
-Promotion usually depended on the
candidate having a sponsor at the next
level up in the party.
The Politburo and Central Committee
-B made few changes to administration at the lower levels to
strengthen his position. Not as many as Khrush. who he criticised for
‘the unjustified transferring and replacing of personnel’.
-B promoted his supporters to the -1982 the average age of
Politburo (1981: 8 protégés, 4 Central Committee (CC)
‘Dnieper Mafia’) members 63, and Council of
-1960-1978 average age of Ministers 65.
Politburo members rose from 58 to -CC increased in size
68. dramatically (470 members
-Met more frequently than before. 1981)
-Only met 12 times 1970-1985
-Little influence!!
The Party
-Privileges were reserved for party members who had reached a particular
level: dachas, better medical facilities and access to special well-stocked shops.
-Most full time party members were reassured by B’s conservative approach.
-Despite the exception of people such as Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev
who wanted some genuine reform. Younger party members also sympathised
with this view- a more dynamic (rather than stagnant) approach to change.
-Developments mirrored the lack of drive at the top.
-Rate of growth of the party membership decreased. Under Khrushchev there
had been sustained growth; under Brezhnev, due to stricter admission
requirements and a lack of enthusiasm, growth in member ship fell from
almost 7% 1965 to less than 2% 1973.
-Ideological appeal losing its grip!
-KGB reported an increase in corruption among party members. Peter Kenez:
“Brezhnev encouraged corruption to a fabulous extent”.
-John Keep described the party as ‘a refuge for nostalgics unable to accept the
challenge facing all organisations in a changing world: adapt or perish’
Brezhnev
-Brezhnev = stability. He lacked charisma but he did know how to build
a solid base of support, and many of the people appointed in 1964 were
still in post in 1982.
-His leadership was never seriously under threat. 1970s it was
reinforced by personality cult. Peter Kenez: “Brezhnev developed a
modest personality cult”.
-Partly rehabilitated Stalin’s reputation in 1966 and 1967: an era of
considerable achievement with only ‘some unfortunate and
temporary errors’. Yet simultaneously he gave people confidence that
there would be no return to the excesses of the Stalin era.
 Society under Brezhnev

d
Developed Socialism: In1977, anniversary of Lenin’s revolution, Brezhnev sends out constitution declaring
USSR to be “mature Socialist society” and guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, religion, the press etc.
- Individual rights undermined however by “catch” that individual rights “must not injure the interests of
society and state”

On the up
-Urban population grew. Soviet population in towns grew from 53% to 64% On the contrary
between 1964 and 1982.
- European russian population
- Whilst 40% of Soviet citizens lived in communal apartments under
growth slows. In 1970
Krushchev, by 1985 the proportion had dropped to 15-18%.
population growth of just
- Higher education became more common in adults resulting in more
6.5%. Tajik population grows
specialist workers.
by 35.7%!
- Min wage and real wage increase by 50%.
- In 1967 the five day working week became the norm. - Life expectancy fell as a result
of serious alcoholism and
pollution.

- 20% of soviet workforce too

“hungover” to work on
mondays

- Crisis of too many specialised

workers. Blue collars ended up
earning more then white collar
workers in places as a result.

- Black market grew to a gigantic

scale. 20% of GMP outside
books.

- High divorce rates due to

gender inequalities and
alcoholism.

- Poor social mobility.

Women
- Nomenklatura existed as a
- Women still second class citizens.
privileged, nepotistic, upper
- despite better education they had less skilled jobs and earned less.
political class.
- Gender defined professions: 99% of typists and nurses women, 74% of
schoolteachers women, 70% doctors women. Despite constituting 45% of - “Brezhnev era encouraged
workforce. corruption to a fabulous
- laws protecting women from excessive manual labour were ignored. extent” P Kenez
- Domestic differences, Women spent, on average, 15 more hours a week than men
doing chores. - Anti-soviet movements grew
amongst the ethnic minorities,
notably amongst Russian Jews
and Georgians.
 Brezhnev’s economic reforms
Economic Stagnation and the cost of the arms race
Kosygin reforms 1965
-Kosygin tried to encourage:
1. innovation and responsibility by giving enterprise managers more incentives and independence.
2. to take account of costs and profits (rather than just throw resources at targets).
-He asked managers to set sales targets, and he cut the number of plan indicators that managers had to follow.
-Reforms failed due to restrictions of centrally planned economy:
1. clashes between managers who wanted to be innovative and bureaucrats who still had the responsibility of ensuring
quantitative targets were met and wanted to stick with what they knew.
2. managers/ administrators scared to attempt innovation.
3. work bonuses were still linked to the fulfilment of targets based on quantity, not quality.
4. consumer demand was still low on list of priorities.
5. prices were decided centrally- bore no relation to what should have been relevant indicators (costs, profits, demand or
need). E.g. the price of coal was set too low so that the coal industry worked at a loss.
6. enterprises which performed badly were rarely penalised. (‘we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’)
-Reforms were abandoned by 1970.

