Infantry tactics

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Infantry tactics are the combination of
military concepts and methods used by
infantry to achieve tactical objectives
during combat. The role of the infantry
on the battlefield is, typically, to close
with and engage the enemy, and hold
territorial objectives; infantry tactics are
the means by which this is achieved.
Traditionally infantry have made up the
largest proportion of an army's fighting
strength, and consequently often suffer
the heaviest casualties. Throughout
history, infantrymen have sought to
minimise their losses in both attack and
defence through effective tactics.

Infantry tactics are the oldest method of

warfare, and span all eras. In different
periods, the prevailing technology of the
day has had an important impact on
infantry tactics. In the opposite direction,
tactical methods can encourage the
development of particular technologies.
Similarly, as weapons and tactics evolve,
so do the tactical formations employed,
such as the Greek phalanx, the Spanish
tercio, the Napoleonic column, or the
British 'thin red line'. In different periods
the numbers of troops deployed as a
single unit can also vary widely, from
thousands to a few dozen.

Modern infantry tactics vary with the type

of infantry deployed. Armoured and
mechanised infantry are moved and
supported in action by vehicles, while
others may operate amphibiously from
ships, or as airborne troops inserted by
helicopter, parachute or glider, whereas
light infantry may operate mainly on foot.
In recent years, peacekeeping operations
in support of humanitarian relief efforts
have become particularly important.
Tactics also vary with terrain. Tactics in
urban areas, jungles, mountains, deserts
or arctic areas are all markedly different.

Ancient history
The infantry phalanx was a Sumerian
tactical formation as far back as the third
millennium BC.[1] It was a tightly knit
group of hoplites, generally upper and
middle class men, typically eight to
twelve ranks deep, armored in helmet,
breastplate, and greaves, armed with
two- to three-meter (6–9 foot) pikes and
overlapping round shields.[2] It was most
effective in narrow areas, such as
Thermopylae, or in large numbers.
Although the early Greeks focused on the
chariot, because of local geography, the
phalanx was well developed in Greece
and had superseded most cavalry tactics
by the Greco-Persian Wars. In the fourth
century BC Philip II of Macedon
reorganized his army, with emphasis on
phalanges,[3] and the first scientific
military research.[4] Theban and
Macedonian tactics were variations
focused on a concentrated point to break
through the enemy phalanx, following the
shock of cavalry.[5] Carefully organized—
into tetrarchia of 64 men, taxiarchiae of
two tetrarchiae, syntagmatae of two
taxiarchiae, chilliarchiae of four
syntagmatae, and phalanges of four
chilliarchiae, with two chilliarchiae of
peltasts and one chilliarchia each of psiloi
and epihipparchy (cavalry) attached[6]—
and thoroughly trained,[7] these proved
exceedingly effective in the hands of
Alexander III of Macedon.

However, as effective as the Greek

phalanx was, it was inflexible. Rome
made their army into a complex
professional organization, with a
developed leadership structure and a
rank system. The Romans made it
possible for small-unit commanders to
receive rewards and medals for valor and
advancement in battle. Another major
advantage was a new tactical formation,
the manipular legion (adopted around
300BC[8]), which could operate
independently to take advantage of gaps
in an enemy line, as at the Battle of
Pydna. Perhaps the most important
innovation was improving the quality of
training to a level not seen before.
Although individual methods were used
by earlier generations, the Romans were
able to combine them into an
overwhelmingly successful army, able to
defeat any enemy for more than two
centuries.[8]

The Roman tactical system

On the infantry level, the Roman Army

adapted new weapons: the pilum (a
piercing javelin), the gladius (a short
thrusting sword), and the scutum (a large
convex shield) providing protection
against most attacks without the
inflexibility of the phalanx.[9] Generally,
battle would open with a volley of light
pila from up to 18 m (20 yd) (and
frequently far less),[10] followed by a
volley of heavy pila just before the
clashing with scuta and gladii. Roman
soldiers were trained to stab with these
swords instead of slash, always keeping
their shields in front of them, maintaining
a tight shield-wall formation with their
fellow soldiers. To motivate the Roman
soldier to come within two meters (6 ft)
of his enemy (as he was required to do
with the gladius) he would be made a
citizen after doing so, upon completion
of his term of service.[10] Roman infantry
discipline was strict, and training
constant and repetitive.

The manipular legion was a improvement

over the phalanx on which it was based,
providing a flexibility and responsiveness
unequalled before that time. By
increasing dispersal, triple that of a
typical phalanx, the manipular legion had
the unanticipated benefit of reducing the
lethality of opposing weapons.[11]
Coupled with superb training and
effective leaders, the Roman army was
the finest in the world for centuries. The
army's power on the field was such that
its leaders avoided most fortifications,
preferring to meet the enemy on open
ground. To take an enemy-held
fortification, the Roman army would cut
off any supply lines, build watchtowers
around the perimeter, set up catapults,
and force the enemy to attempt to stop
them from reducing the fortification's
walls to rubble. The Roman army's
achievements were carefully carved in
stone on Trajan's Column, and are well
documented by artifacts strewn about
battlefields all over Europe.

