1. ARANETA v DINGLASAN
These EOs have no legal anchorage as the emergency
Facts. Petitioners challenge the validity of Executive Order Nos. 62,
192, 225 and 226 which regulates rentals, controls exports,
appropriates funds for operation of government, and appropriates
P6m for the national elections, respectively. These Eos were issued
by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671 or the Emergency Powers
Act which authorizes the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. Petitioners contended that CA
No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect.
Issue. Has CA No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect?
Held. Yes. Although it did not fix the duration of its effectiveness it
should be noted that it is restrictive in duration as provided in
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution. It became inoperative
when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946. The raison
d’etre for the Act’s enactment is the inability of the Congress to
hold regular session due to “helplessness against air attacks.”
2. RODRIGUEZ v GELLA
Facts. Petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 issued on
November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,000
for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relied in provinces and cities visited by
typhoon, droughts and other calamities. These Eos were issued by
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671 notwithstanding the fact that
it has already been declared inoperative as stated in the Araneta v.
Dinglasan case.
Issue. Are EOs 545 and 546 valid?
Held. No.
powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn. Although
CA No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the Constitutional
provision (Section 26, Article VI), it has to be assumed that the
National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. The
powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last
world war. Express repeal as provided in House Bill No. 727 is
unnecessary since it may be unconstitutional, for the Congress may
not repeal it or the President may veto it.
3. SANTIAGO v COMELEC
Facts. On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC
a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials by People’s Initiative”, citing Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed delfin
to publish the petition. On December 18, 1996, petitioners filed a
special civil action for prohibition, raising the following contentions:
(1) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative
if there is an enabling law passed by Congress; and (2) that Republic
Act No. 6735 or “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor”, which was the
cited enabling law by the respondents, does not suffice as an
enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution.
Issue. May the respondents amend the Constitution by People’s
Initiative through RA No. 6735A?
Held. No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory. RA No. 6735 intended to include the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, but is, unfortunately,
inadequate to cover that system. Nevertheless, it was made clear
during the interpellations that Section 2 of Article XVII is limited to
proposals to amend, not to revise, the Constitution. In addition,
contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Unlike in
the case of other systems of initiative therein, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Furthermore, no subtitle is provided for people’s
initiative on the Constitution. Therefore, the Court ordered
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition.
4. MAGTAJAS v PRYCE PROPERTIES
Facts. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by Presidential
Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. It decided to
expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro in 1992. It was greatly
opposed by civic organizations, religious, women’s and youth
groups; and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO did not help
either as it enacted Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93. These
ordinances prohibit the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and prohibit the operation of casinos. Respondents assailed
the validity of the above-mentioned ordinances. Petitioners
contended that the Local Government Code has impliedly repealed
PD No. 1869.
Issue. Are Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO valid?
Held. No. The ordinances violated PD No. 1869 which has the force
and character of a statute. The rationale behind this is that
municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national law-making body. They owe
their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly, from the
legislature.
5. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL v JAC LINER
Facts. JAC Liner Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply
various routes to and from Lucena City assailed the constitutionality
of City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778. Ordinance No. 1631 provides
that only Lucena Grand Central Terminal shall have the right to
franchise, construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a
common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the city of Lucena for a
period of 25 years and subject to renewal; and that it shall not grant
any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus,
mini-bus and/or jeepney terminals. On the other hand, Ordinance
No. 1778 regulates the entry of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-
town jeepneys to the city of Lucena.
Issue. Was the police power properly exercised when the subject
ordinances were enacted?
Held. No. For an ordinance to be valid, it has to meet the following
requisites: (1) the interests of the public generally require the
interference of the state, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It was
able to comply with the first essential requisite, but not with the
second. The ordinances are characterized by overbreadth. The true
role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law. A more careful formulation of solution
should have been done.
