LAW OF EVIDENCE: I INTERNAL ASSESSMENT

NAME: HIMAYUSH CHOPDA

PRN: 15010125238

DIVISION: ‘C’
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

AN ANALYSIS OF ALGUPANDI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU ............................................. 3

ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………………………………3

FACTS OF THE CASE…………………………………………………………………………...3

LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS,
IF ANY …………………………………………………………………………………………...4

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED

ISSUES…………………………………………………………………………………………....4

COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION………………………………....6

 AN ANALYSIS OF ALGUPANDI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 1

A. ABSTRACT

The law of evidence is unique since its tenets are applicable to both civil and criminal trials, and
it forms a bedrock of dispensation of justice at the lowest level. Keeping this in mind, the present
analysis seeks to discuss key legal questions that the Supreme Court sought to address in its
judgment in Algupandi v. State of Tamil Nadu. Firstly, I shall discuss the factual scenario of the
case. Next, the various legal issues that were brought up during the case and the development of
the corresponding principles shall be discussed. The issues primarily deal with the evidentiary
value of a sole and non-independent witness, whether a child witness can be allowed to depose,
the relevance of motive in the assessment of guilt, and the like. Finally, I shall examine how these
principles were applied in the aforementioned case and conclude with the reasons for my
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s judgment.

B. FACTS OF THE CASE

Tamilarasi, the victim, was late Karuppaih’s second wife. After the latter’s death, she was enjoying
regular income from the properties left behind solely for her benefit. The accused, Alagupandi,
was Karuppaih’s son from his first wife. He had a strained relationship with the victim. The victim
had two minor sons, with whom she was sleeping on the fateful night. The prosecution alleged that
the accused entered the victim’s house at midnight on 14th January, 2002, and killed her.

The victim’s brother (PW-1) was staying with her in the same house. When the alleged murder
occurred, he was sleeping on a rock stone outside the house and heard the distressing cry of his
sister. When he went inside the house, he saw the accused coming out of the house with a knife in
his hand. Thereupon, he went inside the house and saw his sister lying in a pool of blood. An FIR
came to be registered after about an hour. An investigation began. Dr. Alavudeen (PW-14)
conducted the post mortem and opined that the victim died due to shock and hemorrhage because
of the injuries sustained by her.

1
AIR 2012 SC 2405
The accused also allegedly made a confessional statement to the police. During the course of the
statement, he informed them that a blood-stained shirt and the knife he had used for the attack was
hidden by him at a particular place. The shirt and the knife were both recovered. On examination,
it was found that the group of the blood found on the shirt and that of the deceased was the same,
blood-group A. The two minor children of the victim were not allowed to be examined as witnesses
since they were children and on due inquiry, the trial court considered them unfit to depose.

The trial court returned a guilty verdict and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment for
committing murder. This was upheld by the High Court. The case reached the Supreme Court on
appeal, and was heard by a Division Bench of A.K. Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar, JJ. The latter
spoke for the court, and upheld the decision of the lower courts.

C. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS, IF ANY

1. Whether the knife and the blood-stained shirt were recovered legally and were admissible,
considering the fact that they were found due to the confessional statement made by the
accused before the police. (Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872)
2. Whether the law permits child witnesses to give evidence. (Section 118 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872)
3. Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained on the testimony of a sole eye-witness.
4. Whether the law permits reliance on the testimony of an interested or related witness.
5. What is the evidentiary value of the time of filing an FIR?
6. What is the value and relevancy of motive in assessing the guilt of an accused?

D. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ISSUES

ISSUE 1

Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, state that a confession made to the police is
inadmissible as evidence. Despite this, in the present case, the Court held that the items which
were found due to the confession of the accused were recovered legally and were admissible in
evidence. This is due to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which acts as an exception
to the rule stated in Sections 25 and 26. It states that when information or document or object,
which is otherwise admissible in evidence, is received as a consequence of a confession or
information given by the accused to the police, such information or document or object is
admissible if it furthers the case of the prosecution. However, the confession of guilt itself remains
inadmissible and cannot be relied upon by the prosecution.

In my opinion, the court has correctly applied the provisions to the facts of the case. The position
that anything recovered or found in consequence of a confession is admissible by virtue of Section
27 has been settled by various decisions.2 The reason for making confessions before police
inadmissible is that experience tells us that the police often resort to torture to force the accused to
confess to a crime he may not have committed. However, documents or other evidence unearthed
as a result of a confession must be made admissible because otherwise the accused would have an
easy way out by merely confessing to all the material facts to render all the evidence inadmissible.