Middle Ages
After the fall of the Roman Empire, many
of the ingenious tactics they used
disappeared. Tribes such as the
Visigoths and Vandals preferred to
simply rush their enemies in a massive
horde. These tribes would often win
battles against more advanced enemies
by achieving surprise and outnumbering
their foes. Born out of the partition of the
Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire
created an effective military. Its
conscripts were well-paid and led by
commanders educated in military tactics
and history. However, the army mostly
relied on cavalry, making the infantry a
smaller portion of its overall force.
The Vikings were able to be effective
against stronger enemies through
surprise and mobility. Like guerrillas in
other wars, the Vikings could decide
when and where to attack. In part
because of their flat bottomed ships,
which enabled them to sneak deep into
Europe by river before carrying out an
attack, the Vikings could frequently catch
their enemies by surprise. Monasteries
were common targets because they were
seldom heavily defended and often
contained substantial amounts of
valuables. The Vikings were fearsome in
battle, but they became even more so
when they included Berserkers.
Battles of the Middle Ages were often
smaller than those involving the Roman
and Grecian armies of Antiquity. Armies
(much like the states of the period) were
more decentralized. There was little
systematic organisation of supplies and
equipment. Leaders were often
incompetent; their positions of authority
often based on birth, not ability. Most
soldiers were much more loyal to their
feudal lord than their state, and
insubordination within armies was
common. However, the biggest
difference between previous wars and
those of the Middle Ages was the use of
heavy cavalry, particularly knights.
Knights could often easily overrun
infantry armed with swords, axes, and
clubs. Infantry typically outnumbered
knights somewhere between five and ten
to one. They supported the knights and
defended any loot the formation had.
Infantry armed with spears could counter
the threat posed by enemy cavalry. At
other times pits, caltraps, wagons or
sharpened wooden stakes would be used
as protection from charging cavalry,
while archers brought down the enemy
horsemen with arrows; the English used
stakes to defend against French knights
at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415.

Pikemen often became a substitute for

communities and villages who could not
afford large forces of heavy cavalry. The
pike could be up to 18 feet (5.5 m) long,
whereas the spear was only 6 to 8 feet
(2.4 m) in length. Archers would be
integrated into these forces of spearmen
or pikemen to rain down arrows upon an
enemy while the spears or pikes held the
enemy at bay. Polearms were improved
again with creation of the halberd. The
halberd could be the length of a spear,
but with an axe head which enabled the
user to stab or chop the enemy cavalry
with either the front of the axe or a thin
point on the opposite side. The Japanese
also created polearms. The naginata
consisted of an approximately 6-foot
(1.8 m) long shaft and a 2.5-foot (0.76 m)
blade. The naginata was often used by
women to guard a castle in the absence
of men.

Infantry besieging Jerusalem during the First

Crusade

The crossbow, which did not require

trained archers, was frequently used in
armies where the extensive training
necessary for longbow was not practical.
The biggest disadvantage of crossbows
was the slow reloading time. With the
advent of steel and mechanical drawing
aids, crossbows became more powerful
than ever. Armor proof against longbows
and older crossbows could not stop
quarrels from these improved weapons.
Pope Innocent II put a ban on them, but
the move toward using this lethal
weapon had already started.

The first gunpowder weapons usually

consisted of metal tubes tied down to
wooden staves. Usually, these weapons
could only be fired once. These gonnes,
or hand cannons, were not very accurate,
and would usually be fired from city walls
or in ambush. Like the crossbow, the
gonne did not require trained soldiers
and could penetrate the armor worn by
enemy soldiers. Missiliers (whatever
their weapon) were protected by soldiers
with melee weapons. Knights would be
on either sides of this force and close in
on the enemy to destroy them after they
had been weakened by volleys. The
introduction of firearms presaged a
social revolution; even an illiterate
peasant could kill a noble knight.

Modern history
Early modern period
A tercio in "bastioned square," in battle.

As firearms became cheaper and more

effective, they grew to widespread use
among infantry beginning in the 16th
century. Requiring little training, firearms
soon began to make swords, maces,
bows, and other weapons obsolete.
Pikes, as a part of pike and shot
formation survived a good deal longer. By
the mid-16th century, firearms had
become the main weapons in many
armies. The main firearm of that period
was the arquebus. Although less
accurate than the bow, an arquebus
could penetrate most armours of the
period and required little training. In
response, armor thickened, making it
very heavy and expensive. As a result, the
cuirass replaced the mail hauberk and
full suits of armour, and only the most
valuable cavalry wore more than a
padded shirt.

Soldiers armed with arquebuses were

usually placed in three lines so one line
would be able to fire, while the other two
could reload. This tactic enabled an
almost constant flow of gunfire to be
maintained, and made up for the
inaccuracy of the weapon. In order to
hold back cavalry, wooden palisades or
pikemen would be in front of
arquebusiers. An example of this is the
Battle of Nagashino.

Maurice of Nassau, leader of the 1580s

Dutch Revolt, made a number of tactical
innovations, one of which was to break
his infantry into smaller and more mobile
units, rather than the traditional clumsy
and slow moving squares.[12] The
introduction of volley fire helped
compensate for the inaccuracy of
musket fire by and was first used in
European combat at Nieuwpoort in 1600.
These changes required well-drilled
troops who could maintain formation
while repeatedly loading and reloading,
combined with better control and thus
leadership. The overall effect was to
professionalise both officers and men;
Maurice is sometimes claimed as the
creator of the modern officer corps.