6. DELA CRUZ v PARAS
Facts. Petitioners are operators of nightclubs who assailed the
validity of Ordinance No. 84 which prohibits the operation and
orders the closure of all nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. According to
them, it is violative of their right to due process and equal
protection of the law, as the license previously given to them was
withdrawn without judicial hearing. Respondents contended that
RA No. 938 entitled “An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and
Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishment, Maintenance
and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within their
Respective Territorial Jurisdiction” was amended and the
municipality’s power also extends to prohibition.
Issue. Is Ordinance No. 84 valid and constitutional?
Held. No. It did not pass the test of validity as it is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. Moreover, the title of RA No. 938 limits the
municipality’s power to regulate since the Constitution mandates
that: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.” Allowing the municipality to prohibit
would result to the invalidation of the statute.
7. UNITED STATES v ANG TANG HO
Facts. The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 entitled “ An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Holding of, and Speculation in,
Palay, Rice, and Corn under Extraordinary Circumstances, Regulating
the Distribution and Sale Thereof, and Authorizing the Governor
General, with the Consent of the Council of the State, to Issue the
Necessary Rules and Regulations Therefor, and Making an
Appropriation for this Purpose.” The Governor General issued
Executive Order No. 53 which fixes the price at which rice should be
sold. Subsequently, a complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. He was later
tried and found guilty. He challenged the validity of the said Act and
contended that it is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Issue. Is Act No. 2868 unconstitutional?
Held. Yes. It is unconstitutional in so far as it undertakes to
authorize the Governor General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the proclamation a crime. It can be inferred that the
defendant committed a crime not because of the Act of the
legislature but because the Governor General issued a
proclamation. The legislature did not specify or define in any
manner the basis for the Order. It has left the sole judgment and
discretion to the Governor General.
8. YNOT v IAC
Facts. President Marcos issued Executive No. 626-A which prohibits
the transportation of carabao from one province to another. The
carabao or carabeef transported shall be confiscated by the
government and shall be distributed as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission and Director of Animal
Industry may see fit. On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot had
transported six carabaos in pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo where
they were confiscated by the police station commander. As a result,
he is now challenging the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A. He
contended that it violates due process.
Issue. Is EO No. 626-A unconstitutional?
Held. Yes. For it to be constitutional, it must appear that (1) the
interest of the public generally requires such interference, and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. It was not able to comply with the second requirement,
thus, it constitutes a violation of police power. Moreover, due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense, and is immediately
condemned and punish. This militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. Lastly, there is an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of properties.
9. DAR v SUTTON
Facts. Delia, Harry and Ella Sutton inherited a land located in
Aroroy, Masbate, which has been devoted exclusively to cow and
calf breeding. Pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of
the government, they made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
However, it was decided on December 4, 1990 that lands devoted
to livestock and poultry raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural lands. Thus, the Suttons made a formal request to DAR
to withdraw their VOS. DAR ignored their request and instead
issued AO No. 9, series of 1993 which provides that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine shall be excluded from the coverage of Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. According to DAR, the AO seeks to remedy
reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Issue. Is AO No. 9 unconstitutional?
Held. Yes. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry raising do not
fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
DAR has exceeded its powers in issuing the assailed AO.
10. SOLICITOR GENERAL v MMA
Facts. Petitioners Rodolfo Malapira, Stephen Monsanto, Dan
Calderon, and Grandy Trieste all filed a complaint against the
confiscation of their driver’s licenses and for the removal of his
front license plate (Trieste only). According to the traffic enforces,
Ordinance No. 7, series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, allows them to
confiscate driver’s license and to remove license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations. Nevertheless, the Gonong decision
prohibited only the removal of the license plates and not the
confiscation of driver’s license. MMA issued Ordinance No. 11 which
authorizes itself “to detach the license plates… of motor vehicles
illegally parked…” in accordance with Executive Order No. 392. The
Solicitor General challenged the validity of the above-mentioned
ordinances as those are in conflict with Presidential Decree No.
1605.
Issue. Are the ordinances valid?
