ALBARinwcke B Pie pndinonnrone LL eben tP™ Survey of 2015-2016 SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 8 DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO Bar Review Director HUMAN RELATIONS The core of Articles 19, NCC is bad faith. ‘cia well-settled rule that good faith is always presumed. Bad faith is never presumed, for whoever alleges bad faith has the burden of proving it. Once again that has been the basis of the SC in deciding the case ‘Of Elizabeth Diaz v. Encanto, et al, G.2. No, 171303, January 20, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J in this case a professor at the University of the Philippines applied for a sabbatical eave with pay. but tt was denied. This issue was brought to court where there was a finding that the grant or denial of such leave is not a matter of right as itis subject to the exigencies of the service, like acute shortage of teaching staf fiven the Office of the Ombudsman has similar findings with the CA that the grant of leave is not a mafter of rightand that there was no bad faith on the part ofthe officials ofthe UP in denying it. Yet before the SC, the “pplicant insisted that the concerned officials acted in bad faith. Sustalning the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman, the SC Held; There are no traces of bad faith or malice in denying the application for sabbatical leave. They “processed the application in accordance with their usual procedure, White the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical Teave application. It is an eleinentary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. (Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Phelps Dodge Phils, inc. 349 Phil. 769 {1998)) Her complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, ‘Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes ‘primordial limitation on all rights’ by setiing certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof” (Berons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Phelps Dodge Phils. inc; 349 Phil, 769 [1998] Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) whict: is exercised in bad ‘sith; (3) tor the sole Intent of prejudtcing or injuring another. (Dart Philippines, Inc, v.Calogcog, 613 Phil. 224 [2099)) ‘The Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, hel Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civit Cade. Good fatth reters to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned, It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Uad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or same moral abloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty tue to some motives of interest or il will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes il ‘will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad falth or bad motive. FAMILY LAW Presumption of marriage. In Luis Uy v, Sps. Mendoza, G.R. No. 206220, Avgust 19, 2015, Carpio, J, the SC once again had the gcéasion to suy that theres a presumption established in our Rules “that a man and wontan deporting temselves.as husband and wife have entered into a lawiul contract of marriage. (Section 3{aa). Rule 131, Riles of Court). Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage. (Delgado vda. de De la Rosa v. Helrs of Marsiana Rustia vda. de Damian, 516 Phil. 130 {2006]}. However, this presumption may be contiadicted by a party and oversome by other evidence, “Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. in Pugeda v, Trias, 114 Phil. 781 (1962), it was.held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may also be shown. in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, june 2 1991, 198 SCRA 472, it was held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself: Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929, as aniended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the ‘marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wile, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Manicipal Court of Manila or,the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was AABRC2O17,SCD2015-2016 in Civil Law/revised with insertions /consolidzted-revised /EVSA cryssolemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act ‘shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage. Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Ever the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. Divorce obtained abroad between a foreigner and a Filipino; effect. In Medina v. Koike, et al, C.R. No. 215723, july 27, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J, a Filipino citizen got married to a Japanesse but a divorce decree was obtained in Japan before the Mayor of Ichinomlya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan as shown by a Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Koike. There was a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26[2} of the Family Code. ‘At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce” and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate” issued by the Consul for the Amuassador of japan in Manila that was fauthenticated by the Department of the Foreign AVfairs, as well as a Certification issued by, the Clty: Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled “The Civil Code of japan 2000" and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009" wete likewise submitted as proof of the existence of fapan’s law on divorce. Ruling on the petition, the SC : Held: Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce: hence, our courts ¢annat grant it, However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages Involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows @ Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent imiafriage in case the divorce is validly ‘obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision rea Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in-accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38, Where a marriage between a Filipino citizén and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad-by the alten spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall. tikewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law, The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing tial'to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. (Fujikl v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524 (2013]) mt {In Gorpuz v. Sta. Tomas, 642'Phil. 420-{2010); the Court had the occasion to rulé that: ‘The starting point in-any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts donot take judicial fotice of foreign judgments and laws, ‘no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."/This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien hiinself or herself. The recognitfonthay be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action wheré'a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. : oF £2 hits, in Gateia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001), it was pointed out that in order-for a divorce obtained atiréad By the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law »who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of d judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien muste alleged and proven like any other fact. If there is no marriage license, the marriage is void; exception. In Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016, Reyes, J, once again the SC ruled that a marriage without a license is void. In this case, the marriage contract of Severina and Luis revealed that no marriage lcense was indlated therein It also appeared that no marriage license was exhibited to the folemnixing officer. Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only 2 prima facie proof of marriage, but is also 4 prima facie evidence ofthe facts stated therein (Section 44, Rule 130 ofthe 1897 Rules of Court) Marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code. 2 JABRC2017.SCO2015-2016 in Civil Law /revised with insertions/consolldated-revised/EVSA/erysArt.77. In ease two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no fonger be necessary to comply with tive requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered asa purely religious ceremony. ‘The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifving a mariage which was solemnized civilly, In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists, the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to. religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony 1s, concerned, Far this exemption to be applicable, tt is sine qua on that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in natur Being that the ceremony was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a cvil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. tt is evident that the win Fequirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and @ ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marciage is not of an exceptional.character and 2 marriage license is required for Luis and Severina’s marriage to be valid (Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, uly 27, 2016). Marriage of exceptional character. {To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absenice of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.” (Aicantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192 [2007}) Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusign other than that the marriage beween Litis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, vaid ab initio. In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553 (2008), the Court similarly declared that marriage solemanized without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void Un tleu of a marriage license, therein parties to che marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage voit. che Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with, The Court held that to permit a false affidavit'to take the place of a marriage license isto allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained: We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not aftect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal Fequisites were complied with. The-argument deserves scant merit, Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal Fequisite of a-marriage license, Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. Xx Similarly, we’ are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a ‘marriage: under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by-a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for atleast five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former Js swith reference to-af irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furchermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have Qualified thelr marriage as an exception to the cequirement for a marriage license, canmiot be -& mere irregularity for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be _Aleposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn “affidavit is a lie, then itis but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, itis as if there was ao affdavit at al. ‘The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "Phe parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception." (Nifal v, Bayadog) “The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation’ in every ‘marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes (he sanctity of ‘amily lifé and of affording protecuon to the family as a basic ‘autonomous social institution,” Partition agreement is valid. 3 [ABRC2017.5CD2015-2016 in civil Law revised with insertions consolidated-revised /EVSA/crys