His innovations were further adapted by

Gustavus Adolphus who increased the
effectiveness and speed of volley fire by
using the more reliable wheel-lock
musket and paper cartridge, while
improving mobility by removing heavy
armour.[13] Perhaps the biggest change
was to increase the numbers of
musketeers and eliminating the need for
pikemen by using the plug bayonet.[14] Its
disadvantage was that the musket could
not be fired once fixed; the socket
bayonet overcame this issue but the
technical problem of keeping it attached
took time to perfect.

Prussian line infantry attack at the 1745 Battle of

Hohenfriedberg.

Once this was resolved in the early 18th

century, the accepted practice was for
both sides to fire then charging with fixed
bayonets; this required careful
calculation since the closer the lines, the
more effective the first volleys. One of
the most famous example of this was at
Fontenoy in 1745 when the British and
French troops allegedly invited each
other to fire first.[15]

The late 17th century emphasised the

defence and assault of fortified places
and avoiding battle unless on extremely
favourable terms.[16] In the 18th century,
changes in infantry tactics and weapons
meant a greater willingness to accept
battle and so drill, discipline and retaining
formation became more important.
There were many reasons for this, one
being that until the invention of
smokeless powder, retaining contact with
the men on either side of you was
sometimes the only way of knowing
which way to advance. Infantry in line
was extremely vulnerable to cavalry
attack, leading to the development of the
carré or square; while not unknown, it
was rare for cavalry to break a well-held
square.

Late modern period

Napoleonic

Napoleon Bonaparte did many things to

change the nature of warfare. Napoleon's
single greatest legacy in warfare was the
extensive use and elaboration of the
disseminated army; he separated groups
of units in his army to spread them out
over a wider area but kept them under his
central command unlike in earlier times
when each separate division would have
fought independently. This allowed him
to force battle by turning or encircling the
enemy army where in previous eras
armies only fought by mutual consent or
because a surprise manoeuvre had them
trapped against an obstacle such as a
river.

He relied heavily on the column, a

formation less than a hundred men wide
and containing an entire brigade in tight
formation and mostly advanced to
contact with the bayonet. The constant
movement and sheer mass of this
formation could break through most
enemy lines, but was susceptible to
being broken by well drilled or large
volumes of fire as it could not fire as it
advanced. Its main advantage was its
ability to march rapidly and then deploy
into line comparatively easily, especially
with well drilled and motivated troops
such as those available to Napoleon
after the French Revolution. He later
utilised the Mixed Order formation which
could be a combination of one or more
lines supported by one or more columns.
This offered the extended firepower of
the line with the rapid reaction ability of
the column in support.

The column formation allowed the unit

rapid movement, a very effective charge
(due to weight of numbers) or it could
quickly form square to resist cavalry
attacks, but by its nature only a fraction
of its muskets would be able to open fire.
The line offered a substantially larger
musket frontage allowing for greater
shooting capability but required
extensive training to allow the unit to
move over ground as one while retaining
the line.

The mixed order remained a part of

French tactical doctrine as the French
army grew in discipline, capitalising as it
did on the strengths of both the line and
column formations, while avoiding some
of their inherent weaknesses. It was used
extensively by Napoleon when
commanding the Grande Armée.

This greatly surpassed other armies at

the time which had to move slowly to
keep their lines aligned and coherent and
as such keep the cavalry from their
interior; spaces could be guarded with
musket fire, but the line had to be
generally aligned and this could be lost
over even apparently flat undulating
ground as individuals slowed or sped up
across uneven ground. The only antidote
was slow movement and the column
afforded tactical battlefield
manoeuvrability and as such a chance to
outflank or outmanoeuvre the enemy, or,
more importantly, concentrate against
weaknesses in the enemy lines.

Napoleon was also an avid user of

artillery—he began his career as an
artillery officer—and used the artillery to
great effect due to his specialist
knowledge. The French army after the
French Revolution was greatly motivated
and after the reforms of 1791, well
trained in the newest doctrine.

Napoleon was eventually defeated, but

his tactics were studied well into the 19th
Century, even as improved weapons
made massed infantry attacks
increasingly hazardous.

Irregular tactics

Countries which have not been major

world powers have used many other
infantry tactics. In South Africa, the Zulu
impis (regiments) were infamous for
their bull horn tactic. It involved four
groups - two in the front, one on the left,
and one on the right. They would
surround the enemy unit, close in, and
destroy them with short assegai, or
iklwas while fire-armed Zulus kept up a
harassing fire. The Zulu warriors
surprised and often overwhelmed their
enemies, even much better armed and
equipped enemies such as the British
army.

The Sudanese fought their enemies by

using a handful of riflemen to lure enemy
riflemen into the range of concealed
Sudanese spearmen. In New Zealand the
Māori hid in fortified bunkers or pā that
could withstand strikes from even some
of the most powerful weapons of the
19th century before luring opposing
forces into an ambush. Sometimes the
natives would arm themselves with
weapons similar or superior to those of
the imperialistic country they were
fighting. During the Battle of Little
Bighorn, Lt. Colonel George Custer and
five out of twelve companies of the 7th
Cavalry were destroyed by a force of
Sioux and Cheyenne.[17]

Unconventional infantry tactics often put

a conventional enemy at a disadvantage.
During the Second Boer War, the Boers
used guerrilla tactics to fight the
conventional British Army. Boer
marksmen would often pick off British
soldiers from hundreds of yards away.
These constant sniper attacks forced the
British infantry to begin wearing khaki
uniforms instead of their traditional red.
The Boers were much more mobile than
the British infantry and thus could usually
choose where a battle would take place.
These unconventional tactics forced the
British to adopt some unorthodox tactics
of their own.

