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COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS Is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and ‘engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common cartier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detalled annual reports respecting Its fnances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, n the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detalled report of hances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report wihich accompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINASdenied the authority of the board to require the report asked for ‘on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by sald board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, Invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board, Its cumbersome and unnecessarlly frolix and that the preparation of the ‘same would entall an immense amount of clerical work.” Whether or not itis constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utlity Commissioners of the Philippine islands? Whether the power to require the detalled report Is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the ‘execution of the law? ‘The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Ultlty Commissioners with Instructions to dismiss the proceeding, ‘The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utity Commissioners relles for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearin upon notice, by order in writing, to The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utlty Commissioners to require detalled reports from public utlites, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general ines wich It shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all ther matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own ull or the will of the State with respect to the public utlties to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to It, hat it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have In order to deal usty and equitably with such public utiltles and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utlty Commissioners to require what information the board wants. Itwould seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utlty Commissioners all ofits powers over a given subjectmatter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power Isto be directed, guided or applied. ‘The true cistinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily Involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to Its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the lav. The first cannot be done; o the latter no valid objection can be made. ‘The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it sad: The Congress may not delegate Its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the ‘general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the Investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in {a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the uidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, Is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law “down the general rules of action under which the ‘commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in deta what those reports shall contain, Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extentit shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utlity Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act isin violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants Altts special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly ‘and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and com under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to Issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose’. Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the priceof rlce or define any basic for fixing the price, ‘August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then, on ‘August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an ‘excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tled, found gulty and sentenced. ‘The official records show that the Act was to take effect on Its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor General issued his proclamation on the fst of August, 1919; and thatthe law was frst published on the 13th of ‘August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. WON the delegation of legistative power to the Governor Genera was valid By the Organic Law, all Legislative power Is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. ‘The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. ‘These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. ‘The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the ‘government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle In constitutional law, essential to the Integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and Is complete in and of Itself, it may be provided that It shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, oF, In like manner, that ts operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine ‘some factor state of things upon which the law makes, or Intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the GovernorGeneral, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta,” and that he would not ‘commit a crime, because there would be no law fxing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a ‘rime. That Isto say, In the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rie at any price. Hence, it must follow that, If the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making ita crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of itt any price was toa crime. When Act No. 2868 Is analyzed, Its the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime, Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause" for enforcing the act, and what ‘was and what was not “an extraordinary ise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fx the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, itso, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause," or what was "an ‘extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Nelther did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, ifat all, Because the Governor-General Issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of elghty centavos (PO.80) which isa price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53." We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General In his discretion to Issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rce in violation ofthe price of Tice, and to make the sale of rice in violation ofthe proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and vod.

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