Held. No. The ordinances were not able to pass the first test of
validity which is: it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statue. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the
measures under consideration do not conform with the existing law.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila.
11. BOIE-TAKEDA v DE LA SERNA
Facts. A routine inspection was conducted by the Labor and
Development Officer in the premises of Boie-Takeda Chemicals. The
result of the inspection indicated that the company had not been
including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in
the computation of their 13th month pay. The Labor and
Development Officer then required Boie-Takeda to effect the
restitution of the underpayment of the 13th month pay to its
employees. The petitioner expressed the view that the commissions
paid to their med reps are not part of the regular or basic salary. It
also attributed grave abuse of discretion to the labor officials for
issuing the questioned order. It contended that the Revised
Guidelines are null and void as they violate equal protection of the
law clause. On the other hand, respondents contend that the
Revised Guidelines merely clarified a gray area.
Issue. Did the respondent labor officials in computing the 13th
month pay committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?
Held. Yes. The term “basic salary” is to be understood in its
common, generally-accepted meaning, as a ray of pay for a standard
work period exclusive of bonuses and overtime pay. The second
paragraph of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the
13th month pay law unduly expanded the concept of basic salary as
defined in PD 851. It was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
therefore, it is null and void.
12. UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION v BF HOMES, INC.
Facts. UBFHAI is the umbrella organization and sole representative
of all homeowners in BF Homes, Paranaque subdivision. BFHI is the
owner-developer of said subdivision. In 1988, because of financial
difficulties, the Securities and Exchange Commission placed BFHI
under receivership to undergo a 10-year rehabilitation program.
Thus, a receiver was subsequently appointed. He was relieved and a
new committee of receivers was appointed which ordered BFHI to
be responsible for the security of the subdivision. UBFHAI filed with
the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation a preliminary
injunction against BFHI on the ground that it illegally revoked their
security agreement with the previous receiver. BFHI filed with the
CA a petition for prohibition for the issuance of TRO, to enjoin HIGC
from proceeding with the case. It was granted and the CA further
ruled out that HIGC does not have jurisdiction over the case.
Issue. Is the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HIGC,
specifically Section 1 (b), Rule II of the “Rules of Procedure on the
Settlement of Homeowners’ Disputes”, valid?
Held. No. The rule deviated from the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A. The third type of dispute over which the HIGC
has jurisdiction should be limited only to a dispute between the
state and the association insofar as it concerns the association’s
franchise or corporate existence. It went beyond the authority
delegated to it and unduly expanded the provisions of the
delegating law by adding the phrase “general public or other
entity.”
13. LUPANGCO v CA
Facts. The Professional Regulation Commission issued Resolution
No. 105 as part of its “Additional Instructions to Examinees” to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. This Resolution prohibits the examinees from
attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the
like, three days before the date of examination. Petitioners now
question the constitutionality of the said Resolution.
Issue. Is Resolution No. 105 unconstitutional?
Held. Yes. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. PRC failed to show
the reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are
authorized to be issued. Moreover, it also infringes on the
examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has
no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. Lastly, it violates
the academic freedom of schools concerned. Based on these
reasons, Resolution No. 105 is null and void and of no force and
effect for being unconstitutional.
14. MARCOS v. COMELEC
Facts. Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban,
Leyte, ran for Congress representing the first district of Leyte. Cerilo
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the first district of Leyte,
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification against Marcos
on the ground that the latter was not able to meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. This fact is stated in her
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) which indicates that she has only
lived in Leyte for 7 months. She later claimed it to be an honest
mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact
her domicile since childhood.
Issue. Was Imelda Marcos able to satisfy the Constitutional
requirement of 1 year residency?
Held. Yes. The honest mistake in the CoC regarding the period of
residency does not negate the fact of residence. It is well-settled
that when the Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it
actually means only domicile. It was held that Tacloban was in fact
the domicile of Imelda. An individual does not lose her domicile
even if she has lived and maintained residences in various places.
Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment.