After 1945

The Korean War was the first major

conflict following World War II. New
devices, including smaller radios and the
helicopter were also introduced.
Parachute drops, which tended to scatter
a large number of men over the
battlefield, were replaced by airmobile
operations using helicopters to deliver
men in a precise manner. Helicopters
also provided fire support in many cases,
and could be rushed to deliver precision
strikes on the enemy. Thus, infantry were
free to range far beyond the conventional
fixed artillery positions. They could even
operate behind enemy lines, and later be
extracted by air. This led to the concept
of vertical envelopment (originally
conceived for airborne), in which the
enemy is not flanked to the left or right,
but rather from above.

A Romanian squad of a TAB-77 APC. This is a typical

Soviet arrangement, with a PK general purpose
machine gun and a RPK light machine gun in the
machine gun and a RPK light machine gun in the
center and two soldiers with AK-47 assault rifles and
one RPG-7 grenade launcher on the flanks. Another

soldier provides liaison or extra firepower where

needed.

Mobile infantry tactics

Soviet infantry attack during WWII

As part of the development of armored

warfare, typified by blitzkrieg, new
infantry tactics were devised. More than
ever, battles consisted of infantry
working together with tanks, aircraft,
artillery as part of combined arms. One
example of this is how infantry would be
sent ahead of tanks to search for anti-
tank teams, while tanks would provide
cover for the infantry. Portable radios
allowed field commanders to
communicate with their HQs, allowing
new orders to be relayed instantly.

Another major development was the

means of transportation; no longer did
soldiers have to walk (or ride a horse)
from location to location. The prevalence
of motor transport, however, has been
overstated; Germany used more horses
for transport in World War II than in
World War I, and British troops as late as
June 1944 were still not fully motorized.
Although there were trucks in World War
I, their mobility could never be fully
exploited because of the trench warfare
stalemate, as well as the terribly torn up
terrain at the front and the
ineffectiveness of vehicles at the time.
During World War II, infantry could be
moved from one location to another
using half-tracks, trucks, and even
aircraft, which left them better rested and
able to fight once they reached their
objective.

A new type of infantry, the paratrooper,

was deployed as well. These lightly
armed soldiers would parachute behind
enemy lines, hoping to catch the enemy
off-guard. First used by the Germans in
1940, they were to seize key objectives
and hold long enough for additional
forces to arrive. They required prompt
support from regulars, however; First
British Airborne was decimated at
Arnhem after being left essentially cut
off.

To counter the tank threat, World War II

infantry initially had few options other
than the so-called "Molotov cocktail"
(first used by Chinese troops against
Japanese tanks around Shanghai in
1937[18]) and anti-tank rifle. Neither was
particularly effective, especially if armor
was accompanied by supporting infantry.
These, and later anti-tank mines, some of
which could be magnetically attached to
the tank, required the user to get closer
than was prudent. Later developments,
such as the Bazooka, PIAT, and
Panzerfaust, allowed a more effective
attack against armor from a distance.
Thus, especially in the ruined urban
zones, tanks were forced to enter
accompanied by squads of infantry.

Marines became prominent during the

Pacific War. These soldiers were capable
of amphibious warfare on a scale not
previously known. As Naval Infantry, both
Japanese and American Marines enjoyed
the support of naval craft such as
battleships, cruisers, and the newly
developed aircraft carriers. As with
conventional infantry, the Marines used
radios to communicate with their
supporting elements. They could call in
sea and air bombardment very quickly.

The widespread availability of helicopters

following World War II allowed the
emergence of an air mobility tactics such
as aerial envelopment.

Squad tactics

Offensive tactics
Aggressive squad tactics were similar for
both sides, though specifics in arms,
numbers, and the subtleties of the
doctrine differed. The main goal was to
advance by means of fire and movement
with minimal casualties while
maintaining unit effectiveness and
control.

The German squad would win the

Feuerkampf (fire fight), then occupy key
positions. The rifle and machine gun
teams were not separate, but part of the
Gruppe, though men were often firing at
will. Victory went to the side able to
concentrate the most fire on target most
quickly. Generally, soldiers were ordered
to hold fire until the enemy was 600
metres (660 yards) or closer, when
troops opened fire on mainly large
targets; individuals were fired upon only
from 400 metres (440 yards) or below.

The German squad had two main

formations while moving on the
battlefield. When advancing in the Reihe,
or single file, formation, the commander
took the lead, followed by the machine
gunner and his assistants, then riflemen,
with the assistant squad commander
moving on the rear. The Reihe moved
mostly on tracks and it presented a small
target on the front. In some cases, the
machine gun could be deployed while the
rest of the squad held back. In most
cases, the soldiers took advantage of the
terrain, keeping behind contours and
cover, and running out into the open
when there were none to be found.

