UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~'lJS-07420 Doc No.

C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

[RELEASE IN FULLI
DCPARTMENT Of' STATE

DIRECTOR, POUCY PLANNING STAFF

WASHINGTON

April . 30, 1992

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hilburn, Senior Reviewe 1

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Dennis B. RossJ)~

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy in the Second Bush
Administration: Ari Overview

You and the President have much to be proud of in foreign

policy. The end of the Cold War, a united Germany in NATO,
peace in · central America, Desert Storm, and the first
negotiations between Israel and all its Arab neighbors in
forty-three years are singular achievements.
But they amount to an unfinished agenda. Historians will ·
ultimately judge you by how well you use the second term to
translate those first-term successes into a coherent and
enduring legacy. Above all, you will be judged by how well you
have handled the two main consequences of the Cold War: the
transformation of the former so·v iet empire, and the victorious
though fraying alliance of the u.s., Europe, and Japan.
In this overview paper, we offer some general thoughts on a
U.S. strategy for successfully meeting those and other
challenges, .highlighting new possibilities for "collective
engagement" but underscoring throughout the irreplaceable role
of American leadership. In succeeding papers, we will lay out
more detailed thinking on specific second term initiatives.
~rican Purposes
The principal purposes of American foreign policy-in th1s
century have reflected a blend of interests and values:
• ~L~st, we have sought to ensure the physical security of
the United States and the s~fety 0f Americans abroad.
• ..Second, we have pursued ~-o~~ prosperity for Americans,
including access to foreign rnarkets and natural resources,
and secure trade routes.

SECRET
DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case NoSHIQ;.~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~l(;~rp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
I
SECRET
- 2 -

• Third, we have sought a benign international environment,

in which American values and interests are most likely to
flourish. That has meant increasingly active support for
democratic pluralism, h~m~n rights, the rule of law, and
free markets in other parts of the world.
These basic purposes are obviously interconnected.
Physical security is a precondition for material well-being.
Since military conflict between democracies has historically
been rare, we have always had a security interest in expanding
the community of democratic countries. And America's foreign
policy does best with the American public when it clearly
reflects our ethos -- our self-image of who we are, what we
stand for, and the values we seek to promote at home and
abroad.
Cold War Assumptions
What has changed dramatically, of course, is the
international setting in which we seek to achieve our
purposes. In the post-Cold War world, the interconnections
between our security, our prosperity, and the spread of our
values are in many ways closer than any time in our history.
In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, our
security interests are directly served by support for democracy
and economic reform. To frame our thinking about this new
environment, it's worth reviewing three of the key assumptions
of Cold War policy.
1. Strategically, the paramount assumption of American policy
during the Cold War was that. the Soviet Union posed a
potentially fatal military and ideologica~ threat to our
security and way of life. Consequently, our number one
priority was to prevent nuclear war as we and our Allies
contained Soviet military and political expansion until the
Communist system weakened from.within.
That was the essence of "containment." Because
containment took priority over other foreign policy objectives,
it sometimes severely distorted our relations with the Third
World, but eventually it worked -- leaving the u.s. without a
great power threat to its security for the first time in half a
century.
2. Economically, our guiding assumption in th~ aftermath of
World War II w~s that the American economy was fundamentally
strong, but that our continued prosperity depended upon
rebuilding Europe and Japan as bulwarks against Soviet
expansionism, markets for American go•)ds, and pillars of an
open world trade and investment regime.
The network of international arrangements and institutions
that the United States created at the height of its economic
predominance fueled four decades of steadily increasing world
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~R~Erp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 3 -

trade and output. It also facilitated the remarkable,rise of

Japan and the European Community as economic rivals of the
U.S., producing ~n historic ~hift in relative economic power.
I