15. AQUINO v. COMELEC
Facts. Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his CoC for the position of
representative for the new second legislative district of Makati City.
It is stated in his CoC that he has only been residing in the said
constituency for 10 months. On the other hand, MOVE Makati and
Mateo Bedon filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
Congressman as provided in Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
The next day, petitioner amended his CoC and indicated that he had
been residing in the constituency for 1 year and 13 days. During the
1995 elections, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes.
However, respondents filed a motion to suspend his proclamation.
Issue. Was Aquino able to comply with Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution?
Held. No. It should be understood that the term residence has
always been synonymous with domicile. It is where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home. In the petitioner’s CoC
for the 1992 elections, it was indicated that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac. Moreover, the act
of leasing a condominium unit indicates that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the 2nd district of Makati.
16. PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS
Facts. Romeo Jalosjos is a full-pledged member of the Congress who
is now confined at the National Penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed
a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman despite having been convicted of a non-bailable
offense in the first instance. He contended the “mandate of
sovereign will” – he was elected by his constituents and therefore
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
Issue. Does membership in the Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general?
Held. No. The Constitution provides that “…nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of laws.” This means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The function and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
17. TRILLANES v. PIMENTEL
Facts. Trillanes won a seat in Senate while being under detention
for staging an alleged coup d’ etat. Before the commencement of
his term, his fellow opposition Senators filed a motion to allow him
to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as a Senator.
Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to
allow him to serve his mandate, after the people elected him as a
Senator. He argues that denying this Omnibus Motion is tantamount
to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper
representation, denying the people’s will, and overruling the
mandate of the people. Moreover, he pleads for the same liberal
treatment accorded to certain detention prisoners like President
Estrada and Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social
functions.”
Issue. Should Trillanes be allowed to discharge his mandate as a
member of the Senate?
Held. No. Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Justification for confinement with its underlying
rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos.
18. JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG
Facts. Plaintiff Nicanor Jimenez, Carlose Albert and Jose Lukban filed
a civil action for recovery of several sums of money by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. The letter described 3
operational plans. Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that the letter is not libelous and it is a privileged
communication.
Issues. (1) Was the publication in question a privileged
communication?
(2) Was it libelous?
Held. (1) No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides
that “…members of the House of Representatives shall… be
privileged from arrest… from any speech or debate therein…” The
phrase “speech or debate therein” refers to utterances made by the
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions. The
publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
(2) No. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs’ action for damages. The statement “are unwitting tools of
the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge” is not
derogatory.
19. OSMENA v. PENDATUN
Facts. In one of his privilege speeches, Congressman Sergio
Osmena, Jr. mentioned that, “…the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at premium prices… even
pardons are for sale…” Due to these allegations, a special
committee created by House Resolution No. 59 was tased to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President. After
giving Osmena a chance to defend himself, the special committee
submitted its report indicating that the Congressman is guilty of
serious disorderly behavior and recommended through House
Resolution No. 175 to suspend him from office for 15 months.
Osmena stated in his petition that the decision be annulled as the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity.
Issue. Does the Congress have the power to suspend one of its
members?
Held. Yes. Although the Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity, it does not protect the legislator from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, mebers of the Congress
could be censured, expelled or committed to prison by votes of
their colleagues.
20. ADAZA v. PACANA
Facts. Homobono Adaza and Fernando Pacana were elected as
Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of the province of
Misamis Oriental. They both filed their CoC during the Batasang
Pambansa (BP) elections. Adaza won, while Pacana lost. Both took
their oath of office, Adaza as a member of the BP and Pacana as the
Governor of Misamis Oriental. Both started to perform their duties.
Adaza then petitioned that he be the Governor and exclude Pacana
therefrom for the following reasons: 1) Petitioner was elected as
Governor for a term of 6 years and remains a Governor until
expiration thereof; and 2) Pacana should be considered to have
abandoned or resigned as Vice-Governor, when he ran for BP.