A Reihe could easily be formed into

Schützenkette, or skirmish line. The
machine gun deployed on the spot, while
riflemen came up on the right, left or both
sides. The result was a ragged line with
men about five paces apart, taking cover
whenever available. In areas where
resistance was serious, the squad
executed "fire and movement". This was
used either with the entire squad, or the
machine gun team down while riflemen
advanced. Commanders were often
cautioned not to fire the machine gun
until forced to do so by enemy fire. The
object of the firefight was to not
necessarily to destroy the enemy, but
Niederkämpfen - to beat down, silence, or
neutralize them.

The final phases of an offensive squad

action were the fire fight, advance,
assault, and occupation of position:

The Fire Fight was the fire unit section.

The section commander usually only
commanded the light machine gunner
(LMG) to open fire upon the enemy. If
much cover existed and good fire effect
was possible, riflemen took part early.
Most riflemen had to be on the front later
to prepare for the assault. Usually, they
fired individually unless their commander
ordered them to focus on one target.

The Advance was the section that worked

its way forward in a loose formation.
Usually, the LMG formed the front of the
attack. The farther the riflemen followed
behind the LMG, the more easily the rear
machine guns could shoot past them.

The Assault was the main offensive in the

squad action. The commander made an
assault whenever he was given the
opportunity rather than being ordered to
do so. The whole section was rushed into
the assault while the commander lead
the way. Throughout the assault, the
enemy had to be engaged with the
maximum rate of fire. The LMG took part
in the assault, firing on the move. Using
hand grenades, machine pistols, rifles,
pistols, and entrenching tools, the squad
tried to break the enemy resistance. The
squad had to reorganize quickly once the
assault was over.

When occupying a position (The

Occupation of Position), the riflemen
group up into twos or threes around the
LMG so they could hear the section
commander.

The American squad's basic formations

were very similar to that of the Germans.
The U.S. squad column had the men
strung out with the squad leader and BAR
man in front with riflemen in a line behind
them roughly 60 paces long. This
formation was easily controlled and
maneuvered and it was suitable for
crossing areas open to artillery fire,
moving through narrow covered routes,
and for fast movement in woods, fog,
smoke, and darkness.

The skirmish line was very similar to the

Schützenkette formation. In it, the squad
was deployed in a line roughly 60 paces
long. It was suitable for short rapid
dashes but was not easy to control. The
squad wedge was an alternative to the
skirmish line and was suitable for ready
movement in any direction or for
emerging from cover. Wedges were often
used away from the riflemen's range of
fire as it was much more vulnerable than
the skirmish line.

In some instances, especially when a

squad was working independently to
seize an enemy position, the commander
ordered the squad to attack in sub-
teams. "Team Able", made up of two
riflemen scouts, would locate the enemy;
"Team Baker", composed of a BAR man
and three riflemen, would open fire.
"Team Charlie", made up of the squad
leader and the last five riflemen, would
make the assault. The assault is given
whenever possible and without regard to
the progress of the other squads. After
the assault, the squad advanced, dodging
for cover, and the bayonets were fixed.
They would move rapidly toward the
enemy, firing and advancing in areas
occupied by hostile soldiers. Such fire
would usually be delivered in a standing
position at a rapid rate. After taking the
enemy's position, the commander would
either order his squad to defend or
continue the advance.

The British method formations depended

chiefly on the ground and the type of
enemy fire that was encountered. Five
squad formations were primarily used:
blobs, single file, loose file, irregular
arrowhead, and the extended line. The
blob formation, first used in 1917,
referred to ad hoc gatherings of 2 to 4
men, hidden as well as possible. The
regular single file formation was only
used in certain circumstances, such as
when the squad was advancing behind a
hedgerow. The loose file formation was a
slightly more scattered line suitable for
rapid movement, but vulnerable to enemy
fire. Arrowheads could deploy rapidly
from either flank and were hard to stop
from the air. The Extended Line was
perfect for the final assault, but it was
vulnerable if fired upon from the flank.
The British squad would commonly break
up into two groups for the attack. The
Bren group consisted of the two-man
Bren gun team and second in command
that formed one element, while the main
body of the riflemen with the squad
commander formed another. The larger
group that contained the commander
was responsible for closing in on the
enemy and advancing promptly when
under fire. When under effective fire,
riflemen went to fully fledged "fire and
movement". The riflemen were ordered to
fall to the ground as if they had been
shot, and then crawl to a good firing
position. They took rapid aim and fired
independently until the squad
commander called for cease fire. On
some occasions the Bren group
advanced by bounds, to a position where
it could effectively commence fire,
preferably at 90 degrees to the main
assault. In this case both the groups
would give each other cover fire. The
final attack was made by the riflemen
who were ordered to fire at the hip as
they went in.

Defensive tactics

German defensive squad tactics

stressed the importance of integration
with larger plans and principles in posts
scattered in depth. A Gruppe was
expected to dig in at 30 to 40 metres (33
to 44 yd) (the maximum that a squad
leader could effectively oversee). Other
cover such as single trees and crests
were said to attract too much enemy fire
and were rarely used. While digging, one
member of the squad was to stand
sentry. Gaps between dug-in squads may
be left, but covered by fire. The placing of
the machine gun was key to the German
squad defence, which was given several
alternative positions, usually being
placed 50 metres (55 yards) apart.