Agriculture Black Market

-Peasants given internal passports reducing difference between urban and countryside lifestyle. -Peter Kenez:
-Farms given lower plan targets to meet. “the black
market..... On
-Fewer restriction on how peasants could use their private plots.
the one hand
-End to experiments of K era. violated the law,
-There was increased investment in agriculture: 1976-80 it received over 26% of state investment on the other
compared with 20% 1961-65 (during the B era state investment in agriculture tripled). hand fulfilled a
Mixed results! necessary
function; it
-There was a rise in output- 1970s the USSR became the world’s largest wheat producer.
smoother over
-The returns in relation to investment input declined. the difficulties
-People were earning more = higher demand = food shortages. that the
-Prices in the collective farm markets doubled. planned, highly
-Increasing gap between supply and demand for food (increased dependence on foreign centralized, rigid
system created”
imports).

Developed Socialism
-1977 USSR was declared to be in ‘Developed Socialism’. Brezhnev declared that it was not yet
possible “to launch the direct transition to communism”. He asserted there had been “the gradual
obliteration of any essential distinction between town and country, between mental and physical
labour, and adoption by all working people of the ideological and political positions of the working
class”

Industrial reform = little

-1972 accepted the concept of a 15-year programme with specific technical and scientific goals.
-Gosplan to continue 5-year plans (e.g. 1971 9th 5-year plan, 1976 10th 5-year plan)
Economic progress
-1964 Oil + mineral resources discovered in Siberia. By 1983, 357million tons of oil had been extracted, 60% of
Soviet oil production.
-Both 10th&11th 5-year plans put a high priority on developing gas and coal reserves. 1974-1984, 30 billion roubles
were spent on over 3000 kilometres of Baik-Amur (BAM) railway, and an expensive 3500-mile pipeline was built in
Siberia to exploit the reserves.
-Scientific progress confined to defence and space industries. Drain on resources!? Necessary!?
-Civilian sectors which were developing in the capitalist world, were largely neglected (technology such as
typewriters, personal computers were seen as threats to the State’s control over the spread of information)
-There was no major restructuring of the economy. It stayed under the Stalinist model. No development= Stagnation!
Brezhnev and dissidence
 Leadership changes 1982-1985
Problems facing USSR by 1980s

Economy – After years of declining growth the economy needed to be addressed. However, the proposal of anything other than a state-owned economy
was met with outrage. Hence, economic restructuring needed to happen, but for the sake of political popularity, without radically changing anything.
This presented a tricky problem. Additionally, there was huge expenditure on arms, which many felt a necessity due to relations with the US.

Political – Any change to the economy was likely to have an effect on the party, as they were so intertwined. Corruption was rife and both Andropov and
Gorbachev felt like this was a problem that needed addressing. In regard to foreign policy, the USSR was struggling to maintain its superpower status.
They were still involved in Afghanistan, which was a very unpopular war, and negotiations and détente with the USA were constantly being discussed.

Social – In any country there is dissent, the USSR was no exception. There were other relatively minor social issues to address, e.g. quality of consumer
goods. More worryingly was the state of the republics, where there was potential trouble.

Background Rise to Power Policies Impact

Son of a railway Chernenko was meant to be -Removed Brezhnevites -Largely failed to

man he left school Brezhnev’s successor. -20% regional part address problems,
at age 16 to work However, Andropov was secretaries replaced just tried to cope
-33% departmental with them
on shipyards and popular enough, and had
heads replaced -No mark on foreign
serve in WWII. Then the support of the KGB and -Broke up monopolies policy
he served as the military, that he was -Rounded up absent -Continued to clash
ambassador to elected General Secretary. It employees (for every with conservatives
Hungary (1954-57), was a ‘bloodless coup’. 100 working, 30 absent) -Too ill and in power
and later became -Bond with US too short a time
the head of the -Shot Korean plane KAL
007, 269 dead
KGB.
-Anti-corruption
1982 - 1984