3. Politically, we tended to . assume that the particular

constellation of nation-states that emerged out of World War II
and postwar decolonization, and the particular elites who ran
them, were by and large enduring realities . with which we wer·e
going to have to deal for the rest of the century.
Today, map makers work overtime to keep up with
revolutionary changes that few of us foresaw even three years
ago. And the sometimes intersecting forces of nationalism and
democracy are confronting us with powerful new opportunities
and dilemmas in the post-Cold War thaw.
New Assumptions
Thus the starting point for a successful strategy in the
second term and beyond is an updated set of assumptions:
• Qng, with no global security rival to counter-balance,
we're left with an increasingly regional security agenda,
composed of two main concerns:
The first is our long-term stake in stabilitv in at
least three key regions -- Europe, East Asia and the
Persian Gulf. The end of the Cold War and the defeat
of Iraq remove the immediate threat of a hostile power
dominating one of those regions. What we face instead
is the challenge of providing reassurance in a period
of uncertainty, marked particularly by geopolitical
upheaval and ethnic rivalry in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, ambiguity about the post-Cold War
military roles of Germany and Japan, and the unclear
path of post-revolutionary Iran.
The second concern is proliferation. At least eight
developing countries could acquire the capability to
put nuclear warheads atop ballistic missiles by the
end of the decade, and that alone makes proliferation
the central security challenge of the 1990s. To
contain the problem, we must develop effectiv~ global
regimes, but perhaps more importantly we must also
adopt regional strategies that address the political
conflicts and insecurities that fuel WMD competition.
• ~. in economic terms, the U.S. ~etains substantial
internal strengths -- a mas~::i.ve d"mestic marl~et, a flexible
work force, high productivity, a11•l traditions of ingenuity
and entrepreneurship -- that· provide a basis for American
competitiveness and international economic leadership into
the next century.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~W'E-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~rp-07420 Doc No . C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 4 -
We also retain a strong stake in an open global
economy, as the increasing role of exports in domestic
employment generatiQ~ makes free trade and investment
even more important ~atjonal objectives then they've
been in the past.
But we are increasingly handicapped by domestic
structural problems, in particular our failure to
apply budget discipline and a corresponding shortage
of domestic savings.
• Three, the system of nation-states that developed during,
the Cold War, and the elites who governed those states, are
caught in a swirl of both centralizing and decentralizing
forces.
The result is not the obsolescence of the
nation-state, which still remains the central actor in
international relations, but rather the transformation
,of the particular system of nation-states that we've
grown accustomed to over the last half-century.
To be sure, there are some respects in which it can be
argued that the ability of nation-states to control
events and command populations is in decline.
Centralizing trends and influences -- like economic
interdependence, European integration, the worldwide
revolution in information technology, and the
multiplication of non-state actors -- are drawing
growing attention, and in some ways eroding the·
sovereign authority of states.
But the more powerful reality today appears to be the
rise of decentralizing. pressures, rearranging the old
system.of nation-states on the basis of new or revived
challenges to the legitimacy of ruling e~ites. From
the disintegrated Soviet empire to the Balkans to much
of Africa and the Middle East, what is happening is
that traditional elites who have either excluded
significant national or ethnic groups from power or
failed to deliver !POlitical ot economic goods are
under attack.
What we are facing, in effect is a proliferation of
political actors and new nation-states that in some
ways reinforces the other proliferation problem, the
spread of WMD. The consequences of this political
proliferation, and the crisis of legitimacy at its
core, are uncertain ones for the u.s.:
•• On the one hand~ there are now enormous
possibilities for nurturing democratic values and
insti-tutions, creating an international
environment that could become more benign than
ever for Americans.

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case. No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~l(;~'lp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 5 -

•• On the other hand, however, the search for

legitimacy and national self-expression will
often be a ~iolent process -- and it may lead to
answers that me~t local tests of legitimacy but
aren't very democratic, like conservative Islamic
regimes or nationalist authoritarian ones.
Five Key Test:?
Against that changing backdrop, five specific and
interlinked policy challenges will loom largest in the second
term, defining both your legacy and 'the prospects for u.s.
interests and values well into the next century. In each case,
there are historic opportunities -- and real dangers if
promising trends turn sour.
1. Securing a Qemocratic Pea~e with Russia. the New
Independent States. and ·Eastern Europe. The fate of political
and economic reform in the former Soviet empire will be the key
test of dramatic but still fragile worldwide trends toward
political pluralism and free markets -- and a critical
ch~~lenge for u.s. security interests given the 30,000 nuclear
we~pons still on former Soviet territory.

• Nothing is of more central importance in this process than

consolidation of nuclear weapons in a democratizing Russia,
as a prelude to even deeper reductions and further
stabilizing steps. An outcome which·leaves several nuclear
powers on the unsettled terrain of the former Soviet Union
will not only pose seriou~ direct security questions for
the u.s., but also send a terrible signal to would-be J
nuclear proliferants. ·
• Russian-Ukrainian relations and the extent to which Yeltsin
can begin to show some economic dividends by t~e winter of
1992-93 will .also be crucial determinants. They may well
be the key to shaping a basic direction and pathway of
democratic reform in both Russia and Ukraine.
. .
• We will have to be skillful and creative in developing the
NACC and CSCE as mechanisms for anchoring the East
Europeans and the NIS in a stable trans-Atlantic security
system. In particular, we have to anticipate and be
innovative in managing the inevitable question of expansion
of NATO membership.
• "Democratic peace" is obviously an optimal outcome. But we
must also prepare for less optimjstic contingencies,
including the fall of Yeltsjn ana the rise of more extreme
Russian nationalists.
2. Sustaining Partnerships with Japan and Europe. While the
future of the former Soviet empire will be what historians will
probably judge you on first, an equally ' important policy
concern will be maintaining our partnerships with the European