Pairs of soldiers were deployed in

foxholes, trenches, or ditches. The pair
stood close together in order to
communicate with each other. The small
sub-sections would be slightly separated,
thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire.
If the enemy did not immediately
mobilize, the second stage of defense,
entrenching, was employed. These
trenches were constructed behind the
main line where soldiers could be kept
back under cover until they were needed.

The defensive firefight was conducted by

the machine gun at an effective range
while riflemen were concealed in their
foxholes until the enemy assault. Enemy
grenades falling on the squad's position
were avoided by diving away from the
blast or by simply throwing or kicking the
grenade back. This tactic was very
dangerous and U.S. sources report
American soldiers losing hands and feet
this way.

In the latter part of the war, emphasis

was put on defense against armored
vehicles. Defensive positions were built
on a "tank-proof obstacle" composed of
at least one anti-tank weapon as well as
artillery support directed by an observer.
To intercept enemy tanks probing a
defensive position, squads often
patrolled with an anti-tank weapon.

Platoon tactics
This is a sub-unit of a company,
comprising three sections with a platoon
headquarters. The strength of standard
infantry platoon varies between twenty
five and thirty six.

Infantry entrenchment

During the Second World War, trenches,

ditches, foxholes and Dragon's teeth
(fortification) were used extensively.

Infantry warfare by type

Jungle warfare

Jungle warfare was heavily shaped by

the experiences of all the major powers
in the Southeast Asian theater of
operations during the Second World War.
Jungle terrain tended to break up and
isolate units. It tended to fragment the
battle. It called for greater independence
and leadership among junior leaders, and
all the major powers increased the level
of training and experience level required
for junior officers and NCOs. But fights in
which squad or platoon leaders found
themselves fighting on their own also
called for more firepower. All the
combatants, therefore, found ways to
increase both the firepower of individual
squads and platoons. The intent was to
ensure that they could fight on their own
... which often proved to be the case.
Japan, as one example, increased the
number of heavy weapons in each
squad. The "strengthened" squad used
from 1942 onwards was normally 15
men. The Japanese squad contained one
squad automatic weapon (a machine gun
fed from a magazine and light enough to
be carried by one gunner and an
assistant ammunition bearer). A
designated sniper was also part of the
team, as was a grenadier with a rifle-
grenade launcher.

The squad's TO&E also included a

grenade launcher team armed with what
historians often mistakenly call a "knee
mortar". This was in fact a light mortar of
50 mm that threw high explosive,
illumination and smoke rounds out to as
much as 400 meters. Set on the ground
and fired with arm outstretched, the
operator varied the range by adjusting
the height of the firing pin within the
barrel (allowing the mortar to be fired
through small holes in the jungle
canopy). The balance of the squad
carried bolt-action rifles.

The result was that each squad was now

a self-sufficient combat unit. Each squad
had an automatic weapons capability. In
a defensive role, the machine gun could
be set to create a “beaten zone” of
bullets through which no enemy could
advance and survive. In an attack, it
could throw out a hail of bullets to keep
the opponent’s head down while friendly
troops advanced. The light mortar gave
the squad leader an indirect "hip-pocket
artillery" capability. It could fire high-
explosive and fragmentation rounds to
flush enemy out of dugouts and hides. It
could fire smoke to conceal an advance,
or illumination rounds to light up any
enemy target at night. The sniper gave
the squad leader a long-range point-
target-killing capability.

Four squads composed a platoon. There

was no headquarters section, only the
platoon leader and the platoon sergeant.
In effect, the platoon could fight as four
independent, self-contained battle units
(a concept very similar to the US Ranger
"chalks.")

The British Army did extensive fighting in

the jungles and rubber plantations of
Malaya during the Emergency, and in
Borneo against Indonesia during the
Confrontation. As a result of these
experiences, the British increased the
close-range firepower of their individual
riflemen by replacing the pre-World War II
bolt-action Lee–Enfield with lighter,
automatic weapons like the American M2
carbine and the Sterling submachine
gun.
However, the British Army was already
blessed in its possession of a good
squad automatic weapon (the Bren) and
these remained apportioned one per
squad. They comprised the bulk of the
squad’s firepower, even after the
introduction of the self-loading rifle (a
semi-automatic copy of the Belgian FN-
FAL). The British did not deploy a mortar
on the squad level. However, there was
one 2-inch mortar on the platoon level.

The US Army took a slightly different

approach.

They believed the experience in Vietnam

showed the value of smaller squads
carrying a higher proportion of heavier
weapons. The traditional 12-man squad
armed with semi-automatic rifles and an
automatic rifle was knocked down to 9
men: The squad leader carried the M16
and AN/PRC-6 radio. He commanded
two fire teams of four men apiece (each
containing one team leader with M16,
grenadier with M16/203, designated
automatic rifleman with M16 and bipod,
and an anti-tank gunner with LAW and
M16).

Three squads composed a platoon along

with two three-man machine gun teams
(team leader with M16, gunner with M60
machine gun, and assistant gunner with
M16). The addition of two M60 machine
gun teams created more firepower on the
platoon level. The platoon leader could
arrange these to give covering fire, using
his remaining three squads as his
maneuver element. The M16/203
combination was a particular American
creation (along with its M79 parent). It
did not have the range of the Japanese
50 mm mortar. However, it was handier,
and could still lay down indirect high-
explosive fire, and provide support with
both smoke and illumination rounds. The
US Army also had 60 mm mortars. This
was a bigger, more capable weapon than
the Japanese 50 mm weapon. But it was
too heavy for use on the squad or even
the platoon level. These were only
deployed on the company level.