Issue. (1) May Adaza simultaneously be a member of BP and the
Governor?
(2) May Pacana still be the Vice-Governor , and succeed as
the Governor?
Held. (1) Section 10, Article 8 of the Constitution provides that it
is prohibited to be a member of the BP and the Governor at the
same time: “A Member of the National Assembly (now BP) shall not
hold any other office or employment in the government…”
(2) Pacana can lawfully assume the office of the Governor as
provided by Section 13 of BP 697: “Governors, mayors, members of
the various Sanggunians or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
CoC, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
21. PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN
Facts. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries (IPI) was held and the Puyat Group was proclaimed the
winner, thus having control of the Board and Management of IPI.
On the other hand, the Acero group instituted at the SEC a
proceeding claiming that the stockholders’ votes were not properly
counted. Justice Estanislao Fernandez orally entered his appearance
as counsel for the Acero group. The Puyat group objected, invoking
Section II, Article VIII of the Constitution. Recognizing its validity,
Fernandez purchased shares of stocks and appeared again as
counsel for the Acero group on the ground that it is for the
protection of his shares.
Issue. Whether or not in intervening in the SEC case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,
before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision
Held. There has been an indirect “appearance as counsel before an
administrative body” is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The “intervention” was an afterthought to enable him
to appear actively on the proceedings in some other capacity. This
intervention falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution.
22. MABANAG v. VITO
Facts. Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The 3
senators were suspended by Senate on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives has not been
allowed to sit in the Lower House, except to take part in the election
of the Speaker, for the same reason. They petitioned to prevent the
enforcement of a congressional resolution designated “Resolution
of both Houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto.” Petitioners
did not take part in the passage of the said resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the required ¾
vote for proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these
members of Congress have been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary ¾ vote in either branch of Congress.
Issue. May the Court investigate the journals for the conclusiveness
of enrolled bills?
Held. Yes. The rule is one of convenience, because courts could not
rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these in the journals of the legislature. Otherwise, after
relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, it might be
ascertained from the journals that an act therefore enforced had
never become a law. The court found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced.
23. CASCO v. JIMENEZ

Facts. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It bought foreign exchange for
the importation of urea and formaldehyde – the main raw materials
in the production of the said glue. Pursuant to the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the company paid 25% margin fee but later
requested for a refund since Section 2 of RA No. 2609 exempts the
importation of urea and formaldehyde from the said fee. However,
the auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said
vouchers upon the ground that the exemption is not in accord with
the provisions of RA No. 2609.
Issue. Are urea and formaldehyde exempt by law from the payment
of the aforesaid margin fee?
Held. No. The term urea formaldehyde in the provision is not the
same with urea and formaldehyde. The term used in the enrolled
bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by the Congress. The Court cannot speculate
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers. The
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
24. SAMPAYAN v. DAZA
Facts. The petitioners are residents of the 2nd Congressional District
of Northern Samar. They filed an instant petition for prohibition
seeking to disqualify Raul Daza, the incumbent Congressman of the
same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a green card
holder and a lawful and permanent resident of US. According to
them, this is a violation of Section 68 of BP 881 and Section 18,
Article II of the Constitution since he has not renounced this status.
On the other hand, Daza denied the allegations and stated that he
had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines.
Issue. Did Daza violate Section 68 of BP 881?
Held. The case was dismissed for being moot and academic. Also,
the jurisdiction of this case lies with Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution which states that the House Electoral Tribunal shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members.
25. ABBAS v. SET
Facts. In the 1987 Congressional elections, petitioners filed with SET
an election contest against 22-senators elect of the LABAN coalition.
All members of the legislative component of the SET, at the time,
happened to be included in the senators assailed. Later, petitioners
filed with SET a motion for disqualification an inhibition of all
senator-members thereof for the reasons that they are all
interested parties. The SET denied the motion, hence this petition.
Petitioners contend that SET committed grave abuse of discretion,
and proposed to amend the rules.