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case NoOOJI&~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~rp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 6 -

Community and Japan. No outside factor is likely to be more

critical to the future of reform in the old Soviet bloc, or a
wide range of other challenges, than the extent to which we and
our Cold War allies are able ~o cooperate.
• We have a pivotal role, since we have better and more
natural ~elations with both partners than they have with
each other. But we are all being pulled in separate
post-Cold War directions by economic competition, racial
and cultural tensions, domestic political pressures, and
greater regionalism in European and Japanese security
perspectives.
• Overcoming those centrifugal forces will require greater
attention and creativity than we have shown so far. That
is likely to mean an innovative approach to the problem of
German and Japanese permanent membership in the UNSC;
faster transformation·of the G-7 into a mechanism for not
just economic but political cooperation; adroit handling of
trade relationships; and careful management of the likely
reemergence of Germany and Japan by the end of the 1990s as
major military powers.
· 3. Strengthening an Open International Economi'C Order and
Rebuilding American competitiveness. We will fail in those
first two· historic challenges -- and in the other tests before
us -- unless we maintain and expartd the post-World War II
liberal international economic order, and bolster our own
competitiveness. Foreign policy begins at home. It's as
simple -- and complicated -- as that.
Through NAFTA, EAI,and other initiatives, the
President has already pursued one of the most
ambitious trade-opening agendas of any Administration
in this century. We are successfully competing in
Latin America and the EC (where we are running
substantial non-oil trade surpluses), but we continue
to face tough competition from the Pacific Rim. It's
a truism to say that we must successfully conclude the
Uruguay Round and bolster GATT. One other major
second term goal should be a completely free-trading
Hemisphere.
With the debt issue largely neutralized, increased
trade and investment are being viewed by most Second
and Third World countries as their principal avenues
to economic growth. We must work closely with the EC
and Japan to guard against excessive protectionism,
and encourage reformer~ in China, India, Africa and
Latin America -- all of whom acquired more legitimacy
in the 1980s. We ought to continue to spotlight the
role models that emerged over the last decade,
particularly the NIEs, Mexico, and Chile.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~l(;~lp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
•·
SECRET
- 7 -

We wlll also have to devote substantial energies.