The deficiency of the US formation

remained the automatic rifleman, a
tradition that had gone back to the
Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) gunner
of World War II. The US Army discovered
that an automatic rifle was a poor
substitute for a real machine gun. A rifle
fired in the sustained automatic role
easily overheated, and its barrel could
not be changed. In post-Vietnam, the US
Army adopted the Belgian Minimi to
replace the automatic M16. With an
interchangeable barrel and larger
magazine, this weapon, known as the
M249 in U.S. inventory, provided the
sustained automatic fire required.

The Republic of Singapore Army, whose

experience is 100% in primary and
secondary jungle as well as rubber
plantation terrain, took the trend one step
further. Their squad contained only seven
men, but fielded two squad automatic
gunners (with 5.56mm squad automatic
weapons), two grenadiers with M16/203
underslung grenade launchers, and one
anti-tank gunner with rocket launcher and
assault rifle.

So in short, jungle warfare increased the

number of short/sharp engagements on
the platoon or even squad level. Platoon
and squad leaders had to be more
capable of independent action. To do
this, each squad (or at least platoon)
needed a balanced allocation of
weapons that would allow it to complete
its mission unaided.

Mountain warfare

During the Soviet–Afghan War, the Soviet

Army and Air Force fought forces called
the Mujahideen. Although the Soviet
Army had greater firepower and modern
equipment than the Mujahideen, they
were not able to completely destroy them
because of the difficulty of countering
guerrilla tactics in the mountains.
When the Stinger missile was supplied to
the Mujahideen, they began to ambush
Soviet helicopters and fixed wing aircraft
in proximity of the military airfields. This
was because the Stinger was only
effective at a range of 15,000 feet
(4,600 m), requiring the Mujahideen to
attack the aircraft as they were landing or
taking off. The Stinger, however, was not
the "weapon that won the war". Although
it did have a significant effect on the
conduct of war, it was not used to shoot
down very many aircraft. It did force the
Soviets to modify their helicopter tactics.
Helicopters begun to cooperate more
closely with the ground forces, fixed wing
aircraft began flying at higher altitudes,
and armor and anti-missile electronic
defense systems were added to aircraft
to help protect them from the Stinger.

The Soviets countered the Mujahideen

tactics in various ways. The Spetsnaz
were used extensively in special
operations by being deployed by
helicopter into areas identified as areas
often transited by the Mujahideen, or
sites of ambushes. Spetsnaz tactics were
effective against Mujahideen because
they employed tactics similar to those
used by the Mujahideen; tanks and
aircraft were comparatively less effective
due to terrain and enemy mobility in it.
The only technology with a significant
impact on Mujahideen were land mines
and helicopters, although over time
Mujahideen were able to find ways to
avoid and evade both.

As the Soviet operations stalled, they

began retaliating against the civilian
population for supporting the
Mujahideen. It was not uncommon for
Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan
village in retaliation for an attack against
Soviet soldiers. At other times they
dropped mines from aircraft in the fields
and pastures, or shooting the livestock
with helicopter weapons. Without the
support of the villagers, the Mujahideen
were forced to carry their own food in
addition to weapons and military
supplies. Another common tactic was to
cordon off and search villages for
Mujahideen. These tactics were not
unlike those used by the United States in
Vietnam, or by the Germans against
Soviet partisans in World War II.

Conventional infantry tactics are

generally modified before
implementation in Mountain Warfare as
the defending side generally has a
decisive advantage over the attacking
side by holding the heights and forcing
the enemy to attack uphill against a fully
prepared well entrenched position. So
generally, frontal assault is avoided by
implementation of blockade tactics and
cutting off the supply lines, thereby
creating a siege. This changed in the
Kargil War of 1999 when Indian forces
were faced with the huge task of flushing
out intruders and disguised Pakistani
soldiers who had captured high mountain
posts. Instead of employing blockade
tactics, Indian Army launched frontal
assault against Pakistani Army positions
but the tactics were intensely modified
by employment of heavy artillery cover
often firing in direct role and relentless
air-strikes before the ground attack. As
any daytime attack would be suicidal, all
the attacks were made under the cover
of darkness to minimize casualties. The
operation took time but was successful
and all the positions were recaptured by
the Indian Army after two months of
fighting.

American trained Iraqi troops about to board a UH-

60. Through the use of helicopters, these troops are
able catch insurgents off guard and raid their
positions.

Trench warfare
British infantry in a trench during The Battle of the
Somme.

During the First World War, the increasing

lethality of more modern weapons, such
as artillery and machine guns, forced a
shift in infantry tactics to trench warfare.
Massed infantry charges were now
essentially suicidal, and the Western
Front ground to a standstill.