ISSUE 2

Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that all persons are competent to testify
unless the court considers them unable to understand questions presented to them or to provide
rational answers to them by reason of tender age, disease etc. Therefore, it is evident that there is
no blanket ban on a child from being a witness. It is only when the alternative conditions mentioned
in the provision are satisfied can a child be prohibited from giving testimony. 3 This was the
conclusion of the court in the present case also with which I agree. However, the trial court had
exercised its discretion and had opined that the children in this particular case were unfit to testify.
Therefore, this was not interfered with by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES 3 AND 4

The court held that the law permits reliance on the testimony of a sole eye-witness to sustain a
conviction. Further, it also held that merely because a witness is related to the victim, it cannot be
said that his testimony cannot be relied upon. This is because there is no provision in law which
stipulates that a minimum number of witnesses are required to sustain a conviction. There is also

2
Navaneethakrishnan v. The State, AIR 2017 SC 876; Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263
3
Panchhi v. State of UP, (1998) 7 SCC 177; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341
no provision in law which lays down that a certain quantity or quality of evidence must be available
against the accused to sustain his conviction. Further, no statute mentions that the testimony of a
witness who is related to the victim must be afforded an inferior status or must be doubted. It is
completely upon the discretion of the court, to be exercised in accordance with sound and
established judicial principles, to determine if evidence in a particular case if sufficient or not.

In my opinion the court correctly held that even the testimony of a sole eye-witness can be
sufficient to warrant conviction on the condition that it inspires confidence in the court and is
cogent and reliable.4 However, I disagree with the finding that the evidence of PW-1 was
convincing and reliable. The reasons for the same shall be given subsequently. Finally, it was also
held that in the absence of any material to show that PW-1 was not stating the truth because of him
being an interested party, an assumption cannot be made to that effect.

ISSUE 5 AND 6

The court held that prompt filing of FIR is relevant and imparts credibility to the case of the
prosecution and the sole eye-witness. It diminishes the possibility of false accusations or
conspiracies that have been hatched over a period of time. Thus, it was held that if FIR is filed
promptly, the testimony of the complainant and the case of the prosecution can be believed more
readily. I believe this position is erroneous and the reasons for this conclusion will be given
subsequently.

With respect to motive, the court held that it is not a pre-requisite to convict an accused but is
always a relevant factor that must be taken into account by the courts to appreciate the case of the
prosecution as a whole.

E. COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In my opinion, the court has erred in arriving at a finding that the testimony of PW-1 is
strengthened by the fact that the FIR was filed by him without inordinate delay. The correct
position of law is that an unexplained delay in filing FIR may be reason to doubt the case of the

4
Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, (2003) 2 SCC 401; Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760
prosecution.5 However, the vice-versa cannot be held to be true. Merely because the FIR was filed
immediately does not rule on the possibility that a person has concocted false charges and has
registered an FIR immediately to leave no room for doubt.

Secondly, the court has erred in stating that the evidence of PW-1 has been corroborated or
supported by several other evidences. The court notes that PW-3 arrived at the scene of the crime
and saw the victim bleeding. Then it notes the post-mortem report which states that the death was
indeed caused because of stabbing various parts of the victim’s body. Thirdly, the court observes
that there has been a recovery of the knife and a blood-stained shirt which matches the blood group
of the victim. All these evidences are relied upon by the court to state that the testimony of the sole
eye-witness has been strengthened and corroborated. This is erroneous. It is easily discernible that
the above evidences merely show that the victim was indeed stabbed and killed. However, they do
not in any manner prove that it was the accused who had committed the crime and not some other
person. It is interesting to also note that fingerprints on the knife were not examined. Further, it
was also not proved that the shirt belonged to the accused.

Finally, the court has erred in relying on the testimony of the sole eye-witness since it cannot be
said to be reliable and convincing because as established above, it has not been corroborated, and
as further also been rendered doubtful by contradictory statements made by hostile witnesses PW-
2 and PW-4, an aspect which the court curiously seems to have not discussed at length.

With respect to recommendations and suggestions, I believe that relying on the testimony of a sole
witness could prove dangerous and such evidence must be accepted only after abundant care and
caution. Further, in cases like the present one, where the sole eye-witness is also an interested
party, conviction must not be sustained unless adequate corroboration exists.

5
Yakub Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 12 SCC 229; State of Rajasthan v. Shubh Shanti Services, (2000) 5 SCC 30