PALE Case Digests 4

Canon 10

Allied Banking Corp v. CA

Citation in the pleadings of the syllabus in SCRA is improper

FACTS: Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11
January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was
covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which provides as one of the conditions of employment the
provision on petitioner’s right to transfer employees:

"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or
assign you to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of
maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public."

Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as
second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been
stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred to
Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish
that would result if he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
constructive dismissal.

Petitioner then replied that his reason is not meritorious considering other employees have accepted being
transferred from one place to another, though having the same predicament. Furthermore, petitioner warned
Galanida that his refusal would warrant either suspension or termination from his work.

On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication7 ("Memo") dated 8 September 1994
from Allied Bank’s Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that
Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal were:
(1) Galanida’s continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch

LA ruling: After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management
prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that
Galanida’s refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Court’s
decision in Dosch v. NLRC;

Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason
for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family."

NLRC and CA affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter

Allied Bank contends that Galanida’s continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful
disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.

On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for Galanida
filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquoted the Court’s ruling in Dosch v.
NLRC
ISSUE: Whether the pleadings of Galanida contained the misquoted decision

RULING: YES, his counsel and the LA should be disciplined due to the use of the misquoted
decision

The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited
reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family" does not appear anywhere in the Dosch
decision. Galanida’s counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of
Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").

The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the
work of the Court, nor does it state this Court’s decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who
gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in
reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court’s decision.20 A counsel should not cite a syllabus in
place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.

In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted
a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored. In short,
they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We
admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties
and the courts taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately.

Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more
careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.

Adez Realty v. CA

Reinstatement to from the practice of law

FACTS: On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby
altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in
order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge
of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted
words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed
before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the
petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering
that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial
judge.2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a
reversal of the questioned resolution.

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62
years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor
promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He
appended to his motion certifications of good moral character

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that
he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for
the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had
admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and
ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this
Honorable Court with a contrite heart."

Subsequent letters and request was filed by Atty. Dacanay all stating that he has reformed, that the practice of
law is the only profession to help him and his family meet ends meet.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Dacanay should be reinstated

RULING: YES, his disbarment is lifted

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove
once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession.
His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more
to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court
lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that —

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is
not only a right, but a bounden duty as well. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members .

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. CA and Sps. Sevilla and Seelin

Illustrative case for dilatory tactic

FACTS: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla
Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for
quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the
name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, ruling in favour of the spouses hence the title of Central Dyeing was declared null and void.

The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June
25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal
became final on March 5, 1992.

The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was
granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely
unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner
of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.

On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on August 18,
1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of
defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court.

On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076,
was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of
Judgment dated October 21, 1993.

Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the
trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9 on
August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents,
the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded
Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.

Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari but
dismissed it on the ground that the case has long been final and executor. Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed
the case, hence the instant petition

ISSUE: Whether petitioner herein can revoke the ruling long been decided and has been final

RULING: NO, it cannot overturn the case decided and affirmed by the court decades ago

It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy
litigated come to an end.

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is
so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already
annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot
validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present
petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.

the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already
been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriffs Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995, with the
attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject
property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to
the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment
on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot
shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the
property. This is a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes. 20 In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., 21 we ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients
by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

Canon 11

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio

Illustrative case of a prosecutor/lawyer disrespecting judicial authority

FACTS: Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao
City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of
the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime
of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix
the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of
the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an
impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by
counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In
an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail
Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was
denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from
the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding
the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The
article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out," which
ridiculed the judge as arrogant

On the first contemptuous act (Guilty): On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted
that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a
press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he
printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in
the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for
an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he
made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer,
the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio
Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the
proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144, where he ridiculed the judge again as having no knowledge of law

On the second contemptuous act (guilty): On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated
January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who
asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the
concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing,
at the latter's instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional
right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and
its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in
radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of
office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was
given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of suspension
dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern
warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Rogelio should be disciplined

RULING: YES, he should be disciplined hence suspended for 1yr.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17 Membership in
the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he]
should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit
grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference
where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case
No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance
in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which
appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his
grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is
his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he
has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Montecillo v. Gica

Contemptous act of a lawyer

FACTS: Francisco M. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation and a civil case for damages against
Jorge Montecillo after the latter called the former "stupid" or a "fool." The civil case for damages eventually
reached the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals wherein it ruled in favor of Gica and awarded him damages.