A common tactic used during the earlier

stages of trench warfare was to shell an
enemy trench line, at which point friendly
infantry would leave the safety of their
trenches, advance across no man's land,
and seize the enemy trenches. However,
this tactic of "preliminary bombardment"
was largely unsuccessful. The nature of
no man's land (filled with barbed wire and
other obstructions) was one factor. For a
unit to get to an enemy trench line, it had
to cross this area, secure the enemy
position, then face counterattack by
opposing reserves. It also depended on
the ability of friendly artillery to suppress
enemy infantry and artillery, which was
frequently limited by "bombproofs"
(bunkers), revetments, poor ammunition,
or simply inaccurate fire.
The casualties caused by machine gun
fire led to the widespread deployment of
light machine guns such as the Lewis
Gun within minor infantry units. Trench
warfare also led to the rapid
development of new designs of
grenades, rifle grenades and light
mortars—all of which represented a rapid
increase in the firepower available to low-
level commanders. There was a growing
emphasis on field craft, especially in the
British and Dominion Armies, where
night-patrolling and raiding tactics soon
also demanded an increase in map-
reading and navigation skills. The
infantryman of 1914 was content to be
trained in rifle and bayonet and usually
attacked in battalion formations. By 1917
he was used to grenades, rifle grenades,
light machine-guns and more specialized
weapons and usually worked his way
forward using platoon or section
tactics.[19]

An improvement was the creeping

barrage in which artillery fire is laid
immediately in front of advancing
infantry to clear any enemy in their way.
This played an important part in later
battles such as the Battle of Arras
(1917), of which Vimy Ridge was a part.
The tactic required close coordination in
an era before widespread use of radio,
and when laying telephone wire under fire
was extremely hazardous. In response,
the Germans devised the elastic defence
and used infiltration tactics in which
shock troops quietly infiltrated the
enemy's forward trenches, without the
heavy bombardment that gave advance
warning of an imminent attack. The
French and British/Dominion Armies
were also engaged in evolving similar
infantry tactics.[20] The Allies introduced
the tank to overcome the deadlock of
static positions but mechanical
unreliability prevented them from doing
so.

The Germans used specially-trained

Stormtroopers to great effect in 1918,
during Operation Michael, breaching the
Allied trench lines and allowing
supporting infantry to pour through a
wide breach in the front lines. Even
though most of the German forces were
on foot, they were soon threatening
Paris. Only timely and stiff resistance, the
use of reserves, and German logistical
and manpower problems prevented an
Allied disaster. After this spring
offensive, the Allies launched a series of
counter-attacks with tanks and small
units of assault infantry protected by air
support and short intense artillery
barrages while the main infantry force
followed and seized strongpoints. This
forced the Germans back and after less
than three months the allies had made
the largest territorial gains on the
western front since the war began. The
Germans then sued for peace ending the
war.

Urban warfare

Urban warfare draws roots from a variety

of tactics and strategies. Typically fought
in towns and cities, Urban combatants
would encounter problems such as
bystanders, buildings, and restricted
mobility. Unlike the battles of Napoleon, a
modern military would be restricted by
narrow alleys and roads. This allows an
opponent to predict or limit the
movement of one's motorized vehicles by
using weapons such as IED's, RPG's, and
artillery. This forces the infantry to push
those threats out.

See also
Suppressive fire
Reconnaissance by fire
Spray and pray
All-around defense/Perimeter defense

Notes
1. Dupuy, p.10.
2. Dupuy, p.10-11.
3. Dupuy, p.11.
4. Dupuy, p.12.
 5. Dupuy, p.13.
6. Dupuy, p.14. The simple phalanx
could be combined into a grand
phalanx of four simple phalanges, a
formation equivalent to a modern
army corps.
7. Dupuy, p.13-14.
8. Dupuy, p.16.
9. Dupuy, p.16-17.
10. Dupuy, p.17.
11. Dupuy, p.19. Covering a wider area
naturally reduces the tendency of any
one soldier to be killed.
12. Messenger, Charles (2001). Reader's
Guide to Military History . Routledge.
 p. 370. ISBN 1579582419. Retrieved
22 January 2018.
13. Dyer, Gwynne (1985). War (2006 ed.).
Basic Books. p. 61.
ISBN 0786717718.
14. Dupuy, Trevor (1980). The Evolution
Of Weapons And Warfare (1990 ed.).
Da Capo Press. p. 131.
ISBN 0306803844.
15. Mackinnon, Daniel (1883). Origin and
Services of the Coldstream Guards
(2017 ed.). Forgotten Books. p. 368.
ISBN 152788578X.
16. Messenger, Charles (2001). Reader's
Guide to Military History . Routledge.
 p. 370. ISBN 1579582419. Retrieved
22 January 2018.
17. Custer suffered from insubordinate
junior officers as much as superior
enemy weapons, as shown in
Sklenar, Larry. To Hell With Honor.
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2000.
18. Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. Illustrated
Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century
Weapons and Warfare (London:
Phoebus, 1978), Volume 18, p.1929-
20, "Molotov Cocktail".
19. Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians
Fighting the Great War 1917-1918,
Viking Canada 2008
 20. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the
Western Front: The British Army's Art
of Attack 1916-18, Yale University
Press, 1994.

Bibliography
17th Century

Dupuy, Trevor N., Colonel, U.S. Army.

Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.
ISBN 0-672-52050-8
Dyer, Gwynne. War. New York: Crown
Publishers, 1985. ISBN 0-517-55615-4

World War II
 World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and
Platoon, Dr Steven Bull, 2004 Osprey
Ltd.
Dupuy, Trevor N., Colonel, U.S. Army.
Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.
ISBN 0-672-52050-8

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