and resources -- to help ensure that the economic
transformations underway in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union ~on't unravel.
The failure of reform, whether in the former Soviet
empire or elsewhere, could trigger mass · population
movements, struggles over resources, and internal
political upheavals -- all powerful sources of
inter-state conflict in a'more complicated post-Cold
War world.
To respond effectively to those challenges, we must
take firm steps to get the deficit under control and
increase domestic savings -- steps that go.beyond the
bounds of foreign policy making but have a powerful
effect on it. And for the sake of our competit~ve .
position ·in world markets over the medium term, we
must begin to address long-neglected shortfalls in
education quality, ' infrastructure, energy dependency,
and government support for American business abroad.
(We· won't be able to compete successfully with the'
Japanese and Germans otherwise, in a game in which
they're now setting the rules.)
4. Containing Proliferation and Regional Insecurity. A more
regional focus to U.S. security policy is a natural consequence
of the collapse of the Soviet threat, and a natural approach to
the deepening dilemma of proliferation -- which in turn has its
roots in regional rivalry· and instability. That will require ·
an integrated and creative set of approaches:
• On proliferation, that means a fundamental reevaluation of
the ~radeoffs that are involved. For example, what is the
proper balance between the value of u.~. nuclear testing
and the non-proliferation merits of a Comprehensive Test
Ban? Between the security of our'own programs and
facilities and the advantages of tough inspection regimes
overseas? Between a national missile defense program and
international cooperation in this area? Between the
narrower imperatives of bilateral relationships with key
proliferants like China and the broader demands of a strong
non-proliferation policy? ·
It means a renewed emphasis on preventive diplomacy to
contain regional nuclear competition, for example
between India and Pakistan. That could also require
new bil«teral and collective security assurances as
compensating steps, an appro~ch that may be
particularly important in de~ling with Kazakh or
Ukrainian nuclear pretensions.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~l(;~tp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 8 -
'
It also means greater international intrusiveness,
whether as part of strengthened global regimes (CWC,
NPT); ad hoc G-7 cooperation (linking assistance and
concessional lending~to behavior on proliferation --
Iran is an early test); or, in the most extreme case,
preemptive military action (the North Korean nuclear
program may still confront us with this question,
highlightirig the need for an "anti" as well as a "non"
proliferation policy).
• On regional security, w~ will be able to put relatively
less emphasis on forward-deployed forces, and greater focus
on crisis response and force reconstitution. Some of the
resultant cost savings should be devoted to UN and other
international peacekeeping forces, as an increasingly
useful complement to our own military resources.
Here too, preventive diplomacy to forestall regional
conflicts and achieve political resolutions will
remain a crucial tool. The success of Arab-Israeli
negotiations -- particularly completing an interim
agreement between Israelis and Palestinians in 1993
would be an important part of your own legacy,
building on the breakthrough at Madrid.
In the Persian Gulf, we should complement our
bilateral security ties with encouragement of
multilateral security dialogue, and perhaps e¥entually
even modest CSBM arrangements. Our aim throughout
would be to draw Iran and post-Saddam Iraq into a more
stable balance at the lowest possible level of
armaments.
In the different ci~cumstances of Asia and the
Pacific, we should also aim for a blend of core
bilateral lfnks and regional security dialogue. We
will want to temper the dangers of revived competition
between Japan and China -- and create a stable
environment for managing issues still remaining from
the Cold War (especially the Northern Territories and
Korean reunification).
5. Consolidating Democratic Institutions and Political
Pluralism. No foreign policy challenge in the second term is
potentially more promising or more frustrating than that of
helping fledgling democracies find solid footing.
• As recent experiences in Algeria, Venezuela and Peru
illustrate, we will face some extremely difficult choices
in supporting the strengthe1•ing oE democracy. In many of
these countries, oligarchical control, violent ethnic and
tribal rivalries, extremist opposition groups, corruption,
huge gaps between rich and poor, authoritarian traditions,
and the uncertain future and uneven social consequences of
market reform all lurk behind what is often still little
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No.sru&~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~f{;f?&1-p-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 9 -

more than a facade of democratic institutions. Democratic

development is not easy or automatic, any more than
e6onomic development is . . I

• None of those problems alters the importance of our stake

in consolidating democracy. What they argue for is a
careful balance between our rhetoric and reality; concerted
action with more stable democracies, particularly in the
G-7, to support democratic institutions; and cooperation
with non-state actors like the IFis and NED/NRI/NDI.
Developing effective regimes for protection of
mi nority righ t s will be especially important, since
minority grievances are becoming one of the most
troubling sources of conflict in a world fixated on
nationalism and ethnicity.
• We will have to learn to accept some risks and instability
in supporting the democratic process, since that process
will by its very nature open up opportunities for
potentially anti-democratic groups long excluded from the
political system.
Enduring legitimacy and stability may ultimately find
their deepest roots in democratic pluralism, but in
the short term (at least) Islamic conservatives or
nationalist authoritarians may acquire strong popular
legitimacy.
And ·in a second Bush Administration, unconstrained by
the Cold War and less inhibited about pushing
democratic and human rights goals, we are still likely
to face some difficult dilemmas in balancing our
long-run faith in democratic processes against short
term uncertainties.
Toward an American Strategy of Collective Engagement
Success in each of the five critical tests outlined above
will require a strategy composed of several basic elements:
active American leadership abroad; coalition-building and
collective action wherever possible in pursuit of our core
purposes; a radical restructuring of the way the U.S.
government organized itself to wage the Cold War; and, not
least, economic revival at home.
We've already emphasized the central importance of getting
our economic house in order. But let me offer a few general
thoughts on the other .three com!'Onent:-:; of q successful strategy
-- as a prelude to the more det~iled ~apers that follow.
Fi rst. American leade r ship . At a time o.f transition and
uncertain~y, the U.S. has a unique leadership role to play --