Atty. Quirico Del Mar, as Montecillo’s counsel, moved for a reconsideration of said decision with a veiled
threat by mentioning the provisions of the RPC on "Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment" and "Judgment
Rendered through Negligence", and the innuendo that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. When the
motion was denied, the CA remarked that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the CA rendered an
unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del
Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Despite this, Atty. del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, made
another threat by stating that his next appeal would be addressed to the President of the Philippines.

Because of such behaviour, the CA, through a resolution ordered Atty. del Mar to explain why he should not
be punished for contempt of court. Atty. del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the CA
could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing them of the course of action he
would follow. He also informed the CA that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing
them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter. Not
content, Atty. del Mar sent another letter to the CA wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted
against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked.
The CA, through a resolution, concluded that Atty. del Mar is guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a
fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law. In response to the CA’s decision, Atty. del
Mar filed a civil case for damages against the 3 Justices of the CA’s 4th Division, trying to hold them liable for
their decision in the earlier civil case. Said case for damages was eventually terminated by compromise
agreement after Atty. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint, apologized to the CA and the
Justices concerned, and agreed to pay damages in favor of the Justices.

Not giving up on his case, Atty. del Mar, filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court praying
to reverse the CA’s decision on the civil case of Gica against Montecillo. The SC denied the petition and in
response, Atty. del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter to the SC’s Clerk of Court
requesting the names of the Justices of the SC who supported the resolution denying his petition, together
with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. Such motion was denied and Atty. del
Mar, aggrieved, made a manifestation before the SC, stating that had the Clerk of Court given him the list he
asked for, he would have filed the same suits against the SC Justices like he did with the CA Justices.

As a reaction, the SC ordered Atty. del Mar to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation. In response, Atty. del Mar gave a defiant
justification of his contemptuous statements and attached the criminal and civil case he filed against the CA
Justices as a veiled threat. In the mind of Atty. del Mar, there is rampant corruption and injustice in the
government, and those that denied his motion are among the corrupt.

Finally, when the SC was executing the suspension order of Atty. del Mar from the earlier CA resolution,
Atty. del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration. Atty. del Mar was given the chance to explain and stated that
he was suffered repeated strokes and high blood pressure which rendered him physically and mentally
unstable. He apologized for the mistakes he might have committed but persisted in his view that he was
justified in filing cases against the Justices of the CA and SC. In the end he stated that due to sickness and old
age, he decided to retire from the practice of law and asked the permission of the SC to release him from the
obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to
punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, the SC denied said prayer of Atty. del Mar
without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. del Mar should be held in contempt of court and be suspended from the
practice of law

RULING: YES, he should be held in contempt hence suspended

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is
his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he
has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect.
Atty. del Mar’s actions in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in
the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure insolence for
said tribunals.

It is manifest that Atty. del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming
that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and
malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

In Re: Almacen

Criticism of a lawyer to the court

FACTS: It all started because of the civil case Yaptinchay v. Calero in which Atty. Almacen was the counsel
for Calero where the trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. Atty. Almacen
received a copy of the decision and 20 days later, he moved for reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify on the time and place of hearing. Said motion was denied for
“lack of proof of service”.

To prove that he did serve the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed a 2nd motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card but the motion
was however withdrawn by the trial Court. Trial Court elevated the case to CA.

CA however on the authority of the SC's decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction
& Co. dismissed the appeal:

“Court resolved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the motion for reconsideration does not
contain notice of time and place of hearing thereof, and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper which
did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out
of time”.

Atty. Almacen moved again to reconsider the resolution urging that the Manila Surety nd Fidelity Co. Inc. v.
Batu Construction & Co. is not decisive. At the same time, he filed a pleading entitled “Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in support for Motion for Reconsideration” citing Republic of PH v. Gregorio Venturanza.
Again, CA denied his motion.

Atty. Almaen then appealed to Court by certiorari and was again denied through a minute resolution but
shortly thereafter, he again filed a motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a 2nd
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time but was ordered expunged from the records. It was at
this juncture Atty. Almacen vented his disappointment by filing his “Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title” pleading filled from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks against the Court as well as for its individual members that is seen as unprofessional.

Nonetheless, Court decided by resolution to withhold action for his petition until he has actually surrendered
his certificate. Court waited for him but no word came from him.