Issue. Must SET continue taking cognizance of this case with its
current senator-members?
Held. Yes. However, the amendment proposal would not be
possible since the “legislative component” of the SET cannot be
totally excluded.
26. PIMENTEL v. HRET
Facts. Petitioners assail the composition of the HRET and the CoA.
They pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize,
reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of HRET and the CoA
to include party-list representatives in accordance with Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution. However, it does not appear
that the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or CoA. As a result, the house
contingents to the HRET and the CoA were composed solely of
district representatives belonging to different political parties.
Issue. Does the present composition of the HRET and CoA violates
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation?
Held. No. It appears from the available facts that the party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees. The discretion of
the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CoA is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.
27. SARMIENTO v. MISON
Facts. Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs on the ground that the latter’s appointment was
unconstitutional by reason of it not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CoA), as provided in Article VIII,
Section 16 of the Constitution. Respondents contend that the said
provision merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President.
Issue. Was the appointment of Mison done in an unconstitutional
manner?
Held. No. Section 16, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that,
“The Congress, may by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone…” The use of the word “alone”
after the word “President” is merely a slip in draftsmanship. This
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers which is to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the CoA except those mentioned in the first
sentence. The position of the Commissioner of BOC is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the CoA is required.
28. GUINGONA v. GONZALES
Facts. Petitioners question the election of respondents Senators
Romulo and Tanada to the CoA by the LDP majority. According to
them, it unduly increased the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-
LABAN in the Commission and reduced the membership of the
LAKAS-NUCD and NPC. To solve the impasse, Senator Arturo
Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect “…
if any party is found to have a deficiency in representation, that
party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by this body its
additional representatives.” According to the petitioner, this is
inviolative of the rule of proportional representative as provided for
in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue. Whether or not the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada
as members of the CoA is in accordance with the provision of the
Constitution
Held. No. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator, reducing the
other party’s fractional membership. This is clearly a violation of the
proportional representation of the political parties. Furthermore,
the Constitution does not contemplate that the CoA must
necessarily include 12 Senators and 12 members of the HOR to
function.
29. PHIVIDEC v. VELEZ
Facts. On September 8, 1987, PVAC filed in the RTC a complaint for
foreclosure of mortgage against PHIVIDEC and PHIVIDEC-PIA.
According to the petitioners, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
said case as it is covered by the arbitration powers of the
government corporate counsel under PD No. 242 which prescribes
the procedure for the administrative settlement and adjudication of
disputes, claims and controversies between or among government
offices, agencies, and instrumentalities including government-
owned or controlled corporations. However, according to Judge
Velez, PD No. 242 is unconstitutional since it emasculates and
impairs the judicial power of review under the Constitution.
Issue. Is PD No. 242 unconstitutional?
Held. No. PHIVIDEC and PIA are government-owned and controlled
organizations while PVAC is a government agency, therefore PD No.
242 is applicable in this case. PD No. 242 is not unconstitutional
since it does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only
prescribes an administrative procedure. IT is an alternative to, or a
substitute for, traditional litigation in court.
30. DELES v. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
Facts. Petitioners and three others were appointed as Sectoral
Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2, and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
However, they were not able to take their oaths and discharge their
duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some
congressmen-members of the CoA, who insisted that Sectoral
Representatives must first be confirmed by respondent commission
before they could take their oaths and assume their office as
members of the HOR. Petitioner contended that her appointment
does not need confirmation by the CoA.
Issue. Does the Constitution require the appointment of Sectoral
Representatives to be confirmed by the CoA?
Held. Yes. Since the seats reserved for Sectoral Representatives may
be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Article XVIII, Section 7, it is indubitable that Sectoral
Representatives to the HOR are among the “other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,”
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, whose
appointments are subject to the confirmation of the CoA. Also,
considering that Congress had adjourned without CoA having acted
on petitioner’s appointment, said appointment had become moot
and academic, and “unless resubmitted shall not again be
considered by the Commission.”