Born in a Siberian When Andropov died, there -Stopped anti- -Chernenko was in
village, was a were enough Brezhnevites corruption, tight on hospital by the end
Chinese border alive to demand Chernenko censorship and hard- of 1984
guard and was in appointment of General liner against dissent
NKVD during the Secretary, as opposed to the -Politburo had 10
‘Great Terror’. In more dynamic Gorbachev. -Irrigated Siberian land members, split 50:50
1948 he was in Gorbachev was comfortable to increase amount of old and young
charge of to wait until ‘after’ cultivated land
-Chernenko was no
propaganda for Chernenko to be appointed
-Continued Andropov’s reformer
Moldavia. Soon Secretary.
industrial programme
became Brezhnev’s -His reign was really
holiday and booze a courtesy paid by
buddy. Gorbachev and more
youthful politicians
1984 - 1985

Born in 1931 to a Gorbachev had enough -Glasnost and -Tried desperately to

well off peasant support to become General Perestroika save the Soviet
family, he studied Secretary in 1984, but Union without too
for a degree in law, allowed Chernenko to go -70% of party officials at much radical change
and then agronomy. first. A member of the district and city level
Andropov took a central committee replaced -Last soviet leader
shine to Gorbachev commented: After one
-52% of Central -Loved by the West
and by 1980 he was leader who was half-dead,
Committee was new and and some
in the politburo. He another who was half-alive,
well educated intellectuals for
saw the corruption and another who could
Glasnost policy
in judicial system. hardly speak, the youthful,
energetic Gorbachev was -He wanted to make
current system more -Hated by
vey welcome
efficient conservatives within
party
1985 - 1991

Gorbachev's Reforms
PERESTROIKA - reconstructing economy to address
stagnation
Stages:
1985-1987 = acceleration
1987-89 = radical reform from above
1989-1990 = attempted market based reform and
reaction
1990-1991 = break up
Support: intellectuals/scientists
Opposition: established political elite (as they
benefitted form privileges of system)/defence and
heavy industry sectors (the 'military-industrial
complex')
ECONOMIC SITUATION - declining, stagnating
because of sabotage, corruption and siphoning off of
state supplies for personal gain
 perestroika make things worse:
theoretical/not planned/lack of coordination
Stupid decisions: e.g. Jan 1991 (PM) withdrew all
high denomination bank notes and public lost
savings
Faults: old central control mechanism were being
dismantled yet new market was still restricted/
cannot combat stagnation without incentive (which
contradicts communism)
DEATH OF COMMUNISM - new programme for party drafted in 1991
No formal commitment to the idea of a communist system
Old Bolshevik commitment to instigating global revolution was abandoned along
with Marxism and Leninism
Very similar to western democratic idea
MOTIVES -
Economic: stagnation/punishing emphasis on
heavy industry
Political: creating identity of change to
consolidate own position as general secretary
(had been running it under Chernenko) by
promoting supporters (Ligachev, Cherbinkov,
Ryzhkov) to counter enemies in the
politburo/address corruption and inefficiency
(under Brezhnev)
GLASNOST - openness and publicity/complete freedom of
media (but still monitored marginally)
Motives: believed there would be no effective reform
unless faults were admitted (this got off to bad start with
Chernobyl disaster - international publicity as a result of
liberal Glasnost)
Support: intellectuals
Opposition: conservatives (wanted control; majority for
personal protection from scandal/fearful of western
criticism)
POLITICAL SITUATION - developments began 1988 = new
constitution guaranteed individual rights/legal changes to make
the system independent of the party/ democratic congress of
the peoples' deputies people elected by the people not party)
Criticism: 750/250000 of congress of peoples' deputies were
reserved for specific organisations e.g. communist party had
100 seats minimum reserved = so limited democracy
Impacts: two political bodies (Congress and Supreme Soviet)
and the relationship between them was not clarified they would
oppose and antagonise each other e.g. forum for Yeltsin to
oppose Gorbachev vocally/ impedingly long democratic process
before anything is changed
 GORBACHEV’S REFORMS

Gorbachev wanted to speed up the economy with a

Command Economy (Communist) with Market Based
Economy ideas (Capitalist) MAJOR CONTRADICTION.
ECONOMY REFORMS Wanted to reduce the power of the party to interfere in the
PERESTROIKA economy, this proved they were part of the problem. The
(RESTRUCTURING) results of this were disappointing, made things worse.
PHASE 1: ACCELERATION
Politics affected the economy – Political changes undermined
PHASE 2: RADICAL REFORM the role of the party. Republics took measures for their own
PHASE 3: POLITICS/ECONOMY survival as nationalist tensions grew; soviets striking etc.
PHASE 4: INDECISION, CRISIS
AND BREAK UP. Economic Plan October 1990. However this was still
ambiguous as there was no clear distinction between whether
it was a command economy or market based economy!