He was reminded to turn over his certificate so that the Court can act on his petition however he manifested
“he has no pending petition in connection with Calero v. Yaptinchay for case is now final and executory” and
that the Court's resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act, and that since his offer
was not accepted, he “chose to pursue the negative act”.

In exercise of the Court's inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar for gross misconduct, the Court
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.

Atty. Almacen denying the charges against him asked for permission “to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him... in open and public hearing”. Court then resolved to require
Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request. He then reasoned that since the Court is the
“complainant, prosecutor and Judge” he preferred to be heard and answer questions in an open and public
hearing so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor.

He also asked to file a written explanation “in the event the Court has no time to hear him in person”. Court
allowed him and he was also heard in oral argument.

In Atty. Almacen's written answer, he offered no apology. He repeated his lamentations embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Almacen should be disciplined

RULING: YES, he should be disciplined hence suspended from the practice of law

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have
known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of period of appeal, movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon adverse party but to also notify of the time and place of hearing which
admittedly did not. This rule was articulated in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction & Co

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate Court to review lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of remedy of appeal, which is not a matter of right. To shift
away himself from his carelessness he looked for a “whipping boy” and took the liberty of vilifying Court and
inflicted exacerbating rancor on members thereof. It thus appears there is no justification for his scurrilous
and scandalous outbursts.

On Almacen's attack on the high Court, they acknowledged that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each tim he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are
given wide latitude to differ with, and voice disapproval of, not only on Court's rulings but also in manner
which they are handed down. However, as a citizen and officer of the Court, every lawyer is expected not to
only exercise his right, but also to consider his duty to expose shortcomings and indiscretions of Courts and
judges. It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of Courts and judges on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to
respect to Courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment.
He vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity.. to the Court” and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him “to observe and maintain respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers”. The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him to “maintain toward the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of temporary
incumbent of judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance”.
The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within Court's authority
to do. By constitutional mandate, ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for
admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
the Bar.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation
of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to
go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by
perspective and infused by philosophy.

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view
that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by
neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

Canon 12

People v. Jarden

Undue delay caused by the accused

FACTS: The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six
counts.

From 1967 the case was only decided on 1970 due to several postponements filed by the accused, either he
was denied presenting evidence during the investigation, filing an extension of time in presenting evidence in
the investigation and answer
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the
prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained silent
during the proceedings.

Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage of the
prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases. The
respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional rights of the accused
Demetrio Jardin. "

ISSUE: Whether RTC was correct in dismissing the case

RULING: NO, RTC erred in their decision

The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the
dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means that the
accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever
legitimate defense he may interpose.

[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were caused by
the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and for his behalf.
Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our Constitution cannot be
invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the trial on the merits, the accused
always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements and requests for reinvestigation. [It would,
therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be allowed to benefit from his
own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own
deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial\

If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been impaired, the
doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the accused had expressly
moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the defendant had deliberately used
all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the principle that the accused must be given every
opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this
purpose.

Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the attorneys for
both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of the breach of duties
to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.

The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: (g) Not to encourage either the
commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt
motive or interest.

The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.

 Canon 13

Paas v. Almarvez

Using the judge’s office as mailing address for court notices

FACTS: The case stemmed due to filing of administrative complaint by Judge Paas against Utility worker
Almarvez and Almarvez against Judge Paas.

udge Paas' husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife's office as his office address in his law
practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from
Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie
Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas' address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice,
Pasay City,10 the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12 of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas
submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit13 wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter
was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas
actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty.
Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's
Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as
Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor
tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate
sworn statements of Atty. Paas' law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15
attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay
City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel16 attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the court are neither routine nor
daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his profession.

On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit17 wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas
did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198,
"People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R.
Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of
those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.

OCA ruled: By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,31 she was aware
that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a
Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a
subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be
given special treatment by other judges or court personnel."

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas indeed
"allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct"34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less
serious charge under the Rules of Court35 and is punishable under the same Rule.36

A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not
only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is
premised on the truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence and that upon a Judge's attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Paas should be disciplined

RULING: YES, he should be disciplined hence suspended for 3 months

CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking on his relationship with a member of
the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be
overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a
lawyer's prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper
conduct.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of court
orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office
of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there is
no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the
necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not violate
his lawyer's oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the
judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.