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~l(;~1-p-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

as a provider of reassurance on security; as a promoter of

economic openness; and as an exemplar of democratic values.
• No one else is equipped to play that role now. If we
abdicate it, the result could be a rise in regional
insecurity and economic turmoil that will eventually
threaten core American purposes.
• There is potentially solid domestic support for U.S.
engagement. The current domestic debate has tended to
focus less on whether American engagement makes sense than
on what kind of internationalism is most appropriate.
Second. coalition-building and collective action. In the
post-Cold War world, there are an increasing number of areas in
which American leadership can catalyze collective action in
pursuit of our national purposes. And, perhaps even more
importantly, there are increasing domestic demands to share
burdens and responsibilities abroad while we cope with resource
constraints at home.
• The success of Western interests and values has widened the
base for potential international coalitions, and opened up ·
new possibilities for multilateral institutions. At the
same time, new transnational threats -- environmental
hazards, disease, narcotics -- require collective rather
than·purely national responses.
• . Mean~hile,domestic budget stringencies and a diminished
sense of external threat add up to much greater popular and
Congressional pressures for visible burden-sharing with our
friends and partners.
"Collective engagement" -is a useful way of describing the
kind of operating style toward which we should aim in the
second.term. It marries the crucial importance of continued
American leadership to the new necessities and possibilities of
coalition diplomacy. And it sends effective signals to
domestic audiences attentive to the need for burden-sharing, as
well as foreign audiences sensitive to American unilateralism.
We need to be careful, however, in how we advertise this
concept. We tend to forget, in the heady aftermath of victory
in the Cold War, that "containment" was a veri ineffective and
sometimes dangerously misleading guide to many policy
challenges outside the main East-West arena. We can't assume
-- or lead the Congress or public to believe -- that every
challenge we face is going to lend itself to a "collective"
response. We can consistently ~im fot that sort of approach,
but we can't always guarantee il .. There could be circumstances
_in which we would decide to take essentially unilateral
· military action (for example, to protect innocent Cuban
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case NoSID&~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~tp-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 11 -

civilians in the event of a violent break-up of the Castro

regime), or essentially unilateral diplomatic action (for
example, to defend Israel against unbalanced measures in the
UNSC). '
We should strive instead for a broad flexible concept of
"coilective engagement":
• What we need in this period of international transition,
faced with a bewildering range of challenges and
opportunities, is a r ange o f ap p r o a ches -- some still
basically unilateral, an increasing number that are more
collective, and a few that may be truly multilateralist, in
which we put our concerns in the hands of the U.N. or some
other institution.
• Which keys on this keyboard we press in particular
circumstances will depend on a number of factors: the
importance of the interests and values that a~e involved;
the capacity and will of others to contribute; our own
resources and will; and the effectiveness of relevant
mu 1 ti latera 1' institutions.
Thi r d. restructuring U.S. fo r eign policv mechanisms. ·we
simply cannot lead effectively, act collectively, or meet the
five key challenges we f~ce in the second term unless we make
some drastic changes in the way in which the u.s. government
organized itself to wage the Cold War. As a starting point,
that means employing an i nt eg rati ve approach, in which
political, economic, and security efforts reinforce one
another. We must employ the broadest possible definition of
national security, in which support for economic reform and
democratic· institution building is seen as important to our
long-term security as military arrahgements.
You will have to make radical restructuring of our policy
mechanisms a high priority in the second term -- and it should
be a central part of your legacy. A few illustrations:
• Budget: Using a broader definition of national security,
we have to find a way to pool budget resources from the 150
and 050 accounts, viewing support for UN peacekeeping as a
contribution to national security sometimes as important as
forward-deployed U.S. forces.
• £ro life r at i on: To better combat proliferation, · we need to
streamline a structure which currently spreads
responsibility and expertise among ACDA, DOD and several
duplicative staffs within Slate .
• Bu siness Pr omoti on : We neetl to overhaul the way in which
we promote · business abroad, revamping export and import
controls, rationalizing the division of labor and
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No . C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~I(;RIE'lfo-07420 Doc No . C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017

SECRET
- 12 -
responsibility among Washington agencies and within
missions abroad, and building a much more effective
public-private sector par~nership.
• Assistance: To better harness foreign assistance to the
goals of collective engagement, we need to drastically .
consolidate the functions and objectives of AID and put
what's left directly under State's chain of command.
• Intelligence: Collection priorities will need to be
adapted to the five key challenges noted above, with
relatively greater emphasis on political-economic questions.
J

• Diplomacy: Coliective engagement will put renewed emphasis

on innovative diplomacy. It will require the restructuring
of Foreign Service recruitment, training and incentives,
with much greater focus on economic and commercial skills;
integrated analytical reporting on political-economic ,
trends rather than competition for spot reporting with CNN;
and an increasing focus on diplomatic coordination with ·
other governments, multilateral institutions, ~nd
non-governmental players.
Attached is a listing of further papers that we plan to
produce, fleshing out the strategy outlined· in this overview.

Attachment:
As stated.

Drafted: S/P:WBurns

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No~~-07420 Doc No. C06299195 Date: 04/10/2017