ECONOMY FAILED DUE TO BAD PLANNING, CONFUSION AND LACK OF

COORDINATION, STUPID DECISIONS, UNHAPPY WORKERS, AND CORRUPTION.
WHAT HAD CHANGED
 Legal changes to make judges and the law system independent
from the party. POLITICAL REFORMS
 A new constitution would guarantee individual rights.
Gorbachev wanted to preserve;
 A new law making body – The Congress of People’s Deputies.
the party, local soviets
 Supreme Soviet would become a working parliament.
 Local soviets were to be made more accountable and more and economy.
professional. Gorbachev wanted to change;
democratisation, feeling of
participating in
WHAT STAYED THE SAME
decision making.
 Wanted to maintain the leading role of the
party.
OVERVIEW
- Could a one party state with a one party
PROBLEMS CAUSED rule allow different views? No not really.
 Contradictory, want party dominance but - Gorbachev’s ideas were not well thought
then want to create a separation of powers. out and resulted in a flawed democracy.
 There could be no real separation of powers - Made the USSR worse and contributed in
with the party subordinated to the law. a break up. Mehrannisa Sadiq.
The Nationalities Issue
• Satellite state
• Novemeber 1998.
• Mass demonstration - rise up against repression.
• Overnight the government and Deutschland
Democratic Republic are gone. Gorbachev does
nothing.
Effect?
Other states, both satellite and republic see the mass
demonstration and begin to think the same ideology.
The evidence that Gorbachev does nothing represents
the idea that if you want something and protest for it,
you get it.
• Velvet revolution.
• Posters spread about getting rid of Czech
leader.
• November 1989—Police suppress peaceful
student protests which sparked more
protests.
• By November 20th the protest swelled from
200,000 to 500,000 protesters.
Impact?
Showed evidence of successful demonstrations
that had fuelled off others, encouraging other
states to do the same.
• Late 1980s the Ukraine party split and
Nationalist protests grew.
• Orthodox Ukrainian party lost membership.
• By 1991 it was declared its own sovereignty.
• April 1989.
• March in support of independence was attacked by
troops.
• Sovereignty declared in November 1989.
• Call for independence supported by 99% of Georgians
by 1991.
• May 1991 was the first free election of a Republic
leader.
Impact?
First free election of Republic leader allowed other
Republic states to recognise that it was not just the
satellite states that could uproar and gain the
independence they want.
• Suffered most during WW2 with 1/4 of their population
dying.
• Communists remained strong against opposition in 1990.
• No changes were made due to the protests calling for
political changes.
Impact?
Showed that the Belorussia leader and Gorbachev were not the
push overs that they seemed.
 The August Coup and Gorbachev’s Fall

• 18th August 1991 Gorbachev is swamped by the KGB and placed under house arrest.

• Plotters declare a state of emergency renouncing Union Treaty and banning Glasnost newspapers.

• Yeltsin is called for resistance of the coup and announced president of Russia.

• Plotters accused of treason.

• Yeltsin overtook control of the army whilst the Soviet parliament met - decrees were cancelled.

• Gorbachev seemed to have some strength as he refused to give in.

• Yeltsin was seen as heroic and a natural leader.

• Resistance of ordinary people heightened as they began to fight for what they wanted.

• Although Gorbachev was seen as a strong leader for not giving into resistance and resigning Yeltsin was the main
reason for his fall.

• Yeltsin’s strength and saviour of the USSR in a crisis due to the August Coup essentially led to Gorbachev’s
overthrow as it was evident that Gorbachev was doing nothing successful for the USSR.
 The End of the USSR

23rd August parliament held a televised session that showed Yeltsin

criticising Gorbachev over allowing conservatives to remain in
parliament after the August coup.

23rd August Yeltsin suspends operations of the Communist Party and

a few days later the Supreme Soviet declares the same of the USSR.

24th August Gorbachev willingly resigns after seeing the damage he

has effectively done and witnessing opposition against him as a
leader.

29th August Supreme Soviet banned all activities by the Communist

party.

Succession of Ukraine in December 1991 finally kills off any prospect

of a loosely federated Soviet surviving.
Impact?

Fall of Communism.

The new states began forming their armies.

How?

August coup was the catalyst for the

collapse but other factors such as Yeltsin,
economic and political reforms and ‘the
system’ helped in favour of the collapse.